eprintid: 34696
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/46/96
datestamp: 2024-04-12 07:19:59
lastmod: 2024-04-16 13:17:07
status_changed: 2024-04-12 07:19:59
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Cui, Chi
creators_name: Dai, Ming
creators_name: Schwieren, Christiane
title: Following Social Norms, Signaling, and Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: public goods game, cooperation, signaling, internalization of social norms
abstract: In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people’s cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect on cooperation in rule-following and rule-breaking groups: It increases cooperation in rule-following groups but decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions among participants in rule-breaking groups rather than rule-following groups. Overall, this paper provides a feasible way to improve social cooperation and enriches the literature on cooperation in the public goods game.
date: 2024
publisher: Universität
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00034696
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0746
ppn_swb: 1885965257
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-346968
language: eng
bibsort: CUICHIFOLLOWINGS20240403
full_text_status: public
series: AWI Discussion Paper Series
volume: 0746
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 36
citation:   Cui, Chi ; Dai, Ming ; Schwieren, Christiane  (2024) Following Social Norms, Signaling, and Cooperation in the Public Goods Game.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/34696/3/Cui_Dai_Schwieren_dp746_2024.pdf