eprintid: 34994
rev_number: 19
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/49/94
datestamp: 2024-06-25 11:55:35
lastmod: 2024-06-25 11:55:49
status_changed: 2024-06-25 11:55:35
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Miettinen, Topi
creators_name: Vanberg, Christoph
title: Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: bargaining, commitment, conflict, delay, international negotiations, climate negotiations, legislative, multilateral, voting, majority, unanimity
abstract: We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.
date: 2024
publisher: Universität
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00034994
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0749
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-349948
language: eng
bibsort: MIETTINENTCOMMITMENT20240605
full_text_status: public
series: AWI Discussion Paper Series
volume: 0749
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 21
citation:   Miettinen, Topi ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2024) Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/34994/7/Miettinen_Vanberg_dp749_2024.pdf