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# The Theory of Interhybridity: Socio-political Dimensions and Migration Experiences of Post-communist Western Balkan States

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The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the Soviet Socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states' priorities for migration policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the hybridization state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related problems. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication.

**Keywords:** Interhybridity, Migration, Politics, Western Balkans

*«Yet it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant,<sup>1</sup> and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages»*

--- Edward W. Said – *Culture and Imperialism*, 1993: 332 ---

The EU started to shape a common migration policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to structure intergovernmental cooperation. Afterwards, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and included migration policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement into *acquis communautaire*. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental cooperation to transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the third countries. Likewise, the TFEU has centralized the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the centralization to Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues.<sup>2</sup> At national level, the EU respects all member states' own constitutions and regulations because all member states have their sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and asylum flows, are referring to their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional cooperation and enlargement policy.

Thus the Western Balkans appears as a strategic region which have high priorities for regional cooperation and strategic partnership for the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming more closer to these countries. Latterly, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalizations, social and cultural funds, financial aid and so forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as twenty-eighth EU member state, giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalization talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve interparty agreement (government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to be perceived as great successes of the EU efforts.

From the perspective of free movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. The judicial complaints, debates and skeptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain against migration policies and Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly. In 2009, only these four countries have received approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) in Schengen zone. With these facts in mind, for the Western Balkan countries visa liberalizations have provided overstay of migrants and asylum applications. All Western Balkan countries' (currently except Kosovo) citizens are allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they move to any member state within this process. Chronically, some matters of free movement lay on the circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with their families in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from where they have entered (i.e. first asylum principle). Essentially, the study investigates the fundamental reasons through using empirical data and attempts to connect the main migration factors (e.g. visa, remittance, asylum and migration) are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkans. In general, the research questions are as follows:

General Questions

Form of Questioning

1. Have the EU integration process and enlargement agenda significant effect on transformation of Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions within Western Balkans?	If yes Why? How?
2. Have the characteristics of transformation process been shaped in between the Soviet Socialism and the European democracy?	How? To what extend?
3. Is the role of Constitutional Courts in Western Balkan states significant at enhancement of judicial independence and judicial review, level of democracy/democratization and rule of law?	Why? To what extend?
4. Can voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and legitimacy – effectiveness on the other be clarified in the context of industrial relations and democracy? <sup>3</sup>	How? At which level: national, international and/or supranational?

The research contributes at both the theoretical and empirical levels to the insights of employment relationship and comparative political analyses of Western Balkan countries. Specifically, it is important to ask; on the one hand how the Western Balkan countries ought to preserve characteristics of Soviet Socialism, and on the other, how these sovereign states will keep up doing reforms in political and judiciary area for meeting European standards and norms during the Europeanization and EU integration process without causing any damage towards the characteristics of Soviet Socialism. The research has focused on the Codebook of the Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006 (Klaus Armingeon, University of Berne), the Comparative Constitutional Project (University of Illinois) and the Judinst Project – Assessing Judicial Institutions and Judicial Performances in which I was an intern at Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. According to the scope of these codebooks, research hypotheses and empirical techniques have been generated as below.<sup>4</sup>

**1. Elections**

- H<sub>1</sub> The date of election of national Parliament affects the percentage of votes.
- H<sub>2</sub> The president's term in office has significant effect on mode of electing the president.
- H<sub>3</sub> The voter turnout in the parliamentary election influences percentage of votes.
- H<sub>4</sub> The number of seats contested in each election affects the percentage of seats.
- H<sub>5</sub> The percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election influences the turnout for presidential election.

**2. Post-Communist Institutions**

- H<sub>6</sub> The political system significantly influences the mode of election of upper chamber.
- H<sub>7</sub> The index of rigidity of constitution affects electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament.
- H<sub>8</sub> The presidential power index has an effect on popular veto and veto point referendum.

**3. Women in Parliament**

- H<sub>9</sub> The number of women in Parliament affects the type of cabinet.

**4. Party System**

- H<sub>10</sub> The effective number of parties in Parliament has an influence on the type of cabinet.

**5. Complexion of Government**

- H<sub>11</sub> The complexion of government affects the percentage of seats.

## 6. Democracy

- H<sub>12</sub> The democratization score significantly influences the electoral process, civil society, independent media and governance scores.  
H<sub>13</sub> Rule of Law score has an effect on judicial framework and independence, and corruption scores.  
H<sub>14</sub> The democracy score affects the national and local democratic governance scores.

## 7. Industrial Relations

- H<sub>15</sub> The number of workers involved in labour conflicts has an effect on the unemployment as a percentage of the labour force.  
H<sub>16</sub> The constitution has a significant effect on industrial relations.

[PROVWORK] - Does the constitution mention a state duty to provide work/employment?

1. Yes; 2. No

a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable

[REMUNER] - Does the constitution provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?

1. Yes; 2. No

a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable

[JOINTRDE] - Does the constitution provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?

1. Yes; 2. No

a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable

[STRIKE] - Does the constitution provide for a right to strike?

1. Yes; 2. No

a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable

[LEISURE] - Does the constitution provide for a right of rest and leisure?

1. Yes; 2. No

a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable

[SAFEWORK] - Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?

1. Yes; 2. No

a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable

## 8. Judiciary

- H<sub>17</sub> Verdicts of constitutional courts have significant influence on judicial review and index of rigidity of constitution.

$$G = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^m (v_i - s_i)^2}$$

Gallagher index of disproportionality (Lijphart 1999: 158), where  $s_i$  is the share of

seats for party  $i$ ,  $v_i$  is the share of votes for party  $i$ , and  $m$  is the number of parties.

Index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula [F]

$$rae_{ele} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^m v_i^2, \text{ where } v_i \text{ is the share of votes for party } i \text{ and } m \text{ the number of parties.}$$

Index of legislative fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula [F]

$$rae_{leg} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^m s_i^2, \text{ where } s_i \text{ is the share of seats for party } i \text{ and } m \text{ the number of parties.}$$

The objectives of the research are listed as follows: comparing *i) Elections*, *ii) Post-communist Institutions*, *iii) Women in Parliament*, *iv) Party System*, *v) Complexion of Government*, *vi) Democracy*, *vii) Industrial Relations* and *viii) Judiciary* criteria in Western Balkan countries. The scope of the research in terms of criteria and factors are as such: **i) Elections** (e.g. date of election of national Parliament, voter turnout in the parliamentary election, number of seats contested in each election, electoral threshold, percentage of votes, percentage of seats, mode of electing the president, president's term in office, date of election of president, turnout for presidential election, percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election), **ii) Post-communist Institutions** (e.g. bicameral or unicameral parliament, subordinated upper chamber, mode of election of upper chamber, form of state organization as defined by constitution, judicial review, electoral system for the Parliament, type of cabinet, index of rigidity of constitution, required referendum, veto point referendum, popular veto, popular initiative and political system), **iii) Women in Parliament** (e.g. percentage of women in Parliament, number of women in Parliament), **iv) Party System** (e.g. effective number of parties in Parliament, index of fractionalization of the party-system), **v) Complexion of Government**, **vi) Democracy** (e.g. year of acquisition of independence or official end of communist rule, overall status of a country, rating of Political Rights, rating of Civil Liberties, Democratization score, Rule of Law score, Economic Liberalization score, rating of press freedom scores, Corruption Perception Index, violent conflict inside the country or at the borders), **vii) Industrial Relations** (e.g. number of workers involved in labor conflicts, number of days not worked, unemployment as a percentage of the labor force) and **viii) Judiciary** (e.g. Constitutional Comparisons, Constitutional Court and Judicial Review). In this study, the hypotheses of Post-Communist Institutions and Democracy were merely taken into account because of the scope of the research. Thus the hypotheses of Elections, Women in Parliament, Party System, Complexion of Government, Industrial Relations and Judicial framework were excluded.

## Methodology and Background

Why the Western Balkan countries were chosen for a comparison analysis? Geographically, the Western Balkans, consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate achievement on their national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in these states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct investments will enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil society in Western Balkans.


From international migration point of view, the Western Balkan case is *sui generis*. The European Commission has been published many analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly Western Balkan countries. Above all, from the European Union perspective, these two regions have a very high priority for pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and externally in Western Balkans. Agreeably, the distance among the EU and Western Balkans is a factor that distinguishes the region from other regions of the world. The EU considers the relationship with the region as both strategy and security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of this region and that's why the hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an effective strategy for the EU enlargement, integration, stability, and development processes.

To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in European Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of Mr. Andrew Rasbash, Head of Unit: Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled 'The EU's Enlargement Policy' and the conference of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled 'The EU's Asylum Policy'. The author has also participated in a conference which is entitled 'Habermas und der Historische Materialismus.' The conference was organized on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel (Universität Frankfurt am Main), Emeritus Prof. Dr. Jürgen Habermas (Universität Frankfurt am Main) and many other social scientists have participated as speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität Wuppertal in Germany. Altogether, the author has applied two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) and ASAN - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë) to the research. The first case is testing the perception of a migrant receiver country (Germany) and the second case is testing the perception of migrant sender country (Albania). The author has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners' & Migrants' Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth interview were very significant in terms of the EU integration and development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center as a hybrid case are likely to spread and networked in the future.

Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases and the European Commission published reports in order to analyze each state and region separately and then compare the illustrations for finding out similarities and differences among each other.

Systematically, the study presents the interrelationship among concepts and categories of comparison analyses of the case of Western Balkan countries' data. The first step of migration process is visa applications. Many embassies of EU member states in Western Balkan countries have set up new regulations and procedures so that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid visa because of not meeting the eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member states towards migrants and gives a clue regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa regulations and procedures. If migrants success to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the remittances. Even though the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa application process, many inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries or different problems may emerge in home countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are the inflexible dynamic factors which directly influence both migrants at host countries and their families at home countries or vice versa. The transfer of money amounts points out another issue which is obligatory partnership with private banks and institutions. Even public institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at host countries because of several reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living in between home and host countries. For instance, migrants who face financial problems are problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host country. Therefore, hybridity which will be argued in the fourth section proposes a solution which links home and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society. The third step is asylum that covers unqualified and low-skilled migrants. Generally, asylum seekers from Western Balkan countries temporarily find solutions for working and staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home countries, the high level of competitiveness, restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries are the

essential points which force asylum applicants finding alternative solutions. However, these solutions sometimes turn out as illegal forms and damage the image of home country and make the host country change the positive attitude towards asylum seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviors of asylum seekers is the lack of information sources. Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online platforms for asylum seekers so that they will enhance awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home and host countries. The fourth step is more related to international migration because migration as a category frames the influxes and dynamics from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model will provide strategies, policies and more effective solutions for measurement of migration dynamics and creation of collaborations among state, private and civil society in terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host countries and migrants) via indirect centralization within public sphere and state's authority to attain the ultimate goal. This will be a reflection of global trends because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for legal migration of high skilled workers and well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type which is shaped by migrants of Western Balkan countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will strengthen the partnership level among home and host countries and will provide some definite solutions for issues such as pensions, bargaining, social dialogue, social protection and inclusion, healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on.



**Figure 1:** A Range of Methodologies and Their Related Paradigms

**Source:** Healy and Perry, 2000:121

Positivism, Constructivism and Case Study Research were followed as paradigmatic research methods. The research has a mainstream methodology understanding that means specified three methods were partly engaged to the research. Positivism supports a quantitative methodology and generally utilizes a hypothesis approach, which is then tested empirically, as the ontological perspective dictates that objective enquiry provides a true and predictive knowledge of external reality. The goal of positivism is scientific explanation whereas the purpose of social science is the “understanding of the meaning of social phenomena”. Constructivism, broadly conceived, is the thesis that knowledge cannot be a passive reflection of reality, but has to be more of an active construction by an agent. Although this view has its roots in the ideas of Kant, the term was first coined by Piaget to denote the process whereby an individual constructs its view of the world. Case Study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.<sup>5</sup>

### **Data Overview: Empirical Comparison of Western Balkans**

The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkan countries are as follows: Serbia has the highest international migration stock and percentage of population. Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. Noticeably, percentage of population of international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high despite the fact that these countries have a low population rate comparing with Serbia. Symptomatically, the results of the comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and percentage of population of the stock of immigrants of Western Balkan countries are as such: Montenegro has

the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. Exclusively, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants. Albania has the highest number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest number of migrant stock at host country. Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkan countries, the graphs illustrate dynamic trends. For example, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high level of inward and outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance flows. The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of asylum of Western Balkan countries indicates interesting results. Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas Albania has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum. The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of origin of Western Balkan countries emphasizes the fact that the Western Balkan region has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of origin. Particularly, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee population level. Whereas Montenegro has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of origin.

With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may recognize many similarities among Western Balkan countries when they especially focus on concepts such as inward and outward remittance flows, refugee population by country or territory of asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries and so forth. The crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the generalization of concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and differences.

Numerical results of Western Balkans are as such<sup>7</sup>: During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Albanian net migration (total migration) numbers are as follows: -270245 (2000) -72243 (2005) and -47889 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 refugees in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 76695 (2000) 2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as such: -9000 (2000) -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 9050 refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population, and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as follows: -32450 (2000), -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population, and 42509 (2010) 6.7 per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net migration numbers are as such: 281795 (2000) 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and refugee population by country of territory of origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 refugees in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent of population, 35141 (2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as follows: -147889 (2000) -338544 (2005) and 0 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 refugees in 2000 to 73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 146748 refugees in 2000 to 183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 856763 (2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population, and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of population. Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkan to the EU have also economic consequences and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both inward remittance flows and outward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$889 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$4 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$1749 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$2.2 billion. Respectively, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$61 million. In Macedonia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$174 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$401 million. Rhythmically, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$2.7 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from \$138 million in 2008 to \$91 million in 2009. Another economic consequence of migration flows is workers' remittances: in 2009, Albania received \$1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina \$1.4 billion, FYR Macedonia \$260 million and Serbia \$3.8 billion.

Empirical results also illustrate another aspect of immigration from Western Balkan to the EU. Feminization of migration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Albania, 53.1 per cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females.

Adhering to the data given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and anti-discriminative solutions. At supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a guarantee of full protection of female migrants' rights. No doubt, feminization of migration is an important factor for demographic change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminization of migration has also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and hybrid model.

Table 1: The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkan Countries

Western Balkan Countries	Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework
<b>Albania (2011-2013)</b>	€228.82
<b>BiH (2011-2013)</b>	€328.7
<b>Kosovo (2011-2013)</b>	€212.4
<b>Macedonia (2011-2013)</b>	€320.3
<b>Montenegro (2011-2013)</b>	€104.9
<b>Serbia (2011-2013)</b>	€622.3
<b>Total Amount</b>	€1.81 billion

Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit higher when the allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans total population: 18.66 million). To be sure, this evidence illustrates at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans.<sup>7</sup>

### The Genesis of Hybridity Notion in Social Sciences

Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or strategic efforts of state, private actors and non-profit organizations. Anheier examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the relation between the public sphere and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is institutionally embedded between state and society and located among the decentralized public sector and the centralizing tendencies in civic society.<sup>8</sup> In this respect, the third sector which essentially has characteristics of heterogeneity and pluralism rather than homogeneity and isomorphism was argued for engagement in between public and private dichotomy. Accordingly, intermediary zone between the state and the market covers an ambivalent political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation and organizational sociology. Thus, hybridity as appeared in sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations with difficulties that occur among Government Organizations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) and Private Market Organizations (PMOs).

Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. 'The Third Way' was argued by many remarkable scientists, politicians and authors.<sup>9</sup> The third way has various meanings such as 'new progressivism' for the American Democrats, 'new labor' for the Labor Party in Britain, a mainstream left or central left, a left-right rationalization, political environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernizing left or modernizing social democracy as Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of structuration of Giddens. What differs the hybrid model from the third way idea is that the hybrid model seeks for approaching governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and civil society from a broader perspective. Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political doctrines to create better political rhetoric for political actors of center left. Thus, the third way approach has a disequilibrium between theory and practice. It explains how the ideal policies ought to be, however, in practice it is vague that to which issues it provides solutions in real terms. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through looking to international financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as failure because of being unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations. Jordan included the big 'conservative' society thesis which is a recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the third way approach, big society idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position and active participation of churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralization process from central government to local governments and then enforces religious institutions at local level. The hybrid model that this study argues is something more than this picture. Ideally, hybridity looks into various communities, associations, unions and



organizations to form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, the role and influence of churches at increasing tendencies and voluntary actions of societies are indispensable however not at adequate level for dealing with social issues.

Giddens created a triangle which can be accepted in the context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. finance, manufacture and knowledge. He emphasized the fact that knowledge has become a driving force of productivity and expanding financial markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening foundations of knowledge base society.

Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership and central authority of state. He stated that the fundamental rights are effective for offering for participation with equal opportunity in the process of production and the interplay of a commercial society or a triple function of the fundamental rights is legitimized by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy can be maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organization.<sup>10</sup> Naively, Habermas preferred to construct the relations between state and civil society from Marxist point of view and put forward argumentations that take into account the world's multidimensional transformation process.

With respect to this great transformation, multilateralism, regionalization and multipolarity caused emerging of new regional powers in the world. Monopoly powers are by inches oligopolized and this situation has balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international and transnational level, and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. Moreover, the economic power shift from the western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries has prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective hybridization via national private actors in modern nation states.<sup>11</sup> Hybridity has various dimensions; such as political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities), judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO 26000), biological hybridity (Darwin's hybridism approach) and so forth.<sup>12</sup>

In the light of these considerations, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at national level or within the EU structure at supranational level interhybridity as the main effect of controlling migration approach is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and non-state parts with taking into account 'migration driving forces' such as remittances, labor policy (wages, employment and so forth), economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. The European Commission has created at implementing decision which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Commission has established a 'Civil Society Facility' to provide funding for non-state actors. The objective of the Facility is to strengthen and promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic transformations through increased participation in the fulfillment of Neighborhood Policy objectives.

Considering clarifications above, interhybridity is not possible with using only hard law of states towards migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline at illegal migration flows. It ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration covers alternative patterns that are in favor of migrants. The attempts to control the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase in the number of illegal migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. Interhybridity is an open debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable. Hypothetically, researchers can make significant progress by re-embedding migration research in a more general understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of social scientific disciplines.<sup>13</sup>

Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical intention. He proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships of the theory's own origins and application. He classified three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, and methodological aspects. Excellently, Habermas stated that: 'Political theory cannot aim at instructing the state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral universal – should be known.' Therefore, a convergence of the two systems on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the welfare state is not to be excluded.

In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure how hybridity may work in EU, Western Balkan countries. The first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The author of this article has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners' & Migrants' Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural

Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which is a common platform for state, private and civil society. It has been established in April (2012) and the main purpose is to include other non-state actors to this platform in order to deal with migrants' integration problems, society needs and many other issues which are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly enlightened me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and volunteers who participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has the potential to create a transition from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the project's motto that is 'problems are potentials.' This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-state actors and each actor has its own problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will be transformed as potentials or opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralization and social transformation in a consensus of hybrid platform together. Togetherness, openness and solidarity are three principles of this harmony. Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that 'if you open your door to others, then you begin to live in a huge house (He referred to an African proverb).' The author of this article is currently preparing a similar hybrid project for Western Balkan countries' institutions for benchmarking, embedding and proliferating hybridity. The other hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration of Albanian young generation who live, study and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a hybrid network of young people at home country and host country. ASAN project participants have created an online database ([www.asan.al](http://www.asan.al)) and rapidly increased capacity of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, ASAN project will deal with internal and external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a general/real hybrid model image, however increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level and incline of participation level will shift this image to specific/ideal hybrid model. Namely, objectives of the project are listed as such: benefit from intellectual property and energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the future of Albania under control; creation and coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of national Albanian identity; establish a national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities for Albanian migrants; increase Albanians' representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors in a common platform; balance employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and unify Albanian youth with their diversities.

### Socio-political Analyses of Western Balkan Countries

Hans Kelsen (1955) investigated Socialist Law Legal System, Soviet Political Structures and various interpretations and approaches to the Socialist Law of State. These interpretations influenced the Western Balkan countries that were a part of Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the legal superstructure and sovereignty of these states were overwhelmingly damaged. In this context, the research has examined how European Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions in Western Balkans have been transformed in frame of EU integration process and enlargement agenda. Undoubtedly, industrial relations and employment relationship (i.e. the relationship between employees, employee representatives, employers and nation-states) are very important factors. Especially, the Western Balkans will be investigated in order to find out whether the EU integration process and EU Legal Structure (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty "TFEU" the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the *acquis communautaire*) for Western Balkans have significant effects on Balkan states' transition to the European Social Model; such as, social dialogue, tripartite and bipartite information exchange and consultation, collective bargaining and legal provisions regarding employment conditions and social protection. In general, the research is in a tight manner bound on the criteria and factors of the Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006, is a collection of political and institutional data which has been assembled in the context of the research project "Forms of Government. A Comparative Data Set for 28 Eastern Countries" directed by Klaus Armingeon (University of Berne) and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.<sup>15</sup>

Table 2: Constitutional Courts of Western Balkans

Country	Website
The Constitutional Court of Albania (Gjykata Kushtetuese e Shqipërisë)	<a href="http://www.gjk.gov.al/">http://www.gjk.gov.al/</a>
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine)	<a href="http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/">http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/</a>
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo (Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës)	<a href="http://www.gjk-ks.org/?cid=2,1">http://www.gjk-ks.org/?cid=2,1</a>
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia (УСТАВЕН СУД НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА)	<a href="http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf">http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf</a>
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Montenegro (Ustavni sud Crne Gore)	<a href="http://www.ustavnisudcg.co.me/engleska/aktuelnostie.htm">http://www.ustavnisudcg.co.me/engleska/aktuelnostie.htm</a>
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia (Уставни суд Републике Србије)	<a href="http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/home/en-GB">http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/home/en-GB</a>

Source: Author's compilation.

In essence, the role of the constitutional courts in Western Balkan states will be examined at the end of the research with taking into account judicial independence of states and judicial review process in order to better reflect the impact of the Europeanization and harmonization process on legal structures, jurisdictions, democratization, rule of law and legalization.

### Approaching a Multidimensional Empirical Framework of Interhybridity

Many mathematical, economical, advanced empirical studies have influenced significantly the insights of migration.<sup>16</sup> An economical and sociopolitical migration model is overlapping with the multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. The economy starts with  $L$  native individuals,  $M$  migrants and a special resource,  $K = \sum_i^L K_i$  which is the sum of individual holdings of resources. This resource is used for training a part of the native population ( $L$ ) that is willing to join the skilled labor market ( $L_1$ ). The rest of the native population ( $L_2$ ) and  $M$  comprise the unskilled labor force or

$$L_2' = L_2 + M$$

The country produces a good  $Q$  using both skilled and unskilled labor  $L_1$  and  $L_2'$ .

The skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements in the sense that the marginal productivity of the skilled workers rises with the amount of the unskilled workers. In the skilled workers' market there is full employment ( $L_1 = E_1$ ), but in the unskilled workers' market there is unemployment, i.e.,

$$L_1 = E_1$$

$$L_2' = E_2' + U_2'$$

where  $L_2'$  is the total number of unskilled workers, and  $E_2'(U_2')$  is the number of employed/unemployed workers in the unskilled labor market.

$$Q = Q(E_1, E_2')$$

Each individual likes to consume goods and each native individual,  $i$ , in the economy has  $\eta_i (= P_K K_i / P_K K)$  share of this special input where  $P_K$  is the given price at which  $K$  can be marketed.

The utility function is given by

$$V = V(Q)$$

The unemployment in the unskilled workers' market results from a wage higher than the market clearing wage in the unskilled labor market. This above-equilibrium wage is the result of bargaining between the unions and the employers. In their effort to maximize income from the labor market, unions propose a nominal wage  $W_2$  in the unskilled workers' market. In addition to the nominal wage for the unskilled workers, the unions also bargain for some additional nonwage benefits, the money value of which equals  $\theta$ . This is a payment for training to acquire more skill. This is bargained because unions are aware that for the majority of the native unskilled workers,  $P_K K_i$  is too small to accommodate training cost. The employed unskilled native workers would now have

$$P_K K_i + \theta = \phi_i$$

to finance the training if they want to join the skilled workers' market (unskilled migrant workers don't have  $P_K K_i$ ). For the employed native unskilled workers the cost of acquiring skill,  $C_s$ , (for a given  $P_K K_i$ ) is dependent on  $\phi_i$  and thus on  $\theta$ ; then

$$C_s = C_s(\phi), C_s' < 0, C_s'' > 0$$

The employed unskilled native workers would decide to join the skilled workers' market if the net discounted expected utility stream with a discount rate  $r(>0)$  is higher for that market. The discounted expected utility stream for an employed native unskilled worker is given by  $rV_2 = (W_2 + P_K K_i) / P$  where  $P$  is the price level and  $rV_2$  shows the return on assets in the unskilled native labor market, which is just equal to current utility. The discounted expected utility from the skilled labor market is given as  $rV_1 = \{(W_1 + P_K K_i) / P - c(\phi)\}$  where  $c(\phi)$  is the cost per period when  $C(\phi)$  is distributed over the entire working period. A native worker would be indifferent between these two markets when  $V_1 = V_2$ . So given the distribution of the capital resource, given  $W_1$  and the choices for  $W_2$  and  $\theta$ , there will be an equilibrium level of  $\phi$  i.e.  $\phi^*$  for which  $V_1 = V_2$ . The total number of participants/employed workers in the skilled workers' market is given by

$$E_1 = L \left[ 1 - \int_0^{\phi^*} f(\phi) d\phi \right]$$

where  $\int_0^{\phi^*} f(\phi) d\phi$  is the proportion of native unskilled workers at a

$$\left[ 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} f(\phi) d\phi \right]$$

given  $\theta$  and would give the proportion of the native population willing to be in the skilled

workers' market. If the union opts for a bigger  $\theta$ ,  $\phi_i$  goes up and  $f(\phi)$  moves downward or to the right and  $L_2$  becomes smaller. Thus, the total number of workers in the unskilled native labor market given by

$$L - E_1 = L_2$$

goes down and

$$L_2 - E_2 = U_2 \text{ also goes down}$$

where  $E_2(U_2)$  is the employed (unemployed) native unskilled worker. The money value of the total amount negotiated by the unions for unskilled workers is written as

$$\overline{W}_2 = W_2 + \theta$$

Employers choose the level of employment,  $E_2$ , once unions choose  $W_2$  and  $\theta$ . The total amount bargained could have been just the nominal wage if the unions did not want to go for the benefits for acquiring more skill. For a chosen level of  $\theta$ ,  $W_2$  and a settled wage,  $W_1$ , in the skilled workers' market,  $E_2'$  is determined such that  $W_2 = P_Q G_2(E_2'; E_1, \theta)$  and  $W_1 = P_Q G_1(E_2'(E_1, W_2, \theta), E_1)$  where  $P_Q$  is the given price of the good. This follows from the assumption that the country is small enough to have any effect on prices. For the sake of simplicity it is also assumed that the immigrants have no effects on demand. Note that  $G_i, i=1,2$  is the marginal product of the respective workers. Unions' bargaining usually involves both skilled and unskilled workers. They are concerned about the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy, wages of both types of workers, the unemployment level in the unskilled labor market and the effects of migration on the labor market in general, especially on the unemployment rate. The unions are also aware of the distortion created by bargaining. For the purpose of this model, however, it is assumed that unions do not directly bargain for skilled workers' wages. It is generally believed that European unemployment is mainly a problem of the unskilled labor. In other words, since there is no threat of a huge supply of unemployed skilled workers to push the wage down in the skilled labor market, unions' bargaining about wages is focused on the unskilled workers' market. This argument stands in line with the fact that unions are less able to influence the skilled labor market outcome in Europe, although they take skilled labor's interest into consideration while bargaining for the unskilled workers. Thus with existing migrants, the labor market in the economy can be described as follows. The total population

$$L = L + M = E_1 + L_2' = E_1 + E_2' + U_2' = E_1 + E_2 + E_M + U_2 + U_M$$

where  $L$  is the total supply of native workers,  $M$  is the number of migrants in the total population,  $E_1$  is the number of skilled workers  $L_2'$  is the total (native and migrant) number of unskilled workers  $E_2'$  is the total (native and migrant) number of employed unskilled workers  $U_2'$  is the total number (native and migrant) of unemployed,  $E_2$  is the number of employed unskilled native workers, where  $E_M$  is the number of employed unskilled migrants,  $U_2$  is the unemployed native workers and  $U_M$  is the unemployed migrant workers. The employment share of each type of unskilled workers is assumed to be determined by their respective sizes in the total unskilled labor force;

i.e.  $\frac{L_2}{L_2 + M} = \gamma$  is the employment share of native unskilled workers and  $\gamma E_2'$  is the number of employed native unskilled workers.

$$M = E_M + U_M$$

With information about how the unskilled workers decide to join a particular labor market, the union will choose a particular combination of  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  to maximize the total earned income (wage and nonwage). The effect of the choice of  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  can be derived from the first order condition of unions' income maximization behavior. Unions, interested in the maximization of total labor market income for native workers, will maximize

$$Y_L = \lambda[(1 - \tau_1)W_1E_1] + [(1 - \tau_2)W_2\gamma E_2' + \theta\gamma E_2' - b\gamma E_2' + bL_2]$$

$$- [\alpha / 2(L_2 - \gamma E_2')^2]$$

with respect to  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  subject to the constraints

$$W_1 = P_Q G_1(E_2'(E_1, W_2, \theta), E_1)$$

$$W_2 = P_Q G_2(E_2'; E_1, \theta)$$

$$\gamma = L_2 / (L_2 + M)$$

$$E_2 = \gamma E_2'$$

where  $\lambda$  the weight attached to skilled workers' market in union decision making;  $\tau_1$  tax on skilled workers' income;  $\tau_2$  tax on unskilled workers' income;  $\gamma$  proportion of native workers in total unskilled workers and also this proportion of total employed unskilled workers is native;  $b$  unemployment benefit and  $\alpha$  weight for the unemployment of natives in union decision making.

The first term presents the wage bill from the skilled workers' market. The wage bill of the unskilled resident workers' market is presented by the second term. And the third term shows that the national union is likely to internalize the effects of union's action on the level of unemployment of the native unskilled workers. Note that although unions are not bargaining for the skilled workers, they may take skilled workers' economic condition into consideration.

First order conditions are presented by

$$\lambda \left[ (1 - \tau_1) (W_1 E_1 E_2' E_2' W_2) \right] + \left[ (1 - \tau_2) \gamma \{ E_2' + W_2 E_2' W_2 \} \right. \\ \left. + \gamma \theta E_2' W_2 - b \gamma E_2' W_2 \right] + \left[ \alpha (L_2 - \gamma E_2') \gamma E_2' W_2 \right] = 0$$

$$\lambda \left[ (1 - \tau_1) (W_1 E_1 E_2' E_2' W_2) \right] + \left[ (1 - \tau_2) \gamma W_2 E_2' W_2 + \gamma (\theta E_2' W_2 - b E_2' W_2 + E_2') \right] + \left[ \alpha (L_2 - \gamma E_2') \cdot \gamma E_2' W_2 \right] = 0$$

Thus, to summarize, equations above solve for unknowns  $W_2, \theta, \phi, W_2^-, C_s, E_1, L_1, L_2, E_2, E_2', V, E_M, L_2', U_2', U_2, U_M, Q, \gamma$  and  $Y_L$  given  $L, M, L^-, K, P_Q, P_K, W_1, \lambda, \tau_1, \tau_2, b$ , and  $\alpha$ . It is assumed that i) this is a small country with given prices, ii) immigrants have no impact on demand, iii) skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements (the latter raises the productivity of the skilled workers), iv) unions don't bargain for skilled workers' wage but they take into consideration skilled/unskilled labor ratio, unemployment and non-wage benefit, v) skilled market has full employment and unskilled market has unemployment because the bargained wage is greater than the market equilibrium wage., vi) all skilled workers are natives. Migrants don't bring any capital with them to be trained and vii) migration is caused by expected wage difference. The optimal combination of  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  will be the one where the marginal gain from  $W_2$  equals the marginal gain from  $\theta$ . For an interior solution, skilled workers will earn more than unskilled workers and unskilled workers will feel better being employed than unemployed;  $b \leq (1 - \tau_2) W_2 \leq (1 - \tau_1) W_1$ . The weights,  $\lambda, \alpha$ , taxes,  $\tau_1, \tau_2$ , and technology will decide whether the wage should be chosen on the elastic or the inelastic part (the second order condition is verified. After unions fix  $W_2^- (= W_2 + \theta)$ , employers decide on the employment level. Thus  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  enter as arguments in the  $E_2'$  function. Since the productivity of  $E_1$  increases with the size of  $E_2'$ , the size of  $E_1$  becomes a deciding factor in the demand for unskilled workers. Thus  $\theta$  affects  $E_2'$  both directly and indirectly.

$$E_2' = E_2'(W_2; \theta, E_1(\theta))$$

Keeping  $W_2$  constant

$$dE_2' = \left\{ \underbrace{\frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial \theta}}_{(-)} \bigg|_{E_1 \text{ constant}} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial E_1} \cdot \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial \theta}}_{(+)} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial \theta}}_{(+)} \bigg|_{(E_1, qE_2)} \right\} d\theta$$

The first term is the usual effect of an increase in the cost of hiring workers. This will have a negative impact, reducing the demand for unskilled workers. The non-wage benefit  $\theta$  (skill training cost) actually helps workers move to the skilled workers' market. The second term shows the increase in demand for  $E_2'$  because vacancies will be created when a number of unskilled workers move to the skilled labor market. When the number of skilled workers increases, to maintain the productivity of the skilled workers at the previous level (i.e.,  $dW_1=0$ ) there will be an additional demand for unskilled workers (because  $E_1$  and  $E_2'$  are q-complements). This positive effect is shown by the third term. The last two terms thus generate favorable effects for employment of unskilled workers. If the elasticity of the marginal product of the unskilled labor curve is not very high, as a result of an upward change in  $\theta$  the employment of unskilled workers will go up i.e.,  $\partial E_2' / \partial \theta > 0$ .

Eq. (18) suggests that if unions are interested only in the employed unskilled native workers' market (i.e.,  $\lambda = \alpha = 0$ ) and want to raise wage, the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for labor will have to be bigger than one to support a positive unemployment benefit (i.e., since  $b$  has to be positive to be meaningful, it can only be supported by  $e > 1$ ). The existence of high unemployment benefit encourages unions to choose a wage on

the elastic part of labor demand curve and thus wages and unemployment will be higher, higher is the unemployment benefit. Any increase in non-wage benefits will on the other hand have a positive effect on the wage bill as shown by Eq. (19) (because of the favorable effects on  $dE_2'$ ), provided the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor is not very high. It is important to note that the negative effect on employment from higher wage demand may be offset by the positive employment effect from higher non-wage benefits. This stands in contrast to other analyses in the literature. where any higher wage demand increases unemployment. In those analyses, if unions are concerned about unemployment, the negotiated wage will be driven to a relatively inelastic part of the labor demand curve compared to the situation when unions are not concerned about unemployment (i.e.,  $\alpha=0$ ). In this paper's analysis even when unions are concerned about unemployment they can bargain for an increase in wages and still can generate a favorable employment effect for native unskilled workers through their choice of  $\theta$ . However, practicing restraints on increased money wage demands will be an additional tool to deal with unemployment. in the case when unions deal only with wage compensation, i.e.,  $W_2$ , they will be eager to lower wage benefits if they are interested in all three parts (skilled workers' market, unskilled workers' market, and unemployment pool) of the labor market but the labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled workers are complements. In this paper's model under the same scenario (i.e., labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled workers are complement and unions pays attention to the skilled wage bill, unskilled wage bill and unemployment) unions can afford not to change the wage demand at all or to change the money wage by a small amount and go for a higher non-wage benefit to maximize the total labor market income. However, to take better care of unemployment pool and/or skilled labor market, unions will prefer to be on the relatively inelastic part of the labor demand curve or to reduce the money wage.

Migration in this paper is caused by the expected wage (actual wage times the probability of employment) difference. A vast majority of the immigrants to western European countries are unskilled workers. Thus they affect the unskilled native workers' market directly. The quantity of immigrants is decided by the government control or quota of immigration. In this section we will find out how immigration affects the equilibrium solution. Following immigration  $\gamma$  goes down. As a result, the marginal gain from both  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  decline. The relative gain or loss will depend on the existing elasticity of labor demand. This suggests that in their negotiation, the labor union may choose a different combination of  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  following migration. They may not change the nominal wage at all; instead unions may try for a reasonable increase in the training cost benefits. It was shown in the previous section that when more unskilled employed workers opt for training, the total number of skilled workers goes up. This has two-fold effects on the unskilled labor market: i) it directly creates vacancies in the unskilled labor market; and ii) the newly trained skilled workers need unskilled workers to boost up the productivity in the skilled workers' market (indirect effect). Also there will be direct negative effects from raising  $\theta$ . However, the direct and indirect effects together raise the employment of unskilled workers by offsetting the negative effect. Consequently, unemployment goes own. By totally differentiating the first order conditions we see that  $d\theta / dM$  will be positive and  $dW_2 / dM$  may take either positive or negative depending on the values of the second derivatives or the rates at which the change in employment is affected by changes in  $\theta$  and  $W_2$  However,  $dW_2 / dM < d\theta / dM$ . The effects of a reduced  $\gamma$  following immigration will lead to a new combination of  $W_2$  and  $\theta$  where favorable effect of increasing  $\theta$  offsets other unfavorable effects.

These effects are shown in Propositions 1–4 where immigrants do not bring capital with them.

*Proposition 1:* An increase in immigration increases the size of the skilled labor market.

*Proof:* To start with  $E_1$  has already been determined by  $W_1$  and only  $\theta$  can affect  $E_1$ . Note that only native unskilled workers can move to the skilled workers' market because they enjoy the privilege of having different values of initial asset,  $P_K K_i$ . The non-wage benefit,  $\theta$ , together with  $P_K K_i$  will give the native workers an edge in getting training compared to immigrant unskilled workers.

$$E_1 = L \left[ 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} f(\phi) d\phi \right]$$

$f(\phi)=f(\phi_0)=f(P_K K_i)$  = proportion of people having different values of  $P_K K_i$  or  $\phi_0$  when  $\theta=0$  (initially).  
 $f(\phi)=f(\phi_0)-a\theta$  = proportion of people having different values of  $\phi$  when  $\theta>0$  and  $a>0$  (note that an increase in  $\theta$  helps to reduce the size of the unskilled labor market or  $f(\phi)$  curve moves rightward or downward or  $f(\phi)$  for  $\theta=0>f(\phi)$  for  $\theta>0$ ). In that case,  $d\tilde{\phi} = d\theta$ . Thus

$$E_1 = L \left[ 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} (f(\phi) - a\theta) d\phi \right] = L - L \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} (f(\phi) - a\theta) d\phi = L - L [F(\tilde{\phi}) - a\tilde{\phi} - F(0)]$$

$$\frac{dE_1}{dM} = \frac{dE_1}{d\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dM} = La\tilde{\phi} \frac{d\theta}{dM} > 0$$

*Proposition 2:* An increase in immigration reduces unemployment of native workers.

*Proof:*

$$E_2' = E_2'(\bar{W}_2, E_1(\theta))$$

$$dE_2' = \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial \bar{W}_2} d\bar{W}_2 + \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial E_1} dE_1(\theta)$$

$$\text{when } d\bar{W}_2 = dW_2 + d\theta$$

$$dE_2' = \underbrace{\frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial W_2} dW_2}_{(-)} + \left[ \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial \theta} \bigg|_{E_1, \text{constant}} + \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial E_1} \cdot \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial \theta} \right] + \underbrace{\frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial \theta} \bigg|_{E_1, qE_2}}_{(+)} d\theta > 0$$

$$\text{Note: } \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial E_1} dE_1(\theta) = \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial E_1} \cdot \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial \theta} + \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial \theta} \bigg|_{E_1, qE_2}$$

The union would opt for a different combination of  $W$  and  $\theta$  when this new combination would have a favorable effect. Total supply of native unskilled workers is written as  $L_2 = L - L$ .

$$\left[ 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} (f(\phi) - a\theta) d\phi \right]$$

$$dL_2 / dM = - dE_1 / dM < 0$$

$$U_2 = L_2 - E_2$$

$$dU_2 / dM = dL_2 / dM - (dE_2 / d\theta)(d\theta / dM) < 0$$

*Proposition 3:* An increase in immigration increases the skill composition of the labor market for the native workers.

*Proof:*

$$\frac{d\left(\frac{E_1}{L_2}\right)}{dM} = \frac{d\left(\frac{E_1}{L_2}\right)}{d\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dM} = \frac{-(-a\tilde{\phi})}{\left\{ \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} (f(\phi_0) - a\theta) d\phi \right\}^2} > 0$$

Thus, following immigration not only does the level of unemployment go down, but the number of skilled workers and the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers go up.

*Proposition 4:* An increase in immigration increases national income and native workers' share in the national income.

*Proof:* The share of native workers income in the national income is given by  $W_1E_1 + W_2E_2$ . It will go up as  $W_1dE_1 + W_2dE_2 + E_2dW_2$  is positive when  $E_2 = \gamma E_2'$ . Following immigration  $E_2'$  rises and  $\gamma$  goes down when  $E_2' = E_2 + E_M$  and  $dE_2' = dE_2$ , because  $dE_M = 0$ . The rise in  $E_2$  offsets the effect of a fall in  $\gamma$ . This increase in native workers' share in national income will be observed even when union opts for no changes in  $W_2$  i.e.,  $dW_2 = 0$ . Thus,

$$(d((W_1E_1 + W_2E_2) / (W_1E_1 + W_2E_2 + W_2E_M)) / dM) > 0.$$

The above analysis is done while focusing just on the resident workers' market.

Let's now assume that both native and migrant employed unskilled workers have equal chances of being trained and employed. It implies that the migrants may move with some amount of special resource,  $K$  and it replaces the assumption that immigrants could not bring any capital with them. Under the scenario immigration will again result in a different combination of  $W_2$  and  $\theta$ ; however, this reshuffling will affect the labor market through  $L'$  (not just  $L$ ). Propositions 1'-3' describe the effects when immigrants arrive with some amount of capital.

*Proposition 1'*: An increase in immigration will increase the size of the skilled workers' market.

*Proof*: The size of skilled workers' market here is given by

$$E'_1 = \bar{L} \left( 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} f(\phi) d\phi \right)$$

Since,

$$d\bar{L} = dM$$

$$\frac{dE'_1}{dM} = \frac{dE'_1}{d\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dM} = \left( 1 + \bar{L}a\tilde{\phi} \right) \frac{d\theta}{dM} > 0$$

*Proposition 2'*: An increase in immigration will decrease the size of the unskilled workers' market.

*Proof*:

$$L'_2 = \bar{L} - \bar{L} \left( 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} f(\phi) d\phi \right)$$

$$\frac{dL'_2}{dM} = \frac{dL'_2}{d\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dM} = -\bar{L}a\tilde{\phi} \frac{d\theta}{dM} < 0$$

*Proposition 3'*: An increase in immigration will increase the skill composition of the labor force.

*Proof*:

$$\frac{E'_1}{L'_2} = \frac{\bar{L} \left( 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} f(\phi) d\phi \right)}{\bar{L} \int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} f(\phi) d\phi}$$

$$\frac{d\left(\frac{E'_1}{L'_2}\right)}{dM} = \frac{d\left(\frac{E'_1}{L'_2}\right)}{d\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dM} = \frac{a\tilde{\phi}}{\int_0^{\tilde{\phi}} (f(\phi_0) - a\theta) d\phi} > 0$$

It is, however, interesting to note that unions' reaction to an increase in  $L'$  following an increase in domestic unskilled labor supply may not increase the skill composition of the work force, i.e.,  $dE'_1 = dL_2$  and  $d(E'_1/L'_2)/dL_2$  may decrease. The intuition behind this result says that as share of native unskilled workers in the total unskilled workers increases, native workers' income goes up via  $\gamma$ . Consequently, unions may not want to increase  $\theta$ . Does this provision of non-wage benefit give any new insights in dealing with the problems of unemployment that is exacerbated by immigration influx? In analyzing unions' response to immigration, many Scholars have shown that unions' reaction depends on whether unions are interested in only native unskilled workers' market (pure wage bill maximization for native unskilled workers) or in unskilled workers' market as a



whole (including unemployment of unskilled migrant workers) or in both skilled and unskilled workers' market. In their analysis for pure wage bill maximization (i.e., only in employed unskilled native workers' market), unions will have to be on that part of the demand curve where the value of the elasticity of the labor demand curve is greater than one. In other two cases (i.e. when unions pay attention to unemployment or to the skilled workers' market), unions might prefer to be on relatively inelastic part. Since bargaining over money wages is not the only choice in this paper, unions may accomplish their objective on any part of the labor demand curve by negotiating only for non-money wage benefits and keeping the money wage fixed. Of course, employment will increase more if labor demand is relatively inelastic. Thus, the introduction of the non-wage benefit brings in an element of flexibility that may benefit unions, employers and the government. The analysis in this paper suggests that as a result of migration when the marginal gain from bargaining for money wage goes down, unions have the option of switching their effort to change the non-wage benefit. In fact, in this paper irrespective of (assumptions about) whether unions want to focus on only unskilled labor market or on both skilled and unskilled labor market, the negotiation about non-wage benefit will have a positive effect. For the purpose of maximizing the total wage bill, it is better if we allow the unions to include all three parts of the labor market (skilled labor market, unskilled labor market unskilled unemployed labor pool).

As it is mentioned before, in European Union countries, the governments cannot affect the wages or employment levels directly because of the institutional factors. Unions and the employers decide on the wages and employment levels through bargaining. The governments are engaged in transfer payment through taxation and unemployment benefits. Thus, the government can only control the factors that indirectly affect unions' and employers' decisions. In a situation when migration act as a 'competitive fringe' in the sense that as a result of migration, unions follows a wage restraints policy, the governments (especially the left-wing governments who don't want to use anti-union policy openly) can use migration as a hidden 'anti-union' policy. However, in this paper's model where unions can use non-wage benefits, migration does not need to be used as an anti-union policy. The government can change the anti-migration or anti-union environment by encouraging bargaining about non-wage benefits. Noticing that unions' policy has a favorable impact on unemployment, the government might come up with some incentives for the employers to settle for a higher  $\theta$  than what the employers would have agreed to otherwise. Employers also might feel encouraged if they don't need to provide for additional wage compensation. The government can afford to do this because the total government expenditure on transfer payment goes down and tax revenue increases as employment increases following a successful bargaining for a higher  $\theta$ . In that case, the bargaining power of the unions is not weakened in the presence of immigration influx. The government's budget is given by

$$B = \tau_1 W_1 E_1 + \tau_2 W_2 E_2' - b U_2'$$

when  $B$  = total budget and immigrants can't join the skilled workers' market. Immigration of unskilled workers can affect  $B$  if immigration has any effects on  $E_1, E_2', U_2'$  or wages.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial B}{\partial M} &= \tau_1 W_1 \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial M} + \tau_2 W_2 \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial M} + \tau_2 E_2' \frac{\partial}{\partial M} \\ &= \tau_1 W_1 \left( \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial \theta} \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial M} \right) + \tau_2 W_2 \left( \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial W_2} \frac{\partial}{\partial M} \right) \\ &\quad + \tau_2 E_2' \left( \frac{\partial W_2}{\partial M} \right) - b \left( \frac{\partial U_2'}{\partial W_2} \frac{\partial W_2}{\partial M} \right) + \end{aligned}$$

where  $M$  = total number of migrants. If unions decide not to change wage benefit at all i.e.,  $(dW_2 / dM) = 0$ , as long as the effect of the first and the second terms exceeds that of the last term in this equation, the government will not resort to any antiunion policy. If both wages and non-wage benefits are changed, the first three terms need to exceed the last term for the government not to use any anti-union policy. However, if

$$\tau_1 W_1 \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial M} + \tau_2 \bar{W}_2 \frac{\partial E_2'}{\partial M} + \tau_2 E_2' \frac{\partial \bar{W}_2}{\partial M} < b \frac{\partial U_2'}{\partial M}$$

(on the highly elastic part of the labor demand curve where migration would act as a competitive fringe) the government's migration policy may reflect an anti-union agenda. Immigration, unemployment and their interrelation not only challenge the labor market of European Union, but they also demand attention for a better performance of the Union economy as a whole. The common perception is that the immigration makes the unemployment situation worse for the native workers. Scholars have argued that the presence of dominant labor unions together with immigration makes European unemployment problem worse than that in the US. Since migration can only be controlled by the government, it (especially the left-wing government) can use immigration as a covert anti-union policy when immigration acts as a competitive fringe. The analysis in this paper offers an alternative to that covert antiunion policy. It shows that it is possible to empower unions with an effective alternative by allowing them to bargain for non-wage benefits together with wage benefits. These non-wage benefits are expected to have favorable effects on unemployment, the skill level of the labor force, and the national income. Instead of using politically unfavorable tax or welfare program, the government actually can

use these redistribution tools to encourage both the employers and the unions to use ‘non-wage benefits’ effectively in their bargaining strategy. That will help in avoiding an anti-union or anti-immigration environment. The first order condition can be written as  $F_1(W_2, \theta; L, M)$  and  $F_2(W_2, \theta; L, M)$ . Totally differentiating the first order condition;

$$\frac{\partial F_1}{\partial W_2}, \frac{\partial F_1}{\partial \theta}, \frac{\partial F_2}{\partial W_2}, \frac{\partial F_2}{\partial \theta}, \frac{\partial F_1}{\partial M}, \frac{\partial F_2}{\partial M}, \frac{\partial W_2}{\partial M}, \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial M}.$$

$$\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial M} > 0 \frac{\partial W_2}{\partial M}$$

may take either sign.

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 = \frac{\partial F_1}{\partial W_2} = & \left[ \lambda(1 - \tau_1)W_1 \left( E_{1E_2E_2}' (E_{2W_2}')^2 + E_{2W_2W_2}' E_{1E_2}' \right) \right] \\ & + \left[ (1 - \tau_2)\gamma \left\{ 2E_{2W_2}' + W_2 E_{2W_2W_2}' \right\} + \gamma\theta E_{2W_2W_2}' - b\gamma E_{2W_2W_2}' \right] \\ & + \left[ \alpha(L_2 - \gamma E_2') \gamma E_{2W_2W_2}' - \alpha \left( \gamma E_{2W_2}' \right)^2 \right] \end{aligned}$$

This is negative because

$$(1 - \tau_2)W_2 > b, E_{1E_2E_2}' < 0, E_{2W_2W_2}' < 0$$

$$\begin{aligned} A_2 = \frac{\partial F_1}{\partial \theta} = & \left[ \lambda(1 - \tau_1)W_1 \left( E_{1E_2E_2}' E_{2\theta}' E_{2W_2}' + E_{1E_2}' E_{2W_2\theta}' \right) \right] \\ & + \left[ (1 - \tau_2)\gamma \left\{ E_{2\theta}' + W_2 E_{2W_2\theta}' \right\} + \gamma E_{2W_2}' + \gamma\theta E_{2W_2\theta}' - b\gamma E_{2W_2\theta}' \right] \\ & + \left[ \alpha \left\{ (L_2 - \gamma E_2') \left( \gamma E_{2W_2\theta}' \right) + \left( \gamma E_{2W_2}' \right) \left( -\gamma E_{2\theta}' \right) \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

This is positive because

$$\lambda(1 - \tau_1)W_1 E_{1E_2E_2}' E_{2\theta}' > 1$$

$$C_1 = \frac{\partial F_1}{\partial M} = \left[ \left[ (1 - \tau_2) \left( E_2' + W_2 E_{2W_2}' \right) + \theta E_{2W_2}' - b E_{2W_2}' \right] \right] [-\gamma / (L + M)]$$

This is positive because

$$E_{2W_2}' \left\{ (1 - \tau_2)W_2 + \theta - b + \alpha L_2 - \gamma E_2' \right\} > (1 - \tau_2)E_2'$$

$$\begin{aligned} A_3 = \frac{\partial F_2}{\partial W_2} = & \left[ \lambda(1 - \tau_1)W_1 \left( E_{1E_2E_2}' E_{2W_2}' E_{2\theta}' + E_{1E_2}' E_{2\theta W_2}' \right) \right] \\ & \times \left[ (1 - \tau_2) \left( \gamma E_{2\theta}' + \gamma W_2 E_{2\theta W_2}' \right) + \gamma \left( \theta E_{2\theta W_2}' - b E_{2\theta W_2}' + E_{2W_2}' \right) \right] \\ & + \left[ \alpha \left\{ (L_2 - \gamma E_2') \cdot \gamma E_{2\theta W_2}' + \left( \gamma E_{2\theta}' \right) \left( -\gamma E_{2W_2}' \right) \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

This is negative because

$$(1 - \tau_2)W_2 > \gamma b, \text{ and } \gamma E_{2W_2}' > (1 - \tau_2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} A_4 = \frac{\partial F_2}{\partial \theta} = & \left[ \lambda(1 - \tau_1)W_1 \left( E_{1E_2E_2}' (E_{2\theta}')^2 + E_{1E_2}' E_{2\theta\theta}' \right) \right] \\ & + \left[ (1 - \tau_2)\gamma W_2 E_{2\theta\theta}' + \gamma \left( E_{2\theta}' + \theta E_{2\theta\theta}' - b E_{2\theta\theta}' + E_{2\theta}' \right) \right] \\ & + \left[ \alpha \left\{ (L_2 - \gamma E_2') \cdot \gamma E_{2\theta\theta}' + \left( \gamma E_{2\theta}' \right) \left( -\gamma E_{2\theta}' \right) \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

This is negative because

$$(1 - \tau_2)W_2 > b, \gamma E'_{2\theta} < 0 \text{ and } 2E'_{2\theta} < \gamma^2 (E'_{2\theta})^2.$$

$$C_2 = \frac{\partial F_2}{\partial M} = \left[ (1 - \tau_2)W_2 E'_{2\theta} + (\theta E'_{2\theta} - b E'_{2\theta} + E'_2) \right] [-\gamma / (L + M)]$$

This is negative because

$$E'_{2\theta} [(1 - \tau_2)W_2 - b] > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial F_1}{\partial L_2} = \left[ \left[ (1 - \tau_2)(E'_2 + W_2 E'_{2W_2}) + \theta E'_{2W_2} - b E'_{2W_2} \right] + \left[ \alpha \{ (L_2 - \gamma E'_2) E'_{2W_2} - \gamma E'_{2W_2} E'_2 \} \right] \right] [1 / \gamma(L + M)] < 0$$

This is negative because

$$E'_{2W_2} \{ (1 - \tau_2)W_2 + \theta - b + \alpha L_2 - \gamma E'_2 \} > (1 - \tau_2)E'_2$$

$$\frac{\partial F_2}{\partial L_2} = \left[ (1 - \tau_2)W_2 E'_{2\theta} + (\theta E'_{2\theta} - b E'_{2\theta} + E'_2) \right] [1 / \gamma(L + M)] > 0$$

This is positive because

$$E'_{2\theta} [(1 - \tau_2)W_2 - b] > 0$$

$$D = (A_1 A_4 - A_2 A_3) > 0, D_1 = (A_1 C_2 - A_3 C_1) > 0, D_2 = (A_4 C_1 - A_2 C_2)$$

may take either sign.

$$(\partial \theta / \partial M) = (D_1 / D) > 0$$

$$(\partial W_2 / \partial M) = (D_2 / D)$$

may take either sign.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

Dealing with international migration in the age of migration requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. Hegel's dialectic method might be applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better outcomes. For instance, Hegel concluded that 'all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real.'<sup>17</sup> As a rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a proactive vision and transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Interhybridity and indirect centralization will create more efficient and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, hybrid structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With indirect centralization within the confine of state's control mechanism, authority and public sphere, these structures will have same legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may improve its common migration and asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the need of moral consciousness in migration turbulence through interhybridity mechanisms and good migration governance within the framework of hybrid model. The rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for researchers to improve migrant-based approach with collection of migrants' narratives. Empirical results are not just simple numbers, thus these should be investigated with migrants' narratives analyses.

Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for all migrants in the world. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity is likely to increase equal opportunity and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora events and ethnic enclaves, maximize benefits and minimize negative effects, and enhance the humane of migration from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action among home, transit and host countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to facilitate the exchange of information, create ground for networking and ensure a communication platform.

The role of the EU is to help Western Balkan countries to keep up realizing reforms in various areas. The Western Balkan countries' migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilization and integration reforms, enlargement and neighborhood policy and the Stabilization Association Process. These reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with BRICs and eastern countries which have multi-dimensional (economic, politic, religious etc.) nexus with Western Balkan countries. Obviously, it can be claimed that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkan countries have significant influences for attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration and stabilization of Western Balkan countries within the EU will be a driving force for the EU. With respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these countries are seen as potentials or opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or potential problems. Therefore, the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled labor migrants in order to balance the need of 20 million high skilled workers over next years. Both two hybrid case – i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural Center and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support such projects in order to attract high skilled labor migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence of the EU member states' national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common EU migration policy. Hopefully, non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for solving migration issues in different alternatives. The involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and active networking.

Moralization of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and hybrid forms can provide definite solutions in various aspects and interhybridity can transform socially the migration process in favor of migrants and society as well as state and non-state actors. Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of migration is an utopia (or absolute spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies with minimum problems is not only rational but also real.

To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in post-soviet bloc Western Balkan countries. The specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the role of states and the existence of centralized power at the institutional structures of these states still exist. Second, people living in these two regions have hybrid identities and are more likely to be included in communicative action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, national interests and values towards inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial era. Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for social transformation of interhybridity.

According to the mode of institutionalization, there are three types of governance; 'governance by governments', 'governance with governments' and 'governance without governments'.<sup>18</sup>

Table 3: Governance by/with/without Government(s)

<b>Type of Governance</b>	<b>Mode of Institutionalization</b>	<b>Norm Building</b>	<b>Norm Implementing</b>	
Governance by government(s)	International/governmental cooperation	Without self-organization	Via nation-states	
Governance with government(s)	Global policy networks	With self-organization	With nation-states	<b>HYBRID MODEL</b>
Governance without government(s)	Transnational network organizations	Via self-organization	Without nation-states	

**Source:** Mückenberger 2008: 27

Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalization and how norms are built and implemented. At the level of governance by governments, states are presented by their own governments. The governments of states can create international global relations with other sovereign states or international organizations. This type of governance doesn't let non-state actors to build norms and it exists only at nation-state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organization. Governance with governments means among others also governments take place, however there are also non-state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid structures in which these actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common objectives. Hybrid model is typically related to governance with governments because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share common interests and these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors hybrid model means centralized authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For private actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil society hybrid model means having a mainstream role among state and private and transform interests in favor of the goodness of society.

The challenge is that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors influence deeply the inter-state system's monopoly of authority. Some commentators assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as sovereignty-free actors link up and operate across state borders as part of transnational networks. We can assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central authority, sovereignty, decentralization and democratic legitimacy is to balance the tendency towards theoretical complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the multidimensional and multicausal nature of current world politics.

In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition for social transformation and indirect centralization. As an illustration, migration and asylum issues acquire elements of multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the nation-state with the assigning policy-making capacity to Brussels. On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on the other hand, this shift of power causes decentralization in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels' governance ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal migrants and asylum seekers under the control of the EU institutions. Collaboration with post-communist institutions in Western Balkan states will enhance democracy level, rule of law and the prosperity for civil society.

## Notes

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## Appendix I: Total Visa statistics 2009

Schengen States	Schengen visas ( <i>Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas</i> )		Number of national long-stay visas issued
	Number of visas issued	Non issuance rate	
AT	285.196	5,23%	27.169
BE	165.474	17,38%	24.588
CH	351.578	8,70%	37.975
CZ	440.360	3,74%	17.109
DE	1.491.784	9,06%	139.640
DK	77.142	5,40%	1.037
EE	93.464	2,49%	399
EL	598.883	4,68%	40.686
ES	748.466	9,97%	135.568
FI	783.340	1,58%	-
FR	1.415.886	12,35%	167.108
HU	272.972	4,14%	8.530
IS	779	4,18%	88
IT	1.053.354	5,02%	155.286
LT	236.299	1,77%	2.824
LU	5.364	2,38%	27
LV	118.436	3,48%	1.450
MT	28.915	9,31%	4.168
NL	313.534	7,37%	9.032
NO	105.430	0,75%	16.502
PL	579.424	3,29%	210.292
PT	107.224	6,87%	15.800
SE	172.595	7,62%	527
SI	97.690	4,19%	391
SK	62.287	3,78%	1.982
<b>UE Member States not applying yet fully the Schengen acquis</b>	<b>Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas</b>		<b>Number of national long-stay visas issued</b>
	<b>Number of visas issued</b>	<b>Non issuance rate</b>	
BG	595.914	1,05%	8.575
CY	113.205	2,63%	-
RO	175.956	3,24%	12.831
<b>Totals</b>	<b>Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas</b>		<b>Number of national long-stay visas issued</b>
	<b>Number of visas issued</b>	<b>Non issuance rate</b>	
<b>Sub-total Schengen</b>	<b>9.605.876</b>	<b>7,11%</b>	<b>1.018.178</b>
<b>Sub-total non Schengen</b>	<b>885.075</b>	<b>1,70%</b>	<b>21.406</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.490.951</b>	<b>6,68%</b>	<b>1.039.584</b>

Source: European Commission 2011: 21

## Appendix II: Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US\$) According to World Bank Data

Albania											
Indicator Name	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	17.45868										
Net migration	-270245					-72243					-47889
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	523	292	17	26	51	56	56	77	65	70	76
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	6802	7626	10761	10385	10478	12722	14079	15340	15006	15711	14772
International migrant stock, total	76695					82668					89106
International migrant stock (% of population)	2.496699					2.631231					2.780839651
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 89106 Host Country: 1438451
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France										1438.3 thousands, 45.4% of total population (2.83 million, Instat 2011)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1%										89.1 thousands, 2.8% of total population
Bosnia and Herzegovina											
Indicator Name	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	20.30026										
Net migration	281795					61825					-10000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	38152	32745	28022	22517	22215	10568	10318	7367	7257	7132	7016
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	474981	447321	406326	300006	228815	109930	199946	78273	74366	70018	63004
International migrant stock, total	96001					35141					27780
International migrant stock (% of population)	2.599048					0.92941					0.73880051
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 27780 Host Country: 1460639
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy										1461.0 thousands, 38.9% of total population (3.8 million, 2011)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3%										27.8 thousands, 0.7% of total population
<p><b>Kosovo**</b> **World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral migrant stocks for host country is; <b>25251</b> and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. According to UNDP Kosovo Remittance Study 2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7 million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 2009.</p>											
Macedonia											
Indicator Name	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	29.38359										
Net migration	-9000					-4000					2000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	9050	4363	2816	193	1004	1274	1240	1235	1672	1542	1398
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	2176	12197	8072	5982	5104	8600	7940	8077	7521	7926	7889
International migrant stock, total	125665					120288					129701
International migrant stock (% of population)	6.254819					5.901941					6.294444771
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 129701 Host Country: 447137
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France										447.1 thousand, 21.9% of total population (2 million, 2010)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3%										129.7 thousands, 6.3% of total population
Montenegro											
Indicator Name	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)											
Net migration	-32450					-20632					-2508
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum							6926	8528	24741	24019	16364
Refugee population by country or territory of origin							135	557	1283	2582	3246
International migrant stock, total						54583					42509
International migrant stock (% of population)						8.709048					6.731539692



Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 42509 Host Country: 36
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary										0.0 thousands
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5%										42.5 thousands, 6.8% of total population (0.63 million, 2010)
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)											
Net migration	-147889					-338544					0
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	484391	400304	354402	291403	276683	148264	98997	97995	96739	86351	73608
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	146748	144231	323335	296632	237032	189989	174027	165643	185935	195626	183289
International migrant stock, total	856763					674612					525388
International migrant stock (% of population)	11.39866					9.066428					7.204424665
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 525388 Host Country: 130844
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark										196.0 thousands, 2.0% of total population (7.3 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7%										525.4 thousands, 5.3% of total population

### Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US\$)

<b>Albania</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
											(estimate)
Inward remittance flows	598	699	734	889	1161	1290	1359	1468	1495	1317	1285
Workers' remittances	531	615	643	778	1028	1161	1176	1305	1226	1090	
Compensation of employees	67	84	90	111	132	129	184	163	270	227	
Migrants' transfer											
Outward remittance flows				4	5	7	27	10	16	10	
Workers' remittances				0	0		0				
Compensation of employees				4	5	7	27	10	16	9	
Migrants' transfer											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$0.9 bn, net ODA received US\$0.4 bn, total international reserves US\$2.4 bn, exports of goods and services US\$3.8 bn in 2008.</i>											
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
											(estimate)
Inward remittance flows	1595	1521	1526	1749	2072	2043	2157	2700	2735	2167	2228
Workers' remittances	950	919	956	1143	1474	1467	1589	1947	1899	1432	
Compensation of employees	631	581	540	595	579	570	560	739	828	643	
Migrants' transfer	26	25	30	11	19	5	8	13	8	6	
Outward remittance flows	2	11	14	20	62	40	55	65	70	61	
Workers' remittances		5	7	10	49	28	41	50	53	46	
Compensation of employees	2	6	7	11	13	12	14	15	17	15	
Migrants' transfer											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$1.1 bn, net ODA received US\$0.5 bn, total international reserves US\$3.5 bn, exports of goods and services US\$6.8 bn in 2008.</i>											
<b>Kosovo**</b>	<i>Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.</i>										
<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
											(estimate)
Inward remittance flows	81	73	106	174	213	227	267	345	407	401	414
Workers' remittances	80	68	92	146	161	169	198	239	266	260	
Compensation of employees	0	5	14	28	52	57	69	106	140	121	
Migrants' transfer											
Outward remittance flows	14	21	23	16	16	16	18	25	33	26	
Workers' remittances	14	21	23	15	15	14	16	22	28	22	
Compensation of employees			1	1	1	2	2	3	5	4	
Migrants' transfer											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$0.6 bn, net ODA received US\$0.2 bn, total international reserves US\$2.1 bn, exports of goods and services US\$5.0 bn in 2008.</i>											
<b>Montenegro</b>	<i>Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.</i>										
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
											(estimate)
Inward remittance flows	1132*	1698*	2089*	2661	4129	4650	4703	5377	5538	5406	558

Workers' remittances	2948	2913	3755
Compensation of employees	148	191	184
Migrants' transfer	2	2	3
Outward remittance flows	<b>114</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>91</b>
Workers' remittances	95	114	70
Compensation of employees	17	23	20
Migrants' transfer	2	1	1

*For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$3.0 bn, net ODA received US\$1.0 bn, total international reserves US\$11.5 bn, exports of goods and services US\$14.8 bn in 2008.*

*\*Serbia and Montenegro*

Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011

### Appendix III: Comparison of the European Union Pre-accession Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries

Albania			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	56.52	38.66	15%
Public Administration Reform	43.15	38.66	15%
Transport	49.06	51.55	20%
Environment and Climate Change	80.12	51.55	20%
Social Development	13.40	25.77	10%
Rural Development/Agriculture	17.20	51.55	20%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>259.45</b>	<b>257.74</b>	<b>100%</b>
IPA Component			
	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	84.30	85.99	87.45
Cross-border Cooperation	10.13	10.28	10.67
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>94.43</b>	<b>96.27</b>	<b>98.12</b>
Bosnia and Herzegovina			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	38.64	55.00	17.5 %
Public Administration Reform	51.55	40.00	12.7 %
Private Sector Development	28.10	50.00	15.9 %
Transport	22.30	35.00	11.1 %
Environment and Climate Change	72.70	54.22	17.3 %
Social Development	46.75	40.00	12.7 %
Acquis related and other Actions	52.54	40.00	12.7 %
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>312.58</b>	<b>314.22</b>	<b>100%</b>
IPA Component			
	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	102.68	104.67	106.87
Cross-border Cooperation	4.75	4.80	4.94
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107.43</b>	<b>109.47</b>	<b>111.81</b>
Kosovo			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	78.50 (18.46%)	61.09	30 %
Private Sector Development	192.93 (45.38 %)	97.75	48 %
Public Administration Reform	106.22 (24.98%)	20.35	10 %
Other	47.55 (11.18%)	24.42	12 %
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>425.20</b>	<b>203.61</b>	<b>100%</b>
IPA Component			
	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	65.83	67.07	70.71
Cross-border Cooperation	2.87	2.93	2.99
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>68.70</b>	<b>70.00</b>	<b>73.70</b>
Macedonia			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Public Administration Reform	28.00	21.33	7 %
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights	44.00	24.38	8 %
Private Sector Development	45.50	45.71	15%
Agriculture and Rural Development	46.40	67.04	22 %
Transport	52.50	60.95	20%
Environment and Climate Change	28.30	54.85	18%
Social Development	37.30	30.47	10%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>282.00</b>	<b>304.76</b>	<b>100%</b>

IPA Component	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Transition Assistance and Institution Building</b>	28.80	28.20	27.94
<b>Cross-border Cooperation</b>	5.12	5.18	5.24
<b>Regional Development</b>	39.30	42.30	51.80
<b>Human Resources Development</b>	8.80	10.38	11.20
<b>Rural Development</b>	16.00	19.00	21.03
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>98.02</b>	<b>105.07</b>	<b>117.21</b>
Montenegro			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	<b>Period 2007 - 2010</b>	<b>Period 2011 - 2013</b>	
<b>Justice and Home Affairs</b>	17.85	7.30	8%
<b>Public Administration</b>	21.65	10.04	11%
<b>Environment and Climate Change</b>	14.80	22.82	25%
<b>Transport</b>	16.20	18.26	20%
<b>Social development</b>	8.63	9.13	10%
<b>Agriculture and Rural Development</b>	8.10	14.60	16%
<b>Ad hoc measures</b>	8.11	9.13	10%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>106.54</b>	<b>91.28</b>	<b>100%</b>
IPA Component	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Transition Assistance and Institution Building</b>	29843599	21585429	49.05%
<b>Cross-border Cooperation</b>	4310344	9257238	12.94%
<b>Regional Development</b>	0	23200000	22.13%
<b>Social Development</b>	0	5757077	5.49%
<b>Agriculture and Rural Development</b>	0	10900000	10.40%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34153943</b>	<b>70699744</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
Serbia			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	<b>Period 2007 - 2010</b>	<b>Period 2011 - 2013</b>	
<b>Justice and Home Affairs</b>	42.00	75.00	12%
<b>Public Administration Reform</b>	89.00	75.00	12%
<b>Social Development</b>	96.00	75.00	12%
<b>Private Sector Development</b>	34.00	75.00	12%
<b>Transport</b>	71.00	75.00	12%
<b>Environment, Climate Change and Energy</b>	93.00	99.00	16%
<b>Agriculture and Rural Development</b>	34.00	75.00	12%
<b>Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities</b>	120.00	75.00	12%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>579.00</b>	<b>624.00</b>	<b>100%</b>
IPA Component	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Transition Assistance and Institution Building</b>	190.00	194.00	203.00
<b>Cross-border Cooperation</b>	12.00	12.00	12.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>202.00</b>	<b>206.00</b>	<b>215.00</b>

## Appendix IV: Output of SPSS Data Analyses (Democracy and Institutions)

### 1. General variables

**Country:** country name

**Country:** country code: Albania 1; Bosnia and Herzegovina 2; Kosovo 3; Macedonia (FYR) 4; Montenegro 5; Serbia 6.

### Case Processing Summary

Cases		N	%
Valid		52	86,7
Excluded(a)		8	13,3
Total		60	100,0

a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,922	,947	4

### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,819
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	315,262
	df	10
	Sig.	,000

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	3,5769	1,07277	52
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	3,9660	,56013	52
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	4,6996	,56573	52
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	3,1923	,88647	52

### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	3,859	3,192	4,700	1,507	1,472	,414	4
Item Variances	,643	,314	1,151	,837	3,668	,164	4
Inter-Item Covariances	,480	,246	,848	,601	3,440	,038	4
Inter-Item Correlations	,816	,749	,896	,147	1,196	,004	4

### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
15,4348	8,327	2,88567	4

### ANOVA with Friedman's Test

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	Friedman's Chi-Square	Sig	
Between People	106,171	51	2,082			
Within People						
	Between Items	64,590(a)	3	21,530	112,567	,000
	Residual	24,922	153	,163		
	Total	89,512	156	,574		
Total		195,683	207	,945		

Grand Mean = 3,8587

a Kendall's coefficient of concordance W = ,330.

### Hotelling's T-Squared Test

Hotelling's T-Squared	F	df1	df2	Sig
415,862	133,185	3	49	,000

## Intraclass Correlation Coefficient

	Intraclass Correlation(a)		95% Confidence Interval		F Test with True Value 0		
	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Value	df1	df2	Sig	Lower Bound
Single Measures	,747(b)	,647	,831	12,780	51,0	153	,000
Average Measures	,922(c)	,880	,951	12,780	51,0	153	,000

Two-way mixed effects model where people effects are random and measures effects are fixed.

a Type C intraclass correlation coefficients using a consistency definition-the between-measure variance is excluded from the denominator variance.

b The estimator is the same, whether the interaction effect is present or not.

c This estimate is computed assuming the interaction effect is absent, because it is not estimable otherwise.

## Correlations

		rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	Pearson Correlation	1	,927(**)	,911(**)	,830(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000
	N	112	112	70	70
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	Pearson Correlation	,927(**)	1	,848(**)	,788(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,000	,000
	N	112	112	70	70
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	Pearson Correlation	,911(**)	,848(**)	1	,913(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000		,000
	N	70	70	78	78
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	Pearson Correlation	,830(**)	,788(**)	,913(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	
	N	70	70	78	78

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Each country and territory is awarded from 0 to 4 raw points for each of 10 questions grouped into three subcategories in a political rights checklist (A. Electoral Process, B. Political Pluralism and Participation and C. Functioning of Government) and for each of 15 questions grouped into four subcategories in a civil liberties checklist (A. Freedom of Expression and Belief, B. Associational and Organizational Rights, C. Rule of Law and D. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights). A country or territory is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free; each 1 to 7 rating corresponds to a range of total raw scores. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are considered Free, 3-5.5 Partly Free, and 5.5-7 Not Free. The dividing line between Partly Free and Not Free falls at 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either Partly Free or Not Free. The total number of raw points is the definitive factor that determines the final status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-33 points are Not Free, 34-67 points are Partly Free, and 68-100 are Free.

## Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country's constitution.	,69	1,423	484
form of state organization as defined by constitution	-,36	,823	484
electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament (see Annex Electoral Systems)	1,00	1,859	484
index of rigidity of constitution (Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see Annex Flexibility of Constitutions)	1,86	2,016	484

## ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between People		3772,988	483	7,812		
Within People	Between Items	1222,228	3	407,409	506,961	,000
	Residual	1164,460	1449	,804		
	Total	2386,687	1452	1,644		
Total		6159,675	1935	3,183		

Grand Mean = ,80

## Correlations

		bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country's constitution.	form of state organization as defined by constitution	electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament (see Annex Electoral Systems)	index of rigidity of constitution (Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see Annex Flexibility of Constitutions)
bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country's constitution.	Pearson Correlation	1	,925(**)	,657(**)	,844(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000
	N	486	486	484	486
form of state organization as defined by constitution	Pearson Correlation	,925(**)	1	,703(**)	,891(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,000	,000
	N	486	502	484	486
electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament (see Annex Electoral Systems)	Pearson Correlation	,657(**)	,703(**)	1	,724(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000		,000
	N	484	484	484	484
index of rigidity of constitution (Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see Annex Flexibility of Constitutions)	Pearson Correlation	,844(**)	,891(**)	,724(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	
	N	486	486	484	486

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Inter-Item Correlation Matrix**

	rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	1,000	,896	,770	,891
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	,896	1,000	,778	,811
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	,770	,778	1,000	,749
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,891	,811	,749	1,000

**Inter-Item Covariance Matrix**

	rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	1,151	,538	,467	,848
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	,538	,314	,246	,403
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	,467	,246	,320	,376
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,848	,403	,376	,786

**Communalities**

	Initial	Extraction
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	1,000	,925
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	1,000	,871
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	1,000	,870
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	1,000	,942

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

**Total Variance Explained**

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3,609	90,215	90,215	3,609	90,215	90,215
2	,251	6,279	96,494			
3	,093	2,313	98,807			
4	,048	1,193	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Component Matrix(a)

	Component 1
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,962
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,933
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	,933
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	,971

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
a 1 components extracted.

## Reproduced Correlations

	rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance
Reproduced Correlation				
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,925(b)	,898	,897	,934
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,898	,871(b)	,871	,906
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	,897	,871	,870(b)	,905
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	,934	,906	,905	,942(b)
Residual(a)				
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"		,013	-,067	-,023
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"	,013		-,083	-,058
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption	-,067	-,083		,021
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance	-,023	-,058	,021	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a Residuals are computed between observed and reproduced correlations. There are 3 (50,0%) nonredundant residuals with absolute values greater than 0.05.

b Reproduced communalities

Rotated Component Matrix(a)

a Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

### 1. Institutions

<b>bicam</b>	bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country's constitution. codes: 1 - unicameral parliament; 2 - bicameral parliament; -2 - communist constitution
<b>subordup</b>	subordinated upper chamber: relationship between the lower and upper chamber, as framed by the post-communist constitutions. codes: 1 - upper chamber is subordinated; 0 - upper chamber is not subordinated; -1 - unicameral parliament; -2 - communist constitution or undemocratic rule
<b>electup</b>	mode of election of upper chamber codes: 1 - appointment/delegation; 2 - indirect by regional/state legislature; 3 - directly by the people; 4 - other; -1 - unicameral Parliament; -2 - communist constitution or undemocratic rule
<b>federal</b>	form of state organization as defined by constitution codes: 1 - federal state; 0 - other; -2 - communist constitution or undemocratic rule
<b>judrev</b>	judicial review - existence of an independent body which decides whether laws are in conformity with the constitution codes: 1 - yes; 0 - no; -2 - communist constitution or undemocratic rule
<b>electsys</b>	electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament



	codes: 0 – proportional representation; 1 – proportional representation modified; 2 – majoritarian; 3 – parallel (the chamber is elected using both majoritarian and proportional representation systems, and each is allocated a fixed number of seats); -2 – communist election rule
<b>cab_type</b>	type of cabinet codes: 1 - single party majority; 2 - minimal winning; 3 - surplus coalition; 4 - single party minority; 5 - minority coalition; 6 - caretaker; 7 - grand coalition n/p – non-party ministers or experts; na – presidential cabinets (cabinets at the formation of which the Parliament composition is not taken into account)
<b>Irid</b>	index of rigidity of constitution codes: 1 - ordinary majorities; 2 – more than ordinary but less than two-thirds majorities plus referendum; 3 - two-thirds majorities and equivalent; 4 - supermajorities (greater than two-thirds). If particularly difficult conditions for amending the constitution existed, an intermediary category was created by adding .5 to the code describing the basic conditions.
<b>Req_rev</b>	required referendum codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
<b>Vp_ref</b>	veto point referendum codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
<b>Pop_veto</b>	popular veto codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
<b>Pop_init</b>	popular initiative codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
Topics of referenda:	refers to the issues on which referenda are required or can be organized
<b>Topic 1</b>	based on post-communist constitutions border issues and association/secession issues; delegation of state powers to international organizations codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
<b>Topic2</b>	adoption of and amendments to constitution; adoption of and change in other laws codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
<b>Topic3</b>	dissolution of Parliament; impeachment codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
<b>Topic4</b>	other issues "of national importance" codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
<b>polsys</b>	political system codes: 0 – parliamentary; 1 – presidential; 2 – semi-presidential, dominated by president; 3 – semi-presidential, dominated by parliament; 4 – other
<b>ppi</b>	presidential power index -2 - communist constitutions

## 2. Democracy

<b>independ</b>	year of acquisition of independence (for NIS) or official end of communist rule (for CEE) codes: 0 – communist rule; 1 - independent or non-communist
<b>FH</b>	overall status of a country codes: 0 – not free; 1 - partly free; 2 – free; “.” missing value – data does not exist
<b>FH_PR</b>	rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”
<b>FH_CL</b>	rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”
<b>NiT_DEM</b>	Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_ROL</b>	Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_EC</b>	Nations in Transit - Economic Liberalization score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on three dimensions: Privatization, Macroeconomic Policy and Microeconomic Policy (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_DEM2</b>	Nations in Transit - Democracy score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 7 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_EP</b>	Nations in Transit – Electoral process score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_CS</b>	Nations in Transit – Civil society score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_Media</b>	Nations in Transit – Independent media score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_GOV</b>	Nations in Transit – Governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_NGov</b>	Nations in Transit – National democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputted as of 2004)
<b>NiT_LGov</b>	Nations in Transit – Local democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputted as of 2004)
<b>NiT_JUD</b>	Nations in Transit – Judicial Framework and Independence score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>NiT_COR</b>	Nations in Transit – Corruption score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
<b>freedom1</b>	rating of press freedom codes: 0 - not free; 1 - partly free; 2 - free; “.” missing value – data does not exist
<b>freedom2</b>	rating of press freedom scores. Data is available only from 1994 onward. “.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist
<b>CPI</b>	Corruption Perception Index. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). codes: table entries are CPI values. “.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist
<b>war</b>	source: Transparency International. violent conflict inside the country or at the borders. codes: 0 – no violent conflict; 1 – war, civil war or turmoil; 2 – ceasefire “.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist