TY  - GEN
N2  - The 1980s and 1990s have been marked with a series of financial and banking crises all over the world. This turned the attention of economists to such questions as how a financial system should be structured in order to reduce the vulnerability of an economy to the risk of a crisis, or what policy should regulators follow in order to prevent the crises, and what regulatory measures would help in reduction of harmful effects of the crises?  This dissertation studies relative advantages of a bank-based financial system against a market-based one. Instead of considering the role of financial intermediaries and financial markets in promoting economic growth, the work focuses on their ability to handle a crisis situation and to provide the optimal allocation of resources. The design of the bailout policy plays an important role in this issue, therefore the analysis begins with a microeconomic discussion of insolvency resolutions and then proceeds to a macroeconomic discussion of an optimal crisis management. The analysis here addresses such issues as constructive ambiguity and forbearance in the bailout policy of banking regulators. In particular, it is shown that ambiguity may be harmful for the economy, since asymmetric beliefs of the public may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources. On the contrary, forbearance may have a positive effect, since it makes intermediaries internalizing the costs of insolvency. In a dynamic context, banking system is more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, since it transfers and magnifies the impact of the shock into future periods through borrowing from future generations, which in financial markets is impossible. However, a properly regulated banking system exhibits the property of intertemporal shock smoothing, whereas financial markets concentrate the burden of the shock in one period. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of several banking crises, including the Russian crisis in 1998, the Japanese crisis of 1990-s, and the Swedish crisis of the beginning of 1990-s.
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/6952/
A1  - Vinogradov, Dmitri V.
ID  - heidok6952
KW  - Finanzkrise 
KW  -  Bankeninsolvenz 
KW  -  SchockBanks 
KW  -  financial markets 
KW  -  financial crises 
KW  -  overlapping generations
TI  - Financial Markets, Financial Intermediation, and Bailout Policy
Y1  - 2006///
AV  - public
ER  -