eprintid: 35591
rev_number: 18
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/55/91
datestamp: 2025-01-16 15:25:11
lastmod: 2025-01-20 13:38:56
status_changed: 2025-01-16 15:25:11
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Piazolo, David
title: The "German Vote" and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: bargaining, majority, unanimity, unreliability, private information
abstract: This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying reliability of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. Three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s reliability. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the fear of being excluded from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. The presence of unreliable parties can under majority rule lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model.
date: 2024
publisher: Universität
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00035591
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0756
ppn_swb: 1915056985
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-355914
language: eng
bibsort: PIAZOLODAVTHEGERMANV20241031
full_text_status: public
series: AWI Discussion Paper Series
volume: 0756
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 37
citation:   Piazolo, David  (2024) The "German Vote" and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/35591/7/Piazolo_dp756_2024.pdf