title: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?
creator: Oechssler, Jörg
creator: Roider, Andreas
creator: Schmitz, Patrick W.
subject: ddc-330
subject: 330 Economics
description: Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.
date: 2008
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/9464/1/Oechssler_Roider_Schmitz08_dp463.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00009464
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-94641
identifier:   Oechssler, Jörg ; Roider, Andreas ; Schmitz, Patrick W.  (2008) Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/9464/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng