title: Incentive Contracts for Politicians
creator: Liessem, Verena
subject: 330
subject: 330 Economics
description: The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable.  Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.
date: 2003
type: Dissertation
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/3837/1/diss.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00003837
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-38379
identifier:   Liessem, Verena  (2003) Incentive Contracts for Politicians.  [Dissertation]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/3837/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng