

**HOW ISLAMIC PARTIES ORGANIZE
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA**

**An Empirical Study of Six Major Islamic Parties
In The Tasikmalaya District, West Java Province**

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Abstract

Many studies have explored the phenomena of Islamic parties in Indonesia, the largest predominantly Muslim country in the world. However, little effort has been made to explore the organizational structures of Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. The existing studies have also paid little attention to the role of Islamic parties at the regional level in the implementation of the decentralized system in terms of the relationship between the central and regional governments.

This study is an attempt to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the way the Islamic parties at the regional level in post-Suharto Indonesia organize. In doing so, the organization of the Islamic parties is examined in three different dimensions, i.e., the party organization on the ground (political linkage between the Islamic parties and their members or supporters), the party organization in central office (leadership of the Islamic parties), and the party organization in public office (the role of the Islamic parties in policy-making).

As the units of analysis, this study selects six major Islamic parties, i.e., the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN), National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB), Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR), United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP), Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) and Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB). Despite the fact that these parties experienced a significant decrease at the national level, most of them succeeded in maintaining or increasing their level of political support at the regional level.

Meanwhile, this study focuses on the Tasikmalaya district as the locus of study because it has become one of the regional bases for these parties to maintain or increase their political achievement. The district also has a long historical root in the Islamic state movement in Indonesia. As a result, Muslims in the district have a strong Islamic sentiment.

This study proposes two major findings. Firstly, the way the Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties in Tasikmalaya district suggests that these parties contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party, and cartel party models. In other words, the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia have hybrid features. Therefore, the organizational features of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia are not completely exceptional or unique compared to the organizational features of party politics in other developing countries. Moreover, the organizational development of the contemporary Islamic parties in Indonesia takes different trajectories. In the case of the PAN and PPP, these parties are in a transitional stage from the mass-based party model to the electoralist party model. The organizational development of the PKS suggests that this party is experiencing a maturation process of the mass-based party model, while the organizational development of the PKB, PBR and PBB shows that these parties are experiencing a stagnation process in the stage of the elite-based party.

Secondly, the case of the Tasikmalaya district also indicates that the Islamic political actors in Indonesia rely on rational calculations rather than ideological considerations when they manage their Islamic parties. In this sense, the PBB, PKS, PPP and PBR as the Indonesian Islamist parties have experienced a moderation process. The way these parties organize has not led to the Islamisation of the state, but it has led to the long term Islamisation of society.

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| <i>abangan</i> | nominal Muslim or syncretist |
| AD | Anggaran Dasar (party's statute) |
| <i>Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah</i> | Islamic tenets based on the Quran, Sunna of the Prophet and consensus |
| <i>ajengan</i> | Islamic teachers among the Sundanese |
| <i>akhlak</i> | ethics |
| <i>akhlakul karimah</i> | good attitude |
| <i>akidah</i> | belief |
| AKP | <i>Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi</i> (Justice and Development Party in Turkey) |
| <i>aliran</i> | lit. "stream"; social cleavage in Indonesia |
| <i>amanah</i> | lit. "trust"; fraction in the Tasikmalaya Legislature |
| <i>Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar</i> | To do good things and to forbid bad things |
| AMK | <i>Angkatan Muda Ka'bah</i> (Youth of Ka'bah) |
| APBD | <i>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah</i> (local budget) |
| ART | <i>Anggaran Rumah Tangga</i> (party rule) |
| <i>aqli</i> | rational |
| Bawaslu | <i>Badan Pengawas Pemilu</i> (election supervisory board) |
| BM PAN | <i>Barisan Muda Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (Youth Organization of National Mandate Party) |
| <i>bupati</i> | district head |
| <i>dapil</i> | <i>daerah pemilihan</i> (Electoral Area) |
| <i>Darul Islam</i> | lit. "Abode of Islam"; Islamic separatist movement in Indonesia in the late 1950s |
| DDI | <i>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) |

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|----------------------|---|
| <i>desa</i> | village level in district area |
| <i>Dewan Tanfidz</i> | executive council |
| DPAC | <i>Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang</i> (organizational structure of National Awakening Party and Reform Star Party at sub-district level) |
| DPAC | <i>Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang</i> (organizational structure of United Development Party and Star and Crescent Party at sub-district level) |
| DPARt | <i>Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting</i> (organizational structure of National Awakening Party at sub-village level) |
| DPC | <i>Dewan Pengurus Cabang</i> (organizational structure of National Awakening Party at district level) or <i>Dewan Pimpinan Cabang</i> (organizational structure of Reform Star Party, United Development Party and Star and Crescent Party at district level) or <i>Dewan Pimpinan Cabang</i> (organizational structure of National Mandate Party and Justice and Prosperity Party at sub-district level) |
| DPD | <i>Dewan Pimpinan Daerah</i> (organizational structure of National Mandate Party at district level) or <i>Dewan Pimpinan Daerah</i> (executive council of Justice and Prosperity Party) |
| DPR | Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council) |
| DPRa | <i>Dewan Pengurus Ranting</i> (organizational structure of Justice and Prosperity Party at village level) |
| DPRD | <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (local legislature) |
| DPRt | <i>Dewan Pengurus Ranting</i> (organizational structure of National Mandate Party, National Awakening Party and Star and Crescent Party at village level) |
| DPTD | <i>Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah</i> (organizational structure of Justice and Prosperity Party at district level) |
| <i>fathonah</i> | smart |
| Hizbullah | lit. "Party of God": Islamic organization |

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| <i>Garda Bangsa</i> | lit. “Nation Guard”: paramilitary force |
| GPA | <i>Gerakan Pemuda Anshor</i> (Nahdlatul Ulama Youth Association) |
| GERAM | <i>Garis Advokasi Masyarakat</i> (Social Advocacy Line) |
| Gerpis | <i>Gerakan Pilihan Sunda</i> (Sundanese Choice Movement) |
| <i>gharar</i> | contractual ambiguity |
| GMII | <i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia</i> (United Development Party Student Organization) |
| GMPI | <i>Generasi Muda Pembangunan Indonesia</i> (United Development Party Youth Organization) |
| <i>Golkar</i> | <i>Golongan Karya</i> (Functional Group) |
| GPK | <i>Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah</i> (Youth Movement of Ka’bah) |
| GRDP | Gross Regional Domestic Product |
| <i>gubernur</i> | governor |
| <i>halal</i> | permitted by the Quran |
| <i>halaqah</i> | lit. “circle”; a small Islamic gathering |
| <i>hibah</i> | grant |
| HIMPAH | <i>Himpunan Penegak Angkutan Nasional</i> (National Transport Union) |
| <i>hudud</i> | restriction |
| <i>ibadah</i> | Islamic service or Islamic rituals |
| <i>imam</i> | leader |
| IPKI | <i>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdaan Indonesia</i> (Indonesia Independence Support Bonding) |
| <i>istiqomah</i> | consistency |
| <i>jihad</i> | struggle |
| <i>kabupaten</i> | district |

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| <i>kecamatan</i> | sub-district |
| <i>kelurahan</i> | village level in municipality area |
| KKN | Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme (corruption, collusion and nepotism) |
| <i>konstituante</i> | Constitutional Assembly |
| <i>kota</i> | municipality |
| KPU | <i>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</i> (General Election Commission) |
| <i>kyai</i> | Islamic teacher |
| <i>lima hidmat</i> | five goals |
| <i>Majelis Syuro</i> | advisory board |
| <i>masyarakat madani</i> | civil society |
| Masyumi | <i>Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia</i> (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) |
| MBB | <i>Muslimat Bulan Bintang</i> (Women of Star and Crescent) |
| MPP | <i>Majelis Pertimbangan Partai</i> (advisory board) |
| MPR | <i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People's Consultative Assembly) |
| <i>muamalah</i> | relationship among mankind |
| Muhammadiyah | largest modernist Indonesian Islamic organization established in 1912 |
| <i>muscab</i> | <i>musyawarah cabang</i> (party convention at district level) |
| <i>musda</i> | <i>musyawarah daerah</i> (party convention at district level) |
| <i>mustadzafin</i> | marginalized people |
| <i>Muslimat</i> | Nahdlatul Ulama Woman Association |
| <i>naqli</i> | skriptural |

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|-----------------------|--|
| <i>Naqsabandiyah</i> | one of major branches in Sufism |
| New Order | Indonesian government under Suharto's rule (1966-1998) |
| NKRI | <i>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia</i> (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) |
| NU | <i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> (Renaissance of Islamic Scholars), largest traditionalist Indonesian Islamic organization established in 1926 |
| <i>otonomi daerah</i> | regional autonomy |
| PAD | <i>Pendapatan Asli Daerah</i> (local origin income) |
| PAN | <i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party) |
| <i>Pancasila</i> | lit. "five pillars"; the Indonesian state philosophy |
| Parkindo | <i>Partai Kristen Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Christian Party) |
| Parmusi | <i>Partai Muslimin Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Muslim Party) |
| <i>partai dakwah</i> | proselytizing party |
| PBB | <i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> (Star and Crescent Party) or <i>Pemuda Bulan Bintang</i> (Youth of Star and Crescent) |
| PBR | <i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Reform Star Party) |
| PD | <i>Partai Demokrat</i> (Democrat Party) |
| PDI | <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party) |
| PDI-P | <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) |
| <i>perda</i> | <i>Peraturan Daerah</i> (local regulation) |
| PERSIS | <i>Persatuan Islam</i> (Islamic Union), modernist Indonesian Islamic organization established in 1924 |
| Perti | <i>Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah</i> (Islamic Education Movement Party) |
| <i>pesantren</i> | Islamic boarding school |

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| <i>Pilkadasung</i> | <i>pemilihan kepala daerah langsung</i> (direct election of regional head) |
| PIRANTI | <i>Pimpinan Ranting</i> (organizational structure of Reform Star Party at the village level) |
| PINAKRANTI | <i>Pimpinan Anak Ranting</i> (organizational structure of Reform Star Party at the sub-village level) |
| PK | <i>Partai Keadilan</i> (Justice Party) |
| PKB | <i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (National Awakening Party) |
| PKI | <i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Party) |
| PKP | <i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan</i> (Justice and Union Party) |
| PKPB | <i>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa</i> (Concern for the Nation Functional Party) |
| PKS | <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Justice and Prosperity Party) |
| PMII | <i>Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Movement of Islamic Student) |
| PNI | <i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Nationalist Party) |
| Polri | <i>Polisi Republik Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Police) |
| PPKB | <i>Pergerakan Perempuan Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (Women's National Awakening Movement) |
| PPP | <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party) |
| PPP-Reformasi | <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-Reformasi</i> (United Development Party-Reformation) |
| <i>preman</i> | thug |
| PRI | <i>Pemuda Reformasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian's Youth Reform) |
| PRIM | <i>Partai Rakyat Indonesia Merdeka</i> (Free Indonesian Party) |

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| <i>priyayi</i> | status of being upper class |
| PSI | <i>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Socialist Party) |
| PSII | <i>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Islamic United Party) |
| PUI | <i>Persatuan Umat Islam</i> (Islamic Society Union) |
| Qadiriyyah | one of major branches in Sufism |
| <i>qimar</i> | financial speculation |
| <i>qishas</i> | harsh Islamic criminal law |
| Quran | the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad |
| <i>rahmatan lil alamin</i> | a blessing for the universe |
| <i>reformasi</i> | reform |
| <i>riba</i> | payment of interest |
| Rp. | Rupiah (official currency of Indonesian) |
| <i>sadaqah</i> | charity |
| Salafism | Islamic movement that takes companions of the Prophet Muhammad, their followers and those after the followers as exemplary models |
| <i>santri</i> | devout Muslim or student in Islamic boarding school |
| <i>sharia</i> | Islamic law |
| <i>siddiq</i> | truthful |
| Simpatik | paramilitary force of National Mandate Party |
| <i>siyasah</i> | politics |
| SK | <i>Surat Keputusan</i> (decree) |
| SPPBR | <i>Suara Perempuan Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Women's Voice of Reform Star Party) |
| <i>Sunna</i> | the Prophet Muhammad's way of life |
| <i>Surat Edaran</i> | circulation letter |

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| <i>tarbiyah</i> | lit. “education” |
| <i>tarikh</i> | history |
| <i>tauhid</i> | theology |
| TNI | <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Military) |
| TPP | <i>Taruna Pelajar Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party Student Organization) |
| <i>ukhuwah Islamiyah</i> | Islamic brotherhood |
| <i>ulama</i> | Islamic scholar |
| UPBR | <i>Ulama Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Islamic Scholar of Reform Star Party) |
| Wahhabism | Muslim sect founded by Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) which advocates a return to the original teaching of Islam as found in the Quran and <i>Sunna</i> of the Prophet Muhammad |
| <i>walikota</i> | mayor |
| <i>waqaf</i> | donation |
| WPP | <i>Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (Woman Organization of United Development Party) |
| Yaumul Ijtima | regular Islamic gathering in the afternoon |
| Lailatul Ijtima | regular Islamic gathering in the evening |
| <i>zakat</i> | tithe (one of the five pillars in Islam) |
| <i>zina</i> | sexual acts outside marriage |

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1. Democratization in Indonesia

Efforts to establish a democratic system in Indonesia can be traced back to the period of parliamentary democracy in 1949-1957. Feith argues that the period of parliamentary democracy contained several democratic elements. The most important element is the fact that civilian politicians enjoyed civil liberties in order to participate in the political process. Through party politics, they also played a pivotal role in making policies. In this period, all political actors, including the opposition parties, respected the existing democratic constitution. They also maintained their commitments to democratic principles. As a consequence, civil liberties were rarely infringed and political coercion was scarcely used.¹

The most significant achievement in the period of parliamentary democracy was the implementation of two democratic elections in 1955.² The first election was implemented on September 29, 1955 in order to recruit members of the People's Representative Council (DPR or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*). The second election was carried out on December 15, 1955 to select members of the Constitutional Assembly (*Konstituante*) whose special assignment was to draft a new constitution. As a result of the September 29 election, four political parties gained a significant number of votes and seats, namely the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasionalis Indonesia* or PNI), the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Party (*Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Partai Masyumi), the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or PKI) and the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars Party (*Partai Nahdlatul Ulama* or Partai NU).

In addition, these parties represented social cleavages in Indonesia in the 1950s, namely *santri*, *abangan* and *priyayi*.³ According to Geertz, the *santri* denotes a group in society who implemented Islamic tenets. Meanwhile, the *abangan* refers to those in society who practiced the animistic aspects of the over-all Javanese syncretism. On the other hand, the *priyayi* is the traditional bureaucratic elites who emphasized the

¹ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. XI.

² For a more detailed discussion on the 1955 election, see Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Cornell University: Southeast Asia Program, 1971).

³ Robert R. Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java* (Yale University: Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), p. 30.

Hinduism aspects.⁴ Further, the *abangan* and *priyayi* were mostly affiliated with the secular-nationalist parties, especially the PNI and PKI, while the *santri* strongly supported Islamic parties, more specifically the Masyumi Party and NU Party.

After less than a decade, the period of parliamentary democracy came to an end in 1959 when Sukarno introduced the so-called “guided democracy”. In this period, the national political stage was dominated by a triangular relationship involving Sukarno, the Army and PKI. In this mutual relationship, Sukarno acted as a counterweight in the strong rivalry between the Army and PKI. More specifically, he relied on the PKI to gain his political supports among the civilians as the party had become one of the major parties. At the same time, Sukarno also depended on the Army to balance the political force of the PKI. For the PKI and the Army, the role of Sukarno was very important in guarantying their role in political process.⁵

Following an economic crisis, the emergence of regional rebellions⁶ and the September 1965 coup⁷, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy was replaced by Suharto’s New Order in 1966. In the beginning of its power, the New Order government introduced liberalization policies, such as freeing most political detainees and guaranteeing the freedom of the press. However, after 1970 the New Order government enforced various policies which reflected that it intended to adopt an authoritarian political regime.⁸ For instance, the New Order government restructured the party system in 1973 by grouping

⁴ See, Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes. Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 14.

⁵ Furthermore, see Herbert Feith, “President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 4, No. 8, 1964, pp. 969-980.

⁶ Furthermore on regional rebellions in Indonesia in the 1950s, see Barbara S. Harvey, *Permesta: Half A Rebellion* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1977); Ichlasul Amal, *Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics: West Sumatera and South Sulawesi 1949-1979* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992); Kees van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985); Audrey Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and Indonesian Polity* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999).

⁷ On different analyses of the September 1965 coup, see Stanley (ed.), *Bayang-Bayang PKI* (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1995).

⁸ Many studies have come to the conclusion that the New Order government adopted an authoritarian regime. See, Liddle, “Suharto’s Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1985, pp. 68-90; Karl D. Jackson, “Bureaucratic Polity : A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communication in Indonesia,” in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), *Political Power and Communication in Indonesia* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978), pp 3-22; Dwight Y. King, “Indonesia’s New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, A Neopatrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime: What Difference Does It Make?” in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds.), *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1982), pp. 104-16; Ruth T. McVey, “Beamtenstaat in Indonesia,” in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds.), *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1982), pp. 84-91.

ten parties together in the 1971 election into three parties, namely the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP) for Islamic parties, the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* or PDI) for secular-nationalist parties and the Functional Group (*Golongan Karya* or Golkar) which served as a political machine for the New Order government. Another example is that the New Order government introduced the sole ideology through which these parties had to adopt Pancasila as their ideological foundation.⁹ With regard to the relationship between the central and regional governments, the New Order government implemented a centralized system so that the role of the central government was very dominant in local politics.

Relying on economic development and applying a security approach in which the role of the Army was very dominant, the New Order government was able to maintain its power in this way for more than three decades. However, the New Order government began to lose its political legitimacy when the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. This situation was exacerbated by various political crises, such as the threat of national disintegration and student demonstrations demanding the elimination of corruption, collusion and nepotism (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme* or KKN) and the ethnic riots in major cities, including in Jakarta. Under all of these conditions, Suharto finally announced his resignation on May 21, 1998 and appointed the Vice President B.J. Habibie as his successor.¹⁰

Under strong pressures for change, B.J. Habibie proposed various liberalization policies, such as freeing political detainees and guaranteeing the freedom of the press. He also removed the sole ideology policy and encouraged the establishment of new parties before the implementation of the 1999 election. Concerning the relationship

⁹ Pancasila consists of five principles, i.e., Belief in one supreme God; Just and civilized humanity; National Unity; Democracy led by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; Social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people. In addition, Pancasila is the state doctrine in which the state is based on neither a secular nor an Islamic state. Furthermore, see Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 8, 1981, pp. 838-51; Ken Ward, "Soeharto's Javanese Pancasila," in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), *Soeharto's New Order and Its Legacy* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), pp. 27-37.

¹⁰ For the chronology of the Suharto's resignation, see Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (eds.), *The Fall of Suharto* (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998); Edward Aspinall, Herbert Feith and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), *The Last Days of President Suharto* (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1999); Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1999); Geoff Forrester (ed.), *Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999); Donald K. Emerson (ed.), *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999)

between the central and regional government, he also proposed the implementation of a decentralized system. These policies, therefore, marked an era of the transition to democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia.

In addition, Hadiz argues that the political landscape in post-Suharto Indonesia has several features which distinguish it from the political features in the New Order period, i.e., the decentralization of power from the presidency to political parties and to parliament, the rise of political parties with predatory interests, the decentralization of power from Jakarta to the regions, the emergence of patronage networks at the national as well as at the regional levels, the rise of political fixers, entrepreneurs, enforcers and the emergence of hooligans and thugs who were organized in party militia and paramilitary forces.¹¹

More than a decade after the Suharto's resignation, some scholars have defined the democratization process in Indonesia as a "liberal democracy".¹² However, other studies have also come to the conclusion that the democratization process in post-Suharto Indonesia was still far from ideal. For instance, Diamond argues that the characteristic of the regime in post-Suharto Indonesia is still ambiguous as there is a blurring of boundaries between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism.¹³ Similarly, Case points out that the democratization process in post-Suharto Indonesia reflects a process of "transition to fuller democracy" as there is a slow process of replacement of the old regime.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Croissant argues that a "defective democracy" takes place in post-Suharto Indonesia because of the Army's hegemony in the political process and the existence of radical Islamic groups as well as the consolidation of corruptions.¹⁵ Moreover, Törnquist describes Indonesia's new democracy as a "bad guys' democracy" since there is a growing number of local bosses, thugs and corruptors who have challenged the democratization process.¹⁶

¹¹ Vedi R. Hadiz, "Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to Neo-Liberal Reform," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2004, p. 619.

¹² See, for instance, Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, "Introduction: Building and Sustaining Democracy," in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.), *Comparing Democracies 3* (Los Angeles, SAGE, 2010), p. 16.

¹³ Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regime," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No 2, April, 2002, pp 21-35.

¹⁴ William Case, "Democracy in Southeast Asia: How To Get It and What Does It Matter?" in Mark Beeson. *Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics, National Differences* (New York: Houndmills, 2004), pp. 75-78.

¹⁵ Aurel Croissant, "From Transition to Defective Democracy. Mapping Asian Democratization," *Democratization*, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2004, p. 156-79.

¹⁶ Törnquist (2000) quoted in Hans Antlöv, "Not Enough Politics! Power, Participation and the New Democratic Polity in Indonesia," in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), *Local Power and Politics in*

More recently, Hadiwinata and Schuck argue that the democratization process in post-Suharto Indonesia can be categorized as an “illiberal democracy” as the legal system is weak, there is systematic corruption in politics and the public administration and the state is not yet able to protect the population from violence. It also can be called a “gridlocked democracy” referring to the weakness of the president although he has been elected directly by the people. Further, it can be categorized as a “domain-democracy” because the Army, entrepreneurs or multinational corporations take certain political domains out of the hands of democratically elected representatives.¹⁷

From the brief explanation above, we can see that the political system in Indonesia has been dominated by a long period of authoritarian regimes. The first effort to establish a democratic political system during the period of parliamentary democracy in 1949-1957 was terminated by Sukarno’s Guided Democracy in 1959-1966. In turn, the transition period after the fall of Sukarno had produced the New Order’s authoritarian regime in 1966-1998. The fall of Suharto in 1998, therefore, marked a new era of the democratization process in Indonesia.

2. Decentralization and Local Politics

As mentioned earlier, the new political system in post-Suharto Indonesia has some salient features. For the purpose of this study, two important dimensions deserve particular attention. The first interesting phenomenon in democratizing Indonesia is the implementation of the decentralized system in terms of the relationship between the central and regional government.

During the New Order period, the central government played a dominant role in local politics. The domination of the central government was institutionalized into Law No. 5/1974 on Principles of Regional Government Administration. Based on this provision, the central government divided the regional administration system into three levels, i.e., province, district or municipality and sub-district or sub-municipality. The central government also established two parallel structures, namely administrative area and autonomous region. The former refers to the top-down implementation of central government’s policies in regional government, while the latter denotes to the bottom-up

Indonesia. Decentralization and Democratization (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 72-86.

¹⁷ Bob S. Hadiwinata and Cristopeh Schuck, “Indonesia: A Defective Democracy faces the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation,” in Bob S. Hadiwinata and Cristopeh Schuck (eds.), *Democracy in Indonesia. The Challenge of Consolidation* (Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 2007), pp. 405-06.

political representation of regional interest. In this sense, province, district or municipality and sub-district or sub-municipality served as the administrative area and autonomous region at the same time.¹⁸

In practice, the central government emphasized more on the implementation of the administrative area than the implementation of the autonomous region. For example, the central government strongly controlled the executive branch of regional government, i.e., governor, district head (*bupati*) and mayor. It should also be acknowledged that many governors, district heads and mayors came from active as well as retired military personnel. Another example is that, the executive branch of regional government played a dominant role in making policies at the local level. As a result, the legislative branch of regional government was not able to implement oversight, budgeting and policy-making functions. In this sense, it served just as a rubber stamp for all of the decisions made by the central government through the executive branch of regional government.¹⁹

After the Suharto's resignation, these conditions have drastically shifted. Initially, the Habibie administration introduced Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Governments in 1999. However, it was not until 2001 under the Abdurrahman Wahid administration that the government began to implement a decentralized system. Afterwards, these provisions were revised by Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance and Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Governments in 2004 during the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration.²⁰

Based on the new provisions, as shown in Figure 1.1, the regional government has recently been divided into three levels, namely province, district and municipality. More specifically, the provincial government is divided into either districts (*kabupaten*) in a rural area or municipalities (*kota*) in an urban area. In turn, districts and municipalities are divided into sub-districts and sub-municipalities (*kecamatan*).


¹⁸ Furthermore, see Michael Malley, "Regions: Centralization and Resistance," in Donald Emmerson (ed.), *Indonesia beyond Suharto* (Armond and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 71-106.

¹⁹ Furthermore, see Ichlasul Amal, "The Dilemmas of Decentralization and Democratization," in David Bourchier and John Legge (Eds.), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s*. Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, pp. 214-22.

²⁰ These provisions did not prevail in the Aceh and Papua province as the central government makes a special arrangement for these regions under Law No. 18/2001 on Special Autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua province as a response to the demand of independence in these regions.

Finally, each of sub-districts and sub-municipalities are divided into villages which can be either *desa* in the district area or *kelurahan* in the municipal area.²¹

Figure 1.1
The Relationship between the Central and Regional Governments
In Post-Suharto Indonesia²²



The new provisions also mention that the provincial government has a dual status as an administrative area and as autonomous region. As the administrative area, it serves as a representative of the central government in a given region. In this sense, the provincial government implements some authorities of the central government. On the other hand, as the autonomous region, the provincial government has some authorities in managing its own regional affairs, such as mediating disputes amid districts or municipalities, disputes between districts and municipalities, facilitating cross-district and cross-municipal developments as well as carrying authorities that are not or not yet implemented by districts and municipalities.

Different to the provincial government, the district and municipal governments serve as the autonomous region.²³ Therefore, they have authorities in managing their own regional affairs covering various sectors, i.e., public works, health, education and

²¹ In addition, up to January 2009, there were thirty-three provinces, three hundred and ninety-nine districts and ninety-eight municipalities. The number continues increasing since there are many demands to establish new regional governments, either the provincial, district, or municipal governments.

²² Derived from Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government.

²³ There are at least two arguments of the district-focused decentralization. Firstly, it would promote democratization through which local communities can participate in public policy-making. Secondly, it is the best way to ensure that the decentralized system does not encourage separatism and national disintegration. Furthermore, see Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, "Introduction: Decentralization, Democratization and the Rise of the Local," in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia. Decentralization and Democratization*, pp. 1-11.

culture, agriculture, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land affairs, cooperatives and manpower sectors. In addition, the relationship between the provincial government and the district or municipal governments is based on the coordinative relationship.

In practice, since the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001, the district and municipal governments have been able to make their own policies, including local budget policy. Not surprisingly, regional legislature has also played a significant role in making policies. Following the direct presidential election in 2004, the regional government has also implemented the direct governor, district head and mayor election (known as *pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* or *pilkadasung*). Along with the implementation of the democratization process, there is also a growing participation among local population in policy-making. In this sense, the implementation of the decentralized system since 2001 has facilitated the emergence of local politics as a new arena for political contestations.

The most prominent example of the emergence of local politics is the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law) in some regions outside of Aceh.²⁴ For instance, the Tasikmalaya district proposed some elements of *sharia* in its policy of development planning. Another example is the Bulukumba district which enforced some elements of *sharia* in public policies, including restrictions (*hudud*) and harsh Islamic criminal law (*qishash*), such as whip punishments for sexual acts outside of marriage, alcoholic drinking and cruel treatments.

In addition, *sharia*-based policies at the regional level have been proposed by the executive branch of regional government in various policies, such as governor's decree (*surat keputusan gubernur*), district head's decree (*surat keputusan bupati*), district head's circulation (*surat edaran bupati*), or mayor's instruction (*instruksi walikota*). They have also been proposed by the legislative branch of regional government in the form of regional policy (*peraturan daerah* or *perda*). Moreover, Salim explains that *sharia*-based policies at the regional level can be categorized into

²⁴ There are various terms to describe such a local regulation. Suaedy uses the term "the religiously nuanced local regulations," while Buehler employs the term "the *sharia* by-laws" and Bush introduces the term "the religion-influenced regional regulations". See, Ahmad Suaedy, "Religiously Nuanced Local Regulations and the Future of Indonesian Democracy. An Outline," paper presented in Islam and Democracy in South Asia. *Asia Calling Forum* 2008; Michael Buehler, "The Rise of *Sharia* by-Laws in Indonesian Districts," *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 16. No. 2, 2008, pp. 255-85; Robin Bush, "Regional *Sharia* Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?" in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 174-91. This study uses a term of *sharia*-based policies.

three types, i.e., regulations on public order and social problems, such as prostitution, gambling and alcohol consumption, regulations on religious skills and obligations, including reading the Quran and paying tithe (*zakat*) and regulations on religious symbolisms, such as the obligation to wear Muslim clothes.²⁵

It is also important to mention that the implementation of the decentralized system has significantly failed to increase social welfare of local population. Various factors have contributed to this situation, such as the implementation of the decentralized system which has not been followed by a fundamental change inside the local bureaucratic structure. As pointed out by Antlöv, ‘the bureaucracy remains dominated by people trained under the Suharto’s authoritarian regime and many people who lived comfortably under the New Order are still in power’.²⁶ Another factor is the emergence of a new feudalism as well as a patronage system in local politics²⁷ and money politics in the direct governor, district head and mayor elections.²⁸ There are also a growing number of corruptions at the regional level.²⁹ In this sense, local elites have hijacked the implementation of the decentralized system in order to propose their own personal interests.³⁰

3. The Rise of Islamic Parties

Another prominent feature of the new political landscape in post-Suharto Indonesia is the rise of the Islamic parties.³¹ As mentioned earlier, the New Order government had

²⁵ Arsekal Salim ‘Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratization’, in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre (eds.) *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2007), p. 126.

²⁶ Hans Antlöv, ‘Not Enough Politics! Power, Participation and the Democratic Polity,’ pp. 72-86

²⁷ See, Jacqueline Vel, ‘*PILKADA* in East Sumba: An Old Rivalry in A New Democratic Setting,’ *Indonesia*, Vol. 80, 2005, pp. 81-107; Michael Buehler and Paige Johnson Tan, ‘Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province,’ *Indonesia*, Vol. 84, 2007, pp. 41-69; Nankyung Choi, ‘Election, parties and elites in Indonesian’s local politics,’ *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2007, pp. 325-54.

²⁸ See, for instance, Nankyung Choi, ‘Local Elections and Party Politics in Post-*Reformasi* Indonesia: A View From Yogyakarta,’ *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2004, pp. 280-301.

²⁹ See, Ari Kuncoro, ‘Corruption, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia,’ *East Asian Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, 2006, pp. 25-39.

³⁰ Vedi R. Hadiz, ‘Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to Neo-Liberal Reform,’ pp. 615-36.

³¹ According to Salih and El-Tom, the term ‘Islamic party’ refers to political organizations that are characterized in that ‘their adherence professes an Islamic identity with a conscious and deliberative objective of advancing an Islamic way of life as well as serving the interests of the Muslim Umma (community of believers)’. M.A. Mohamed Salih and Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, ‘Introduction,’ in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.), *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), p. 1. Meanwhile, based on the case of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi* or AKP) in Turkey, Yavuz defines Islamic parties as parties whose ideology is derived from or shaped by Islamic ideas. These parties mobilize their constituents on the basis of a shared Islamic identity. Moreover, they

domesticated the Islamic parties by introducing the fusion policy in 1973 through which these parties were merged into a single party, namely the PPP. As a consequence of the fusion policy, the PPP experienced various internal conflicts as the party consisted of different Islamic parties with alternate interpretations of Islam as well as with differing platforms. The New Order government also enforced the PPP to adopt Pancasila as its ideological foundation. Moreover, the mass depoliticizing policy had an impact on political disengagement between the PPP and its members or supporters. It is not surprising if during the New Order period, the PPP in particular and political Islam in general, had been “constitutionally, physically, electorally, bureaucratically and symbolically defeated by the state”.³²

Thanks to liberalization policies introduced by the Habibie administration, this situation has massively shifted. Nowadays, some Islamic parties adopt Islam as their ideological foundation. Some of Islamic parties also propose the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. Other Islamic parties, however, select Pancasila as their ideological base and introduce more secular platforms. The major Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia are the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN), National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB), Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR), PPP, Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) and Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB).

The PAN was founded on August 23, 1998 by former political activists opposing the New Order government.³³ Introducing pluralism and inclusive principles, this party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. In the beginning of its creation, this

aim to implement Islamic worldviews, namely the Islamization of the state and society. See, M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 5-13. In the context of Indonesia, Islamic parties refer to organizations that are “active in politics with a Muslim membership and have the goal to bring about the advancement of Islam in society and in politics”. Kees van Dijk, “Different Settings, Different Definitions and Different Agendas. Islamic and Secular Political Parties in Indonesia and Malaysia,” in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.), *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, p. 53. This study follows the definition of Islamic parties proposed by Baswedan who argues that parties in Indonesia can be defined as Islamic parties if they have the following characteristics. Firstly, they explicitly adopt Islam as their ideology. Secondly, even if they do not adopt explicitly Islam as their ideology, they utilize Islamic values, symbols, or languages in their platforms and symbols. Thirdly, they draw support mostly from Islamic organizations. Fourthly, their leaders, including their legislators in national and local legislatures, come predominantly from an Islamic background. Furthermore, see Anis Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia. Present and Future Trajectory,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, Issue 5, 2004, pp. 669-90.

³² Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Ohio University Press, 2003), p. 2.

³³ Furthermore on the initial establishment of the PAN, see, for instance, Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2003), pp. 131-40.

party tended more towards being a secular-nationalist party. After the implementation of the 1999 election, however, some Islamic elements have been more dominant inside this party.³⁴ In addition, the most prominent figure in this party is Amien Rais, once the chairperson of the Muhammadiyah and the head of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR). This party relies on Muhammadiyah's members in Yogyakarta, Central Java and West Sumatera as its loyal supporters.³⁵ In addition, this party experienced a continuous decline in the number of votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Meanwhile, the PKB was established on July 23, 1998 by five leaders of the NU, namely Munasir Ali, Ilyas Ruchyat, A. Mustofa Bisri, A. Muhith Muzadi and Abdurrahman Wahid.³⁶ Officially, this party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. As its loyal supporters, this party relies heavily on NU's members coming from poor and lower-class people in rural areas of Central and East Java.³⁷ In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, this party also experienced a continuous decrease in the number of votes and seats. It is also important to mention that since its establishment, this party has experienced internal conflicts, i.e., the conflicts between the Abdurrahman Wahid group and the Matori Abdul Jalil group in 2001-2002, between the Abdurrahman Wahid group and the Alwi Shihab group in 2005 and again between the Abdurrahman Wahid group and the Muhaimin Iskandar group in 2007.

Created by a charismatic leader, Zainuddin M.Z., the PBR was founded on January 20, 2002. This party officially adopts Islam as its ideological foundation. It should be acknowledged that the creation of this party had to do with internal conflicts within the PPP when some prominent elites of the PPP, including Zainuddin M.Z. believed that the PPP had a strong relationship with the New Order government. They also believed that they had been marginalized from the PPP. Afterwards, they declared their resignation from the PPP and created the United Development Party-Reformation (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-Reformasi* or PPP-Reformation). Shortly before the

³⁴ Furthermore, Luthfi Assyauckanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 195-97.

³⁵ See, Kevin Raymond Evans, *The History of Political Parties and General Elections in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Arise Consultancies, 2003); Dwight Y. King, *Half-Hearted Reform. Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia* (Westport and Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), pp. 105-20.

³⁶ Furthermore on the creation of the PKB, see, for instance, Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto*, pp. 106-13.

³⁷ Kevin Raymond Evans, *the History of Political Parties and General Elections in Indonesia*; Dwight Y. King, *Half-Hearted Reform. Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 105-20.

implementation of the 2004 election, the PPP-Reformation changed its name to the PBR. In addition, although it succeeded in gaining votes and seats in the 2004 election, the PBR was not able to maintain its political performance in the 2009 election when it failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.

Another Islamic party as previously mentioned is the PPP which was founded on January 5, 1973 through the party fusion policy introduced by the New Order government.³⁸ After the NU announced its resignation as a political party in 1984 (known as *kembali ke khittah 1926* or Return to the Guidelines of 1929), the recent PPP consists of three parties, namely, the Indonesian Muslim Party (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia* or Parmusi), the Indonesian Islamic United Party (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or PSII) and the Islamic Education Movement Party (*Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* or Perti). During the New Order period, this party was forced to adopt Pancasila as its ideology and was also banned for using the *ka'bah* as the party symbol. Since 1998, however, this party has adopted Islam as its ideological foundation and has utilized the *ka'bah* as the party symbol. This party gains its votes mainly from poor and lower class people coming from NU's members outside Java as well as former members of the Parmusi, PSII and Perti.³⁹ In addition, the PPP also experienced a continuous decrease in the number of votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the PKS succeeded in increasing its level of political support gradually in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. Established on April 20, 2002, this party in fact was reinvented from the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan* or PK) as the PK failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold in the 1999 election. Initially, this party was developed from the Islamic students' networks in some major universities in Indonesia.⁴⁰ Inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organization, this party declared Islam as its ideological foundation. Some

³⁸ Furthermore on the creation of the PPP, see, for instance, Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto*, pp. 157-64.

³⁹ Kevin Raymond Evans, *the History of Political Parties and General Elections in Indonesia*; Dwight Y. King, *Half-Hearted Reform. Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 105-20.

⁴⁰ For a more detailed discussion on the historical background of the PKS, see Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto*, pp. 83-90; Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); Yon Machmudi, "Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party," PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2006, pp. 107-31; Ahmad-Norma Permata, "Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006," PhD dissertation, Münster University, 2008, pp. 103-20; Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto*, pp. 83-90.

of the prominent figures in this party are Suropto, Hidayat Nur Wahid and Tifatul Sembiring.

The PBB was founded on July 17, 1998.⁴¹ Imposing the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, this party adopts Islam as its ideological base. It should be acknowledged that this party claims itself to be the only successor of the Masyumi Party.⁴² For its supporters, this party relies on former members of the Masyumi Party and members of PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam* or Islamic Union) in rural areas of West Java, Sumatera and Kalimantan.⁴³ The central figure in this party is Yusril Ihza Mahendra, once serving as the Minister of Justice in the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration. Despite the fact that it was able to increase the number of its votes in the 2004 election, this party experienced a significant decrease in the 2009 election when it was not able to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.

Table 1.1
Performance of the Islamic Parties
In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections at the National Level

| Islamic Parties | Votes 1999 (%) | Seats 1999 (%) | Votes 2004 (%) | Seats 2004 (%) | Votes 2009 (%) | Seats 2009 (%) |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| PAN | 7.1 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 9.5 | 6.01 | 7.68 |
| PKB | 12.6 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 9.5 | 4.94 | 4.82 |
| PBR | - | - | 2.8 | 2.4 | 1.21 | 0 |
| PPP | 19.7 | 11.6 | 8.2 | 10.5 | 5.32 | 6.6 |
| PK/PKS | 1.3 | 1.4 | 7.3 | 8.2 | 7.88 | 10.18 |
| PBB | 1.8 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2 | 1.79 | 0 |
| Total | 37.7 | 32.6 | 38.7 | 42 | 27.15 | 29.28 |

Source: The General Elections Commission (1999-2009).

In general, the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia can be distinguished into two groups. The first group is the so called “Islam-inclusive,”⁴⁴ “secular oriented Muslims,”⁴⁵ “substantive *sharia* group,”⁴⁶ “Muslim-nationalist parties,”⁴⁷ and “pluralist

⁴¹ Furthermore on the initial establishment of the PBB, see, for instance, Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto*, pp. 61-67.

⁴² On the relationship between the Masyumi Party and the PBB, see Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 40-46.

⁴³ Kevin Raymond Evans, *The History of Political Parties and General Elections in Indonesia*; Dwight Y. King, *Half-Hearted Reform. Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 105-20.

⁴⁴ Anis Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia. Present and Future Trajectory.”

⁴⁵ Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party,” p. 192.

⁴⁶ Nadirsyah Hosen, *Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 93-96.

Islamic parties”.⁴⁸ Parties in this group adopt Pancasila as their ideological base. Moreover, their interpretation of Islam is based on the context and substance of Islam. In this sense, they believe in pluralism and non-sectarianism principles. Despite the fact that they employ Islamic tenets and symbols to attract their supporters, they reject the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. The PAN and PKB can be categorized in this group.

On the other side, there is the so called “formal *sharia* group,”⁴⁹ “Islamist,”⁵⁰ or “formalist Islamic parties”.⁵¹ Parties in this group adopt Islam, more specifically, the Quran and *Sunna* of the Prophet as their ideological foundation. Different to the first group, their interpretation of Islamic tenets is based on formalistic interpretations (textual). In this sense, they argue that the modern situation has to adjust to Islam. Not surprisingly, they view democracy just as a tool or tactic that may be useful to implement *sharia* and to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Included in this group are the PBR, PPP, PKS and PBB.

Table 1.2
Features of the Islamic Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia

| Features | The Muslim-Nationalist Parties | The Islamist Parties |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Ideology | Pancasila | Islam |
| Interpretation of Islam | Substantive approach | Formalistic approach |
| Characteristic | Pluralism | Sectarianism |
| Political attitude | From liberal to moderate | From moderate to radical |
| Party affiliation | PAN and PKB | PBR, PPP, PKS and PBB |

Source: compilation by the Author.

In addition, the polarization of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia reflects different Muslim’s attitudes in understanding democracy in general. Nasr argues that attitudes of Muslims toward democracy can be distinguished into two categories, namely the Islamist and Muslim democrats.⁵² Moreover, the polarization of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia also reflects a diverse political attitude of Islamic

⁴⁷ Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Frédéric Volpi and Francesco Cavatorta (eds.), *Democratization in the Muslim World. Changing Patterns of Power and Authority* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 46-53.

⁴⁸ Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia,” in Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown (eds.), *Religious Organizations and Democratization. Case Studies from Contemporary Asia* (London: Armonk, 2006), pp. 221-41.

⁴⁹ Nadirsyah Hosen, *Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia*, pp.93-96.

⁵⁰ Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia”; Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party,” p. 193.

⁵¹ Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia.”

⁵² Furthermore, see Vali Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2005), pp. 13-27.

parties in the Islamic world, ranging from the most moderate to the most militant Islamic parties in dealing with major issues, such as the nature of the state, the position of woman, human rights and the implementation of *sharia*.⁵³

Since 1999 the Islamic parties have played a significant role in the political process both at the national as well as regional levels. Some observers even argue that local politics has become a new political arena for the Islamists to establish an Islamic state and to implement *sharia*. For instance, Abuza argues that the proponents of *sharia* attempt to implement a strategy to create “Islands of Islam” in Indonesia by implementing *sharia* in regional governments.⁵⁴ They attempt to do so after they failed to insert the elements of *sharia* in the national constitution.⁵⁵ Similarly, Salim points out that the proponents of *sharia* are likely to employ a “bottom up strategy” by forcing the implementation of *sharia* in some regions after they failed to apply a “top down strategy” by inserting elements of *sharia* during a constitutional amendment in 2002.⁵⁶

4. Exploring Islamic Parties at the Local Level

Many studies have explored the phenomena of the Islamic parties in Indonesia. Some of them have attempted to examine the role of these parties during the period of parliamentary democracy. Boland, for instance, focuses on the political rivalry between the Masyumi Party and NU Party, including its consequences on the political system.⁵⁷ Similarly, Noer explores the role of the Masyumi Party in political process in the period of parliamentary democracy, including the role of the party leaders, such as Mohammad Natsir.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Karim examines the role of various Islamic parties in the period of parliamentary democracy.⁵⁹ On the other hand, Federspiel explains the relationship between the Masyumi and NU Party and the army in the period of Guided Democracy

⁵³ On the general features of Islamic parties in large parts of the Islamic world, see M.A. Mohamed Salih and Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, “Introduction,” pp. 23-25.

⁵⁴ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 31-34.

⁵⁵ Furthermore, see Nadirsyah Hosen, *Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia*; Bernhard Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy*, pp. 178-205.

⁵⁶ Arskal Salim, “Sharia in Indonesia’s Current Transition: An Update,” in Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi Azra (eds.), *Sharia and Politics in Modern Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 213-32. Furthermore on the demand for the accommodation of *sharia* in the constitutional amendments in 2002, see Nadirsyah Hosen, *Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia*, pp. 201-14.

⁵⁷ B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (Den Haag: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

⁵⁸ Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Analisis Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Mizan, 2000).

⁵⁹ M. Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1993).

in 1957-1965.⁶⁰ Likewise, Samson discusses the role of these parties in political process from the period of Sukarno's Guided Democracy to the early years of the New Order Government in the late 1960s.⁶¹

Some studies have also explored the role of the Islamic party during the New Order period. For instance, Syamsuddin focuses on the internal dynamics of the PPP as well as some contributing factors to the internal conflicts of this party.⁶² Meanwhile, Turmudi examines the relationship between Islamic teachers, Muslims voters and the achievement of the PPP during the New Order's elections in the Jombang district, East Java province.⁶³

Some studies have also tried to explain the development and performance of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. For instance, Amir focuses on the internal dynamics of these parties in their initial stage of the establishment after the fall of Suharto, including their efforts in gaining political support in the 1999 election.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, Barton examines the performance of these parties in the 1999 and 2004 elections.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Baswedan compares the Islamic parties in the 1950s and in the 2000s and comes to the conclusion that the contemporary Islamic parties are more diverse and more pragmatic.⁶⁶ Likewise, focusing on the performance of the PPP, PBB and PK/PKS in 1998-2003, Platzdasch argues that these parties "pursued different forms of political pragmatism".⁶⁷ It is also important to underline that the contemporary studies on parties in democratizing Indonesia focus mainly on the Islamist parties, especially the PKS.⁶⁸

This condition indicates that little effort has been made to explore organizational structures of major Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. Moreover, the existing studies have also paid little attention to the role of the Islamic parties at the local level in

⁶⁰ Howard M. Federspiel, "The Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1973, pp. 407-20.

⁶¹ Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 12, 1968, pp. 1001-17.

⁶² Syamsuddin Haris, *PPP dan Politik Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991).

⁶³ Endang Turmudi, "Religion and Politics: A Study on Political Attitudes of Devout Muslims and the Role of the Kiai in Contemporary Java," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1995, pp. 18-41.

⁶⁴ Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto*.

⁶⁵ Greg Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia."

⁶⁶ Anis Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia. Present and Future Trajectory."

⁶⁷ Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy*, p. 327.

⁶⁸ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*; Yon Machmudi, "Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party"; Greg Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia," pp. 221-41; Ahmad-Norma Permata, "Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006"; Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp 179-212.

the implementation of the decentralized system. In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia, therefore, this study presents an in-depth and empirical analysis of the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the local level in post-Suharto Indonesia.

The main question in this study is “How Islamic Parties Organize at the Local Level in Post-Suharto Indonesia?” To be more specific, this study attempts to answer these challenging questions: How do Islamic political parties organize at the district level in post-Suharto Indonesia? How do they create and maintain the political linkage with their members or supporters? How do elites of these parties organize their parties at the district level? What kinds of role do these parties play in making policies at the district level? Why do these parties organize the way they do at the district level? What are implications for democratization and decentralization in post-Suharto Indonesia?

To answer these research questions, this study is divided in eight chapters. Chapter 1 explains the background and significance of the study. Chapter 2 discusses the analytical framework as well as the theoretical framework of this study. Since analyses of this study are based on empirical data, Chapter 3 explains method of the study. Meanwhile, Chapter 4 describes research area and units of analysis. Further, Chapter 5-7 are dedicated to examining the organizational features of the Islamic parties in three different organizational dimensions, i.e., the party organization on the ground, the party organization in central office and the party organization in public office. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the findings of this study, including their implications to party research as well as to the democratization and decentralization processes in post-Suharto Indonesia.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to discuss the analytical framework employed in this study. In doing so, this chapter is divided into four major parts. The first part discusses the analytical perspective of this study, namely rational choice institutionalism. The second part elaborates various theories on party organization as well as party models based on organizational development of parties in established democracies. In order to minimize “Eurocentric” perspectives, the following part deals with theoretical reviews of party organization and party models in developing countries. Based on these theoretical reviews, the last part explains the analytical framework applied in the study.

1. Rational Choice Institutionalism

In exploring organizational structures of Islamic parties at the regional level in post-Suharto Indonesia, this study follows the rational choice institutionalism way of thinking for three main reasons. Firstly, as Peters argues, “this approach tends to provide a lucid analytic connection between individuals and their institutions through the capacity of institutions to shape the preferences of individuals and to manipulate the incentives available to members of the organizations”.¹ Secondly, the rational choice institutionalism attempts “to defuse the unconstructive stand-off between structuralists and behaviouralists” so that it focuses not only on agency or interests, but it is also concerned with structure and institutions.² Thirdly, in a pragmatic vein, by following key assumptions of the rational choice institutionalism approach, this study aims to explore the rational dimensions of Islamic political actors who have typically been assumed as ideological or irrational.³

¹ B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’* (London: Pinter, 1999), p. 67.

² Furthermore, see Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism”, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (London: Macmillan Press, 2002), pp. 90-108.

³ Similar to other theoretical approaches, however, rational choice institutionalism contains some theoretical and analytic problems. Peters explains four limitations of rational choice institutionalism. Firstly, “the difficulty in falsifying the predictions coming from this body of theory”. Secondly, “there is little direct confrontation of theory and evidence”. Thirdly, “there is sometimes little relationship between the institutions described in theory and the institutions with which the members of those structures are familiar”. Fourthly, “the models are largely incapable of generating the type of predictions of policy outcomes that would be required if these models are to be more than interesting representations of the complex realities that they are meant to describe”. See, B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’* pp. 67-68. Meanwhile, Shepsle points out that the application of rational choice institutionalism in social research tends to make “abstraction, simplification, analytical rigor, and an insistence on clean lines of analysis from basic axioms to analytical propositions to

To understand the key assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, we need to understand basic assumptions of rational choice theory. Based on neoclassical economic theory, rational choice theory employs a set of assumptions. According to Coleman, there are at least three major assumptions of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory assumes that social interaction is basically guided by the actor's rational choice among alternative outcomes. It also argues that in order to decide a definite choice, an individual applies a calculation of its costs and benefits. Moreover, it assumes that actions of an individual are purposive and intentional.⁴ In short, as argued by Hindmoor, "Rational choice theorists recognize that structures determine the range of choices open to individuals, but, ultimately, they account for outcomes in terms of the choices individuals make. They emphasize agency over structure".⁵

Hindmoor also explains that rational choice theory applies the axiomatic approach. In this sense, "A person is rational if they are instrumentally rational, they are instrumentally rational if they have a preference-ordering which is reflective, complete, transitive and continuous, and if they have such a preference-ordering their rationality will manifest itself in utility maximization".⁶ Similarly, Zey points out that in the rational choice way of thinking, "an actor will choose an action rationally, based on a hierarchy of preference (values, utilities), that promises to maximize benefits and minimize costs".⁷

In addition, the rational choice way of thinking has been used to define the concept of a political party. For instance, in his *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Downs defined a political party as "a team of men seeking to control the government apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election".⁸ Another example is Epstein who defined a political party as "any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label".⁹ Similarly, Schlesinger argued that as a matter of fact a political party is "a team that seeks to control by winning elective

empirical implications". See, Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 32.

⁴ James S. Coleman, *Foundation of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990), pp. 13-19 and 27-44.

⁵ Andrew Hindmoor, *Rational Choice* (New York: Palgrave, 2006), p. 1.

⁶ Ibid, p. 184.

⁷ Mary Zey, *Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), pp. 2.

⁸ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 25.

⁹ Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 2000), p. 9.

office”.¹⁰ When analyzing parties in the United States, Aldrich also defined parties in a similar sense i.e., as coalitions of elites seeking to capture and utilize political office.¹¹ In the rational choice perspective, therefore, a political party is viewed as a political organization which pursues two main goals, namely to maximize votes (a vote-seeking party) and to secure their position in government (an office-seeking party).¹²

Regarding institutionalism, scholars have distinguished two approaches of institutionalism, namely traditional institutionalism and new institutionalism. Lowndes argues that the traditional institutionalism approach focuses its analytical process on the rules, procedures and formal organizations of government.¹³ Moreover, Peters explains that traditional institutionalism has several characteristics, i.e., legalism, structuralism, holism, historical and normative analysis.¹⁴ In contrast to rational choice theory, therefore, the traditional institutionalism approach emphasizes structure over agency.

In contrast, the new institutionalism approach modifies its focus of analysis from organizations to rules, from a formal to an informal concept of institutions, from a static to a dynamic conception of institution, from submerged values to a value-critical stance, from a holistic to a disaggregated concept of institution and from independence to embeddedness.¹⁵ Peters explains that there are four major assumptions of the new institutionalism approach. Firstly, institution refers to a structural feature of society that can be either a formal structure (a legal framework) or an informal structure (a set of shared norms). Secondly, institutions have some degree of stability over time. Thirdly, institutions affect individual behavior. Fourthly, institutions contribute to a sense of shared values and meaning among members of the institutions.¹⁶ Further, new institutionalism has various versions, including rational choice institutionalism.

In the rational choice way of thinking, as March and Olsen pointed out, “Institutions are not simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating

¹⁰ Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p. 10.

¹¹ John Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 19-20.

¹² Further, Strøm and Müller explain that political parties have a small and well-defined set of objectives which can be distinguished into the office-seeking, vote-seeking, and policy-seeking objectives. In the modern political era, however, parties rarely have opportunities to realize all of their goals simultaneously. Therefore, political parties are likely to make trade-offs and compromises among these different objectives. Furthermore, see Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds.), *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decision* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-35.

¹³ Furthermore, see Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism.”

¹⁴ B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’*, pp. 6-11.

¹⁵ Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism.”

¹⁶ B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’* pp. 18-19.

individual actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are (also) collections of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life”.¹⁷ Shepsle explains that the rational choice institutionalism approach differentiates the relationship between individuals and institutions into three ways, i.e., institutions as “exogenous constraints, or as an exogenously given *game form*,” institutions as the rules of the game or equilibrium which are provided by the players themselves and institutions as “macrosociological practices” which are defined and altered by historical contingency.¹⁸ Similarly, Peters points out that rational choice institutionalism explains the relationship between individual and institutions into three versions, i.e., institutions as rules to prescribe, proscribe and permit individual behaviors, institutions as decision rules to achieve collective welfare and institutions as an instrument to fulfill individual goals.¹⁹

According to Shepsle, the development of rational choice institutionalism was heavily influenced by the first version, i.e., the institutions as constraints or the institutions as rules.²⁰ In this version, institutions are viewed as “aggregations of rules that shape individual behavior, but individuals react rationally to those incentives and constraints established by those rules”.²¹ Similarly, Immergut explains that institutions structure individual actions so that they choose suboptimal equilibria.²² Different to rational choice theory, therefore, rational choice institutionalism assumes that institutions still play a pivotal role in determining actions of political actors. In this sense, instead of acting as purely rational actors, political actors experience bounded rationality²³ or narrow rationality.²⁴

Unlike traditional institutionalism, on the other hand, the rational choice institutionalism approach argues that there is a room for political actors to act rationally so that their actions are in fact not completely dictated by institutions. Landa argues that the rationality of political actors is influenced by a combination of social justification of

¹⁷ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Elaborating “New Institutionalism”, in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, p. 4.

¹⁸ Furthermore, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism.”

¹⁹ Furthermore, see B. Guy Peters, “*Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’*” pp. 52-55.

²⁰ Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism.”

²¹ B. Guy Peters, “*Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’*” p. 50.

²² Furthermore, see Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” *Politics & Society*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1998), pp. 5-34.

²³ Furthermore, see Herbert Simon, *Reason in Human Affairs* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

²⁴ Furthermore, see Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

rational behavior and of individual-level application of norms to a particular situation of choice.²⁵ Likewise, Rose and Mackie point out that it is true that political actors must react to external changes in the larger political environment. However, they must also deal with their internal concerns.²⁶ Within institutions, therefore, there is room for political actors to make political maneuvers in order to pursue their own interests. As argued by Perkins, “Political actors are not simply pawns, acting out strategies dictated by larger structures, but are actors with their own goals and aspirations. Structures remain important, but alone they can only provide probabilistic models which are of little help when wishing to understand the mechanisms between structures and outcomes”.²⁷

In the rational choice institutionalism perspective, therefore, the role of structure is as important as agency in determining the socio-political actions. In Peters’ words:

The fundamental argument of the rational choice (institutionalism) approach is that utility maximization can and will remain the primary motivation of individuals, but those individuals may realize that their goals can be achieved most effectively through institutional action, and find that their behaviour is shaped by the institutions.²⁸

Further, Hall and Taylor explain that “the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences” and they “behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment if these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation.”²⁹ In this sense, rational choice institutionalism argues that “political institutions are systems of rules and inducements within which individuals attempt to maximize their utilities”.³⁰

Following the rational choice institutionalism way of thinking, this study provides five major assumptions. Firstly, Islamic political actors have certain interests, i.e., to win elections. Secondly, these actors organize Islamic parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. Thirdly, in organizing their parties, they have a set of strategies. Fourthly, among the existing strategies, these Islamic political

²⁵ Dimitri Landa, “Rational Choices as Social Norms,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2006), pp. 434-53.

²⁶ Richard Rose and Thomas T. Mackie, “Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-Off Facing Organization,” in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds.), *When Parties Fail. Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 533-58.

²⁷ Doug Perkins, “Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party Formation,” *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), p. 356.

²⁸ B. Guy Peters, “*Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’*” p. 48.

²⁹ Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,” *Political Studies*, Vol. XLIV (1996), p. 944-45.

³⁰ Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism,” p. 96.

actors select the most preferred strategy. Fifthly, in selecting the most preferred strategy, they take into account incentives and constraints provided by formal as well as informal institutions or structures. In other words, this study rests on the assumption that by calculating incentives as well as constraints provided by the existing socio-political structures, Islamic political actors apply a certain strategy when they organize their parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections.

2. Party Organization and Party Models

Needless to say, the political party is the most interesting subject of analysis in modern political science. Moreover, it is a study that has challenged many scholars for a long time. As Montero and Gunther point out, “indeed, parties were among the first subjects of analysis at the very birth of modern political science”.³¹ Research on parties reached its golden age in the mid twentieth century in which many seminal works had been produced.³² Using different approaches, studies on parties have focused on various subjects.³³ One of the most complicated topics is party organization. As Panebianco points out, analysis of party organization is one of the oldest research dimensions of parties and it is one of the most frustrating parts in the studies of parties as well.³⁴ In addition, the study of party organization had been started by Ostrogorski (1902) and the efforts in turn had been continued by Michels (1911), Weber (1922), Duverger (1951) and Kirchheimer (1966).

There has been widespread agreement that the role of parties is very important in a democratic system. Mair argues that, “In modern democracies... politics is about party politics”.³⁵ As a consequence, as pointed out by Rossiter, “no democracy without

³¹ José Ramón Montero and Richard Gunther, “Introduction: Reviewing and Reassessing Parties,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 2.

³² According to Scarrow, the discourse on parties has a long history in Western European countries and the United States. It can be traced back to the intellectual debates about parties among political scientists and practitioners in Britain, the United States, and Germany in the eighteenth century. Susan E. Scarrow, “Coming to Terms with Parties in the Nineteenth Century,” in Susan E. Scarrow (ed.) *Perspective in Political Parties. Classic Readings* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1-26.

³³ Puhle argues that the party literature focuses on six dimensions, namely the electoral dimension, interest of the party constituency, party organization, party system, policy formulation, and policy implementation. Furthermore, see Hans-Jürgen Puhle, “Still the Age of Catch-allism? Volksparteien and Parteienstaat on Crisis and Re-equilibration,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, pp. 61-62.

³⁴ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 3.

³⁵ Peter Mair, *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 125.

politics and no politics without parties”.³⁶ Although many studies indicate that parties have become less relevant to their members or supporters³⁷ and the rise of the anti-party movement³⁸ so that various alternative political organizations have emerged and have replaced the role of parties in the political process,³⁹ parties still play a significant role in the modern political age. This is due to the fact that they are able to continue their special functions and to maintain the critical level of organization needed to fulfill those functions. They also have a capability to adapt to changing rules, attitudes and circumstances.⁴⁰

Theoretically speaking, parties are assumed both by their members and by other organizations as a political agency aiming to establish the political linkage between voters or citizens and policy-makers or governments.⁴¹ More specifically, as explained by Klingemann, parties select the demands of society which have been articulated mostly by interest groups and the mass media. Afterwards, they turn these demands into political issues by defining out policy alternatives. In turn, they attempt to transform their policy alternatives into government policies.⁴² In this sense, parties serve as a

³⁶ Clinton Rossiter as cited in John Kenneth White, “What Is A Political Party,” in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics* (London: Sage, 2006), p. 7.

³⁷ The phenomenon of declining party membership size takes place not only in established democracies, but also in new democracies. Furthermore on parties declining in European countries, for example, see Hermann Schmitt and Sören Holmberg, “Political Parties in Decline?” in Hans Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (eds.), *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-133; Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Partisan Change and the Democratic Process,” in Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 261-85; Russel J. Dalton and Steven A. Weldon, “Public Images of Political Parties. A Necessary Evil?” *West European Politics*, 28:5 (2005), pp. 931-51. Meanwhile, on parties declining in new democracies, see, for instance, Juan J. Linz, “Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Problem and Paradox,” Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, pp. 291-317.

³⁸ For the rise of the anti-party movement in European countries, for instance, see Mariano Torcal, Richard Gunther and José Ramón Montero, “Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, pp. 257-90; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies* (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 1-22.

³⁹ For various alternative political organizations outside parties, see Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, “Alternative Organizations: Environmental, Supplementary, Communitarian, and Antiauthoritarian,” in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds.), *When Parties Fail. Emerging Alternative Organizations*, pp. 3-12; Thomas Poguntke, “Political Parties and Other Organizations,” in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, pp. 396-405.

⁴⁰ Nathan Yanai, “Why Do Political Parties Survive? An Analytical Discussion,” *Party Politics*, Vol. 5. No. 1 (1999), pp. 5-17.

⁴¹ Kay Lawson, “Political Parties and Linkage,” in Kay Lawson (ed.), *Political Parties and Linkage. A Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 3.

⁴² Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard I. Hofferbert, and Ian Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 7-9.

political representation through which they make voices, opinions and the interests of society present in political process.⁴³

In the context of new democracies, Diamond, Linz and Lipset underline that parties play a pivotal role in connecting political leadership and voters, or political elite and civil society, or the rulers and the ruled.⁴⁴ Moreover, Randall and Svåsand argue that the role of parties in the transition to democracy is paramount to recruit and to train political leaders, to organize responsible opposition to government, to contribute to conflict resolution and to institutionalize democratic behavior and attitudes among people.⁴⁵

The functions of parties have to do with party organization. Theoretically speaking, a well-organized party will be able to implement these ideal functions, and vice versa. In other words, by understanding party organization, one can analyze the ability of parties to implement their ideal functions. Moreover, by exploring party organization, one can understand the real condition inside parties when they deal with various constraints and incentives surrounding them. In Taggart's words:

Understanding how a party organizes itself allows us a glimpse into a party's true nature. It permits us to look beyond the persona deliberately cultivated and projected to the voters at election time. It also enables us to look beyond the activists' exalted claims of ideological commitment and purity to see how deep those claims run when faced the ideology-sullyng problems of political survival. The organization of the party is where the rhetoric meets the reality. It is nexus between beliefs and action.⁴⁶

In the party organization literature, there are a number of classical works with different focus of analyses. For instance, Ostrogorski focused on party structure, processes, critical events and actors when he explored parties in Britain⁴⁷ and in the United States.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Michels emphasized intra-party democracy in the mass-based party in Western European countries.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Duverger explored the relationship between parties and their members, the basic elements of parties and the

⁴³ Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Los Angeles: University of Press, 1967), pp. 8-9.

⁴⁴ Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?" in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 9.

⁴⁵ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, "Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation," *Democratization*, Vol. 9. No. 3 (2002), pp. 1-10.

⁴⁶ Paul Taggart, *The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 110.

⁴⁷ M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. I* (New York: Haskell House Publishres, 1970).

⁴⁸ M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II* (New York: Haskell House Publishres, 1970).

⁴⁹ Robert Michels, *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-56.

ability of parties in articulating interests of their members.⁵⁰ In addition, Sartori focused on the phenomenon of fraction, faction and tendency inside parties in the United States, Italy and Japan.⁵¹

These classical literatures have been continued by other scholars in order to explain contemporary phenomena of party organization. Janda, for instance, proposes two dimensions of comparative analysis, namely the party's external relationship (the relationship between party and society) and the party's internal organization (intra-party democracy).⁵² Meanwhile, Lawson employs four variables when he analyses the element of party organization, namely motives, means, degree of closure and external situation.⁵³ Another example is Panebianco who explores comprehensively the dynamics of the struggle for power within parties (organizational power).⁵⁴ Focusing on party organization in the United States, on the other hand, Schlesinger attempts to categorize party models, namely the business firm, the interest group and the public bureau.⁵⁵ More recently, Randall and Svåsand introduce four aspects of party institutionalization, i.e., systemness (the increasing scope of, density and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure), value infusion (the identification and commitment between party and its supporters), decisional autonomy (the degree of freedom from interference in determining policies and strategies) and reification (the party's existence in the public imagination).⁵⁶

A more comprehensive analytical framework, however, has been proposed by Katz and Mair. According to these scholars, party organization can be analyzed by distinguishing it into three different organizational faces, namely organization of the party on the ground, organization of the party in central office and organization of the party in public office. The organization of the party on the ground deals with the relationship between parties and their members or supporters. The organization of the party in central office has to do with party leadership. Meanwhile, the organization of

⁵⁰ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern States* (London: Lowe and Brydone Ltd, 1964), pp. 4-60.

⁵¹ Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis* (Colchester: ecpr Press, 2005), pp. 63-102.

⁵² Kenneth Janda, "Cross-National Measures of Party Organizations and Organizational Theory," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 11 (1983), pp. 319-32.

⁵³ Kay Lawson, "Toward a Theory of How Political Parties Work," in Kay Lawson (ed.), *How Political Parties Work. Perspective from Within* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), pp. 285-303.

⁵⁴ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁵ Joseph A. Schlesinger, "On the Theory of Party Organization," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1984), pp. 369-400.

⁵⁶ Vicky Randal and Lars Svåsand, "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," *Party Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5-29.

the party in central office relates to the role of the parties in making policies. Further, they also argue that although these three different organizational dimensions have their own focuses, they co-exist and inter-relate each other.⁵⁷

For the purpose of analysis, this study follows the analytical framework of party organization proposed by Katz and Mair for three reasons. Firstly, compared to the other analytical frameworks of party organization, it is likely that Katz and Mair's analytical framework is more comprehensive in covering all dimensions of party organization. Secondly, the similar analytical framework has been widely utilized by many scholars when they analyze the organizational features of parties in established democracies.⁵⁸ Thirdly, a similar analytical framework has also been employed to analyze phenomena of party organization in new democracies.⁵⁹

It is also important to note that the concept of party organization is strongly intertwined with the concept of party models. By exploring party organization, therefore, one can categorize parties into a certain model. Krouwel argues that party organization becomes one of the most prominent variables in categorizing party models.⁶⁰ Moreover, organizational development of parties in fact reflects sequences in development of party models. Katz and Mair point out that, "the development of the parties in Western democracies has been reflective of a dialectical process in which each of the party models generates a reaction which stimulates further development, thus leading to yet another type of party, and to another set of reactions and so on".⁶¹

Scholars also employ various approaches in order to develop a comprehensive party model. Mair and Mudde, for instance, propose four variables to classifying party models, i.e., origins and sociology (referring to historical and socio-structural factors), transnational links (referring to the relationship among parties with the same ideology in different countries), policy and the ideology of parties as well as party name as name or

⁵⁷ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," *The American Review of Politics*, Vol. 14 (1993), pp. 593-617. See, also Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22; Peter Mair, *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations*, pp. 120-54.

⁵⁸ V.O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961); Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), to name a few.

⁵⁹ See, for instance, Ingrid van Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Paul Webb and Stephen White (eds.), *Party Politics in New Democracies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁶⁰ André Krouwel, "Party Models," in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, p. 249.

⁶¹ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), p. 6

label of a party reflect its own ideological identity. They also argue that a combination of the historical factor and ideological factor is the best approach to develop party models since the historical factor can explain the long-term development of parties, while the ideological factor can explain the real identity of parties (what they are rather than what they do).⁶²

Based on their goal orientation as well as their relationship with society, Neumann develops eight party models, i.e., the patronage, principles, personage, programmatic, individual representation, social integration, total integration and democratic integration parties.⁶³ Meanwhile, based on the relationship between parties and their members, Duverger classifies four party models, i.e., the direct, indirect, cadre and mass parties.⁶⁴ Focusing on their organizational networks and functions, however, Sartori introduces five models of party, i.e., the legislative-electoral, quasi-mass or pre-mass, electoral mass, semi-apparat and apparat mass parties.⁶⁵

Moreover, based on their formal organizations, their programmatic commitments, their strategy and behavioral norms, Gunther and Diamond develop five party models, namely the elite, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist and movement parties. More specifically, the elite party consists of the local notable and clientelistic parties. In the mass-based party, there are the denominational and fundamentalist parties (the religion party), the pluralist-nationalist and ultranationalist parties (the nationalism party) and the Leninist and class-mass parties (the socialist party). Meanwhile, the ethnicity-based party in turn can be divided into the ethnic and congress parties. In this typology, the electoralist party can be distinguished into the personalistic, catch-all and programmatic parties. Lastly, the movement party consists of the left-libertarian and postindustrial extreme right parties.⁶⁶

To consolidate these various party models, Krouwel proposes five party models, namely the elite party, the mass party, the electoralist catch-all party, the cartel party and the business-firm party. He argues that these models are based on similarities in

⁶² Furthermore, see Peter Mair and Cas Mudde, "The Party Family and Its Study," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 211-29.

⁶³ Sigmund Neumann, "Toward A Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties. Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956), pp. 400-05.

⁶⁴ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern States*, pp. 5-16 and 62-90.

⁶⁵ Giovanni Sartori, "Party Types, Organization and Functions," *West European Politics*, 28:1(2005), pp. 5-32.

⁶⁶ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," *Party Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 167-99.

focus and crucial features of the party models develop by other scholars in the past. As he points out:

Not all party models that have been proposed are totally unique. Among the proposed models there is substantial similarity and overlap, and numerous party types that have been suggested are merely reformulations of an already existing model.⁶⁷

In addition, Katz and Mair explain that each of party models may or may not contribute to democracy depending on various factors, including changes in civil society and changes in the relationship between parties and the state.⁶⁸ It is also important to note that there is no a certain party model that is dominant at any given time. Especially in the modern era, therefore, it is possible to see the existence of all party models in a party system. It is even possible for a party to have some elements as well as represent more than one ideal model.⁶⁹ Two factors contribute to such conditions. Once a party has been institutionalized as a particular model, the basic nature of the party may be frozen so that it becomes resistant to pressure for change. Also, there is no strong correlation between social context on one side, and the ideology, platform and strategy of a party on the other side.⁷⁰

For the purpose of analysis, this study applies the party models summarized by Krouwel, namely the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party. It is important to note that one party model, namely the business-firm party, is excluded from this study. This is due to the fact that the business-firm party is a recent phenomenon taking place only in European countries.⁷¹ In building the analytical framework, therefore, each of these party models will be elaborated further into three different organizational dimensions, namely the organization of the party on the ground, the organization of the party in central office and the organization of the party in public office.

As mentioned earlier, the theories of party organization and party models as discussed above are based on the experiences of the United States and Western European countries or established democracies. As the development of party organization and party models is influenced by a particular factor and it also takes place

⁶⁷ André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 249-69.

⁶⁸ Furthermore, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 5-28.

⁶⁹ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," p. 172.

⁷⁰ Hans Daalder, "The Rise of Parties in Western Democracies," in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy*, p. 174.

⁷¹ André Krouwel, "Party Models," p. 260.

in particular contexts, however, it is important to review the existing literature on party organization and party models in developing countries as well.

3. Party Organization in Developing Countries

Generally speaking, the development of party organization in new democracies takes place in the following conditions. Firstly, it has been regularly interrupted by a long period of authoritarian regimes.⁷² Secondly, different to parties in Western democracies in which they emerged in the context of a competitive oligarchy, parties in developing countries emerged from hegemonic regimes.⁷³ Thirdly, parties in these countries exist around extreme poverty and economic dependence associated with late industrialization,⁷⁴ a high social fragmentation and heterogeneity and the strength of traditional religious and ethnic bases of identification.⁷⁵ Fourthly, the development of party organization and party models in these countries takes place under international norms as well as traditional values so that parties in these countries experience the so-called “indigenization”.⁷⁶

As a consequence, the development of party organization in these countries does not simply follow a linear process similar to the development of party organization in established democracies, ranging from the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party to the latest stage of the cartel party. Therefore, it is possible that the development of party organization in developing countries takes a different path from the development of party organization and party models in the United States and Western European countries. As van Biezen points out, “Because parties in new democracies appeared in a different historical, social and cultural context, we should not expect them to be like in the old democracies”.⁷⁷

⁷² See, Vicky Randall, “Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World,” in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, pp. 387-95.

⁷³ Ingrid van Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*, pp. 24-27.

⁷⁴ Vicky Randal and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” pp. 16-17.

⁷⁵ Vicky Randall, “Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World.”

⁷⁶ Mitra and Enskat point out that through the indigenization, “parties acquire local roots when they find a niche in locally embedded values and networks, and learn to articulate their special interests in idiom of the modern state and use their proximity to power and patronage in order to promote the interests of their followers”. Subrata K. Mitra and Mike Enskat, “Introduction,” in Subrata K. Mitra, Mika Enskat, and Clemens Spieß (eds.), *Political Parties in South Asia* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2004), p. 7.

⁷⁷ Ingrid van Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*, p. 27.

Randal and Svåsand explain that the establishment of party organization in developing countries takes various trajectories. Some of them have been terminated at the stage of the elite-based party. Parties in other developing countries have also reached the stage of the electoralist party or the cartel party. Further, they explain that parties in developing countries lack experience with the stage of the mass-based party. It is not surprising if the development of party organization in these countries has typically been foreshortened from the elite-based party to the electoralist party or even the cartel party.⁷⁸

It should also be acknowledged that the degree of party institutionalization in developing countries is different. Some studies have come to the conclusion that parties in developing countries resemble the ideal-type of the elite-based party. Based on the organizational features of parties in Africa, Asia and Latin America countries, Randall, for instance, argues that parties in this area tend to be dominated by a single leader. As a consequence, decision-making process inside these parties is almost fully oriented top down. Moreover, she explains that these parties put an emphasis on the role of personal and family networks of charismatic leaders when they create and maintain the political linkage with their members or supporters. As a result, they are often viewed simply as ephemeral vehicles for the personal ambition of their charismatic leaders.⁷⁹

Kitschelt also points out that clientelistic politics is very dominant in Asian and Latin American countries because of the absence of a redistributive welfare state. As a result, allocation of patronage becomes the most important factor in the relationship between parties and their members or supporters. He also argues that voters in developing countries largely do not elect parties based on their platforms, but they rely more on material incentives.⁸⁰ Similarly, in analyzing parties in South Asian countries, Spieß also reaches the similar conclusion that parties in these countries have excessive factionalism as they are based on dynastic or family rule. Consequently, party systems in this area tend to be regionalized and their institutionalization is weak.⁸¹

Meanwhile, Erdmann argues that contemporary African parties have the following features. Firstly, they have barely distinguishable platforms. Secondly, their

⁷⁸ Vicky Randal and Lars Svåsand, "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," pp. 17-18 and 83-84.

⁷⁹ Vicky Randall, "Conclusion," in Vicky Randall (ed.), *Political Parties in the Third World* (London: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 174-91.

⁸⁰ Herbert Kitschelt, "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 6/7 (2000), pp. 845-79.

⁸¹ Clemens Spieß, "Epilogue: Rethinking Party Theory in the Light of South Asian Experience," in Subrata K. Mitra, Mika Enskat, and Clemens Spieß (eds.), *Political Parties in South Asia*, pp. 329-42.

bureaucratic organization is weak. Thirdly, they rely on informal relations through which clientelism and patronage play a dominant role. Fourthly, strong personalism dominates formal internal structure of parties. Fifthly, they experience a high degree of factionalism. Sixth, they lack internal democracy.⁸² These organizational features indicate that parties in developing countries adopt the elite-based party model.

Other studies also show that, to a limited extent, parties in developing countries contain some elements of the mass-based party model. As Randall argues, similar to parties in Western countries, the concept of social cleavage is also important for parties in developing countries.⁸³ However, different to the social cleavages in Western countries which are based on economic divisions, the social cleavages in developing countries are based more on ethnic divisions as shown by African parties⁸⁴ and some parties in Latin America.⁸⁵ Similarly, parties in Southeast Asian countries are also associated with certain ethnic groups so that they are ethnically-based organizations rather than ideologically-based organizations.⁸⁶ Therefore, polarization among parties in these countries is rarely based on the left-right ideological spectrum.

Moreover, some studies argue that parties in these countries tend to adopt the electoralist party model. This argument is based on the fact that these parties are rarely in a position to offer ideologies so that they prefer to position themselves in the centre of different ideology. Even if they have ideologies, their ideologies are eclectic and vague. In general, parties in these countries lack coherent platform.⁸⁷ Often, their relationship with other social organizations is very weak or absent. Moreover, even if parties have a link with social organizations, such as women, youth, student, peasant groups and trade unions, the role of these social organizations is limited within the organization of parties. In this sense, their role is important just in a frame of mobilizing supports in election period.⁸⁸ In other words, parties in these countries view their members only in a frame to gain supports rather than as a significant element of internal

⁸² Gero Erdmann, "Party Research: Western European Bias and the "African Labyrinth," *Democratization*, 11:3 (2004), pp. 63-87.

⁸³ Furthermore, see Vicky Randall, "Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World," pp. 387-95.

⁸⁴ Gero Erdmann, "Party Research: Western European Bias and the "African Labyrinth."

⁸⁵ Furthermore, see Robert H. Dix, "Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1992), pp. 488-511.

⁸⁶ See, Aurel Croissant, "Conclusion: Electoral Politics in Southeast Asia," in Aurel Croissant and Beate Martin (eds.), *Between Consolidation and Crisis. Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), pp. 351-64.

⁸⁷ Vicky Randall, "Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World."

⁸⁸ Vicky Randall, "Conclusion."

organization. Consequently, they have blurred membership figures and members of parties also lack strong loyalty so that they have a high frequency of party-switching.⁸⁹

In addition, Perkins argues that the organizational features of parties in new democracies, more specifically in Eastern European countries are determined by various structural conditions, i.e., the historical legacy of the party (past strategies constrain future choices of political actors), the porous bureaucracy, the availability of effective media to parties, the availability and support of social organizations to parties, the nature of the past regime, the size of the country, the early success of a ruling party and the ability of the parties to control local resources. These factors, in turn, have led to the emergence of the electoralist party in these countries.⁹⁰

More recently, some studies indicate that parties in developing countries can be categorized as the cartel party. This is due to the fact that, as pointed out by Randall, “the boundary between the ruling party and government or bureaucracy in these countries is also often extremely hazy”.⁹¹ Further, van Biezen explains that parties in these countries are closely linked to the state in three dimensions. Firstly, they are highly dependent on the state in terms of party finance. This situation takes place due to the fact that parties in these countries lack capability to derive income from membership fees. Secondly, to a large extent, they are also managed by the state. Thirdly, they have various controls over key resources of the state.⁹²

To sum up, the development of party organization and party models in these countries does not simply follow a linear process to the development of party organization in Western countries, ranging from the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party to the cartel party. However, it does not necessarily mean that the organizational features of parties in developing countries are completely different from the organizational features of parties in Western countries. As explained above, many studies indicate that some parties in developing countries tend to adopt the elite-based party model, while other parties resemble the ideal-type of the mass-based party, the electoralist party, or the cartel party models.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Doug Perkins, “Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and Media in Party Formation,” *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), pp. 355-75

⁹¹ Vicky Randall, “Conclusion,” p. 179.

⁹² See Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký, “The State and the Parties. Public Funding, Public Regulation and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary Democracy,” *Party Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 235-54.

4. The Analytical Framework

4.1. *The Ideal-Type of the Elite-Based Party Organization*

Historically speaking, the elite-based party surfaced in the nineteenth century in Northern European countries. The elite-based party emerged in the following contexts. Firstly, there was highly restricted suffrage through which political participation of the society was limited to certain groups and persons. Secondly, ascribed status was very dominant in competition among parties. Thirdly, political activities largely revolved around the distribution of privileges.⁹³

In the late of the nineteenth century and early the twentieth century, various versions of the elite-based party arose in Southern European countries, the United States and some developing countries. According Krouwel, the alternative versions of the elite-based party are the personage party (Neumann), the caucus (Ostrogoski), the parliamentary origin party (Duverger), the individual representation party (Neumann and Kirchheimer), the notables party (Neumann), the elite party (Beyme), the modern cadre party (Koole), the local cadre party (Epstein), the traditional local notable party (Katz and Mair, Lapalombara and Weiner) and the legislative-electoral party (Sartori).⁹⁴

In general, organization of these parties has the following features. As pointed out by Katz and Mair, these parties are “basically committees of those people who jointly constituted both the state and civil society”.⁹⁵ Within these parties, organization of the party on the ground as well as organization of the party in central office plays an insignificant role, while organization of the party in central office plays a very dominant role.⁹⁶ In addition, these parties tend to be the office-seeking party so that their goal is to occupy as many positions as possible both in the executive branch as well as in the legislative branch of government.⁹⁷

⁹³ Furthermore, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 8-10; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77; Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77.

⁹⁴ Furthermore, see André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 250-52.

⁹⁵ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” p. 9.

⁹⁶ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization,” p. 602; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” pp. 1-22; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, p. 115.

⁹⁷ Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, pp. 136-65; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 249-69.

The party on the ground. The organizational structure of the party on the ground in the elite-based party is very weak since the party elites are able to create and maintain the political linkage with their supporters directly. In doing so, they employ patronage and clientelism as well as their interpersonal networks with their supporters.⁹⁸ In such a mechanism, there is a mutual relationship through which the party elites become the patrons and their supporters act as the clients. As the patrons, the party elites provide material and non-material facilities for their supporters. In return, as the clients, supporters provide political support for the party elites.⁹⁹

To some extent, the organizational structure of the party on the ground serve as an instrument of the party elites when they attempt to provide material support for their supporters, such as money, jobs in the government and government contracts. Through the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the party elites can also provide non-material support by providing platforms favorable for their supporters.¹⁰⁰ In this context, the organizational structure of the party on the ground in the elite-based party provides a significant contribution for institutionalization of patronage, clientelistic and interpersonal network mechanisms between the party elites and their supporters.¹⁰¹

Supporters therefore have a sense of obligation to vote for the party elites in elections and they also must support the party elites with positions in the government. By employing patronage, clientelism and interpersonal networks, therefore, the party elites are able to create and maintain the political linkage with their supporters not just during election period. In this sense, they are able to create and maintain the political linkage with their supporters by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities.¹⁰²

Moreover, as the party elites depend on the exchange of obligations and services through patronage, clientelistic and interpersonal network mechanisms, they disregard the role of an ideology when they create and maintain the political linkage with their

⁹⁸ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 253-54 and 262-63; Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties* (Göteborg: Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, 2004), pp. 59-64.

⁹⁹ Jonathan Hopkin, "Clientelism and Party Politics," in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, pp. 406-12.

¹⁰⁰ Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 68-72 and 74-78

¹⁰¹ Jonathan Hopkin, "Clientelism and Party Politics."

¹⁰² Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties*, pp. 59-64.

supporters. In this sense, the role of an ideology in the elite-based party is replaced by the role of charismatic leaders. Moreover, platforms of the elite-based party in fact reflect the interests of the party elites.¹⁰³

As patronage, clientelistic, or interpersonal network mechanisms take place in daily life activities, the party elites pay little attention to the need for election campaigns. In order to attract voters, therefore, the party elites prefer the application of a low-risk strategy, such as relying on their own personal charisma¹⁰⁴ as well as by employing their personal contacts¹⁰⁵ rather than employing the organizational structure of the party on the ground. Not surprisingly, the role of the party on the ground is also weak or absent during election period.¹⁰⁶

In the elite-based party, there are no special requirements to become supporters. The elite-based party allows anyone to become its supporters as long as he or she provides obligations as the clients for the party elites. In this sense, the elite-based party prefers to have “supporters” rather than “members”. Consequently, firstly, the elite based party disregards the existence of a formal membership system. Secondly, there is no specific level of membership in the elite-based party. Thirdly, the relationship between the party elites and their supporters is based on a subordinate rather than on an equality relationship.¹⁰⁷

To make sure that the supporters provide their obligations to vote for the party elites and to support the party elites when they have a position in the government, the loyalty of the supporters is paramount. For the elite-based party, therefore, quality of the supporters is more important than quantity of the supporters. As a consequence, supporters of the elite-based party are small and elitist. However, it does not necessarily mean that the elite-based party makes no significant efforts to attract supporters. The elite-based party attempts to get supporters but just on the consideration that its

¹⁰³ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 253-54 and 262-63; Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” pp. 153-59.

¹⁰⁴ Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” pp. 153-59.

¹⁰⁵ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 253-54 and 262-63.

¹⁰⁶ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 8-10.

¹⁰⁷ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 253-54 and 262-63.

supporters are willing to serve as the clients of the party elites.¹⁰⁸ In this sense, the elite-based party focuses on a particular group who has a personal relationship with the party elites rather than on a wide array of groups in society.¹⁰⁹

Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office, in the elite-based party, the organizational structure of the party on the ground is managed by the same persons who manage the organizational structure of the party in public office. In general, however, the existence and role of these two organizations is weak. Compared to the organizational structure of the party in central office, in the elite-based, the organizational structure of the party on the ground plays a more significant role.¹¹⁰

The party in central office. The domination of the party elites also takes place in the organizational structure of the party in central office. The party elites serve as party leaders or they appoint party leader. In recruiting a leader, the party elites adopt a self-recruitment process which is based on their personal initiatives. Moreover, officials of the party come mainly from upper-class origin. Such a mechanism is employed by the party elites in order to make sure that the interest of officials of the party in central office is in accordance with the interests of the party elites.¹¹¹ Such a mechanism is also necessary to make sure that officials of the party in central office act as the clients of the party elites. Through a self-recruitment process, therefore, the patron-client relationship is institutionalized within the elite-based party.¹¹²

The role of the party elites is also dominant in the decision-making process in the organization of the party in central office. In this sense, the decision-making process in the elite-based party is based on a top-down mechanism so that the role of supporters is excluded. Moreover, the organizational structure of the party in central office in the elite-based party is minimal and centralized. It also lacks modern management principles, such as discipline, a division of authority, transparency and accountability.

¹⁰⁸ Jonathan Hopkin, "Clientelism and Party Politics."

¹⁰⁹ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 253-54 and 262-63.

¹¹⁰ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," p. 602; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," p. 115.

¹¹¹ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," p. 115.

¹¹² Jonathan Hopkin, "Clientelism and Party Politics."

Similar to the organizational structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the organizational structure of the party in central office is controlled by the party elites.¹¹³

It is also important to note that the personal wealth of the party elites play a dominant role in party finances. As the elite-based party disregards a formal membership, consequently, it is not able to generate membership fees. In addition, if the party elites have a position in the government, the elite-based party also receives a state subvention. Depending on the financial contributions from the party elites, therefore, the elite-based party lacks sustainable financial resources.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, as the party elites have their own resources to make direct contact with their supporters, they tend to disregard the existence of the organizational structure of the party in central office. If the organizational structure of the party in central office exists in the elite-based party, however, it consists of relatively close alliances or cliques and it is characterized by particular factional organization. Moreover, the party elites also disregard the role of the organizational structure of the party in central office in creating and maintaining the political relationships between the party elites and their supporters. Similar to the organizational structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the organizational structure of the party in central office in the elite-based party lacks social activities in election period and beyond.¹¹⁵

With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, in the elite-based party, the organizational structure of the party in central office is completely subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office. In this sense, officials of the party in public office have dominant roles in managing the organizational structure of the party in central office. Similar to the organizational structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the organizational structure of the party in central office serves just as a tool for the party elites to obtain positions in public

¹¹³ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 253-54 and 262-63.

¹¹⁴ André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 253-54 and 262-63.

¹¹⁵ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 175-77; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 8-10; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 253-54 and 262-63.

office. It is also important to note that compared to the other organizational faces, the face of the party in central office is the weakest face in the elite-based party.¹¹⁶

The party in public office. The most prominent face in the elite-based party is the organizational structure of the party in public office, either in the legislative branch or in the executive branch of government. Regarding the organizational structure of the party in the legislative branch of government, legislators of the elite-based party are seen as the only group who play a dominant role in managing the organizational structure of the party on the ground as well as the organizational structure of the party in central office. They also typically make claims that they are leaders of society and representatives of the interests of society. With regard to the model of representation, therefore, legislators of the elite-based party act as trustees for their supporters.¹¹⁷

Moreover, legislators of the elite-based party spend less time when they are involved in making policies. They also tend to make political compromises with other political actors. In this sense, they conduct debates on policy issues which are diffused and unfocused. It is also important to mention that they disregard the role of an ideology as it makes them difficult to establish political compromises with other political actors. In general, legislators of the elite-based party defend their own interests when they are involved in making policies.¹¹⁸

To support their roles in making policies, legislators of the elite-based party employ their personal networks. On the other hand, they disregard the role of the party on the ground as well as the role of the party in central office. Moreover, they also disregard the role of social organizations. In this context, legislators of the elite-based party lack support from internal organization as well as external organization when they are involved in making policies.¹¹⁹

Since their main goal is to gain and secure their positions in public office, typically, legislators of the elite-based party have little ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. They also have minimal ambitions of hegemony when they are involved in making policies. Moreover, they are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors so that it is not too difficult for

¹¹⁶ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," p. 602; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," p. 115.

¹¹⁷ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 8-10.

¹¹⁸ Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," pp. 153-59.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

them to develop coalitions with other political actors. Therefore, in regard to policy-making, legislators of the elite-based party prefer either to share their power with other political actors or to act as a stabilizer within a political system.¹²⁰

4.2. The Ideal-Type of the Mass-Based Party Organization

The mass-based party appeared for the first time in late nineteenth century in Western European countries. The mass-based party emerged in the following settings. Firstly, there was mass suffrage so that the right to vote was not limited. Secondly, the political system was more democratic marked by the strong competition among parties and an active role of social movements. Thirdly, the political goals and conflicts largely revolved around social reformation or opposition to the established system. Consequently, parties competed on the basis of representative capacity. Historically speaking, the mass-based party emerged initially among certain elements of society, particularly working-class and religious groups so that the socialist party or the religious party has been regarded as the most appropriate manifestation of the mass-based party.¹²¹

The relationship between the formation of the mass-based party and social structures in Western European countries had been explored by Lipset and Rokkan. By adopting Talcott Parsons' classification of the functions of a social system, these scholars argued that the national revolution as well as the industrial revolution served as the most important variables in determining the formation of the mass-based party since they led to social cleavages. In turn, these social cleavages were transformed into parties through which the proponents of the secular governments established the secular-nationalist parties, the proponents of the church created the religious parties, the owners and employers formed the capitals parties, the labor and workers established the working-class parties. Moreover, these social cleavages were also transformed into a party system in which there was a rivalry between the secular-nationalist parties and the

¹²⁰ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 175-77; Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," pp. 153-59.

¹²¹ Furthermore, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 132-38; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 10-12; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 177-83.

religious parties on one hand, and the capitalist parties versus the working-class parties on the other hand.¹²²

Some variants of the mass-based party are the mass party (Michels and Duverger), the class-mass and the denominational mass parties (Kirchheimer), the external origin party, the branch-based mass party, the cell-based devotee party (Duverger), the democratic or total integration party, the principle party (Neumann), the mass-bureaucratic party (Panebianco), the programmatic party (Neumann and Wolinetz), the pluralist mass-based party, the fundamentalist party, the Leninist-party, the pluralist nationalist party, the religious fundamentalist party (Gunther and Diamond) and the organizational mass party (Sartori).¹²³

Overall, however, these parties have the following characteristics. Firstly, they serve “as a bridge or linkage” connecting society and the state.¹²⁴ Secondly, within these parties, there is a strong connection between the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office. More specifically, the organizational structure of the party on the ground delegates its power to the organizational structure of the party in central office. In turn, the organizational structure of the party in central office scrutinizes and controls activities of the organizational structure of the party in public office.¹²⁵ Thirdly, these parties are defined as the policy-seeking party as organization of the mass-based party is based on the purpose of maintaining ideological consistency.¹²⁶

It is important to note that different to other variants of the mass-based party, the religious fundamentalist party has different characteristics. In the religious fundamentalist party, there is little interpretation of the ideology and platforms of the party since it is based on religious doctrines. Moreover, the relationship within the

¹²² Furthermore, see S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.

¹²³ Furthermore, see André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 250-52.

¹²⁴ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” p. 11.

¹²⁵ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization,” pp. 602-04; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” pp. 1-22.

¹²⁶ Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, pp. 136-65; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 249-69.

religious fundamentalist party and its members is characterized by hierarchical, undemocratic or absolutist relationship. In this context, the religious fundamentalist party disciplines and emphasizes devotions to its members.¹²⁷ Additionally, “through unintended and unfavorable processes,” however, the religious fundamentalist parties have transformed into secular parties marking the era of secularization and democratization in Western European countries during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.¹²⁸

The party on the ground. In the mass-based party, the role of the party on the ground is very significant in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members. In doing so, the organizational structure of the party on the ground conducts various activities which, in general, can be distinguished into two types. The first type is political or ideological activity, such as operating schools, publishing ideological and policy papers, holding policy discussion, running communication media and training officials of the party. The second type is social activity, such as providing food, employment services, basic education and conducting recreational activities. The organizational structure of the party on the ground carries out such activities in and beyond election periods.¹²⁹ Through the organizational structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the mass-based party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities.¹³⁰

Moreover, the mass-based party is generated by a certain ideological motivation. The ideology of the party, in turn, is translated into the comprehensive platforms of the party. Further, the role of the ideology and platforms of the party is very important not only in creating, but also in maintaining the political linkage with members of the party. As the mass-based party has a certain ideological base, consequently, platforms of the mass-based party are designed for a particular group in society. Bound together by the

¹²⁷ Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 177-83.

¹²⁸ Furthermore, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 257-64.

¹²⁹ Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 101-03; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 177-83; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 10-12; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 254-56 and 262-63.

¹³⁰ Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties*, pp. 39-44.

same ideology and platforms, there is a strong collective consciousness between the party and its members.¹³¹

In order to maintain such a collective consciousness, the mass-based party also has its own channels of communication, such as party's newspapers, policy papers, personal contacts or schools. On one hand, these channels of communication allow the members to articulate their interests. Moreover, they are also important for members of the party in order to control or supervise leaders and officials of the organization of the party at all levels. In addition, these channels of communication are very important in disseminating and maintaining the ideology and platforms of the party to members of the party.¹³²

Through the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the mass-based party conducts political and social activities in its daily activities, including in election period. Election campaigns remain important for the mass-based party in order to achieve both quantity and quality of members. In election period, the organizational structure of the party on the ground conducts campaigns by advertising candidates through mass media, by promoting candidates through direct voter contacts, by holding public meeting and rallies, by registering voters, or by providing child-care program for members of the party. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party on the ground employs labor-intensive activities and internal channels of communication in mobilizing members of the party in election period.¹³³

The existence of a formal membership system is very important for the mass-based party. As Duverger points out, "without members, the party would be like a teacher without pupils".¹³⁴ Moreover, a formal membership system within the mass-based party is based on comprehensive definitions of rights and obligations. In this sense, all members of the party have equal rights and obligations to leaders and officials of the party. There is also a certain level of membership in the mass-based party, such as the electors, supporters and militants. Compared to the other party models, therefore,

¹³¹ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 101-03; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 177-83; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 10-12; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 254-56 and 262-63.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern States*, p. 63.

the mass-based party has a more prominent system regarding a formal membership system.¹³⁵

The role of the party on the ground is also important in recruiting members of the party. Typically, the mass-based party employs two kinds of membership enrollments. First is open recruitment in which there are no particular requirements to become a member of the party. Second is restricted recruitment in which the party applies special requirements to a particular level of membership. In the mass-based party, therefore, the membership recruitment is not only highly selective, but it also appeals to a particular social, religious, or ethnic group on the basis of social cleavages. In other words, the mass-based party focuses on a particular group in society.¹³⁶

With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office, these two organizational structures in the mass-based party have a strong engagement. The organizational structure of the party in central office is very important in providing support for and in guiding the organizational structure of the party on the ground. It is also very important as a central coordinator for activities of the party on the ground. Moreover, the organization of the party in central office is also important as the voice or guardian of the organization of the party on the ground. Also, the organizational structure of the party on the ground is very important for the organizational structure of the party in central office to provide resources that are necessary for the existence and successes of the mass-based party in general.¹³⁷

The party in central office. In the mass-based party, members of the party play a significant role in the recruitment process of leaders and officials of the party in central office. Through party convention, members of the party have authority and legitimacy to recruit leaders of the party. They also delegate their authority to leaders of the party in recruiting officials of the party in central office. Further, members of the party provide mandates to leaders of the party to manage the organizational structure of

¹³⁵ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 101-03; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 177-83; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 10-12; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 254-56 and 262-63.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," pp. 602-04; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," p. 117.

the party in central office. In this sense, the recruitment process of leaders and officials of the party is based on a bottom-up mechanism. It is also important to note that the recruitment process is carried out through the inner-party educational systems so that it is based on highly selective, competitive, intensive indoctrination and acceptance of the ideology of the party.¹³⁸

The organizational structure of the party in central office in the mass-based party is typically realized by a “representative bureaucracy” with clear political-administrative functions.¹³⁹ Different to the party organization in central office within the elite-based party, the party organization in central office within the mass-based party is managed by more modern management principle. As argued by Sartori, the mass-based party in fact is “an organizational party” which is characterized by “an extensive organizational structure.”¹⁴⁰ In this sense, there are clear structures and division of authority in the organizational structure of the party in central office in the mass-based party.¹⁴¹

In conducting the decision-making process, leaders and officials of the party in central office rely on the role of the ideology and platforms of the party. Since members of the party become the main actors in the mass-based party, these leaders and officials also involve the role of members of the party in the decision-making process of the party in central office. In this sense, the decision-making process in the party in central office is based on a bottom-up mechanism. It is also important to mention that the party in central office is managed by amateur politicians so that they manage politics as an art rather than as a vocation.¹⁴² When the numbers of members increase, however, it is difficult for all of them to be involved in the decision making process. Not surprisingly, the contemporary mass-based party experiences a phenomenon of oligarchy in which

¹³⁸ Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 101-03; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 177-83; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 10-12; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 254-56 and 262-63.

¹³⁹ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65.

¹⁴⁰ Giovanni Sartori, “Party Types, Organization and Functions,” p. 13.

¹⁴¹ Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 101-03; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 177-83; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 10-12; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 254-56 and 262-63.

¹⁴² Ibid.

just a few representatives of members of the party can participate in the decision-making process.¹⁴³

The mass-based party is regarded as a self-financing party since it relies on membership fees as its primary financial resource. The membership fee is very important in financing activities of the party in central office. It is also important as an instrument to maintain political commitment as well as a sense of belonging among members of the party. The mass-based party also relies on other financial resources, such as income from investments, publications and various events organized by the party and donations from private individuals, companies and affiliated social organizations.¹⁴⁴

With these permanent financial resources, the organizational structure of the party in central office in the mass-based party is able to conduct various activities in election period and beyond. For daily activities, for instance, the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts regular meetings in order to guarantee the implementation of the ideology and platforms of the party and to maintain commitment of members to the party. It also carries out other activities guaranteeing participation of members of the party in the wider political process. In addition, the organizational structure of the party in central office increases the frequency of such activities in election period.¹⁴⁵

The existence and roles of the organizational structure of the party in central office are very important for the organizational structure of the party in public office. More specifically, the organizational structure of the party in central office is very important in monitoring and in supervising officials of the party in public office on behalf of the organizational structure of the party on the ground. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party in central office serves as an important agent through which the organizational structure of the party in public office could be held accountable by members of the party. Moreover, the organizational structure of the

¹⁴³ Furthermore, see Robert Michels, *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, pp. 342-56.

¹⁴⁴ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, pp. 101-03; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-65; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 177-83; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 10-12; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 254-56 and 262-63.

¹⁴⁵ Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties*, pp. 39-44.

party in central office also becomes a mediating agent for the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in public office.¹⁴⁶

The party in public office. The organizational structure of the party in public office is very important in the mass-based party in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies. In this sense, legislators of the mass-based party cannot rely on their own interests. Instead, they must act in line with the ideology and platforms of the party. Moreover, their actions must reflect the interests of members of the party as well. In terms of the model representation, therefore, legislators of the mass-based party act as delegates for members of the party.¹⁴⁷

In making policies, legislators of the mass-based party typically defend the ideology and platforms of the party radically so that they spend much time in making policies. They also carry on debates on policy issues which are intense, protracted, issue-focused and extensive. Moreover, members of the party are able to participate actively in the process. With a clear ideological stand and the involvement of members of the party, legislators of the mass-based party have high political consistency in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.¹⁴⁸

In carrying out their roles in making policies, legislators of the mass-based party receive various means of support from affiliated social organizations. The supports are institutionalized into the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office. In addition, supports for legislators of the mass-based party are realized by various organizations, such as, by research units and think tanks. In this sense, legislators of the mass-based party employ internal organization when they are involved in policy-making.¹⁴⁹

Since the mass-based party attempts to transform its ideology and platforms into public policies, legislators of the mass-based party tend to hold power alone in making policies so that they have a strong ambition for hegemony. Moreover, with a clear ideological standing, it is not an easy for legislators of the mass-based party to share

¹⁴⁶ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," pp. 602-04; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," p. 117.

¹⁴⁷ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 10-12.

¹⁴⁸ Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," pp. 153-59.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

power and to develop collaborations with other political actors. Therefore, legislators of the mass-based party are neither tolerant of nor collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in making policies. As they do not have to rely on infrastructures provided by the government, legislators of the mass-based party do not reluctant to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government either.¹⁵⁰

4.3 The Ideal-Type of the Electoralist Party Organization

The electoralist party has been a growing phenomenon of party organization since the mid twentieth century. There were several conditions which provided a significant contribution to the emergence of the electoralist party, such as demands on social amelioration among society, an increasing level of economic growth and a maturation of welfare states. These conditions, in turn, determined the deideologization process through which society became more pragmatic and its engagement with political parties became looser. In addition, the electoralist party emerged in a party system in which parties' competition was based on policy effectiveness.¹⁵¹

There are some variations of the electoralist party, including the catch-all party (Kirchheimer), the professional-electoral party (Panebianco), the rational-efficient party (Downs), the multi-policy party (Downs), the programmatic party (Wolinetz), the non-partisan party (Ignazi), the personalistic party (Gunther and Diamond), the electoral mass party (Sartori), the rational-efficient party and professional machine model (Wright, Schumpeter, Downs, Pomper) and the party machine (Seiler).¹⁵²

In general, these parties share the similar organizational features. Firstly, they act as a broker in the relationship between society and the state. In this context, they aggregate and present the interests of society to the state as well as becoming an agent of the state in defending state policies.¹⁵³ Secondly, with the electoralist party, the

¹⁵⁰ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 177-83.

¹⁵¹ Furthermore, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," p. 604; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-74; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 12-15; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 185-88; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," pp. 120-21; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 256-58 and 262-63.

¹⁵² Furthermore, see André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 250-52.

¹⁵³ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," p. 13.

organizational structure of the party on the ground is very weak as the party has a weak political linkage with its supporters. On the other hand, the organizational structure of the party in central office is very dominant.¹⁵⁴ Thirdly, aiming to win elections by maximizing its votes, these parties can be categorized as the vote-seeking party.¹⁵⁵

The party on the ground. Different to the mass-based party with the intention to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, the main goal of the electoralist party is to gain as many votes as possible. In doing so, the electoralist party prefers to implement an effective strategy, i.e., mobilizing supporters of the party rather than creating and maintaining the political linkage with members of the party. Similar to the elite-based party, therefore, the electoralist party prefers to have supporters rather than members. In this sense, the electoralist party disregards the organizational structure of the party on the ground beyond election period. In the electoralist party, therefore, the role of the party on the ground is important just to create a political image that the party conducts serious efforts to establish and maintain the political relationships with its supporters. In this sense, the electoralist party creates and maintains the political relationships with its supporters by conducting short-term, occasional and result- oriented activities.¹⁵⁶

In creating and maintaining the political relationships with its supporters, the electoralist party disregards the role of the ideology and platforms of the party.¹⁵⁷ It also relies on pragmatic and eclectic platforms of its candidates of legislator. Moreover, the electoralist party sets its platforms based on public mood as well as direction of the party leaders. In this context, the electoralist party attracts its supporters by proposing various platforms covering the needs of society at large, such as economic development

¹⁵⁴ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," pp. 604-05; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22.

¹⁵⁵ Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," pp. 136-65; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 249-69.

¹⁵⁶ Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties*, pp. 52-55.

¹⁵⁷ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," p. 604; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-74; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 12-15; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 185-88; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," pp. 120-21; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 256-58 and 262-63.

and the maintenance of public order.¹⁵⁸ As a consequence, it experiences a high frequency of supporter-switching from election to election.¹⁵⁹

It is also important to mention that the electoralist party pays much attention to the need of election campaigns in order to gain as many votes as possible. In conducting campaign activities, the electoralist party employs modern techniques. To mobilize its supporters in election period, instead of developing the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the electoralist party prefers to utilize external channels of communication, such as television, radio and newspaper. It also prefers to employ various techniques, such as media spots, telemarketing and continued polling. In this sense, the electoralist party employs capital intensive mechanisms and external channels of communication when it conducts its campaign activities.¹⁶⁰

As maximizing votes becomes the main objective of the electoralist party, the quantity of supporters is very important. Moreover, the recruitment process of supporters is not selective. For the electoralist party, an individual's identity is more important than a group's identity so that it is not surprising if it disregards a formal membership system.¹⁶¹ It is also important to note that instead of focusing on a particular group of society based on a certain social segment or class, the electoralist party attempts to secure its access to a wide range of groups in society. In this sense, the electoralist party attempts to get supporters from different social backgrounds.¹⁶²

With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office, in the electoralist party, the party on the ground is subordinate to the party in central office. As the party in central office employs various external organizations to mobilize supporters of the party, it marginalizes the existence and role of the party on the ground. Moreover, the party on the ground is also subordinate to the party in public office. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party on the ground in the electoralist party acts just as a

¹⁵⁸ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 185-88.

¹⁵⁹ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200.

¹⁶⁰ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," pp. 177-200; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," p. 604; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-74; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 12-15; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 185-88; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," pp. 120-21; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 256-58 and 262-63.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

“cheer leader” for the organizational structure of the party in central office as well as for the organizational structure of the party in public office.¹⁶³

The party in central office. The organizational structure of the party in central office in the electoralist party is realized by a group of professionals with advanced skills in managing a political party.¹⁶⁴ In addition, the group of professionals can be distinguished into three categories, namely professional staff on the party payrolls, professional political consultants and professional staff paid by the government but engaged in essentially party political works. In the context of the electoralist party, however, the organizational structure of the party in central office is managed by the professional staff on the party payroll.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the recruitment process of these staff is based on technical and managerial skills principles. Different to the recruitment process of the central office in the mass-based party, therefore, the recruitment process of the central office in the electoralist party is not based on political criteria, such as years of experience in the party or service to the party.¹⁶⁶

In managing the party in central office, this group of staff employs technocratic principles, such as applying efficient and effective principles. Moreover, the decision-making process in the party in central office is conducted by a top-down mechanism so that it excludes supporters of the party. In this respect, supporters of the party cannot participate actively in the decision-making process. They cannot articulate their interests

¹⁶³ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 12-15; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” pp. 1-22; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies,” pp. 120-21.

¹⁶⁴ Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” pp. 177-200; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization,” p. 604; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-74; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 12-15; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 185-88; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies,” pp. 120-21; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 256-58 and 262-63.

¹⁶⁵ Paul Webb and Robin Kolodny, “Professional Staff in Political Parties,” in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, pp. 337-58.

¹⁶⁶ Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” pp. 177-200; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization,” p. 604; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, pp. 262-74; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 12-15; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 185-88; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies,” pp. 120-21; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 256-58 and 262-63.

and they cannot supervise these staff either. Such a condition occurs due to the fact that the electoralist party disregards the role of ideology.¹⁶⁷

Since the electoralist party disregards a formal membership system, it is not able to collect membership fees. To finance activities of the party in central office, however, the electoralist party receives financial supports from affiliated interest groups and some companies owned by the party. It also depends on a state subvention as its primary financial income which takes various forms, such as subventions to legislators, national and regional government grants, free or easy access to media coverage, financial aid to partisan media and publications and per capita voter grants.¹⁶⁸

In the electoralist party, the role of the organizational structure of the party in central office is very important in mobilizing supporters in election period. Therefore, the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts various campaign activities. Nevertheless, as the electoralist party disregards a strong political linkage with its supporters, similar to the role of the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the role of the organizational structure of the party in central office is just relevant in election period. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party in central office lacks activities beyond election period.¹⁶⁹

With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, in the electoralist party, the party in central office has a strong relationship with the party in public office. Some of the professional officials of the party in central office are usually officials of the party in public office at the same time. Even if they are different persons from officials of the party in public office, they share similar interests. In managing the party in central office, moreover, they rely on officials of the party in public office. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office.¹⁷⁰

The party in public office. Legislators of the electoralist party have autonomy both from the party and from supporters of the party in carrying out their role in making policies. Since the electoralist party lacks political relationships with its constituents, on

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties*, pp. 52-55.

¹⁷⁰ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 12-15; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," pp. 120-21.

one hand, legislators of the electoralist party disregard the interests of supporters of the party. As a result, what they do in policy-making most of the time is not in line with the interests of supporters of the party. On the other hand, it is also possible for legislators of the electoralist party to neglect the state interests. Acting as a broker in between society and the state, legislators of the electoralist party act as political entrepreneurs.¹⁷¹

In making policies, legislators of the electoralist party propose moderate and eclectic policies which are based on collective bargaining and public mood. Consequently, they spend less time on making policies. Moreover, if they conduct debates on policy issues, the debates are conducted just as a formality so they are diffused and unfocused. In this sense, legislators of the electoralist party lack political consistency in transforming the platforms of the party into public policies.¹⁷²

In making policies, legislators of the electoralist party tend to rely on other social organizations. To a certain extent, they also rely on the state. However, they do not rely on the role of the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office. In this context, they exclude the involvement of supporters of the party in policy-making.¹⁷³

Further, legislators of the electoralist party act as facilitators of compromise among political actors in making policies. In this respect, they act autonomously as the guarantor against unreasonable exploitation of one political actor by another. They also position themselves toward the centre among different ideologies. In this sense, they lack ambition for hegemony when they are involved in making policies. In this sense, it is not too difficult for legislators of the electoralist party to develop collaborations with other political actors so that they are typically tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors. On the other hand, it is not easy for legislators of the electoralist party to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government since they tend to establish the political linkage with the state.¹⁷⁴

4.4. The Ideal-Type of the Cartel Party Organization

Emerging in the 1970s in Western European countries, the cartel party is a further development of the electoralist party. The appearance of the cartel party has marked a

¹⁷¹ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," p. 18.

¹⁷² Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," pp. 153-59.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties. A New Typology," pp. 185-88.

modern political era in which goals of politics became more self-referential. There was also a shift of party competition from the pursuit of hegemony or domination to the building of a shared mutual interest. The emergence of the cartel party also increased the professionalization of politics in which the role of experts and professionals has been more dominant in managing party organization. In this sense, the rise of the cartel party reflected a new political phenomenon in which party organization has been managed by technocratic principles.¹⁷⁵

According to Krouwel, there are three stages in the development of the cartel party. The first stage is the inter-party cartel in which a party with no goal orientation attempts to maintain its power in public office. In doing so, it creates coalitions on the most important policy issues with other parties. The second stage is the formation of the state-party cartel. In this stage, parties inside the inter-party cartel disconnect themselves from their supporters in order to engage with the state. In addition, there is mutual symbiosis between the inter-party cartel and the state. On one hand, the inter-party cartel employs resources of the state to ensure its own collective survival as well as to colonize the state institutions. On the other hand, it allows the state to regulate its organization. As a result, there is ambiguous differentiation between the organization of the inter-party cartel and the institution of the state since the inter-party cartel serves as an agent of the state and the state becomes a partisan institution. The third stage is the tripartite power cartel in which the state-party cartel broadens their coalitions with other powerful interest groups. In this stage, therefore, there is a political engagement between several parties, the state and some powerful interest groups.¹⁷⁶

In general, the cartel party has the following features. Firstly, the cartel party consists of several parties in favor of developing collusion and cooperation and in securing their positions in the state. In this sense, the cartel party establishes a strong political linkage with the state and, at the same time, makes a distance with society.¹⁷⁷ Secondly, in the individual party within the cartel party, the relationship between the organization of the party on the ground and the party in central office is very weak. Moreover, the relationship between these organizational structures is based on a

¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 16-17; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies," pp. 122-26; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 258-60 and 262-63.

¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, see André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 258-60.

¹⁷⁷ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 17-21; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22.

“stratarchical” relationship in which the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office act relatively independently from each other. Meanwhile, the organizational structure of the party in public office is the most dominant face.¹⁷⁸ Thirdly, aiming to secure its position in the state, the cartel party is categorized as the office-seeking party.¹⁷⁹

The party on the ground. The main goal of the individual party within the cartel party is to secure its position in the state. In this sense, it prefers to develop political collaboration with other parties rather than to create and maintain the political linkage with its supporters. Consequently, the individual party within the cartel party disregards the existence of the party on the ground. It also disregards the role of the party on the ground in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its supporters. Such conditions take place not only in election period, but also beyond.¹⁸⁰

The individual party within the cartel party pays much attention to the need of election campaigns in order to maximize its votes. To attract voters, instead of proposing its own policies, the individual party within the cartel party utilizes policies and programs of the state. In this sense, the ideology and platforms of the individual party within the cartel party are fuzzy. They also become increasingly centralistic and more nationalized. Moreover, in conducting campaign activities, the individual party within the cartel party employs various techniques, such as using polling and relying on the role of professional campaign strategists. The individual party within also utilize various external channels of communication. In election campaigns, therefore, the individual party within the cartel party involves capital intensive as well as many external channels of communication.¹⁸¹

Along with the change of voting behavior in which parties are not able to rely on the loyalty of their members, the individual party within the cartel party disregards a formal membership system. Compared to the elite-based party, therefore, the individual party within the cartel party prefers to have “supporters” rather than “members” in a greater degree. Different to the electoralist party, however, the individual party within the cartel party disconnects itself from its supporters so that the relationship between the

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 17-21; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” pp. 1-22; Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” pp. 136-65; André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 258-60 and 262-63.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

individual party within the cartel party and its supporters is loose. Moreover, instead of focusing on a certain social segment or class, the individual party within the cartel party attempts to gain its support from a wide range of groups in society.¹⁸²

As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party is characterized by stratararchy. In such a relationship, the officials of these two organizational structures have autonomy in managing their own organizational structures. Consequently, these organizational structures lack coordination. In general, the relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party is loose.¹⁸³

The party in central office. In the individual party within the cartel party, the organizational structure of the party in central office is manifested by a group of professionals with high skills in managing a party. The party in central office consists of contractual staff, consultants and outside experts possessing a variety of specific technical skills. Moreover, all of the staff of the party in central office is recruited with technical and managerial skill considerations in mind. Different to the organization of the party in central office in the mass-based party which is organized by amateur democrats, the organization of the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party is managed by professional consultants. On the other hand, different to the organization of the party in central office in the electoralist party, the organization of the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party is managed by the professional political consultants as well as the professional staff paid by the state. In this sense, the role of the state is very dominant in the recruitment process of these professional staff.¹⁸⁴

In managing the party in central office, these professional officials employ technocratic principles, such as such as relying on expertise or competence, autonomy, mobility, self-regulation, efficiency and carrier-orientation. Moreover, they organize the party in central office by considering contribution of the party to the efficiency of the

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 17-21.

¹⁸⁴ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 17-21; Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," pp. 1-22; Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," pp. 136-65; André Krouwel, "Party Models," pp. 258-60 and 262-63.

entire social system and by neglecting the role of ideology. As a consequence, the decision-making process in the party in central office is also based on efficiency and effectiveness principles. In this context, supporters of the party are completely excluded from the decision-making process in the party in central office.¹⁸⁵

The individual party within the cartel party depends on a state subvention as its primary financial resources. A state subvention is important not only to finance its campaign activities, but also to organize the party in central office. In addition, a state subvention takes various forms, such as subvention for legislators, national and regional government grants, free or easy access to media coverage, financial aid to partisan media and publications and per capita voter grants. However, the individual party within the cartel party lacks membership fees.¹⁸⁶

Similar to the role of the organizational structure of the party on the ground, in the individual party within the cartel party, the role of the organizational structure of the party in central office is insignificant in creating and maintaining the political relationships with supporters of the party beyond election period. Its role is also insignificant in mobilizing supporters in election period. In mobilizing its supporters, the individual party within the cartel party relies on the state institutions. Therefore, compared to the organization of the party in central office in the electoralist party, the organization of the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party plays a less significant role in conducting activities in and beyond election period.¹⁸⁷

There are three possibilities regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office in the individual party within the cartel party. Firstly, the organizational structure of the party in central office becomes simply more autonomous from the party in public office. Secondly, the organizational structure of the party in central office becomes more subject to the control of the organizational structure of the party in public office. Thirdly, the organizational structure of the party in central office is simply marginalized by the organizational structure of the party in public office. In most cases, however, the organizational structure of the party in central office tends to be subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," pp. 17-21.

The party in public office. Legislators of the individual party within the cartel party have no obligation to act in line with the interests of their supporters. In this sense, they have greater autonomy in carrying out their roles in making policies. On the other hand, in order to secure their positions in legislature, they strongly rely on the state interests. In this sense, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party act as agents of the state.¹⁸⁹

In policy-making, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party defend policies of the state. In doing so, they spend less time when they are involved in making policies. They also conduct debates on policy issues which are diffused and unfocused.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party receive various means of support from the state. More specifically, they receive support from public institutions, other executive government agencies and other quasi non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, they lack support from the organizational structure of the party on the ground and from the organizational structure of the party in central office. They also lack support from social organizations. In this sense, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party depend on the state institutions when they are involved in making policies.¹⁹¹

Since they have strong engagement with the state, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party have no ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Moreover, in order to secure their access to the state, they prefer to share power with legislators from other participants of the cartel party in order to ensure that there are no “winners” or “losers” among participants of the cartel party. In this context, they attempt to manage competition among political actors so that there is no hegemony of certain political actors in the cartel party. Therefore, they are tolerant of and collaborative just with political actors from other participants in the cartel party. In contrast, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party prevent collaborations with political actors from non-participants of the cartel party due to the fact that they attempt to monopolize the route to the state. In this sense, they have ambition for hegemony over political actors from non-participants of the cartel party

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” pp. 153-59.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

when they are involved in making policies. Therefore, they are neither tolerant of nor collaborative with political actors from non-participants of the cartel party.¹⁹²

4.5. Summary of the Analytical Framework

From the elaboration above, we can see that each of the party models can be divided further into three different organizational structures, namely the organization of the party on the ground, the party in central office and the party in public office. Moreover, each of the organizational structures has its own features. A summary of the ideal-type of each party model in the three different organizational dimensions is presented in the following table.

¹⁹² Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” p. 17-21.

Table 2.1 Ideal-Types of Party Models in Three Faces

| Party Models/Faces | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|---------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| The party on the ground | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities - The party relies on clientelism and interpersonal networks of the party elites in creating and maintaining political linkage with its supporters - The party employs labor-intensive activities and external organizations to attract voters - The party disregards a formal membership system - The party focuses on supporters from a particular group in society - The party on the ground is independent from the party in central office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities - The party relies on its ideology and platforms in creating and maintaining political linkage with its members - The party employs labor-intensive activities and the party organization to attract voters - The party respects a formal membership system - The party focuses on members from a particular group or class in society - The party on the ground provides resources that are necessary for the existence and success of the party in central office. While the party in central office is seen as the voice or guardian of the party on the ground | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters by conducting short-term, occasional and one way activities - The party relies on its pragmatic platforms in creating and maintaining political linkage with its supporters - The party employs capital-intensive activities and external organizations to attract voters - The party disregards a formal membership system - The party focuses on supporters from a wide array of groups in society - The party on the ground is subordinate to the party in central office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party lacks efforts to create or maintain the political linkage with its supporters - - The party employs capital-intensive activities and the state agencies to attract voters - The party disregards a formal membership system - The party focuses on supporters from a wide array of groups in society - Stratarchy |

| Party Models/Faces | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| The party in central office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party elites serve as or recruit the party leader - The party organization is managed by elitism, clientelism or interpersonal network mechanism - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities just in election period - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Members of the party recruit the party leader - The party organization is managed by ideological considerations - The party depends on membership fees - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities in and beyond election periods - The organizational structure of the party in central office is the agent by which the organizational structure of the party in public office could be held accountable by members of the party | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party leader comes from professionals - The party organization is managed by technocratic principles - The party depends on a state subvention, donation from private individuals, companies and affiliated social organizations and companies owned by the party - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities just in election period - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party elites recruit the party leader from professionals - The party organization is managed by technocratic principles - The party depends on a state subvention - The organizational structure of the party in central office lacks activities in and beyond election periods - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office |

| Party Models/Faces | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| The party in public office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as trustees - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in making policies - Legislators employ their own personal infrastructure to support their role in policy-making - Legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in making policies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as delegates - Legislators defend the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making policies - Legislators employ the party organization to support their role in policy-making - Legislators have an ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government - Legislators are neither tolerant of nor collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in making policies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as entrepreneurs - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in making policies - Legislators employ external organizations to support their role in policy-making - Legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in making policies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as agents of the state - Legislators defend the state interests when they are involved in making policies - Legislators employ the state institutions to support their role in policy-making - Legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative just with political actors coming from other participants of the cartel party when they are involved in making policies |

Source: Compilation by the Author.

5. Summary

To explore how Islamic parties organize at the regional level in post-Suharto Indonesia, this study follows the rational choice institutionalism way of thinking. Therefore, this study assumes that by taking into account incentives and constraints provided by the existing socio-political structures, Islamic political actors apply a certain strategy when they organize their Islamic parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections.

In developing the analytical framework, this study follows party models proposed by Krouwel, namely the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party and the cartel party. This study also applies the analytical framework of party organization introduced by Katz and Mair in which the party organization is divided into three different organizational faces, i.e., the party organization on the ground, the party organization in central office and the party organization in public office. As the analytical framework of this study, therefore, each of the party models is divided into these three different organizational dimensions. Based on the development of party organization in established democracy as well as in developing countries, this study develops various criteria in each of these three different organizational faces.

As discussed in this chapter, there are six criteria to explore the organizational features of the party on the ground, namely the efforts to create and maintain the political linkage, the instruments to create and maintain the political linkage, the strategy to attract voters during election period, the membership, the backgrounds of members or supporters and the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office.

To examine the organizational features of the party in central office, there are five criteria, i.e., the recruitment process of leaders and officials of the party, the instruments to manage the central office, the party finances, the activities of the central office in and beyond election periods as well as the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, more specifically in local legislature.

Meanwhile, to examine the organizational features of the party in public office, more specifically in legislature, there are also five criteria, that is the model of representation, the consistency of legislators to transform their personal interests, the ideology and platforms of their parties and the interests of the state into public policies, the supporting infrastructures in policy-making, the ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government and finally the political relationships among legislators when they are involved in making policies.

CHAPTER 3 METHOD OF THE STUDY

This chapter aims to discuss the empirical method of this study. In doing so, it is divided into four main parts. The first part explains the research method applied in this study, namely qualitative research. The second part describes the unity of analysis as well as the locus of the study. Meanwhile, the third part describes data-gathering techniques employed in this study, together with a discussion on how the field research was conducted. The final part deals with techniques and procedures of data analysis, including the way in which analysis in this study is carried out.

1. Qualitative Research

Denzin and Lincoln define qualitative research as an activity to “study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them”.¹ They also point out that “qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials... that describe routine and problematic moments and meaning in individual’s lives”.² Moreover, in order to seek out the variety of explanations and interpretations, according to Glesne, the role of fieldwork through which qualitative research interacts with their respondents is very important in qualitative research.³

This study applies the qualitative research method for three reasons. Firstly, the qualitative method is the most appropriate method to be employed when the aim of a study is to explore people’s subjective experiences, including their interpretations on those experiences. In this sense, the qualitative method provides social researchers an opportunity to explore further the meaning, process and context of a unit of analysis.⁴ Secondly, the qualitative method also allows social researchers to study a phenomenon in-depth as well as in detail.⁵ By applying the qualitative method, therefore, social researchers are able to capture the real condition of a phenomenon. Thirdly, as a matter

¹ See, Norman K. Denzin and Yvonnas S. Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research,” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonnas S. Lincoln (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005), p. 3.

² Ibid, pp. 3-4.

³ C. Glesne, *Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction* (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 5.

⁴ Furthermore, see Fiona Devine, “Qualitative Analysis,” in David Marsh and Gerry stoker (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (New York: Palgrave 2002), pp. 197-215.

⁵ Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002), p. 14.

of fact, the qualitative method has conventionally been applied in political science, especially in the context of micro-level analysis.⁶ As this study intends to explore the organizational features of several Islamic parties at the local level in Indonesia, therefore, the qualitative research is compatible to this study.

As explained by Creswell, there are at least five approaches in the qualitative method, namely narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographical and case study.⁷ Compared to the other approaches, the case study method becomes the standard method in social science. However, there is no general agreement regarding the precise definition of the case study method. Creswell, for instance, defines the case study method as a method of study which explores one or more cases within a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed and in-depth data collection by involving multiple sources of information.⁸ Meanwhile, Gerring defines the case study method as an intensive research of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.⁹

Further, Yin argues that the case study research is properly used when a study is to answer “how” and “why” questions.¹⁰ In the context of political science, the case study research is generally more useful when a study has seven characteristics. For instance, when the strategy of a study is “exploratory” rather than “confirmatory”, when a study focuses more on “causal mechanisms” than “causal effects” and when a study has “useful variance” which is available for only a single unit or a small number of units so that basically the same case is not studied several times.¹¹

In the context of this study, the case study research is selected for the following reasons. As mentioned earlier, this study attempts to explore the organizational features of Islamic parties at the local level in Indonesia. Therefore, this study attempts to answer how Islamic parties organize and why these parties organize the way they do. In this context, this study also intends to conduct explanation rather than confirmation

⁶ Fiona Devine, “Qualitative Analysis,” pp. 197-215.

⁷ For the comparison of these five approaches at the glance, see John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2007), pp. 76-81.

⁸ See, John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches*, p. 73; Robert E. Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies,” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonnas S. Lincoln (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005), pp. 445-48.

⁹ John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2 (2004), pp. 351-54.

¹⁰ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), pp. 10-11.

¹¹ Furthermore, see John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” p. 352.

analysis. Moreover, this study also focuses on causal mechanism rather than causal effects.

2. Case Selection

One can argue that a study of all the Islamic parties which participated in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections in all regions must be conducted in order to provide a comprehensive explanation of the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the local level in post-Suharto Indonesia. Nevertheless, such a study requires an enormous amount of effort. This is due to the fact that there were eighteen parties which can be categorized as Islamic parties in the 1999 election, while there were seven parties in the 2004 election and eight in 2009. It should also be acknowledged that up to January 2009, there were 33 provinces, 399 districts and 98 municipalities in Indonesia. These numbers continue to increase as there are many demands for new provinces, districts and municipalities.

To understand the phenomenon of how Islamic parties organize at the local level in post-Suharto Indonesia, this study conducts a multiple-case study.¹² To be more specific, in selecting the Islamic parties to be observed, this study applies the information-oriented selection strategy. Flyvbjerg argues that the information-oriented selection strategy is useful to maximize the utility of information from a large sample.¹³ By applying the information-oriented selection strategy, therefore, cases in this study are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content.

The information-oriented selection strategy, further, can be divided into four strategies, namely the paradigmatic cases, critical cases, extreme or deviant cases and maximum variation cases strategies.¹⁴ For the purpose of analysis, this study applies the maximum variation case strategy in order to obtain a comprehensive explanation. By applying the maximum variation cases, therefore, this study focuses on several major Islamic parties in Indonesia which succeeded in gaining significant votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections so that they represent major forces of political Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia. In selecting Islamic parties to be observed, moreover, this

¹² For a more detailed discussion on the multiple-cases design, see, for example, Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, pp. 53-60; John Gerring, "What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?" pp. 350-52.

¹³ Flyvbjerg explains that there are five types in the information-oriented selection strategy, i.e., extreme/deviant cases, critical cases, paradigmatic cases and maximum variation cases. Furthermore, see Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research," *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2006), p. 230.

¹⁴ Ibid.

study also considers two major groups of Islamic parties in Indonesia which also represent the characteristics of all Islamic parties in the Islamic world, namely the Muslim-nationalist parties and the Islamist parties as explained in Chapter 1. Based on these considerations, this study focuses on six Islamic parties as its units of analysis, i.e., the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN), the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB), the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR), the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP), the Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) and the Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB).

Further, this study selects the Tasikmalaya district in West Java province as the research area as the district has some peculiarities. Historically speaking, the district has deep historical roots in Islamic radical movements. Muslims in the district also represent characteristics of Muslims with a strong Islamic sentiment. It is also important to note that the six Islamic parties mentioned above gained significant votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections in the district. In this sense, the district has become one of the bases for all Islamic parties in Indonesia to gain support. Moreover, similar to some regions in Indonesia, there is also a growing demand for the implementation of *sharia* in the district. We will return to general features of the district more comprehensively in the following chapter.

With regard to the time frame of the study, the term of post-Suharto in this study refers to a period in which, as a young democracy, Indonesia attempts to establish a democratic system after more than thirty-two years under the New Order authoritarianism system. More specifically, the term of post-Suharto denotes to the period since the Suharto's resignation in May, 1998. Also known as the period of *reformasi* (reformation), the term also refers to an uneasy period for Indonesia to implement the consolidation of democracy as well as the decentralized system in terms of the central and regional government relationship.

3. Data-Gathering Techniques

In order to produce insightful findings, this study combines three data-gathering techniques, namely in-depth interviews, direct observation and documentary analysis which are extremely useful to collect comprehensive information. It is important to note however that the in-depth interviews serve as the primary data-gathering techniques in this study. Meanwhile, direct observation and documentary analysis are treated as the

supporting or complementary data-gathering technique. By combining these three data-gathering techniques, therefore, this study applies a triangulation method.¹⁵

3.1. In-Depth Interview

Glesne defines an interview as an “oral exchange that takes place between at least, two persons, but other possibilities include one or more respondents”.¹⁶ In conducting the in-depth interviews, this study applied elite and specialized interviews. According to Manheim and Rich, the elite interview refers to an interview which is conducted with persons representing some particular groups within society. Meanwhile, the specialized interview denotes an interview which is conducted by persons with knowledge and information on a specific topic.¹⁷ In addition, Silverman explains that the role of the specialized interview is important to get a second opinion and to validate data collected from the elite interview.¹⁸

During the field research in the Tasikmalaya district, more than sixty-seven respondents were interviewed. The elite interview was conducted with forty-nine officials from the organizational structure of the Islamic parties on the ground, i.e., at the sub-district, village and sub-village levels. It was also carried out with prominent leaders of the Islamic parties at the district level and some prominent officials of these parties at the national level in Jakarta. Moreover, the elite interview was also conducted with some leading legislators from the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district Legislature (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* or DPRD).

Eighteen respondents coming from outside observers were also interviewed. These outside observers included two bureaucrats, a staff of the General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or KPU), head of the Election Supervisory Board (*Badan Pengawas Pemilu* or Bawaslu), heads of major Islamic organizations, i.e., the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or NU), Muhammadiyah and Islamic Union (*Persatuan Islam* or PERSIS), a manager of an Islamic boarding school, a cultural observer, an academic, a journalist, an NGO activist and a representative of students in Siliwangi University, a thug (*preman*), a police officer and

¹⁵ Triangulation is generally considered as a process of using multiple sources to clarify meaning in order to verify information. See, for instance, Robert E. Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies,” pp. 712-13.

¹⁶ C. Glesne, *Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction*, p. 67.

¹⁷ Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, *Empirical Political Analysis. Research Methods in Political Science* (New York & London: Longman, 1986), pp. 132-38.

¹⁸ Furthermore on various advantages of the specialized interviews, see David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction* (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 159-60.

two ordinary people. In addition, the specialized interviews were also conducted with heads of two secular-nationalist parties in the district, i.e., the Functional Group Party (*Partai Golongan Karya* or Partai Golkar) and the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* or PDIP).¹⁹

It is important to note that some respondents belonged to more than one category as they had different positions. For instance, some respondents were officials of the Islamic parties in central office and, at the same time, they were also legislators. Another example, one respondent had a dual status as a party's legislator and, at the same time, as a head of an Islamic organization. In this case, the in-depth interviews were focused on their experiences and information from the main position which they had been categorized.

In addition, during the field research, it was not too difficult to choose representatives of officials of the Islamic parties in central office and representatives of legislators from these Islamic parties. However, problems arose when this study had to select representatives of officials of the Islamic parties on the ground. This is partly due to the fact that these Islamic parties had established their organizational structure in hundreds of villages and sub-villages in the district.

To deal with such problems, this study applied “the purposeful sampling strategy” in selecting the respondents.²⁰ To be more specific, this study combined four types in the purposive sampling strategy, namely the snowball or chain strategy, the maximum variation strategy, the confirming and disconfirming case strategy and the stratified purposeful strategy.²¹ By using the snowball or chain strategy, some respondents were selected by considering the recommendations of other respondents. By applying the maximum variation strategy, some respondents were selected by considering their ability to provide a diverse variation and to identify important common patterns. Meanwhile, by employing the confirming and disconfirming case strategy, some respondents were selected in order to elaborate on initial analysis, to seek exceptions and to see variations of information. Moreover, by employing the stratified purposeful strategy, all of the respondents were selected on the basis of area, age, experience and social background.

¹⁹ The profiles of these respondents can be found in Appendix 1.

²⁰ Creswell explains that the purposeful sampling strategy is useful “because it can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study”. John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches*, p. 125.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 126-29.

With regard to the interview process, the average duration for each interview was ninety minutes.²² At the beginning of each interview, there was a so called “informed consent” through which the respondents were provided with a general introduction to this study.²³ In this short introduction, the respondents were informed about the main purposes of this study. Moreover, they were also informed about information needed for this study. As the topic of the interviews covered sensitive issues for some respondents, the short introduction also explained that information from the interviews would remain confidential and just for academic purposes.

In conducting the interviews, this study also applied the standardized open-ended interview. As explained by Patton, “the standardized open-ended interview consists of a set of questions carefully worded and arranged with the intention of taking each of the respondents through the same sequence and asking each of the respondents the same questions with essentially the same words”.²⁴ In the context of this study, a set of questions was prepared in the interview guide prior to the interviews. The questions in the interview guide were formulated with certain respondents in mind so that each respondent had specific questions in accordance with their categories.

Therefore, officials of the Islamic parties at the sub-village, village and sub-district levels were questioned about their experiences and impressions when they manage the organizational structure of the Islamic parties on the ground. Similarly, leaders and officials of the Islamic parties in central office in the district as well as officials of the Islamic parties in central office at the national level were questioned about their experiences and impressions when they manage the organizational structure of the Islamic parties in central office at these levels. Meanwhile, legislators from the Islamic parties were questioned about their experiences and impressions when they were involved in making policies in the legislature. The same form was also applied to the outside observers who were questioned about their information and interpretation of

²² In conducting the in-depth interviews, I was supported by three research assistants. The role of these research assistants was very important, especially in gaining access to the respondents and arranging schedule of the interviews. Moreover, their role was also very important in providing assistances during the interview process, especially in helping to understand what the respondent meant. Since the role of the research assistants was very important, there was a short methodological training for these research assistants prior to the interview activities so that they learned to understand the aims of this study, to identify and to get access to the respondent and to raise as well as to respond to questions during the interview process.

²³ See Buttolph Johnson, Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, *Political Science Research Methods* (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), p. 219.

²⁴ Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, pp. 343-44.

how the Islamic parties in the district organize and why these parties organize the way they do.²⁵

When the interviews with officials of the Islamic parties on the ground were conducted, the interviews were initiated with general questions. Afterward, the more complex questions were posed. At the end of each interview, the respondents were given an opportunity to provide important information which was not covered by the interview guide. Moreover, the interviews were cross referenced with each other so that the information was double-checked. The same technique and procedure were also applied in the interviews with the respondents from other categories.

It is important to mention that although the interviews were based on the interview guide, in some cases, the interviews were not always carried out in exactly the same manner as the interview guide had anticipated to minimizing a high degree of standardization. During the interview process, the respondents were also given an opportunity to provide their own opinions. Moreover, to avoid mistakes about what the respondents actually said, the interviews were tape-recorded. Meanwhile, to record information as comprehensive as possible, extra notes were taken as well. For instance, when the interviews with officials of the Islamic parties in central office were conducted in workplace of the central office, extra notes regarding activities of the central office were taken. In addition, the field notes also covered information that was not covered by the interview guide, such as personal impressions about the respondents.

The interviews took place in a diverse set of locations. Some interviews with officials of the Islamic parties at the sub-village, village and sub-district levels were conducted in the home of these respondents. Some of them were also conducted in the workplace of the Islamic parties at sub-districts level. The interviews with officials of the Islamic parties in central office were conducted in the workplace of the central office in the district. Moreover, the interviews with officials of the Islamic parties in central office at the national level were conducted in the national legislature and in the workplace of these parties in Jakarta. Meanwhile, the interviews with legislators from the Islamic parties were mostly conducted in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature. Other interviews were carried out in Islamic boarding schools, in small mosques (*mushola*) and in restaurants.

²⁵ The interview guides in their ideal-types can be found in appendix 2.

3.2. Direct Observation

The direct observation technique has some advantages for a social researcher, for example, a researcher can obtain additional information about the topic being studied. Direct observation also can add new dimensions for understanding either the context or the phenomenon being studied. Moreover, direct observation is useful for exploring real phenomena.²⁶ Not surprisingly, as explained by Silverman, direct observation is very important in social science as observation in social science “is fundamentally about an understanding the routine rather than what appears to be exciting”.²⁷

An intensive direct observation was carried out between November 6, 2008 and February 6, 2009 in the Tasikmalaya district. During direct observation, some workplaces of the Islamic parties at the sub-village level, the village level and the sub-district level were visited. To observe activities of central office, direct observation also took place in workplaces of the Islamic parties at the district level. Some visits were conducted in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature as well, in order to observe activities of legislators from the Islamic parties.

It should also be acknowledged that during direct observation, field notes were taken as soon as possible in direct conjunction with the analytical framework. The field notes included episodic records containing additional information,²⁸ such as conditions of the organizational structure of the Islamic parties at the sub-village level, village and sub-district levels, activities of the Islamic parties in the central office at the district level and situations in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature. In addition, the field notes were made in a form of a sketch map so that they would be easier to understand. Soon after short notes were made, the notes were expanded. In addition, the information from direct observation was managed by making some categories derived from the analytical framework.

3.3. Documentary Analysis

Another technique in data-gathering employed in this study is documentary analysis. This study employs documentary analysis due to the fact that documents provide

²⁶ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, p. 109-13.

²⁷ David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*, p. 30.

²⁸ According to Johnson, Reynolds and Joslyn, episodic records are records that are not part of an ongoing, systematic record-keeping program but are produced and preserved in a more casual, personal and accidental manner. See, Janet Buttolph Johnson, Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, *Political Science Research Methods*, pp. 238-44.

additional information as well as preliminary information which can be explored further through the in-depth interviews and direct observation.²⁹ Moreover, Yin explains several advantages of documentary analysis. Firstly, it is helpful in verifying the correct spelling that might have been mentioned in the interviews. Secondly, it can provide other specific details to confirm information from other sources. Thirdly, it can be useful in making inferences or other new questions for the next interviews.³⁰ In the context of this study, documentary analysis was carried out in order to find patterns and processes of events related to the organizational features of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district.

In practice, documentary analyses were conducted before, during and after the field research. Before the field research, information on the district as well as the Islamic parties in the district was collected. In this sense, the role of documentary analysis was very important in providing initial information about the Tasikmalaya district as the area of the study and the Islamic parties in the district as the units of analysis. During the field research, documentary analysis was important in supporting activities of the in-depth interviews and direct observation. Moreover, the role of documentary analysis in this study was also significant in understanding patterns and developing interpretations in the data analysis process.

More specifically, the documentary analysis technique was applied in order to collect information on the Tasikmalaya district, including its social, cultural, economic and political conditions. Documentary sources came from the government institutions, such as the bureau of statistics, the legislature and the KPU in the district. Documentary analysis was used to collect information on the Islamic parties in the district as well. In this context, documentary sources came from party's constitutions and party's reports. In order to develop interpretations, other scholarly sources related to the Islamic parties were also employed in the data analysis process.

4. Data Analysis

This study takes into account reliability and validity issues.³¹ In order to develop valid interpretations, this study combines several data analysis techniques. Creswell points

²⁹ Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, p. 295.

³⁰ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, pp. 101-06.

³¹ According to Hammersley, reliability refers to "the degree of consistency with which instance are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observers on different occasions". Meanwhile, validity denotes to "the extent to which an account accurately represents the social

out that the qualitative research should take the following procedures, i.e., managing data, reading data, describing, classifying, interpreting data and presenting data.³² These procedures must be conducted comprehensively through an on-going process from the first step to the last step.³³

In the context of this study, all of information collected from the interviews was transcribed into a form of textual data. Since this information served as the primary data, in the transcription process, it was treated carefully by conducting checks and rechecks among the information in tape-recorder, the information in the field notes and the textual data. After all of the information collected from the interviews had been transcribed into a form of textual data, they were categorized. In this process, they were selected and grouped into three categories, namely the information on the organizational structure of the Islamic parties on the ground, the information on the organizational structure of the Islamic parties in central office and the information on the organizational structure of the Islamic parties in public office. Additionally, in categorizing this data, the textual data was also combined with field notes made during direct observation and summaries derived from documentary analysis.

Afterwards, the textual data was read several times in order to get a comprehensive sense of this data. In doing so, some notes, codes and reflections on pieces of information were made. In this step, all of the information was again treated carefully by conducting check and recheck activities. By going to such effort, this study attempts to obtain validity. As Miles and Huberman point out, in order to attain validity, interpretations and arguments have to be tested on their plausibility, their sturdiness and their conformity by using triangulation, making contrasts or comparisons, checking out rival explanations and getting feedback from the respondents.³⁴ Similarly, Silverman explains that validity can be achieved by double-checking all of the information among the respondents.³⁵

phenomena to which it refers.” Hammersley quoted in David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*, p. 145 and 149.

³² John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches*, pp. 150-55.

³³ Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), pp. 21-23; David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*, pp. 240-41.

³⁴ Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods*, pp. 230-43.

³⁵ David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*, pp. 156-60.

After the managing and reading of the data was conducted, interpretations and arguments regarding the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the three different levels were described in as much detailed as possible.³⁶ In developing interpretations and arguments, this study applies two data analysis techniques proposed by Miles and Huberman, namely the conceptual coherence and plausibility.³⁷ In this sense, if interpretations and arguments had correlation with the analytical framework, therefore, they were made. On the other hand, if interpretations and arguments had no correlation with the analytical framework, they were treated and re-evaluated again. Moreover, if interpretation and arguments sounded plausible, then interpretations and arguments were made. On the other hand, if they seemed implausible, these tentative interpretations and arguments were treated and re-evaluated.

In developing its interpretations and arguments, this study also combines the deductive and the inductive analyses.³⁸ This study applies the deductive analysis as it applies the analytical framework of party organization and models which is mostly based on the experience of Western countries to explain the phenomenon of the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the local level in Indonesia. On the other hand, this study also employs the inductive analysis as arguments and interpretations in this study are based mainly on the empirical data.

In the context of the deductive analysis, this study applies the pattern matching technique, while in the context of the inductive analysis this study uses explanation-building technique.³⁹ More specifically, in applying the pattern matching technique, interpretations and arguments in this study were based on simple patterns of information. They were also based on rival explanations of the data. Meanwhile, in applying the explanation-building technique, the interpretations and arguments in this study were developed by making initial propositions, revising the initial propositions and then comparing the revision to the analytical framework.

³⁶ It is important to mention that conducting the fieldwork in less than three months provided a limited opportunity to capture the comprehensive phenomena on the topic. During data analysis, consequently, I found some pieces of information that needed to be further explored and confirmed. However, since it was not possible to maintain long-distance communication with the respondents, further exploration and confirmation could not be carried out. Some lacking necessary details, to be sure, might have affected interpretations and arguments in this study.

³⁷ Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods*, pp. 215-30.

³⁸ The deductive analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are used to explain real-world events. Meanwhile, the inductive analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are built from empirical events. See, for instance, Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, *Empirical Political Analysis. Research Methods in Political Science*, pp. 17-20.

³⁹ Furthermore, see Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, p. 136-44.

In the last step, interpretations and arguments in this study had been mostly presented in the form of narrative texts. As the interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language, quotations from the interviews were adjusted so that they would be easier to understand. Major findings of the study were also displayed in some tables so that they would be easier to understand.

In general, data analysis in this study can be categorized into these steps. Firstly, following the theory of party organization proposed by Katz and Mair, data analysis in this study is based on the three different organizational faces, namely the organizational structure of the Islamic parties on the ground, the organizational structure of the Islamic parties in central office and the organizational structure of the Islamic parties in public office. Therefore, the real conditions and situations of the Islamic parties in these three different aspects are explored.

Secondly, applying the party models summarized by Krouwel, data analysis in this study is also based on four major party models, namely the elite-based, mass-based, electoralist and cartel parties. In this sense, the Islamic parties are categorized into a certain party model. As the reality is never as clear-cut as the analytical framework expects it to be, it is possible that each of the three different organizational structures contains some elements of the ideal-type of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party, or the cartel party. In other words, it is possible that each of the Islamic parties contain some hybrid features. Since some elements are more prominent than the others, however, each of these parties is categorized into a certain party model. The empirical analysis is presented in detail in Chapter 5 to Chapter 7.

Thirdly, after exploring the organizational features of these six Islamic parties in the three different dimensions, the comprehensive feature of these parties is discussed. Such an analysis is very important in answering how these parties are organized. The analytical process is continued by explaining the way these parties organize. In doing so, this study will apply the analytical perspective as discussed in Chapter 2, namely rational choice institutionalism. Such an analysis is very important in providing answers why these parties organize the way they do. Lastly, some theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. The last step of analysis in this study is presented in Chapter 8.

5. Summary

In order to understand the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the local level in post-Suharto Indonesia, this study applies the qualitative research, more specifically, the case study research. Moreover, by applying the information-oriented selection strategy, more specifically the maximum variation case, this study focuses on six Islamic parties as its units of analysis. Moreover, because of its peculiarities, the Tasikmalaya district is selected as the locus of the study. Meanwhile, in collecting information on how and why Islamic parties organize, this study applies the triangulation method by combining the in-depth interviews, direct observation and documentary analysis techniques. As the primary source, however, this study relies on the interviews. Finally, this study combines various techniques in the data analysis process in order to attain valid findings.

CHAPTER 4

THE TASIKMALAYA DISTRICT AND ITS ISLAMIC PARTIES

Before going further to the empirical analysis, it is important to describe the socio-political conditions of the Tasikmalaya district which serves as the research area of this study. In doing so, this chapter describes features of the local population, the organizational profile of the executive branch of government and the political support of political parties in the district, including the profile of the legislative branch of government. This chapter also portrays a general picture of the Islamic parties in the district as the unit of analysis in this study, including their ideologies, platforms, organizational structures and political achievements in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.

1. The Tasikmalaya District

The Tasikmalaya district is located around 106 km southeast of the West Java capital, Bandung in Preanger (*Priangan*) regions.¹ It is bordered by the Majalengka and Ciamis districts, the Tasikmalaya municipality to the North, the Garut district to the West, the Ciamis district to the East and the Indian Ocean to the South. Covering an area of 271251 square kilometers, the district is topographically divided into two areas, the lowlands in the southern area and the mountainous region in the north. Covered by forest and a predominantly rural area, it is also often known as “the thousand hills district” in West Java province.²

¹ Historically, Preanger was a residency (an administrative level between provincial and district governments) which was established during the British colonialism in 1811-1816. The Preanger Resident covered some districts, including Bandung, Cianjur, Ciamis, Cimahi, Garut, Sumedang and Tasikmalaya. In addition, in the 1950s, the residential level was completely removed from the government system in Indonesia. Furthermore, see Nina H. Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak Priangan 1800-1942* (Bandung: Pusat Informasi Kebudayaan Sunda, 1998), pp. 33-34.

² Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) of the Tasikmalaya District (2007).

Figure 4.1
Indonesian Map



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/indonesia_adm_2002.jpg.

Figure 4.2
West Java Map



Source: http://www.bpkp.go.id/unit/Jabar/Peta_administratif_jawa_barat.jpg.

1.1. Local Population

The district is located in the centre of the Sundanese areas, the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia.³ In 2007 the district had a total population of 1686633 consisting of 855252 female and 831381 male residents. Regarding the ethnic distribution, the major ethnic group in the district is Sundanese (94.7 percent). Other minor ethnic groups are Cirebon, Javanese, Batak, Betawi and Chinese. Islam is the most dominant religion in the district (99.5 percent) with a small number of Protestants and Catholics.⁴ It is also important to mention that the majority of the Sundanese are orthodox Muslims. They implement Islamic tenets in their daily activities strictly, such as wearing a scarf for woman and implementing Islamic rituals and ceremonies. Dominated by Muslim, the district is also well known as “the Muslim town” in West Java province.

Most of the Sundanese Muslims in the district are Sunni. The other Muslims follow other branches in Islam, including Shia and Sufism. In addition, the Sundanese Muslims have different characteristics to the Javanese Muslims as their Muslim identity is strongly related to their Sundanese identity. In this sense, the Sundanese Muslims combine practices of Islam with their Sundanese cultures. To a certain extent, however, they also have a strong identification with the wider Islamic community. As Newland points out:

Being Muslim for the Sundanese, then, is associated with being indigenous to West Java, where affiliation with Islam tends to suggest a certain ethnic purity. A Muslim identity also connects the Sundanese with the wider Islamic community (*ummat*) theologically centered on Mecca, which has had a decisive influence on the religious and political thought of the Sundanese living in the Priangan Mountains.⁵

A detailed historical account of the spread of Islam in the district is beyond the scope of this study. However, it should be acknowledged that Islam was spread in the district through various modes. Some historians argue that Islam arrived in this district from Mecca. Other scholars believe that Islam came to this district from Persia (Iran) and

³ Moriyama explains that the Sundanese people had realized that they had different language, culture and ethnicity with Javanese for long time ago. This awareness had been stronger since the Dutch colonialism came in power. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sundanese people established various organizations in order to show their own identities distinguishing them from the Javanese people as the largest ethnic group in Indonesia. Furthermore, see Mikihiro Moriyama, “Discovering the “Language” and the “Literature” of West Java: An Introduction to the Formation of Sundanese Writing in 19th Century West Java, *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1996); Edi S. Ekadjati, “Paguyuban Pasundan: A Sundanese Revival 1913-1918, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, No. 66 (2003).

⁴ Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) of the Tasikmalaya District (2007).

⁵ Lynda Newland, “Under the Banner of Islam: Mobilizing Religious Identities in West Java, *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2000).

Gujarat (India). Moreover, similar to the Islamisation of Indonesia in general, the Islamisation in the district was also structurally shaped by various interlocking groups and institutions, namely the sultanates with their maritime economic power along Java's coast, a group of foreign Muslim scholars serving in the bureaucratic and ritual posts of the sultanates and the Sufi mystical teachers.⁶ In West Java province in general and in the district in particular, the spread of Islam came from two regions, namely Banten and Cirebon in the sixteenth centuries. According to Wessing, in the early days, Islam in this region was strongly influenced by shamanistic practices. The spread of Islam in this area was also strongly mystical in which Islamic teachers were recognized to have great magical powers.⁷

There are at least three historical events through which the district cannot be separated from Islamic radical movements in Indonesia. Firstly, there were several Islamic revolts which took place during the Dutch and Japanese colonialism. These Islamic revolts were organized by Sufism groups, Islamic teachers and various Islamic boarding schools. Secondly, another Islamic radical movement took place after the declaration of independence in 1945, namely the Islamic State Movement (*Darul Islam Indonesia* or DII). Led by S.M. Kartosuwiryo, the movement aimed to establish an Islamic state and to implement *sharia* (Islamic laws) in Indonesia. The movement spread to five other provinces in Indonesia, including Aceh, West Sumatera and South Sulawesi in 1948-1962.⁸ Despite the fact that the movement failed to achieve its goals, it has inspired various Islamic radical groups in the district to preserve the demand of the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in the district until recently. Thirdly, there was an ethnic riot in 1996 stimulated by police brutality and abuse towards an Islamic

⁶ Furthermore, see Horikoshi Hiroko, *A Traditional Leader in A Time of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in West Java* (Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976), p. 39.

⁷ Furthermore, Robert Wessing, "A Change in the Forest: Myth and History in Java," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1993).

⁸ Horikoshi argues that the movement was based on the long-standing failure of Islamic parties to realize an Islamic state or to provide united leadership to the Islamic community. Furthermore, see Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process," *Indonesia*, Vol. 20 (1975). See also, Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*, pp. 237-76; Kees van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

teacher. In this riot, several police offices, churches and Chinese-owned businesses were destroyed.⁹

The influence of Islam on the political attitude of the local population is very strong. The dominant actors in maintaining a strong relationship between Islam and politics in the district are Islamic teachers (*kyai* or *ulama*).¹⁰ The role of Islamic teachers in the district is very significant in determining not only religious aspects, but also the socio-political dimensions of the local population. Moreover, the relationship between Islamic teachers and the local population is based on the patron-client mechanism. In such a relationship, Islamic teachers serve as the patrons who provide material as well as spiritual resources for the local population. The local population in return acts as the clients who provide obedience and respects to Islamic teachers. Through such a relationship, these Islamic teachers have a so-called “traditional authority” to lead the local population.¹¹ They also have “sacred authority” in which Islamic teachers have the privilege to interpret Islamic tenets and these interpretations are strictly followed by the local population.¹² In general, Islamic teachers in the district play a pivotal role in linking the local population and other actors in the larger system, including with party politics.¹³

Nowadays, the role of Islamic teachers in determining the political attitude of the local population is not as decisive as it was in the past due to several factors. The manager of the Sukahideung Islamic boarding school in the district, an Islamic boarding school with no affiliation with any political party, Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, explains that the role of Islamic teachers in determining the voting behavior continues to decline as there is a growing political pragmatism among these Islamic teachers.¹⁴ Moreover, since the fall of Suharto or the reformation period, as argued by a cultural observer, Acep Zamzam Noer,

⁹ The chronology of the Tasikmalaya riot in 1996 is available at http://www.temppointeractive.com/ang/har/1997/970107_1-e.htm.

¹⁰ Horikoshi distinguishes Islamic leaders in Indonesia into two types, namely *ulama* and *kyai*. Coming from the Islamic teachers' family, the former refers to the Islamic teacher who plays moral and religious roles in society. Meanwhile, the latter refers to Islamic teacher with charismatic personalities. The position of *kyai* is superior to *ulama* in the local population. Furthermore, see Horikoshi Hiroko, *A Traditional Leader in a Time of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in West Java*, pp. 344-46.

¹¹ Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion* (London: The University of California Press, 1973), pp. 186-94.

¹² Furthermore, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 57-60.

¹³ Horikoshi Hiroko, *A Traditional Leader in A Time of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in West Java*, pp. 375-81.

¹⁴ Interview with Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, December 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

many Islamic teachers has acted as political brokers in the relationship between political parties and their electorates as well as between candidates for governor, district head and mayor and their voters.¹⁵ As a consequence, the political trust in Islamic teachers among the local population has been declining.

On the other hand, there is also a growing political pragmatism among the local population. The deputy manager of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school in the district, Abdul Haziz Affandy, explains that since the modification of the electoral system from the close-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections and because of a growing mechanism of money politics, the local population has become more pragmatic in its political activities, including in their voting behavior.¹⁶ Similarly, the manager of the Cipasung Islamic boarding school in the district, Acep Adang Ruchyat, argues that the local population has become more rational in their political attitude so that they are able to distinguish in Islamic teachers between their status as religious leaders or politicians.¹⁷

The role of Islamic social organizations is also very important in maintaining a strong relationship between Islam and politics. There are three main Islamic organizations which determine the socio-political preferences of the local population in the district. The biggest Islamic organization is the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or NU) representing traditionalist Muslims¹⁸ with strong elements of Sufism.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Islamic Union (*Persatuan Islam* or PERSIS)²⁰ and the Muhammadiyah²¹ represent modernist (puritan) Muslims.

¹⁵ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶ Interview with Abdul Haziz Affandy, December 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁷ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁸ Furthermore on the NU, see Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).

¹⁹ On Sufism in Indonesia, see Martin van Bruinessen, "Origins and Development of the Sufi Orders (Tarekat) in Southeast Asia," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1-23; Julian Day Howell, "Modulations of Active Piety: Professors and Televangelists As Promoters of Indonesian "Sufisme", in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 40-62.

²⁰ Furthermore on the PERSIS, see Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam. Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1970).

²¹ Furthermore on the Muhammadiyah, see, Syamsuddin, M. Sirajuddin, *Religion and Politics in Indonesia Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia New Order* (Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1991); Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree. A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983).

To a lesser extent, the Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) in the district also play an important role in maintaining the relationship between Islam and politics. In 2005, there were 634 Islamic boarding schools and 61778 Islamic students (*santri*). Not surprisingly, the district is also known as “the Islamic boarding schools town” in Indonesia. Among these Islamic boarding schools, there are three major Islamic boarding schools, namely the Cipasung, Miftahul Huda and Suryalaya Islamic boarding schools.

The Cipasung Islamic boarding school was founded in 1931 by a charismatic Islamic teacher, Ruchyat. Adopting a modern educational system, the school provides educational curricula covering not only religious lessons, but also modern skills, such as technology and computer studies. It also conducts educational activities from elementary school to university level. After the death of Ruchyat, the school was led by another charismatic leader, Ilyas Ruchyat, son of. At the moment, the school is led by Acep Adang Ruchyat, the little brother of Ilyas Ruchyat. In 2003, the school had more than five thousand students and alumni coming from many regions in Indonesia as well as some neighboring countries.²² In addition, the school is affiliated with the NU in which some leaders and teachers in the school serve as officials of the NU in the district.²³

Meanwhile, the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school was founded in 1967 by another charismatic Islamic teacher, Choer Affandi, who served as the leader of the Islamic State Movement in the 1950s in the district. Applying Salafism, the school focuses heavily on Islamic studies. Different to the Cipasung Islamic boarding school in which its educational curricula are set by a wider spectrum of persons, the educational curricula of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school are guided only by Choer Affandi and his decedents. Since the death of Choer Affandi, the school has been led by his first son, Asep A. Maoshul Affandy. In 2007, the school had more than three thousands students and alumni coming from different regions in Indonesia and some neighboring countries.²⁴ Although some leaders and teachers of the school serve as officials of the NU in the district and in the West Java province, the school has no formal relationship with the NU.²⁵

²² More information about the school is available at <http://www.cipasung.com>.

²³ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁴ More information about the school is available at <http://www.miftahul-huda.com>.

²⁵ Interview with Abdul Haziz Affandy, December 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

The oldest Islamic boarding school in the district is the Suryalaya Islamic boarding school which was founded by Syaikh Abdullah bin Nur Muhammad in 1905. Similar to the Cipasung Islamic boarding school, the Suryalaya Islamic boarding school implements a modern approach in its educational system covering not only religious lessons, but also other modern subjects. Based on two major branches in Sufism, namely Qadiriyyah and Naqshabandiyyah, the school provides educational activities from elementary school to university level. In addition, it is internationally known as the leading drug rehabilitation center. Currently, the school is led by another charismatic Islamic teacher, Ahmad Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin, the son of Syaikh Abdullah bin Nur Muhammad. In 2007, the school has more than three thousands students and of alumni coming from various regions in Indonesia and some neighboring countries.²⁶

The relationship among these Islamic organizations, Islamic boarding schools and the Islamic parties is very strong. The local population assumes that the NU and Cipasung Islamic boarding school have a strong relationship with the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB) as Ilyas Ruchyat became one of initiators of the party. Meanwhile, the Muhammadiyah is close to the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN) and the PERSIS has a political relationship with the Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB). The local population also assumes that the Mifathul Huda Islamic boarding school is close to the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP), while the Suryalaya Islamic boarding school is close to the Functional Groups Party (*Partai Golongan Karya* or Golkar Party).²⁷

Regarding the socio-economic conditions, it is important to mention that the local population in the district experiences various problems. In 2007, for instance, the per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) of the district was Rp. 5601223.41 (€ 373.41) so that it was categorized as one of the districts with a low per capita GRDP in West Java province.²⁸ Another example, the poverty level reached 28.55 percent of the total population, while the unemployment level reached 7.9 percent in 2007.²⁹ The purchasing

²⁶ More information about the school is available at <http://www.suryalaya.org> or <http://www.suryalaya.net>.

²⁷ Interview with anonymous, January 3, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁸ Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) of the Tasikmalaya District in 2007.

²⁹ Ibid.

power was also very low reaching only Rp. 558928 (€ 37.26).³⁰ Not surprisingly, the district was also categorized as one of the poorest districts in West Java province. Moreover, in 2007, 27.5 percent of the total population in the district was not able to complete elementary school, while 53.3 percent of them finished elementary school. This information shows that the educational attainment in the district is very low.³¹

Similarly, the self-financing ability of the district is also very limited. In 2007, for example, the local origin income of the district contributed Rp. 34726029176 (€ 2515068.61) to the total income of the district that reached Rp. 956897001611 (€ 63,793,133.44). In other words, the local origin income (known as *Pendapatan Asli Daerah* or PAD) only contributed 3.63 percent to the total income. Not surprisingly, in terms of the self-financing capacity, the district has depended on subsidies from the central government since the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001.³²

In general, the local population in the district has two interesting peculiarities. Firstly, Islam is embedded in the way of life of the local population. Secondly, the local population has experienced various socio-economic problems. Such a combination has, in turn, facilitated the local population in adopting a strong Islamic sentiment. As argued by Mujani and Liddle, Islamic sentiments in Indonesia are stronger among those who are less educated in general, those who are educated in religious rather than secular schools, those whose household incomes are relatively low and those who live in village areas.³³ Not surprisingly, the local population in the district is categorized as Muslims with a strong Islamic sentiment.

1.2. Executive Branch of Government

During the New Order period in 1966-1998, similar to other regional governments in Indonesia, the executive branch of government in the district lacked the authority to manage the district. In this period, the central government appointed the district head (*bupati*) who mostly came from the military. Not surprisingly, the executive branch of government served as the instrument of the central government in order to establish and

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.


³² The Tasikmalaya District Government's Report in 2008.

³³ Furthermore, see Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Politics, Islam and Public Opinion," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2004), 109-23.

maintain the centralized system. Meanwhile, the role of the legislative branch of government (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* or DPRD) was insignificant in making policies. During the New Order period, the legislative branch of government acted just as *rubber-stamps* for policies made by the central government through the executive branch of government in the district.

Since the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy (*otonomi daerah* or otda) in 2001, the condition has shifted. Based on new provisions on regional government, similar to other district and municipal governments in Indonesia, the executive branch of government in the district has authority to manage the district in various sectors, i.e., public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land affairs, cooperatives and manpower. In addition, following the implementation of the direct presidential election in 2004, the district has also implemented the direct district heads elections (known as *pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* or *pilkadasung*) since 2006.³⁴

Figure 4.3
The Tasikmalaya District Administrative System³⁵



³⁴ Furthermore on the direct elections of governor, district head and mayor in Indonesia, see Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb, "Indonesia and the Quest for "Democracy", in Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds.), *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 1-37.

³⁵ Derived from Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 6/2004 on Tasikmalaya Government Structure.

Based on Tasikmalaya Regulation (*Peraturan Daerah* or *Perda*) No. 6/2004 on Tasikmalaya Government Structures, as shown in Figure 4.3, the executive branch of government consists of the district head and vice. In managing the district, they are supported by an executive secretariat, a legislative secretariat, agencies, technical institutions and sub-district governments. It is important to note that the village government has autonomy in arranging their own affairs so that government at the village level is not a part of the executive branch at the district level.

Further, there are twelve agencies in the district, namely the educational, regional income, health, transportation, farming, fishery & marine, forestry, agriculture, commerce, industry & cooperation, mining & energy resource, public works, regional settlement, spatial plan & environmental, population, labor and family planning agencies. Meanwhile, there are six offices (the public safety and national unity, archive and library, social empowerment, tourism and culture, agricultural instructor and research and development offices), three boards (the regional development planning, internal controlling and training, education and personnel boards) and a civil service police unit within technical institutions. After the implementation of the decentralized system and the establishment of the Tasikmalaya municipality in 2001, the district has thirty-nine sub-districts and three thousand and fifty-one villages, including Singaparna sub-district as the capital of the district.³⁶

Table 4.1
Profile of Sub-Districts

| No. | Sub-District | Area (ha) | Number of Village | Population | |
|-----|---------------|------------|-------------------|------------|--------|
| | | | | M | F |
| 1 | Cipatujah | 22,440 | 15 | n/a | n/a |
| 2 | Karangnunggal | 128.210 | 14 | 35,826 | 35,984 |
| 3 | Cikalong | 13,291.966 | 13 | 27,364 | 27,276 |
| 4 | Pancatengah | 19,905 | 11 | 21,980 | 21,806 |
| 5 | Cikatomas | 15,032.83 | 9 | 20,228 | 20,112 |
| 6 | Cibalong | 5,959.973 | 6 | 14,161 | 14,014 |
| 7 | Parungponteng | 4,718.894 | 8 | 15,903 | 15,751 |
| 8 | Bantarkalong | 6,294.810 | 8 | 15,090 | 14,722 |
| 9 | Bojongasih | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| 10 | Culamega | 6,211.5 | 5 | 11,058 | 11,023 |

³⁶ Before the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001, the Tasikmalaya municipality was an administrative area within the Tasikmalaya district.

| No. | Sub-District | Area (ha) | Number of Village | Population | |
|-----|---------------|------------|-------------------|------------|--------|
| | | | | M | F |
| 11 | Bojonggambir | 12,261 | 10 | 18,148 | 18,029 |
| 12 | Sodonghilir | 10,671 | 12 | 29,068 | 28,638 |
| 13 | Taraju | 5,552 | 9 | 15,991 | 16,556 |
| 14 | Salawu | 5,969.193 | 12 | 25,475 | 26,928 |
| 15 | Puspahiang | 5,171 | 8 | 15,107 | 15,306 |
| 16 | Tanjungjaya | 3,637 | 7 | 18,859 | 19,132 |
| 17 | Sukaraja | 4,185.312 | 8 | 21,561 | 21,423 |
| 18 | Salopa | 10,695.531 | 9 | 20,780 | 20,928 |
| 19 | Jatiwaras | 7,705.997 | 11 | 23,058 | 22,769 |
| 20 | Cineam | 770.290 | 10 | 16,038 | 16,812 |
| 21 | Karangjaya | 4,748.130 | 4 | 5,917 | 6,171 |
| 22 | Manonjaya | 4,215 | 12 | 25,653 | 26,338 |
| 23 | Gunungtanjung | 1,389.80 | 7 | 13,535 | 14,825 |
| 24 | Singaparna | 2,178.837 | 10 | 27,856 | 28,592 |
| 25 | Mangunreja | 2,265.832 | 6 | 16,303 | 16,814 |
| 26 | Sukarame | 1,562.572 | 6 | 18,824 | 19,439 |
| 27 | Cigalontang | 11,913 | 16 | 35,499 | 34,733 |
| 28 | Leuwisari | 5,416.55 | 7 | 16,049 | 16,404 |
| 29 | Padakembang | 1,809 | 5 | 14,991 | 16,022 |
| 30 | Sariwangi | 8,505.29 | 8 | 14,036 | 14,211 |
| 31 | Sukaratu | 3,361.104 | 8 | 20,465 | 20,443 |
| 32 | Cisayong | 4,709.708 | 13 | 22,604 | 23,971 |
| 33 | Sukahening | 2,561.651 | 7 | 12,928 | 13,185 |
| 34 | Rajapolah | 1,692.04 | 8 | 18,569 | 18,989 |
| 35 | Jamanis | 723.773 | 8 | 15,982 | 15,104 |
| 36 | Ciawi | 4,223 | 11 | 27,624 | 27,809 |
| 37 | Kadipaten | 3,564.638 | 6 | 14,693 | 14,853 |
| 38 | Pagerageung | 6,368.450 | 10 | 23,873 | 2,380 |
| 39 | Sukaresik | 1,708.400 | 8 | 16,240 | 16,038 |

Source: <http://tasikmalayakab.go.id/index.php>.

Tatang Farhanul Hakim has served as the district head since 2001. Born on March 18, 1961, he started his political career as a member of the Golkar in the 1970s. Afterwards, he decided to move to the PPP in 1978. He started his career in the PPP by serving as an official of the party at the village level, before holding a position as the vice head of the party in the district in 1987-1998. His political career continued to advance when he was in charge as the head of the PPP in the district in 1999-2006. Afterwards, he served as a legislator for the PPP in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in the periods of 1992-1997, 1997-1999 and 1999-2001. Supported by the PPP and Golkar Party, in turn, he was

appointed as the district head by the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in 2001.³⁷ When the district conducted the 2006 direct district head election, he was re-elected by gaining 24.24 percent of the total votes.³⁸

In addition, Tatang Farhanul Hakim is one of a small number of district heads in Indonesia to come from an Islamic party. According to Bush, among the five hundred governors, district heads and mayors who were directly elected until June 2007, only 4.9 percent of them came from Islamic parties and 2.7 percent of them came from a coalition of these parties. The others were candidates from a coalition of Islamic parties and secular-nationalist parties (37 percent), from secular-nationalist parties (33 percent) and from a coalition of secular-nationalist parties (23 percent).³⁹

Since 2001, Tatang Farhanul Hakim has introduced various *sharia*-based regulations. He introduced Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the Tasikmalaya District in 2001-2005 through which the development process in the Tasikmalaya district was based on Islamic principles. When he was re-elected in 2006, this policy was continued under a new provision, namely Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 17/2006 on Tasikmalaya Medium-Term Development Plan in 2006-2010. He also introduced Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 3/2001 on Security and Order Based on Morality, Religion, Local Ethics and Values in the Tasikmalaya district.

Moreover, he also introduced various *sharia*-based regulations in the form of district head's decree (*Surat Keputusan Bupati*) and a district head's letter (*Surat Edaran Bupati*). Until 2008, there were at least three *sharia*-based regulations in these forms, i.e., the District Head Decree No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 on Quran Literacy Obligation for Pupils and Bride Muslim Dress in the Tasikmalaya District, the District Head Circulation Letter No. 451/1271/Sos on Wearing of Muslim Dress for Government Apparatus in the Tasikmalaya District and the District Head Circulation Letter No. 556.3/SE/03/Sos/2001 on Management of Swimming Pools in the Tasikmalaya District.

Tatang Farhanul Hakim argues that through these provisions, he attempts to achieve several goals. The first goal is to maintain Islamic culture in the district as the majority of

³⁷ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁸ General Election Commission's Report in the Tasikmalaya District (2006).

³⁹ Bush Robin, "Regional *Sharia* Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?" in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 174-91.

the local population is Muslim. The second goal is to establish an Islamic society in the district so that the district will be able to serve as a barometer of the Islamic movements in West Java province. And the third goal is to unite the Muslim community in the district. He also argues that, instead of facilitating the reemergence of the Islamic radical movements, more specifically the Islamic State Movement, these provisions aim to prevent the rise of such movements in the district in particular and in Indonesia in general.⁴⁰

Various reactions emerged when Tatang Farhanul Hakim introduced these provisions. According to Acep Zamzam Noer and an academic from Siliwangi University, Subhan, some Islamic organizations in the district, such as youth organizations inside the NU, did not support these provisions. On the other hand, various fundamental organizations, such as the Taliban and Mujahidin and some Islamic boarding schools, such as the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school, supported these provisions.⁴¹ These provisions were supported by the Islamic parties, including the Muslim-nationalist parties, as well as the secular-nationalist parties. The head of the Golkar Party in the district, Eman Sulaiman, explains that his party decided to support these provisions as they were in accordance with the ideology and platforms of his party.⁴² Similarly, the head of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* or PDI-P) in the district, Ade Sugianto, argues that since they were in line with the ideology and platforms of his party, there was no reason for his party to reject these provisions.⁴³

However, many people criticized the implementation of these provisions. Acep Zamzam Noer, for instance, argues that such provisions in fact reflect political maneuvers of Tatang Farhanul Hakim and his proponents in order to gain their political support. In this sense, it has nothing to do with the intention to establish an Islamic state in the district.⁴⁴ Similarly, Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab explains that these provisions have failed to increase the social welfare of the local population, including in the religious sector.⁴⁵ These illustrations suggest that the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy in the district has been hijacked by local elites in order to serve their own personal interest. Not

⁴⁰ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴¹ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya); Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴² Interview with Eman Sulaeman, December 16, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴³ Interview with Ade Sugianto, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁴ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁵ Interview with Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, December 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

surprisingly, the implementation of the decentralization system and regional autonomy since 2001 has failed to increase the social welfare of the local population.⁴⁶

1.3. Political Parties and Legislature

Since the 1955 election, the district has been known as one of the political bases for the Islamic parties in Indonesia to gain political support in elections. In the 1957 election, the major Islamic parties in the district were the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Party (*Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Masyumi Party), the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars Party (*Nahdlatul Ulama* Party or NU Party) and the Indonesian Islamic United Party (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or PSII). Despite the fact that all of these parties experienced a significant defeat at the national level in the 1955 election, they were still able to gain significant votes and seats in the district in the 1957 election. In addition, these Islamic parties competed with secular-nationalist parties, i.e., the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or PKI), the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasionalis Indonesia* or PNI), the Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or PSI), the Free Indonesian Party (*Partai Rakyat Indonesia Merdeka* or PRIM) and the Sundanese Choice Movement (*Gerakan Pilihan Sunda* or Gerpis).

Table 4.2
Distribution of Votes and Seats in the 1957 Election⁴⁷

| Party | Votes (from a total of 392,036 votes) | Seats (from a total of 35 seats) |
|---------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| Masyumi Party | 123,570 | 11 |
| NU Party | 74,369 | 7 |
| PKI | 67,940 | 6 |
| PNI | 63,745 | 6 |
| PSI | 15,995 | 2 |
| PRIM | 12,036 | 1 |
| PSII | 11,683 | 1 |
| Gerpis | 9,213 | 1 |
| Others | 13,485 | - |

Source: Library of Indonesia Studies, Cornell University.

⁴⁶ A similar condition also takes place in many regions in Indonesia. Furthermore, see M. Ryaas Rasyid, "Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia," in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia. Decentralization and Democratization* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 63-71; Vedi R. Hadiz, "Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to Neo-Liberal Reform," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2004, pp. 615-36.

⁴⁷ Special thanks to Kevin Evans for providing this information.

However, these Islamic parties in the district experienced a significant decline in the New Order's elections.⁴⁸ In the 1971 election, although the NU Party was able to gain 17.62 percent of votes and 7 percent of seats, the party was not able to prevent the political domination of the Golkar. Similarly, although it was able to gain third position, the Indonesian's Muslim Party (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia* or Parmusi) which was a reinvention of the Masyumi Party gained one seat. Other Islamic parties, namely the Indonesian Unite Islam Party (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* or PSII) and Islamic Education Movement Party (*Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* or PERTI) were even not able to obtain a single seat in the district.

Table 4.3
Distribution of Votes and Seats in the 1971 Election

| Party | Votes (from a total of 590,934 votes) | Seats (from a total of 39 seats)⁴⁹ |
|----------------|--|--|
| Golkar | 447,511 | 24 |
| NU Party | 104,130 | 7 |
| Parmusi | 24,564 | 1 |
| PSII | 5,303 | - |
| PNI | 4,034 | - |
| IPKI | 2,427 | - |
| Parkindo | 1,271 | - |
| Perti | 1,087 | - |
| Catholic Party | 381 | - |
| Murba Party | 226 | - |
| TNI-Polri | - | 7 |

Source: The General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (1997).

The political domination of Golkar in the district remained stable after the 1971 election. Many factors contributed to this condition. The main factor is the party fusion policy proposed by the New Order government. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Islamic parties and the secular-nationalist parties in the 1971 election were forced to merge into a single party. In the context of the Islamic parties, the NU Party, Parmusi, Perti and PSII were forced to merge into the PPP. Meanwhile, the PNI, IPKI, Parkindo, Catholic Party and Murba were induced to establish a single secular-nationalist party, namely the Indonesian

⁴⁸ Furthermore on the New Order's elections, see Syamsuddin Haris, "General Elections under The New Order," in Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth (eds.), *Elections in Indonesia. The New Order and Beyond* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 18-37.

⁴⁹ In the 1971 election, seven seats of the total thirty-nine seats in the Tasikmalaya Legislative Council were allocated for the military (TNI) and police (Polri).

Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* or PDI). As a consequence of the party fusion policy, the PPP and PDI experienced various internal conflicts during the New Order period. Moreover, the implementation of the sole ideology in which the PPP was forced to adopt Pancasila as their ideological foundation also became another contributing factor to the failure of this party to increase the level of its political support.

Table 4.4
Distribution of Votes in the New Order's Elections

| Party | 1977 (%) | 1982 (%) | 1987 (%) | 1992 (%) | 1997 (%) |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Golkar | 58.49 | 61.11 | 71.78 | 68.37 | 70.33 |
| PPP | 39.37 | 32.77 | 15.94 | 20.67 | 28.81 |
| PDI | 2.14 | 6.12 | 12.28 | 10.96 | 0.86 |

Source: General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (1997).

The political constellation in the district has shifted since the fall of the New Order authoritarian regime in 1998. In the 1999 election, forty-eight parties competed in the district, including sixteen Islamic parties. As a result, three secular-nationalist parties and five Islamic parties were able to gain significant votes and seats. The secular-nationalist parties in the 1999 election which gained significant votes and seats were the PDI-P which was reinvention of the PDI, the Golkar Party and the Justice and Union Party (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* or PKP). Meanwhile, the Islamic parties which succeeded in gaining significant votes and seats in this election were the PPP, the PKB, the PAN, the PBB and the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan* or PK). In the 1999 election, as shown in the following table, the PPP succeeded in replacing the Golkar as the winning party in the district.

Table 4.5
Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Eight Parties in the 1999 Election

| Party | Votes (from a total of 1,162,348 votes) | Seats (from a total of 45 seats) |
|--------------|--|---|
| PPP | 298,399 | 11 |
| Golkar | 257,163 | 9 |
| PDI-P | 214,125 | 8 |
| PKB | 133,464 | 5 |
| PAN | 64,322 | 3 |
| PBB | 54,685 | 2 |
| PKP | 16,495 | 1 |

| Party | Votes (from a total of 1,162,348 votes) | Seats (from a total of 45 seats) |
|-----------|--|-------------------------------------|
| PK | 15,869 | 1 |
| TNI-Polri | - | 5 |

Source: General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (1999).

Further, the 1999 election produced forty-five legislators for the period of 1999-2004 in which five of them were representatives of the military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) and police (*Polisi Republik Indonesia* or Polri). The organizational structure of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period was divided into a head, three deputies and five commissions focusing on government, economy, finance, development and social welfares issues. Regarding the profile of these legislators, as shown in Table 4.6, all of the legislators in this period were Muslims. Moreover, most of them were males and they had bachelor and diploma degrees.

In this period, Ade Sugianto from the PDI-P served as the head of the legislature, supported by Tatang Farhanul Hakim from the PPP, Dede T. Widarsih from the Golkar and Uyun Moch. Yunus from TNI/Polri as the deputies. As mentioned earlier, the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period elected Tatang Farhanul Hakim as the district head for the period of 2001-2006. Moreover, the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period also supported the *sharia*-based policies which were proposed by Tatang Farhanul Hakim. In general, however, there was no significant political achievement made by the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period.

Table 4.6
Profile of the Legislators in 1999-2004

| No | Name | Position | Fraction | Sex | Education | Religion |
|---------------------------|--|-----------|---------------------|-----|-------------|----------|
| 1 | Ade Sugianto | Head | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 2 | Tatang Farhanul Hakim/ Didin Badrudin | Vice Head | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 3 | Dede T. Widarsih | Vice Head | Golkar | F | High School | Islam |
| 4 | Uyun Moch Yunus | Vice Head | TNI-Polri | M | n/a | Islam |
| Commission A (Government) | | | | | | |
| 5 | Heri Hendriana | Head | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Master | Islam |
| 6 | Arip Rachman | Vice Head | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 7 | Dedi Sumadi T. | Secretary | TNI-Polri | M | n/a | Islam |
| 8 | Agus Mansyur | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 9 | Nandang Zenal Mustofa | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 10 | Adang Roosman | Member | Golkar | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 11 | Asep Nurjaeni | Member | Golkar | M | Master | Islam |
| 12 | Momon Sam'an Kertajani | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |

| No | Name | Position | Fraction | Sex | Education | Religion |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----|-------------|----------|
| Commission B (Economy) | | | | | | |
| 13 | Ajen Zaenal Mustofa | Head | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 14 | Lucky Dayapermana | Vice Head | <i>Amanah</i> (PK) | M | High School | Islam |
| 15 | Laela Suroya | Secretary | PDI-P | F | High School | Islam |
| 16 | Ruhimat | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 17 | Satim Sukarsa | Member | Golkar | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 18 | Iip Samsul Arief | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 19 | Tetep Abdulatip | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 20 | Omon Alhadi | Member | TNI-Polri | M | n/a | Islam |
| Commission C (Finance) | | | | | | |
| 21 | Acep Sutrisna | Head | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 22 | Subarna | Vice Head | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 23 | Endang Hadis | Secretary | Golkar | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 24 | Asep Ahmad S. | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 25 | Undang Ishak Abdullah | Member | Golkar | M | Master | Islam |
| 26 | R. Rahmat Heryadi | Member | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 27 | Ade Komaludin | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Master | Islam |
| 28 | Basir Sirajudin Ahmad | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PBB) | M | High School | Islam |
| 29 | Endang Hidayat | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 30 | Pu'yat Purwayadi | Member | TNI-Polri | M | n/a | Islam |
| Commission D (Development) | | | | | | |
| 31 | Encap Supriatna | Head | Golkar | M | High School | Islam |
| 32 | Aa Suparman K. | Vice Head | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 33 | Dedi Mulyadi | Secretary | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 34 | U. Ruzhanul Ulum | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 35 | Dju'an | Member | Golkar | M | High School | Islam |
| 36 | Cion Wirawan | Member | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 37 | Basuki Rahmat | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PKP) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 38 | Atang Suryana Ansurulhaq | Member | PKB | M | High School | Islam |
| 39 | Syahrul | Member | TNI-Polri | M | n/a | Islam |
| Commission E (Social Welfare) | | | | | | |
| 40 | Ade Muhamad Yasin | Head | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 41 | Arifin | Vice Head | Golkar | M | High School | Islam |
| 42 | Yadi Mulyadi | Secretary | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 43 | Sobariah | Member | PPP | F | High School | Islam |
| 44 | Adang Sofyan Toha | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PBB) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 45 | Muhamad Ma'mun | Member | PKB | M | High School | Islam |

Source: Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (1999).

In the 2004 election, there were twenty-four parties in the district, including seven Islamic parties. As a result, three secular-nationalist parties and six Islamic parties gained significant votes and seats. Most of them were parties gaining votes and seats in the 1999 election. The new parties were the Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat* or PD) which adopted Pancasila and the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR) which adopted Islam as their ideological foundation. In this election, the Golkar Party was able to defeat the PPP although the PPP increased its votes and seats. In addition, PKB was able to

maintain its support, while the PAN, PBB and some others experienced a significant decline in their votes and seats. Interestingly, the Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) which was a reinvention of the PK and the PBR succeeded in increasing the level of their political support in this election.

Table 4.7
Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Nine Parties in the 2004 Election

| Party | Votes (from a total of 891,996 votes) | Seats (from a total of 45 seats) |
|--------------|--|---|
| Golkar Party | 243,376 | 12 |
| PPP | 241,363 | 12 |
| PDI-P | 98,169 | 7 |
| PKB | 69,482 | 5 |
| PKS | 57,118 | 4 |
| PAN | 39,865 | 2 |
| PD | 30,566 | 1 |
| PBR | 34,504 | 1 |
| PBB | 28,097 | 1 |

Source: The General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (2004).

The 2004 election produced 45 legislators for the period of 2004-2009. The organizational structure of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period was divided into a head, three deputies and four commissions, namely government, economy, development and social culture. The profile of the legislators in this period was slightly different with their counterparts in the previous period. As shown in Table 4.8, although most of the legislators were males, the proportion of females increased. Moreover, three Islamic parties were able to send their female representatives, namely the PKB, PPP and PKS. The number of legislators who had a master degree also increased. Similar to the previous period, these legislators came from an Islamic background.

In this period, U. Ruzhanul Ulum from the PPP served as the head of the legislature, supported by Adang Roosman from the Golkar Party and Aef Syaripudin from the PDI-P as the deputies. Different to the legislators in the previous period in which they were representatives of the military and police, all of the legislators in this period were elected through the 2004 election. Similar to the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in the previous period, however, there was no significant performance made by the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period. In addition, a similar condition also takes place in other areas in

Indonesia. Not surprisingly, as indicated by the AsianBarometer surveys, political trust in the legislative institution among the Indonesian people continues to decrease.⁵⁰

Table 4.8
Profile of the Legislators in 2004-2009

| No | Name | Position | Fraction | Sex | Education | Religion |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----|-------------|----------|
| 1 | U. Ruzhanul Ulum | Head | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 2 | Adang Roosman | Vice Head | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 3 | Aef Syaripudin | Vice Head | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| Commission I (Government) | | | | | | |
| 4 | Dede T. Widarsih | Head | Golkar Party | F | High School | Islam |
| 5 | Agus Mansur | Vice Head | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 6 | Momon Sam'an Kertajani | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 7 | Arifin | Member | Golkar Party | M | High School | Islam |
| 8 | Aris Jauhari | Member | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 9 | Ade M. Yasin | Member | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 10 | Cecep Badrul Mutakin | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 11 | Dindin Suryana | Member | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 12 | Iip Syamsul Arief | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 13 | Ucu Dewi Syarifah | Member | PKS | F | High School | Islam |
| Commission II (Economy) | | | | | | |
| 14 | Subarna | Head | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 15 | Herry Andrianto | Vice Head | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 16 | Udin Djuana | Member | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 17 | Asep Nurjaeni | Member | Golkar Party | M | Master | Islam |
| 18 | Asep Hussein | Member | Golkar Party | M | Master | Islam |
| 19 | Evi Elvinadianty | Member | PPP | F | High School | Islam |
| 20 | Adjid Ahmad Adjidin | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 21 | Laela Suroya | Member | PKB | F | High School | Islam |
| 22 | Demi Hamzah Rahadian | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 23 | Dadi Supriadi | Member | PKS | M | High School | Islam |
| Commission III (Development) | | | | | | |
| 24 | Nandang A.H. | Head | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 25 | Danny Ahfa | Vice Head | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 26 | Asep Hidayat | Member | PKS | M | Master | Islam |
| 27 | Erry Purwanto | Member | Golkar Party | M | Master | Islam |
| 28 | Anas Sunarsa Kalyubi | Member | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 29 | Encap Supriatna | Member | Golkar Party | M | High School | Islam |
| 30 | Ruhimat | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 31 | Cecep Nurul Yakin | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 32 | Tatang Setiawan/Ajen Zaenal | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 33 | Mustofa | Member | PDI-P | M | Master | Islam |
| 34 | Ade Abdurachmat | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 35 | Haris Sanjaya | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PD) | M | High School | Islam |
| | R. Hedi Hadiat | | | | | |
| Commission IV (Socio-Culture) | | | | | | |
| 36 | Ismail A.S. | Head | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 37 | Tetep Abdullatif | Vice Head | PKS | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 38 | S. Herman Hidayatullah | Member | Golkar | M | High School | Islam |

⁵⁰ Matthew Carlson and Turner, "Popular Perceptions of Political Regimes in East and Southeast Asia," *Democratization*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), pp. 377-398.

| No | Name | Position | Fraction | Sex | Education | Religion |
|----|---------------------|----------|---------------------|-----|-------------|----------|
| 39 | Agoeng N.S | Member | Golkar | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 40 | Neng Madinah Ruhiat | Member | PPP | F | Bachelor | Islam |
| 41 | Apip Ifan Permadi | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 42 | Ucu Subandri | Member | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 43 | Syamsudin | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 44 | Dede Saeful Anwar | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PBR) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 45 | Muhammad Noer | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PBB) | M | High School | Islam |

Source: Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (2004).

The 2009 election was followed by thirty-eight parties in the district, including seven Islamic parties. As a result, four secular-nationalist parties and four Islamic parties gained significant votes and seats. Most of them were parties which gained significant votes and seats in the 2004 election. Another secular-nationalist party which succeeded in obtaining votes and seats was the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (*Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa* or PKPB). In this election, the PPP was able to defeat the Golkar Party again. In addition, the PAN and PKS succeeded in increasing their seats. Meanwhile, the PKB was able to maintain the number of its seats. In this election, the PBB and PBR experienced a significant decline so that they failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.

Table 4.9
Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Eight Parties in the 2009 Election

| Party | Votes (from a total of 826,429 votes) | Seats (from a total of 50 seats) |
|--------------|--|---|
| PPP | 224,215 | 14 |
| Golkar Party | 123,941 | 8 |
| PD | 99,559 | 7 |
| PDI-P | 90,049 | 7 |
| PKB | 73,029 | 5 |
| PKS | 56,926 | 5 |
| PAN | 62,230 | 3 |
| PKPB | 21,408 | 1 |

Source: The General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (2009).

The 2009 election produced the Tasikmalaya District Legislature for the period of 2009-2014. Consisting of fifty legislators, the structure of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period is similar to the previous period. However, the profile of legislators in this period is rather different with the previous one. As shown in Table 4.10, female representation as well as the number of legislators holding master and bachelor

degrees has increased. Similar to the previous periods, however, all members come from an Islamic background. In this period, Ruhimat from the PPP serves as the head of the legislature, supported by Mochamad Arief Arseha from the Golkar Party, Ade Sugianto from the PDI-P and Ucu Asep Dani from the PD as the deputies.

Table 4.10
Profile of the Legislators in 2009-2014

| No | Name | Position | Fraction | Sex | Education | Religion |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|----------------------|-----|-------------|----------|
| 1 | Ruhimat | Head | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 2 | Mochamad Arief Arseha | Vice Head | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 3 | Ade Sugianto | Vice Head | PDI-P | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 4 | Ucu Asep Dani | Vice Head | PD | M | Master | Islam |
| Commission I (Government) | | | | | | |
| 5 | Aef Syaripudin | Head | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 6 | R. Toni Hanip | Vice Head | Golkar Party | M | High School | Islam |
| 7 | Yamin Yusuf | Member | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 8 | U. Ruzhanul Ulum | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 9 | Abud | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 10 | Iwan Kurniawan | Member | PD | M | High School | Islam |
| 11 | Yayan Abdullah | Member | PD | M | High School | Islam |
| 12 | Ucu Subandri | Member | PDI-P | M | High School | Islam |
| 13 | Nandang AH | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 14 | Ucu Dewi Syarifah | Member | PKS | F | Bachelor | Islam |
| 15 | Rosy Hermawaty | Member | PKS | F | Bachelor | Islam |
| 16 | Demi Hamzah Rahadian | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| Commission II (Economy) | | | | | | |
| 17 | Cecep Nurulyakin | Head | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 18 | Ferry Willyam | Vice Head | PD | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 19 | Yoga Juanda | Member | Golkar Party | M | High School | Islam |
| 20 | Hidayat Muslim | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 21 | Apip Ifan Permadi | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 22 | Budiman S Pirmansyah | Member | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 23 | Dede T. Widadsih | Member | Golkar Party | F | Bachelor | Islam |
| 24 | Arip Rachman | Member | PDI-P | M | Master | Islam |
| 25 | Haris Sanjaya | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 26 | Syamsudin | Member | PKB | M | High School | Islam |
| 27 | Dadi Supriyadi | Member | PKS | M | High School | Islam |
| 28 | Deni Ramdani | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| Commission III (Development) | | | | | | |
| 29 | Aris Jauhari Suhayatin | Head | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 30 | Ajen Zenal Mustopa | Vice Head | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 31 | Hedi Hediati | Member | PD | M | High School | Islam |
| 32 | Subarna | Member | PPP | M | Master | Islam |
| 33 | Ujang Sukmana | Member | PPP | M | High School | Islam |
| 34 | Erry Purwanto | Member | Golkar Party | M | Master | Islam |
| 35 | Agoeng Novansyah | Member | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 36 | Ade Abdurrachmat | Member | PDI-P | M | Master | Islam |
| 37 | Momon Sam'an Kertajani | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 39 | Asep Hidayat | Member | PKS | M | Master | Islam |
| | Nana Suryana | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PKPB) | M | High School | Islam |

| No | Name | Position | Fraction | Sex | Education | Religion |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----|-------------|----------|
| Commission IV (Social Welfare) | | | | | | |
| 40 | Andi Sulanjani | Head | PD | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 41 | Maftuh Farid | Vice Head | Golkar Party | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 42 | Asop Sopiudin | Member | PPP | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 43 | Mimi Rohmiati | Member | PPP | F | High School | Islam |
| 44 | Siti Nurjanah | Member | PPP | F | Bachelor | Islam |
| 45 | Mansur Supriadi | Member | PD | M | High School | Islam |
| 46 | Titin Sugiartini | Member | PDI-P | F | High School | Islam |
| 47 | Ade Anwas | Member | PDIP | M | High School | Islam |
| 48 | Oleh Soleh | Member | PKB | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 49 | Uteng Warsito | Member | PKS | M | Bachelor | Islam |
| 50 | Yane Sriwigantini | Member | <i>Amanah</i> (PAN) | F | Bachelor | Islam |

Source: Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (2009).

The illustrations above show that the historical root of the Islamic parties in the district is very deep. While they experienced a defeat in the 1955 election at the national level, some of them were able to gain votes and seats in the 1957 election in the district. The condition shifted during the New Order period, while the Golkar was able to maintain its political domination. Since the fall of the New Order government, however, the Islamic parties were able to gain their supports again. Since the 1999 election, the PPP has been able to maintain the level of its political support, although the party experienced defeat by the Golkar Party in the 2004 election. Three other Islamic parties, i.e., the PAN, PKB and PKS, have relatively been able to maintain their achievements in these elections, while the PBR and PBB continued losing their political support.

By comparing the profile of the legislators in the period of 1999-2004 with their counterparts in the period of 2004-2009, in terms of educational background and female representation, one can argue that the competencies of these legislators has increased. However, so far, there have been no exceptional performances made by these legislators as the executive branch of government has played a dominant role in making policies in the district. Almost a decade after the implementation of the decentralized system in Indonesia, therefore, the Tasikmalaya District Legislature has not been able to conduct its functions properly. We will return to this issue in Chapter 7.

2. The Islamic Parties

It should be acknowledged that the requirements to establish a new political party in Indonesia have been more difficult since the implementation of the 1999 election. In the 1999 election, according to Law No. 2/1999 on Political Party, a party can establish its

organizational structures at the central level (Jakarta), provincial, district or municipal, sub-district and village levels.⁵¹ Moreover, Law No. 3/1999 on Election stated that a party must establish its organizational structures in at least fifty percent of the total provinces and in at least fifty percent of the total districts or municipalities in each of those provinces.⁵² Based on this provision, forty-eight parties participated in the 1999 election.

In the 2004 election, these provisions were changed by Law No. 31/2002 on Political Party. According to this provision, a party must establish its organizational structures in at least fifty percent of the total provinces, in at least fifty percent of the total districts or municipalities in each of those provinces and in at least twenty-five percent of the total sub-districts in each of those districts or municipalities. The provision also stated that the organizational structure of a party at every level must have its workplace.⁵³ Based on this provision, twenty-four parties participated in the 2004 election. In this sense, this provision succeeded in reducing the number of parties in the 2004 election.

In the 2009 election, this provision was also changed by Law No. 2/2008 on Political Party. According to this provision, a party must establish its organizational structures in at least sixty percent of the total provinces, in at least fifty percent of the total districts or municipalities in each of those provinces and in at least twenty-five of the total sub-districts in each of those districts or municipalities. Each of them must also have its workplace.⁵⁴ Based on this provision, thirty-eight parties participated in the 2009 election. Therefore, even though the requirements to create a new political party were higher than the previous ones, this provision was not able to reduce the number of parties in the 2009 election.

2.1. The PAN

The PAN in the district was founded in 1998, shortly after its establishment in Jakarta. Adopting Pancasila as its ideology, the party declares that it is an open and a self-reliant party. The party's constitution states that the party adopts democratic principles as well as Islamic values. Moreover, the party aims to bring about religious morality, humanity and

⁵¹ Article 11 of Law No. 2/1999 on Political Party.

⁵² Article 39 Paragraph 1b and 1d of Law No. 3/1999 on Election.

⁵³ Article 2 Paragraph 3b and 3d of Law No. 31/2002 on Political Party.

⁵⁴ Article 3 Paragraph 2c and 3d of Law No. 2/2008 on Political Party.

pluralism in order to be a blessing for the universe (*rahmatan lil alamin*). It also aims to establish the so-called “new Indonesia” which respects and enforces religiousness, people’s sovereignty and social welfare.⁵⁵ The ideology of the party in turn is transformed into four major platforms, i.e., the maintaining religious values, improving law enforcement and establishing good, clean and efficient governance, maintaining people’s sovereignty, maintaining the social welfare by developing *masyarakat madani*,⁵⁶ and improving standard of living in society, especially in the education and health sectors. Further, these major platforms are divided into various sectors, such as law and politics, national defense, economy, religion, education, gender and environment.⁵⁷

In the law and political sectors, for instance, the party aims to establish a decentralized system and regional autonomy. It is important to note that the party has its own interpretation on a decentralized system. Firstly, instead of at the district and municipal levels, the party argues that regional autonomy should be implemented at the provincial level. Secondly, it proposes a federalist system regarding the central and regional government relationship in Indonesia. Thirdly, it puts an emphasis on equal developments among regions. Fourthly, it tries to increase revenue sharing between the central and regional governments.⁵⁸ However, the party has no specific platforms focusing on the district.⁵⁹ Considering its ideology and platforms, we can argue that the PAN is “the most secular party” among the other Islamic parties.

⁵⁵ Article 3-5 of the party’s statute (2005). In addition, party’s constitution in Indonesia consists of two major provisions, namely statute (*Anggaran Dasar* or AD) and rules (*Anggaran Rumah Tangga* or ART). The former outlines ideology, vision, mission, principles and purposes of the party, while the latter defines organizational structures of the party. Party constitution is legalized in a national convention which is followed by party leaders at the national level, representatives of the party at the provincial level, representatives of the party at district or municipality level and representatives of members from all regions in Indonesia. It is normally applied for a period of five years and may be renewed.


⁵⁶ In Indonesian, the term “*masyarakat madani*” is employed interchangeably with civil society. The term in fact refers to the concept of *Madinah* society during the Prophet Muhammad encompassing pluralism, tolerance and democracy. Initially, the term was introduced by Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia and it was developed further by Nurcholish Madjid in Indonesia in the early 1990s. See, for example, Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban: Membangun Makna dan Relevansi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995).

⁵⁷ Furthermore, see Article 7 of the party’s statute (2005).

⁵⁸ Furthermore, see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, *Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009* (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2004), pp. 226-39; Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya* (Jakarta: KPU, 2003), pp. 79-84.

⁵⁹ The PAN’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005.

Figure 4.4
Organizational Structure of the PAN⁶⁰



As shown in Figure 4.4., the organizational structure of the PAN in central office in the district is manifested by the DPD (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*). Adopting the organizational structure of the Muhammadiyah, DPD consists of collegial leadership

⁶⁰ Derived from article 9-10 and 16-18 of the party's statue (2005); Article 25 and 28-31 of the party's rule (2005).

between the executive council and the advisory board (*Majelis Pertimbangan Partai* or MPP). The main function of the executive council of the DPD is to manage the party in the district. Meanwhile, consisting of religious leaders and intellectuals, the main function of the MPP is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party as well as to supervise the executive council of the DPD. In doing its functions, the executive council of the DPD is supported by some deputies. It is also supported by autonomous agencies which are established by the party national leadership in Jakarta, such as the youth organization (*Barisan Muda Partai Amanat Nasional* or BM PAN) and *Simpatik* (the paramilitary force).

Meanwhile, the organizational structures of the party on the ground are represented by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*) at the sub-district level. The organizational structure of the party on the ground is also represented by the DPRt (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting*) at the village, area at the sub-village and sub-area at the group levels among households. Similar to the DPD, there is also collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board in these organizational structures. In addition, in serving its functions, the executive council of these organizational structures is also supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy.

In the 1999 election, the party in the district was able to gain 5.53 percent of the votes and three seats. Meanwhile, in the 2004 election, it experienced a decline when it gained 4.24 percent of the votes and two seats. In the 2009 election, however, it succeeded in increasing the level of its political support by achieving 7.53 per cent of the votes and three seats. In addition, in the 1999 election, the party gained its support mainly from the electorates in Leuwisari sub-district and some sub-districts that are recently included in area of the Tasikmalaya municipality, such as Tawang, Cipedes and Cihideung sub-districts. Meanwhile, in the 2004 election, the party obtained its support mainly from the electorate in Electoral Areas 1 and 6.⁶¹ In the 2009 election, the party gained its support from these areas as well as Electoral Area 3.⁶²

⁶¹ In the 2004 election, the Tasikmalaya district had been divided into seven electoral areas (*daerah pemilihan* or *dapil*). Electoral Area 1 consisted of Sariwangi, Singaparna, Sukarame, Mangunreja, Cigalontang and Tanjungjaya sub-districts. Electoral Area 2 covered Jamanis, Ciawi, Kadipaten, Pagerageung and Sukaresik sub-districts. Meanwhile, Electoral Area 3 included Leuwisari, Padakembang, Sukaratu, Cisayong, Sukahening and Rajapolah sub-district. Then, Electoral Area 4 contained Salopa, Jatiwaras, Cineam, Karangjaya, Manonjaya and Gunungtanjung sub-districts. Electoral Area 5 involved Karangnunggal,

2.2. The PKB

In the district, the PKB was founded in 1998, soon after its declaration in Jakarta. According to the party's constitution, the PKB adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. The party's constitution states that the party adopts nationalism and democratic principles. Employing a symbol which is similar with the symbol of the NU, it also adopts Islamic values, especially *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah*.⁶³ The party aims to reach major and minor goals. As the major goals, the party aims to bring about the national goals as stated in the preamble of the national constitution. It also aims to bring about democracy which is based on Pancasila and people's sovereignty in the frame of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* or NKRI). For the minor goals, the party makes an effort to bring about a just and prosperous society as well as democratic, open, clean and good attitude (*akhlakul karimah*) practices.⁶⁴

The ideology of the party in turn is translated into various platforms which can be divided into seven sectors, namely religion, politics, economy, law, social-culture, education and defense. In the political sector, for instance, the party insists in improving the performance of the state institutions and to implement law and human rights enforcement. The party also insists on the maintaining of the NKRI. Meanwhile, in the economic sector, the party has a strong commitment to implement a people-based economy in which economy is based on just and fair market mechanisms.⁶⁵

Regarding the implementation of a decentralized system, the party intends to establish a prosperous and a democratic society at the local level based on self-reliance, participation and multiculturalism. In doing so, the party tries to shift the paradigm of a decentralized system, from the administrative decentralization to the devolution of power.

Cikalong, Pancatengah and Cikatomas sub-districts, while Electoral Area 6 comprised Cibalong, Parungponteng, Bantarkalong, Bojongasih, Culamega, Cipatujah and Sukaraja sub-districts. Finally, Electoral Area 7 consisted Bojonggambir, Sodonghilir, Taraju, Salawu and Puspahieng sub-districts.

⁶² Similar to the 2004 election, in the 2009, election the Tasikmalaya district had been divided into seven electoral areas.


⁶³ Article 3-7 of the party's statute (2005). *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* is an Islamic doctrine adopted by the NU as well. The concept refers to a way of thought that chooses a compromise between the extreme rationalism (*aqli*) and the extreme skripturalism (*naqli*). In this sense, many argue that *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* in fact is moderate Islamic doctrine. Moreover, the concept also refers to a way of life based on the Quran, *Sunna* of the Prophet and his rightly-guided Successors and four schools in Islamic jurisprudence.

⁶⁴ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya*, pp. 95-96.

⁶⁵ Article 8 of the party's statute (2005).

Another effort is that the party attempts to manage natural resources in regional governments in order to improve the prosperity of the local population. Moreover, it also makes an effort to establish a regional autonomy in which the regional governments are accountable, transparent, clean, public-service oriented and participative.⁶⁶ However, the party lacks platforms focusing on the district.⁶⁷

Figure 4.5
Organizational Structure of the PKB⁶⁸



⁶⁶ Furthermore, see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, *Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009*, pp. 250-97.

⁶⁷ The PKB's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006.

⁶⁸ Derived from article 12-14 of the party's statute (2005).

The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested by the DPC (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang*). Adopting the organizational structure of the NU, the DPC consists of collegial leadership between *Dewan Tanfidz* (the executive council) and *Majelis Syuro* (the advisory board). Consisting of a head, a deputy head and a secretary, *Dewan Tanfidz* of the DPC has the main function of organizing the party in the district. It is supported by three organizations, namely divisions, bodies and autonomous agencies, such as the National Guard (*Garda Bangsa* or paramilitary forces) and Women's National Awakening Movement (*Pergerakan Perempuan Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PPKB). Meanwhile, consisting of religious leaders and intellectuals, *Majelis Syuro* of the DPC has the main functions of maintaining the ideology and platforms of the party as well as to supervise *Dewan Tanfidz* of the DPC.

The organizational structures of the party on the ground are represented by the DPAC (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang*) at the sub-district level which consists of collegial leadership between *Dewan Tanfidz* and *Majelis Syuro*. In implementing its functions, *Dewan Tanfidz* of the DPAC is supported by some sections, bodies and autonomous agencies. There are also the DPRt (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting*) at the village level and the DPARt (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting*) at the sub-village level. These organizational structures consist of collegial leadership between *Dewan Tanfidz* and *Majelis Syuro* as well. In conducting its functions, *Dewan Tanfidz* of these organizational structures is supported by bodies and autonomous agencies.

In the 1999 election, the party was able to gain 11.48 percent of the votes and five seats. Meanwhile, in the 2004 election, despite the fact that it experienced a significant decline by gaining 7.31 percent of the votes, the party succeeded in maintaining its seats. Similarly, by gaining 8.83 percent of the votes, the party succeeded in maintaining its seats in the 2009 election. In addition, in the 1999 election, the party gained its support mainly from the electorate in Singaparna, Bantarkalong and Kawalu sub-district. Meanwhile, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, the party gained its support from the electorate in Electoral Area 1 in which there is the Cipasung Islamic boarding school as well as Electoral Area 5.

2.3. *The PBR*

The PBR in the district was founded in 2004, shortly after its creation in Jakarta. Officially, the party adopts Islam as its ideological foundation. Using a symbol which is similar to the PPP's symbol, the party aims to bring about *masyarakat madani* in Indonesia which is prosperous, just, self-reliant and democratic, under a blessing from God in the frame of the NKRI.⁶⁹ Since 2006, the party has reinterpreted its ideological base from conservatives Islam to religious-socialism through which the party is based on Islamic-socialism.⁷⁰ Further, the ideology of the party is translated into five missions, i.e., to improve and establish Islamic morality and ethics, to realize national independence and dignity, to advocate for the marginalized people, to strengthen the implementation of democracy and human rights, to support law enforcement, to implement bureaucratic and administrative reform and to maintain the NKRI.⁷¹

Since 2006, the party in the district has focused on internal agendas in order to develop its organizational structures. Firstly, the party focuses on establishing the party organization from the district to village levels. Secondly, it aims to extend its social and political networks. Thirdly, it puts an emphasis on the image-building of the party. Fourthly, it tries to increase the role of advocacy, legislation and lobby. Fifthly, it attempts to improve its financial income, including mobilization and utilization of resources. Sixthly, it insists in increasing the quality of party leadership at every level. Seventhly, it aims to bring about social activities focusing on poor people.⁷²

The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*) which consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the expert board. The executive council has a main function of managing the party in the district. In conducting its functions, the executive council of the DPC is supported by deputies, a secretary and its deputies and a treasurer and its deputies. It is also supported by divisions and the legislators from the party (fractions). In this sense, the legislators from the party are subordinate to the DPC. Meanwhile, the expert board consists of intellectuals, professionals, social leaders, as well as youth leaders. The expert

⁶⁹ Article 3-5 of the party's statute (2006).


⁷⁰ Furthermore on the new ideology of the party, see Burzah Zarnubi, *Membangun Bangsa Mandiri Menuju Kemakmuran Sejati* (Jakarta: DPP PBR, 2008), pp. 9-10

⁷¹ Article 6 of the party's statute (2006).

⁷² The PBR's Programs in 2006-2011.

board has the main function of conducting academic activities about current and strategic problems.

Figure 4.6
Organizational Structure of the PBR⁷³



The organizational structure of the party on the ground party in the district is represented by the DPAC (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang*) at the sub-district level which also consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the expert board. In order to support the executive council of the DPAC, there are some sections. There is also the PIRANTI (*Pimpinan Ranting*) at the village level and the PINAKRANTI (*Pimpinan Anak Ranting*) at the sub-village level. In implementing its function, the executive council

⁷³ Derived from article 17-23 of the party's statute (2006).

of the PIRANTI is supported by the working groups, while the executive council of the PINAKRANTI is supported by the area coordinators.

As the newest party among the Islamic parties, the party succeeded in gaining votes and seats in the 2004 election. In this election, the party gained its support from the electorate in Electoral Area 3, especially in Padakembang sub-district. However, the party was not able to maintain its level of support in the 2009 election so that it failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.

2.4. The PPP

The PPP in the district has existed since 1973. After the Suharto's resignation in 1998, the party changed its ideological foundation from Pancasila to Islam. Using the *ka'bah* as its symbol, the party aims to bring about *masyarakat madani* which is justice, prosperity and democracy in the frame of the NKRI and under the blessings of God. Further, the party sets five goals (*lima hidmat*), i.e., to realize an Islamic society, to maintain human rights based on Islamic values, to create and maintain the NKRI, to create and maintain democracy and to establish the social welfare and justice. In realizing these goals, the party is based on six Islamic principles, namely religious service (*ibadah*), consistency (*istiqomah*), truth and justice, democracy, equality and calling people to do good things and to forbid bad things (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*).


The ideology of the party in turn is transformed into various platforms which can be categorized into the religion, politics, law, education, gender & children as well as foreign affairs sectors. In the political sector, for instance, the party insists in maintaining the NKRI and people's sovereignty. In the economic sector, the party has a commitment to implement a democratic economy focusing on small and medium enterprises. Believing that the issue of terrorism is a global scenario to devastate Islam, in the foreign affairs sector, the party refuses to acknowledge the existence of terrorism as it destroys the image of Muslim as well as Islam in general.

Moreover, the party also has various platforms regarding the implementation of a decentralized system. For instance, the party tries to manage natural resources at the regional level in order to increase the social welfare of the local population. It also attempts to establish law enforcement so that there will be legal certainty. No less important, the

party aims to develop small and medium enterprises (SMEs) so they can generate regional development.⁷⁴ In addition, the party sets specific platforms focusing on Nangro Aceh Darussalam province. Relying on the national issues, the party lacks platforms concerning the district.⁷⁵

The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*) which consists of collegial leadership among the executive council, advisory board and expert board. Consisting of religious leaders, the main function of the advisory board is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party and to supervise the executive council of the DPC. Meanwhile, consisting of Islamic intellectuals, the main function of the expert board is to provide recommendations to the executive council of the DPC based on academic considerations.

Figure 4.7
Organizational Structure of the PPP⁷⁶



⁷⁴ Furthermore, see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, *Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009*, pp. 126-27; Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya*, pp. 48-49; Bernhard Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 178-86.

⁷⁵ The PPP's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005.

⁷⁶ Derived from article 10-11 of the party's statute (2007).

In managing the party in the district, the executive council of the DPC is supported by division and bodies. Since 1998, the party in the district has had fifteen bodies, such as organization, membership and kaderization, politics and government, missionary endeavors, education and law. The executive council of the DPC is also supported by autonomous bodies established by the party national leadership in Jakarta, such as the Youth Movement of the *Ka'bah* (*Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah* or GPK), the Youth Generation of the *Ka'bah* (*Angkatan Muda Ka'bah* or AMK), the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* or GMII) and the Woman of United Development (*Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan* or WPP).⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the organizational structure of the party on the ground in the district is represented by the DPAC (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang*) at the sub-district level which consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. To support the executive council of the DPAC, there is the section. The organizational structure of the party on the ground is also represented by branch at the village level which also consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. In serving its functions, the executive council of branch is supported by some working groups.

As mentioned earlier, during the New Order period, the PPP in the district became the most significant competitor of the Golkar despite the fact that it experienced a decrease in the number of the votes and seats from time to time. In the 1999 election, however, the party succeeded in defeating the Golkar by gaining 25.67 percent of the votes and eleven seats. Although it succeeded in increasing the number of the votes and seats, the party was defeated by the Golkar Party as the winning party in the 2004 election. In the 2009 election, however, the party succeeded in defeating the Golkar Party again by gaining 27.13 percent of the votes and fourteen seats. In addition, in the 1999 election, the party gained its support from the electorates in Sodonghilir, Manonjaya, Cikalong, Karangnunggal, Pagerageung and Singaparna sub-districts. Meanwhile, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, the party gained its votes from the electorate in almost all of Electoral Areas.

⁷⁷ Article 61 of the party's statute (2007).

2.5. *The PKS*

The PKS, which was reinvention of the PK in the 1999 election, was founded in 2002 in the district. Adopting Islam as its ideology, the party aims to bring about the national goals as stated in the preamble of the national constitution and to establish a civil society which is just, prosperous and under the blessing from God in the frame of the NKRI. Moreover, the party distinguishes its goals into two categories, namely the general goal and the specific goal. As the general goal, the party aims to establish a proselytizing party (*partai dakwah*), while the specific goal is that it attempts to increase its political influence in the state and society.⁷⁸

The ideology of the party is translated into various platforms which are divided into politics, economy and socio-cultural platforms. In the political platform, for instance, the party tries to establish the NKRI which is based on the one and only God so that it rejects the idea of secularization. The party also aims to implement *sharia* and to propose Islam as the only solution for national problems. For the economic platform, the party attempts to establish an economic system which is based on *sharia*. Meanwhile, in the socio-cultural platform, the party emphasizes health and education platforms and it tries to establish Islamic cultures as the main social-cultural platform.⁷⁹

Since 2008, the party has had specific platforms regarding the implementation of a decentralized system and regional autonomy. According to the party's documents, regional autonomy should be controlled and coordinated by the central government. Regional autonomy should also be based on justice and proportionality. Moreover, the party declines the implementation of regional autonomy which contributes to conflict between the central and regional government and which facilitates corruption, collusion and nepotism. In this sense, for the party, transparency and accountability are very important in the

⁷⁸ Article 2 and 5-6 of the party's statute (2006).

⁷⁹ Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, *Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai Keadian Sejahtera* (Jakarta: MPP PKS, 2008). See also, Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, *Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009*, pp. 300-27; Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya*, pp. 97-101; Bernhard Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy*, pp. 193-205; Ahmad-Norma Permata, "Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006," PhD dissertation, Münster University, 2008, pp. 125-38; Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp 123-26.

implementation of the regional autonomy.⁸⁰ In addition, the party in the district has specific platforms focusing on the district, such as the providing free health services, implementing socio-economic empowerment and supporting the agricultural sectors.⁸¹

It is also important to note that there has been a transformation regarding the platforms of the party. In the 1999 election, the PK stressed its platforms on the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, the PKS relied more on non-Islamic issues, such as campaigning for war on corruption. As pointed out by Bubalo and Fealy, in these elections, “the party leaders usually admitted that an Islamized state was an aspiration but that formalizing this by declaring Indonesia to be an “Islamic state” was not important”.⁸²

The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested by the DPTD (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah*) which consists of collegial leadership among the DPD (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*), the advisory board and the *sharia* board. Inside the DPD, there are an executive council, a secretary and its deputies as well as a treasure and its deputies. In managing the party in the district, the executive council of the DPD is supported by proselytizing areas and divisions. Meanwhile, the advisory board consists of a head, a secretary and three commissions, namely legislation, organization & areas, cadre & woman, public policy and strategic analysis. The main function of the advisory board is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party and to supervise the DPD. On the other hand, the *sharia* board consists of a head, a secretary and some divisions. The main function of the *sharia* board is to maintain the implementation of Islamic tenets within the party.⁸³


⁸⁰ Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera* (Jakarta: MPP PKS, 2008), p. 7.

⁸¹ The PKS's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006.

⁸² Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East and Indonesia* (Washington DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper Number 9, 2005), p. 31. See also, Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party,” PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2006, pp. 195-215; Ahmad-Norma Permata, “Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006,” pp. 113-20.

⁸³ Article 48-51 of the party's rule (2006).

Figure 4.8
Organizational Structure of the PKS⁸⁴



The organizational structure of the party on the ground is realized by the DPC (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang*) at the sub-district level which is managed by the executive council of the DPC. In implementing its functions, the executive council of the DPC is supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy. There is also the DPRa (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting*) at the village level. Similarly, in implementing its functions, the executive council of the DPRa is supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy.

In the 1999 election, the PK gained only 1.36 percent of the votes and one seat in the district. However, the PKS was able to increase its support in the 2004 election by gaining 6.4 percent of the votes and four seats. In the 2009 election, the party was able to continue its success by gaining 6.89 percent of the votes and five seats. In addition, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, the party gained its support from the electorate in Electoral Areas 1, 2, 3 and 7, especially in Sukaresik, Ciawi and Pagerageung sub-district as the urban area in the district.

⁸⁴ Derived from article 10 and 18-20 of the party's statute (2006).

2.6. *The PBB*

In the district, the PBB was founded in 1998 after its declaration in Jakarta. Using a star and crescent symbol, the party adopts Islam as its ideological foundation. The party's constitution explicitly states that the party aims to achieve two main goals. Firstly, based on Islamic doctrines, it aims to bring about the national goals as stated in the preamble of the national constitution. Secondly, it aims to bring about the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. The party also declares itself as an independent and active party in order to do *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*.⁸⁵ Moreover, the party sets seven missions, i.e., to improve political consciousness among society, to improve Islamic awareness among elites since they are the role models in society, to participate in elections, to articulate and aggregate the interests of society, to improve the quality of its members, to maintain the relationship between society and the party, to improve the quality of social life and to do *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*.⁸⁶

The ideology of the party in turn is translated into various platforms, i.e., politics and government, economy, education, human resources, environment, agriculture, maritime, defense, information and communication, social-culture, foreign affairs, relationship between leaders and society, youth, transmigration, industry service and health platforms. For the political platform, for instance, the party tries to consider other alternative government systems, i.e., parliamentarism and federalism. For the law platform, the party attempts to make the Quran and *Sunna* of the Prophet as the source of national laws. Moreover, the party insists in amending all provisions both at national and local levels which are against *sharia*. Meanwhile, for the economic platform, the party tries to implement a *sharia*-based economy.⁸⁷ Focusing on internal agendas, the party lacks definite platform on the district.⁸⁸


⁸⁵ Article 3-5 of the party's statute (2005).

⁸⁶ Article 7 of the party's statute (2005).

⁸⁷ Furthermore, see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, *Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009*, pp. 52-72; Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya*, pp. 27-35; Bernhard Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy*, pp. 186-93; Luthfi Assyauckanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 184-88.

⁸⁸ The PBB's Report in 2005.

Figure 4.9
Organizational Structure of the PBB⁸⁹



The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*) which consists of collegial leadership among the executive council, the advisory board and the conduct board. Supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy, the executive council of the DPC has the main functions of managing the party in the district. In serving its functions, the executive council of the DPC is supported by some divisions, special bodies and autonomous bodies, such as the Youth of Star and Crescent (*Pemuda Bulan Bintang* or PBB), the Women of Star and Crescent (*Muslimat Bulan Bintang* or MBB) and the paramilitary force (*Brigade Hizbullah*). Meanwhile, consisting of religious leaders, the main function of the advisory board is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party and to supervise the executive council of the DPC. On the other hand, the main function of the conduct board is to supervise ethical aspects of officials of the DPC and to solve disputes within the DPC.

⁸⁹ Derived from article 11-16 of the party's statute (2005).

The organizational structure of the party on the ground in the district is represented by the DPAC (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang*) at the sub-district level which consist of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. In implementing its function, the executive council of the DPAC is supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy, a treasurer and its deputy and sections. The organizational structure of the party on the ground is also represented by the DPRt (*Dewan Pimpinan Ranting*) at the village level which also consist of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. In conducting its functions, the executive council of the DPRt is supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy, a treasurer and its deputy and some affairs.

In the district, the party experienced a continuous decrease. In the 1999 election, the party was able to gain 4.7 percent of the votes and two seats. In this election, the party gained its support from the electorates in Kawalu sub-district and some sub-districts that are recently included in area of the Tasikmalaya municipality, such as Cipedes and Indihiang. In the 2004 election, the party was not able to maintain the level of its political support by gaining 2.99 percent of the votes and one seat. In this election, the party relied on the electorate from Electoral Area 2, especially in Sukaresik sub-district. The condition was even worse in the 2009 election when the party was able to gain only 1.08 percent of the votes so that it failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.

3. Summary

From the descriptions above, we can see that the Tasikmalaya district has some salient features. The district has a deep historical root in Islamic radical movements, including the Islamic State Movement in the 1950s. The district also has a deep ideological root in which Islam is embedded in the way of life of the local population. In this sense, the local population practices Islamic tenets strictly. Not surprisingly, Islamic tenets and culture determines all dimensions of life for the local population. It is also important to note that Islamic teachers play an important role in determining the socio-political conditions of the local population, including in its political dimension.

The Islamic Puritanism as a factor in the district is coupled with a low quality of life among the local population. Many young generations in the district are not able to afford formal education so that they participate in informal education, more specifically Islamic

boarding schools. The poverty level and unemployment rate in the district is also high, while the per capita GRDP of the local population is low. Not surprisingly, the district is categorized as the poorest districts in West Java province. Along with these factors, Islamic Puritanism as a factor has led to a strong Islamic sentiments among the local population.


Regarding the features of the local politics, in general, the executive branch of government, more specifically the district head, have played a dominant role in making policies, including in proposing various *sharia*-based regulations. As a result, the legislative branch of government is not able to implement their functions properly. In this sense, the policy-making processes in the district are driven by personal or group interests rather than the interests of the local population.

It is also important to mention that, in contrast with the Islamic parties at the national level, the Islamic parties in the district have been able to maintain the level of their political support. Not surprisingly, the district is regarded as one of the bases for the Islamic parties not only at the local level, but also at the national level. However, except the PKS, the Islamic parties rely on their national issues. On the other hand, they disregard platforms focusing on the regional issues. Also, most of them focus on the internal agendas, especially in building their internal organizational structures. Similar to the secular-nationalist parties, therefore, the Islamic parties lack distinctive set of goals and platforms.⁹⁰

Moreover, there is a significant variation regarding the ideological orientation of the Islamic parties. Based on their ideology and platforms, the Muslim-Nationalist parties do not propose agendas with strong Islamic nuances. In addition, compared to the other Islamic parties, the PAN can be regarded as the most Muslim-Nationalist party. In contrast, the Islamist parties propose various platforms with strong Islamic nuances. It should also be acknowledged that the PKS has reformulated its platforms after the implementation of the 1999 election so that they propose more moderate platforms. In general, compared to the other Islamic parties, the PBB can be regarded as the most Islamist party.

⁹⁰ Andreas Ufen, "Political Parties and Democratization in Indonesia," in Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen (eds.), *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 169.

Figure 4.10
Ideological Spectrum of the Islamic Parties⁹¹



As stated in their constitutions, the Islamic parties establish their organizational structures which are parallel with the government structures, ranging from the district level, the sub-district level, to the village level. Some of them, such as the PPP and PKS, have even established their organizational structures at the sub-village level. All of the Islamic parties also have various organizational equipments, such as autonomous bodies and paramilitary forces. Some of them have also established political linkage with some Islamic organizations, especially with the NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS. Then, how do these Islamic parties practically manage their organizations in the district? The following chapters provide answers of this question.

⁹¹ For a comparison, see Anis Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia. Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, Issue 5, 2004, pp. 678-81; Abuza, Zachary, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 13-36.

CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF THE ISLAMIC PARTIES ON THE GROUND

After having described the general profile of the Tasikmalaya district as the locus of this study and the Islamic parties in the district as the units of analysis, it is now time to conduct empirical analysis. We begin the empirical analysis by exploring the organizational features of the Islamic parties on the ground. In doing so, we apply the six criteria as developed in Chapter 2, i.e., the efforts made by the Islamic parties to create and maintain the political linkage with their members or supporters, the instruments employed by these parties to create and maintain this political linkage, the strategies employed by these parties to attract voters in election period, the position of these parties regarding a formal membership, the background of members or supporters of these parties as well as the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the party in central office.

1. The PAN: From the Party Organization To Legislative Candidates

The vanguard of the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN) on the ground is represented by the organizational structures of the party at the household level (sub-area), at the sub-village level (area), at the village level (*Dewan Pimpinan Ranting* or DPRt) and at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC).¹ The party's constitution does not specifically mention the functions of these organizational structures. In general, however, it points out that each of them must manage the internal as well as external activities at its own levels.²

The head of the party in central office in the district (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah* or DPD), Ade Komarrudin, admits that the party leaders in the district lack information on the exact number of these organizational structures.³ However, a former official of the area in Manonjaya village, Deden Marno, explains that since the beginning of its creation, the party did not establish the party organizations in all of households, sub-villages and villages in the district. In the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, it was even able to

¹ Article 9 of the party's statute (2005); Article 29-31 of the party's rule (2005).

² Article 54 Paragraph 5 of the party's rule (2005).

³ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

establish the party organizations at the sub-district level just in a small number of regions. A similar situation also occurred in the implementation of the 2009 election.⁴

The party decided to establish its organizational structure on the ground in some regions for several reasons. Deden Marno explains that after the implementation of the 1999 election, the party has experienced some difficulties in recruiting officials for the party organization on the ground. Since the beginning of its creation, the party has also lacked the financial capability to establish its organizational structure on the ground.⁵ As a consequence, the party decided to establish its organizational structures on the ground just in a certain region in which members and potential supporters of the party existed. In this sense, apart from minimizing its constraints, the party also attempts to maximize its potency.

The party organization on the ground has limited facilities so that their officials experience many constraints when they conduct their functions. For instance, there is no single sub-area, area and DPRt with the workplace so that officials of these organizational structures use their private home. Another example, as explained by an official of the DPRt in Sukaresik village, Dede Komarrudin, the party organization on the ground lacks financial support from the party organization in central office. In this sense, in carrying out their administrative function, officials of the party organization on the ground employ the facilities of the central office in the district, such as computers and telephones, when they implement their functions. As the district covers a wide region, only those who are close to the workplace of the central office can use these facilities.⁶

Experiencing many constraints, officials of the party organization on the ground rely on the role of the central office in generating their activities. Deden Marno explains that in conducting many social activities in the district, such as organizing sport events, arranging social charity, providing free circumcisions for Muslim boys as well as free cataract surgery and providing an ambulance car, the party leaders in the central office establish coordination with officials of the area and DPRt.⁷ Moreover, officials of the party organization on the ground also depend on the role of the party's legislators in conducting

⁴ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶ Interview with Dede Komarrudin, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

their activities. Dede Komarrudin explains that the party's legislators usually involve the role of these organizational structures when they carry out their activities, such as when they conduct Islamic gatherings (*pengajian*) in their electoral areas.⁸

Since the implementation of the 2004 election, by and large, the party organizations on the ground have relied on the role of the legislative candidates to carry out their activities. It should be acknowledged that most of these legislative candidates in the 2009 election served as officials of the party organizations on the ground, more specifically the DPC. Dede Marno states that in the implementation of the 2009 election, the party encouraged its legislative candidates to initiate as many social activities as possible so that "their existences can be seen and felt by the local population". In this context, the party assumed that when these legislative candidates were able to generate many social activities, the local population would see the real contributions of these candidates. In turn, the local population would vote either for these candidates or for the party.⁹

In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party employs different strategies in order to attract voters. Yane Sriwirutanti, who became a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, explains that she employed some religious events in the district to introduce her profile and platforms. In these events, she provided an explanation to the audience that all political parties in fact were similar because they had similar goals. She also emphasized that "instead of their ideologies, what makes a difference among all of parties in fact was commitment of their candidates to help people." As an official of the DPC in Sukaraja sub-district, she also utilized the role of this organizational structure to support her candidacy as she lacked the financial capability to establish a winning team. In addition, she states that she did not use radio or newspapers in her campaigns as the local population were not familiar with these channels of communication.¹⁰

Similarly, Dede Komarrudin, who also became a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, explains that he utilized the role of the party organizations on the ground to mobilize his voters. As an official of the DPRt, he tried to provide several assistances for people in his village who wanted to articulate their interests to the government, such as by providing assistance for these people to make a proposal letter demanding financial aid to

⁸ Interview with Dede Komarrudin, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰ Interview with Yane Sriwirutanti, December 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

the government when they wanted to build a mosque. Moreover, he provided assistance for these people when they needed business capital by providing access to financial aid from foreign countries and international organizations. Dede Komarrudin also explains that the role of the party organizations on the ground is very important in supporting the administrative process of his candidacy, especially in observing the counting process in the voting day. In addition, Dede Komarrudin also utilized the youth organization (*Karang Taruna*) as he served as the head of this organization in the district.¹¹

Another legislative candidate in the 2009 election, Ratna Dewi, applied a different strategy. She explains that in order to attract voters, she tried to recruit what she called as “key persons of society” in her electoral area, especially from the youth and religious leaders. She believed that these persons had capacity to mobilize their followers to support her candidacy. Ratna Dewi also concedes that in order to support her candidacy, she employed Islamic events in the local population, such as Islamic gatherings. Also, she conducted door to door visits in her electoral area to introduce her profile and platforms.¹²

With regard to the formal membership system, the party’s constitution explicitly mentions the recruitment and dismissal process as well as the rights and obligations of members of the party.¹³ The party distinguishes its followers into two categories, i.e., members and sympathizers. The former refers to those who support the party with membership cards, while the latter refers to those who support the party without membership cards.¹⁴ In addition, Deden Marno explains that nearly before the implementation of the 2009 election, the party distributed thousands membership cards in the district with health insurance.¹⁵ According to Dede Komarrudin, the health insurance provides financial compensation for members of the party who are ill or die in which the amount is between Rp. 1 million (€ 66.6) and Rp. 2 million (€ 133). The party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pengurus Pusat* or DPP) takes care of the premium.¹⁶

¹¹ Interview with Dede Komarrudin, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹² Interview with Ratna Dewi, December 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³ Article 1-10 of the party’s rule (2005).

¹⁴ Article 11 of the party’s rule (2005).

¹⁵ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶ Interview with Dede Komarrudin, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

The party's constitution also states that there are no specific criteria to be a member of the party.¹⁷ In this sense, members of the party come from a wide array of groups in society. Dede Komarrudin explains that despite the fact that the creation of the party was strongly related to a prominent figure of the Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, it does not simply mean that the party belongs only to members of the Muhammadiyah. He underlines that as a modern party, the party tries to attract members and supporters "no matter who they are and what their religious backgrounds are".¹⁸ Similarly, Deden Marno asserts that "despite the fact that many people in the district wrongly perceive that the party belongs to the Muhammadiyah, it does not mean that the party is intended only for members of the Muhammadiyah".¹⁹

The head of the Muhammadiyah in the district, Iip Syamsul Arif also provides similar information. He explains that members of the Muhammadiyah in the district affiliate with different parties as they believe that all parties attempt to achieve similar goals. He also adds that as members of the Muhammadiyah in the district mostly serve as public servants, they are disallowed by the government to involve actively in a political party.²⁰ Information from direct observation also shows that the party attempts to gain support not only from members of the Muhammadiyah, but also from members of the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or NU), Islamic Union (*Persatuan Islam* or PERSIS) and different Sufism groups.

In managing their organizational structures, officials of the party organization on the ground conduct regular coordination and communication with the party leaders at the district level. Dede Komarrudin explains that the relationship between officials of the party organization on the ground and the party leaders in the district is not based on feudalism principles.²¹ Deden Marno also emphasizes that rather than on a top-down mechanism, the relationship between these organizational structures is based on a bottom-up mechanism.²² In this sense, the party leaders in the district provide greater autonomy to the party organizations on the ground in managing their own organizational structures. On the other

¹⁷ Article 1 Paragraph 1 and Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the party's statute (2005).

¹⁸ Interview with Dede Komarrudin, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁹ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁰ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²¹ Interview with Dede Komarrudin, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²² Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

hand, the party organizations on the ground provide political supports for the party leaders in the district.

In summary, the PAN on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party tends to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting short-term, intensive and one way activities. In this sense, the role of the legislative candidates of the party is more significant than the role of the party organization. Secondly, in creating and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters, the party relies on eclectic platforms of its legislative candidates. Thirdly, in order to attract voters, the party employs the labor-intensive activities. However, although some of them utilize external organizations to support their candidacy, to a limited extent, the legislative candidates of the party still employ the role of the party organizations on the ground. Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. Fifthly, the party attempts to gain supports from a wide array of groups. Sixthly, there is a mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground and party organization in central office.

2. The PKB: Depending on the NU

The frontline of the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB) on the ground is realized by the organizational structures of the party at the sub-village level (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting* or DPART), at the village level (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting* or DPRt) and at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang* or DPAC).²³ According to the party's constitution, each of these organizational structures has its own responsibilities, such as to create and maintain the political linkage between the party and its members and supporters, to mobilize voters in election period and to manage the membership system.²⁴

The head of *Dewan Tanfidz* in the district, Acep Adang Ruchyat, concedes that the party leaders lack information on the exact numbers of these organizational structures.²⁵ However, an official of the DPAC in Singaparna sub-district, Cecep Abdul Qoyum, explains that in the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections the party did not

²³ Article 12 of the party's statute (2005).

²⁴ Article 15-17 Paragraph 2 of the party's rule (2005).

²⁵ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

establish the party organizations on the ground in all areas.²⁶ According to an official of the DPRt in Cibubur village, Husen Zaenal Ali, a similar condition also took place in the implementation of the 2009 election.²⁷

The party decided to establish its organizational structures on the ground in several areas for some calculative reasons. A former official of the DPRt in Cintaraja village, Emen, explains that after the implementation of the 1999 election, members of the party have been reluctant to serve as officials of the party on the ground as the party leaders do not provide financial incentive to become officials of these organizational structures.²⁸ Cecep Abdul Qoyum adds that since its creation, the party has experienced difficulties in recruiting officials of the party organization on the ground with organizational skills.²⁹ Moreover, the head of *Dewan Syuro* in the district, Endang Hidayat points out that the party established its organizational structures on the ground just in some areas as the national provision on political parties requires a party to have its organizational structures at the sub-district level.³⁰ As a result, despite the fact that the party's constitution requires the organizational structures of the party at the sub-village and village levels, the party leaders established the party organization at the sub-district level.

Further, the party disregards the role of the party organizations in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters. Instead, it utilizes the role of the NU in creating and maintaining the political relationships with its members or supporters. In addition, as a mass-based organization, the NU has organizational structures, ranging from national to local levels. At the national level, there is the central board. Meanwhile, at the provincial level, there is the regional board. The organizational structure of the NU at the district or municipal level is represented by the branch board. Also, there is the branch at the sub-district level and the sub-branch at the village level. The NU also has organizational apparatus, namely institutions, committees and autonomous bodies, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama Youth Association (*Gerakan Pemuda Anshor* or GPA) and Nahdlatul Ulama Woman Association (Muslimat).

²⁶ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 2009, 6 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁷ Interview with Husen Zaenal Ali, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya)

²⁸ Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁹ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁰ Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Since 1984 the NU formally has refused to have an affiliation with any political parties. The NU has also disallowed its officials at every level to have a position in a political party.³¹ However, in practice, as explained by Emen and Cecep Abdul Qoyum, most officials of the party organizations on the ground are officials of the NU at the same time.³² Moreover, the vice head of the NU in the district, Muttaqien, argues that “the PKB and NU has structural and cultural relationships”. They have the structural relationship as many officials of the PKB at the same time serve as officials of the NU. Meanwhile, they have the cultural relationship as all officials of the PKB apply the doctrine of the NU in organizing their party, namely *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah*.³³ A cultural observer in the district, Acep Zamzam Noer, also points out that the NU in fact serves as a stepping-stone for the political actors of the PKB to obtain a certain position in the party as well in the government.³⁴

Because the political engagement of the PKB and NU is very strong, it is difficult to distinguish activities of these organizations. A social leader in the district explains that he is not able to distinguish the difference between activities of the PKB and activities of the NU as they are overlap.³⁵ Similarly, Cecep Abdul Qoyum asserts that activities of the party cannot be separated from activities of the NU as “the PKB is the NU and vice versa”.³⁶ In this sense, on many occasions, the party utilizes activities of the NU when it creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters. For instance, the party employs Islamic gatherings organized by the NU, namely *Yaumul Ijtima* and *Lailatul Ijtima* through which the party leaders introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to the audiences.³⁷

The party also utilizes activities of autonomous bodies of the NU, such as when the GPA celebrates Islamic festivals and provides emergency relief for the victims of natural disasters in the district.³⁸ The head of the Muslimat in the district, Euis Hasanah, also explains that the party has engaged in different social activities conducted by the Muslimat,

³¹ Article 45 Paragraph 2 of the Nahdlatul Ulama’s rule (2004).

³² Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya); Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

³³ Interview with Muttaqien, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁴ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁵ Interview with anonymous, January 3, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁶ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁷ Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya); Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya); Interview with Husen Zaenal Ali, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁸ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

such as when the Muslimat provides Islamic education, generates economic empowerment and provides assistance in the implementation of a *haji* pilgrimage.³⁹ These illustrations suggest that despite the party disregards the role of the party organizations on the ground, it is still able to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by utilizing long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities of the NU, including its autonomous bodies.

Apart from utilizing the role of the NU and its autonomous bodies, in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members and supporters, the party also employs other strategies. Firstly, it attempts to optimize the interpersonal networks of its leaders and officials. In this context, the role of the Cipasung Islamic boarding schools is very important. A former official of the DPRt in Cintaraja and Cipakat villages, Sahid, explains that most officials of the party were alumni of the school.⁴⁰ It should also be acknowledged that Acep Adang Ruchyat also serves as one of managers of the school. In addition, information from direct observation shows that prior to the implementation of the 2009 election, all of officials of the party organization on the ground were inaugurated by the party leaders in this school.

Secondly, the party tries to maximize the characteristic of social relationship between Islamic teachers and the local population in the district which is based on the patron-client relationship. Emen explains that as most officials of the party also serve as Islamic teachers in the district, they also utilize their status as religious leaders for political purposes, including for creating and maintain the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters.⁴¹ In this sense, the patron-client relationship not only covers the religious dimension, but it also includes the political dimension.

Thirdly, to a certain extent, the party relies on the ideology of *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* which is also adopted by the NU. As explained in the previous chapter, this ideology refers to a way of thought which chooses a compromise between extreme rationalism (*aqli*) and extreme skripturalism (*naqli*) based on the Quran, *Sunna* of the Prophet and his rightly-guided Successors and on four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition, many argue that this ideology denotes moderate attitudes in Islam. A similar

³⁹ Interview with Euis Hasanah, January 8, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁰ Interview with Sahid, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴¹ Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

principle is adopted by the PKB so that this party adopts Islam as its ideological base and introduces pluralism and tolerance.

With regard to strategy to mobilize supporters, since the beginning of its creation, the legislative candidates of the party has utilized activities of the NU. For example, the party was involved in Islamic events and in celebration of different Islamic festivals organized by the NU.⁴² Moreover, it has also employed activities of the autonomous bodies of the NU. Euis Hasanah, who was also a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, concedes that she relied on activities of the Muslimat as she did not receive a significant support from the party. She also explains that the role of the Muslimat was more significant than the role of radio and newspapers in supporting her candidacy.⁴³

The party has also relied on its charismatic leaders. For instance, in the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, it relied strongly on the personal figure of Ilyas Ruchiyat and his family in the Cipasung Islamic boarding school. It has also relied on the ideological foundation of the party. Cecep Abdul Qoyum explains that in their campaign activities, the legislative candidates of the party explained to the local population that the party was the only political affiliation for members of the NU.⁴⁴ Since the implementation of the 2009 elections the party has also notified a serious movement threatening the ideology of the NU, namely the Wahhabism movement which is adopted by the PKS.

Further, Cecep Abdul Qoyum explains that in the implementation of the 1999 election in which the electoral system was based on the closed-list proportional representation system, the role of the party organizations on the ground was essential in introducing the ideology and platforms of the party to the local population. Their role was also important in distributing party flags, ballyhoos and stickers. However, this condition has significantly changed toward the implementation of the 2004 election which was based on the open-list proportional representation system. Since the implementation of the 2004

⁴² Interview with Husen Zaenal Ali, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya); Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴³ Interview with Euis Hasanah, January 8, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁴ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

election, therefore, most of the legislative candidates of the party have disregarded the role of the party on the ground to support their candidacy.⁴⁵

The party's constitution explicitly mentions the recruitment and dismissal process of members of the party. It also states the rights and obligations of members of the party.⁴⁶ Moreover, the party distinguishes its members into three categories, namely direct, indirect and honorary members. The direct members refer to those who are registered as members of the party and are involved in activities of the party. The indirect members refer to those who are registered as members of the party, but they are not involved directly in activities of the party. Meanwhile, the honorary member denotes to those who are recruited by the leadership of the party at the national level (*Dewan Pengurus Pusat* or DPP) because of their contributions to the party.⁴⁷

Cecep Abdul Qoyum argues that in the implementation of the 1999 election, many people were very enthusiastic to become members of the party. At that time, the party also provided membership cards. However, the condition shifted prior to the implementation of the 2004 election when there has been a growing political pragmatism among the local population as well as the modification of the electoral system from the closed-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections.⁴⁸ Moreover, Emen explains that since the beginning of its establishment, the party has lacked a membership database.⁴⁹ Huzein Zainal Ali also adds that until 2008, just a small number of members had membership cards.⁵⁰

The party's constitution also states that there are no specific criteria to become a member of the party.⁵¹ In this sense, formally, the party attracts members from a wide array of groups. Husen Zaenal Ali concedes that although the party is "a son of the NU," it does not simply mean that members of the party come only from members of the NU. He also argues that the party tries to attract members from different Islamic organizational

⁴⁵ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁶ Article 3-11 of the party's rule (2005).

⁴⁷ Article 3 of the party's rule (2005).

⁴⁸ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁹ Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁰ Interview with Husen Zaenal Ali, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵¹ Article 10 of the party's statute (2005).

backgrounds.⁵² In practice, however, the situation is different as members of the party mostly come from members of the NU. It is even likely impossible for members of the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS to become members or supporters of the party.

In managing their organizational structures, officials of the party organization on the ground lack coordination and communication with the party leaders in the district. Emen explains that when he served as an official of the DPRt, he rarely conducted coordination and communication with the party leaders and officials in the central office.⁵³ A similar situation also occurred in the implementation of the 2009 election. Husen Zaenal Ali asserts that he established coordination and communication with the party leaders and officials of the central office just several months before the implementation of the 2009 election.⁵⁴ Information from direct observation shows that the party leaders tend to disregard the role of the party organization on the ground as they prefer to create and maintain the political linkage with members and supporters of the party directly.

To sum up, the PKB on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting long-term, on-going and intensive activities. Secondly, in doing so, it utilizes the organizational structures of the NU, clientelism, interpersonal networks as well as the ideology of the party. Thirdly, the party employs the labor-intensive activities in mobilizing its supporters in election period. Instead of its internal organization, the legislative candidates of the party rely on the role of external organizations, more specifically the NU and its autonomous bodies. Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. Fifthly, the party attempts to attract members and supporters from a particular group, i.e., members of the NU. Sixthly, the party organizations on the ground are subordinate to the party organization in central office.

3. The PBR: Relying on Patronage Politics

The organizational structure of the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR) on the ground is manifested by the PINAKRANTI (*Pimpinan Anak Ranting*) at the sub-village level, PIRANTI (*Pimpinan Ranting*) at the village level and DPAC (*Dewan*

⁵² Interview with Husen Zaenal Ali, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵³ Interview with Emen, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁴ Interview with Husen Zaenal Ali, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Pimpinan Anak Cabang) at the sub-district level.⁵⁵ Each of these organizational structures has its own functions, such as to manage the party at their levels, to implement the ideology and platforms of the party at their levels and to provide regular reports to the party organization in central office at the district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC).⁵⁶

The party leader in the district, Dede Saiful Anwar, claims that the party in the district has been able to establish the party organizations on the ground in nearly all of areas in the district. However, he concedes that he lack information on the exact numbers of these organizational structures.⁵⁷ On the contrary, a former official of the DPAC in Cikalong sub-district, Jaja Jamaluddin, explains that prior to the implementation of the 2004 election, the party did not establish its organizational structures at the sub-village and village levels in all areas. In this election, the party even established its organizational structures at the sub-district level just in a small number of areas.⁵⁸ An official of the PIRANTI in Singkir village, Azis Abdul Karim, states that a similar situation continued in the implementation of the 2009 election.⁵⁹ Information from direct observation shows that the party was not able to establish the party organizations on the ground in all of areas in the district.

According to Jaja Jamaluddin, the party decided to establish the party organizations on the ground just in some areas for some calculative reasons. Firstly, the party lacks financial capability. Secondly, it experiences difficulties in recruiting officials for the party organizations on the ground. Thirdly, members of the party are reluctant to become officials of the party organizations on the ground. Fourthly, the party realizes that its potential voters exist only in a certain area in the district.⁶⁰

In addition, the party also decided to establish the party organizations on the ground just in the election period. For instance, the party established the party organizations at the sub-district level just a few months before the implementation of the 2004 election.⁶¹ A similar condition occurred prior to the implementation of the 2009 election. In addition, in the 2009 election the party leaders forced the legislative candidates of the party to establish

⁵⁵ Article 9 Paragraph 4 of the party's statute (2006).

⁵⁶ Article 20 and 22 of the party's statute (2006).

⁵⁷ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁸ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁹ Interview with Azis Abdul Karim, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁰ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶¹ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

the party organizations on the ground in their own electoral areas at their own expense in order to support their candidacy. Azis Abdul Karim explains that he was elected as the executive council of the PIRANTI in his village by his son who proposed his candidacy in the 2009 election just eight months before the voting day. He also concedes that he has no understanding about what he should do as an official of the party organization on the ground.⁶²

Further, the party organizations on the ground have limited facilities. For example, there was no single PINAKRANTI and PIRANTI with the workplace so that their officials employed their private homes in managing these organizational structures. They also lack financial support and technical assistance from the party leader in the district. Jaja Jamaluddin explains that, despite the fact that in the implementation of the 2004 election some of the party organizations on the ground received facilities from the party leaders, such as party shirts, flags and ballyhoos, these facilitates were not enough to cover the real necessities.⁶³ The situation was not better in the implementation of the 2009.⁶⁴

In creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters, the party employs two mechanisms. Firstly, it utilizes the patronage relationships and clientelism. Jaja Jamaluddin explains that prior to the implementation of the 2004 election he distributed material goods to some leading Islamic figures in the district who supported the party, such as “sugar, instant noodles and sarong”. By doing these efforts, he expected that these persons would vote for the party.⁶⁵ Secondly, the party also employs interpersonal networks of their leaders and officials. Azis Abdul Karim concedes that he utilized his status as an Islamic teacher to introduce the ideology and platforms of the party among people in his village. He also utilized the alumni networks of his Islamic boarding school.⁶⁶

In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party employs different strategies in order to gain as many votes as possible. Jaja Jamaluddin explains nearly before the implementation of the 2004 election, the legislative candidates of the party distributed material goods to their potential voters, such as giving carpets to mosques, providing

⁶² Interview with Azis Abdul Karim, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶³ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁴ Interview with Iron Saroni, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁵ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁶ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

financial aid to some prominent figures in the local population and distributing sport equipment.⁶⁷ Another legislative candidate in the 2009 election, Iron Saroni, explains that he selected a different strategy by conducting what he called as a “political education” for the local population. In his campaigns, therefore, he tried to rely on his platforms and agendas. He claims that by applying such a strategy, he tried to conduct “the enlightenment process” to the local population. He decided to implement such a strategy as many legislative candidates in the 2004 election experienced financial loss due to the fact that they provided material goods to people in their electoral areas at their own expense. He also implemented such a strategy as he had limited financial capabilities to distribute material goods to people in his electoral area.⁶⁸

Iron Saroni adds that some of the legislative candidates of the party also utilized the role of the party organizations on the ground to support their candidacy. He states that the role of the party organizations on the ground was very important in providing political observers for these candidates in the manual voting process.⁶⁹ However, as the role of the party organizations could not guarantee that these legislative candidates would gain significant votes, he also established his own winning team. In addition, Iron Saroni concedes that due to a limited financial capability, he did not utilize radio and newspapers in his campaigns. Instead, he distributed simple posters and ballyhoos in his electoral area at his own expense.⁷⁰

Regarding the formal membership system, the party’s constitution explicitly mentions the requirement process to become a member of the party. It also mentions the rights and obligations of members of the party.⁷¹ In this sense, the formal membership system is very important for the party. Practically, however, the situation is completely different. Since its initial establishment in 2002 the party has lacked the capacity to develop a membership database so that it had no information on the exact figure of its members. Moreover, Jaja Jamaludin explains that prior to the implementation of the 2004 election, the party provided membership cards only for the party leaders and officials.⁷² Azis Abdul

⁶⁷ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁸ Interview with Iron Saroni, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁹ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁰ Interview with Iron Saroni, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷¹ Article 3-7 of the party’s rule (2006).

⁷² Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Karim also concedes that although the party leaders claimed that they distributed two-hundred membership cards in his sub-district before the voting day in the 2009 election, he had no information about these membership cards.⁷³

The party's constitution also explicitly states that there are no specific criteria to be a member of the party.⁷⁴ Jaja Jamaluddin explains that in the implementation of the 2004 election, the party attempted to attract voters from a wide array of groups in the local population.⁷⁵ A similar effort was made in the implementation of the 2009 election. Azis Abdul Karim concedes that in order to support the candidacy of his son, he tried to attract supporters not only from Islamic background, but also from the secular-nationalist.⁷⁶ In addition, Iron Saroni asserts that since its creation in 2004 the party has been assumed to become "a garbage can party" as its leaders, officials, members and supporters come from disappointed persons of other parties, especially the PPP.⁷⁷

The party adopts the hierarchical system in which each of the organizational structures is subordinate to the upper organizational structure.⁷⁸ In practice, however, the relationship between officials of the party organization on the ground and the party leaders in the district is loose. Jaja Jamaluddin explains that shortly before the implementation of the 2004 election, the relationship between officials of the party organization on the ground and the party leaders at the district level was relatively good. In the 2004 election, although in a limited extent, the party leaders established several coordination and communication meetings with these officials. However, the situation changed significantly prior to the implementation of the 2009 election when the party leaders lacked communication and coordination with officials of the party organization on the ground.⁷⁹ Moreover, Azis Abdul Karim asserts that toward the implementation of the 2009 election, there was no single forum through which officials of the PINAKRANTI and PIRANTI established communication and coordination with the party leaders.⁸⁰ Iron Saroni explains that such a condition occurred due to the fact that the party leaders focused on their own candidacy so

⁷³ Interview with Azis Abdul Karim, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁴ Article 3 of the party's rule (2006).

⁷⁵ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁶ Interview with Azis Abdul Karim, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁷ Interview with Iron Saroni, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁸ Article 8 of the party's rule (2006).

⁷⁹ Interview with Jaja Jamaluddin, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁰ Interview with Azis Abdul Karim, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

that they did not manage the party organizations on the ground appropriately.⁸¹ As a result, the party organizations on the ground are autonomous and independent from the party leaders in the district.

In brief, the PBR on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting short-term, non-intensive and one way activities. Secondly, in doing so, it employs the patronage, clientelism and interpersonal networks of the party leaders and officials. Thirdly, in order to mobilize voters, the party tends to employ the labor-intensive activities. To a limited extent, the legislative candidates of the party also employ the role of the party organizations on the ground as well as the role of external organizations, such as the NU. Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. Fifthly, it tries to attract as many votes as possible from a wide array of groups. Sixthly, the party organizations on the ground tend to become independent from the party organization in central office.

4. The PPP: Maximizing Many Resources

The forefront of the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP) on the ground is represented by the organizational structures of the party at the village level (branch) and at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang* or DPAC). According to the party's constitution, these organizational structures have four functions, i.e., to implement the party's constitution at their own levels, to recruit their officials, to establish and coordinate working groups for branch and sections for the DPAC as well as to implement other functions provided by the organizational structure of the party in central office at the district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC).⁸²

The party has been able to establish the branch and DPAC in all areas since its establishment in 1973. A former official of the branch in Tanjungjaya village, Gopur, explains that the party has established the branch structure in all of villages in the district since the New Order period.⁸³ Similarly, an official of the DPAC in Rajapolah sub-district, Empep Suryadi, explains that the party has established the DPAC in all of sub-districts

⁸¹ Interview with Iron Saroni, November 28, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸² Article 36 and 41 of the party's statute (2007).

⁸³ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008.

since 1973.⁸⁴ Moreover, an official of the branch in Manggungsari village, Eko Hadi Praja, explains that the party has even been able to establish the organizational structure of the party at the sub-village level, namely the coordinators, although it is not mentioned in the party's constitution.⁸⁵

Although just a few of them has their own workplace, the party organizations on the ground are able to conduct social activities. Eko Hadi Praja explains that since the 1980's his branch has carried out many activities, such as providing assistances for poor people and elderly to access the health service, stimulating economic activities and providing financial assistance for poor children to access education.⁸⁶ Similarly, Empep Suryadi explains that all of the DPAC has conducted similar activities. He also adds that until recently his DPAC has conducted regular meetings in which the party's legislators establish political communication with members and supporters of the party. In this sense, he argues that "the party organizations on the ground serve as a political mediator in which members and supporters of the party are able to articulate their interests to the party's legislators".⁸⁷

In creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members and supporters, the party employs different instruments. Firstly, the party uses its own organizational structures on the ground. It also employs the role of autonomous bodies of the party, such as the Youth Movement of *Ka'bah* (*Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah* or GPK), Youth Generation of *Ka'bah* (*Angkatan Muda Ka'bah* or AMK) and Women of United Development (*Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan* or WPP). In addition, Empep Suryadi explains that through kaderization program, officials of these autonomous bodies serve as officials of the party organization on the ground.⁸⁸ Moreover, the head of the GPK in the district, Iqbal, explains that in carrying out its activities, the GPK usually involves the role of the party organizations on the ground as the organizational structures of the GPK does not reach the village and sub-district levels.⁸⁹

Secondly, the party utilizes activities of the NU, including its autonomous bodies. For instance, the branch and DPAC participate actively in Islamic gatherings conducted by

⁸⁴ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁵ Interview with Eko Hadi Praja, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁶ Interview with Eko Hadi Praja, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁷ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁸ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁹ Interview with Iqbal, November 7, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

the NU. The party organizations on the ground also employ various activities carried out by autonomous bodies of the NU, such as when they utilize activities of the Muslimat in celebrating Islamic festivals in the district. Through these events, the party leaders introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to the audience.⁹⁰

Thirdly, the party utilizes programs of the government. As explained in the previous chapter, the party has a strong relationship with the district head, Tatang Farhanul Hakim. As a prominent member of the party, Tatang Farhanul Hakim concedes that he has a mandate from the party leaders to support activities of the party in the district.⁹¹ Similarly, Empep Suryadi argues that as the district head comes from the party, “the success of the district head in managing the district also means the success of the party and vice versa”.⁹² It should also be acknowledged that the party also has a strong relationship with some village heads in the district. According to Gopur, until 2008 there were at least ten village heads who at the same time served as officials of the branch and DPAC.⁹³ Empep Suryadi adds that around 50 percent of village heads are loyal members or supporters of the party.⁹⁴

In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party also employs such instruments to attract voters. Empep Suryadi, who was also a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, explains that the role of the branch and DPAC was very significant in mobilizing supporters, especially for those with a limited financial capability.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, Gopur, who also became a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, argues that the role of the party organizations on the ground was very important in mobilizing “the ideological voters” who had affiliated with the party for a long time.⁹⁶ Another legislative candidate of the party in the 2009 election, Iqbal, explains that he utilized the role of an autonomous body of the party, namely the GPK, to support his candidacy.⁹⁷ Neng Madinah Ruchyat applied a similar strategy. To support her candidacy, she utilized regular Islamic gatherings organized by an autonomous body of the NU, i.e., the Muslimat. She decided to rely more on the role of the Muslimat due to the fact that she lacked support from the party. She also

⁹⁰ Interview with Eko Hadi Praja, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹¹ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹² Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹³ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁴ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁵ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁶ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁷ Interview with Iqbal, November 7, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

established a winning team in which its members came from different Islamic organizations in the district.⁹⁸ Coming from the Cipasung Islamic boarding school, Neng Madinah Ruchyat also employed family and alumni networks.

Moreover, to support his candidacy in the national legislature in the 2009 election, Asep A. Maoshul Affandy emphasized the issue of the implementation of *sharia* in the district in particular and in Indonesia in general. He argued that the implementation of *sharia* did not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Coming from the Manonjaya Islamic boarding school family, Asep A. Maoshul Affandy also utilized family and alumni networks. Moreover, he established a winning team in which the members came from different social organizations and political parties in the district. Interestingly, in order to introduce his profile and platforms to the voters in his electoral area, Asep A. Maoshul Affandy also used the internet in which he maintained a personal blog.⁹⁹

Having experienced financial limitations, Empep Suryadi utilized the implementation of the government's programs in order to support his candidacy in the 2009 election. For instance, he introduced his profile to the peasant community through the agricultural programs implemented by the government. He also introduced his platforms by utilizing some programs implemented by the village legislature (*Badan Perwakilan Desa* or BPD) in his electoral area, such as village development programs.¹⁰⁰

The party's constitution explicitly mentions the rights and obligations of members of the party. It also manages the recruitment and dismissal process of members of the party.¹⁰¹ Empep Suryadi contends that the formal membership system is very important for the party as it is useful to assess "the strength of the party".¹⁰² Likewise, Gopur argues that the formal membership system is very significant for the party in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members.¹⁰³

Practically, however, the situation is slightly different as the party has experienced a decrease in the formal membership system. Gopur explains that since the New Order

⁹⁸ Interview with Neng Madinah Ruchyat, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁹ Interview with Asep A. Maoshul Affandy, December 16, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰¹ Article 2-4 and 7-9 of the party's statute (2007).

¹⁰² Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰³ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

period, although there were many restrictions and intimidations, many people were enthusiastic to become members of the party. However, the situation shifted just before the implementation of the 2004 election along with a growing political pragmatism among people.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Gopur explains that since the New Order period, the party has provided membership cards.¹⁰⁵ However, as pointed out by Eko Hadi Praja, the party lacks information about the exact number of its members.¹⁰⁶

The party's constitution also states that there is no specific condition to become a member of the party.¹⁰⁷ Gopur explains that although all members of the party in the district are Muslims, they come from different Islamic organizations, such as the NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS.¹⁰⁸ In addition, an outside observer also explains some members and supporters of the party also come from the proponents of the Islamic State Movement in the 1950's. Some of the party leaders and legislators are even descendants of the leaders and proponents of this movement.¹⁰⁹

Officials of the party organization on the ground have a strong relationship with the party leaders in the district. Eko Hadi Praja explains that officials of the branch and DPAC establish regular communication and coordination forums with the party leaders.¹¹⁰ Empep Suryadi adds that even officials of these organizations carry out regular communication and coordination forums with the party's legislators.¹¹¹ Information from direct observation confirms such statements. Many officials of the branch and DPAC visit the workplace of the central office regularly. They also conduct daily communications with the party's legislators in the legislature.

Overall, the PPP on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting long-term, on-going and intensive activities. Secondly, in doing so, it combines different instruments, i.e., the interpersonal networks, clientelism, the ideology of the party and programs of the government. Thirdly, to attract voters, it combines the labor-intensive and

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Eko Hadi Praja, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁷ Article 2 of the party's rule (2007).

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁹ Interview with anonymous, December 23, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁰ Interview with Eko Hadi Praja, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹¹ Interview with Empep Suryadi, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

capital-intensive activities. Also, it employs the role of the party organizations on the ground as well as the role of external organizations. Fourthly, to a limited extent, the formal membership system is important for the party. Fifthly, the party attracts members and supporters from a wide array of groups. Sixthly, there is a mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground and the party organization in central office.

5. The PKS: Relying Only on the Party Organization

The vanguard of the Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) on the ground is manifested by the organizational structures of the party at the village level (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting* or DPRa) and at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang* or DPC).¹¹² The party also has a supporting organizational structure between these two organizational structures, namely the proselytizing areas. Further, each of these organizational structures has its own responsibilities, such as to execute the policies of the party, to collect membership fees, to receive donations (*waqaf*), grant (*hibah*) and contributions permitted by the Quran (*halal*), legal and voluntary, to introduce the party's views and statements and to conduct kaderization program.¹¹³ The party's constitution also clearly mentions that the party relies only on its own organizational structures in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members.¹¹⁴

It is important to mention that officials of the party organization on the ground must meet certain criteria. They must have achieved a certain level of membership, i.e., the intermediate member. For officials of the DPC, they have also had experiences in managing the DPRa. All of them must be pious people who rely on moral values, truth, justice, and are concerned with the benefit and unity of people. Also, they have no personal and group interests as well as they have an ability to conduct religious proselytizing in all dimensions of life.¹¹⁵ In addition, an official of the DPRa in Singasari village, Iwan, explains that most officials of the party organizations on the ground in the district have met these requirements.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Article 19-20 of the party's rule (2006).

¹¹³ Article 56 and 59 of the party's rule (2006).

¹¹⁴ Article 4(d1) of the party's rule (2006).

¹¹⁵ Article 58 Paragraph 1 of the party's rule (2006).

¹¹⁶ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

It is also important to note that the party experiences some difficulties in establishing the political relationships with major Islamic organizations. More specifically, it experiences difficulties in establishing the political relationships with the NU as leaders and most members of the NU assume that the party adopts Wahhabism which is totally different to the ideology of the NU.¹¹⁷ It also faces difficulties in establishing the political relationships with the Muhammadiyah as the Muhammadiyah in the district has been relatively successful in maintaining its neutrality.¹¹⁸ To a limited extent, however, the party has been able to establish the political relationships with the PERSIS as some members and officials of the PERSIS have become members and officials of the party.¹¹⁹

Since the implementation of the 1999 election the party has succeeded in conducting various activities. The most important activity of the party on the ground is the *tarbiyah* (education). Adopted from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organization,¹²⁰ the concept refers to activities in studying Islam covering wider subjects, such as theology (*tauhid*), rituals (*ibadah*), ethics (*akhlak*), history (*tarikh*) and politics (*siyasah*). Permata argues that the specific character of the *tarbiyah* activities is “the overt political orientation,” that is, to build an Islamic society in Indonesia.¹²¹ According to the party’s constitution, the *tarbiyah* activities is conducted to reach six goals, i.e., to establish Islamic tenets among members of the party, to bring about Islamic understanding among society, to build Islamic characters among members of the party which are in accordance with the Quran and *Sunna* of the Prophet Muhammad, including in their belief (*akidah*), rituals (*ibadah*), ethics (*akhlak*), relationship between mankind (*muamalah*) and other dimensions of life, to strengthen Islamic brotherhood (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*) in order to create Islamic solidarity, to establish new generations with a better understanding and implementation of Islam and to increase the quality of members of the party.¹²²

In practice, the *tarbiyah* activities is conducted through a number of circles (*halaqah*) referring to a small Islamic gathering in which an Islamic teacher sits surrounded

¹¹⁷ Interview with Muttaqien, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁸ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁹ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁰ Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*. Lowly Institute for International Policy, No. 5, 2005, pp 66-74.

¹²¹ Ahmad-Norma Permata, “Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006.” *Ph.D dissertation*. Münster University, 2008, p. 16.

¹²² Article 4 of the party’s rule (2006).

by five to ten students.¹²³ Each of the *halaqah* groups conducts many activities, such as studying the Quran, discussing contemporary political issues both at the local and regional levels as well as providing social service. However, the most prominent activity of the *halaqah* groups is the proselytizing activity. Moreover, Iwan explains that there are two types of proselytizing activities, namely general proselytizing for ordinary people and special proselytizing for members of the party.¹²⁴ Through the general proselytizing, the party creates the political linkage with its supporters. Meanwhile, through the special proselytizing activities, the party maintains the political linkage with its members.¹²⁵

In carrying out these *tarbiyah* activities, officials of the party utilize mosques, small mosques, Islamic boarding schools and private homes. In this context, it should be acknowledged that officials of the party in the district experience some constraints in conducting the *tarbiyah* activities as mosques, small mosques and Islamic boarding schools in the district are mostly organized by the NU. Iwan also explains that since the implementation of the 1999 officials of the party have experienced some black campaigns through which the party has been accused of adopting Wahabbism and of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.¹²⁶

According to Iwan, the party encourages its members to be involved in the daily activities of the local population. For example, the party encourages its members to participate actively in regular Islamic gatherings in the district. The party also encourages its members to participate actively in celebrating Islamic festivals.¹²⁷ In addition, the most well-known social activity of the party is to provide emergency relief for the victims of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, or floods.¹²⁸ Another prominent activity is to providing free medical and dental service, including mass and free circumcisions, to hosting bazaars and to providing cheap basic goods for poor people.¹²⁹

To attract voters in the election period, the party relies solely on its ideology and platforms. A legislative candidate of the party in the 2009 election, Yuda Cahyadi, explains

¹²³ Furthermore, see Machmudi Yon (2006). *Islamising Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party*. Ph.D dissertation. Canberra University, pp. 61-67.

¹²⁴ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁵ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁶ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁷ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁸ Interview with anonymous, January 3, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁹ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

that in campaign activities, all of the legislative candidates attempted to build an image that the party was an anti-corruption party. In their campaign activities, these legislative candidates also tried to show that they were concerned with the suffering of Muslims in Palestine.¹³⁰ Iwan explains that the party usually increases the frequency of the *tarbiyah* activities in the election period. As the party lacks political relationship with other Islamic organizations in the district, the legislative candidates of the party relied solely on the role of the party organizations. Iwan also explains that through the party organizations on the ground, these legislative candidates distributed stickers, calendars and flags from the party.¹³¹ Information from direct observation also shows that members of the party mobilized their families, relatives and friends to vote for these legislative candidates. In this sense, the party adopts popular direct selling methods to gain votes.

The party's constitution categorizes members of the party into three types, namely supporting, core and honorary members.¹³² The supporting members are prepared for at least two years. They are recruited and dismissed by the organizational structure of the party at the district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah* or DPTD). The supporting member in turn is divided into the new and junior members.¹³³ Meanwhile, the core members are prepared for at least five years. There are four types of the core member, i.e., intermediate, senior, specialist and top-level members. The intermediate and senior members are recruited and dismissed by the organizational structure of the party at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Wilayah* or DPTW).¹³⁴ Meanwhile, the specialist and top-level members are recruited and dismissed by the organizational structure of the party at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat* or DPTP). Similarly, the honorary member are also recruited and dismissed by the DPTP.¹³⁵

Every member of the party must meet certain requirements and proclaims the membership oath.¹³⁶ For example, the new members must pledge loyalty to the Quran and *Sunna* of the Prophet. They also must implement the party's constitution and keep internal information confidential. Similarly, the junior members must pledge loyalty to the Quran

¹³⁰ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³¹ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³² Article 9 of the party's statute (2006).

¹³³ Article 5 Paragraph 3 of the party's rule (2006).

¹³⁴ Article 5 Paragraph 4 of the party's rule 2006.

¹³⁵ Article 5 Paragraph 5 of the party's rule 2006.

¹³⁶ Article 6 Paragraph 1(a) of the party's rule (2006).

and *Sunna* of the Prophet. They also must implement *sharia*, maintain the relationship with other members and Muslims, have a commitment to implement the party's constitution and keep internal information secure. Meanwhile, the intermediate and senior members have higher requirements, such as they must implement a holy struggle (*jihad*) if the party requires it. Moreover, every member must provide a membership fee. Iwan explains that some sympathizers of the party in the district also provide financial contributions.¹³⁷ In addition, the party's constitution also explicitly mentions that every member must have a membership card and each of them has to follow kaderization program.¹³⁸

Until May 2006 the party in the district had nine hundred and thirty-eight loyal cadres consisting of seven hundred and twenty-six newbie members, one hundred and eighteen junior members, fifty-nine intermediate members, thirty-two senior members and three specialist members. In terms of gender category, there were sixty-nine males and twenty-five females in the core members. Meanwhile, with regard to educational background, 56.7 percent of members held a high school degree, while 17.8 percent of members held a diploma degree and 25.5 percent of members held a university degree. In terms of economic background, 85.4 percent of members had a financial income below Rp. 1 million (66.7 €), 12 percent of members had a financial income between Rp 1-2 million (66.7 € - 133.5 €) and 2.6 percent of members had a financial income above Rp. 2 million (133 €) per month.¹³⁹

Further, the party's constitution explicitly states that every member is required to proclaim the party's oath which is in accordance with Islamic tenets.¹⁴⁰ Iwan argues that members of the party can come from different backgrounds "as long as they will participate in the *tarbiyah* activities".¹⁴¹ Information from direct observation shows that most members of the party in the district come from Islamic organizations with modern and Puritanistic features, especially from the PERSIS.

According to the party's constitution, the organizational relationship within the party is based on a hierarchical system.¹⁴² Iwan explains that officials of the DPRa at the

¹³⁷ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³⁸ Article 5 Paragraph 2 of the party's rule (2006).

¹³⁹ The PKS's Report in the Tasikmalaya District 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Article 6 Paragraph 1(a) of the party's rule 2006.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴² Article 66 of the party's statute (2006).

village level provide regular reports to officials of the DPC at the sub-district level. In turn, officials of the DPC provide regular reports to the party leaders in the district. Iwan also points out that it is possible for officials of the party organization on the ground to conduct direct communications and coordination with the party leaders as well as with the party's legislators. The coordination and communication forums between these officials take formal and informal meetings.¹⁴³ In general, the party organizations on the ground provide resources that are necessary for the existence and success of the party leaders in the district.

To summarize, the PKS on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, intensive and reciprocal activities. Secondly, in doing so, it relies on the ideology and platforms of the party. Thirdly, in mobilizing its supporters in election period, the party employs the labor-intensive activities. It also relies solely on the role of the party organizations on the ground. Fourthly, the formal membership system is very important for the party. Fifthly, the party attracts members from a particular group. Sixthly, there is a mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground and the party organization in central office.

6. The PBB: Between the Ideology and Party Elites

The Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB) on the ground is represented by the organizational structures of the party at the village level (*Dewan Pimpinan Ranting* or DPRt) and at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang* or DPAC).¹⁴⁴ Each of these organizational structures has its own responsibilities, such as to implement the platforms of the party and to implement the decisions made by the party convention at given level.¹⁴⁵ They also have the authority to conduct coordination and communications with officials of the party organization on the ground in other areas and to manage the party at their own levels.¹⁴⁶

The head of the party in central office in the district (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC), Momon Abdurrahman, concedes that the party lacks information on the exact

¹⁴³ Interview with Iwan, November 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴⁴ Article 11 of the party's statute (2005).

¹⁴⁵ Article 16 Paragraph 5 of the party's rule (2005).

¹⁴⁶ Article 8 Paragraph 1 of the party's organization guidelines (2005).

numbers of the party organizations on the ground.¹⁴⁷ However, an official of the DPRt in Sukamenah village, Syamsudin, explains that until 2008 the party established the DPAC in a few areas. He also adds that the party established the DPRt only in villages and sub-districts with a significant number of potential voters and with members of the party who have a willingness to serve as officials of these organizational structures. Moreover, the party established the party organization on the ground in a certain area in which the party's legislators exist.¹⁴⁸

The party organizations on the ground have limited facilities. Consequently, as explained by Syamsudin, officials of the party organization on the ground lack initiative to implement their responsibilities.¹⁴⁹ In order to create and maintain the political linkage with its supporters, the party utilizes Islamic events organized by the local population. Through these events, the party leaders introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to the audience. Official of the DPRt in Sukaratu village, Iyuk Lukman, explains that in regular Islamic gatherings in his village, he often invites Islamic teachers affiliated with the party to provide a lecture. By initiating such activities, he argues that the party will be able to maintain its loyal supporters.¹⁵⁰ The party also employs Islamic events conducted by the PERSIS. In addition, as a modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia, the PERSIS has organizational structures, ranging from the national to the sub-district levels, namely the central board at the national level, regional board at the provincial level, branch board at the district level or municipality levels and branch representative council board at the sub-district level. It also has some autonomous bodies existing from the national level to the regional level. The vice head of the PERSIS in the district, Dadang Sholihat, explains that the PERSIS conducts many religious activities in the district, such as studying the Quran, celebrating Islamic festivals, collecting and distributing tithe (*zakat*) and helping the local population to build mosques and small mosques.¹⁵¹

It is also important to mention that the party relies strongly on its ideology and platforms when it creates and manages the political linkage with its members or supporters. Syamsudin asserts that despite the fact that the local population has become more

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Momon Abdurrahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Iyuk Lukman, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵¹ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

pragmatic, the party still attempts to introduce the ideology of the party to the local population by emphasizing the implementation of *sharia* in the district. Further, he argues that as the local population is familiar with Islamic tenets, it is not difficult to implement *sharia* in the district. Syamsudin also argues that the implementation of *sharia* in the district is not contradictory to the national constitution and provisions.¹⁵² Similarly, Iyuk Lukman explains that he underlines the implementation of *sharia* in the district in implementing his responsibilities as an official of the DPAC. He also argues that among the other Islamic parties, the PBB is the only party that proposes the ideology and platforms of the Masyumi Party.¹⁵³

To a lesser extent, the party also utilizes the personal networks of its leaders and officials in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters. Syamsudin explains that in introducing the implementation of *sharia*, he initially focuses on his own relatives. He expects that his relatives, in turn, will also introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to other relatives.¹⁵⁴ Iyuk Lukman also applies a similar strategy. Coming from a family supporting the Masyumi Party, he utilizes his family networks to introduce the ideology and platforms of the party on the local population.¹⁵⁵

In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party employs different strategies to attract voters. Firstly, it relies on the issue of the implementation of *sharia*. Saeful Azis, for example, explains that in his campaign activities, he put more emphasis on the implementation of *sharia*. In his campaigns, he explained to his potential supporters that although the party proposed the implementation of *sharia*, it did not necessarily mean that the party proposed an Islamic state in Indonesia. He also provided an explanation to his potential voters that the party attempted to implement *sharia* through democratic mechanisms so that the party was different from other radical and fundamental Islam movements. In addition, Saeful Azis preferred to make direct contact with his potential supporters.¹⁵⁶

Secondly, the party relies on its charismatic leaders. Dadang Sholihat explains that in the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, many Islamic teachers from the

¹⁵² Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵³ Interview with Iyuk Lukman, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Iyuk Lukman, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Saeful Azis, December 5, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

PERSIS served as the vote getters. He adds that some of the legislative candidates of the party employed the organizational structures of the PERSIS in order to support their candidacy.¹⁵⁷ Some other legislative candidates established their own supporting organizations. For example, a legislative candidate in the 2004 election established a group known as *ajengan bendo* consisting of young Islamic teachers in the district which gained attention because of its radical action in the district, such as anti-alcohol sweeping and anti-premarital sex actions.¹⁵⁸

To a limited extent, the party also relies on eclectic issues of its legislative candidates. Ulih Muslihudin explains that he tried to introduce several agendas which could solve “the real social problems of the local population”. For example, he tried to facilitate people in his electoral area having access to business capital provided by the government and to help children gaining an access to education and health services. He also established a social organization, namely the Social Advocacy Line (*Garis Advokasi Masyarakat* or GERAM) in which he conducted discussion forums on various social problems.¹⁵⁹

Regarding the formal membership system, the party’s constitution distinguishes members of the party into six categories. The ordinary members refer to those with a commitment to the ideology and platforms of the party. These members have at least two recommendations from other ordinary members. The cadre members denote those who have followed kaderization program. Meanwhile, the major members refer to those who have been active in the party in the last five years and who are recommended by the officials of the party at every level. The special members refer to those who have been recommended by the DPC and the organization of the party at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW). The distinctive members refer to those who have been recommended by the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP), while the honorary members refer to those who serve as leaders of social organizations with similar goals as the party.¹⁶⁰ The party’s constitution also mentions the

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁸ Interview with anonymous, December 23, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Ulih Muslihudin, December 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶⁰ Article 8 of the party’s statute (2005); Article 1 of the party’s rule (2005).

rights and obligations as well as the recruitment and dismissal process of members of the party.¹⁶¹

In practice, however, the party in the district is not able to implement such provisions. Syamsudin concedes that officials of the party organization on the ground disregard the formal membership system as they experience difficulties in recruiting new members. He also explains that although the party provided membership cards shortly before the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, it lacks a membership database.¹⁶² Similarly, Iyuk Lukman explains that he lacks information about the number of members or supporters of the party in his village. He also concedes that although he serves as an official of the party organization on the ground, he does not have membership card.¹⁶³

The party's constitution clearly states that there is no specific condition to become a member of the party. Syamsudin argues that despite the fact that members of the party in the district are Muslims, it is possible for non-Muslims to become a member of the party "as long as they agree with the ideology and platforms of the party".¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile, Iyuk Lukman explains that in the implementation of the 2009 election, he focused on former members of the Masyumi Party as well as on members of the PERSIS in his village.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, Dadang Sholihat, who also served as the head of the DPC in the district in 2001-2006, explains that in the 1999 elections many members of the PERSIS voted for the party. However, the condition shifted toward the implementation of the 2004 election, when they also supported the other Islamist parties, especially the PKS.¹⁶⁶

Syamsudin argues that ideally officials of the party organization on the ground conduct regular communications and coordination with the party leaders in the district so that they have information about the situation in the party in general. However, in reality, officials of the party organization on the ground lack coordination and communication with the party leaders. He also asserts that coordination and communications between these officials and the party leaders just exist in the election period.¹⁶⁷ Iyuk Lukman also concedes that since his recruitment in 2008 he has lacked communication and coordination

¹⁶¹ Article 2-6 of the party's rule (2005).

¹⁶² Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶³ Interview with Iyuk Lukman, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Iyuk Lukman, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Syamsudin, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

with the party leaders. As a consequence, he has no understanding about his responsibilities as an official of the DPRt.¹⁶⁸ Information from direct observation also shows that the party organizations on the ground were treated as an instrument to gain votes for the party leaders who proposed their candidacy in the 2009 election.

Overall, the PBB on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting short-term, non-intensive and one way activities. Secondly, in doing so, it relies heavily on the ideology and platforms of the party and, to a lesser extent, on the interpersonal networks of its leaders and officials. Thirdly, to attract its supporters, the party employs the labor-intensive activities and the role of the party organizations on the ground as well as the role of external organizations. Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. Fifthly, it attempts to attract members from a particular group, more specifically, members of the PERSIS and former members of the Masyumi Party. Sixthly, the party organizations on the ground are subordinate to the party organization in central office.

7. Conclusion

This chapter aims to explore the organizational features of the Islamic parties on the ground in the Tasikmalaya district. From the illustrations above, we can see that each of these parties has its own prominent features regarding the political linkage between these parties and their members or supporters. More specifically, the most salient feature of the PAN on the ground is the fact that the legislative candidates of this party begin to have a dominant role in creating and maintaining the political linkage between this party and its members or supporters. Meanwhile, the most prominent feature of the PKB on the ground is the dominant role of the NU, including its autonomous bodies, in creating the political linkage between this party and its members or supporters. In the PBR, the patronage mechanism serves as an important instrument in the relationship between the party leaders and their supporters. Moreover, the most salient characteristic of the PPP on the ground is the fact that this party attempts to maximize the different resources when this party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters. Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the most prominent dimension of the PKS on the ground is the

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Iyuk Lukman, December 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

fact that the party relies solely on the role of its internal organizations to create and maintain the political linkage with its members. Meanwhile, the most interesting feature of the PBB is the dominant role of the ideology of the party on one hand and a growing dominant role of the party leaders on the other hand, in creating and maintaining the political linkage between this party and its members or supporters. A summary of the organizational features of these parties on the ground in the district is presented in the following table.

Table 5.1
Organizational Features of the Islamic Parties on the Ground

| Party/ Indicators | Effort to create and maintain the political linkage with members/supporters | Instrument to create and maintain the political linkage with the members/supporters | Strategy to attract voters | Formal membership | Background of members/ supporters | Relationship with the party in central office |
|----------------------|---|---|---|----------------------|---|---|
| PAN | By conducting short-term, intensive and one way activities | By relying on eclectic platforms | By employing labor-intensive activities and relying on the party organization | Important | A wide array of groups in society | Mutual |
| PKB | By conducting long-term, on- going and intensive activities | By employing clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party elites as well as the ideology of the party | By employing labor-intensive activities and relying on external organization | Not important | A particular group in society | Subordinate |
| PBR | Short-term, non-intensive and one way activities | By employing clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party elites | By employing labor-intensive activities and by relying on the party organization as well as external organization | Not important | A wide array of groups in society | Independent |
| PPP | Long-term, on-going and intensive activities | By combining clientelism, the interpersonal networks of the party elites, the ideology of the party and platforms of the government | By combining labor-intensive activities and capital-intensive activities as well as the party organization and external organizations | Important | A wide array of groups in society | Mutual |
| PKS | Long-term, intensive and reciprocal activities | By employing the ideology and platforms of the party | By employing labor-intensive activities and relying on the party organization | important | A particular group in society | Mutual |
| PBB | Short-term, non-intensive and one way activities | By employing the ideology of the party and interpersonal networks of the party elites | By employing labor-intensive activities and by combining the party organization and external organizations | Not important | A particular group in society | Subordinate |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

As shown in Table 5.1, the PKB, PPP and PKS conduct long-term, on-going and intensive activities in and beyond election periods in order to create and maintain the political linkage with their members or supporters. As a result, these parties relatively have a strong political engagement with their members or supporters. On the other hand, the PAN, PBR and PBB tend to conduct short-term, non-intensive and one way activities. In this sense, these parties conduct their activities just in the election period so that the political linkage between these parties and their members or supporters is weak. In addition, except the PPP and PKS, all of the Islamic parties disregard the existence and role of their organizations on the ground in creating and maintaining the political linkage with their members or supporters.

As the main instrument of creating and maintaining the political linkage with their members or supporters, most Islamic parties utilize clientelism as well as the interpersonal networks of the party elites. More specifically, the PBR rely strongly on these instruments. In the case of the PKB, this party utilizes the interpersonal networks of the party elites with the NU so that despite the fact that the party lacks social activity, it is still able to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by utilizing the activities of the NU. The PKB also employs its ideological foundation which is in accordance with the ideology of the NU. Similarly, the PBB also combines the interpersonal networks of the party elites with the ideology of the party. In the case of the PPP, this party also combines such methods with other instruments, i.e., the ideology of the party together with the program of the government as the district head come from this party. Meanwhile, the PAN creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by relying on the eclectic platforms of its legislative candidates. Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the PKS relies solely on the role of its ideology and platforms when it creates and maintains the political linkage with its members.

To mobilize voters, the legislative candidates of all of the Islamic parties tend to employ labor-intensive activities. Nevertheless, as their party has many resources, the legislative candidates of the PPP also conduct capital-intensive activities in their campaigns. Moreover, the legislative candidates of all of the Islamic parties employ the party organizations on the ground to support their candidacy to a different degree. More specifically, the PKS relies heavily on the role of its ideology and platforms as well as on

the party organization. By contrast, the legislative candidates of the PKB disregard the role of the party organization as they rely on the role of the NU. The legislative candidates of the other Islamic parties combine the role of the party organization with the role of other social organizations, including the role of the government in the case of the PPP.

From the discussion above, we can also see that all of the Islamic parties attempted to develop the formal membership system prior to the implementation of the 1999 election. In addition, in this election, the local population was very enthusiastic to become members of these parties. Nevertheless, as there is a growing political pragmatism among the local population, most of the Islamic parties have disregarded the formal membership since the 1999 election. As a result, most of them also lack membership database and they are not able to generate membership fees. Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the formal membership is very important for the PKS as it develops the membership system in which members of the party must fulfill several requirements. To a lesser degree, however, the PAN also conducts a similar effort, such as providing membership identity cards with health insurance.

Regarding the background of the members and supporters, the PAN, PPP and PBR attempt to attract voters from a wide array of groups. In this context, it is important to note that although the PAN is assumed by many people as the Muhammadiyah's party, in fact, this party also gains support from members of other Islamic organization, including the NU and some Shia groups. By contrast, the PKB, PKS and PBB focus on a particular group of society. More specifically, the PKB focuses on members of the NU, even though the party's constitution states that the party is an open party. The PKS focuses on those who have willingness to take part in the *tarbiyah* activities, especially the youth, while the PBB focuses on members of the PERSIS as well as former members of the Masyumi Party.

Lastly, the PAN, PPP and PKS also try to establish an internal mechanism in which there is a mutual relationship between the organizational structures of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office. More specifically, the PKS develops a strong organizational relationship in which the party organizations on the ground play a pivotal role in supporting the party leaders. To a lesser degree, the PAN and PPP also make a similar effort. However, the PKB and PBB establish an internal mechanism in which the organizational structures of the party on the ground are

subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in central office. Meanwhile, in the case of the PBB, the organizational structures of the party on the ground are independent from the organizational structure of the party in central office.

From the elaboration above, we can see that the general feature of these parties on the ground is complex. If we compare these findings to the theoretical framework as elaborated in Chapter 2, we can see that each of these parties contains some elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party and even the cartel party. In this sense, except the PKS, each of these parties has hybrid features. Consequently, as shown in Table 5.2, it is not easy to categorize these parties into a single party model. As some elements are more prominent than the others, however, some of them can be categorized into a certain party model.

Table 5.2
Hybrid Features of the Islamic Parties on the Ground

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|------------------------|--|---|--|-------------------------|
| PAN | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party employs labor-intensive activities and the party organization to attract voters - The party respects the formal membership system - The party on the ground provides resources that are necessary for the existence and success of the party in central office. While the party in central office is seen as the voice or guardian of the party on the ground | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters by conducting short-term, occasional and one way activities - The party relies on its pragmatic platforms in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its supporters - The party focuses on supporters from a wide array of groups in society | |
| PKB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities - The party relies on clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party elites in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its supporters - The party employs labor-intensive activities and external organizations to attract voters - The party disregards the formal membership system - The party focuses on supporters from a particular group in society | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party relies on its ideology and platforms in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party on the ground is subordinate to the party in central office | |

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| PBR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party relies on clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party elites in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its supporters - The party employs labor-intensive activities and external organizations to attract voters - The party disregards the formal membership system - The party on the ground is independent from the party in central office | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters by conducting short-term, occasional and one way activities - The party focuses on supporters from a wide array of groups in society | |
| PPP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party relies on clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party elites in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its supporters | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities - The party relies on its ideology and platforms in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members - The party employs labor-intensive activities and the party organization to attract voters - The party respects the formal membership system - The party on the ground provides resources that are necessary for the existence and success of the party in central office. While the party in central office is seen as the voice or guardian of the party on the ground | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party employs capital-intensive activities and external organizations to attract voters - The party focuses on supporters from a wide array of groups in society | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party employs capital-intensive activities and the state agencies to attract voters |

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|------------------------|--|---|--|-------------------------|
| PKS | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities - The party relies on its ideology and platforms in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members - The party employs labor-intensive activities and the party organization to attract voters - The party respects the formal membership system - The party focuses on members from a particular group or class in society - The party on the ground provides resources that are necessary for the existence and success of the party in central office. While the party in central office is seen as the voice or guardian of the party on the ground | | |
| PBB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party relies on clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party elites in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its supporters - The party employs labor-intensive activities and external organizations to attract voters - The party disregards the formal membership system | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party relies on its ideology and platforms in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members - The party employs labor-intensive activities and the party organization to attract voters - The party focuses on members from a particular group or class in society | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its supporters by conducting short-term, occasional and one way activities - The party on the ground is subordinate to the party in central office | |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

The PAN on the ground contains hybrid features of the mass-based party and electoralist party models. In this party, the elements of the mass-based party model are as dominant as the elements of the mass-based party model. Taken as a whole, however, the party tends to adopt the electoralist party model as its legislative candidates play a more dominant role in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters. The way the PAN creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters indicates that this party has experienced a transformation from the mass-based party model to the electoralist party model.

Meanwhile, the PKB on the ground has hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Similarly, the PBR on the ground also contains hybrid features of the elite-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of the elite-based party model are more dominant in these parties. These parties rely on clientelism and the interpersonal networks of their leaders and officials when they create and maintain the political linkage with their supporters. They also employ labor-intensive activities and disregard the role of the party organizations in mobilizing supporters in the election period. Moreover, they disregard the formal membership system. In addition, in the case of the PKB, by utilizing the daily activities of the NU, it is able to create and maintain the political linkage with its supporters. Moreover, the party also focuses on a particular group in society as its loyal supporters. In the case of the PBR, the party conducts short-term, occasional and one way activities to create and maintain the political linkage with its members. It also attracts its supporters from a wide array of groups in society.

The PPP on the ground has hybrid features of the mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models. By and large, however, the elements of the mass-based party model are very strong in this party. The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members or supporters by conducting long-term, intensive and reciprocal activities. In doing so, apart from the other instruments, it relies on its ideological foundation. In the election period, it employs labor-intensive activities as well as tending to rely on the party organization to attract supporters. Moreover, its legislative candidates also rely on the party organization when they mobilize voters. To a limited extent, the formal membership system is important for this party. There is also a mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground

and the party leaders in central office in which the former provides organizational resources for the latter, while the latter serves as the voice or guardian of the former.

Interestingly, different to the other Islamic parties which contain hybrid features, the PKS on the ground adopts the mass-based party model purely. The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, intensive and reciprocal activities. In doing so, the party relies on its ideology and platforms. In election period, it employs labor-intensive activities to mobilize its members. Its legislative candidates also rely strongly on the party organization to support their candidacy as the party experiences some difficulties in establishing the political relationships with major Islamic organizations. For the party, the formal membership system is also very important so the party has developed the membership system. Moreover, there is also a mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground and the party leaders in central office in which the party organizations on the ground provides organizational resources for the party leaders in central office, while the party leaders in central office serve as the voice or guardian of the party organizations on the ground.

Lastly, the PBB on the ground contains hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. In this party, the elements of the elite-based party model are as dominant as the elements of the mass-based party model. Overall, it is likely that the party tends to adopt the elite-based party model as the party elites play a more dominant role in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters. Different to the PAN that experiences a transformation process from the mass-based party model to the electoralist party model, the way the PBR creates and maintains the political relationships with its supporters indicates that the party has experienced a transformation from the mass-based party model to the elite-based party model.

CHAPTER 6

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF THE ISLAMIC PARTIES IN CENTRAL OFFICE

In this chapter we continue the analytical process by examining the organizational features of the Islamic parties in central office.¹ In doing so, we apply the five criteria as proposed in Chapter 2, i.e., the recruitment process of party leader, the mechanisms employed by these parties when they manage their leadership, the party finances, the activities of the organizational structure of these parties in central office in order to create and maintain the political linkage with their members or supporters and the relationships between the organizational structure of these parties in central office and the organizational structure of these parties in public office, more specifically in legislature.

1. The PAN: Trying To Build A Modern Organization

The organizational structure of the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN) in the central office at the district level is represented by the DPD (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*). The party's constitution does not specifically mention the authority of the central office. However, the party convention in the district (*Musyawarah Daerah* or Musda) in 2005 decided that the party leaders in the central office have the following functions, i.e., to manage the activities of the party in the district, to implement the decisions and policies made by members of the party through the party convention, to provide regular reports to members of the party in the party convention, to establish a constructive relationship with the government and with other social organizations in the district and to introduce platforms of the party to the government, other social organizations and the local population.²

The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership model consisting of the executive council and advisory board (*Majelis Pertimbangan Partai* or MPP).³ According to the party's constitution, the party leaders are elected by members of

¹ Organizational structure of the party in central office in general refers to party leadership at the national level. As this study focuses on the Islamic parties at the local level, more specifically at the district level, therefore, the organization of the party in central office in this study refers to the organization of the Islamic parties at the district level.

² Mekanisme dan Prosedur Organisasi PAN Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2005-2010.

³ Article 10 and 16 Paragraph 2 of the party's statute (2005).

the party for a five-year period at the party convention. In addition, members of the party in the party convention are represented by officials of the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or the DPW), the party leaders in the district from the previous period, officials of the party organizations on the ground (*Dewan Pimpinan Ranting* or DPRt at the village level and *Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC at the sub-district level) as well as leaders of the party's autonomous bodies.⁴

A former secretary of the executive council in the district, Iip Syamsul Arif, explains that the party leadership in the period of 1998-2000 was recruited just by several members of the party as the party was in its initial process of establishment so it was not able to conduct a party convention. It was not until 2000 that party leaders were elected by members of the party in the party convention. Iip Syamsul Arif, who also serves as the head of the Muhammadiyah in the district, argues that although some prominent leaders of the Muhammadiyah were actively involved in the establishment of the party, their role in the recruitment process was far from dominant.⁵

The head of the executive council in the district, Ade Komaruddin, explains that he was elected at the 2005 party convention which was carried out under democratic mechanisms. He also adds that during the recruitment process he did not conduct campaign activities to support his candidacy. Moreover, as all of the candidates were unenthusiastic to become the party leader, there was no strong competition among these candidates in the recruitment process. In this sense, he argues that “the recruitment process took place smoothly and did not involve money politics”.⁶

Information from direct observation suggests that members of the party decided to choose Ade Komaruddin as the party leader in the district for several reasons. Firstly, he is the most prominent academic at Siliwangi University, the biggest university in the district. Holding a doctoral degree, he is also the member of the party with the highest academic degree in the district. Administrative staff of the executive council, Yono Haryono, explains that members of the party are very proud of having a leader with such an intellectual capacity.⁷ They also have high expectations that Ade Komaruddin will be able

⁴ Article 14 and 24 Paragraph 3 of the party's rule (2005).

⁵ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷ Interview with Yono Haryono, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

to manage the party in the district appropriately. From these illustrations, we can see that members of the party considered organizational skill and intellectual capability in selecting Ade Komaruddin as the party leader in the district.

The deputy general secretary of the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP), Viva Yoga Mauladi, asserts that the party organization at the national level did not intervene in the recruitment process. He also explains that the party leaders at the national level intervene the recruitment process only in particular circumstances, such as when the candidates of party leader have been involved in criminal acts. Further, Viva Yoga Mauladi explains that along with the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy in 2001 concerning the relationship between the central and regional government, the party leadership at the national level has allowed members of the party to recruit their own leaders at the regional level.⁸

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the party cannot be separated from its prominent leader, Amien Rais, who served as the party leader at the national level in 1999-2004. Viva Yoga Mauladi concedes that during this period, the party strongly relied on the charismatic figure of Amien Rais. Consequently, the party lacked a significant effort to develop its internal organizational structures. It was not until 2005 when Soetrisno Bachir became as the party leader that the party started to develop its internal organizations from the national to regional levels, such as providing organizational guidance for managing the party organizations at all levels and providing mechanisms for the recruitment process of members.⁹ In addition, Sutrisno Bachir was “more of a political entrepreneur than an ideologically motivated leader”.¹⁰

A similar situation also took place in the district, when in 2005 Ade Komaruddin served as the party leader and he started to develop organizational structures of the party. Yono Haryono explains that since 2005 the party leaders in the district have made some significant efforts to develop internal organizational structures of the party. For instance, they set up an administrative system which is based on modern management principles. They also developed a membership database and provided some organizational guidance

⁸ Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁹ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 340.

¹⁰ Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

for the party organizations on the ground. Yono Haryono adds that they have encouraged members of the party to play a more significant role in the decision-making process in the central office.¹¹ In addition, Ade Komarrudin asserts that since 2005 he has attempted to manage the party based on professional principles, such as by developing effective and efficient procedures.¹²

Regarding the party finances, the party's constitution clearly mentions that it is possible for the central office at the district level to generate its financial income from different sources, i.e., membership fees, donations, charities and grants contributed by members and supporters of the party, as well as other financial sources allowed by Islam (*halal*) and government provisions.¹³ The party's constitution also states that the central office at the district level must manage the party finances with transparency and accountability.¹⁴

In practice, as explained by Ade Komaruddin, the party in the district has several financial sources. Firstly, the party receives financial contributions from its legislators in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in which these legislators must give 20 percent of their take-home salary to the party. Secondly, it receives financial contributions from its legislators in the West Java Province Legislature. Thirdly, it receives donations from sympathizers of the party.¹⁵ Fourthly, it receives a state subvention.¹⁶ Ade Komaruddin also explains that the party receives financial contributions from the party leaders and from officials of the central office as they often carry out some activities in the central office at their own expense.¹⁷ In addition, Viva Yoga Mauladi explains the party organizations at the national and provincial levels do not provide regular financial assistance to the party organization at the district level.¹⁸

¹¹ Interview with Yono Haryono, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹² Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³ Article 24 of the party's rule (2005).

¹⁴ Article 25 of the party's rule (2005).

¹⁵ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶ According to Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 1/2006 on Financial Assistance to Political Parties in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature, the government annually provides a subvention for parties with seat(s) in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (Rp. 20.000.000 (€ 1333) per seat) since 2006.

¹⁷ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁸ Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

Further, Iip Syamsul Arif explains that the party initially strongly relied on donations from sympathizers of the party.¹⁹ Meanwhile, Ade Komaruddin adds that prior to the implementation of the 1999 election the party was able to collect membership fees. Along with the political euphoria after the fall of Suharto, at that time, members of the party were very enthusiastic to support Amien Rais in particular and the party in general. However, prior to the implementation 2004 election the party experienced difficulties in collecting membership fees along with a significant decline in trust in political parties among the local population.²⁰ Recently, instead of giving membership fees, members of the party often propose some financial assistance to the party.²¹ Information from direct observations shows that since 2006 the party in the district has relied on financial contributions from its legislators, the state subvention as well as financial contributions from the party leaders.

Table 6.1
Budget of the PAN in 1998-2005

| Year | Income | Expenditure |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| August 1998 - September 2000 | Rp. 278180000 (€ 18545.33) | Rp. 277416000 (€ 18494.4) |
| March 2002 - October 2005 | Rp. 513968996 (€ 34264.6) | Rp. 511462182 (€ 34097.48) |

Source: The PAN's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005.

Further, there are four main allocations of organizational expenditure, namely the overheads (including renting the workplace of the central office and other overhead costs), campaign activities, routine activities and the party convention.²² Deden Marno, who also serves as a deputy secretary of the executive council, explains that the implementation of party convention and routine activities, including the establishment of the party organizations on the ground, become the biggest allocation beyond election period. On the other hand, the implementation of campaign activities, such as providing the party flags, becomes the biggest allocation in election period.²³

Having experienced budget constraints, the central office of the party in the district is not able to conduct activities in order to create and maintain the political linkage with members of the party. To be more specifically, the party leadership in the period of 1998-

¹⁹ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁰ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²¹ Interview with Yono Haryono, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²² Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²³ Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

2000 focused on the dissemination of the ideology and platforms of the party among the local population. They also put an emphasis on the internal consolidation of the party.²⁴ Another example, the party leadership in the period of 2000-2005 focused on internal agendas. As stated in the party's report in 2005, in this period the party did not conduct social activities and communication with the local population.²⁵ A similar situation was also experienced by the party leadership in the period of 2005-2010. As conceded by Ade Komaruddin, instead of external agendas, the party leadership focused on internal agendas, such as establishing the party organizations on the ground and conducting kaderization program.²⁶ Information from direct observation however shows that since 2006 the party leaders have provided an ambulance car for the local population. In this sense, to a limited extent, the party leaders in the district have attempted to provide social service for members and supporters of the party.

The party's constitution also clearly mentions that the party's legislators must follow the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making policies.²⁷ Ade Komaruddin explains that the party's legislators ideally serve as the representatives of the party in defending the ideology and platforms of the party in the regional legislature. In this sense, they must implement the policies made by the party leaders. Ade Komaruddin also explains that the party's legislators also ideally must provide regular reports to the central office.²⁸ Similarly, Viva Yoga Mauladi asserts that the legislators of the party are sub-ordinates to the central office so that they must implement the decisions and instructions given by the party leaders.²⁹

In actual fact, as explained by Iip Syamsul Arif who was also a party's legislator in the periods of 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, the party's legislators in the district attempted to implement decisions made by the party leaders when they were involved in making public policies. He also explains that there were internal forums in which the party's legislators provided regular reports to the party leaders.³⁰ Information from direct observation also indicates that the party's legislators establish daily coordination and communication with

²⁴ The PAN's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2000.

²⁵ The PAN's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005.

²⁶ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁷ Article 60 Paragraph 4 of the party's statute (2005).

²⁸ Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁹ Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

³⁰ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

the party leader and officials of the central office. In this sense, in line with the party's constitution, they serve as the agent of the party in defending and implementing the ideology and platforms of the party in making public policies.

In summary, the PAN in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is managed by technocratic principles. Thirdly, regarding the party finance, the party relies on a state subvention as well as on financial contributions from the party elites. Fourthly, the party organization in central office attempts to conduct social activities in election period and beyond. Fifthly, there is a mutual relationship between the party organization in central office and the party organization in public office in which the latter serves as the agent of the former in defending policies of the party in public policy-making.

2. The PKB: Depending on the Party Elites and NU Leaders

The central office of the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB) at the district level is organizationally manifested by the DPC (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang*). According to the party's constitution, the DPC has several functions, namely to propose policies of the party at the district level, to recruit and dismiss officials of the party organization on the ground (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting* or DPRt at the village level and *Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting* or DPART at the sub-village level) and to provide recommendations to the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pengurus Wilayah* or DPW) regarding the recruitment process of officials of the party organizations at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang* or DPAC).³¹ Moreover, the DPC also has some responsibilities, such as to implement the decisions and policies of the party at the district level, to provide regular reports to the party organization at the provincial level and to provide regular reports to members of the party in the party convention at the district level (*Musyawarah Cabang* or Muscab).

The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership format consisting of the executive council (*Dewan Tanfidz*) and advisory board (*Majelis Syuro*).³² The party's constitution mentions that these leaders are elected by the party leaders from

³¹ Article 14 Paragraph 2-3 of the party's rule (2005).

³² Article 12 Paragraph 1 and Article 16-17 of the party's statute (2005).

the previous period, officials of the party organization at the sub-district level and the party's legislators at the district level for a five-year period at the party convention.³³ Through these representatives, formally, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders.

As a matter of fact, the recruitment process of the party leaders in the district is dominated by the party elites at the national level (*Dewan Pengurus Pusat* or DPP) and leaders of the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or NU) in the district. The head of *Majelis Syuro* in the district, Endang Hidayat, explains that the party leadership in the period of 1999-2002 was appointed by the party leaders at the national level. Endang Hidayat, who formerly served as the head of the NU in the district, also asserts that leaders of the NU in the district played a significant role in the recruitment process.³⁴ A similar mechanism was also applied to the party leadership in the period of 2006-2011 as the party elites at the national level experienced an internal conflict involving Abdurrahman Wahid group on one hand and Muhaimin Iskandar group on the other hand. As an impact of this internal conflict, in 2007 the party leadership at the national level dissolved the party leadership in the period of 1999-2002 in the district that was elected through the party convention. To replace this leadership, the party elites at the national level appointed the new party leadership in the period of 2008-2011.

The head of *Dewan Tanfidz* in the district, Acep Adang Ruchyat, explains that he was appointed by the party elites at the national level due to the reason that he was relatively neutral in responding to the internal conflict.³⁵ Information from direct observation also shows that Acep Adang Ruchyat was elected by the party elites at the national level as he serves as the manager of the Cipasung Islamic boarding school. As explained in Chapter 4, the role of the school is very important for the party in creating and in maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters in the district in particular and in the West Java province in general. Since its establishment in 1998, except the party leadership in the period of 2002-2006, therefore, the party leadership in the district was appointed directly by the party elites at the national level as well as by the NU leaders in the district.

³³ Article 54-57 of the party's rule (2005).

³⁴ Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 10, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁵ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Further, as the party leaders in the district are structurally and culturally affiliated with the NU, they also employ the managerial principles employed by the NU leaders when they manage the party.³⁶ For instance, the party adopts a collegial leadership model consisting of *Dewan Tanfidz* and *Majelis Syuro*. Endang Hidayat concedes that the idea to have such the collegial leadership mechanism is borrowed from the NU in which there is also the collegial leadership mechanism consisting of the executive council (*Tanfidziyah*) and advisory board (*Syuria*). Moreover, similar to *Tanfidziyah* and *Syuria* in the NU, officials of *Dewan Tanfidz* mostly come from young generations, while officials of *Majelis Syuro* mainly come from senior generations.³⁷ Acep Adang Ruchyat concedes that he employs the managerial principles applied by Islamic teachers and leaders of the NU when he manages the party in the district. For instance, he relies on the role of *Majelis Syuro* when he makes a decision for the party. He also considers a seniority principle in recruiting officials of the central office.³⁸

Administrative staff of the executive council, Ujang, explains that in doing their functions, the party leaders prefer to apply “informal mechanisms”. For example, the head of *Dewan Tanfidz* prefers to conduct an informal meeting with officials of the central office in his residence. It is not surprising if the party leaders infrequently visit the workplace of the central office. Ujang also explains that the party leaders and officials of the central office act as a big family since most of them have kinship with each other. In this sense, interpersonal networks and family relationships among the party leaders and officials of the central office serve as the most important mechanisms inside the central office.³⁹

Further, the party leader at the national level, Muhaimin Iskandar, concedes that there are two prominent characteristics applied by the party leadership at the national level when they manage the party. Firstly, old generations and charismatic figures have a dominant role in the decision-making process in the party so they disregard the party’s constitution. Secondly, traditional principles, such as feudalism and seniority, as well as the patron-client relationship become the most prominent mechanism. As a consequence, after more than a decade after its establishment, “the party leadership at the national level is not

³⁶ A similar pattern also takes place in the organizational structure of the party at the national level. See, Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia*, p. 255.

³⁷ Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 10, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁸ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁹ Interview with Ujang, November 27, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

able to develop a modern political party which is based on the principle of participation, accountability, transparency, equality, efficiency and effectiveness”.⁴⁰ In addition, information from direct observation shows that although the party leadership at the national level has published several books on party management, these books had not been distributed appropriately to the party organizations at the regional level so party leaders at the regional level lack guidance to manage their organization.⁴¹

Concerning the party finances, the party’s constitution mentions that the party at the district level can generate financial incomes from membership fees, other financial sources permitted by government provisions, donations which are allowed by Islam (*halal*) and property right transfer (*waqaf*).⁴² Practically, as explained by Acep Adang Ruchyat, the party in the district has five primary financial sources from financial contributions from its legislators in which they must provide 30 percent of their take-home salary to the party, financial contributions from the district vice head as the district vice head comes from the party, donations from sympathizers of the party, financial contributions from the party leaders and officials of the central office as well as the state subvention.⁴³ In addition, although the party organizations at the national and provincial levels do not provide regular financial assistance to the party organization at the district level, they provide “incidental assistances,” such as when they conduct their platforms at the regional level.⁴⁴ Information from direct observation also shows that since 2006 the party in the district has depended on the state subvention as well as on the financial contributions from the party leaders as its primary financial sources.

Endang Hidayat explains that prior to the implementation of the 1999 election the party in the district was able to collect membership fees. Along with the political euphoria among the local population, at that time, the party even received non-financial contributions from members and supporters of the party. Since a decline in trust in political parties among the local population prior to the implementation of the 2004 election,

⁴⁰ Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, January 30, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁴¹ See, for instance, H. Andi Muawiyah Ramly (ed.), *Saya Bekerja Maka PKB Menang. Modul Pelatihan Kader Penggerak Partai untuk Pemenangan Pemilu 2009* (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2008); Kelompok Kerja DPP PKB, *Pemenangan Pemilu Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (Jakarta: Lembaga Pemenangan Pemilu PKB, 2002); Sultanul Huda et.al (eds), *Workshop Penguatan Sistem dan Manajemen Partai* (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2007).

⁴² Article 21 of the party’s rule (2005).

⁴³ Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁴ Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, January 30, 2009 (Jakarta).

however, the party has not been able to collect membership fees. To a limited extent, the party still receives non-financial contributions from its members and supporters. For instance, some members and sympathizers of the party provide food and social services when the party conducts the party convention and kaderization program.⁴⁵

Table 6.2
Budget of the PKB in 2002-2006

| Year | Income | Expenditure |
|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 2002 | Rp. 59406000 (€ 3627) | Rp. 53515500 (€ 3567.7) |
| 2003 | Rp. 43820500 (€ 2921.37) | Rp. 43992500 (€ 2932.83) |
| 2004 | Rp. 45750000 (€ 3050) | Rp. 46005000 (€ 3067) |
| 2005 | Rp. 49500000 (€ 3300) | Rp. 53768500 (€ 3584.57) |
| 2006 | Rp. 148000000 (€ 9866.66) | Rp. 124315000 (€ 8287.67) |

Source: The PKB's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006.

Meanwhile, there are nine major items of expenditure, namely the office maintenance, routine activities, transportation, meetings & consolidations, subsidy & assistance, public relations, infrastructure developments, infrastructure maintenance and the budget deficits from the previous years. According to Acep Adang Ruchyat, the routine activities and development of the party structure make up the biggest expenditure beyond election period, while the regular meetings, consolidations and campaign activities contribute as the biggest expenditure in election period. It should also be acknowledged that to a limited extent, the party annually provides financial aid to the NU in the district “in order to maintain the political relationships between the party and the NU”.⁴⁶

Endang Hidayat explains that as the party has experienced budget constraints, the party leaders adopt a principle of “activities follow money” instead of “money follows activities” in conducting activities in the district. Consequently, the party lacks effort to conduct external activities so it focuses only on internal agendas.⁴⁷ For instance, the party leadership in the period of 2002-2006 put an emphasis on five internal agendas, including establishing the party organizations on the ground, developing internal organizational structure of the central office, conducting regular meetings & the party convention and carrying out kaderization program.⁴⁸ Acep Adang Ruchyat explains that the party leadership in the period of 2007-2011 also focused on consolidation agendas as the party

⁴⁵ Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 10, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁶ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁷ Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 10, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁸ The PKB's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006.

experienced internal conflicts.⁴⁹ Moreover, Hidayat concedes that in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters, the party employs activities of the NU and its autonomous bodies.⁵⁰ Similarly, Acep Adang Ruchyat points out that “since the PKB is the NU and vice versa, activities of the party are integrated in the daily activities of the NU”.⁵¹ In this sense, although the party was not able to conduct social activities, it is still able to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by utilizing social activities carried out by the NU.

Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party’s constitution clearly mentions that the party’s legislators serve as the agent of the party in implementing the ideology and platforms of the party in making public policies.⁵² The party’s constitution also states that the party’s legislators must maintain their responsibility to the party leaders by providing regular reports.⁵³

In practice, Acep Adang Ruchyat claims that the party leaders conduct coordination and communication with the party’s legislators, especially when these legislators are involved in a crucial policy. In this sense, there is no single public policy in the district that is contradictive to the ideology and platforms of the party.⁵⁴ It is also important to note that some officials of the central office serve as the party’s legislators at the same time. Some of them also have a kinship relationship with these legislators. Further, an official of the DPAC in Singaparna sub-district, Cecep Abdul Qoyum criticizes this situation. He argues that a dual status has often led to a conflict of interests among officials of the central office and the party’s legislators. He also argues that it is very difficult for the party leaders to supervise the party’s legislators as “some of them must supervise themselves.”⁵⁵ Information from direct observation also shows that the central office becomes a stepping stone for the party leaders and its officials to obtain political position as party’s legislator.

To sum up, the PKB in the central office has the following features. Firstly, the party elites at the national level and the NU leaders in the district play a dominant role in

⁴⁹ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁰ Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 10, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵¹ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵² Article 21 Paragraph 2 of the party’s rule (2005).

⁵³ Article 21 Paragraph 3 and 4 of the party’s rule (2005).

⁵⁴ Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁵ Interview with Cecep Abdul Qoyum, January 6, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is managed by patronage and interpersonal network mechanisms. Thirdly, in terms of the party finance, the party depends on a state subvention as well as the financial contributions of the party elites. Fourthly, experiencing budget constraints, the party organization in central office conducts activities just in election period. Moreover, the party utilizes activities of the NU in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters. Fifthly, the party organization in central office is subordinate to the party organization in public office.

3. The PBR: Depending on the Party Elites

The organizational structure of the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR) in the central office at the district level is represented by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*). According to the party's constitution, the DPC has some responsibilities, i.e., to implement the party's constitution at the district level, to implement the policies made by the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP) and the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW), to implement the policies made by members of the party in the party convention at the district level (*Musyawarah Cabang* or Muscab), to provide organizational guidelines for the party organization at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang* or DPAC), to provide regular reports to the party convention and to the party organization at the provincial level, to facilitate the establishment of autonomous organizations of the party and to organize membership.⁵⁶

The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership system consisting of the executive council and expert board. The party's constitution mentions that the party leaders are elected by members of the party at the party convention for a five-year period.⁵⁷ However, it does not explicitly state about the participants of the party convention. The head of the executive council in the district, Dede Saiful Anwar, explains that the participants of the party convention are the party leaders from the previous period, officials of the party organizations at the sub-district level and leaders of autonomous bodies of the party, such as the Indonesian's Youth Reform (*Pemuda Reformasi Indonesia*

⁵⁶ Article 8-10 and 18 Paragraph 1 of the party's statute (2006).

⁵⁷ Article 17 and 33 of the party's statute (2006).

or PRI), Women's Voice of Reform Star Party (*Suara Perempuan Partai Bintang Reformasi* or SPPBR) and Islamic Scholars of Reform Star Party (*Ulama Partai Bintang Reformasi* or UPBR).⁵⁸

The deputy of the executive council in the district, Syarif Hidayat, explains that the party leadership in the period of 2004-2006 was appointed by the party elites at the national level. It was not until 2006 that the party in the district succeeded in conducting the party convention to recruit the party leadership in the period of 2006-2011. Syarif Hidayat also explains that all participants had equal rights to vote as it adopted a principle of "one participant, one vote". In the recruitment process, moreover, a candidate must reach at least 50 percent of the votes to serve as party leader.⁵⁹ In addition, an official of the party organization in West Java province, Nandang Harun, explains that the recruitment process was fully under the authority of the party organization at the district level. In this sense, there was no intervention from the party organization at the provincial level.⁶⁰ Similarly, according to the deputy general secretary of the party leadership at the national level, Yusuf Lakaseng, the party leadership at the national level did not intervene in the recruitment process.⁶¹

In managing the party in the district, the party leaders and officials of the central office rely heavily on elitism. Dede Saiful Anwar concedes that his role in the party is very dominant although he has provided discretion to other officials of the central office. He argues that such a situation occurs due to the fact that most officials in the party lack organizational skill and personal initiative to manage the central office. For instance, if he is not able to attend a regular meeting, officials of the central office usually reschedule the meeting. Another example is that, if he is not able to attend an inauguration ceremony of the establishment of the party organizations on the ground, the inauguration ceremony will be postponed.⁶² Syarif Hidayat confirms these statements. He explains that the role of Dede Saiful Anwar is very dominant in the decision-making process within the party because "Dede Saiful Anwar has a personal charisma as a leader of the party and as a prominent

⁵⁸ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁹ Interview with Syarif Hidayat, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁰ Interview with Nandang Harun, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶¹ Interview with Yusuf Lakaseng, February 2, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁶² Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Islamic teacher in the district”.⁶³ Information from direct observation also suggests that Dede Saiful Anwar lacks communication and coordination with other officials of the central office.

To a lesser degree, the party leader and officials of the central office also utilize Islamic tenets when they manage the party in the district. Dede Saiful Anwar, who studied Islam in Mecca for two years, asserts that in organizing the party in the district, he relies on Islamic tenets. By doing so, he argues that he has attempted to conduct “Islamic worship” in the party. By quoting the Prophet Muhammad’s words, he also contends that “a goodness which is not well-organized will be defeated by a well-organized badness”. In this sense, he believes that the party must be managed properly in order to pursue its goals. Moreover, he asserts that all officials of the party organizations at every level must serve as “a grace for the whole world” (*rahmatan lil alamin*).⁶⁴

Further, Dede Saiful Anwar claims that prior to the implementation of the 2009 election, the party shifted its main strategy from relying strongly on the role of party leaders to relying solely on the role of the party organizations. In this context, he tried to establish the party organizations on the ground in many areas.⁶⁵ In addition, Yusuf Lakaseng also claims that, different to the party leadership at the national level from the previous period that relied strongly on the role of charismatic leaders, the party leadership at the national level in the period of 2005-2010 attempted to employ modern management principles, such as employing rational calculations and building the party discipline.⁶⁶ Information from direct observation, however, shows that the party leaders both at the national level and at the district level lack significant effort to manage the party organizations based on the modern mechanism so that the party still depends on the role of its charismatic leaders.

The party’s constitution clearly mentions that the party at the district level can generate its financial incomes from five sources, namely membership fees, donations from supporters of the party which is allowed by Islam (*halal*), transfers of property (*waqaf*) and financial contributions from the party’s legislators as well as financial contributions from

⁶³ Interview with Syarif Hidayat, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁴ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁵ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁶ Interview with Yusuf Lakaseng, February 2, 2009 (Jakarta).

members or supporters of the party with positions in the executive branch of government.⁶⁷ In fact, Dede Saiful Anwar explains that the party in the district relies on four financial sources, i.e., donations from supporters of the party, financial contributions from the party's legislators, financial contributions from the party leader and officials of the central office, financial contributions from the legislative candidates and the state subvention.⁶⁸ In addition, Nandang Harun explains that the party organization at the provincial level provide no regular financial assistance for the party organization at the district level.⁶⁹ Similarly, Yusuf Lakaseng adds that the party organization at the national level does not provide regular financial assistance for the party organization at the district level.⁷⁰ In addition, information from direct observation shows that the party leader and officials of the central office in the district lack transparency and accountability when they manage the party finance.

Syarif Hidayat explains that the establishment of the party organizations on the ground makes up the biggest allocation in election period, while the implementation of the party convention contributes as the biggest allocation beyond election period.⁷¹ He also adds that as the party experiences budget constraints, it lacks an effort to conduct activities beyond election period. Instead, the party focuses on activities in election period, such as providing financial aid when the local population celebrates religious events.⁷² Moreover, Dede Saiful Anwar explains that just before the implementation of the 2009 he conducted many social activities at his own expense, such as providing free medical treatment and mass circumcision for people in his electoral area.⁷³ These illustrations suggest that the party in the district depends on the personal role of Dede Saiful Anwar in conducting its activities.

Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party's constitution clearly mentions that party's legislators are subordinate to party leaders. The party's constitution also explicitly states that these legislators serve as an instrument of the

⁶⁷ Article 40 of the party's statute (2006).

⁶⁸ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁹ Interview with Nandang Harun, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁰ Interview with Yusuf Lakaseng, February 2, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁷¹ Interview with Syarif Hidayat, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷² Interview with Syarif Hidayat, November 19, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷³ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

party in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.⁷⁴ In this sense, they must conduct coordination and communication with party leaders before they make actual and strategic decisions in the legislature.⁷⁵ The party's constitution also clearly states that in carrying out their roles in making public policies, party's legislators must provide regular reports to party leaders at least once every six months.⁷⁶

As the only party's legislator in the district in the period of 2004-2009, Dede Saiful Anwar claims that there were some regular forums through which he provided regular reports to the central office.⁷⁷ Such a statement was challenged by a student of Siliwangi University, Roni Romansya, who argues that Dede Saiful Anwar had an absolute power to determine both decisions of the party in the district and decisions of the party in the legislature as he has a dual status as the party leader and as the only party's legislator at the same time.⁷⁸ Information from direct observation also shows that Dede Saiful Anwar prioritized his position as the party's legislator rather than his position as the party leader in the district.

In short, the PBR in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is managed by elitism principle. To a limited extent, they also rely on the ideology and platforms of the party. Thirdly, in term of the party finance, the party depends on financial contributions of the party elites as its financial resource. Fourthly, the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities just in election period. In conducting activities, the party also depends on the role of its leader. Fifthly, the organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the party in public office.

4. The PPP: Towards Oligarchy

The organizational structure of the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP) in the central office at the district level is manifested by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*). According to the party's constitution, the party organization at

⁷⁴ Article 24 Paragraph 3 of the party's statute (2006).

⁷⁵ Article 24 Paragraph 5 of the party's statute (2006).

⁷⁶ Article 24 Paragraph 4 of the party's statute (2006).

⁷⁷ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁸ Interview with Roni Romansya, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

the district level has these following responsibilities, i.e., to implement the ideology and platforms of the party at the district level, to recruit officials for the central office at the district level, to establish and coordinate the division and body as its supporting organizations, to carry out the candidacy of its legislators at the district level, to provide recommendations to members of the party with positions in the executive branch of government at the district level, to establish the party organization in the district legislature (fraction), to provide guidance to the party's legislators at the district level, to disaffirm or revise the decisions made by the party's legislators at the district level, to organize the party convention at the district level (*Musyawarah Cabang* or Muscab) and to establish the party organizations at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang* or DPAC).⁷⁹

The party organization at the district level consists of a collegial leadership model consisting of the executive council, advisory board and expert board. These leaders are recruited by the party leaders and officials from the central office in the previous period, officials of the party organizations at the sub-district level, representatives of the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP), the party's legislators at the district level and members of the party with position in the executive branch of government at the district level for a five-year period at the party convention.⁸⁰

A former head of the executive council in the district, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, explains that during the New Order period, members of the party played a significant role in the recruitment process of party leaders despite the fact that the party experienced various political repressions from the government.⁸¹ Moreover, the head of the executive council in the district, Ruhimat, explains that in the New Order period, the recruitment process of party leaders was mainly based on the ideology of the party. As the party consisted of four Islamic parties (the NU Party, PSII, Perti and Parmusi), the candidates of party leaders came from the prominent cadres of these parties.⁸²

Further, Tatang Farhanul Hakim explains that since the fall of Suharto in 1998, members of the party have played a more significant role in recruiting party leaders. He also asserts that different to the recruitment process of party leaders inside the other Islamic

⁷⁹ Article 29 of the party's statute (2007).

⁸⁰ Article 27 Paragraph 2 of the party's statute (2007); Article 31 Paragraph 2-3 of the party's rule (2007).

⁸¹ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸² Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

parties, the recruitment process of party leaders inside the PPP is very competitive as it often involves money politics.⁸³ In addition, the vice head of the party leadership at the national level, Choizin Chumaidi, explains that since the New Order period the party leadership at the national level has provided a political discretion for members of the party at the regional level to manage their own organizations, including in recruiting their leaders. Along with the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy in 2001, the role of the party organization at the national level recently is limited to providing guidance for the recruitment process of party leaders at the regional level.⁸⁴

In managing the party in the district, the party leaders employ several mechanisms. The party leadership in the period of 1999-2006, for instance, relied strongly on the role of the party elites, more specifically the role of Tatang Farhanul Hakim who also served as the district head at the same time. In addition, Tatang Farhanul Hakim concedes that when he was in charge as the party leader in the district, he provided financial incentives for officials in the central office. He also provided some facilities for officials of the party organizations on the ground in some areas, such as computers. Consequently, officials of the party organizations at all levels supported his leadership and had political loyalties to the party.⁸⁵

The treasurer of the executive council in the district, Neng Madinah Ruchyat, explains that in the party leadership in period of 2006-2011, the party leaders and officials of the central office tended to apply elitism as the decision-making process inside the central office was dominated by a few person of the party leaders and officials of the central office. She also explains that although the party encourages the participation of women in organizing the party, she still experiences many obstacles in participating in the decision-making process.⁸⁶ Information from direct observation shows that the head of the executive council, several deputies and the secretary of the central office become the key actors in the decision-making process within the central office.

The party leaders also rely on the ideology of the party when they manage the party organizations in the district. Tatang Farhanul Hakim asserts that he relied on Islamic tenets when he managed not only the central office, but also the party organizations at all levels.

⁸³ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁴ Interview with Choizin Chumaidi, February 4, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁸⁵ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁶ Interview with Neng Madinah Ruchyat, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

In addition, he argues that the PPP is the only Islamist party in Indonesia as its leaders, officials, members and supporters are Muslims.⁸⁷ Similarly, Ruhimat states that Islamic tenets serve as the most important principle when he manages the party organizations. He adds that as the party always urges people to do good things and to leave bad things (*amar maaruf nahi munkar*). Ruhimat also encourages officials of the party organizations at every level to serve as Islamic leaders in their regions.⁸⁸

Regarding the party finances, the party's constitution mentions that the party at the district level can generate its financial incomes from membership fees, financial contributions from its legislators as well as from its members with positions in the executive branch of government, the state subvention and other financial sources allowed by Islam (*halal*).⁸⁹ The party's constitution also clearly states that the party finances must be managed in transparent and accountable manner.⁹⁰

Ruhimat explains that the party in the district generates its financial income from different sources, i.e., financial contributions from the party's legislators in which they must provide around 17 percent of their take-home salary to the party, financial contributions from the district head as the district head comes from the party, donations from sympathizers of the party, the state subvention, and financial contributions from the party leaders and officials of the central office. Ruhimat also explains that after the implementation of the 2004 election the party has experienced difficulties in collecting membership fees.⁹¹ In addition, Choizin Chumaidi explains that the party leadership at the national and the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pengurus Wilayah* or DPW) do not provide a regular financial assistance for the party organization at the district level.⁹²

Further, Ruhimat explains that there are several important allocations of expenditure, such as the overhead costs, including renting the workplace of the central office and phone and water charges. Another example is social activity through which the

⁸⁷ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁸ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁹ Article 63 Paragraph 1 of the party's statute (2007).

⁹⁰ Article 63 Paragraph 2 of the party's statute (2007).

⁹¹ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹² Interview with Choizin Chumaidi, February 4, 2009 (Jakarta).

party provides financial assistance to its members or supporters who are ill or poor.⁹³ Information from direct observation, however, shows that since 2006 the party has depended on the state subvention as well as on the financial contributions of the party elites, including financial contributions from the party's legislators.

As it has many financial sources, the party in the district is able to carry out activities in election period and beyond. Ruhimat asserts that different to the other Islamic parties, the party is the only Islamic party in the district which has conducted various social activities. He also explains that as the party leader, he encourages officials of the party organizations at every level to provide social service to the local population.⁹⁴ Similarly, Tatang Farhanul Hakim explains that many activities of the party have been integrated into activities of the government and daily activities of the local population.⁹⁵ Information from direct observation also shows that, to a certain extent, the party employs the activities of the NU, especially in conducting Islamic events.

With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party's constitution clearly mentions that the party's legislators serve as the main instrument of the party in implementing the ideology and platforms of the party in making public policies.⁹⁶ It also states that these legislators must implement the decisions and policies made by the party and they are also under supervision of the party leaders⁹⁷ so they must provide regular reports to the party leaders.⁹⁸ Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the party organization at the district level also has the authority to withdraw or revise the decisions made by these legislators. In this sense, formally, the party's legislators act as the agent through which they could be held accountable by members of the party.

In reality, there are regular forums through which the party leaders conduct communication and coordination with the party's legislators. Ruhimat asserts that the party leaders provide a political discretion to the party's legislators "as long as their actions in making public policies are in accordance with the ideology and platforms of the party".

⁹³ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁴ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁵ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁶ Article 62 Paragraph 2 of the party's statute (2007).

⁹⁷ Article 62 Paragraph 3 of the party's statute (2007).

⁹⁸ Article 62 Paragraph 4 of the party's statute (2007).

Ruhimat, who also serves as a party's legislator in the period of 1999-2014, claims that his dual status is important in order to develop a strong relationship between the party and its legislators.⁹⁹ The deputy secretary of the executive council in the district, Gopur, provides similar information. He explains that the party's legislators provide regular reports to the party leaders and officials of the central office in the district. As a result, there is no friction between the party leaders and officials of the central office on one side and the party's legislators on the side.¹⁰⁰

However, Ruhimat concedes that the party leaders and officials of the central office are not able to conduct organizational supervision to the party's legislators properly as the party leaders and many officials of the central office serve as the party's legislators at the same time.¹⁰¹ Information from direct observation also shows that the central office becomes a stepping stone for the party leaders and its officials in order gain positions in the regional legislature. It is also important to note that officials of the central office, who are at the same time serving as the legislators of the party, tend to prioritize their status as the legislators of the party rather than as officials of the central office. In this sense, it is not easy to distinguish between the party leaders, officials of the central office and the party's legislators.

Overall, the PPP in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is managed by a combination of patronage and elitism principles as well as ideological considerations. Thirdly, in regard to the party finance, the party depends on a state subvention and the financial contribution of the party elites. Fourthly, the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts various social activities in and beyond election periods in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members or supporters. Fifthly, the party organization in central office is subordinate to the party organization in public office.

⁹⁹ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Gopur, December 6, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰¹ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

5. The PKS: Combining Islamic Tenets and Modern Principles

The central office of the Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) at the district level is organizationally manifested by the DPTD (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah*) which has four primary functions, i.e., structural, conceptual, managerial and operational functions. The structural function aims to develop the party organization at the district level, such as establishing the party organizations at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang* or DPC) and proposing the legislative candidates as well as the candidates for district head.¹⁰² The conceptual function intends to propose public policies at the district level.¹⁰³ The managerial function denotes activity to manage the party organization at the district level, such as controlling and supervising the party organizations at the village level (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting* or DPRa) and conducting kaderization activities.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, the operational function refers to administrative functions, such as publishing and introducing the party's political stances in public policies to the local population.¹⁰⁵

The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership system consisting of the executive council (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah* or DPD), advisory board and *sharia* board. Structurally, the position of the advisory and *sharia* boards is higher than the position of the executive council. The advisory board deals with many functions, such as implementing policies made by the party at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Wilayah* or DPTW), providing advice, recommendations, consultation and supervision to the executive council in order to manage the party at the district level, formulating annual programs and budgets of the party and providing improvements for the policies made by the party.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, the *sharia* board has other functions, i.e., to implement elements of *sharia* inside the party, to provide Islamic foundations for the party's decisions and to supervise Islamic attitudes among the party leaders and officials of the party at all levels.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² Article 44 of the party's statute (2006).

¹⁰³ Article 45 of the party's statute (2006).

¹⁰⁴ Article 46 of the party's statute (2006).

¹⁰⁵ Article 47 of the party's statute (2006).

¹⁰⁶ Article 41 of the party's statute (2006).

¹⁰⁷ Article 50-51 of the party's statute (2006).

According to the party's constitution, the party leaders are elected at the party convention at the district level (*Musyawarah Daerah* or Musda) for a three-year period.¹⁰⁸ However, the party's constitution does not mention anything about the participants of the party convention. The head of the executive council in the district, Yuda Cahyadi, explains that the participants of the party convention at the district level are the core members and party leaders as well as officials of the central office from the previous period.

Moreover, Yuda Cahyadi explains that the recruitment process of the head of DPTD takes several procedures. Firstly, there is a preliminary forum called the internal selection (*Pemilihan Raya* or Pemira) in which every group of the core members (*halaqah*) proposes its candidates. It is important to note that the candidates of the head of DPTD must be proposed by the core members. They are not allowed to propose their own candidacies. Secondly, the proposals in turn are examined by a selection committee. Included in the examination process are the level of membership, backgrounds and attitudes of the candidates. Thirdly, after providing approval for the candidates, the selection committee then returns the proposals to the groups. Fifthly, all groups then propose two or three definite candidates to compete in the party convention. Yuda Cahyadi also underlines that the candidates are prohibited to conduct campaigns during the recruitment process.¹⁰⁹ In addition, an official of the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat* or DPTP), Ade Suherman, explains that, formally, the party leadership at the national level has authorities to supervise the recruitment process. In practice, however, it provides a political discretion for members of the party at the district level to recruit their own leaders.¹¹⁰

The party's constitution also explicitly states that the head of the central office at the district level must meet six requirements. Firstly, he must have reached the senior level of membership for at least two years. Secondly, he must have served as an official of the central office from previous years. Thirdly, he must have strong Islamic characteristics. Fourthly, he has an understanding of proselytizing activities, of the implementation of *sharia* as well as of the socio-political conditions of the district. Fifthly, he is concerned

¹⁰⁸ Article 18 Paragraph 5-6 of the party's rule (2006).

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁰ Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta).

with the party management. Sixthly, he also has organizational skills.¹¹¹ Yuda Cahyadi explains that since its establishment in 2003, the heads of the central office in the district have fulfilled these requirements.¹¹² It is also important to mention that the requirements to serve as the head of the advisory and the head of *sharia* board are higher than the requirements to serve as the head of the central office.¹¹³

Yuda Cahyadi asserts that in managing the party in the district, the party leaders rely heavily on Islamic tenets so that “they do not manage the party with pragmatic principles”. He adds that all officials of the party share a similar understanding in managing the party, i.e., “the party is not only a pure political party, but it is also a proselytizing party”.¹¹⁴ Information from direct observation also shows that the role of the *sharia* board is very important in maintaining the implementation of Islamic tenets inside the party. Meanwhile, the role of the advisory board is vital in providing input and feedback to the party so the decisions and policies of the party are always in line with Islamic tenets.

In managing the party in the district, the party leaders also employ modern management principles. Yuda Cahyadi asserts that in doing their functions, all officials of the party attempt to act in line with the party’s constitution.¹¹⁵ Moreover, Ade Suherman explains that the party leadership at the national level has provided administrative guidelines for party organizations at the regional level so that party leaders at the regional level will be able to manage the party in accordance with the ideology and goals of the party.¹¹⁶ Information from direct observation shows that the party in the district develops an administration system not only for the central office, but also for the party organizations on the ground, including the organizational relationship among these two organizational structures.

Regarding the party finances, the party’s constitution states that the financial sources of the party organization at the district level come from three sources. Firstly, the party at the district level collects membership fees. Secondly, it receives tithes (*zakat*) & charities (*sadaqah*), grants (*hibah*), donations (*waqaf*), testaments and other financial

¹¹¹ Article 43 Paragraph 1 of the party’s rule (2006).

¹¹² Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, 17 November 2008.

¹¹³ Article 40 Paragraph 2-3 and Article 48 Paragraph 2 of the party’s rule (2006).

¹¹⁴ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁵ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁶ Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta).

contributions from members and supporters of the party. Thirdly, it receives the state subvention.¹¹⁷

Yuda Cahyadi explains that the financial sources of the party in the district come from membership fees which can be divided further into three types, namely obligatory monthly fee, *halaqah* fee and general fee for Islam. The party also receives the financial contributions from the party's legislators in which they must provide 30 percent of their take-home salary to the party, donations from sympathizers of the party from Indonesian as well as from foreign countries and institutions, and the state subvention. Yuda Cahyadi also asserts that as they have a common understanding in managing the party, the party leaders as well as officials of the party organizations at every level are very enthusiastic to finance activities of the party at their own expense.¹¹⁸ In addition, Ade Suherman explains that the party leadership at the national level and the party organization at the provincial level also provide regular financial assistance to the party organization at the regional level.¹¹⁹ The document of the party's report shows that the party in the district relied strongly on the financial assistances provided by the party leadership at the national level and the party organization at the provincial level as well as the state subvention.

Table 6.3
Budget of the PKS in 2003-2006

| Item | Income | Item | Expenditure |
|--|------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Surplus from the previous year | Rp. 29280070 (€ 1952) | Overhead | Rp. 39488200 (€ 2632.55) |
| Contributions from the party's legislators | Rp. 91627800 (€ 6108.52) | Publication and Public Relation | Rp. 1279000 (€ 85.27) |
| Membership fees | Rp. 20806900 (€ 1387.13) | Transportation | Rp. 30228400 (€ 2015.23) |
| Donations | Rp. 70569600 (€ 4704.64) | Social activities | Rp. 410189000 (€ 27345.94) |
| Financial assistances of DPTP and DPTW | Rp. 193551050 (€ 12903.4) | | |
| The state subvention | Rp. 88330000 (€ 5888.66) | | |
| Total | Rp. 5192495885 (€ 346166.39) | Total | Rp. 491184600 (€ 32745.64) |

Source: The PKS's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006.

Moreover, there are four major items of expenditure, namely the overheads, including renting the workplace of the central office, publications and public relations, transportation and social activities, such as the *tarbiyah* and proselytizing activities. Yuda

¹¹⁷ Article 26 Paragraph 1 of the party's rule and (2006) and Article 89 of the party's statute (2006).

¹¹⁸ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁹ Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta).

Cahyadi also concedes that the party in the district still has financial obligations to some members and supporters of the party although he does not mention the exact amount of these financial obligations.¹²⁰ In addition, information from direct observation shows that the party leaders manage the party finances by promoting transparency and accountability.

Since its establishment, the party in the district has conducted various activities in and beyond election periods. For instance, the party leadership in the period of 2003-2006 prioritized nine activities, i.e., to build the party organizations, to establish a kaderization system, to do proselytizing as well as to urge people to do good things and to leave bad things (*amar maaruf nahi munkar*) among the local population, to improve Islamic awareness among the local population, to build Islamic public opinions, to develop political and legal awareness, to implement communication, social relations, collaboration, reconciliation and to provide a significant contribution to the development process among the local population.¹²¹

The party leadership in the period of 2006-2009 had similar agendas. Yuda Cahyadi explains that the most important activity of the party in this period was the *tarbiyah* activities, such as providing free medical treatment, conducting economical empowerment for the women, providing agriculture and animal husbandry counseling, carrying out religious activities, celebrating Islamic festivals, conducting sport competitions and providing assistance for victims of natural disasters.¹²² In addition, Ade Suherman explains that the party leadership at the national level has encourages the party organizations at the regional level to conduct social activities in and beyond election periods based on the consideration that the party is a proselytizing party. In this sense, the party leaders, officials of the party organizations at all levels and members of the party have a common consciousness that being involved in activities of the party is part of Islamic worship.¹²³

Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party's constitution clearly mentions that the party's legislators are the executors of the ideology

¹²⁰ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²¹ DPD PKS Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, "Nota Laporan Keterangan Pertanggungjawaban DPD PKS Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2003-2006," 13-14 Mei 2006.

¹²² Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, 17, November 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²³ Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta).

and platforms of the party in making public policies.¹²⁴ Moreover, it also states that the party organization at the district level has authorities to manage the organizational structure of the party in the regional legislature (fraction), including replacing the party's legislators after receiving approval from the party leadership at national level and party leaders at the provincial level.¹²⁵ It is also important to note that the party's constitution disallows the party leaders and officials of the central office to serve as a party's legislator at the same time.¹²⁶ Ade Suherman argues that such provision is very important in preventing conflict of interests within the party.¹²⁷

Yuda Cahyadi explains that although the party's legislators serve as the instruments of the party leaders, it does not simply mean that the party leaders make a strong intervention to the organizational structure of the party in the regional legislature. Instead, "there is a synergy between the party's legislators and party leaders as well as officials of the central office". Moreover, he states that there are regular forums through which the party's legislators establish communication and coordination with the party leaders and officials of the central office. In these forums, the party's legislators provide regular reports on their performance in the legislature, while the party leaders provide input and feedback for these legislators.¹²⁸ It is also important to mention that the party's legislators are supervised by the advisory board and the *sharia* board of the central office. In this context, these boards have an important role in making sure that the performance of the party's legislators is in accordance with the ideology of the party.

To summarize, the PKS in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party organization is managed by a combination of Islamic tenets and modern management principles. Thirdly, the party depends on the financial contribution from the party elites and a state subvention. Fourthly, the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts various social activities in election period and beyond in order to create and maintain the political linkage with members or supporters. Fifthly, the organizational

¹²⁴ Article 22 Paragraph 3 of the party's rule (2006).

¹²⁵ Article 22 Paragraph 4c of the party's rule (2006).

¹²⁶ Article 21 of the party's rule (2006).

¹²⁷ Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta).

¹²⁸ Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

structure of the party in central office is the agent by which the party in public office could be held accountable by members of the party.

6. The PBB: Domination of the Party Elites

The organizational structure of the Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB) in the central office at the district level is realized by the DPC (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang*). According to the party's constitution, the party organization at the district level has two major responsibilities. Firstly, it implements the policies and decision made by members of the party in the party convention at the district level (*Musyawarah Cabang* or Muscab). Secondly, it provides organizational reports on the development of the party organization at the district level to the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW) at least once every six months.¹²⁹

The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership system consisting of the executive council, advisory board and conduct board. According to the party's constitution, these party leaders are elected by members of the party at the party convention at the district level for a five-year period.¹³⁰ The party's constitution also states that the recruitment process is followed by the party leaders from the previous period, representatives of the party organization at the sub-district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang* or DPAC), party's legislators at the district level, leaders of autonomous bodies of the party and outside observers coming from sympathizers of the party.¹³¹ It is also important to mention that the head of the executive council must meet eight requirements, i.e., he is Muslim, he practices Islam, he is able to be a role model for people, he is able to be a leader (*Imam*) in the five daily prayers, he is able to read the Quran and he has Islamic characteristics, such as being truthful (*siddiq*), trusted (*amanah*) and smart (*fathonah*). He also must pledge loyalty to the Quran as well as to the party's constitution.¹³²

The former head of the executive council in the district, Dadang Sholihat, explains that the party leadership in the period of 1998-2000 in the district was appointed by the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP). It was not until

¹²⁹ Article 16 Paragraph 3 of the party's statute (2005).

¹³⁰ Article 11 Paragraph 3 of the party's statute (2005).

¹³¹ Article 27 Paragraph 1 of the party's statute (2005).

¹³² Article 12-13 of the party's rule (2005).

2001 that the party leadership in the district was elected by members at the party convention. Moreover, Dadang Sholihat who also serves as the head of the PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam* or PERSIS) in the district adds that some prominent leaders of the PERSIS had been actively involved in the recruitment process. As a result, the head of the executive council in this period came from the PERSIS.¹³³ Moreover, the head of the executive council in the district, Momon Abdurahman, explains that he was elected at the 2005 party convention which was conducted by democratic principles. At that time, the party leadership at the national level as well as the party organization at the provincial level did not intervene in the recruitment process.¹³⁴

The general secretary of the party leadership at the national level, Sahar L. Hasan, explains that despite the fact that the role of the party leadership at the national level was very dominant in recruiting party leaders at the regional level in the initial period of the party establishment, party leaders at the national level have provided autonomy for members of the party at the regional level to select their own leaders since 2000.¹³⁵ The party's document also mentions party leaders at the regional level should have participated in the first stage of kaderization.¹³⁶ However, Sahar L. concedes that as the party lacks effort to carry out kaderization program, most of party leaders at the regional level have not followed the first stage of kaderization.¹³⁷

In managing the party in the district, the party leaders rely on two principles. Dadang Sholihat concedes that the party leadership in the district in the period of 1998-2000 relied on Islamic tenets. As the party leaders came from members of the PERSIS, the party leadership in this period applied Islamic modernism and Puritanistic when they manage the party organizations at all levels.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, Momon Abdurahman explains that as the party stands up for the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia*, the party leadership in the district in the period of 2005-2010 also emphasized

¹³³ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³⁴ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹³⁵ DPP PBB, *Pedoman Pengaderan dan Pedoman Dasar Badan Pengelolaan Pengaderan* (Jakarta: DPP PBB, 2006).

¹³⁶ DPP PBB, *Pedoman Pengaderan dan Pedoman Dasar Badan Pengelolaan Pengaderan* (Jakarta: DPP PBB, 2006).

¹³⁷ Interview with Sahar L. Hasan, February 5, 2009 (Jakarta).

¹³⁸ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

the implementation of *sharia*.¹³⁹ In addition, the deputy of the executive council in the district, Sidiq Anggaperbata, asserts that the implementation of *sharia* inside the party became the first agendas for the party before it conducts other agendas.¹⁴⁰

The party leaders also employ elitism. Dadang Sholihat argues that similar to the relationship between *Imam* and his followers in Islam, members of the party must follow party leaders.¹⁴¹ Momon Abdurahman also explains that during his leadership, all decisions of the party in the district were mostly made by senior officials who were mostly Islamic teachers in the district.¹⁴² In addition, Sahar L. Hasan argues that party leaders at the regional level experience a dilemma when they manage their organizational structures. On one hand, they attempt to organize the party organization by applying modern management principles. On the others hand, they realize that the implementation of modern management principles does not guarantee the party to gain a significant support in elections. As winning elections becomes the main goal of the party, party leaders at the regional level tend to rely heavily on traditional principles in managing their organizational structures.¹⁴³

Regarding the party finances, the party's constitution states that the party at the district level can generate its financial income from the entrance fees, monthly fees and charities (*infaq*), tithes (*zakat*), grants (*hibah*), donations (*waqaf*) and other financial sources allowed by Islam (*halal*), including a state subvention.¹⁴⁴ It also mentions that a state subvention from the government must be distributed proportionally to the party organizations at every level.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, in order to create integrity, transparency and professionalism, the party finance must be audited by an independent auditor.¹⁴⁶

Table 6.4
Budget of the PBB in 2002-2004

| Year | Income | Expenditure |
|-------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 2002 | Rp. 22360000 (€ 1490.67) | Rp. 20360000 (€ 1357.33) |
| 2003 | Rp. 33615000 (€ 2241) | Rp. 33615000 (€ 2241) |
| 2004 | Rp. 102167500 (€ 6811.17) | Rp. 102167500 (€ 6811.17) |

Source: The PBB's Report in 2005.

¹³⁹ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Sidiq Anggaperbata, December 5, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴¹ Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴² Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴³ Interview with Sahar L. Hasan, February 5, 2009 (Jakarta).

¹⁴⁴ Article 18 of the party's rule (2005).

¹⁴⁵ Article 41 Paragraph 2 of the party's statue (2005).

¹⁴⁶ Article 41 Paragraph 3 of the party's statue (2005).

In practice, Momon Abdurahman explains that the party in the district receives financial income from five primary sources, i.e., donations from supporters of the party, financial contributions from the party's legislators in the regional legislature through which they must provide 50 percent of their main salary to the party, the state subvention, financial contributions from the party leaders as well as official of the central office, and financial contributions from the legislative candidates. Momon Abdurahman adds that the party organizations at the national and provincial levels do not provide a regular financial assistance to the party organization at the district level.¹⁴⁷ In addition, Sidiq Anggaperbata explains that since the 2004 election, the party in the district has not been able to collect membership fees.¹⁴⁸ As a result, the party in the district has depended on the financial contribution of the party leaders, more specifically Momon Abdurahman.

Meanwhile, there are three major items of expenditure, namely the overhead costs, including renting the workplace of the central office, administration affairs and the implementation of the party convention.¹⁴⁹ The secretary of the executive council in the district, Saeful Azis, explains that the party lacks financial capability to conduct many social programs as "the financial income of the party is enough just to cover the administrative affairs".¹⁵⁰

As a result, the party leadership in the district in the period of 2001-2004 focused its activities on two agendas, namely core and supporting agendas. The former refers to internal agendas, such as establishing the party organizations on the ground. Meanwhile, the latter denotes external agendas, such as developing a mass and intellectual basis, implementing economic empowerment among the local population and developing party networks.¹⁵¹ Dadang Sholihat also concedes that in this period, the party utilized activities of the PERSIS.¹⁵² Meanwhile, Momon Abdurahman explains that as the party experienced budget constraints, the party leadership in the district in the period of 2005-2010 lacked ability to conduct social activities so the party focused on its internal agendas, such as

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Sidiq Anggaperbata, December 5, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Saeful Azis, December 5, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵¹ The PBB's Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005.

¹⁵² Interview with Dadang Sholihat, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

establishing party organizations on the ground prior to the implementation of the 2009 election.¹⁵³

The party's constitution explicitly states that the party's legislators serve as the important instrument of the party in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, in actual fact, as explained by Momon Abdurahman, the party leaders lack communication and coordination with the party's legislator. Consequently, they are not able to make sure that the party's legislator proposed the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making public policies.¹⁵⁵ Sidiq Anggaperbata provides similar information. He explains that the party leaders are not able to conduct supervision functions of the party's legislator due to the fact that the party's legislator of the party is more senior than the party leaders.¹⁵⁶ In addition, Sahar L. Hasan also concedes that many party's legislators at the regional level disregard the role of party leaders. In this sense, it is not easy for party leaders at the regional level to supervise the performance of party's legislators in making public policies.¹⁵⁷

Overall, the PBB in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is managed by elitism and, to a lesser extent, by ideological considerations. Thirdly, the party depends on the financial contributions of the party elites. Fourthly, the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities just in election period. Fifthly, the party organization in central office is subordinate to the party organization in public office.

7. Conclusion

This chapter intends to reveal the organizational features of the Islamic parties in central office in the Tasikmalaya district. From the elaboration above, we can see that each of these parties has its own prominent features in terms of party leadership. More specifically, the most salient feature of the PAN is the fact that the party leaders attempt to develop a modern political party in the district. Meanwhile, the most prominent feature of the PKB is the dominant role of the party leadership at the national level as well as the NU's leaders in

¹⁵³ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁴ Article 40 Paragraph 1-2 of the party's statute (2005).

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Sidiq Anggaperbata, December 5, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Sahar L. Hasan, February 5, 2009 (Jakarta).

managing the party organization in the district. Similarly, the most interesting feature of the PBR is the dominant role of the party leader in managing the party. In the PPP, there has been a transformation process from the dominant role of members of the party to the dominant role of the party elites in managing the party organization in the district. On the other hand, the most prominent dimension of the PKS is the combination of Islamic tenets and technocratic principles in the party organization. In contrast, the most salient characteristic of PBR is the combination of elitism and ideological considerations. A summary of the central office's features of these parties in the district is presented in the following table.

Table 6.5
Organizational Features of the Islamic Parties in Central Office

| Party/ Indicators | Recruitment process of the party leader | Management principle | Financial Resource | Activity | Relationship with the party in public office |
|----------------------|--|---|---|----------------------------------|---|
| PAN | Members of the party | Technocratic principles | Depending on the state subvention and the party elites | In election period and beyond | Mutual |
| PKB | The party elites and the NU leaders | Patronage, clientelism and interpersonal networks | Depending on the state subvention and the party elites | Only in election period | Subordinate |
| PBR | Members of the party | Combination of elitism and, to a lesser extent, ideological consideration | Depending on the party elites | Only in election period | Subordinate |
| PPP | Members of the party | Combination of elitism and ideological considerations | Depending on the state subvention and the party elites | In election period and beyond | Subordinate |
| PKS | Members of the party | Combination of ideological consideration and technocratic principles | Depending on the party elites and the state subvention | In election period and beyond | Mutual |
| PBB | Members of the party | Combination of elitism and ideological consideration | Depending on the party elites | Only in election period | Subordinate |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

In the initial period of their establishment in the district, the national leadership of the Islamic parties played a dominant role in the recruitment process of the party leaders. The condition shifted after the implementation of the 1999 election, when members of these parties play a more significant role in the recruitment process of the party leaders. More specifically, as shown in Table 6.5, the role of members of the party in recruiting the party leaders is very essential in the case of the PAN, PPP and PKS. To a lesser degree, a similar condition also takes place in the case of the PBR and PBB. Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the role of members of the party in the recruitment process of the party leaders is insignificant in the case of the PKB. In this party, the role of members of the party is replaced by the dominant role of the party leaders at the national level as well as the NU's leaders in the district.

In managing their organizations, some Islamic parties try to employ technocratic principles. Led by the most prominent academic in the district, the leaders of PAN tend to manage the party organization by employing technocratic principles. Similarly, the leaders of the PKS also apply such principles. By and large, however, the leaders of the PKS employ its ideological foundation in developing their party organization. Meanwhile, the leaders of the PKS employ patronage mechanisms and clientelism and they utilize their interpersonal networks when they manage their party organization. The other leaders of the Islamic parties combine elitism and Islamic tenets when they manage their party organizations. In this context, some Islamic parties experience the personalization of political power in their organizational structures. More specifically, the PBR depends on the role of Dede Saiful Anwar as the party leader. To a lesser degree, the PBB also depends on the role of its leaders. Meanwhile, the PPP experiences a transformation process from the dominant role of members of the party to the dominant role of the party leaders in its organizational structures.

Regarding the party finance, in the implementation of the 1999 election, all of the Islamic parties were able to collect membership fees. Along with a growing political pragmatism in the local population and a decline in political trust in political party, just before the implementation of the 2004 election, most of them have not been able to generate membership fees anymore. Interestingly, to a limited extent, the PKS is the only Islamic party which is still able to generate membership fees. As these parties lack membership fees, most of them rely on the financial contribution from the party elites as the primary financial

resource. In addition, the financial contribution from the party elites takes various forms, such as the financial contribution from the party leaders at the national level, the financial contribution of members of the party with a position in the regional government (the district head and vice head), the financial contribution from the legislators, as well as the financial contribution from the legislative candidates. It is also important to note that these parties have also tended to depend on the state subvention as the government in the district provides the subvention for all parties with seat(s) in the legislature in 2006.

Having experienced budget constraints, these Islamic parties experience many difficulties in conducting their regular activities in order to create and maintain the political linkage with their members and supporters. Overall, the PPP, the PKS and, to a lesser degree, the PAN, are still able to conduct activities in election period and beyond. As a consequence, the central office of these parties in the district serves as a centre in which coordination and communication among the party leaders, officials of the central office, members and supporters of these parties are established. On the other hand, the PKB, PBR and PBB lack effort to conduct social activities beyond election period. In creating and maintaining the political linkage with their members or supporters, these parties focus on activities in election period.

Further, some of the Islamic parties have also succeeded in developing their organizational relationship between their leaders in the central office and their legislators. More specifically, the PAN and PKS develop a mutual relationship between the party leaders and their legislators. In this context, on one hand, the organizational structure of these parties in the central office serves as the agent in connecting members and their legislators. On the other hand, the legislators from these parties serve as the agent in defending the ideology and platforms of these parties in making public policies in the regional legislature. On the contrary, the PKB, PBR, PPP and PBB develop an internal organizational relationship in which their leaders and officials of their central office are as subordinate to their legislators.

Table 6.6
Hybrid Features of the Islamic Parties in Central Office

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|------------------------|--|--|--|-------------------------|
| PAN | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Members of the party recruit the party leader - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities in election period and beyond - The organizational structure of the party in central office is the agent by which the organizational structure of the party in public office could be held accountable by members of the party | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party organization is managed by technocratic principles | |
| PKB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party elites serve as or recruit party leader - The party organization is managed by clientelism or interpersonal network mechanism - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities only in election period - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party depends on a state subvention | |
| PBR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party organization is managed by elitism - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities only in election period - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Members of the party recruit the party leader - The party organization is managed by ideological considerations | | |

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|------------------------|--|---|---|-------------------------|
| PPP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party organization is managed by clientelism or interpersonal network mechanism - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Members of the party recruit the party leader - The party organization is managed by ideological considerations - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities in election period and beyond | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party depends on a state subvention | |
| PKS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Members of the party recruit the party leader - The party organization is managed by ideological considerations - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities in election period and beyond - The organizational structure of the party in central office is the agent by which the organizational structure of the party in public office could be held accountable by members of the party | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party organization is managed by technocratic principles - The party depends on a state subvention | |
| PBB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The party organization is managed by elitism - The party depends on the financial contribution of the party elites - The organizational structure of the party in central office conducts activities only in election period - The organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Members of the party recruit the party leader - The party organization is managed by ideological considerations | | |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

From the discussion in above, as shown in Table 6.6, we can see that the general features of these Islamic parties in central office are complex. If we compare these findings to the theoretical framework as elaborated in Chapter 2, we can see that each of these parties contains some elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party and the electoralist party models. In this sense, all of these Islamic parties contain hybrid features of these party models. In this sense, it is not easy to categorize these parties into a single party model. As some elements are more prominent than the others, however, some of them can be categorized into a certain party model.

The PAN in the central office contains hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of the mass-based model are very dominant in this party. More specifically, members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Despite the fact that party experiences budget constraints, the party in the district is still able to conduct social activities in and beyond election period in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters. In this party, the organizational structure of the central office serves as an agent through which the party's legislators could be held accountable by members of the party.

Meanwhile, the PKB in the central office resembles the elite-based party models, although it depends on a state subvention as one of its primary sources. In the party, the role of the party elites is very dominant in the recruitment process of the party leaders. The party organization is also managed by elitism, clientelism and the interpersonal networks of the party leaders. Moreover, the party also depends on the financial contribution of their elites. Meanwhile, by utilizing daily activities of the NU, the party conducts social activities only in election periods. In this party, the party leaders in the central office are subordinate to the party's legislators.

Similarly, the PBR in the central office also contains some elements of the elite-based party and mass-based party models. Taken as a whole, however, the elements of the elite-based party model are very strong in this party. In this party, the role of Dede Saiful Anwar is very dominant not only in managing the party organization, but also in providing the party finance. As a result, the party in the district is identical to this figure. Apart from his position as the party leader, Dede Saiful Anwar also serves as the only

party's legislator. However, he prioritizes his status as the party's legislator rather than as the party leader. In this party, therefore, the party organization in central office is subordinate to the party in public office.

The PPP in the central office also contains hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of the elite-based party model are as strong as the elements of the mass-based party model. Taken as a whole, however, it seems that the party tends to adopt the elite-based party model as the party leaders have a more dominant role in managing the party organization. The way this party organizes in the district indicates that it has experienced a transformation from the mass-based party model to the elite-based party model.

On the other hand, the PKS in the central office contains hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of the mass-based party models are very dominant in this party. More specifically, members of the party play a pivotal role in recruiting the party leaders. In this party, the party organization is managed by ideological considerations. Moreover, to create and maintain the political linkage with members and supporters, the party conducts activities in election period and beyond. There is also a mutual relationship between the party leaders and the party's legislator.

Lastly, the PBB in the central office contains some elements of the elite-based party and mass-based party models. However, the elements of the elite-based party model are more dominant. In this party, the party organization is managed by elitism principle. To finance its activities, the party also depends on the financial contribution from the party elites. As a result, the party conducts activities just in election period in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members or supporters. In this party, the organizational structure of the party on the ground is also subordinate to the party in public office.

CHAPTER 7

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF THE ISLAMIC PARTIES IN PUBLIC OFFICE

This chapter explores the organizational features of the Islamic parties in public office, more specifically in the Tasikmalaya District Legislatures (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* or *DPRD*). In doing so, we apply the five criteria as introduced in Chapter 2, namely the models of representation, the efforts of legislators of the Islamic parties to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, the supporting infrastructures employed by legislators of these parties in making public policies, the ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government as well as the relationships among legislators of these parties as well as between the legislators of these parties and legislators of the secular-nationalist parties in making public policies.

In addition, the analysis in this chapter focuses on two important policies in the district, i.e., *sharia*-based policies and regional budget policy (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* or *APBD*). As discussed in Chapter 4, the *sharia*-based policies in the district are realized by the Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the Tasikmalaya district in 2001-2005 which was later on continued by the Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 17/2006 on the Tasikmalaya Medium-Term Development Plan in 2006-2010 and the Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 3/2001 on Security and Order Based on Morality, Religion, Local Ethics and Values. Meanwhile, in the implementation of the decentralized system and local autonomy, similar to other regional governments, the government in the district has the political authority to manage its domestic affairs, including in the budgeting process.

1. The PAN: When the Ideology Is Irrelevant

As explained in Chapter 4, the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN) was able to gain three seats in the district in the 1999 election. The party however failed to maintain this achievement in the following election when it gained only two seats. In the 2009 election the party was able to increase the number of its votes significantly and obtaining three seats. Overall, the party in the district was relatively able to maintain its level of political support in these three elections.

A party's legislator in the district, Demi Hamzah Rahadian, explains that following the modification of the electoral system from the closed-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections by which the voters relied more on personal candidates rather than on political parties, the political attitude of party's legislators in implementing their functions has also changed. If the closed-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election produced the party's legislators who acted as "the party servants", the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections created the party's legislators who tended to act as "the public servants" for their electorates. In other words, the new electoral system led to a transformation of the party representation from the party's legislators as "the agent of the party" to the party's legislators as "the agent of the electorates".¹

Such an argument is denied by the deputy general secretary of the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP), Viva Yoga Mauladi. Based on his understanding of the national provision on political parties and elections as well as the party's constitution, Viva Yoga Mauladi argues that all of party's legislators at the national and regional levels must serve as the agent of the party.² This information suggests that there is a different interpretation between the party's legislators at the regional level and the party leadership at the national level regarding the model of representation.

Moreover, Demi Hamzah Rahadian concedes that in implementing his responsibilities as the party's legislator, he relies on the interests of his electorates in his own electoral area (*daerah pemilihan* or *dapil*) rather than on the interests of the local population at large. He argues that such a practice is in accordance with Law No. 22/2003 on Structure and Position of National, Provincial and District/Municipal Legislators and Regional Representative Council.³ Similarly, another party's legislator in the district, Iip Syamsul Arif, argues that the party's legislators must prioritize the interests of their electorates in their own electoral area. However, it does not necessarily mean that they disregard the interests of the local population at large.⁴

¹ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

² Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

³ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Information from direct observation shows that in their daily activities, the party's legislators prioritize the interests of their electorates rather than the interests of the local population in general. In addition, the interests of their electorates are typically manifested with proposal letters demanding various infrastructure projects of the government, such as projects to build mosques, roads, or put up street lights. Demi Hamzah Rahadian explains that the electorates attempt to make direct contact with the party's legislators when they propose these projects as they experience what he calls "bureaucratic obstacles". In this sense, the party's legislators provide political solutions for their electorates in dealing with the complexity of bureaucratic procedures.⁵

Iip Syamsul Arif contends that such this mechanism does not impair the budgeting process as the regional budget has provided the financial allocations for these sectors. Further, he argues that by facilitating their electorates to access the regional budget, the party's legislators have implemented their main function, i.e., to articulate the interests of their electorates.⁶ A cultural observer in the district, Acep Zamzam Noer, provides a different point of view. He argues that such a practice in fact reflects the patron-client relationship between the party's legislators and their electorates. On one hand, these legislators act as the patron through which they must propose policies which provide benefits to their electorates. On the other hand, the electorates act as the clients through which they must vote for these legislators in elections.⁷ These illustrations, therefore, indicate that the party's legislators tend to adopt the trustee model of representation.

Further, although the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological foundation, the party's legislators support the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies in the district. According to the journalist of Radar Priangan, Duddy, the party's legislators in the period of 2005-2009 played a significant role in imposing the Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the Tasikmalaya District in 2001-2005. He also explains that this policy was also supported by several Islamic boarding schools in the district with a political affiliation with the party, such as the Cintawana Islamic boarding school in which its leaders are the loyal supporters of the party.⁸

⁵ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶ Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸ Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

The party's legislators in the period of 2005-2009 did not reject the implementation of the Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 17/2006 on the Tasikmalaya Medium-Term Development Plan in 2006-2010. Demi Hamzah Rahadian argues that the party's legislators decided to support this policy due to calculative considerations. Firstly, the implementation of these policies is a very sensitive issue in the district. As the majority of the local population is Muslim, therefore, "it did not make sense for the party's legislators to reject these policies". Secondly, the implementation of this policy has nothing to do with the implementation of an Islamic state in the district as it serves just as "the political commodity" for all of political actors in the district so that the implementation of *sharia* in the district is merely a slogan.⁹ In addition, Viva Yoga Mauladi explains that the implementation of various *sharia*-based policies at the regional level has been utilized by all of local political actors for the purpose of political marketing and an image building of their own parties.¹⁰

Information from direct observation confirms such statements. Although the party's legislators support these policies, they lack significant effort to transform the elements of *sharia* into public policies in the district, especially in the regional budget policy. For instance, as conceded by Demi Hamzah Rahadian, the regional budget policy in the district provides a limited financial allocation for Islamic education sector. "Not surprisingly, although the development plan policy in the district contains the elements of *sharia*, in reality, the condition of Islamic schools in the district is still very poor".¹¹ Similarly, a staff of Tasikmalaya Corruption Watch (TCW), Dadi Abdul Hadi, argues that the party's legislators do not make any significant effort to propose the pro-poor budget in the district. Consequently, the regional budget is not able to increase the social welfare of the local population.¹²

Further, to support their role in making public policies, these legislators rely heavily on the role of the party organizations, more specifically the party organization in central office at the district level (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah* or DPD) and the party organizations on the ground (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC at the sub-district level and *Dewan*

⁹ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰ Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

¹¹ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹² Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Pengurus Ranting or DPRt at the village level). Demi Hamzah Rahadian asserts that the role of the party organizations is very important, especially in the budgeting process as they serve as “the eyes and ears of the party’s legislators”. Meanwhile, the central office serves as “the selector” of various demands from the local population.¹³ In other words, the role of the party organizations on the ground is very significant as an instrument of the interest articulation, while the role of the central office is very important as an instrument of the interest aggregation.

To a limited extent, the party’s legislators also receive organizational support from the party leadership at the national level. Viva Yoga Mauladi explains that the party leadership at the national level provides organizational guidelines for all of the party’s legislators at the regional level so they understand what they should do in making public policies. It also conducts an annual forum in which it provides instructions and technical skills for all of the party’s legislators.¹⁴ Information from direct observation shows that the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW) also provides organizational support for the party’s legislators, such as conducting a regional forum through which these legislators in the district establish communication and coordination with their counterparts in other district and municipalities in West Java province.

It should also be acknowledged that together with the legislators of the PBR, PBB and PD, the legislators of the PAN in the period of 2004-2009 established the Amanah fraction in the district. Demi Hamzah Rahadian asserts that legislators of the PAN played a dominant role in the fraction, including in deciding the final stance of the fraction. Further, he explains that such a situation came about due to the fact that legislators of the other parties in this fraction had limited competence in the budgeting process in particular and in making public policies in general.¹⁵ Dadi Abdul Hadi confirms such a statement. He asserts that in fact “the Amanah fraction was the PAN fraction” as legislators of this party played a dominant role.¹⁶

¹³ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁴ Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta).

¹⁵ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁶ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Different to the situation in the fraction, the party's legislators lack ambition for hegemony in making public policies in the legislature. Demi Hamzah Rahadian explains that such a condition occurs due to the fact that the party has a small number of seats. However, it does not simply mean that they do not have an aspiration to propose their own policies. For instance, although there were only two legislators of the party in the period of 2004-2009, the role of these legislators was very significant in proposing public policies, such as when they urged the executive branch of government to provide identity cards for the local population for free in 2007 and when they put an emphasis on the financial allocation for the elderly to gain access to health facilities and for poor children to gain access to education.¹⁷

It is also important to mention that these legislators are well-known as clever and well-educated persons by other legislators. Demi Hamzah Rahadian explains that Heri Hendriana became one of the leading legislators in the district in the period of 1999-2004, especially in the budgeting process.¹⁸ Similarly, Iip Syamsul Arif played a significant role in the budgeting process in the period of 2004-2009.¹⁹ He was also known as one of the few legislators who were concerned with the social welfare of the local population so that he gained a lot of respect and appreciation from other legislators.²⁰

Further, Demi Hamzah Rahadian concedes that all of legislators in the district lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. He also adds that the legislature has not been able to implement the overseeing function optimally for two reasons. Firstly, most legislators have limited technical skill so that they are far behind the bureaucrats in making policies. Secondly, since 2004 the national provisions have not optimally supported the implementation of controlling function. As a consequence, similar to the status of the regional legislature during the New Order period, the Tasikmalaya District Legislature recently serves just as a rubber stamp for public policies made by the executive branch of government.²¹

Demi Hamzah Rahadian also asserts that although each of the parties adopts different ideological foundations, all of the legislators have a similar political stance when

¹⁷ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁸ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁹ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁰ Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²¹ Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

they are involved in making public policies. In this sense, the ideology and platforms of parties are not in line with the political stance of their legislators in making public policies. In this sense, it is very difficult to distinguish the political stance of legislators of the Muslim-Nationalist with legislators of Islamist and secular-nationalist parties.²² Viva Yoga Mauladi also explains that similar to the condition at the national level, there is no certain pattern regarding collaboration and conflict between the party's legislators and legislators of other parties at the regional level. He also adds that collaboration and conflict in the policy-making processes are mostly based on pragmatic reasons rather than on ideological considerations. These illustrations suggest that the ideology and platforms of the party are irrelevant for the party's legislators when they are involved in making public policies.²³

In summary, the PAN in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party's legislators tend to act as trustees. Secondly, they disregard the role of the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making public policies so that they tend to defend their own personal interests. Thirdly, they employ the party organizations to support their role in policy-making. Fourthly, they have minimal to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Fifthly, although they play a dominant role in the Amanah fraction, they lack ambition to achieve hegemony in making policies. In this sense, they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the policy-making processes.

2. The PKB: When the Ideology Is Flexible

The National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB) was able to maintain their political achievement in the district by gaining five seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. It should also be acknowledged that most of the party's legislators in the period of 2009-2014 served as the party's legislators in the previous period.

The head of the PKB fraction in the district, Syamsudin, claims that since the implementation of the 1999 election all party's legislators have attempted to articulate the interests of the local population at large. For example, they allocated an "endowment fund" for poor and elderly people. They also provided sufficient financial allocation to the health

²² Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²³ Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

and education sectors. By conducting such efforts, Syamsudin argues that the party's legislators serve not only as the representative for their electorates, but also as the representative for the local population at large.²⁴ However, Dadi Abdul Hadi denies such a claim. He explains that since the implementation of the decentralized system and local autonomy in 2001, the party's legislators have made a limited effort to propose the public policies which increase the social welfare of the local population. In the education sector, for instance, they do not have empathy to improve the facilities of Islamic schools (*madrasah*) despite the fact that most of them had obtained their education in these schools. Based on their performance, Dadi Abdul Hadi argues that, "rather than serving as the representative of the local population, the party's legislators serve as the representative of their own interests".²⁵

Another party's legislator in the district, Haris Sanjaya explains that in the budgeting process, the party's legislators rely on political, sociological and historical analysis. In this sense, they have relied on national provisions when they play their role in making public policies in order to minimize an abuse of power.²⁶ However, Acep Zamzam Noer criticizes such an opinion. He argues that this explanation is made in order to hide the fact that the party's legislators stand up just for their own personal interests as all of public policies made by these legislators have failed to improve the social welfare in the district.²⁷

Information from direct observation shows that the party's legislators tend to prioritize the interests of their electorates rather than the interests of the local population at large. It is also important to mention that some of them also serve as officials of the party organization in central office in the district (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang* or DPC). In this sense, they have autonomy from the party leaders in the district as well as from their electorates when they are involved in policies-making. These illustrations indicate that the party's legislators tend to act as trustees for their electorates.

Although the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological foundation, the party's legislators do not decline the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies. Syamsudin explains the party's legislators decided to take this political stance for calculative reasons.

²⁴ Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁵ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁶ Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁷ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Firstly, these policies are in accordance with the nature of the local population, i.e., the pious Muslims. Secondly, they have nothing to do with the implementation of an Islamic state in the district. Thirdly, they are not against the national constitution and national provisions. In addition, Syamsudin asserts that in playing their role in making public policies, the party's legislators interpret the ideology of the party in "flexible ways".²⁸

Another party's legislator in the district, Haris Sanjaya, has a similar point of view. He argues that the political stance to support the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies in the district is not against the party's constitution as the implementation of these policies does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic state in the district. He also concedes that this political stance is important for the party in order to gain political support from the local population, especially from members of the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or NU) since they are the loyal supporters of the party. Moreover, he explains that it is not possible for the party's legislators to reject the implementation of these policies "as all of legislators in the district also support the implementation of these policies".²⁹

An academic of Siliwangi University, Subhan, explains that in 2001 most of the prominent leaders of the party and NU's leaders did not support the implementation of Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the Tasikmalaya District in 2001-2005. They argued that it was more important to implement *sharia* in a substantive manner rather than to formalize it in a public policy.³⁰ Similarly, Acep Zamzam Noer explains that the party's legislators do not actively propose policies with the elements of *sharia*. As *sharia* becomes an interesting political instrument to gain supporters, however, "it is too attractive" to be ignored.³¹

To support their role in making public policies, the party's legislators receive organizational supports from the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pengurus Pusat* or DPP). The party leader at the national level, Muhaimin Iskandar, explains that the national party leaders has provided organizational guidelines for party's legislators at the national and regional levels in order to support their functions in making public policies.

²⁸ Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

²⁹ Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁰ Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³¹ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

They have also established a forum called FOKSAM (*Forum Kerjasama* or the cooperation forum) through which the party leadership at the national level provides instruction and technical skills for party's legislators at all levels.³² Information from direct observation shows that although the party leadership at the national level has published several guidelines to all of the party's legislators, these guidelines have not been distributed well to the party's legislators in the district.³³

Further, the party's legislators have their personal staff. A member of this staff, Jejeng, explains that the staff mostly comes from former activists of the Indonesian Movement of Islamic Student (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* or PMII), a student organization affiliated with the NU. Jejeng also explains that they receive their financial fees from the personal contributions of the party's legislators. They do not receive their financial fees from the party leadership in the district. The role of this staff is very important for the party's legislators in providing substantive and technical supports in daily activities of these legislators, such as in preparing a political stance of the party in a public policy.³⁴

The party's legislators also receive supports from the NU. Syamsudin argues that as the NU serves as the main organizational foundation of the party, the party's legislators take into consideration advice and input of the NU's leaders in the district when they are involved in making public policies.³⁵ However, Acep Zamzam Noer explains that the party's legislators have a strong relationship just with a few leaders of the NU with a strong political ambition. In this sense, he argues that the party's legislators do not have a strong organizational relationship with the NU. As a result, they are not able to increase the social welfare of members of the NU in the district.³⁶

In policy-making, the party's legislators lack ambition for hegemony. This is partly due to the fact that they are not the majority in the legislature. Syamsudin concedes that as the party gained five seats in the legislature, the PKB fraction in the district is not able to

³² Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, January 30 2009 (Jakarta).

³³ See, for example, DPP PKB, *Menjadi Politisi Negarawan. Modul Pelatihan Orientasi Politik DPC dan DPW PKB* (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2008).

³⁴ Interview with Jejeng, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁵ Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁶ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

initiate its own policies.³⁷ Moreover, Haris Sanjaya asserts that the party's legislators cannot be "a sectarian actor" when they are involved in making public policies. In this sense, "they must consider political opinions as well as political attitudes of legislators of other parties".³⁸

Syamsudin also explains that there is no "clash of ideologies" among the legislators when they are involved in making public policies. Further, he asserts that although the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base, it does not necessarily mean that the party's legislators have a different political stance with the legislators of the Islamist parties.³⁹ Similarly, Haris Sanjaya explains that there is no ideological disparity between the party's legislators and legislators of other parties as all of them follow national provisions when they are involved in making public policies.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Acep Zamzam Noer underlines that the party's legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties as all of them have a similar goal, i.e., imposing their own personal interests.⁴¹

The party's legislators also lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. This is due to the fact that the district vice head, Endang Hidayat, serves as the head of *Majelis Syuro* (the advisory board) of the party leadership in the district despite the fact that the party did not support the Endang Hidayat's candidacy as the district vice head in 2006. It should also be acknowledged that Endang Hidayat is the father-in-law of Syamsudin as the head of the PKB fraction. These illustrations suggest that it is not an easy task for these legislators to criticize policies made by the executive branch of government.

Haris Sanjaya also explains that the national provisions on the regional government do not facilitate the regional legislature to conduct the overseeing function in ideal manners. These provisions explicitly state that the regional legislature is part of the regional government. In this sense, different to the relationship between the national legislature and the president, the relationship between the regional legislature and the executive branch of regional government does not apply the principle of separation of power. As a result, there

³⁷ Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁸ Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

³⁹ Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁰ Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴¹ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

is no single policy of the executive branch of government which has been disapproved by the legislature.⁴²

To sum up, the PKB in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party's legislators act as trustees. Secondly, they disregard the role of the ideology and platforms of the party so that they tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in policy-making. Thirdly, they employ the role of external organizations and, to a limited extent, the party organizations to support their role in making policies. Fourthly, they lack desire to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government as the district vice head come from the party and some of the legislators have a family relationship with the district vice head. Fifthly, they lack ambition to establish hegemony in the policy-making so that they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties.

3. The PBR: When Elitism Continues

In the 2004 election, as a new party, the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR) gained one seat in the district. However, the party failed to send its representative to the legislature in the 2009 election. In 2004 the party was represented by Dede Saiful Anwar who also served as the party leader in the district. In addition, Dede Saiful Anwar was one of the leading vote getters for the Functional Groups (*Golongan Karya* or Golkar) during the New Order period. After the fall of Suharto, he decided to move to the PPP by serving as the general secretary of the expert board. Since 2003 he has decided to support the PBR.

Dede Saiful Anwar explains that according to the party's constitution, in carrying out his functions as the only party's legislator, he must rely on the party's main goal, i.e., to improve the social welfare of the local population. In doing so, he claims that he has maintained the political relationships with the local population in general and with his electorates in his electoral area in particular. He also claims that he succeeded in articulating and realizing aspirations of his electorates in many policies, such as health care service for the elderly people and education service for poor children.⁴³

⁴² Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴³ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Such claims are denied by Acep Zamzam Noer. He asserts that similar to other legislators, “Dede Saiful Anwar does not understand about what he should do in making public policies to improve the social welfare of the local population”. Acep Zamzam Noer also explains that Dede Saiful Anwar does not involve the participation of his electorates in making public policies as he is so very dominant in the party organization in the central office and in the legislature.⁴⁴ Duddy provides similar information. He explains that since the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy in 2001 Dede Saiful Anwar has had a limited effort in proposing public policies which improve the social welfare of the local population.⁴⁵

Information from direct observation also shows that Dede Saiful Anwar plays a dominant role in deciding the political stance of the party in the legislature. On one hand, officials of the party organizations suppose that Dede Saiful Anwar has made significant efforts in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies. On the other hand, his electorates assume that Dede Saiful Anwar has attempted to defend the interests of his electorates in making public policies. Having had a dual status as the party leader and as the only party’s legislator at the same time, Dede Saiful Anwar has autonomy in playing his role in making public policies. In this sense, he tends to acts as a trustee with regard to the model of representation.

Dede Saiful Anwar has attempted to implement the *sharia*-based policies in the district. He argues that the implementation of these policies is very important in realizing “the Islamic structure of the government and the Islamic culture of the local population”. Moreover, he asserts that the implementation of these policies reflects the political will of the government and local population in the district to realize Islamic tenets into daily activities so that Islam is not a merely slogan. He also states that one should not have “Islamphobia” when there are various *sharia*-based regulations as Islam serves as a blessing for all mankind (*rahmatan lil alamin*), including for the minorities.⁴⁶

Further, Dede Saiful Anwar claims that he made many efforts to realize the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, such as allocating adequate financial allocation to the education sector when he was involved in the budgeting

⁴⁴ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁵ Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁶ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

process.⁴⁷ However, Dadi Abdul Hadi asserts that Dede Saiful Anwar has limited effort to make the pro-poor budget policy, especially in the education sector. Dadi Abdul Hadi also adds that Dede Saiful Anwar has limited competence in the budgeting process.⁴⁸ A student of Siliwangi University, Roni Romansya provides similar information. He explains that as a political campaigner with a long political experience, Dede Saiful Anwar often makes personal claims that are far from the truth. Still according to Roni Romansya, there are some indications that Dede Saiful Anwar has also been involved in corruption when he served as the head of the special committee on the education sector in the legislature in 2006.⁴⁹

Dede Saiful Anwar explains that the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP) and the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW) provide neither inputs nor facilities to support his role as the only party's legislator in the district. He does not receive organizational support from the party organizations on the ground (*Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang* or DPAC at the sub-district level, *Pimpinan Ranting* or PIRANTI at the village level and *Pimpinan Anak Ranting* or PINAKRANTI at the sub-village level).⁵⁰ In addition, the deputy general secretary of the party leadership at the national level, Yusuf Lakaseng, concedes that the party leadership at the national level provides organizational supports just for party's legislators in the national legislature as it experiences budget constraint.⁵¹ Information from direct observation also indicates that although Dede Saiful prefers to establish his personal own networks to support his role in making public policies rather than to rely on Islamic organizations.

As mentioned earlier, together with the legislators of the PAN, PBB and PD, Dede Saiful Anwar creates the Amanah fraction. As the fraction is dominated by the legislators of the PAN, Dede Saiful Anwar plays an insignificant role in the fraction. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that he has limited competence to implement his responsibilities as a legislator. In this context, Dede Saiful Anwar concedes that "as a single fighter of the party in the legislature", it is not easy for him to take a more significant role both in the

⁴⁷ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁸ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴⁹ Interview with Roni Romansya, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁰ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵¹ Interview with Yusuf Lakaseng, February 2, 2009 (Jakarta).

fraction and in the legislature.⁵² Consequently, although he has a dominant role in the party organizations, he lacks ambition for hegemony in the fraction in particular and in the legislature in general.

Dede Saeful Anwar explains that he has attempted to maintain his personal relationship with the other legislators in the fraction. He concedes that he has a similar understanding with the legislators of the PAN as well as with the legislator of the PBB and the PBB as these parties also adopt Islam as their ideological foundation. By contrast, he has a different point of view with the legislator of the PD. Moreover, he concedes that he shares a similar point of view with legislators of the other Islamist parties, especially with the legislators of the PPP and PKS. On the other hand, it is difficult for him to share a similar political stance with the legislators of the PKB as well as with the legislators of the secular-nationalist parties.

However, it does not simply mean that he could not establish political collaborations with legislators of other parties in making public policies. In this context, he argues that “there are no eternal friends, but there is only an eternal interest in politics”.⁵³ In addition, Yusuf Lakaseng explains that the pattern of conflict and coalition between the party’s legislator and legislators of other parties in making public policies in the district does not necessarily follow the pattern of conflict and coalition between party’s legislator and legislators of other parties in making public policies at the national level. He also asserts that the party leadership at the national level provides autonomy to party’s legislators at the regional level to conduct coalition with legislators of other parties in making public policies.⁵⁴

Dede Saiful Anwar also lacks ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government in the district. He asserts that he has tried to maintain his personal relationship with the district head. He also states that he shares similar visions with the district head despite the fact that he did not support the candidacy of Tatang Farhanul Hakim as the district head in 2006.⁵⁵ Likewise, Tatang Farhanul Hakim contends

⁵² Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵³ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁴ Interview with Yusuf Lakaseng, February 2, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁵⁵ Interview with Dede Saiful Anwar, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

that he has tried to maintain his personal relationship with all legislators in the district, including with those who did not support his candidacy as the district head in 2006.⁵⁶

In short, the PBR in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party's legislator acts as a trustee. Secondly, he disregards the role of the ideology and platforms of the party so that he defends his own personal interests when he is involved in policy-making. Thirdly, he employs his own infrastructure to support his role in making policies. Fourthly, he has minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Fifthly, he lacks ambition for hegemony in the Amanah fraction in particular and in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in general. In this sense, he is tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the policy-making processes.

4. The PPP: Playing With the Ideology

The United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP) was able to gain eleven seats in the 1999 election in the district. In the 2004 election the party gained twelve seats despite the fact that it failed to become the winning party in the district as it was replaced by the Golkar Party. However, in the 2009 election it removed the domination of the secular-nationalist parties as the winning party by gaining fourteen seats. In general, the party succeeded in increasing its electoral achievement in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 elections.

The head of the PPP fraction in district, Apip Ifan Permadi, argues that in implementing their responsibilities, the party's legislators attempt to serve as "the mouthpiece of the local population". In this sense, the interests of the party's legislators in making public policies must be in accordance with the interests of their electorates in their own electoral areas. Apip Ifan Permadi adds that in implementing their functions, the party's legislators must rely on six Islamic principles as mentioned in the party's constitution, namely worship (*ibadah*), truth, honesty, justice, equality, solidarity, unity and consistency (*istiqamah*).⁵⁷

Another party's legislator in district, Ruhimat, provides a similar explanation. According to him, the party leadership in the district (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC)

⁵⁶ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁷ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

provides greater discretion for the party's legislators to implement their functions when they are involved in policy-making. Nevertheless, it does not simply mean that they are uncontrollable as all of them must act in line with the party's constitution and platforms.⁵⁸ Information from direct observation shows that the workplace of the PPP fraction serves as a room in which the party's legislators establish coordination and communication with officials of the party organizations on the ground (branch at the village level and *Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang* or DPAC at the sub-district level) as well as with members and supporters of the party.

Apip Ifan Permadi explains that after the implementation of the 1999 election, members and supporters of the party typically articulated their interests through the party organizations on the ground which in turn delivered these aspirations to the party leadership in central office at the district level. After selecting these aspirations, the party leaders at the district level then send these aspirations to the party's legislators. However, along with the modification of the electoral system and a growing political pragmatism among the local population, members and supporters of the party prefer to articulate their interests directly to the party's legislators. Therefore, members or supporters of the party tend to disregard the role of the party organizations on the ground and the party leadership in the central office when they articulate their interests.⁵⁹ In addition, the interests of members and supporters of the party are mostly realized by proposal letters, demanding social development projects and social financial assistance.

It is also important to underline that in making public policies, the party's legislators support policies proposed by the executive branch of government due to the fact that the district head, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, comes from the party. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Tatang Farhanul Hakim served as the party leader in the district in the period of 1999-2006.⁶⁰ On the other hand, as conceded by Tatang Farhanul Hakim, the district head in particular and the bureaucracy in general provide political supports the party's legislators when they are involved in policy-making.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁵⁹ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁰ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶¹ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

Further, the party's legislators play a significant role in supporting the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies in the district. Subhan explains that although the proposal of these policies came from the executive branch of government in the district, more specifically the district head, the party's legislators were also involved in the initial process. In proposing these policies, the party's legislators were supported by autonomous agencies of the party, such as the Youth Movement of the Ka'bah (*Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah* or GPK).⁶² They were also supported by several Islamic boarding schools affiliated with the party, such as the Miftahul Huda.⁶³

Apip Ifan Permadi argues that the party's legislators support these policies as they are not against the national constitution and provisions. He also underlines that in the future, the party's legislators will continue to impose other *sharia*-based policies in the district as they believe that "the source of all provisions on earth lies on the Quran and *Sunna* of the Prophet Muhammad".⁶⁴ Similarly, another party's legislator, Neng Madinah Ruchyati, asserts that the party's legislators will keep introducing various *sharia*-based policies in the district as the majority of the local population is Muslims.⁶⁵

Apip Ifan Permadi also claims that the party's legislators have attempted to transform the elements of *sharia* into many public policies in the district. For instance, they provided input and feedback for the district head to propose *sharia*-based decrees, i.e., the District Head Decree No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 on Quran Literacy Obligation for Pupils and Bride Muslim Dress in the Tasikmalaya District, the District Head Circulation Letter No. 451/1271/Sos on Wearing of Muslim Dress for Government Apparatus in the Tasikmalaya District and the District Head Circulation Letter No. 556.3/SE/03/Sos/2001 on Management of Swimming Pools in the Tasikmalaya District. They also provided financial allocation for the celebration of Islamic events and for the improvement of physical Islamic infrastructures, such as Islamic boarding schools.⁶⁶

However, Acep Zamzam Noer denies such claims. He asserts that the idea to implement the elements of *sharia* in the district has nothing to do with the ideology of the party as well as with the interests of the local population. Instead, it serves only as "a

⁶² Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶³ Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁴ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁵ Interview with Neng Madinah Ruchyati, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁶ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

political maneuver” of these legislators to gain political support. Acep Zamzam Noer adds that the party’s legislators do not make any significant effort to transform the elements of *sharia*, especially in the campaigns against corruption.⁶⁷ Similarly, the head of the Sukahideung Islamic boarding school, Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, explains that the issue of the implementation of *sharia* serves merely as “a political commodity” for all political actors to gain political support from the fanatic and uneducated people in the district.⁶⁸

Moreover, Dadi Abdul Hadi explains that since the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies in the district in 2001, the party’s legislators do not put emphasis on providing financial allocation for the health sector. He argues that it is very ironic that the local population still experiences many difficulties in accessing health facilities so that the district has been categorized as a district with the highest maternal mortality rate in West Java Province, despite the fact that the district imposes various *sharia*-based policies. Dadi Abdul Hadi adds that the party’s legislators focus on their personal advantages in the budgeting process. For instance, they established personal collaborations with businessmen in order to take economic benefits from the development projects of government. Some of them also established their own company in order to attain the government contracts for development projects.⁶⁹

To support their role in policy-making, the party’s legislators rely on several organizations. Firstly, they obtain political support from the party organizations. Apip Ifan Permadi explains that in playing their role in making public policies, these legislators are supported by the party organizations on the ground as well as by some autonomous agencies of the party. He also asserts that officials of the party organizations on the ground serve as important agents for these legislators to collect aspirations from members and supporters of the party.⁷⁰ Moreover, the party’s legislators also receive political support from the party leadership in the district⁷¹ and the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW)⁷², such as training program of the legal drafting.

⁶⁷ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁸ Interview with Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, December 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁶⁹ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁰ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷¹ Interview with Ruhimat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷² Interview with Choizin Chumaidi, February 4, 2009 (Jakarta).

Secondly, they receive support from the executive branch of government. There is a mutual relationship between the party's legislators and district head. On one hand, as explained by Apip Ifan Permadi, the party's legislators provide political support to the district head, such as providing input and recommendation to the district head before he takes a decision on a crucial issue.⁷³ On the other hand, as explained by Tatang Farhanul Hakim, the district head provides supports for these legislators when they are involved in policy-making, such as providing preliminary information when they prepare the regional budget policy.⁷⁴

Thirdly, they also receive support from some Islamic organizations in the district, especially the NU. They also obtain support from some prominent Islamic teachers and Islamic boarding schools in the district. Neng Madinah Ruchyati, for instance, explains that in performing her role in making policies, she relies on the roles of an autonomous body of the NU, namely the Nahdlatul Ulama Woman Association (*Muslimat*).⁷⁵ Moreover, Apip Ifan Permadi states that in proposing the *sharia*-based policy in 2001, the party's legislators were supported by an Islamic organization known as the Islamic Boarding School Society Forum (*Forum Masyarakat Pesantren* or FMP).⁷⁶ At that time, they also received support from some proponents of the Islamic state movement in the district.⁷⁷ In addition, some of the party's legislators also rely on the role of thugs (*preman*) who typically serve as "a political broker" between these legislators and their electorates in the patron-client relationship.⁷⁸

As the party has a strong relationship with the district head, the party's legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Instead, they always provide their political support for the district head. However, Apip Ifan Permadi argues that the party's legislators in particular have made various efforts in order to conduct the supervision function to the bureaucracy in the district in technical

⁷³ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁴ Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁵ Interview with Neng Madinah Ruchyati, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁶ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁷ Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁷⁸ Interview with anonymous, December 23, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). Additionally, Wilson argues that instead of ideological commitment, the relationship between the Islamist parties and the *preman* is based on economic resources. Furthermore, see Ian Douglas Wilson, "As Long as It's *Halal*': Islamic *Preman* in Jakarta," in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam. Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 192-210.

matters.⁷⁹ In other words, they conduct the overseeing function just over the street level bureaucracy on one hand and they do not conduct the controlling function over the district head in the ideal manner on the other hand.

It should also be acknowledged that although the party has successfully become the winning party in the district, the party's legislators lack desire for hegemony in making public policies. Apip Ifan Permadi explains that although the party has a large number of seats, it does not simply mean that they play a dominant role in policy-making. This situation occurs partly due to the fact that just a few legislators of the party have capabilities to implement their functions, especially in the budgeting process.⁸⁰ Subhan also explains that although they are the majority in the legislature, the party's legislators do not have the collective consciousness to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.⁸¹

Moreover, Apip Ifan Permadi concedes that the political position between the party's legislators and legislator of other parties in fact cannot be distinguished. In some cases, the party's legislators even have different political stance to legislators of the other Islamist parties, including the PKS.⁸² Neng Madinah Ruchyat also explains that there is no "ideological struggle" among the legislators when they are involved in policy-making. She adds that the legislators of the PKS are slightly different to legislators of other parties as "they act more hypocritical by denying what they actually do in making public policies".⁸³

Such statements are confirmed by officials of the secular-nationalist parties in the district. The leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* or PDI-P) in the district, Ade Suherman, explains that all legislators in the district have a similar political stance when they are involved in making public policies. He also asserts that "it is very difficult to distinguish between criminals and Islamic teachers or leaders (*kyai*) in the legislature".⁸⁴ The leader of the Golkar Party in the district, Eman Sulaeman shares a similar opinion. According to him, the political

⁷⁹ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁰ Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸¹ Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸² Interview with Apip Ifan Permadi, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸³ Interview with Neng Madinah Ruchyat, January 5, 2009 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁴ Interview with Ade Suherman, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

constellation in the legislature is “very fluid” so that it is very difficult to identify patterns of coalition and conflict between the legislators of the PPP and legislators of other parties.⁸⁵

In brief, the PPP in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s legislators tend to act as political entrepreneurs in making public policies. Secondly, they tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in making public policies. Thirdly, they employ the role of the party organizations, other social organizations, more specifically the NU and its autonomous bodies, bureaucracy and even thugs to support their role in making public policies. Fourthly, they lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government as the district head come from the party. Fifthly, they also lack ambition for hegemony in the policy-making processes so that they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties despite the fact that they become the winning party in the district.

5. The PKS: Pursuing Minimal Targets

In the 1999 election, the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan* or PK) was able to gain one seat in the district. Having failed to pass the required 2 percent of the electoral threshold in the 1999 election, the political actors of the PK established the Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS). By modifying its campaign issue from the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* to the more secular platforms, such as the campaigns against corruption and the implementation of good governance, the PKS gained four seats in the 2004 election and five seats in the 2009 election. In general, the PKS was relatively able to maintain its electoral performance in the district.

The head of the PKS fraction in district, Asep Hidayat, asserts that the party’s legislators serve as the representative of the party in making public policies. They must act in line with the ideology and platforms of the party. He also explains that based on Law No. 22/2003 on the Structure and Position of Legislatures, the party’s legislators must articulate the interests of their electorates in their own electoral areas. Moreover, Asep Hidayat explains that in doing their functions, these legislators are supervised by the party leaders in the district (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah* or DPTD). More specifically, to ensure that

⁸⁵ Interview with Eman Sulaeman, December 16, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

they will always act in line with the ideology and platforms of the party, these legislators are supervised by the executive council (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah* or DPD) and advisory board. Moreover, to ensure that they will always act in concordance with Islamic tenets, the party's legislators are supervised by the *sharia* board.⁸⁶

Another party's legislator, Dadi Supriadi, explains that the party's legislators must have met certain requirements. Firstly, they have achieved a certain level of membership, namely the core member. Secondly, they would be able to adhere to God and His messenger as well as to do Islamic struggle (*jihad*) if the party requires it. In this context, they must implement Islamic tenets strictly, such as not smoking. Further, Dadi Supriadi explains that the party's legislators must be proposed by the core and honorary members so that "they are not allowed to have an ambition to become a party's legislator, including in proposing their candidacy". When they have been nominated as a legislative candidate, however, they cannot reject the nomination.⁸⁷

Information from direct observation shows that in their daily activities, the party's legislators receive many proposal letters from their electorates demanding development projects and financial assistances. It is important to note that different to the articulation process in the other Islamic parties in which the proposals are submitted to an individual legislator, members and supporters of the party deliver their proposals to the secretary of the fraction. Therefore, as stated by Dadi Abdul Hadi, "the PKS fraction attempts to institutionalize the articulation process from the individual-based system to the organizational-based system".⁸⁸ These illustrations show that the party's legislators tend to adopt delegates regarding the model of representation.

Further, Subhan explains that since 2001 the party's legislators have imposed the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies in the district. He also explains that these legislators believe in the implementation of these policies in order to formalize Islam due to the fact that the majority of the local population is Muslim.⁸⁹ However, Asep Hidayat argues that the party recently interprets *sharia* in a broader understanding so that the implementation of *sharia* does not simply refer to the implementation of restrictions

⁸⁶ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁷ Interview with Dadi Supriadi, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁸ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁸⁹ Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

(*hudud*) and harsh Islamic criminal law (*qishas*). In this context, the implementation of *sharia* covers all dimensions of human life, such as health and education. Consequently, as claimed by Asep Hidayat, the party's legislators attempt to realize the elements of *sharia* into public policies, such as proposing a policy of the female reproductive health and a policy of the basic education.⁹⁰

However, Acep Zamzam Noer criticizes such claims. He argues that the party's legislators do not put emphasis on proposing public policies which are able to increase the social welfare of the local population. He also asserts that, similar to legislators of other parties, "the party's legislators just play around with *sharia*".⁹¹ Similarly, Dadi Abdul Hadi argues that there is no single indication which shows that the party's legislators have transformed the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, especially in the regional budget policy.⁹² In addition, information from direct observation also indicates that the party's legislators have limited capability to conduct their functions, especially in the budgeting process.

In responding to such criticisms, Asep Hidayat argues that the party's legislators have conducted maximum efforts in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies. However, as the party gained a limited numbers of seats, they are not able to initiate their policies which are in line with the ideology and platforms of the party in the ideal form.⁹³ Dadi Supriadi has a similar point of view and argues that as "the party is still young, its strength and ability in policy-making are still limited". He also emphasizes that although the party's legislators were so far not able to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into the ideal form, it does not simply mean that the struggle of the party is over. He adds that "as the party has a long term goal, there will still be other chances to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the ideal form in the future".⁹⁴

To support their role in making policies, the party's legislators rely on the role of the party organizations. Asep Hidayat asserts that it is likely impossible for the party's legislators to work alone in carrying out their functions. Instead, they must rely on the party

⁹⁰ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹¹ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹² Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹³ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁴ Interview with Dadi Supriadi, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

leaders in the district (*Dewan Pengurus Daerah* or DPD) and the party organizations on the ground (*Dewan Pengurus Cabang* or DPC the sub-district level and *Dewan Pengurus Ranting* or DPRa the village level). Asep Hidayat also explains that the role of the party organizations on the ground is essential to absorb the aspirations of members and supporters of the party.⁹⁵ Dadi Supriadi adds that the party's legislators also utilize the *halaqah* groups to absorb the interests of members of the party.⁹⁶

Moreover, the party's legislators also receive supports from the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Wilayah* or DPTW) and the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat* or DPTP). An official of the party leadership at the national level, Ade Suherman, explains that the party leaders at the national level provide an annual forum through which all of party's legislators establish coordination and communication with the party leaders. Moreover, the party organization at the provincial level conducts a similar forum so that all of party's legislators in a certain province establish coordination and communication with the party organization at the provincial level as well as with their counterparts in other districts or municipalities in a given province. Through these forums, therefore, the party leaders provide instructions, supervisions and trainings to improve technical skills for all of party's legislators at the regional level.⁹⁷

Similar to the legislators of the other Islamic parties, the party's legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Asep Hidayat states that the relationship between the party's legislators and district head is "smooth". Further, he argues that the party's legislators are not able conduct the overseeing function properly as national provisions do not optimally support the regional legislature to do so. As a consequence, as he argues, the position of the regional legislature seems to be subordinate to the executive branch of government.⁹⁸

It is also important to mention that although the party adopts Islam as its ideological foundation, it does not necessarily mean that the party's legislators insist on implementing *sharia* strictly. Asep Hidayat explains that these legislators adopt four minimal principles

⁹⁵ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁶ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁹⁷ Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta).

⁹⁸ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

when they are involved in policy-making. Firstly, they produce a policy that is not against the basic tenets of Islam (*akidah*). Secondly, they produce a policy that is not forbidden by Islam (*haram*). Thirdly, they produce a policy that does not harm the local population. Fourthly, they reject a policy that is clearly against *sharia*, such as a policy with the elements of gambling or sexual acts outside marriage (*zina*).⁹⁹ Similarly, Dadi Supriadi argues that by considering the political constellations in the legislature, “the party’s legislators do not transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies massively and instantly”.¹⁰⁰

Further, Asep Hidayat explains that the party’s legislators maintain their personal relationship with legislators of other parties. However, they will not support legislators of other parties if they propose a policy which is clearly against Islamic tenets. Asep Hidayat also explains that the party’s legislators do not have any constraint to establish collaborations with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties. In this sense, “it is possible for the party’s legislators to conduct a technical coalition, but it is not necessarily an ideological coalition, with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties.”¹⁰¹ Moreover, Dadi Supriadi asserts that the party’s legislators have a willingness to establish collaborations with legislators of other parties as long as “it is not against the Islamic belief (*akidah*)”.¹⁰²

Overall, the PKS in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s legislator acts as delegates. Secondly, because of many constraints, the party’s legislators fail to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the ideal manners. Thirdly, to support their role in making policies, they rely solely on the role of the party organizations. Fourthly, they have minimal ambition to make an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Fifthly, by and large, they lack ambition to establish hegemony so that they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the policy-making processes.

⁹⁹ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰¹ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰² Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

6. The PBB: When the Ideology without Realization

In the 1999 election, the Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB) succeeded in gaining two seats in the district. However, the party experienced a significant decrease in the 2004 election by gaining one seat. In the 2009 election, the party even failed to send its representative in the legislature. Currently, the party is represented by Muhammad Noer. Coming from a family that supported the Masyumi Party, Muhammad Noer served as an official of the NU Party at the sub-district level in 1960's. During the New Order period, he was not involved in political activities because serving as a public servant. Following his father's advice, finally, he decided to join with the PBB after his retirement in 1998.

Believing that the PBB is the only descendent of the Masyumi Party, Muhammad Noer argues that in implementing his functions as the party's legislator, he must rely on the ideology and platforms of the party. He also asserts that, compared to the role of the party leaders in the district (*Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* or DPC), the role of the party's legislator is more important, especially in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies. Muhammad Noer also underlines that he must prioritize the interests of his electorates in his own electoral area rather than the interests of the local population at large when he is involved in policy-making.¹⁰³

As discussed in the previous chapter, the party leaders in the district are subordinate to Muhammad Noer. Information from direct observation also shows that as the seniority principle serves as one of the most important principles in the party, the party leaders in the district tend to be reluctant to supervise Muhammad Noer. On the other hand, members and supporters of the party take for granted the ideal role of Muhammad Noer in the legislature. In addition, the general secretary of the party leadership at the national level (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP), Sahar L. Hasan, explains that it is not easy for the party leaders at the national level to supervise the party's legislators at the regional level as they argue that they serve as the representative of their electorates rather than as the representative of the party. This situation occurs as an implication of the modification in the electoral system from the close-list system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional system in the 2004 and 2009 elections.¹⁰⁴ These illustrations, therefore, suggest that Muhammad Noer

¹⁰³ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Sahar L. Hasan, February 5, 2009 (Jakarta).

has autonomy both from his party as well as from his electorates when he is involved in making public policies. In short, he acts as a trustee with regard to the model of representation.

In his daily activities as the only party's legislator, Muhammad Noer receives many proposal letters from members and supporters of the party demanding development projects and financial assistances. He explains that instead of sending proposal letters to the party organizations, members and supporters of the party prefer to deliver their proposal letters to him directly either at his residence or at the legislature.¹⁰⁵ In this sense, members and supporters of the party prefer to articulate their interests to the party's legislator directly rather than to the party organizations.

Subhan explains that the party's legislators have strongly supported the implementation of the *sharia*-based policies in the district since 2001.¹⁰⁶ Muhammad Noer also concedes that since 2006 he has supported the implementation of various *sharia*-based policies in the district as the implementation of these policies become the main priority. He also explains that, different to the Islamic state movement in the district in the 1950s, the party insists on implementing *sharia* in democratic principles and in constitutional approach. Moreover, Muhammad Noer also claims that he has made a lot of efforts in order to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the district.¹⁰⁷

Such a claim is denied by Acep Zamzam Noer. He contends that similar to other legislators in the district, Muhammad Noer does not have understanding about what he should carry out in making public policies. In this sense, similar to the legislators of the other Islamic parties, Muhammad Noer just plays around with the issue of the establishment of an Islamic state in general and the implementation of *sharia* in particular. Acep Zamzam Noer adds that because of his seniority, Muhammad Noer is not able to play a significant role in making policies.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Dadi Abdul Hadi explains that Muhammad Noer has limited competence in the budgeting process. As a result, "he has been played" by legislators of other parties in making public policies.¹⁰⁹ Information from

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

direct observation also shows that Muhammad Noer plays an insignificant role in the Amanah fraction as it is dominated by the legislators of the PAN.

Muhammad Noer also claims that in implementing his functions, he conducts communication and coordination with the party leaders in the district.¹¹⁰ However, this statement is denied by the party leader in the district, Momon Abdurahman.¹¹¹ Moreover, Muhammad Noer concedes that he does not receive organizational support from the party leadership at the national level and the party organization at the provincial level (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* or DPW) when he plays his role in policy-making.¹¹² In addition, Sahar L. Hasan explains that as the party leaders at the national level have limited financial capability, they lack of agenda to support party's legislators at the regional level.¹¹³

Instead of utilizing the role of the party organizations, Muhammad Noer employs the role of an Islamic paramilitary force in the district, namely the Front of Hizbullah.¹¹⁴ Organized by young and radical Islamic teachers, this paramilitary imposes the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in the district. Acep Zamzam Noer explains that there is a transactional mechanism between Muhammad Noer and this organization. On one hand, Muhammad Noer receives political support from this organization when he is involved in making public policies. On the other hand, Muhammad Noer provides financial assistance to this organization.¹¹⁵ In addition, Muhammad Noer also maintains personal relationships with some proponents of the Islamic state movement in the district.¹¹⁶

In doing his functions, Muhammad Noer lacks ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government in the district. He explains that he tries to maintain his personal relationship with the district head. He also concedes that he does not make any significant effort to supervise the executive branch of government as the national provision on regional government explicitly states that the regional legislature has an equal position to the executive branch of government. Further, he adds that recently the executive

¹¹⁰ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹¹ Interview with Momon Abdurahman, November 14, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹² Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹³ Interview with Sahar L. Hasan, February 5, 2009 (Jakarta).

¹¹⁴ Interview with Roni Romansya, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁵ Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁶ Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

branch of government plays a more dominant role in making public policies, especially in proposing all of public policies in the district.¹¹⁷

Muhammad Noer also lacks ambition for hegemony in policy-making. In the Amanah fraction, Muhammad Noer plays an insignificant role as the fraction is dominated by the legislators of the PAN. He also plays an insignificant role in the legislature in general. The most important factor in contributing to this situation is the physical condition of Muhammad Noer which does not allow him to follow the dynamics of the political process in the legislature. In addition, Muhammad Noer is the oldest legislator in district. Another factor is the fact that Muhammad Noer has very limited competence in making public policies, especially in the budgeting process.¹¹⁸

Further, Muhammad Noer asserts that there is no “clash of ideology” among legislators in the legislature when they are involved in making public policies due to the fact that all legislators in the district have a similar political stance although their parties adopt different ideological foundations.¹¹⁹ Similarly, Ade Suherman explains that in the period of 1999-2004, the legislators of the PBB had a similar political stance to the legislators from the secular-nationalist parties when they were involved in making public policies despite the fact that these parties adopted different ideological bases and imposing different political platforms.¹²⁰ According to Eman Sulaeman, such a condition continues when Mohammad Noer serves as the only legislator of the PBB.¹²¹ Therefore, it is very difficult to identify the pattern of conflict and coalition between Mohammad Noer and legislators of other parties in making public policies.

In general, the PBB in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s legislator acts as a trustee. Secondly, he disregards the ideology and platforms of the party so that he tends to defend his own personal interests when he is involved in policy-making. Secondly, instead of the role of the party organizations, he employs the role of an external organization, i.e., the Front of Hizbullah to support his role in making policies. Fourthly, he has minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Fifthly, he lacks ambition to achieve hegemony in the fraction as well as in the

¹¹⁷ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁸ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹¹⁹ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²⁰ Interview with Ade Suherman, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

¹²¹ Interview with Eman Sulaeman, December 16, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

legislature. In this sense, although his party serves as the most Islamist party, he is tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties, including with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties.

7. Conclusion

This chapter attempts to examine the organizational features of the Islamic parties in public office, more specifically in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature. From the explanations above, we can see each of these Islamic parties has its own prominent features regarding their role in making public policies. More specifically, the most salient feature of the PAN in public office is the fact that the party's legislators disregard the role of the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making public policies. Similarly, the most prominent characteristic of the legislators of the PKB is their political pragmatism in the policy-making processes. Meanwhile, the most interesting feature of the PBR in public office is the dominant role of the party elite, more specifically Dede Saiful Anwar in deciding political stances of the party in making public policies. Moreover, the PPP, PKS and PBB in public office share a similar feature, i.e., their legislators play around with the issue on the implementation of *sharia* in particular and the establishment an Islamic state in general. To a different degree, these parties lack significant effort to transform their ideology and platforms into public policies in the ideal manners. A summary of the organizational features of these parties in the legislature in the district is presented in the following table.

Table 7.1
Organization Features of the Islamic Parties in Public Office

| Party/ Indicators | Model of representation | Motivation | Supporting infrastructure | Ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government | Relationship with other legislators |
|----------------------|----------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| PAN | Trustee | Personal interests | The party organization | Minimal | Tolerant and collaborative |
| PKB | Trustee | Personal interests | External organization (the NU) and, to a limited extent, the party organization | Absent | Tolerant and collaborative |
| PBR | Trustee | Personal interests | Personal infrastructure | Minimal | Tolerant and collaborative |
| PPP | Entrepreneur | Personal interest and, to a limited extent, the government interests | A combination of the party organization, external organization (the NU) and the government | Absent | Tolerant and collaborative |
| PKS | Delegate | Personal interests and to a limited extent, the ideology and platforms of the party | The party organization | Minimal | Tolerant and collaborative |
| PBB | Trustee | Personal interests | External organization (paramilitary force of the Front of Hizbullah) | Minimal | Tolerant and collaborative |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

As shown in the Table 7.1, the legislators of the PAN, PKB, PBR and PBB tend to act as the trustees for their electorates in the policy-making processes. In this sense, they receive greater discretion from their party as well as from their electorates when they are involved in making public policies. On the contrary, the legislators of the PKS act as the delegates for members of the party. In this sense, to a very limited extent, the interests of the legislators of the PKS are relatively in accordance with the interests of members of the party in making public policies. Meanwhile, the legislators of the PPP tend to act as political entrepreneurs in the relationship between their electorates and government in the policy-making processes.

To a different degree, the legislators of the Islamic parties tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in making public policies. In the case of the PAN, PKB, PBR and PBB, such a tendency is very strong. This situation occurs due to the fact that most of the legislators of these parties serve as the party leaders as well as officials of the party in the central office. Consequently, the party leaders are not able to conduct the supervision to the performance of these in the legislature. On the other hand, their electorates also take for granted their ideal role in making public policies. A similar tendency also takes place in the case of the PPP. By and large, however, the legislators of the PPP defend the interests of the executive branch of government as the district head comes from the PPP. To a lesser degree, a similar tendency also takes place in the case of the PKS. Since they must establish political compromises with legislators of other parties, the legislators of the PKS are not able to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the ideal forms.

To support their role in policy-making, the legislators of the Islamic parties employ different instruments. More specifically, the legislators of the PAN and PKS rely on the role of the party organizations due to the fact that these parties do not have a strong relationship with other Islamic organizations in the district. To a lesser degree, the legislators of the PPP and PKB also involve the role of the party organization. In the case of the PKB, however, the legislators of this party rely strongly on the role of the NU in the district. Meanwhile, in the case of the PPP, the legislators of this party also employ the NU and bureaucracy in the district. In contrast, the legislators of the PBR and PBB employ the role of external organizations to support their role in making policies. The legislator of the

PBR prefers to establish his personal organization, while the legislator of the PBB employs the paramilitary force, namely Front of Hizbullah.

It is also important to mention that most of the legislators of the Islamic parties have minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government in the district due to two main factors. Firstly, the national provisions do not support the implementation of the overseeing function of the executive branch of government. Secondly, most of the legislators of the Islamic parties have limited competence to implement their functions, especially in the budgeting process. Moreover, the legislators of the PPP and PKB lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government in the district as the district head and the district vice head come from these parties. In this sense, despite the fact that the decentralized system has been implemented since 2001, the legislature serves just as rubber-stamp for policies made by the executive branch of government in the district.

Moreover, the legislators of all of the Islamic parties also lack ambition for hegemony in the policy-making processes. From the discussions above, we can see that the legislators of all of the Islamic parties do not have a different political stance in making public policies, including with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties either. As a result, it is difficult to identify the pattern of conflict and collaboration between the legislators of the Muslim-nationalist parties and the legislators of the Islamist parties on one side, and between the legislators of these Islamic parties and legislators of the secular-nationalist parties on the other hand. In this sense, all of the legislators of these parties are tolerant of and collaborative with other legislators when they are involved in making public policies.

From the elaboration above, we also can see that the general feature of these parties in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature is complex. If we compare these findings to the theoretical framework as elaborated in Chapter 2, we can see that each of these parties contains some elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party and even the cartel party. In this sense, all of the Islamic parties have hybrid features so that it is not easy to categorize each of them into a single party model. By exploring the dominant elements, however, each of them can be categorized into a certain party model.

Table 7.2
Hybrid Features of the Islamic Parties in Public Office

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| PAN | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as trustees - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in the policy-making processes - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in the policy-making processes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators employ the party organization to support their role in making policies - Legislators have ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government | | |
| PKB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as trustees - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in the policy-making processes - Legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in the policy-making processes | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators employ external organizations to support their role in making policies | |
| PBR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as trustees - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in the policy-making processes - Legislators employ their own personal infrastructure to support their role in making policies - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in the policy-making processes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators have ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government | | |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators employ the party organization to support their role in making policies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as entrepreneurs - Legislators defend their personal interests when | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators defend the state interests when they are involved in the policy-making processes |

| Islamic Parties | The elite-based party | The mass-based party | The electoralist party | The cartel party |
|-----------------|---|--|---|--|
| PPP | | | <p>they are involved in the policy-making processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators employ external organizations to support their role in making policies - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in the policy-making processes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators employ the state institutions to support their role in making policies - Legislators lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government |
| PKS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in the policy-making processes - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in the policy-making processes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as delegates - Legislators defend ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in the policy-making processes - Legislators employ the party organization to support their role in making policies - Legislators have ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government | | |
| PBB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators act as trustees - Legislators defend their personal interests when they are involved in the policy-making processes - Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors when they are involved in the policy-making processes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators have ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislators employ external organizations to support their role in making policies | |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

The PAN and PBR in public office contain hybrid features of the elite-based and mass-based party models. Overall, the elements of the elite-based party model are more dominant in these parties. More specifically, the legislators of these parties tend to act as the trustees for their electorate. They also tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in making public policies. Moreover, they lack ambition for hegemony in policy-making so that they are very tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties. In addition, in the case of the PBR, the legislator of the party also employs his personal infrastructures to support his role in making public policies.

Meanwhile, the PKB in public office has hybrid features of the elite-based and electoralist party models. However, the elements of the elite-based party models are dominant in this party. As a result, the party's legislators tend to act as the trustees for their electorate. Moreover, they tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in policy-making. As the district vice head comes from the party, they also lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Similarly, they have minimal ambition for hegemony so that they are very tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the legislature.

On the other hand, the PPP in public office contains hybrid features of the mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models. In general, however, the elements of the electoralist party model are very dominant in this party. Acting as brokers in the relationship between their electorates and government, the party's legislators tend to act as the political entrepreneurs. In this sense, they tend defend their own personal interests when they are involved in making public policies. In supporting their role in making public policies, they also rely on the role of external organizations. Despite the fact that they have a significant number of seats, the party's legislators lack ambition for hegemony so that they are very tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in policy-making.

In contrast, the PKS in public office resembles hybrid features of the elite-based and mass-based party models. In general, the elements of the mass-based model are more dominant in this party. As discussed in this chapter, the party's legislators act as the delegates for members of the party. To a very limited extent, they also try to defend

the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in policy-making. Moreover, they employ the role of the party organizations to support their role in making public policies. The party's legislators also have minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government.

Finally, the PBB in public office has hybrid features of the elite-based party and mass-based party models. Taken as a whole, the elements of the elite-based model are more dominant in this party as the legislator of the party acts as the trustee for their electorates. He also tends to defend his own personal interests when he is involved in policy-making. Despite the fact that the party becomes the most Islamist parties which proposes the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia*, the legislator of the party is very tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in making public policies.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The downfall of Suharto in 1998 marked a new era for Indonesia, as the world's largest Muslim-majority country, to establish a democratic system after more than three decades under the New Order's authoritarianism. The implementation of democratization since 1998 as well as the implementation of the decentralized system regarding the central and regional government relationship since 2001 has in turn led to the transformation of Indonesian political landscape. Among various interesting dimensions of the new political system in democratizing Indonesia are the emergence of local politics and the resurgence of political Islam, more specifically Islamic political parties.

Since the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001, local politics has emerged as a new arena for political contestation. Different to the role of the regional legislatures during the centralization system in the New Order government period, the regional legislatures have recently played a more significant role in the policy-making processes. Following the implementation of the direct presidential election in 2004, the regional governments have also implemented the direct governor, major and district head elections (known as *pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* or *pilkadasung*) since 2005. On the other hand, political liberalization has also led to a growing political participation among people at the regional level.

Moreover, the democratization has facilitated the rise of Islamic parties after they were depoliticized in political process not only at the national, but also at the regional level during the New Order period. Recently, there are six major Islamic parties that succeeded in gaining significant votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. These parties are the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN), National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB), Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR), United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP), Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS) and Star and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB). In these three elections, despite the fact that these parties

experienced a significant decrease at the national level,¹ most of them succeeded in maintaining or increasing their level of political support at the regional level.

The Tasikmalaya district becomes one of the regional bases for these parties to maintain or increase their level of political support in these elections. In addition, the district is historically known as one of areas in Indonesia in which Islamic radical actors conducted the Islamic State Movement (*Darul Islam Indonesia* or DII) in the 1950s. It is also important to mention that most of Muslims in the district implement Islamic Puritanism. Such a religious characteristic is coupled with a low quality of life. As a result, Muslims in the district have a strong Islamic sentiment. In addition, supported by the Islamic parties, the executive branch of government in the district has actively proposed various *sharia*-based regulations.

Considering the political achievements of these parties in the district, this study aims to explore the way Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties in the district. In doing so, this study applies four party models proposed by Krouwel, namely the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models.² This study also applies the analytical framework of party organization introduced by Katz and Mair in which party organizations are divided in three organizational faces, i.e., the party organization on the ground (the political linkage between parties and their members or supporters), the party organization in central office (party leadership at the district level) and the party organization in public office (the role of parties in public in the regional legislature).³ Based on the experience of parties in established and new democracies, this study develops some criteria to define the ideal-type of the party models in these organizational dimensions. It is also important to note that the analytical process in this

¹ Furthermore, see Greg Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia," in Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown (eds.), *Religious Organizations and Democratization. Case Studies from Contemporary Asia* (London: Armonk, 2006), pp. 221-41.

² André Krouwel, "Party Models," in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, pp. 249-69.

³ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization," *The American Review of Politics*, Vol. 14 (1993), pp. 593-617. See, also Peter Mair, "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State," in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies* (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 1-22; Peter Mair, *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 120-54.

study follow the rational choice institutionalism's way of thinking.⁴ Therefore, this study assumes that by taking into account incentives and constraints provided by the existing socio-political structures surrounding them, Islamic political actors apply a certain strategy when they organize their Islamic parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections.

By applying these analytical and theoretical frameworks in the case of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district, this study proposes two major findings. Firstly, based on the case of the Islamic parties in the district, the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia contain the elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party and the cartel party models in terms of party organizations in the three different structures. In other words, the organizations of the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia contain hybrid features. Secondly, the way the Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia suggests that, by and large, these religious actors rely on rational calculations rather than ideological considerations when they manage their parties.

1. The Hybrid Features

The case of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district shows that the Islamic political actors at the regional level in Indonesia select different strategies when they organize their party organizations on the ground, in central office, in public office. As discussed in the previous chapters, the organizational features of these parties in the three different organizational aspects contain the elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and, to a lesser extent, cartel party models. As some elements are more prominent than the other elements, however, the organizational features of these parties in each of these organizational dimensions can be categorized into a certain party model.

More specifically, the political actors of the PAN select different strategies when they manage the party organizations in the three different organizational faces. In creating

⁴ Furthermore on the key assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, see B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The 'New Institutionalism'* (London: Pinter, 1999), pp. 47-69; Vivien Lowndes, "Institutionalism", in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (London: Macmillan Press, 2002), pp. 90-108; Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 23-38.

and managing the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the political actors of the PAN attempt to modify their strategy from relying on the role of the party organizations to relying on the role of their legislative candidates. Meanwhile, they attempt to develop what Panebianco called “a representative bureaucracy” when they manage the party leadership.⁵ Moreover, they apply a pragmatic approach when they are involved in the policy-making processes. By implementing such strategies, the organizational features of the PAN in each organizational face contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, however, the organizational features of the PAN on the ground have experienced a transformation processes from the mass-based party to electoralist party models. Meanwhile, the organizational features of the PAN in central office resemble the ideal-type of the mass-based party model and the organizational features of the PAN in public office are close to the ideal-type of the elite-based party model.

The political actors of the PKB apply a different strategy when they manage their party organizations in the three different organizational dimensions. In creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the political actors of the PKB utilize the role of an external organization, namely the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars Party (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or NU). Meanwhile, they rely on the role of the party leaders at the national level and the role of NU’s leaders in the district when they manage the party leadership. Moreover, they apply a pragmatic approach when they are involved in policy-making process. By adopting such strategies, the organizational features of the PKB in these organizational faces contain some elements of the elite-based party and electoralist party models. Taken as a whole, however, the organizational features of the PKB resemble the ideal-type of the elite-based party model.

The political actors of the PBR apply the similar strategy when they manage their party organizations in the three different organizational dimensions. More specifically, they prefer to rely on the patronage politics to create and maintain the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters. Similarly, they also depend on the role of the party leaders when they manage the party organization in central office and in public office. By

⁵ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 262-65.

selecting such a strategy, the organizational features of the PBR in the three different organizational dimensions contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, however, the elements of the elite-based party model are very dominant in the organizational features of the PBR.

Meanwhile, the political actors of the PPP select different strategies when they manage their party in the three different organizational faces. In creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the political actors of the PPP try to maximize their resources, i.e., the party organizations, the relationship between the party and the NU as well as the relationship between the party and the executive branch of government in the district. Meanwhile, they tend to rely on the role of a few persons when they manage the party leadership. Moreover, the political actors of the PPP take advantage of Islamic issues, such as the implementation of *sharia*, when they are involved in making policies. By implementing these strategies, the organizational features of the PPP in these three organizational dimensions contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models. Overall, the organizational features of the PPP on the ground resemble the ideal-type of the mass-based party model. Meanwhile, the organizational features of the PPP in the central office have experienced a transformation process from the mass-based party model to the elite-based party model. In this context, this party has experienced Michaels's iron law of oligarchy.⁶ Moreover, the organizational features of the PPP in the public office resemble the ideal-type of the electoralist party model.

The political actors of the PKS select a similar strategy when they manage their party organizations in the three different organizational faces. They rely on the role of the party organizations when they create and maintain the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters. Meanwhile, they combine Islamic tenets and modern management mechanisms when they manage the party leadership. They also attempt to realize minimal targets as they experience many constraints in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies. By selecting such strategies, the organizational features of the PKS in these three different organizational dimensions

⁶ Furthermore, see Robert Michels, *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-56.

contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. In general, the organizational features of the PKS tend to adopt the ideal-type of the mass-based party model.

A different strategy is selected by the political actors of the PBB when they manage their party organizations in the three different organizational faces. In creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the political actors of the PBB rely on the role of the party leaders as well as on the ideology of the party. Similarly, they depend on the role of the party leaders when they manage the party leadership. In the policy-making processes, they tend to disregard the ideology of the party. By adopting such strategies, the organizational features of the PBB in these three different organizational dimensions contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the organizational features of the PBB on the ground have experienced a transformation process from the mass-based party model to the elite-based party model. Meanwhile, the organizational features of the PBB in central office and in public office are close to the ideal-type of the elite-based party model.

Table 8.1
Organizational Features of the Islamic Parties
In the Tasikmalaya District

| Islamic Parties | The party on the ground | The party in central office | The party in public office |
|------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------------|
| PAN | The electoralist party/ The mass-based party | The mass-based party | The elite-based party |
| PKB | The elite-based party | The elite-based party | The elite-based party |
| PBR | The elite-based party | The elite-based party | The elite-based party |
| PPP | The mass-based party | The elite-based party/ The mass-based party | The electoralist party |
| PKS | The mass-based party | The mass-based party | The mass-based party |
| PBB | The elite-based party/ The mass-based party | The elite-based party | The elite-based party |

Source: Assessment by the Author.

Further, the different strategies selected by the Islamic political actors when they manage the party organizations in the three different organizational dimensions in the district also have an implication for the comprehensive features of these parties. As shown in Table 8.1, it is likely that the PKS adopts the mass-based party model as the elements of the mass-based party model are dominant in this party. Meanwhile, the PAN and PPP adopt the mass-based party model as the elements of this model are dominant in these parties, especially in the party organization on the ground and the party organization in central

office. The PKB and PBR adopt the elite-based party model as the elements of this model are dominant in these parties. Similarly, the PBB also adopts the elite-based party model as the elements of this model are dominant in this party, especially in the party organization in central office and the party organization in public office and, to a lesser degree, in the party organization on the ground.

Based on their dominant elements, the Islamic parties in the district can be categorized into two models, namely the elite-based party and mass-based party models. More specifically, the PKS and, to a lesser degree, PPP and PAN can be categorized as the mass-based party as these parties rely heavily on the role of their members or supporters so that they relatively rely on a bottom-up process.⁷ These parties, therefore, can be categorized as the policy-seeking party.⁸ However, it is important to note that in the case of the PAN and PPP, some elements of the mass-based party appear in the organizational dimension of these parties on the ground and in central office. Regarding the organizational dimensions of these parties in public office, the PAN adopts the elite-based party model, while the PPP adopts the electoralist party model.

Therefore, the political actors of the PAN and PPP are experiencing the so called “logic of two-level games”.⁹ On one hand, the political actors of these parties rely on the role of members and supporters of the parties when they manage the party on the ground and the party in central office. On the other hand, they tend to disregard the ideology and platforms of their parties when they are involved in the policy-making processes. In other words, these parties rely on their ideologies and platforms when they create and maintain the political linkage with their members or supporters and when they manage the party leadership, while they employ pragmatic calculations when they are involved in policy-making. Such a situation is rather different from the PKS in public office as this party, to a

⁷ This finding is in line with Tomsa’s argument that compared to other parties in Indonesia, organization of the PKS and Golkar Party is better institutionalized. Furthermore, see Dirk Tomsa, *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 151-79.

⁸ Wolinetz categorizes the elite-based party and the cartel as the office-seeking party, the mass-based party as the policy-seeking party and the electoralist party as the vote-seeking party. Furthermore, see Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero and Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, pp. 159-62.

⁹ The term of logic of two-level games has been introduced by Putnam to describe an uneasy condition faced by decision-makers in international forums in which they must reconcile domestic pressure and international contexts simultaneously. Furthermore, see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988, pp. 427-60.

limited extent, still attempts to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.

On the other hand, the PKB, PBR and, to a lesser degree, PBB can be categorized as the elite-based party as the role of the party elites is dominant so that these parties rely on a top-down process. Therefore, these parties can be categorized as the office-seeking party. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, instead of relying on the role of the party organizations, the political actors of these parties rely on patronage politics and interpersonal networks of the party leaders when they create and maintain the political linkage with members or supporters of the parties. Similarly, the organizational dimension of these parties in central office has also experienced a personalization of politics as the role of the party leaders is very dominant in managing the party organizations. The elements of the elite-based party model also appear in the organizational dimensions of these parties in public office as legislators from these parties tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in making policies.

Overall, the organization of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district indicates that the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia experience so called “indigenization”. In addition, when analyzing parties in South Asian countries, Mitra and Enskat have come to the conclusion that parties in these countries operate under two different conditions, namely international and locally embedded values.¹⁰ A similar situation also takes place in the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia. As revealed by this study, the Islamic political actors at the regional level in Indonesia manage the organization of the Islamic parties in the three different organizational faces by applying democratic and modern principles and, at the same time, traditional mechanisms. Consequently, the organizational features of these parties contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models.

2. The Rational Dimensions

The way the Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district also shows that, to a large extent, the religious political at the regional level in Indonesia

¹⁰ Furthermore, see Subrata K. Mitra and Mike Enskat, “Introduction,” in Subrata K. Mitra, Mika Enskat and Clemens Spieß (eds.), *Political Parties in South Asia* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2004), pp. 1-30

apply rational calculations rather than ideological considerations. As elaborated in the previous chapters, these actors have a set of alternative strategies in managing their parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. More specifically, they can manage their parties by developing the ideal-type of the elite party, mass party, electoralist party, or cartel party models. By taking into account incentives as well as constraints provided by the different socio-political structures surrounding them, they decide to opt into a definite party model in order to minimize constraints and, at the same time, to maximize incentives within the existing socio-political structures.

There are at least six major socio-political factors considered by these actors when they manage their parties in the three different organizational faces. In addition, each of these socio-political factors can be either a constraint or incentive for each of them. The first factor is the informal mechanism in the local population, including the patron-client relationship and personal or family networks. The second factor is public trust in political parties among the local population which has decreased after the implementation of the 1999 election. The third factor is party identification among the local population, including the relationship between the Islamic political parties and Islamic social organizations. The fourth factor is the degree of religiousness among the local population. The fifth factor is internal conditions of the Islamic parties, such as organizational skills, capabilities to carry out the ideal functions of the legislators and supporting organizational infrastructures. The sixth factor is the modification of the electoral system from the closed-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections.

By taking into account these factors, the Islamic political actors develop a certain party model in order to attract as many votes as possible. To be more specific, the political actors the PAN combine the electoralist party and mass-based party models when they manage the organizational face of their party on the ground. Meanwhile, they adopt the mass-based party model when they manage the party organization in central office and they choose the elite-based party model when they manage the organizational face of the party in public office. A different strategy is selected by the political actors of the PKB, PBR and, to a lesser degree, PBB who prefer to adopt the elite-based party model when they manage their parties. Moreover, the political actors of the PPP prefer to develop the mass-based

party model when they manage the organizational dimension of the party on the ground. In managing the organizational dimension of the party in central office, however, they prefer to combine the elite-based party and the mass-based party models. Meanwhile, they adopt the electoralist party model when they manage the party organization in public office. Different to the other Islamic parties, the Islamic political actors of the PKS tend to select the mass-based party model when they manage their party organizations in the three different organizational faces.

The political actors of the PAN decide to combine the electoralist party and the mass-based party models when they manage the party organization on the ground for two reasons. The political actors of the PAN realize that the modification of the electoral system from the close-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections has led to the transformation of voting behavior. The modification of the electoral system has led to the transformation of voting behavior among the local population in which voters relied on candidates of the legislator rather than on political parties as a political organization.¹¹ As revealed by Liddle and Mujani, along with the implementation of the open-list proportional representation system, the Indonesian voters have recently begun to rely more on candidates rather than on parties.¹² The political actors of the PAN, therefore, realize that the role of the legislative candidates is more important than the role of the party organizations to gain votes in elections. In this sense, they tend to adopt some elements of the electoralist party. In addition, such a situation in fact is the typical condition for new parties when they must compete with the established parties in a new democracy. As argued by van Biezen:

Faced with the challenge of enticing citizen involvement in a context where mass participation is already established, parties (in new democracies) are encouraged to pursue expansive electoral strategies to capture the still unaligned voters and to create a transient electoral relationship with society rather than durable partisan linkages.¹³

¹¹ As Katz argues, electoral systems have a significant influence on party and party system, including the dimension of party organization. Furthermore, see Richard S. Katz, *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 30-34.

¹² R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 7 (2007), pp. 832-57.

¹³ Ingrid van Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 48.

On the other hand, the political actors of the PAN also realize that they do not have a strong relationship with major Islamic organization in the districts. They understand that the majority of Muslims in the district have been affiliated, either structurally or culturally, with the NU. They are also aware that the Muhammadiyah in the district is relatively able to maintain its neutrality in political realm. Moreover, they understand that leaders, members and masses of the PERSIS tend to support the PBB and PKS. As a consequence, they realize that they cannot rely on these Islamic organizations.¹⁴ In this sense, they believe that they must develop their party organizations in order to maximize their chance of winning elections. Therefore, although they start to adopt the ideal-type of the electoralist party model, the political actors of the PAN still conduct some efforts to maintain some elements of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party on the ground.

However, the political actors of the PAN decide to develop the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party in central office as they realize that they have organizational resources, more specifically intellectual capacity and organizational skills. In this sense, they prefer to rely on modern management principles rather than on the dominant role of the party leaders. To a limited extent, they also employ technocratic principles. Based on such calculations, therefore, they have decided to develop the bureaucratic dimension of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party in central office.

Regarding the face of their party in public office, the political actors of the PAN prefer to develop the elite-based party model as they realize that instead of a political party as a political institution, the local population prefers to make direct contact with the legislators when they attempt to access distribution of state resources, such as public infrastructure projects. In this sense, the political actors of the PAN rely on clientelistic linkage rather than on programmatic linkage strategies when they play their role in the

¹⁴ This phenomenon suggests that, to a certain extent, party identification in Indonesia in the 1950s (known as *politik aliran* or literally political stream) is still useful to explain the party identification in contemporary Indonesia. Therefore, this argument is in line with Ufen's argument on contemporary party identification in Indonesia. Furthermore, see Andreas Ufen, "From *Aliran* to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2008), pp. 5-41.

policy-making processes.¹⁵ In this sense, they provide material incentives (such as money and jobs) rather than purposive incentives (such as platforms of the party) to mobilize their supporters.¹⁶ Such a mechanism is paramount for these parties in order to create and maintain the political linkage with members or supporters of the party.

Meanwhile, considering that they emerged from civil society movements as well as the fact that they have a strong relationship with the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia, i.e., the NU, one might expect that the political actors of the PKB and PBR will select the ideal-type of the mass-based party model when they manage these parties. Meanwhile, in the case of the PBB, considering that the party actively proposed the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, one might also expect that the political actors of the PBB will adopt the ideal type of the mass-based party model. On the other hand, because of the modification of the electoral system and a growing political pragmatism among the local population, one might expect that the political actors of these parties will adopt the ideal-type of the electoralist party model. While these assumptions are not completely incorrect as the organizational features of these parties contain some elements of the mass-based party and electoralist party models, overall, the political actors of these parties prefer to develop the elite-based party model when they manage their parties in the three different organizational aspects.

The political actors of these parties prefer to select the elite-based party model for five reasons. Firstly, they realize that they have a strong relationship with some Islamic organizations in the district. In the case of the PKB and, to a lesser degree the PBR, the political actors of these parties realize that they have a strong relationship with the NU. In the case of the PBB, the political actors of this party understand that they are close to the PERSIS and former supporters of the Masyumi Party. Therefore, the political actors of these parties realize that it is more effective to utilize their personal networks than to develop the party organizations to create and maintain the political linkage between these parties and their members or supporters.

¹⁵ Furthermore on clientelist and programmatic linkage strategies, see Herbert Kitschelt, "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities," *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 33 (2000), pp. 845-79.

¹⁶ Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 68-72 and 74-78.

Secondly, the political actors of these parties also realize that the patron-client relationship serves as the most prominent mechanism in the local population, especially in the relationship between Islamic leaders or teachers and the local population. Since many leaders and officials of these parties, at the same time, serve as Islamic leaders and teachers in the district, they also realize that they have their personal resources, including their family connection and religious networks. On the other hand, they are aware that they have limited organizational skill, supporting organizational infrastructures and financial capability to manage their parties. In this sense, the political actors of these parties tend to select the ideal-type of the elite-based party model as they realize that developing the ideal type of the mass-based party model requires needs many efforts. They also recognize that developing a mass-based party would take time. Moreover, they realize that they must compete with other parties which some of whom have been established since the New Order period. For the political actors of these parties, therefore, developing the ideal-type of the mass-based party model is completely ineffective and inefficient in gaining votes.

Thirdly, the political actors of these parties realize that they have a limited number of seats in the legislature. They also understand that their legislators have limited competence to carry out their functions, especially in the budgeting process. Moreover, they understand that the local population relies on the role of the legislators rather than on the role of the party as a political institution when they articulate their interests. In this sense, similar to the political actors of the PAN, the political actors of these parties prefer to establish clientelistic linkage rather than programmatic linkage strategies when they manage the face of their parties in public office.

Fourthly, in the case of the PKB, the political actors of this party realize that they exist around the local population with a strong Islamic sentiment. In this context, similar to the political actors of the PAN, it does not make sense for the political actors of the PKB to decline *sharia*-based regulations, despite the fact that the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. As a consequence, the political actors of the PKB supported the implementation of various *sharia*-based regulations in the district. In this context, the political actors of the PKB supported the implementation of *sharia*-based regulations because of a strategic interest in order to attract supporters coming from the proponents of the implementation of *sharia*.

In addition, the political actors of the PKB and PAN are experiencing so called “dual obligations”. As Jonasson argues, religious parties in fact exist under such a situation in which, “on the one hand, there is the obligation to act in line with the general tenets of the religion. On the other hand, there is the obligation to be electorally successful”.¹⁷ The political actors of these parties realize that in managing their parties, they should act in accordance with their ideological foundation. However, they are also aware that they cannot disregard Islamic issues which are very sensitive to the local population, such as the implementation of *sharia*-based regulations. In order to attract supporters, therefore, the political actors of these Muslim-nationalist parties decide to support the implementation of *sharia*-based regulations, despite the fact that they do not adopt Islam as their ideological foundation.

Fifthly, in the case of the PBB, the political actors of this party realize that their party must propose a definite agenda which distinguish it from the other Islamic parties. In this context they propose the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* continuously. Moreover, they also realize that they must maintain the political linkage with some leaders and members of the PERSIS as well as with the former proponents of the Masyumi Party as the party has a similar ideological stance with the PERSIS and the Masyumi Party. In this context, although they tend to move to the ideal-type of the elite-based party model, the political actors of the PBB still maintain some elements of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party on the ground.

A different strategy is adopted by the political actors of the PPP in which they develop the mass-based party model when they manage the party organization on the ground. They select such a party model for two reasons. The political actors of the PPP realize that, different to the other Islamic parties, they have established a party in the district since 1973. They also understand that, compared to the other Islamic parties, they have a long experience in managing the party organizations on the ground. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the political actors of this party succeeded in establishing the party organization at the village level in the New Order period, despite the fact that they

¹⁷ Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties* (Göteborg: Göteborg University, 2004), p. 469.

experienced many obstacles from the government and military. Moreover, since activities of the party have been embedded in the daily life of the local population, they also realize that they have relatively succeeded in developing durable partisan linkages with their members and supporters. Such situations suggest that it is likely impossible for the political actors of the PPP to establish the party models except the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party on the ground.

On the other hand, they select a combination of the elite party and the mass party models when they manage the organizational dimension of the party in central office. They decide to take this strategy for two reasons. On one hand, they realize that the party leadership must take a determinant role in the decision making process inside the party in order to manage the party leadership effectively as members and supporters of the party have increased from time to time. On the other hand, they realize that they have a strong relationship with some Islamic organizations in the district, more specifically the NU. Moreover, they realize that the party has a strong political engagement with bureaucracy in the district as the district head comes from the party. Therefore, the political actors of the PPP realize that they have rich political resources to develop the mass-based party model. Consequently, apart from relying on the role of the party elites, the political actors of the PPP still maintain some elements of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party in central office.

Regarding the face of their party in public office, the political actors of the PPP tend to develop the electoralist model as they consider that similar to Indonesian Muslims in general, Muslims in the district are moderate. Further, they understand that Muslims in the district agree with the implementation of *sharia* in general, but they disagree if the meaning of *sharia* includes the harsh Islamic criminal law.¹⁸ Therefore, it does not make sense for them to impose on the implementation of *sharia*-based regulations that cover the implementation of the harsh Islamic criminal law. In addition, the legislators of the PPP come from the NU which is known as one of the moderate Islamic organization in Indonesia. As Hefner argued, together with the Muhammadiyah, the NU spreads “a culture

¹⁸ Life No Better with Sharia by Laws: Survey, *The Jakarta Post*, November 24, 2007, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071123.A05>, access date: November 25, 2007.

of tolerance, equality and civility” in Indonesia.¹⁹ In this sense, their response to the implementation of *sharia*-based regulations in the district is vague. They also lack ambition for hegemony in policy-making despite the fact that the party gained a significant number of seats in the legislature.

Further, as the patron-client relationship serves as the most prominent political mechanism in the local population, one might expect that the political actors of the PKS will adopt the ideal type of the elite-based party model. On the other hand, along with the modification of the electoral system and a growing political pragmatism among the local population, one might expect that they will develop the electoralist party model. While these assumptions are not completely wrong since this party contains some elements of the elite-based party and electoralist party models, the comprehensive features of the PKS indicate that the political actors of this party prefer to develop the mass-based party model when they manage the party organizations in the three different faces.

The political actors of the PKS decide to develop the mass-based party model at least for three reasons. Firstly, similar to the political actors of the PAN, the political actors of the PKS realize that they do not have a strong political relationship with the Islamic organizations in the district. As explained in the previous chapters, the PKS experiences many difficulties in establishing the political relationships with the major Islamic organizations in the district. The NU’s leaders in the district mostly believe that the party adopts Wahhabism that is totally different from the ideology of the NU. Meanwhile, the Muhammadiyah has been relatively successful in maintaining its neutrality in political field. In this context, developing the party machine is a must for the political actors of the PKS in gaining as many supporters as possible.

Secondly, emerging from an Islamic intellectual movement, the political actors of the PKS realize that they have organizational skills to manage the face of their party in central office. Accordingly, similar to the political actors of the PAN, the political actors of the PKS prefer to apply modern management principles. They also disregard the patron-client mechanism as not many of them serve as leading Islamic leaders and teachers in the district on one hand and as they realize that they do not have a strong relationship with

¹⁹ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam. Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 218.

Islamic leaders and teachers in the district on the other hand. Under such constraints and incentives, they decide to adopt the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party in central office.

Thirdly, similar to their counterparts at the national level,²⁰ the political actors of the PKS in the district realize that they must develop a positive political image so that the party can be distinguished from the legislators from the other Islamic parties. Based on this consideration, they supported the implementation of various *sharia*-based regulations in the district. Such an effort is very important in attracting supporters coming from the proponents of the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of an Islamic state. In addition, as they put an emphasis on developing a positive political image among the local population, they have often been accused of being a hypocrite by the legislators from the other Islamic parties. These illustrations suggest that developing the mass-based party in the party organization in public office is the best alternative option for the Islamic political actors of the PKS in order to attract as many votes as possible.

In general, the findings of this study show that the ideological spectrum of Islamic parties in Indonesia, as discussed in Chapter 4, has nothing to do with the way the Islamic political actors organize their parties. In other words, the ideological foundation of the Islamic parties has no correlation with the party models. In this context, one might expect that the Muslim-Nationalist parties will adopt the ideal-type of the electoralist party model, while the Islamist parties will adopt the ideal type of the mass-based party model. As revealed by this study, instead of adopting the ideal-type of the electoralist party model, the Muslim-Nationalist parties, more specifically the PAN and PKB tend to adopt the ideal-type of the mass-based party and the elite-based party models, respectively. Meanwhile, in the case of the PKS and PPP, it is true that these Islamist parties tend to adopt the ideal-type of the mass-based party model. On the other hand, the case of the PBR and PBB indicates that these parties tend to adopt the ideal-type of the elite-based party model.

²⁰ Furthermore on the PKS at the national level, see Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 339; Mathias Diederich, "Islamic Parties in Indonesia's Political Landscape and Their Respective Stances on Woman and Minorities," in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.), *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), p. 98; Ahmad-Norma Permata, "Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006," PhD dissertation, Münster University, 2008, pp. 260-66; Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy and Whit Mason, *Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey* (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008), pp. 68-70.

Table 8.2
Performance of the Islamic Parties
In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections in the Tasikmalaya District

| Islamic Parties | Votes 1999 (%) | Seats 1999 (from a total of 45 seats) ²¹ | Votes 2004 (%) | Seats 2004 (from a total of 45 seats) | Votes 2009 (%) | Seats 2009 (from a total of 50 seats) |
|-----------------|----------------|---|----------------|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| PAN | 5.53 | 3 | 4.47 | 2 | 7.53 | 3 |
| PKB | 11.48 | 5 | 7.79 | 5 | 8.83 | 5 |
| PBR | - | - | 3.87 | 1 | 0.64 | - |
| PPP | 25.67 | 11 | 27.06 | 12 | 27.13 | 14 |
| PK/PKS | 1.36 | 1 | 6.4 | 4 | 6.89 | 5 |
| PBB | 4.70 | 2 | 3.15 | 1 | 1.08 | - |
| Total | 48.74 | 22 | 52.74 | 25 | 52.1 | 27 |

Source: Modified from Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (1999-2009).

The findings of this study also suggest that there is a relatively strong relationship between the way the Islamic parties organize and their performance in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. In other words, the way the Islamic political actors manage their party organizations has a consequence for their achievement in these elections. If we explore further the relationship between the way the Islamic parties organize and their achievement in the district in these elections, as shown in Table 8.2 above, we can see that the Islamic parties which tend to adopt the ideal-type of the mass-based party model were able to maintain their level of political support in these elections. In contrast, the Islamic parties which tend to adopt the ideal-type of the elite-based party model were not able to increase or maintain their political attainments in these elections.

More specifically, the PKS succeeded in increasing its level of political support slightly from 6.4 percent of the votes in the 2004 election to 6.89 percent of the votes in the 2009 election. Similarly, the PPP succeeded in increasing their level of political support slightly from 25.67 percent of the votes in the 1999 election to 27.06 percent of the votes in the 2004 election and 27.13 percent of the votes in the 2009 election. After suffering from experiencing a significant decline in the 2004 election, the PKS succeeded in increasing its level of political support to 7.53 percent of the votes in the 2009 election. Meanwhile, by developing the elite-based party, the PKB experienced a significant decline from 11.48 percent of the votes in the 1999 election to 7.79 percent of the votes in the 2004 election.

²¹ In the 1999 election, five seats of the total forty-five seats in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature were allocated for the representatives of the military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) and police (*Polisi Republik Indonesia* or Polri).

However, the party was able to increase its levels of support in the 2009 election by gaining 8.83 percent of the votes. Adopting a similar strategy, the PBR and PBB were not able to maintain their level of political support. These parties experienced a continuous decline from the 1999 election to the 2009 election. In the 2009 election, these parties even failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold. In addition, from their performance in these elections, we can also see that the level of political support gained by the Muslim-Nationalist parties is stable. On the other hand, the level of political support obtained by the Islamist parties is diverse. In the case of the PPP and PKS, the level of political support has increased from one election to another, while in the case of the PBR and PBB, the level of political support has constantly decreased.

It is also important to mention that the case of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district suggests that only the Islamist parties which made a significant effort to create and maintain the political linkage with their members and supporters, such as in the case of the PPP, PKS and PAN, were able to increase their level of political support. Relying only on the dominant role of the party elites as well as on the ideology and platforms of the party, such as in the case of the PBR, PBB and PKB, therefore, is not enough to attract voters and, in turn, to win elections. Moreover, compared to the other Islamic parties, the way the PKS and PPP manage the organizational dimension of these parties on the ground indicates that these parties play a significant role in the Islamisation of the local population. In doing so, they utilize religious events in the local population. They also generate social activities in which some of them have been embedded in daily activities of the local population. These illustrations also indicate that there is a significant relationship between the degree of the Islamisation of the society and the level of electoral success.

From the discussion in the previous chapters, therefore, we can see that the Islamic political actors in the Tasikmalaya district follow rational calculation rather than ideological considerations when they manage their parties. As revealed in this study, the Islamic political actors have a set of alternative strategies when they organize their parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. In this context, they can develop the ideal-type of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party, or cartel party models. By taking into account the informal mechanism, public trust in party politics, party identification, religiousness of the local population, internal factors and the modification of

the electoral system, these actors select a definite party model. More specifically, the political actors of the PAN, PPP and PKS tend to develop the mass-based party model, while their counterparts in the PKB, PBR and PBB tend to select the elite-based party model.

It is also important to note that despite the fact that these parties select different strategies, these strategies in fact are similar in nature, i.e., they are not only efficient in terms of political cost, but they are also effective in gaining as many votes as possible. As Tan points out:

As rational actors, Indonesia's political operators have perpetually used the least costly means available to reach their political goals... Party leaders today, in an environment of high uncertainty and high stakes, have sought to take the least costly path to power.²²

The applications of such calculations by these Islamic political actors indicate they rely more on rational dimensions as well as pragmatic aspects than on irrational or ideological considerations when they organize their Islamic parties in order to maximize their chance of winning elections.²³

3. Theoretical and Practical Reflections

From a theoretical point of view, the findings of this study suggest that the organizational features of the Islamic parties in Indonesia are not completely exceptional and unique compared to the organizational features of party politics in other developing countries. The relationship between these parties and their members is weak or absent.²⁴ As elaborated in the previous chapters, most of the Islamic parties disregard a formal membership as well as membership fees. Fourthly, similar to party organization in Southeast Asian,²⁵ Latin

²² Paige Johnson Tan, "Party Rooting, Political Operators and Instability in Indonesia: A Consideration of Party System Institutionalization in a Communal Charged Society," *A paper presented to the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 10, 2004*, <http://people.uncw.edu/tanp/SPSA2004.html>

²³ When analyzing the Islamist parties at the national level in post-Suharto Indonesia, Platzdasch also argues that "Islamist parties constantly turned to be more immediately relevant political goals while putting ideological purity second". See, Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy*, p. 329.

²⁴ For a comparison, see Vicky Randall, "Conclusion," in Vicky Randall (ed.), *Political Parties in the Third World* (London: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 174-91

²⁵ Croissant, "Conclusion: Electoral Politics in Southeast Asia," in Aurel Croissant and Beate Martin (eds.), *Between Consolidation and Crisis. Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), pp. 351-64.

America,²⁶ and African countries,²⁷ these Islamic parties are associated with certain Islamic groups so that they are ethnically-based organizations.²⁸

Secondly, they tend to be dominated by a single leader so that they are often viewed simply as ephemeral vehicles for personal ambition of their charismatic leaders. As revealed in this study, in managing the party organization in central office, most of the Islamic parties rely on the role of their charismatic leaders, including for their primary financial sources.²⁹ In creating and maintaining the political linkage with their members and supporters, most of them also rely on informal mechanisms, such as patron-client mechanism, interpersonal relationship and family networks because of the absence of a redistributive welfare state.³⁰

Regarding the organizational features of the Islamic parties in public office, the legislators from the Islamic parties are rarely in a position to offer ideologies and platforms when they are involved in making policies. As a result, the pattern of conflicts or collaborations among the legislators from these parties and between the legislators from these parties and legislators from the secular-nationalist parties remains ambiguous. In addition, the PPP as the winning party has a strong engagement with the state.³¹ Moreover, the ideologies and platforms of these Islamic parties are eclectic and vague so that they also lack coherent policy. Compared to the Philippine and Thailand, however, party organization as well as party system in Indonesia are better institutionalized.³²

Based on the experience of parties in Southern and East-Central Europe, van Biezen argues that there are three scenarios regarding the organizational development of parties in

²⁶ Robert H. Dix, "Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1992), pp. 488-511

²⁷ Gero Erdmann, "Party Research: Western European Bias and the 'African Labyrinth,'" *Democratization*, 11:3 (2004), pp. 63-87.

²⁸ Vicky Randall, "Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World," in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, pp. 387-95.

²⁹ For a comparison, see Vicky Randall, "Conclusion.," Clemens Spieß, "Epilogue: Rethinking Party Theory in the Light of South Asian Experience," in Subrata K. Mitra, Mika Enskat and Clemens Spieß (eds.), *Political Parties in South Asia*, pp. 329-42.

³⁰ For a comparison, see Herbert Kitschelt, "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities."

³¹ For a comparison, see Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký, "The State and the Parties. Public Funding, Public Regulation and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary Democracy," *Party Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 235-54; Vicky Randall, "Conclusion."

³² Furthermore, see Andreas Ufen, "Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2008, pp. 327-50; Aurel Croissant and Philip Völkel, "Party System Types and Party System Institutionalization: Comparing New Democracies in East and Southeast Asia," *Party Politics* (forthcoming).

new democracies.³³ Firstly, parties in these countries follow the trajectory of parties in Western European countries (the life-cycle effect), ranging from the stage of the elite-based party, the stage of the mass-based party, the stage of the electoralist party to the stage of the cartel party. Secondly, they resemble the organizational development of parties in contemporary Western European countries, namely the electoralist party or the cartel party, rather than those in early democratized Europe (the period-effect). In this sense, by taking a ‘shortcut’³⁴ or a ‘bypass’³⁵ or an ‘evolutionary leap’³⁶ towards a more contemporary organization, they miss out on the earlier stages of party development, namely the elite-based party and the mass-based party. Thirdly, they establish entirely new types of party organization without having a relationship with the organizational development of parties in Western European countries (the generation-effect).

It should be acknowledged that except the PPP which was established in 1973 during the New Order period, these Islamic parties were established in 1998. In the case of the PBR, this party was founded in 2002. Considering their initial establishment in which the role of charismatic party leaders was very important, we can see that these parties in fact were close to the ideal-type of the elite-based party model. However, it does not necessarily mean that members and supporters of these parties do not play a significant role in developing these parties. Because of a political euphoria after more than three decades of living under the New Order authoritarian regime, members and supporters of the Islamic parties were very enthusiastic to participate actively in these parties. Such a situation occurred until the implementation of the 1999 election. During the implementation of the 1999 election, therefore, the organizational features of these parties contained some elements of the elite-based party model and, to a lesser degree, some elements of the mass-based party model.

³³ Furthermore, see Ingrid van Biezen, “On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies,” *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 44, Issue 1(2005), pp. 147-74.

³⁴ Ingrid van Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*, pp. 202-20.

³⁵ Paul Webb and Stephen White, “Political Parties in New Democracies. Trajectories of Development and Implication for Democracy,” in Paul Webb and Stephen White (eds.), *Party Politics in New Democracies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 359-69.

³⁶ G. Smith, “Transitions to liberal democracy,” in Stephen Whitefield (ed.), *The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe. Studies in Russia and East Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 1–13.

After the implementation of the 1999 election, however, the organizational development of these parties takes different trajectories. In the case of the PAN and PPP, it is likely that these parties are in a transitional stage from the mass-based party model to the electoralist party model. In the case of the PAN and PPP, therefore, the organizational development of these parties tends to take the second stage. Meanwhile, the organizational development of the PKS suggests that this party is experiencing a maturation process of the mass-based party model. Moreover, the organizational development of the PKB, PBR and PBB shows that these parties are experiencing a stagnation process in the stage of the elite-based party.

Moreover, the findings of this study also suggest that, to a limited extent, the Islamist parties are experiencing a moderation process. In party literature, the moderation theory argues that the integration of Islamist parties within the political system has led these parties to trade off their ideology and platforms for electoral viability and political legality. In this sense, according to Tezcür, Islamist political actors have become moderates as they have a strategic interest to win elections.³⁷ Sinno and Khanani also point out that Islamist parties become moderate when a democratic regime implements democratic election in a country. On the other hand, they become more radical when a (semi) authoritarian regime is in power in a country. Moreover, they also argue that for Islamist parties in a democratic country, supporting a democratic regime is more beneficial in the long term.³⁸

As revealed in this study, the Islamist parties in the district still rely on Islamic ideology, symbols, principles and values when they create and maintain the political linkage with their members and supporters and when they manage their organizations in central office. Even for the secular-nationalist parties, the role of Islam is very important in creating and maintaining the political linkage with members or supporters of these parties as the local population has a strong Islamic sentiment. In organizing the organizational dimension of the party on the ground and in central office, therefore, the Islamist parties rely heavily on the role of Islamic tenets, norms and symbols. In this context, they way

³⁷ Furthermore, see Guneş Murat Tezcür, "The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors, Party Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010, p. 69-88.

³⁸ Furthermore, see Abdulkader H. Sinno and Ahmed Khanani, "Of Opportunities and Organization. When Do Islamist Parties Choose To Compete Electorally?" in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.). *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, pp. 29-49.

these parties manage the party organization on the ground and the party organization in central office has led to the long term Islamisation of society.

However, the political actors of these parties lack significant effort to transform the ideology and platforms of their parties into public policies. Considering many constraints, the political actors of these parties disregard Islamic ideology and agendas when they are involved in the policy-making processes. In this context, the way these parties organize the party organization in public office does not have an implication on the Islamisation of the state.³⁹ As mentioned by a legislator from the PBB, Muhammad Noer:

Different to the Darul Islam movement or the Islamic State of Indonesia in the 1950s, our party will establish *sharia* in the district in particular and in Indonesia in general constitutionally. Our party is also concerned with the preparation of the implementation of *sharia*. Therefore, our party attempts to develop a strong foundation for the people before the implementation of *sharia* comprehensively. In this context, our party proposes *sharia* step by step or in gradual manners.⁴⁰

Similarly, a legislator from the PKS, Asep Hidayat points out:

Islam covers every aspect of mankind. Accordingly, our party understands Islam, including *sharia* in the general sense. To transform the ideology and platforms of the party, we attempt to propose public policies in order to produce the common good. Therefore, we are concerned with democratic issues, such as proposing anti-corruption policies and introducing pro-poor budgets rather than on the issue of the establishment of Islamic legal punishment, such as implementing hand amputation for thieves and executing the stoning of adulterers.⁴¹

Moreover, a cultural observer in the district, Acep Zamzam Noer, emphasizes:

There is no empirical evidence for the statement that the Islamist parties propose *sharia*-based regulations concerning on the improvement of social welfare. Since the implementation of the 1999 election, these parties have been concerning with symbols of Islam rather than with the substance of Islam, such as welfare and justice. They have also been relying on personal interests of party leaders rather than interests of the local population. As a consequence, it is very difficult to distinguish the Islamist parties with the secular-nationalist parties.⁴²

³⁹ In contrast to this argument, some studies have come to the conclusion that the Islamist parties attempt to implement a strategy to create “Islands of Islam” in Indonesia by implementing *sharia* in regional governments. They attempt to do so after they failed to insert the elements of *sharia* in the national constitution. In this sense, the Islamist parties employ a “bottom up strategy” through local politics after they failed to apply a “top down strategy” at the national level. See, for instance, Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 31-34; Arskal Salim, “Sharia in Indonesia’s Current Transition: An Update,” in Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi Azra (eds.), *Sharia and Politics in Modern Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp 213-32.

⁴⁰ Interview with Muhammad Noer, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴¹ Interview with Asep Hidayat, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

⁴² Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya).

In addition, many studies have come to the conclusion that the PKS changed their political stance to become more moderate prior to the implementation of the 2004 election. As a result, this party succeeded in increasing its level of political support in the 2004 and 2009 elections.⁴³ To a lesser degree, as the most Islamist parties in Indonesia, the PBB also diminished their radical political stance. However, this party was not able to maintain its level of political support in the 2004 and 2009 elections. The case of these two Islamist parties indicates that there is a significant correlation between the degree of moderation on one hand, and the level of electoral success on the other hand.

These illustrations suggest that the moderation process of the Islamist parties takes place only in the organizational dimension of these parties in public office. On the other hand, because Islam serves as the primary instrument for these parties in creating and maintaining the political linkage with their members or supporters, the moderation process does not occur in the organizational dimension of these parties on the ground and in central office.⁴⁴ The way the Islamist parties organize, therefore, provides a significant contribution to the Islamisation of society, but not necessarily the Islamisation of the state. In addition, this argument is in accordance with Hilmy's argument when he analyses the PKS:

Although they have successfully reconciled democracy and Islam in an electoral sense by participating in general elections, the extent to which they subscribe to democracy in a more substantive sense remains questionable. It is doubtful that PKS activists would advocate democratic values such as civic liberties – freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equality, and the like. Rather, it seems as if tolerance and pluralism are the only two democratic values that PKS activists uphold, but even those values are mainly adhered to externally and not internally. Internally, in fact, PKS activists must adhere to a rather stringent internal code of behavior that would appear to contradict some basic principles of democracy.⁴⁵

However, it is important to underline that, as revealed in the Chapter 7, the moderation process of the Islamist parties in public office takes place because of strategic calculations rather than substantial changes of their political attitude. In this sense, the Islamist parties

⁴³ See also, Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East and Indonesia* (Washington DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper Number 9, 2005); Ahmad-Norma Permata, "Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006"; Luthfi Assyauckanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009); Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 179-212.

⁴⁴ Similarly, Hilmy points out that "for the Islamist elites, the notion of power matters more than the notion of theology. At the grass roots level, however, theology is more important, partly because of the convincing arguments constructed by the elites." See, Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism*, p. 217.

⁴⁵ Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism*, p. 254.

still become a major political force in Indonesia in realizing the Islamisation of the state in the future.

In addition, the moderation process of the Islamist parties has its own dilemma. On one hand, the process indicates that these parties provide a significant contribution to democratization in Indonesia as they accept democracy as the main rule of the political process. On the other hand, the process also means that these parties become more pragmatic in proposing public policies. Therefore, similar to the legislators from the Muslim-Nationalist parties and legislators from the secular-nationalist parties,⁴⁶ the legislators from the Islamist parties also tend to hijack democracy at the regional level by utilizing Islam to propose personal interests of party leaders. Such a situation is exacerbated by the implementation of the new electoral system that has facilitated the emergence of the patron-client relationship and a new feudalism in local politics.⁴⁷

Further, the role of party politics in the process of transition to democracy is very important. As Randal and Svåsand argue, in terms of the party organization on the ground, parties have two important functions, namely representation (expressing people's demands and simplifying as well as structuring electoral choice) and integration (integrating voters into political system and conducting political education). Regarding the party organization in central office, parties have two ideal functions, i.e., aggregating interests and recruiting as well as training political leaders. Meanwhile, with regard to the party organization in public office, parties play a significant role in making government accountable and organizing opposition and dissent.⁴⁸

As revealed in this study, the way the Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties at the local level indicates that these parties have failed to implement such ideal functions. Not surprisingly, according to the AsianBarometer surveys, compared to other

⁴⁶ Furthermore, see Vedi R. Hadiz, "Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to Neo-Liberal Reform," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2004, pp. 615-36.

⁴⁷ The emergence of the patron-client relationship and a new feudalism in local politics also takes place in other regions in Indonesia. See, for instance, Jacqueline Vel, "*PILKADA* in East Sumba: An Old Rivalry in A New Democratic Setting," *Indonesia*, Vol. 80, 2005, pp. 81-107; Nankyung Choi, "Election, parties and elites in Indonesian's local politics," *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2007, pp. 325-54; Michael Buehler and Paige Johnson Tan, "Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province," *Indonesia*, Vol. 84 (2007), pp. 41-69.

⁴⁸ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, "Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation," *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2002), pp. 1-10.

political institutions, party politics has the lowest trust level among the Indonesian people.⁴⁹ In this sense, the way Islamic parties organize may jeopardize the consolidation of democracy as well as the implementation of the decentralized system regarding the central and regional government relationship in post-Suharto Indonesia.

More specifically, the way the Islamic political actors organize the organizational face of the Islamic parties on the ground shows that they have failed to conduct political education to their members and supporters. Compared to the other Islamic parties, the PKS is the only party politics which is able to create and maintain the political linkage with its members or supporter regularly, including in implementing kaderization program. Moreover, similar to Islamic parties in other Muslim countries,⁵⁰ all of these parties still rely on Islamic symbols, principles and norms when they attempt to create and manage the political linkage with their members or supporters. Experiencing various constraints, these parties utilize these symbols, principles and norms as the easiest way to create and maintain the political linkage with their members and supporters. For these parties, therefore, instead of being as a political agenda to improve the social welfare among the local population, Islam serves only as a political instrument to attract voters and, in turn, to win elections.

Meanwhile, the way the Islamic political actors manage the organizational face of the Islamic parties in central office illustrates that, except the PKS and to a lesser degree the PPP, they have failed to implement their functions in recruiting political leadership and in training political elites. In this sense, these parties have experienced the personalization of party leadership in particular and the personalization of party organization in general. With limited organizational skill and supporting infrastructures, they have also failed to articulate and aggregate interests of their members and supporters. Such a situation is exacerbated by the fact that the local population prefers to articulate their interests directly to the legislators from the Islamic parties rather than to these parties as a political institution. In addition, the PKS and PPP have relatively succeeded in implementing party institutionalization. Without a substantial effort to moderate their ideology and platforms, however, the

⁴⁹ Matthew Carlson and Turner, "Popular Perceptions of Political Regimes in East and Southeast Asia," *Democratization*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), pp. 377-398.

⁵⁰ See, for example, Ann-Kristin Jonasson, *At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties*; M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.). *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*.

institutionalization process inside these parties also means the institutionalization of the radical political Islam as well.

Further, the way the Islamic political actors manage the organizational face of the Islamic parties in public office indicates that these parties have failed to transform their ideologies and platforms into public policies. On one hand, the Muslim-Nationalist parties support the implementation of several *sharia*-based regulations in the district. On the other hand, the Islamist parties do not push further their platforms into the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of an Islamic state. In gaining as many votes as possible, therefore, these parties experience what Downs called as the spatial model of party competition⁵¹ in which they attempt to gain more votes by moving toward the center of party competition as the Indonesian Muslims are moderate in their behavior and attitude. Moreover, the way the Islamic political actors manage the organizational face of the Islamic parties in public office also suggests that these parties do not make effort to make government accountable. As a result, similar to the role of the regional legislature during the New Order period, the role of the regional is limited only as a rubber-stamp for public policies made by executive branch of government in particular and by the central government in general.

As the role of political parties is very important in a democratic system, the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia will be determined by how the Islamic parties at the regional level organize. Similarly, the success of the decentralized system will also be influenced by how the Islamic parties at the regional level implement their functions ideally. In order to provide a significant contribution to the democratization and decentralization, these parties must develop their organization properly so that they will be able to implement their functions appropriately. In this context, an Islamic party that adopts the ideal-type of the mass-based party model and, at the same time, proposes moderate ideology and platforms, is likely needed for the democratic consolidation as well as for the success of the decentralization process. To be sure, many things are urgently needed to develop such an Islamic party not only in local politics, but also in the national political stage in democratizing Indonesia.

⁵¹ Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 65, No. 2, 1957, pp. 135-50.

Appendix 1. List of Respondents

Bureaucracy

1. Tatang Farhanul Hakim (Head of the Tasikmalaya District, Former head of executive council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and Secretary of DPW in West Java Province)
2. Asep Achmad Djaelani (Secretary of the Tasikmalaya District)

Institutions of Election

1. Dadan Bardan (Staff of the General Election Commission of the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Bambang (Head of Election Supervisory Board)

Islamic Parties

PAN:

1. Ade Komaruddin (Executive council of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Yono Haryono (Secretary of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District)
3. Demi Hamzah Rahadian (Legislator)
4. Deden Marno (Former official of Area in Manonjaya Village and official of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District)
5. Dede Komaruddin (Former official of DPRt in Sukaresik Village)
6. Yane Sriwigantini (Candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election and official of DPC in Sukaraja Sub-District)
7. Ratna Dewi (Candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
8. Viva Yoga Mauladi (Deputy Secretary General of DPP in Jakarta)

PKB:

1. Endang Hidayat (Head of *Majelis Syuro* of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Acep Adang Ruchyat (Head of *Dewan Tanfidz* of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and Manager of the Cipasung Islamic boarding school)
3. Abdul Haziz Affandy (Vice head of *Majelis Syuro* of DPW in West Java Province and Vice Manager of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school)
4. Ujang (Administrator of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)
5. Syamsudin (Legislator)
6. Haris Sanjaya (Legislator)
7. Husen Zaenal Ali (Official of DPRt in Cibubur Village)
8. Cecep Abdul Qoyum (Official of PAC in Singaparna Sub-District, Chairman of *Garda Bangsa* in the Tasikmalaya District and Treasury of *Anshor* in the Tasikmalaya District)
9. Emen (Former official of DPRt in Cintaraja Village)
10. Sahid (Former official of DPRt in Cintaraja and Cipakat Villages)
11. Euis Hasanah (Chairman of *Muslimat* in the Tasikmalaya District and candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
12. Muhaimin Iskandar (Head of *Dewan Tanfidz* of DPP in Jakarta)

PBR:

1. Dede Saeful Anwar (Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District, legislator and legislative candidate in the 2009 election)
2. Syarif Hidayat (Deputy Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)
3. Azis Abdul Karim (Official of PIRANTI in Singkir Village)
4. Jaja Jamaluddin (Former official of PAC in Cikalong Sub-District)
5. Iron Saroni (Candidates of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
6. Nandang Harun (Official of DPW in West Java Province)
7. Yusuf Lakaseng (Deputy Secretary General of DPP in Jakarta)

PPP:

1. Ruhimat (Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Iqbal (Official of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and candidates of the provincial legislature in the 2009 election)
3. Apip Ifan Permadi (Legislator)
4. Empep Suryadi (Official of PAC in Rajapolah Sub-District and legislative candidate in the 2009 election)
5. Gopur (Former official of Branch in Tanjungjaya Village and candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
6. Eko Hadi Praja (Official of Branch in Manggungsari Village)
7. Neng Madinah Ruchyat (Candidates of legislator in the provincial legislature in the 2009 election, legislator and official of DPC)
8. Asep A. Maoshul Affandy (Candidates of legislator in the national legislature in the 2009 election)
9. Choizin Chumaidi (Deputy Chairman of DPP in Jakarta)

PKS:

1. Yuda Cahyadi (Executive Council of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District and candidates of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
2. Asep Hidayat (Legislator)
3. Dadi Supriadi (Legislator)
4. Iwan (Official of DPRa in Singasari Village)
5. Ade Suherman (Official of DPP in Jakarta)

PBB:

1. Momon Abdurrahman (Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Siddiq Anggaperbata (Vice Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)
3. Saeful Azis (Secretary of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and candidates of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
4. Muhammad Noer (Legislator)
5. Syamsudin (Official of DPRt in Sukamenah Village)
6. Iyuk Luqman (Official of DPRt in Sukaratu Village)
7. Ulih Muslihudin (Candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election)
8. Sahar L. Hasan (General Secretary of DPP in Jakarta)

Secular-Nationalist Parties

1. Eman Sulaeman (Chairman of Golkar Party in the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Ade Sugianto (Chairman of PDI-P in the Tasikmalaya District)

Islamic organizations

1. Muttaqien (Vice-chairman of NU in the Tasikmalaya District)
2. Dadang Sholihat (Chairman of PERSIS in the Tasikmalaya District)
3. Iip Syamsul Arief (Chairman of Muhammadiyah in the Tasikmalaya District and Legislator)

Others:

1. Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab (Manager of Sukahideung Islamic boarding school)
2. Acep Zamzam Noer (Cultural Observer)
3. Subhan (Academic)
4. Dudy (Journalist)
5. Dadi Abdul Hadi (Tasikmalaya Corruption Watch)
6. Roni Romansya (Student)
7. Anonymous (Thug)
8. Anonymous (Police)
9. Anonymous (Ordinary people)

Appendix 2. Interview Guides

1. Interview with officials of the party on the ground

Interviewee's name and position:

Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- In general, I am interested in the relationship between the Islamic parties and their electorates.
- The profile of the officials of the party on the ground:
 - How is the recruitment process of the officials of the party on the ground?
 - How are the religious, educational and economical backgrounds of the officials of the party on the ground?
 - What kinds of duties and obligations do the officials of the party have on the ground?
 - Why are the officials of the party on the ground interested in organizing the party on the ground?
 - How do officials of the party on the ground manage the party on the ground?
 - Why do officials of the party on the ground manage the party on the ground the way they do?
 - What is the ideal type of official of the party on the ground?
- Effort and instruments to create and maintain political linkage:
 - What is the main consideration of the officials of the party on the ground when they organize the party on the ground?
 - What is the main instrument to create and maintain political linkage? Clientelism? Ideology? Religion? Programs of the government?
 - What kinds of activities do the Islamic parties on the ground undertake to create and maintain political linkage during and beyond election periods?
 - How often do the Islamic parties conduct political and social activities?
 - Who is the main electorate of the Islamic parties?
 - Why do the Islamic parties on the ground focus on everybody or on specific groups?
 - How is the relationship between the Islamic parties and other Islamic organizations?
 - What ideal role should the party on the ground play in creating and maintaining political linkage?
- Strategy and technique in election campaigns:
 - What kinds of strategies are used by the Islamic parties in campaigns?
 - Why do the Islamic parties choose certain strategies?
 - What kinds of techniques are used by the Islamic parties in campaigns?
 - Why do the Islamic parties choose certain techniques?
- Formal membership and background of members:
 - How important are members for the Islamic parties?
 - Is there any formal membership inside the Islamic parties?
 - Why do (not) the Islamic parties have a formal membership?
 - How are the religious, educational and economic profiles of the Islamic parties' members?
 - How is the recruitment process of members?

- What kinds of duties and obligations do members have?
- Do the members provide a membership fee? Why do (not) the members provide a membership fee?
- Is there any opportunity for the members to communicate with officials of the party on the ground?
- The relationship with the organization of the party in central office and in public office:
 - How is the relationship between officials of the party on the ground and officials of the party in central office?
 - How is the relationship between officials of the party on the ground and legislators?
 - Is there any regular forum through which officials of the party on the ground meet with officials of the party in central office and legislators?
 - What kinds of intra-channel communication do the officials of the party on the ground have?
 - How often do officials of the party on the ground communicate with officials of the party in central office and legislators?
 - How is point of view among officials of the party in the central office and members of legislators on existence and roles of the party on the ground?
- Thank you!

2. Interview with officials of the party in central office

Interviewee's name and position:

Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- In general, I am interested in how the Islamic parties organize.
- The profile of officials of the party in the central office;
 - How is the recruitment process of officials of the party in the central office?
 - How are the religious, educational and economical backgrounds of officials of the party in the central office?
 - What kinds of duties and obligations do officials of the party in the central office have?
 - Why are officials of the party in the central office interested in organizing the party on the ground?
 - What is the ideal type of official of the party in the central office?
- The party in central office:
 - What is the main consideration of officials of the party in the central office when they manage the central office? Votes? Ideology? A position in public office?
 - How do officials of the party in the central office manage the central office?
 - Why do officials of the party in the central office manage the central office the way they do?
 - How is the decision-making process in the party in the central office made?
 - Who is involved in the decision-making process in the party in the central office?
 - How far can the members participate in the decision-making process in the party in the central office?
 - What kind of activities do official of the party in the central office conduct during and beyond election periods?

- What ideal role should the party in the central office play?
- Party finances:
 - What kinds of financial resources do the Islamic parties have?
 - What kinds of expenses do the Islamic parties have?
 - How do the officials of the party in the central office manage the party finances?
 - Who is in charge of the management of party finances?
- The relationship with the organization of the party on the ground and in public office:
 - How is the relationship between officials of the party in central office and the party on the ground?
 - How is the relationship between officials of the party in the central office and legislators?
 - Is there any regular forum to meet officials of the party in the central office, officials of the party on the ground and legislators?
 - What kinds of intra-channel communication do the officials of the party in the central office have?
 - How often do officials of the party in the central office communicate with officials of the party on the ground and legislators?
 - How is the point of view among officials of the party on the ground and legislators on existence and roles of the party in the central office?
- Thank you!

3. Interview with officials of the party in central office

Interviewee's name and position:

Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- In general, I am interested in the role of the Islamic parties in policy making.
- The profile of the legislators from the Islamic parties:
 - How is the recruitment process of legislators?
 - How is the candidacy process of legislators?
 - How are the religious, educational and economical backgrounds of legislators?
 - What kinds of duties and obligations do legislators have?
 - Why are legislators interested in representing the Islamic parties?
 - Who is represented by legislators?
 - What is the ideal type of legislator?
- The role of the legislators from the Islamic parties in public policy making:
 - How is the *sharia*-based policy-making processes made?
 - How is the local budget policy-making processes made?
 - What kinds of considerations do legislators have in making policies?
 - How far can the electorates be involved in the policy making?
 - How do legislators defend the ideology and programs of the Islamic parties in public policy making?
 - Why do (not) legislators defend the ideology and programs of the Islamic parties in public policy making?

- Is there any support from the party on the ground and the party in the central office for legislators in public policy making?
- What kinds of support do the party on the ground and the party in the central office provide for legislators in public policy making?
- Is there any support from the government for legislators in public policy making?
- What kinds of support does the government provide for legislators in public policy making?
- The relationship with the organization of the party on the ground and in central office:
 - How is the relationship between legislators and officials of the party on the ground and the party in the central office?
 - Is there any regular forum by which legislators and officials of the party on the ground and the party in the central office meet?
 - What kinds of intra-channel communication do legislators have?
 - How often do legislators communicate with officials of the party on the ground and the party in the central office?
 - How is the point of view among officials of the party on the ground and party in the central office on the existence and roles of legislators?
- The relationship between the legislators from the Islamic parties with legislators from other parties:
 - How is the relationship among legislators from the Islamic parties in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?
 - How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the secular-nationalist parties in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?
 - How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the government in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?
- Thank you!

4. Interview with Outside Observers

Interviewee's name and position:

Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- In general, I am interested in the organization of the Islamic parties.
- The organization of the Islamic parties on the ground
 - How do the Islamic parties create and maintain political linkage with electorates during election periods? In similar ways? In different ways?
 - How do the Islamic parties create and maintain political linkage with electorates beyond election periods? In similar ways? In different ways?
 - What kinds of channels do the Islamic parties employ to establish political linkage with their electorates? In similar ways? In different ways?
 - What is the ultimate goal of the Islamic parties in organizing their party on the ground? Votes? Seats? Policy?
- The organization of the Islamic parties in central office
 - How do the Islamic parties organize the central office?
 - What kinds of principles do the Islamic parties use in managing the central office?

- How is the main feature of the decision-making process in the central office?
- How far are the electorates involved in the decision-making process in the central office?
- How do the Islamic parties manage party finances?
- What is the ultimate goal of the Islamic parties in organizing the central office? Votes? Seats? Policy?
- The organization of the Islamic parties in public office
 - What is the type of representation among legislators from the Islamic parties (trustee, delegate, entrepreneur, agent of the government)?
 - How is the relationship among legislators from the Islamic parties in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?
 - How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the secular-nationalist parties in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?
 - How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the government in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?
 - How far can the electorates of the Islamic parties be involved in public policy making?
 - What is the ultimate goal of the Islamic parties in public policy making (votes, seats, policy)?
- Thank you!

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