Goeschl, Timo ; Perino, Grischa
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Abstract
The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.
| Document type: | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
| Volume: | 0591 |
| Place of Publication: | Heidelberg |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Apr 2015 07:40 |
| Date: | April 2015 |
| Number of Pages: | 25 |
| Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
| DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | International climate policy; diffusion of innovations; intellectual property rights; hold-up problem. |
| Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
