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Designing History in East Asian Textbooks
Identity politics and transnational aspirations
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2 Teaching 'the others' history' in Chinese schools

The state, cultural asymmetries and shifting images of Europe (from 1900 to today)

Gotelind Müller

This chapter develops the regional analysis presented in the preceding chapter, focusing specifically on the case of China and its portrayal in school texts of significant foreign 'Others'. It provides a historical overview of how official curriculum developers envisioned the teaching of world history in Chinese schools during the twentieth century. The various shifts in curricula design are analysed as clues to changing agendas of how to frame 'the self' and 'the other' in the normative setting of school education and the cultural asymmetries expressed in these shifts. Special attention is paid to the depiction of Europe. This is taken up in more detail in a second section on current history textbooks, which analyses the various ways in which 'Europe' is framed by Chinese curriculum developers today, and what this might tell us about the official perspective on projects of regional integration in general, and East Asian regionalisation in particular.

Introduction

To become aware of oneself is necessarily intertwined with becoming aware of the other. This truism is well documented for individual identity formation by developmental psychology's empirical studies. In the cultural field, the fact holds true as well, even if the other is arguably less important than in the case of children, who in their earliest phase totally depend on the other for survival. Thus, how strongly the other determines the self of cultural groups varies, but its – at least assumed – existence is nevertheless indispensable for drawing the line between the in- and out-groups and defining what is particular about the in-group. The degree of the other's importance is supposedly already an expression of real or perceived asymmetry: we preoccupy ourselves more with what seems essential (or threatening) to us, and are less inclined to invest in acquiring knowledge on 'others' just for knowledge's sake. The history of schoolbooks confirms this assumption as one way of defining 'self' and 'other' in a normative setting. What textbooks are required to talk about and what they are not, and how they do it, give us some clues on the guiding

specific interests and motivations, as well as the conceptions of the 'self', at least on the side of textbook producing/designing agents (though not necessarily on the side of the addressed audience, i.e. the pupils). It also provides insights into which aspects of 'others' are deemed that important that future generations of the cultural–national 'self' should learn about them (be it for emulation or defence).

In the case of China, historically, there was not much official interest in *knowing* about the other, as long as there was no *need* to do so. The notion of China as 'all under heaven' (*tianxia* 天下) is well known enough, mirroring the officially maintained attitude of cultural superiority, even if *Realpolitik* in history sometimes was forced to acknowledge an inverted asymmetry, at least in terms of power relations (e.g. with the Liao, the Jin, the Mongols or the Manchus). Interest in the far-away West/Europe thus was much less developed than the other way round – a fact that has been bemoaned by many reformers and modernisers in China since the mid nineteenth century, when China suddenly appeared to lag behind in a more complex and competitive multi-centred world.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the situation changed, and East Asia was forced to pay more attention to the West/Europe. In China, at first reluctantly, information on the West was gathered and presented to the Chinese reading public.[1] However, only with the establishment of a modern school system did learning about the West/Europe become institutionalised and available to a greater number of Chinese. The school system's outlook owed much to European models, partly mediated via Japan. Besides learning about China's history, curricula now envisioned also the teaching of foreign history, including neighbouring Asian cultures at times, but above all focusing on Europe.

History education, its form and content, was an important place of knowledge production, guided by the state and its interests. It expressed a power asymmetry of the state enforcing its preferred history view via at times quite detailed guidelines, and, during most of the twentieth century, history education and textbook writers hardly managed to escape strict state control. But asymmetry was also at the basis of *what* was to be learned about the West: there was a perceived *need* to learn *from* the West/Europe how to develop (or what to avoid to achieve quick development). The overpowering social Darwinism paradigm thus conditioned much of how (world) history textbooks were framed and designed, what was to be included, and what not. This urge has still not lost its salience. Furthermore, Western (including also Soviet) books on European history often were used as reference when compiling Chinese textbooks.[2] This makes for a remarkably stable pool, for example, in the realm of illustrations.

The status of China vis-à-vis 'the world', however, changed and shifted over the twentieth century, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century China has regained much of what it had lost in status since the nineteenth century. Thus, the current attitude towards Europe, though still being

influenced by developments and shifts over the twentieth century, has opened up new lines of interest. This is owing to the objective factor of China being more globalised and integrated into the world as a major player in economics and politics today (cf. China's participation and standing in various international organisations), but it is also owing to subjective factors connected to the objective/outward 'rise' and position/placement in global networks, nurturing a new national(ist) self-appreciation. Thus, asymmetries have shifted on material as well as psychological levels, and one of the consequences is a steady shift from 'victimisation history' to more 'happy history'. Connected to this, there is also a cautious but steady drive towards stronger integration of China also on a regional level.

Images of 'the others' consequently changed and shifted as well, along with shifts of interest by those teaching their history in China. To follow these shifts, this article will outline what the Chinese state wanted to teach about 'the others' history' over the twentieth century, and then look at how Europe in particular is presented today in history schoolbooks and what this may tell us about shifts in asymmetry between China and Europe.

Configuring Europe and the world in Chinese history curricula through the twentieth century: an overview

The earliest textbooks on world history had already come out in China before a national school system was officially established[3] and thus were largely free to design their contents, though in practice they took Western or Japanese textbooks as models.[4] It was only in the very last years of the Manchu Dynasty, in 1909, that the state actively intervened in history education and put out its first brief regulations for the teaching of history, including world history. Here 'foreign history' (*waiguo lishi* 外國歷史) is named as a third topic after 'Chinese history' (*zhongguoshi* 中國史) and the 'history of Asian nations' (*yazhou geguo shi* 亞洲各國史; LSJ 2001b: 9).[5]

However, it was only in the Early Republic that the regulations become more detailed. In 1913, the first to change was terminology: former 'Chinese history' became 'history of our country' (*benguoshi* 本國史), asserting the new national claims after the abdication of the 'foreign' Manchus. 'Asian history' was to be more specifically 'history of [East] Asian nations' (*dongya geguo shi* 東亞各國史),[6] and 'foreign history' became 'Western history' (*xiyangshi* 西洋史), thus narrowing down, at least terminologically, the scope of interest in comparison with the broader outlook of the late Qing (LSJ 2001b: 12).

The early 1920s were unique in that an all-encompassing 'history' class was aimed at, giving up the division between 'us' and 'them'.[7] This move was quite conscious, as the 1923 regulations for junior secondary school (*chuzhong* 初中) demonstrate. The 'conventional' division is to be overcome to present the common advance of mankind – and to overcome traditional dynastic periodisation. It thus helps to integrate and reframe *Chinese* history, above all, by theoretically presenting the whole world in one and the same

framework. However, in a short enumeration of topics to be taught under the umbrella of a broad periodisation into 'antiquity' (*shanggu* 上古), 'middle ages' (*zhonggu* 中古), 'early modern' (*jingu* 近古) and 'modern' (*jinshi* 近世), the subchapters retained the division into Chinese and 'others', but for a few chapters on cultural contacts (LSJ 2001b: 14–15). At senior secondary school (*gaozhong* 高中) level, the guidelines of 1923 were even more innovative, including also new approaches to method. Thus, historical material was to be categorised and introduced to pupils also in a theme-oriented fashion, breaking up the purely chronological narrative. For the first time, as well, explicit emphasis was placed on modern times, which were to make up two-thirds of history teaching. These 1923 regulations were surprisingly modern from today's point of view also in the sense that they asked for simultaneous use of various materials, not just one textbook, stipulating also a more investigative type of learning. The teachers were called upon to give only some brief outlines and otherwise to use a question-based, interactive teaching method. This 'modern' outlook can also be detected in small, but telling, content details: the Mongols, for example, are presented in the context of their world empire as a 'centre', spreading out to the west and east during their expansion (LSJ 2001b: 19). This underlines the strong 'internationalist' and 'China-decentred' design of history teaching in the 1920s, which had given up China's traditional claim of representing the centre alone. 'Europe' as a term comes up here for the first time, with the Middle Ages and feudalism. Pupils were to learn about the Renaissance (termed here *fugu* 復古!, putting the accent on the 're' of 're-naissance' and implying a somewhat backward-oriented movement),[8] represented by Italy, and the rise of 'the nation' is specified here more broadly as 'Western' (*xiyang* 西洋), not 'European'. On the other hand, colonisation and economic invasion are associated with 'Western Europe' in the seventeenth/eighteenth century, focusing more precisely on England, Spain and France (i.e. on perceived 'great' nations). But this 'negative' feature is counterbalanced by integration of 'Western European' thought, i.e. humanism, rationalism and romanticism, as well as economic thought during that period (LSJ 2001b: 19). Thus, the pupil is obviously supposed to differentiate between 'the West' and various nations of 'Europe' in most cases, rather than being confronted with a consistent overarching category. 'The West', in turn, is named in connection to a 'middle-class' struggle for democracy, epitomised in the American and French revolutions. East Asian rival Japan, however, is interestingly not characterised as 'Westernised' but 'Europeanised' (*ouhua* 歐化). And it was 'European' powers that struggled among themselves because of economic aggression, in which context their aggression in China is situated, and the latter's fight against it. Thus, one gains the impression that 'the West' (which geographically covered the USA as well, but also appeared as more of a 'civilisation category') is rather mentioned in positive contexts, whereas problematic features are 'European', if not more country-specific.[9] Consequently, in 1923, the regulations talk about World War I as a 'European war' – a figure of speech that continued later in Taiwan[10] – which is interesting

in view of the fact that China had at least joined the war, if late, and suffered from it during the Versailles Conference owing to Japanese gains on her territory, the immediate reason for the May Fourth demonstrations. Thus, this naming also reflected this remarkably China-decentred (though clearly anti-imperialist) approach to history in the early 1920s, following the general trend of historiography of the time, which was experimental and free to a degree hardly achieved again in the coming years.[11]

A new curriculum shift came with 1929 when the Nanjing regime of the Nationalist Party (GMD) had been firmly established and had ushered in a phase of much stronger state control, including in education. Now, the issue was to educate citizens for a new national(ist) state. Thus, Chinese history and 'foreign' history (*waiguoshi* 外國史) were again neatly separated, though there was an argument for pointing out connections between them in class where feasible (LSJ 2001b: 21), and this division would basically remain in practice until today.[12] On senior secondary school level, there were even two distinct sets of regulations. 'Foreign history' (the master term, although the term 'world history' (*shijieshi* 世界史) also appeared; LSJ 2001b: 24)[13] was now – and for the first time – explicitly devised as 'Euro-centric' (LSJ 2001b: 22).[14] The aim in studying 'foreign history' was decidedly teleological: to 'understand how the present came about', i.e. to 'understand the present international situation'. A certain revolutionary drive is still discernible here,[15] as it is stressed that it was imperialism and capitalism that brought about oppression of 'weak peoples' and workers (Culp 2007: 234). But, after 'the Great War' (*dazhan* 大戰) (i.e. World War I), these had started to protest. Thus, 'foreign history' should – above all – explain how imperialism came about. However, it is underlined: China does not want to learn imperialism in turn from historical example (LSJ 2001b: 37). Rather, the aim is to help redress this situation of being on the exploited side. On the other hand, Western scientific thought was seen as something to be learnt from the West (LSJ 2001b: 37). Thus, one of the newly introduced features was the topic of technology as a contribution to material culture. In other words, in science, the West/Europe was a model; politically it was not. In sum, though some features were retained from the earlier regulations, such as the focus on modern times in history teaching, there were also telling innovations, most notably the explicit connection of history teaching to 'political training' (LSJ 2001b: 21).

As for textbook use, the 1929 regulations were still rather liberal, especially because new textbooks had to be written first. So, creative ways of adapting existing teaching materials or other readings on foreign history, even including books in foreign languages, were accepted. And, for diversification of content, more 'cultural history' was argued for. In terms of time coverage, the post-World War I revolutionary activities in Europe were newly added, and the post-war situation was taken up in some detail. Furthermore, the guidelines asked for some cross-over and comparative teaching, e.g. building connections between geography and history, or drawing comparisons between the French and the Russian (October) Revolutions. Thus, it is interesting to note that these

first GMD textbook regulations of 1929 retained quite some sympathy for innovative teaching in practice and for revolutionary history in teaching content. Also, the stress on historical relativity and on the plurality of voices in history is a strongly 'liberal' feature, suggesting a certain degree of continuity with the early 1920s (LSJ 2001b: 41).

This changed, however, in the early 1930s, when the GMD's efforts to keep its grip on the nation had become more decisive.[16] For junior secondary schools in 1932, the new regulations declared anti-imperialism *and* national pride as primary goals of history education (LSJ 2001b: 43). Following this tendency to promote loyalty on the part of Chinese subjects, there were some remarkable shifts in presentation: China now became 'centred' again. Therefore, for example, the Mongols at the time of their world empire were now called 'the Yuan' 元 (!), thus viewing them as 'Chinese' and, by this, laying *Chinese* claims to the world empire the Mongols once conquered, including China. With Europe, in early modern times the topic of the 'rise' to become 'strong nations' and, in the nineteenth century, the topic of nation-building (taking Italy and Germany as examples) were newly introduced (LSJ 2001b: 46), bespeaking the GMD's primary goal of nation-building at home. Connections between 'our' history and 'foreign' history were now reframed and 'institutionalised' by an obligatory final chapter on the relationship of both histories in general, on a comparison of both, and on the specific Chinese contribution to world history to 'centre' China again in the context of the world (LSJ 2001b: 47–8).

In the 1932 senior secondary school curriculum, 'foreign' history became a rather important topic, even getting an almost equal share with Chinese (*benguo* 本國) history.[17] Here, the 'world's races' (*renzhong* 人種) are introduced explicitly for the first time in the starting section as a new content feature, bespeaking the interest parts of the GMD harboured towards fascism at the time and the widespread interest in 'racial studies'.[18] Thus, in the 1930s, the GMD tried to build up a 'common identity', including the minorities in China, by arguing for 'racial bonds'.[19] (This 'racial' framing has reappeared only very recently and is part of current curricula.)

With the next curricula of 1936, at senior secondary school level Chinese and foreign history finally achieved equal shares, thus nominally marking a peak for education in 'foreign' history (LSJ 2001b: 68). However, the remark that foreign history books 'are lacking' suggests that textbook production according to the guidelines had not really made the envisioned progress (LSJ 2001b: 75). Thus, it seems, there were some discrepancies between the guidelines and teaching practice at the grass-roots level.[20]

During wartime, regulations came out to address the specific situation of an educational system under strained conditions and the need to enforce a clear-cut identity to China to hold together against the enemy. World history per se was obviously not of much interest now. Rather, to unify the country, topics such as ethnic amalgamation in China were of primary importance. Thus, world history now was to be taught only cursorily (one-fifth) in junior

secondary school (LSJ 2001b: 77).[21] This consisted of a quick tour of Greece, Rome, Korea, Japan and India, which were to be mentioned as ancient cultures, followed by the religions of Christianity and Islam; feudalism, however, had completely disappeared. Thus, 'Europe' was to crop up only with regard to the Renaissance. The former nation-building examples, though, remained, and the discussion of the axis powers drew world history up to the present (LSJ 2001b: 80). In Chinese history, the nationalist move was even more pronounced, for example relegating Western standard calendar reckoning below the reintroduced Chinese traditional dynastic reign years (LSJ 2001b: 81). In senior secondary school, the 1940 regulations gave foreign history a somewhat higher share (two-fifths), but the content only repeated in more detail the topics already taught in junior secondary school. Just one year later, in 1941, the previous division of junior and senior secondary school was abolished (which meant that content, at least, was not to be repeated at both levels). Now, only in one out of six years was foreign history to be taught (LSJ 2001b: 89). In wartime, obviously, there were more pressing issues than teaching foreign history.

In 1948, finally, the last regulations of the GMD were promulgated. As in the early 1920s, there was a move to integrate 'foreign' and 'own' history, at least in junior secondary school (LSJ 2001b: 97). Thus, invoking again the example of the Mongols, the appellation of 'Yuan' when presenting their world empire was tacitly removed. But this move 'back' to some of the early 1920s positions was only partial, as, at senior secondary school level, the division between 'own' and 'foreign' was retained, and 'foreign' history was to be as brief and cursory as in 1940 (LSJ 2001b: 100). Thus, in the very last months of GDM rule, no substantial overhaul of curricula could be achieved.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), curricula were rewritten. In the first years under communism, history was to be a subject even in elementary school. The mid 1950 elementary history curriculum stipulated the new base line: workers and class struggle are the makers of history. And historical materialism is the way to understand history. China was declared a multi-ethnic nation that contributed to world civilisation. Pupils should therefore, above all, learn self-respect, for example that the Chinese people are 'diligent, courageous and smart' (LSJ 2001b: 104). In the whole curriculum, world history made up only a tiny part, basically in terms of a world revolutionary picture (LSJ 2001b: 105). Avoiding duplication with junior secondary school was one declared reason for this short treatment of foreign history (even though the young PRC did not come out with regulations for the latter quickly). Furthermore, 'world history' (in the PRC, consistently called *shijieshi* 世界史) was to focus on the 'daily growing peace camp' under the Soviet Union's leadership, whereas the US-led imperialist 'invaders' camp' was to be presented as being 'doomed'. (One might remember it was also the time of the beginning of the Korean War and the 'socialist North Korean brother's' advance, adding to the Chinese Communists' (CCP) 'conventional' anti-American propaganda.) The third focus of 'world history'

was to be on anti-colonial liberation movements and their necessary success (LSJ 2001b: 107). For the first time in Chinese curricular development, illustrations were explicitly asked for and specified: they should comprise 'plans of revolutionary developments, time charts, statues of outstanding personalities, and photos of historic places' (LSJ 2001b: 108). Thus, even though earlier history textbooks did in fact often provide visual material, only now was its specific importance acknowledged by the state by the perceived need to regulate and actively use it.

It was, however, only in 1956 that curricula for all levels were reworked, thus leaving junior and senior secondary schools until then in a kind of grey operational zone. This general overhaul of curricula started again with elementary history lessons. However, world history was almost absent again at that level. The West appeared only in the context of imperialist aggression against China – but for the 'revolutionary' part of the First International, Marx and Engels, Lenin and the like. In addition, the most recent Bandung Conference of Asian and African states was to be mentioned, showing China's new diplomatic efforts and her willingness to speak to and for the (Third) world (LSJ 2001b: 128).

Interestingly, the 1956 curricula in general went back to the old GMD split between 'us' and 'them'.[22] In both junior and senior secondary schools, separate sets of curricula were devised: one for 'Chinese history', one for 'world history', thus stressing the difference even more than did the GMD. (Obviously, Soviet Union (SU) curricular models were influencing this consistent, clear-cut division.[23]) Now there was some coordination between junior and senior secondary school history teaching, as junior secondary schools were to take on mainly ancient history, while senior secondary schools were to focus on modern times. However, compulsory education was still far off, i.e. only a certain percentage of pupils would actually make it to junior and senior secondary school – a marked difference from the Soviet model influential at the time – and thus world history education would only 'reach' some of the pupils (Jones 2005a: 74). The declared aim of world history education was now to educate for an 'internationalist communist world-view' (LSJ 2001b: 166). Thus, the Chinese Revolution should appear as part of world revolution, as the whole world functions according to class-struggle principles, moving through the five economic stages (primitive society, slave-holder society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism). The pronounced marking of 'European' history as basically 'Western European' in most instances is notable (and might reflect current political camps on both sides of the 'Iron Curtain'). With Italy and the ascent of capitalism, this 'rise' of Europe – in GMD times viewed as a critically important nation-building topic – had to be explained now as owing much to Chinese inventions such as printing (!), thus relativising European (capitalist) 'success' (LSJ 2001b: 169).

Looking at the details of the syllabus, which sketched out textbook contents more minutely than ever before, one notes a certain focus on 'outstanding figures', which contrasts the call for a 'materialist interpretation' of history

in the general guidelines with a factual 'great men' view: thus, Cromwell, Peter the Great, Pugachev – the only 'unsuccessful figure' in this list – Louis XIV, Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau are listed for the earliest phase of 'modern' history. The French Revolution appears rather critical in historical judgement here, as teachers were explicitly asked to stress the difference between a capitalist (French) and a proletarian revolution (LSJ 2001b: 187).[24] Napoleon, in turn, was to be characterised as an invader, especially in his attacking Russia. (This clearly reflects a Russian/Soviet influence in Chinese history schoolbooks at the time, as, prior to 1949 as today, Napoleon tends to be presented rather as a 'great man'!) And a first kind of 'canonisation' of the 'great powers' of the late nineteenth century was established by designing separate subchapters for Germany, England, France, Russia, the US and Japan, always adding remarks on their aggression in China in the negative and on their own workers' movements in the positive. Only with Russia was its aggression towards China left out – obviously owing to the current 'friendship' with the SU, which was 'extended' backwards also to the portrayal of tsarist times. Worst of all was, of course, the USA as the 'typical monopolistic capitalist'. The newly introduced topic of the Paris Commune, however, became an important dividing line in periodisation (LSJ 2001b: 170),[25] and teleological narration should – in the eyes of the state – point out the 'necessary' victory of communism. Together with this teleological view, there was a pronounced accent on chronology and 'facts' (LSJ 2001b: 171). Owing to the new 'division of labour' between junior and senior secondary schools, the senior secondary school curriculum for world history of 1956 exclusively dealt with modern times. The 'political' act of the English Revolution of the seventeenth century was to mark the beginning of this 'modern' history, which was to end with the October Revolution, again subdivided into a former and later period by the Paris Commune. This 'political' (Maoist) periodisation would remain until the most recent times in the PRC, when, in the Deng era, the 'economic' (traditional Marxist) periodisation came to the forefront again.

As for the rest of the world, the syllabus gives special treatment to 'awakening Asian countries' in the beginning of the twentieth century. Probably not unconnected to the recent Korean War, Korea was especially highlighted, and in the 1950s there was still stressed a communality with Vietnam (later China's enemy) in struggling against the French. (Notably, the old 'vassal' countries, Korea and Vietnam, head the list of 'awakening Asian countries', which then moves further west over India to Persia and Turkey – indirectly bespeaking a China-centred approach.) The treatment of the SU, in turn, went into some detail also on the New Economic Policy (NEP) and later 'socialist' construction, especially addressing the planned economy and its successes – topics that were to become more sensitive in China in the coming years of dispute about economic policies. When taking up the period of the 1930s, the guidelines stipulated that Japan's aggression was to be linked up in teaching with the coming World War II, notably glossing over Stalin's non-

aggression pact with Hitler (which could have shaken the belief in the 'firm resistance' against fascism), whereas the appeasement of the Western countries was denounced as 'helping' the fascists (LSJ 2001b: 192). The SU's central (and 'socialist peace-loving') role is reinforced also by presenting it as being forced into participating in World War II by Hitler's attack, therewith, however, marking a new phase of the war.[26] Consequently, it was the SU's combat that put down fascism, whereas the Allies were not credited at all. For developments after the war, anti-colonialism throughout the world was to be shown advancing, suggesting a unilinear development of the whole world in the direction of socialism (LSJ 2001b: 193).

After this most comprehensive outline of history education in the early PRC in 1956 for all levels, which had not much time left to be put into effect before the Anti-Rightist Movement and the ensuing Great Leap shook up the nation and the education system, in 1957 there was an official intervention in history education to the effect that textbooks were 'too demanding', and thus 'simplification' was called for. Reflecting the ever more difficult relationship with the SU and the Chinese Maoist quest for a particular 'Chinese way', it was decreed that only in natural sciences could SU textbooks be used any longer as a model, whereas other textbooks should reflect more 'Chinese conditions' (LSJ 2001b: 236). New textbooks had been, in fact, produced since 1953,[27] but obviously there was no consensus on modifications in 1957, and so just 'simplification' – which went well with the thrust of the Great Leap – was called for.

The next – and last – curriculum reform before the Cultural Revolution came in 1963. Basically, tendencies already present in the 1956 curriculum were now radicalised. However, owing to the ongoing shifts in Chinese politics and the contemporary socialist education campaign, the guidelines were even more contradictory. On the one hand, a focus on outstanding personalities in history was officially rejected in favour of a reading based on social conditions and historical stages, but, on the other hand, the syllabus, in fact, showed a notable accent on 'great men' (LSJ 2001b: 239)! With secondary education, the accent on 'outstanding people' was even called for explicitly, naming, as a kind of baseline, Qin Shihuangdi (秦始皇帝; 259–10 BC), Han Wudi (漢武帝; 156–87 BC), Tang Taizong (唐太宗; 599–649) and Kangxi (康熙; 1654–1722) for Chinese history; Solon, Charlemagne, Peter the Great and Lincoln for world history. This was explained as going in tandem with the idea to highlight people who had made a 'positive contribution' in history, whereas the 'bad' ones should be talked about only in the second line. (That kind of argumentation already prepared much of what became diffused in the coming years during the Cultural Revolution and its favorite 'theory' of the 'three accentuations', *san tuchu* 三突出.[28]) On the other hand, one of the declared key tasks of history education was to drive home the difference between a capitalist and a socialist revolution (which was to be only underscored by some leading revolutionary figures), and class struggle was to be the most important notion of all.

World history had a one-fourth share in history education, again mostly modern world history (whereas the ratio of ancient to modern Chinese history was balanced). However, an uncertainty in (or rather: the contested state of) historical judgement can be seen in the stipulation that now only the period until 1949 was to be discussed in Chinese and world history, thus avoiding taking sides with later developments (LSJ 2001b: 240). Furthermore, history education should demonstrate to the pupils how the Chinese 'great dynasties' influenced the world and what they received – on the other hand – from outside, thus relating Chinese and world history (LSJ 2001b: 257). Furthermore, the guidelines demanded that Eurocentrism should be broken up by adding more non-European history – thus also moving away from Soviet models. Political struggles of the time are also reflected in the outline's call not to talk too much about 'theory', but to get down to concrete issues,[29] even if 'correct' evaluations were mandatory. The guidelines explicitly warned against taking all history as allegorical hints for today – as was the position of the leftists. And world history also should educate towards friendship with neighbours and beware of chauvinism (LSJ 2001b: 259) – a call that went unheard, judging from hindsight, with regard to all the territorial conflicts in the years to come. But the world history syllabus of 1963 secondary education also self-assuredly pointed out, for example with feudalism, that China made the transition to feudalism 1,000 years earlier than Europe! If the end of feudalism in Europe came with peasant uprisings in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries and the first manufactures in Italy, then China was for most of ancient history's time much more advanced than all others. And – as a kind of addendum to global ancient history – it obviously 'gave much' to other Asian cultures (LSJ 2001b: 302). The detailed syllabus even argued, in the context of the seafarers (namely Diaz, da Gama, Columbus and Magellan), that this 'classical' Western 'rise' topic was now to be 'enriched' by adding Chinese seafarer Zheng He (鄭和; 1371–1433(?)), stressing again that he was 'earlier' than the Europeans (LSJ 2001b: 312).[30] In the context of the 'Asian peoples' struggle against foreign invasion', the more self-assured Chinese attitude is evident as well in presenting the Taiping 太平 in this context as a major force; and the contribution of Chinese immigrants to Indonesia's struggle against the Dutch is also highlighted (LSJ 2001b: 317). Thus, in this historical vision of 'world' history, the emergent self-complacent Sinocentric attitude is striking – and obviously is to compensate for the 'loss' of the Soviet model. In sum, in Chinese perception, an upgrading of the Chinese 'self' was necessary, leading to a readjustment in cultural asymmetry between the Soviet–European and the Chinese side in history textbooks.

After 1963, there was a longer break in curriculum development, owing to the Cultural Revolution. Even though textbooks on history were also produced in this phase, especially in the last years of the Cultural Revolution, there were no official guidelines, as the Ministry of Education remained closed for years. Thus, the next official regulations came out only after the Cultural

Revolution, in 1978. Here, the transition to a new framework emerges. For the first time, Maoism is explicitly referred to, and recent political struggles are evident: there is a denunciation of 'Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇; 1898–1969), Lin Biao (林彪; 1907–71) and the 'Gang of Four's' idealist history view' and especially of the 'Gang of Four's' distortion of history, which used it only as a weapon for attack (LSJ 2001b: 327), such as speaking about Confucianism versus Legalism when intending 'classes'. Now, classical Marxist history concepts such as the relations of production and the like were reinstated. The still prevailing uneasiness over how to tread on the contested field of education is reflected anew, however, in frequent, cautious insertions of citations of Mao's works, which had almost never been cited earlier in guidelines during Mao's lifetime. Previously, hardly any citations were to be found, and where they were, they were usually from Marx and Engels or Lenin (LSJ 2001b: 328).[31] Looking more closely, however, one realises that Mao's chosen words are skilfully used to defend and shield the transition to what is actually a new framework that differed in content from the earlier 'Maoist' thrust in education. A new note is, for example, struck by China being defined again as multi-ethnic, *without*, however, insisting on the 'central role' of the Han. Typical of the new, post-Cultural Revolution framework was also the new accent on economy in history. In general, world history was to be taught only in the first year of senior secondary school (which was integrated in the newly established 'whole ten-years education system'), and it was stipulated that it had to be taught through to the end of World War II only, whereas the time afterwards was to be merely sketched out, naming the SU – in accordance with 'politically correct' parlance of the time – as representing socialist imperialism, US imperialism, the Cold War and the 'Third World's awakening'. (With Chinese history, however, it was decided that it should be taught until 1957, arguing that this was the year the fifth volume of the official edition of Mao's works came out. Thus, obviously, one still felt safe only under Mao's 'umbrella'.) In textbook styles, there was one new feature introduced: a division into main text and smaller sections for 'self study' signalled a breaking away from the exclusive focus on the teacher's narrative along textbook lines (LSJ 2001b: 330). In addition, a new attention to complementary material such as films etc. is to be noticed (LSJ 2001b: 330), again suggesting a first move towards a greater consideration of soliciting pupils' interest.

All in all, these 1978 guidelines show a first tentative move to break free of Maoist fetters without a complete rupture with the past, hiding the shift behind a carefully constructed Maoist façade, which resulted in the obviously transitional character of the guidelines. The transition went on with the 1980 curriculum, but, in 1986, the new framework fully emerged, and the educational system was overhauled on all levels, thus marking the year as the second decisive moment in the PRC history curriculum development after 1956. Finally, history would now be taught up to the present, i.e. up to the 1980s. (This was very probably owing to the 1981 party resolution on history,

which had decided upon historical 'verdicts' also for the more recent period. Thus, an official genre such as textbooks could finally follow up trends that had been spelled out already in academic historiography (LSJ 2001b: 441).[32]) All in all, the tone of the 1986 guidelines was moderate. In post-World War II history, the successes of the capitalist countries were now conceded, and their innovative power was acknowledged. The socialist countries, in turn, were spoken of somewhat vaguely as being 'set upon reform', and the attacks on the SU were notably toned down (LSJ 2001b: 483), reflecting the political détente underway. Structurally, there were some new chapters added, such as the ones on Western science, literature and art, which, however, were marked as 'not relevant' for examination (LSJ 2001b: 487), thus again demonstrating a move towards a more complex design of lessons and textbooks, with obligatory and facultative sections.

Shortly afterwards, in 1988, another important step was taken by new regulations that established finally the new compulsory education system of nine years, with six years of elementary and three years of junior secondary school, as it is still today. Several other new developments can be discerned here: there was a whole new section introduced in the guidelines on 'principles' of structuring content. These stress that the economy has to be the most important aspect, and only on this basis should one discuss politics and culture (an anti-Maoist and Dengist stance). A further principle is 'friendship' with other countries, another historical materialism. Thus, there is clearly a return to 'classical' Marxist positions (LSJ 2001b: 511), which had been the direction of change since the Cultural Revolution but was only now safely engrained enough to be declared explicitly. Chinese history was to be taught in an ancient–modern ratio of 1:1, whereas world history was to remain mainly modern (1:2; LSJ 2001b: 512). Structurally new are the introductory 'guiding questions' taking up general problems such as why and how one should study world history (LSJ 2001b: 533), thus adding a more reflective note to the 'traditional' simple memorising of historical facts.

In 1990, the next curriculum came out, encompassing now both junior and senior secondary schools, but the contents were not significantly altered. Only in 1991 did a new turn become evident in an official comment on history education, based on then-General Secretary Jiang Zemin's (江澤民; 1926–) call for an education 'fitting the national sentiment' (*guoqing* 國情; LSJ 2001b: 607). Here, clearly, the current upheavals in the socialist world were in the background. Language became more aggressive again, for instance interpreting post-World War II history as being nothing else than a continuation of imperialism by other means (LSJ 2001b: 631). History education had, again, become problematic owing to context changes, and thus these years were another little transitional phase before a decision was reached on how to deal with these recent challenges in the world, with the demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states[33] adding to inner-Chinese tensions epitomised in the 1989 protests and their crushing. Obviously, established views of 'self' and 'other' had to be readjusted.

Current images of Europe in Chinese history textbooks: an analysis

With the new regulations for junior secondary school history textbooks in 1992, history education started to shift towards readjusting to the current situation (LSJ 2001b: 656–85). On the one hand, owing to worldwide, massive changes in connection with the dissolution of the SU and the recent legitimacy crisis in China in 1989, a new section on 'ideological education' was added to the guidelines for history classes (LSJ 2001b: 678–9). However, also introduced was a more 'modern' stress on 'competence education', thus demonstrating a simultaneously defensive and modernising reaction to cope with the situation (LSJ 2001b: 679). In terms of evaluations of European history, one notable issue is the more and more pronouncedly positive evaluation of the French Revolution (LSJ 2001b: 677), which in the years to come would finally shake off the 'ambivalent' reading of its being a 'capitalist' revolution to being declared, if not hailed as, a 'great revolution' (*da geming* 大革命) in 1994 (LSJ 2001b: 701). The 'ideological' topic of the Paris Commune, though, was downgraded in importance. This is one of the signs of how Chinese historiography tried to bridge the gap to world historiography abroad at the time without forsaking 'revolutionary history' per se.[34] Furthermore, when talking about the most recent period, history classes in the mid 1990s would, for the first time, also take up the issue of European integration – and try to explain the end of the SU to Chinese pupils (LSJ 2001b: 684). In this context, a new reading of the post-Cold War world, with the new political formula of 'one superpower' (i.e. the USA) and the multipolarisation of the world (*duojihua* 多極化), was introduced in the 1996 guidelines (LSJ 2001b: 704). Thus, the discussion of Europe *apart* from the USA also came up in the context of a certain 'counterweight' to the negatively 'hegemonic' United States. The 1996 section on 'ideological education', furthermore, argued that the world has grown competitive, implying that the educational aim of patriotism is also meant to help China remain competitive through the loyalty and dedication of her subjects (and thus not only to bolster the CCP's claim to power, probably to gain wider acceptance for the need of 'ideological education'; LSJ 2001b: 705). The periodisation also manifests a new approach: it is, in a way, much more traditionally Marxist in giving higher priority to economic than political developments – something that is in line with the whole readjustment after the Cultural Revolution, as we have seen, but that only now was firmly entrenched enough to even tackle periodisations. Whereas, in the Mao era, the 'political' English Revolution had usually marked the beginning of 'modern times' (*jindai* 近代), now that place was taken by the 'rise of capitalism' – going well also with the CCP's cautious reappraisal of market economy at the time (LSJ 2001b: 706). The 2000 guidelines add a new perspective only with regard to the fact that the crumbling of communism in Eastern Europe is now explained as a momentary 'low ebb of socialism' and that one should understand the world as being in 'continuous

turmoil' (LSJ 2001b: 730), thus making room for no longer having to end with a 'rosy' revolutionary future perspective, as CCP textbooks had been required to do for decades, which had become ever more difficult to sustain in view of realities. Some reason is given also for the 'failure' of Eastern Europe: reforms in the 1970s and 1980s were 'not adequately' undertaken, thus implicitly throwing into profile the 'correct' Dengist course. China's future – a kind of continuous warning – depends on it being made fit for 'international competition', and in this regard the CCP has historically 'proven' to be the most capable agent.

The present guidelines demonstrate some further shifts in designing 'self' and 'other' in history teaching.[35] Now, for the first time, state-authored curricula – notably terminologically downgraded to 'curricula standards' – in the PRC devise an obligatory enumeration of the 'three races' (white, yellow, black) in the very first section of the world history course (LKB 2001a: 21),[36] thus ironically taking up a legacy of the GMD in the 1930s. Even though this might be explained as a (nineteenth-century) Marxist-driven attempt to ground 'history' again in 'materialist' biological factors, it goes well with the new 'racial' recasting of Chinese identity and culture (blending the 'racial' and the cultural 'self') discernible in China mainly since the 1980s and thus, again, proves textbooks to be mirrors of the state's general agenda.[37] Furthermore, it goes well with the perceived global 'competition' for which education has to make Chinese citizens fit. Thus, for example, historical issues such as cultural contacts, which earlier were divided in textbooks into singular sections when considering a specific region (e.g. Arab civilisation, followed by Sino–Arabian cultural contacts; Korean civilisation, followed by Sino–Korean contacts, etc.), were now reorganised into a new comprehensive chapter on global cultural contacts and conflicts, from the Greco–Persian Wars to Marco Polo, thus focusing on the theme of coexistence and rivalry through the ages. In this way, the pupil is also to realise that interaction and integration with the world often entail politically and culturally asymmetrical arrangements, but also constant efforts to readjust them.

As for the framing of 'Europe' and the West, in pre-modern history the term 'Europe' comes up – as in earlier textbooks – as 'Western Europe' only with the Middle Ages and 'feudalism'. In modern, i.e. 'real' world, history (LKB 2001a: 23),[38] in turn, the 'most important European nations' are to be focused upon, as they (and later Japan) made the transition from feudalism to capitalism and only then moved ahead of China. This all remains in the established framework. Notable, however, is that this section on the 'rise' of capitalism switches back in language to a rather emotional and aggressive tone, for instance stating that capitalism 'cruelly exploited' other peoples or that the powers aimed 'madly' at enlarging their colonies (LKB 2001a: 23), which in the – for the rest – rather prosaic style of today's guidelines appears somewhat anachronistic. The 'most important countries' of 'Europe' and America are, however, also credited for initiating the second industrial revolution and for having art, as technology, boom in an 'unprecedented way'

(LKB 2001a: 23). Thus, 'modern' world history is designed to above all 'analyse capitalism's progressing character, brutality, greediness and expansiveness' to make pupils 'realise the great historical importance of the birth of Marxism' and to 'understand the righteousness and reasonableness of the fight of the colonised peoples against capitalist invasion and expansion' (LKB 2001a: 24). In sum, the 'modern' West still appears as highly problematic in these current guidelines.

If one looks to the syllabus details, however, there are slight differences:[39] for example, for the early phase of 'modern' history, not only is capitalism mentioned (in terms of maritime expansion), but also the Renaissance (in terms of an art topic), as a 'counterbalance'. The three major developments of the English Glorious Revolution, American independence and the 'great French Revolution' are to be represented by the 'Bill of Rights', the 'Declaration of Independence' and the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man', thus introducing pupils to crucial texts of Western (liberal!) tradition. And, for the 'personal' part, Washington and Napoleon are chosen as standing for the (great) 'capitalist politicians'. Thus, the stress is much less on the negative aspects, which leaves one with the impression that the general guidelines might be more of a political statement, whereas the syllabus is more interested in the West's 'contributions' to 'world history'. The suggestions for activities also add new features in that, for example, with the Renaissance, the reading whether the 're' was more important or the 'naissance' should be discussed, which makes for an interesting (more complicated) view compared with the formerly simple 'progressive' reading of that topic in the PRC. Napoleon, on the other hand, is even part of 'emotional education' with the suggestion of the film *The Battle of Austerlitz* (*Austerlitz*, German film of 1960), notably shifting him from the earlier somber figure – under Soviet influence, which denounced him for his attack on Russia – to a 'great man' dominating Europe![40]

Only with colonisation, another 'emotional' topic that, however, touched China herself, is the negative image of Europe consistent: the 'brutality' of it has to be demonstrated to the pupil. Thus, the example of Robert Clive, who laid the foundations of British rule in India, is newly introduced, adding to the already established narrative of Britain having been able to become a 'great nation' only thanks to exploitation of its colonies. Again, there is a suggestion to educate emotionally – this time towards sympathy with anti-colonial forces – by a movie on the Indian 'Queen of Jhansi', who attempted to resist the British in the mid nineteenth century (LKB 2001a: 25).[41] In a sense, then, where Napoleon represents the topic of European great power (at home), the 'Queen of Jhansi' points at that power's abuse (abroad).

Furthermore, with a view of how the rest of the world *positively* coped with that European/Western power, a kind of tentative comparative discussion of reform policies is introduced with the Meiji Restoration and Japan's way to 'capitalism' by contrasting it with the (failed) Chinese 1898 reforms (LKB 2001a: 26).[42] Europe, however, is to be looked at also for the development of the workers' movement and communism, i.e. as providing important lessons

on how to deal with capitalism critically as well. A major topic is, of course, the world wars, namely World War II. In this context, a slightly new note is provided by suggesting the film *The Defense of Stalingrad*[43] – stressing the Soviet contribution to anti-fascism – together with the film *General Patton*[44] – now also crediting the Allies with this US 'hero'(!) – by which pupils should gain confidence that righteousness will be victorious in the end (LKB 2001a: 30). In this way, the aim of teaching World War II in the context of 'world history' classes – in marked difference from the teaching of it in 'Chinese history' classes, which focuses on the Chinese–Japanese conflict and Japanese wartime atrocities in China – is a view of World War II's global implications, stressing the common (achieved) goal to subdue fascism. As for the post-war period, compared with earlier guidelines, a new feature in the current ones is the integration of biotechnology and Western popular culture (jazz or Hollywood movies) as new topics to be covered by 'world history', making for a more diversified and less exclusively 'political' image of the present West/Europe, thus opening up new lines of interest to pupils.

Now, how do the guidelines translate into textbooks? And what images of Europe in particular emerge? I will take a look at three currently used sets of world history textbooks for junior secondary school based on the national curriculum standards (still in the testing phase), which also provide some regional diversification:[45] the indisputably most widely used People's Education Press (PEP)[46] textbook in current (2008) use, appearing in Beijing, the textbook for the Shanghai region by East China Normal University Press[47] and the one for Sichuan in South-West China, published by Sichuan Education Press. As the most relevant shifts for a 'new' way of configuring 'Europe', China and their contemporary impact are focused on the *current* role of Europe and China in the world,[48] I will consider here specifically the representations of the post-war era in these textbooks.

The PEP textbook takes on the prescribed post-war topic of 'the most important capitalist countries' development and change' by covering 'Western Europe' and Japan in one chapter (after having presented the USA in a separate one), discussing their economic take-off. It states that, in the early 1950s, Western Europe already was beyond its pre-war economic level. Furthermore, the pupil learns about how West Germany and France became the nucleus of the European Community. The textbook also tells in detail what has changed with integration: everyone and every good or capital can move freely, one can take up work and settle or study everywhere. The tendency to come closer to a unified foreign policy is also stressed. The participant countries 'share' their resources and complement each other (which sounds almost communist), and all benefit economically. (The growth of the European Union is up to date to 2007.) There is one passport, one flag and one anthem (Beethoven's *Ode to Joy* – which is very famous in China, though few Europeans might be aware that it is the 'common anthem' of the European Union). The institutional structure of the European Union is presented as well. Thus, the image of the European Union emerges as extremely positive

and driven by ideals (*Shijie lishi, xia* 2007: 54–6).[49] (The book, however, does not talk about Asian integration, e.g., the ASEAN, as others do.) In the chapter on the present situation, it becomes quite clear that the 'exaltation' of Europe also has some 'anti-US background'. It is pointed out in the introductory section, at length,[50] that the USA were close to a voting debacle in 2000 for elections to the UN Human Rights Committee, which is thought to show that many countries, i.e. including the 'traditional' US allies in Western Europe, are less inclined to accept US 'hegemony' today (*Shijie lishi, xia* 2007: 90). The present 'multi-polar' world, the textbook states, at least includes Europe, Japan, China and Russia, besides the USA, as 'poles' (*Shijie lishi, xia* 2007: 91). And as the guidelines ask for a special treatment of the Kosovo Conflict to denounce US/NATO actions, the blame on the whole conflict is put on the USA exclusively, and the bombing of the Beograd Chinese Embassy is accentuated by a photo of Chinese youths demonstrating against the 'US bombings' (*Shijie lishi, xia* 2007: 92). The USA is to be 'unmasked' for having 'used' the human rights argument to invade a sovereign European country (the Yugoslavian Federation) – which is probably why the aforementioned introductory section had addressed the human rights voting debacle, and the number of warships and airplanes is enumerated to show how the USA forcefully attempted to go against a multipolarisation of the world. Effectively, critical US human rights reports are cited to show America's 'black' side and to make pupils think about US human rights rhetoric even more (*Shijie lishi, xia* 2007: 93). However, the answer to this contested situation should be more worldwide integration, and thus the last chapter deals with globalisation and China's joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the latter's problematic aspects for China not negating the action, which on balance has been 'the right step'.

The Shanghai textbook is slightly different in tone. On the post-war period, it is more critical, for example also noting the recent (since the late 1980s) trend of a neo-conservative rise around the globe (Wang S. 2006: 89). It does not split the American economic rise from Europe and Japan, as PEP did, and puts the emphasis with European integration on Western Europe's economic necessities and on its being squeezed in between the two superpowers, i.e. it argues for the whole process having been driven by need, not lofty ideals. From the outset, it is described as an activity of 'the Six' (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; Wang, S. 2006: 93). However, only the early developments until 1991 are discussed together in the same chapter. The questions at the end of this chapter, though, explicitly ask whether European integration could be more than a specific case: a model of global significance (Wang S. 2006: 96). Thus, the more 'sceptical' Shanghai textbook is the one to raise the question of China's possible consideration of similar efforts. In the chapter on the liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the textbook also takes up the 'rise' of Singapore and South Korea and includes a short discussion of the 'Four Tigers', encompassing 'China's Taiwan' and Hong Kong together with the other two (Singapore and

Korea; Wang S. 2006: 104–5), bespeaking its consideration of 'Asian' contexts and prospects. The part on the WTO, on the other hand, is much more positive than in the PEP textbook, leaving out the latter's reservations and arguing that finally China is part of the world (which might also reflect Shanghai's strong position in international economics; Wang S. 2006: 123). In its treatment of the Gulf, Iraq and Kosovo wars, the Shanghai textbook, however, is even more anti-US than PEP (which, probably, being located in Beijing, close to the government and issuing the most diffused textbooks, would be more cautious also for diplomatic reasons). The USA is furthermore accused of destruction of the environment (and 'Third World countries' of population explosion, the Chinese part in both not directly addressed, however! Wang S. 2006: 124–7). Thus, the Shanghai textbook reflects an awareness of China's being part of international competition and of the need to reconsider the specific advantages of its geopolitical situation to develop its competitive potentials.

The Sichuan textbook, finally, presents still another view: it, again, takes all prospering economies after the war, i.e. the USA, Western Europe and Japan, together as exemplifying the 'golden era' of economic development (Gong 2006: 90). With regard to Europe, West Germany's economic success is particularly highlighted (Gong 2006: 91–2). European integration is also presented, naming above all France and Italy(!), and only in the italics section (not necessary to read) giving more details since 1951. However, the section is very short and no comparison to the rather detailed introduction in PEP. The European Union is mainly seen – like Japan – as a competitor with the USA, 'shaking' the 'hegemony' of the United States (Gong 2006: 95). However, it is precisely the Sichuan book that talks more about 'Asian integration'. Thus, only here does the ASEAN come up (Gong 2006: 108). (The 'Four Little Tigers' enumerated after describing the take-off of South Korea and Singapore notably mean, here, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, bespeaking a stronger interest in Southeast Asia, which – after all – is also geographically close to south-west China (Gong 2006: 108). It means, however, that Taiwan and Hong Kong and their remarkable economic successes in the post-war period do not figure at all!) In the globalisation chapter, international organisations, including the European Union, but also APEC, are cited as examples of growing connectedness (Gong 2006: 121). The story of the European Union is consequently taken up in this context again, focusing on the time since the 1990s. Globalisation, however, is seen as ambivalent to some extent, as with PEP, as it also entails new challenges (Gong 2006: 123). As for the European Union, it is finally taken up a third time in the chapter on multipolarisation. Again, the European Union is evidently presented as a welcome competitor with the USA (Gong 2006: 127), and that the Europeans (like China) often have trade problems with the United States as well is listed (Gong 2006: 128), as is Germany's and France's criticism of the Iraq War. The textbook also addresses the issue of 9/11, but it does so only in terms of a 'positive shock' for the USA, as, after that, the

United States finally made some moves towards China and Russia (Gong 2006: 130), thus demonstrating that the textbook's interest lies merely in the foreign policy implications of that event. China's joining of the WTO, in turn, is evaluated as very positive (Gong 2006: 133), thus being in line with the basic tenor of the Sichuan textbook, which might be described as 'China's getting back finally to the place it ought to hold in the world'. In a way, where PEP voiced the 'ideals' of an integrated 'rise', with a view to Europe as an implicit 'model other', the Shanghai textbook linked this explicitly to the competitive situation in which China should consider applying a similar strategy, and the Sichuan textbook showed confidence in the success of the latter in terms of an emerging strong, new 'self'.

Taking together these three examples of world history textbooks, one might conclude that there is a notable interest in present-day 'Europe' represented by the European Union, but that this interest is intimately tied up with China's attempt to 'rise' in the context of a 'multipolar' world. Connected to this is the evident ambivalence towards the question of a similar Asian integration. In any case, 'Europe' clearly is framed with a view to outbalancing US 'hegemony' in global politics. Thus, whereas China had felt compelled to learn about (and from) 'Europe's' development earlier, i.e. since the nineteenth century, now cultural, economic and political asymmetries have undergone a substantial shift towards China's dealing with the 'West' at eye level, with the perspective of possibly raising itself to the upper end of a new asymmetry.

Regional integration? Instead of a conclusion

The current PRC world history textbooks show that, not surprisingly, much of the established, classical Marxist view on Western history is still there. Europe's historical image thus remains strongly tied to imperialism and capitalism, but it is noticeable that, at present, these aspects are more downplayed, whereas Europe as a cultural 'model' in the sense of (past) greatness, for example with 'great people' and scientific achievements, comes up again (not dissimilar to the late Qing and Early Republican phase, though the scientific component owes much to later Soviet influence as well). What remains in the wings is the question of regional integration: the European Union is admired, though feelings about whether this will be possible to emulate in (East) Asia are divided. Mostly, regional integration à la the European Union is seen as a political and, above all, economic device. On the cultural foundations of 'Europeanness' as an important background to any sustained regional integration, the textbooks are markedly silent, though it would be easy to take up the thread of China as 'mother culture' in the case of East Asia (cf. key words such as *hanzi wenhuaquan* 漢字文化圈 (cultural sphere of Chinese characters), 'Asian values', Confucianism, Buddhism, etc.). Though it is acknowledged that China played this 'maternal' role towards the rest of East Asia when talking about ancient times, PRC history textbooks hesitate to take it up in the context of possible future developments in the

direction of regional integration, as it is a sensitive political issue (and also easily prone to chauvinism).[51] Furthermore, the way World War II is taught – not so much in 'world history' classes but in *Chinese* (modern) *history* classes[52] – remains a constant reminder to the pupils of how difficult a closer connection to Japan would be. As long as there is no agreement on this part of 'common' history, the European Union model will not be a very realistic option. The PRC–Taiwan issue and the two Koreas furthermore complicate any regional integration vision.

In Europe, a crucial issue was the new relationship France and West Germany started after World War II. Without it, the present European Union would not be thinkable. And there was not only economic interest (though it started with economic cooperation), but also the perceived commonness of cultural 'roots' that drew the population favourably into the integration process at first. The European Union, however, has suffered all along from often having been decided above the heads of the citizens.[53] In East Asia, obstacles are much higher. In any case, without building up more trust, which cannot be torpedoed by history education stressing insurmountable differences, a regional integration is hardly possible. Thus, the Japanese–South Korean–PRC common textbook and similar projects are of great significance, even if they still have to be developed and have not yet made it into classes[54] – in marked difference to the German–French textbook, which, however, comes out only after a long history of pronounced German–French friendship.[55] Thus, in the East Asian case, this step already would be probably asking too much. It would need a strong political will, especially in China, if anything in terms of regional integration were to be 'copied' from Europe. In the meantime – as the popular TV series *Daguo jueqi* 大國崛起 (*Rise of the great nations*) and its kind of sequel *Fuxing zhi lu* 復興之路 (*Road to revival*) demonstrate – the point to learn from Europe rather rests in the older visions of 'national greatness'. Probably, only when feeling strong and secure in itself, will China find the vision of regional integration more attractive, but then from a strong position in the world and in the region (whose boundaries might be otherwise defined than simply China, Taiwan, the two Koreas and Japan), so that as 'senior' partner it might treat on its own conditions. Thus, national interest would not have to be sacrificed, and the lost, ancient feeling of 'mother culture' could be revived. Whether, however, the rest of (East) Asia would find such a kind of regional integration attractive remains dubious. Integration in Europe only included democratic (and economically more or less compatible) states and is in itself a basically democratic (though heavily representative) affair. Therefore, the present political outlook of East Asia rather points to the possibility of more economic integration. For a political integration to follow, this would require substantial changes. That even with democratic states this is very difficult bespeaks the present problem of the European Union to get ahead with political integration (cf. the constitution issue). In East Asia, which comprises different political systems, interpretations of the past and designs for the future, this is an even greater challenge.

Notes

1 A good survey is still Xiong (1994).
2 Japanese textbooks were also often used as reference during the earlier twentieth century (see Wong 1986: Ch. 2). These textbooks usually referred to Western/European history outlines themselves. In China, at first mainly English (US or UK) reference works were used, later Soviet ones.
3 There were, however, first moves to design curricula in 1902 by school edicts for primary and secondary school education. Cf. *Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo* 課程教材研究所 [Institute for Curricular Teaching Materials] (comp.) (2001a) *20 shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biaozhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian. Kecheng (jiaoxue) jihua juan* 20 世紀中國中小學課程標準, 教學大綱匯編. 課程 (教學) 計畫卷 [*Collected twentieth century curriculum standards and teaching outlines for Chinese secondary and primary school: curriculum (teaching) plans*], Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu. Here, history was also to include foreign history at the secondary school level (see ibid.: 15–16), divided into ancient, medieval and modern. In 1904, this was further specified, stating that education in Chinese history in primary school should stress Chinese identity by the 'great deeds' done by the forefathers (ibid.: 23), even more pronouncedly aiming at national pride in higher elementary (ibid.: 33). Foreign history, in turn, was to be integrated into secondary school, expressly accentuating the 'big countries' and the recent periods (ibid.: 42).
4 For further information on this point see Wong (1986). See also the brief remarks in Hsiung (2004: 38–52, reference on p. 38).
5 All official guidelines for history education during the twentieth century are collected in *Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo* 課程教材研究所 [Institute for Curricular Teaching Materials] (comp.) (2001b) *20 shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biaozhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian. Lishi juan* 20 世紀中國中小學課程標準, 教學大綱匯編. 歷史卷 [*Collected twentieth century curriculum standards and teaching outlines for Chinese secondary and primary school: history*], Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu (above and in the following cited as LSJ). Before these official history guidelines, some regulations were integrated into the general regulations.
6 As Culp has already noted, *dongya* (東亞) actually comprised in practice also what today would be called Southeast, South and Central Asia (see Culp 2007: 211–45, reference on p. 227, note 50). One may add that this very probably reflected the similarly broad Japanese usage of *tōyōshi* (東洋史) (see Tanaka 1993).
7 See also Jones 2005b: 31–63, reference on p. 58.
8 One can hardly ignore the fact that '*fugu*' at a time so clearly under the spell of the May Fourth Movement was a rather negatively connoted term. This is striking, because, in leading May Fourth publications, the Renaissance (usually termed (*wenyi*) *fuxing* (文藝) 復興!) had a very positive image!
9 One may note that 1923 was a time when China harboured hopes in the US role as a fair arbitrator to help China (and to ward off Japan's ambitions on the mainland), as epitomised in the recent Washington Conference, 1921–2. This may be one further reason for stressing 'Europe' in negative contexts, and talking about 'the West' more broadly in less ambivalent cases.
10 Cf. Chen 1986.
11 For historiography of the time see Tang (1996), Wang, F. (2000) and Schneider (1997).
12 See Jones, who stresses the continuity between GMD and CCP educational politics (Jones 2005a: 65–100, reference on p. 66).
13 The fourfold periodisation into antiquity, middle ages, modern and contemporary was retained, but somewhat shifted, and was more clearly defined: now, antiquity was to be from the Bronze Age to the fifth century AD, the middle ages from the

fifth to the fifteenth century, modern times from the fifteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, and contemporary times from then on.

14 Interestingly, in this 'shift back' towards a national perspective, World War I, for example, was now renamed a 'world' war, which would be the use until today in mainland China.

15 'Still' refers here to the GMD's break with the Communists in 1927 before establishing itself with the 'Nanking decade' (1928–37). Even though there is also Sun Yat-sen's (Sun Zhongshan's 孙中山; 1866–1925) legacy of anti-imperialism, the latter reflected Sun's disappointment with the Western powers in his later years and some influence of the Soviet Union. For the later GMD, anti-imperialism was more strongly related to Japan's threatening advance on the mainland.

16 One may also note that this was the period of Chiang Kai-shek's (Jiang Zhongzheng 蒋中正; 1887–1975) repeated campaigns against the Communists and against rivals in his own camp.

17 Both were taught three semesters, but 4:3 in hours.

18 Cf. Dikötter (1992).

19 Cf. Leibold (2006: 181–220); see also Müller (2008a: 153–80).

20 Since I know of no statistics on which textbook actually was used where, it is hard to determine how far these state designs translated into social practice, even when considering the various textbooks available at the time. Therefore I limit myself here to the intentions of the state in framing education on 'the others' histories', which can be gleaned from the curricula.

21 The regulations are for junior secondary school and from 1940.

22 See Alisa Jones' argument that the '1949 divide' did not hold much significance for history teaching (Jones 2005a: 66).

23 See G. Wang (1975: 1–24). For the Soviet model in PRC historiography of 'world history' in general, see Martin (1990).

24 In the general outline, at least the 'participation of the masses' was conceded (see LSJ 2001b: 169).

25 See also Dorothea Martin, who notes that, in Western history textbooks, this topic is almost never considered worth an entry (Martin 1990: 67).

26 This, again, marks the presentation as going along 'European/Soviet' lines, as Hitler's attack on the SU was a decisive moment for the European theatre of war, whereas, from a Chinese perspective on World War II, Pearl Harbor would be the more plausible dividing line.

27 This suggests that, even though there were no new guidelines available yet, except for elementary schools, in 1953, obviously new textbook production was taken up already, complying with the same historical principles set out for elementary schools and Marxist historiography in general, always with a view to Soviet model textbooks.

28 These accentuations or 'prominences' are to throw into profile the main hero in contrasting him with evil figures, other good but less perfect figures and by situating him in a corresponding 'positive' setting (see Yang 1998: 111–17).

29 For this kind of debate, see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (1988).

30 This, by the way, has become a favourite topic again recently, following hobby historian Gavin Menzies' contested publications (since 2002) on Zheng He even being the actual discoverer of the Americas, prior to Columbus! Menzies' thesis received some enthusiastic responses in China.

31 A notable exception is one citation of Khrushchev in the 1956 curriculum (see LSJ 2001b: 187) to the effect that socialism is no longer something in one country but a world phenomenon. (This could be, however, interpreted in various ways: as a simple hailing of socialism; as Khrushchev intending to refer to – and distance himself from – Stalin's 'socialism in one country'; or as a Chinese challenge to Moscow's ideological supremacy.)

32 For Chinese scholarship on world history at the time, see Croizier (1990: 151–69), Littrup (1989: 39–64) and E.Q. Wang (2003: 327–52). (Wang and Littrup have published several times on these and connected issues.) See also the general overview of Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (2005: 139–61).

33 How history teaching was affected by these changes in Eastern Europe itself can be gleaned from Zajda and Zajda (2003: 363–84).

34 For the general growing awareness of, and interconnectedness with, foreign historical scholarship since the 1980s, see Xu (2007: 325–50).

35 I focus here on junior secondary school level national regulations (2001, still in effect in early 2009, i.e. aimed at grades seven to nine, with Chinese history taught in grades seven and eight, foreign history in grade nine; each year divided into two textbook volumes) and the 'history' course. There is now also an alternative experimental option of an integrated 'history and society' course at that level, for which two versions of guidelines appeared in 2001. (For a critical discussion of this experiment see the chapter by Li Fan.) Furthermore, some regional regulations exist, but the differences are rather minimal. For senior secondary school level, there are the 2002 regulations for the currently used textbooks on 'history', teaching modern Chinese and modern world history in the first and second year, respectively (and a third optional year on ancient Chinese history); and there are the 2003 guidelines for an experimental textbook series with three volumes for an obligatory integrated 'history' course, covering all Chinese and world history together, in a presentation that differs in approach from volume to volume (i.e. vol. 1: Political history; vol. 2: Socio-economic history; vol. 3: Cultural-intellectual history), after which there is designed a six-volume set for optional courses, again thematically designed and open to pupils' choice as to which aspects they are interested in (i.e. vol. 1: Major reforms in history; vol. 2: Democratic ideas in modern society; vol. 3: War and peace in the twentieth century; vol. 4: Evaluation of Chinese and foreign historical figures; vol. 5: Investigations into historical mysteries; vol. 6: World cultural heritage). However, the differences in the various curricula versions are mainly in arrangement, and contents are described in rather less detail in the other 'curricula standards' versions than in the junior secondary school 'history' guidelines, which thus can be safely taken as representative.

36 *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu* 中華人民共和國教育部 [Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China] (comp.) (2001a) *Quanri-zhi yiwu jiaoyu lishi kecheng biaozhun (shiyangao)* 全日制義務教育歷史課程標準 (實驗稿) [History curriculum standard for compulsory education, full-time system, provisional draft], Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press (above and in the following cited as 'LKB').

37 For this contemporary use of 'racial' categories see, e.g., Dikötter (2002: 495–510, especially pp. 504–7); Sautman (2001: 95–124) (see also Sautman 1997: 75–95) and Schmalzer (2004).

38 It is stated that ancient history, though not having lacked in cultural contacts, had not yet reached a global interconnectedness, and so 'real' world history only sets in with the seafarers.

39 As noted above, there are often discrepancies between the general guidelines and the syllabus outlines in the PRC.

40 In the 'history and society' curriculum standards (version 1), he is even the only explicitly named figure in the suggestions for activities (but for Martin Luther King's 'I have a dream'; see *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu* (2001b: 22)). And in the new senior secondary school curriculum standards, he is named

as one of the 'great personalities of the period of bourgeois revolution in the West', together with Cromwell and Washington (see *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu* 2003: 24).

41 *Zhangxi nüwang* 章西女王. This probably refers to the Indian film *The tiger and the flame* (1953). The 'Queen' had been widow of the Raja of Jhansi in Northern India and rebelled against the British annexing the Jhansi territory in the mid nineteenth century.

42 This goes well with the general upgrading of the term 'reform' in Chinese political discourse, counterbalancing earlier 'revolutionary' rhetoric. (The comparison of the Meiji and the Chinese 1898 reforms is even more pronounced at senior secondary school level in the new experimental design of the optional six volumes, of which volume 1 focuses on 'reforms' in history; here, this comparison is a suggested activity in class; see *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu* (2003: 18).)

43 *Sidalingele baoweizhan* 斯大林格勒保衛戰. This probably means *The great battle of the Volga*, a Soviet film released in 1962.

44 *Badun jiangjun* 巴頓將軍. This probably means the 1970 US film *Patton*.

45 A fourth school textbook that was consulted is the *Zhonghua* 中華 edition, appearing however in Beijing, as does the PEP edition. For an enumeration of available editions, see the chapter by Su Zhiliang.

46 PEP (*Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe* 人民教育出版社) was responsible for textbook production in the PRC since its foundation in the 1950s. Only after the Cultural Revolution was textbook production somewhat pluralised, i.e. some other editions could be produced, though they had to go through a thorough screening before being admitted to be used in schools. However, the lion's share of the textbook market remained with the official PEP.

47 There is also another Shanghai textbook on world history, based, however, not on the national but a Shanghai curriculum, edited by Su Zhiliang. In this Shanghai regional design, world history is taught in grade eight, whereas the textbooks chosen here are all based on the national curriculum standards, which envisage world history for grade nine and thus make comparison easier. (Furthermore, final examinations tend to take the national curriculum as a standard, which creates problems for pupils having used textbooks based on regional curricula. However, the differences in content are rather marginal.)

48 As one may glean from the above overview on curricula designs, in Chinese 'world history' teaching, 'Europe' as a category tended to be merged into the broader category of 'the West' mainly with late nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. Only after the Cold War, was 'Europe' rediscovered as a meaningful category.

49 *Shijie lishi, xia* 世界歷史,下 [World history, vol. 2] (2007), Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe [People's Education Press, above and in the following referred to as 'PEP']. The PEP textbooks still tend to be edited (nominally) collectively.

50 For an interpretation of textual and visual arrangements in Chinese textbooks, see my article: Müller (2008b: 189–206).

51 For possible reasons why there is hesitancy in China to take up the issue of 'East Asianness', see the chapter by Sun Ge.

52 Here, one should stress that images of 'others' are not only transmitted in 'world history' classes but also in classes on Chinese history, as far as they were directly involved with China. In the latter case, obviously, Chinese interests colour the framing of 'others' even more.

53 This is probably one of the reasons why European textbooks are often hesitant to take up the 'idealistic' side of European identity (see Pingel (2002), who finds only German and Italian textbooks to be somewhat more outspoken on the 'ideal' of Europeanness). Furthermore, the debates surrounding the 'compatibility' of Turkey show how contested older views on 'Europeanness', e.g., pointing to the 'common' Christian faith, have become.

54 See the critical arguments regarding the three countries' textbook of Iwasaki and Narita (2008: 271–83).

55 The German–French senior secondary textbook *Histoire/Geschichte*, of which two volumes have appeared up to now (2006 and 2008), is compatible with both countries' educational system.

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