TY  - GEN
AV  - public
KW  - Non expected utility preferences 
KW  -  ambiguity 
KW  -  updating 
KW  -  dynamic consistency 
KW  -  consequentialism
A1  - Dominiak, Adam
A1  - Dürsch, Peter
A1  - Lefort, Jean-Philippe
N2  - Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and find that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/9828/
ID  - heidok9828
TI  - A Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment
Y1  - 2009///
ER  -