eprintid: 9828
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/00/98/28
datestamp: 2009-09-21 10:40:19
lastmod: 2015-04-24 18:01:23
status_changed: 2012-08-14 15:30:45
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Dominiak, Adam
creators_name: Dürsch, Peter
creators_name: Lefort, Jean-Philippe
title: A Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment
ispublished: pub
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Non expected utility preferences , ambiguity , updating , dynamic consistency , consequentialism
abstract: Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and find that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.
abstract_translated_lang: eng
class_scheme: jel
class_labels: D81, C91
date: 2009
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00009828
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0487
ppn_swb: 608488283
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-98286
language: eng
bibsort: DOMINIAKADADYNAMICEL2009
full_text_status: public
citation:   Dominiak, Adam ; Dürsch, Peter ; Lefort, Jean-Philippe  (2009) A Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/9828/1/dp487.pdf