Mapping attitudes towards the European Union

A comparative analysis among European citizens of 27 member states

Master thesis

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Abstract

The European Union's growing range of competences increases the degree of required societal support among the member states' citizens. This study intends to 'map' national attitudes towards the EU and to deduct their political implications. Therefore, the concepts of i) identification with the EU and ii) support of the EU are combined within a matrix of four ideal types.

Individuals are assigned to these four ideal types: the 'EU-Enthusiasts', the 'EU-Pragmatics', the 'sceptical EU-Idealists', and the 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'. I claim that the population share of the two 'mixed' ideal types - mostly neglected in the literature – provide essential insight into national attitude towards the EU: 'sceptical EU-Idealists' identify themselves as citizens of the EU but are critical towards its politics; on the other hand, 'EU-Pragmatics' support the EU's politics but do not identify with its institutions or its community.

The study's main finding is the enormous country-specific variation of i) the populations' ideal type shares and ii) correlations between identification with and support of the EU (Eurobarometer 77.3, May 2012). Another crucial result is the (partial) rejection of the explanatory macro variable 'duration of EU membership'. Beyond this, the geographic split-up seems inappropriate: the often assumed idea of pragmatic 'Eastern' and idealistic 'Western' countries cannot be affirmed, which calls for a change of mind with respect to 'East-West' and 'old-new' prejudices in this scientific field.

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1 Introduction

After a number of decades, it has become evident that the economic integration of the European Union (hereinafter 'EU') and its strengthened appearance in everyday life has neither increased the citizens' identification with the EU nor support for it[1]. This is a worrying circumstance – especially since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, which highlighted the growing range of competences assigned to the EU. This widened policy scope calls for a stronger *citizens' commitment to the EU* - assuming that a continued Europeanisation is preferable with regard to global politics and economic interweaving[2].

Klaus-Dieter Lehmann states that Europe is neither a 'melting pot' nor a 'salad bowl' but a mosaic – the question is what adhesive forces keep it together (Lehmann 2012)? Many scholars regard *identification with the EU and the European community*[3] as a crucial adhesive which is said to lead *directly to support for the EU* (hereinafter 'EU-identification' and 'EU-support'[4]). But to date, the assumption that EU-identification straightly brings EU-support has *not* been verified. However, a marked finding is that the relationship between both concepts is *country-specific* (see ch. 2). This context provides the background to this work's research design (see ch. 1.2).

National 'visions' of and expectations towards the EU diverge enormously[5]. This leads to the decisive question of how to strengthen EU-identification and EU-support among culturally and economically unequal member states? What 'kind' of 'identity promotion' is promising in a given country? In order to give political implications with regard to this question, this work attempts to '*map' national attitudes* towards the EU.

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[1] Roose (2010a, pp 137 f.); Fligstein (2008, p 142)

[2] This field of research inherently features normative overtones. Nevertheless, Europeanization is assumed as favourable process. General discussion on desirability of European integration is *not* elaborated in this study.

[3] Definition of the terms 'identity' and 'identification' are discussed in chapter 4.2

[4] In order to facilitate reading, I introduce additional abbreviations in the following (i.e. 'EU-support', 'EU-attitude', and 'EU-framing'). It is noteworthy that these introduced terms do *not* refer to the EU as *subject* of action. These terms describe the EU as *target object* of the *citizens' identification/support/attitude/framing processes.*

[5] e.g. Kriesi (1999, pp 272 ff.)

1.1 Relevance

One might argue that this scientific field indicates normative overtones. This criticism cannot easily be denied. After all, voices claim the European 'project' as redundant and are in favour of rejecting it as a whole. However, the following three arguments emphasize the new challenges of the EU and the derived relevance of the *citizens' attitude towards it* (hereinafter 'EU-attitude').

The times of the EU being a mere 'top-down' institution[6] seem to be over: the EU is acquiring a *citizens' interest.* It is embedded in a reciprocal environment that features intensified 'bottom-up' processes – for example by democratisation[7], appearances in the media, strengthened European civil society, and broadening political competencies[8]. This new situation requires a changing quality of transnational legitimacy.

Secondly, *critical junctures* are a severe issue endangering the EU's stability. The latest critical event is the financial crisis that broke out in 2007. The consequences put the member states' solidarity to the test – the future of 'failed' member states is still uncertain today and some countries are not willing to provide the needed assistance. European citizens might withdraw their support as soon as the EU does not provide the expected benefits or costs are anticipated. This points to a lack of stability and deeply-rooted commitment towards the EU (hereinafter 'EU-commitment'). Only in few member states does this kind of commitment seem to be prevalent[9].

The third challenge the EU faces is *world politics*. Among powerful global players, such as the United States and China, it is favourable for the EU's power position to speak with one voice. Despite the impossibility that all Europeans could have the same opinion on one issue, the crucial precondition seems to be an agreed-upon legitimised democratic structure of the EU. Most importantly, the citizens' feeling of 'belonging together' makes this legitimate political 'mouthpiece' reality.

Consequently, conducting research on EU-identification and EU-support seems crucial for the

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[6] When it comes to the *EU* as institution, this term describes the EU's role as *political* institution incorporating its structures, procedures and rules (Hillmann 2007, p 381 f.). In the literature, the definition varies enormously depending on the discipline (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p 1). Chapter 3.1 shows detailed aspects of this term.
Usually, a very broad definition is used throughout this work: institutions are social "formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between people" (Hall 1986, p 7). These rules can emerge consciously and unconsciously as a result of culture and sense-giving.
[7] But although mentioned democratisation processes have been carefully initiated, it is arguable whether the population feels represented by the powerful and centralized EU executive.
[8] Beck (2012)
[9] Brost & Schiertz (2012); Habermas (2013)

EU's new challenges. But only a little research on *country-specific EU-attitude* has yet been published. This study aims to take *first steps* into this area combining the concepts of EU-identification and EU-support. The next section clarifies this research attempt in a brief summary.

1.2 Research attempt

This section contains the basic concept behind the present work intends to 'map' national EU-attitude. Due to the early stage of presentation, many aspects of the research design are anticipated without detailed theoretical derivation (cf. ch. 3 and 4.2). Nevertheless, this overview is expected to facilitate intelligibility of the following chapters.

First of all, it is assumed that national institutions have a crucial effect on EU-attitude. For instance, *political* and *social* institutions create a unique context in which citizens form their individual attitude (see ch. 2.1 and 3). Throughout this work, institutions are, if not declared as political institution, used in a broader sense: institutions are social rules that structure relationships (Hall 1986, p 7). These rules can emerge consciously and unconsciously as a result of culture and sense-giving (Hillmann 2007: 381).

This study's innovative idea[10] is the *combination* of high/low EU-identification and high/low EU-support. These two concepts are of *equal* value, *independent* from each other and exhibit *weak mutual influence.* *C*onsequently, a *matrix* of high/low EU-identification and high/low EU-support can be established (see table 1 in ch. 4.2). The matrix contains four fields that correspond to the four ideal types[11] i) 'EU-Enthusiasts', ii) 'EU-Pragmatics', iii) 'sceptical EU-Idealists', and iv) 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'[12].

This work stands in *opposition to 'mainstream' assumptions* which presume that EU-identification works as a *sufficient* (and partly *necessary*) *condition* for EU-support[13]. Two 'mainstream' ideal types are predominant in literature: 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'EU-Opponents'. Two almost *neglected ideal types* are shown in the 'mixed' cells: *'sceptical EU-Idealists'* and

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[10] As far as the author knows there has not yet been published a comparable research design.
[11] According to Max Weber's definition of ideal types (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 353; Weber 1984c, pp 19 ff.)
[12] Respondents might rate low due to *either* rejection of the EU *or* indifference towards it; therefore, this ideal type is split in EU-Opponents *and* EU-Non-affected.
[13] "There is the normative suggestion that the creation of European identity will lead to increased public support for integration" (Carey 2002, p 390). Confer also Mau (2005); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Christin (2008); Lucarelli   (2011);   Easton   (1965). Certainly, there are scholars who perceive this relationship as rather loose, e.g. Thomas Meyer who argues that "high scores in 'European identity' can go very well together" with the rejection of EU integration (Meyer in Bain & Holland 2007, p 30).

'EU-Pragmatics'. The crucial idea behind these two patterns is that there are individuals who do identify themselves as citizens of the EU but are critical towards its politics, i.e. the 'sceptical EU-Idealists'. On the other hand, individuals who support these politics but do not identify with its institutions or the community are 'EU-Pragmatics' (detailed explanation see ch. 4.2).

This perspective is usually not applied to empirical research and, consequently, the four introduced ideal types *have not yet been analysed*. I claim that these 'mixed' individual patterns provide essential insight into national EU-attitude. Summing up, the *research question* is the following:

> *What pattern of country-specific EU-attitude do the member states' populations feature? This characteristic EU-attitude is reflected by the combination of high/low EU-identification and EU-support which results in distinct, national shares, of the four ideal types 'EU-Enthusiasts', 'EU-Pragmatics', 'sceptical EU-Idealists', and 'EU-Non-affected'/'EU-Opponents'.*

The attempt of this work is to find out, how a *predetermined, dualistic framing of the EU influences the national attitude towards the EU* (see ch. 3.2.2)[14]. This study applies a *rational* and an *emotional* dimension which refer to *two societal spheres* including different *target objects* and modes of psychological *retrieval* (see ch.2.1 and 3.2).

Furthermore, three explanatory approaches are presented and evaluated. The respective variables are based on national contexts[15]: *national value orientation*, the evaluation of national institutions (referring to the *political opportunity cost model; cf. ch. 3.3.2)*, and the emergence probability of EU-identification due to the prevalent *national identity type* (see ch. 3.3)[16]. The presented results are limited to *descriptive* results based on *aggregated micro data* (Eurobarometer 77.3). Nevertheless, they provide political implications as to how EU-commitment can be strengthened considering the country-specific EU-attitude. Above this, the work attempts to contribute to measurement systematisation and the development of theoretical concepts on EU-identification and EU-support.

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[14] Boomgaarden et al. (2011, p 243); Lucarelli (2011)

[15] With regard to the characteristic context within each nation-state, this work's theoretical fundament is institutionalism (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 382): national institutions are therefore the decisive factor for the emergence of transnational identification and support. Besides institutionalism, also other relevant theoretical perspectives will be introduced as social constructionism and symbolic interactionism (see ch. 3).

[16] Due to the novelty and extent of this research attempt, the causality between micro and macro level cannot be examined.

In order to fulfil these attempts, the study's *structure* is as follows. General limitations are shown hereinafter. Chapter 2 presents relevant literature and derives shortcomings of this scientific field including this work's point of contact. Afterwards, chapter 3 introduces the main theoretical perspectives and assumptions of this study and describes three theoretical explanatory approaches. The detailed research design is found in chapter 4 including methodological positioning and operationalisation. Chapter 5 shows the results of ideal-typical EU-attitudes, presenting a country clustering and the evaluation of explanatory variables. The final chapter comprises suggestions for further research, political implications, and an outlook on the new challenges of European integration.

1.3   General limitations

The present work contains general limitations that require clarification *in advance*. Firstly, comparative research can be misleading, resulting in *ad hoc* explanations. This proves problematic because such explanations can hardly be confirmed due to the subject's *high complexity*[17]. Relevant influence factors are almost impossible to analyse simultaneously, such as public media, institutional checks and balances, the influence of world politics, and also individual attributes and psychological dispositions.

The reader shall also be aware that the following problems arise due to an 'international' questionnaire: the *measurement instruments* can be critizised since translations cannot master various cultural cleavages. This includes national answering strategies and culturally biased text apprehension. Also, the items provided in relevant datasets cannot fulfil the requirements of the theoretical model (cf. ch. 4.2 and 4.3). Furthermore, complexity and abstract nature of the constructs 'identification' and 'support' impede *measurability*; consequently, literature shows *no agreed upon basic definitions and concepts* which hampers the development of this research field (cf. ch. 2.2).

The question arises what the *unit of analysis* actually is: is it the EU, the member state, or the citizen? Besides the EU as target object of the citizens' EU-attitude, there are also 'Europeans' and 'Europe' - in terms of history, culture, and bilateral trust – and these are meaningful alternative target objects of commitment. Leaving this variety of options behind and turning to this study's defined target object of citizens' attitude, namely the EU, it is arguable as to whether it

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[17] Fuchs presents a model of mass opinion that shows the complexity of this issue on system and individual level (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 44).

is composed of political institutions, national or transnational political actors, citizens, emergent abstract values, narratives, and principles – or all of the above.

Rautenfeld argues that European identity is "marked by emptiness rather than specific content"; hence, individuals have room to fill it "as they best see fit" (Rautenfeld 2011, p 235). It is likely that every citizen 'frames' the EU differently in numerous dimensions; the identification of a *nation-specific EU-attitude is highly questionable* against this backdrop (cf. ch. 3.2.1, 4.2). This issue challenges this research design fundamentally.

Some scholars argue that *identification* with the EU is *not necessary* for a running political system. Referring to Habermas, only a common "civic culture" is needed[18]. This general suggestion also strains this work's research design.

2   Previous research

In chapter 2.1, a brief overview of the research landscape is presented. Three sections show relevant literature whose structure is oriented towards this work's basic research decisions. A short summary is given at the end of each section. Chapter 2.2 demonstrates the shortcomings of the research field and this study's points of contact.

2.1   Overview of relevant research and prevailing approaches

Presenting the whole literature of this scientific realm goes beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, I focus on empirical studies that *compare country-specific* attitudes towards the EU and Europe. Various theoretical approaches, methods, and explanatory variables are applied to analyse attitudes towards Europe in this research landscape[19]. Overall, the research landscape is very *difficult to structure* due to various approaches and little consensus on basic concepts. Studies differ in several classification spheres, be it the theoretical approach, basic definitions, unit of analysis, or methodology. Nevertheless, the following paragraphs attempt to show a brief overview of differentiation criteria.

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[18] The "civic culture" assumes that shared civic principles are the main precondition for a running (transnational) political system; Almond & Sidney Verba (1989); Donig, Meyer & Winkler (2005, p 133); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Habermas (2008).
[19] Only few studies investigate EU-identification and EU-support. I, thus, present studies analysing *related* concepts and target objects. For instance, there is much literature on 'identity' and 'trust' as related concepts and 'Europe' or 'Europeans' as related target objects.

The 'quest' for adequate concepts of European identity and its support is in progress and ranges from essentialist, through rational-choice and constructivist to neo-institutionalist perspectives (cf. Fan 2008). Many sociological studies are based on *institutionalist* and *constructivist* assumptions in order to find nation-specific and/or individual characteristics that affect attitudes towards the EU. Independently of this theoretical backdrop, the main distinction seems to be a – seemingly unconscious - content-wise focus: studies mostly refer to an i) *economic, a political, or a social/cultural/community-based* point of view.

Also, scholars' theorisation and operationalisation of the attitude towards the EU is mostly described within a continuum. It mostly ranges from ii) *affectual* to *rational*. Another differentiation is whether the analyses interpret iii) *concrete behaviour and attitudes* or *latent values and beliefs*. Studies are generally conducted on *iv) macro* or *micro* level, and partly include a multilevel design. With regard to the emergence of EU-attitude, the assumed causality direction is either v) *bottom-up* which reflects the civil society's influence or institutional *top-down* hypotheses which are currently prevailing.

So far, research has focused on *specific support* of the EU rather than on identification with it. The decision to analyse specific support is surely in favour of less abstractness and the *easier-to-measure* construct. As aforementioned, EU-support is often assumed to be the immediate result of EU-identity. Several scholars and preinvestigations of the present work have revealed that this link is *not* that clear[20]. In literature, European identity and support serve as both vi) *independent or dependent variables*. European identity is often 'only' one explanatory variable amongst many. As previously mentioned, most scholars assume that EU-support is unidirectional dependent on the emergence of EU-identification (e.g. Christin 2008, pp #177; Mau 2005; Fuchs & Klingemann 2011; Lucarelli 2011). With regard to their operationalisation, some are even equating EU-identification and EU-support - and others skip the role of identity as a whole (Haller 2009; Kritzinger 2003; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). This means that these two concepts are *not clearly differentiated* in literature.

Also, *various research interests* are related to the topic: for instance the role of welfare regimes, partisanship, occupation, mobility, and the link between attitudes towards the nation and the EU (Kumlin 2009; Mau 2005). These research interests fragment the scientific field. Apart from sociological approaches, other disciplines, such as political sciences, economics, philosophy and psychology have stepped into this research realm and offer promising approaches. To date, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that every scholar goes their own way.

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[20] e.g. Bruter (2006, p 174); Carey (2002, p 390); Köngeter (2013); Meyer in Bain & Holland (2007, p 30)

This *hampers scientific synergies*; only few common standards and *little consensus* have yet been established.

2.1.1 Findings of qualitative and quantitative research

Qualitative studies are rare although they bear crucial potential in this research field. In quantitative research, mainly descriptive figures, regressions and multi-level-models are used to show descriptives and causalities. This section provides a short overview of qualitative and quantitative research highlighting their assets and drawbacks.

Qualitative research: the national 'framing' of the EU

In this dynamic field of research, "[q]ualitative studies on citizens' EU-attitudes [are] comparatively new" (Bücker 2012, pp 18 f.). The current development is due to "general doubts about the appropriateness of the quantitative or 'variable oriented approach'" (ib.). Qualitative studies are conducted in order to *understand* national and individual attitudes towards Europe that cannot be gathered by quantitative data. This research realm contains both macro level approaches, e.g. national "public frames" (ib.), and micro level approaches, e.g. by conducting interviews on 'European social classes' (Fligstein 2008; Rautenfeld 2011). At the macro level, qualitative research allows for the analysis of country-specific historical background, national value orientations, national identity-patterns, and public media[21]; at the micro level, in-depth-interviews can reveal crucial insights as to how EU-attitude emerges and what dimensions and causalities are related to it.

Qualitative studies are often interview-based, such as the work of Bücker whose interdisciplinary work is rooted in sociological and psychological approaches. She presents firstly a critical overview of the research field's 'state of the art' and shows a reflected proceeding in her own research. Furthermore, she suggests convincing systematisations of EU-attitude, EU-support and their target objects. In the perspective of social constructivism, Bücker succeeds in developing an innovative and empathic research design that examines *ideal typical framings of the EU*[22] by Polish and Eastern German citizens. She argues that the *public discourse* is one of the most crucial factors of these *public frames:* these frames represent a national "horizon of meaning" (Bücker 2012, p 281). The results show that there is only little overlap

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[21] Haller (2009); Bücker (2012); Regös (2013)

[22] "Frames" are defined as guiding principles that structure human action and attitude construction (Bücker 2012, pp 292 f.).

of Eastern German and Polish public frames: this supports the hypothesis that *national frames are predominant* compared to European and individual frames. With regard to the study at hand, this finding highlights the relevance of differentiated national attitudes towards the EU which can hardly be gathered by quantitative analyses.

Guinaudeau gives a case in point how to combine quantitative individual data and qualitative historical deliberations. Her case study traces how French citizens shape 'their own' national European identity. She argues that a strong *political* national identification *increases* EU-identity whereas a strong *cultural* national identification decreases it (see also ch. 3.3.3). Thus, "national political cultures do play a role shaping citizens' evaluation of the European project" which supports the idea of nation-states working as *moderators* between individual characteristics and their stance towards the EU (Guinaudeau 2011).

Another qualitative study that focuses on the macro level is conducted by Haller. He develops nine *ideal typical country clusters* which consider a nation's unique historical backdrop and descriptives based on individual data (Haller 2009, pp 298 ff.). Haller's country clustering thus combines qualitative-evaluative and quantitative methods[23]. The historical-institutional considerations include sensitive analyses of 'national' emotions towards the EU and specific narratives related to it. One might criticise that the nine ideal typical country clusters seem to overlook the connection to its citizens. Nevertheless, I argue that Haller's work is a *role model* for future research.

Other studies working with clusters often simply assume that *geographical closeness* is the decisive factor. This results mostly in 'mainstream clusters' of 'Core', 'Southern', 'Scandinavian', and 'Eastern' countries (e.g. Mau 2005; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000, p 156). In this study, the author tries to *step back from this presupposition*[24].

> Qualitative research highlights the importance of a *sensitive* insight into the people's stance towards the EU. Country-specific *public frames* play a decisive role and create a "horizon of meaning" which is induced by national institutions and public media.

Quantitative research: interaction of individual and institutional variables

Both individualistic and institutionalist approaches are applied in quantitative research – often

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[23] Some *ideal type* descriptions are relevant for the present study's *clustering* (see ch. 5.5)
[24] For practical reasons the wording of 'Core', 'Southern', 'Scandinavian', and 'Eastern' countries is nevertheless used.

combined as a multi-level analysis; thus, the data used is gathered on micro level and/or macro level. Investigations with focus on *individualistic* assumptions mostly present descriptive figures on European identity and support. The main finding is that EU-attitude differs enormously i) among member states and ii) they *depend* heavily on the *questionnaire item used* – which partly leads to inconsistent results among studies. For instance, many member states, such as Austria, Sweden, Italy, Greece, and Hungary are said to be Euro-sceptical in some analyses - and in others they seem Euro-enthusiastic (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011; Fligstein 2008, p 142; Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 205; Risse-Kappen 2010). An explanation for these inconsistencies has not yet been found and points to a severe research gap[25].

Quantitative studies often show *interaction* effects between the national and individual level. *Depending on the member state, an individual variable has a certain effect on EU-attitude.* For instance, the effect of a high occupational status can lead to stronger EU-support in one country, and in another one it leads to weaker EU-support (Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008; Fligstein 2008; Kumlin 2009).

Neil Fligstein presents a comprehensive study concerned with individual characteristics in his monograph 'Euroclash'. It is one of the most relevant works in this research field and contains comparative cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses on European identity. Fligstein's longitudinal data shows that there is *no* significant increase in strength of European identity from 1988 until 2004 (Fligstein 2008, p 142). France, Italy, and Germany feature a strong EU-identity; contrary to Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Greece[26]. A crucial limitation is that Eastern European countries are missing (Fligstein 2008, p 160). The follow-up investigation cover exactly this issue: a new article by Fligstein et al. considers the bail-outs in 2010/11 as critical juncture and presents new Eurobarometer data. They show that the figures on identifying as 'European' has become slightly lower during the crisis but is generally stable over time. Again, strong national differences lead to the assumption that the *emergence probability of EU-identification and EU-support is influenced by nationality* (Fligstein 2012, pp 111 ff.) (see ch. 3). One of the most remarkable findings is that there seems to be 'winners' and 'losers' of the European project. Fligstein regards occupational status[27] as the main influence factor on the assignment to these groups (besides e.g. age, gender, and education[28])

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[25] As far as the author knows, no research attempts have yet been published to analyse this shortcoming.

[26] This item is criticised due to the used item: feeling as 'only European' is a very rare answer in every country (average: 3.9%) (Fligstein 2008, p 141); it would have been more appropriate to include the feeling of being "European and national" and /or "national and European".

[27] Unfortunately, the effect of occupational status is *not* identified by each country, only dummy-variables are used statistical regressions which do *not* account for interaction effects.

[28] This is opposed to Christin's findings that claim gender and age insignificant factors – in contrast to

(Fligstein 2008, pp 160 ff.; Fligstein 2012, p 118). This finding points to the possibility that *not only national institutions* work as decisive factor but also *'transnational assignment'* to groups, e.g. a 'European elite'[29].

The following paragraphs highlight the *institutionalist* approach (e.g. Allam & Goerres 2011; Christin 2008; Easton 1965, pp 154 ff.; Kritzinger 2003; Mau 2005). In general, many of these works also contain individual data and conduct a comparative evaluation of explanatory macro variables. These institutional macro variables are various with regard to their manifestation. There are 'hard' indicators, such as years of EU membership, welfare regime type, and dominant parties; on the other hand, there are 'soft' indicators, such as the country's 'identity type', and value orientation.

Christin wrote a comprehensive and well-structured monograph on citizen's support towards the EU. It is interdisciplinary and applies a broad scope of theoretical approaches. It contains theoretical explanations of support, measurement issues, systematisation attempts, and multi-level models. Above that, Christin applies *two EU-framing dimensions* to analyse the attitude towards national and European entities: firstly, the stance towards the *political community* is measured by *attachment*; secondly, and the attitude towards *regime institutions* is measured by *trust* (Christin 2008, p 80)[30].

The study of Brinegar highlights *cross-level-interactions* and argues that contextual *and* individual factors are crucial for support of European integration. The study reveals different attitudes towards the EU which are influenced by occupation types. These depend for their part strongly on the country's welfare regime type and skill endowments type (Brinegar & Jolly 2005). Thus, *institutionalist and individual factors* seem to be highly *intertwined* and, again, national institutions work as 'moderators'.

Although most of these scholars claim that each country's context provides a unique backdrop for the relationship of individual characteristics, country dummies are – at best – commonly used in statistical regressions which do *not account for the moderator effect* (Carey 2002, p 391).

> Quantitative research suggests that national institutions work as *'moderating variable'* between individual attributes and EU-attitude. Both *institutional* and *individual* factors seem to be decisive and require simultaneous analyses.

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identification, education, and political sophistication (Christin 2008).
[29] Opposed to findings of Rautenfeld (2011)
[30] These dimensions serve as a role model for this work (see ch. 3.2.2).

2.1.2 Concepts of identity

A comprehensive summary on concepts of identity[31] would go beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, this section presents studies that provide *inspiration for the research design at hand*. The following paragraphs introduce concepts which prepare this study's understanding of EU-identification (see ch. 3.2.1) and crucial elements of the two-dimensional EU-framing (see ch. 3.2.2).

Checkel and Katzenstein manage to present comprehensive and sophisticated deliberations on European identity. Their anthology includes sociological, anthropological, historical, and political perspectives (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, pp 1 ff.). EU-identity is mostly figured as process initiated by a *top-down* construction of nations and the EU. Checkel & Katzenstein notice that utilitarian approaches and mathematized methodologies became more and more important which takes constraints and incentives induced by the EU into account (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, pp 7 ff.). This new 'rationalized' *mainstream perspective* however *hampers* sociological approaches that could improve *understanding* of this 'supra-identity'. Thus, EU-identity remains an undefined mystery: research has not helped yet to understand why it emerges, how it is triggered, what 'kinds of identities' exist, and - last but not least - what it actually is.

Risse-Kappen also presents a very sensitive comparison of identity measures. He focuses on collective identity concepts by using descriptive aggregated data (Risse-Kappen 2010). The author claims that the "Europeanization of National Identities" has occurred. In this point of view, national identity is always the - more or less - fertile 'soil' on which European identity grows in a unique way: although there are countless 'kinds' of how Europe exists in the minds of citizens they show these national characteristics. According to Risse-Kappen, citizens of Western and Southern countries are more likely to be Europeanized than citizens from Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. He also introduces the concept of *exclusive and inclusive national identities* (cf. ch. 3.3.3): inclusive national identities are more prone to allow EU-identification and are predominant in Germany, France, Spain, and Italy; whereas exclusive national identities hamper the emergence of EU-identification and are predominant in Finland, Sweden and Great Britain (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 46)[32].

Another concept mentions the emergence of an *"identity light"* version among some countries

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[31] Literature on European support is left out since its conceptualisation is less multifaceted. Its elaboration is conducted in chapters 2.1.1 and 3.2.2.

[32] Other studies use alternative operationalisations and show different results; Germany, France and Sweden often show contradicting results (e.g. Haller 2009, p 306).

(Karolewski 2011, p 952): this 'light' identity becomes evident when solid support and solidarity which imply short-term costs is needed. This 'light' identity is disadvantageous when critical junctures occur such as economic crises. According to Gerhards results, only the Swedish and Dutch are 'real' solidary supporters in contrast to Germany and many Southern European states that feature a rather pragmatic stance (Gerhards 2008). This is a surprising finding since most studies suggest that the Dutch and Scandinavians are very Eurosceptic. These inconsistencies call again for a more detailed examination of EU-identification and EU-support. Furthermore, the results of Risse-Kappen describe an unstable EU-attitude among 'Eastern' countries: although coordinated EU action was favoured by these nations during the last financial, economic, and national crises, their citizens seem to change their attitude towards the EU very fast when confronted by disadvantages. Risse-Kappen explains that attitude by a predominant *rational 'EU-framing'* whose mechanism of evaluation is based on cost-benefit calculation (Risse-Kappen 2010, pp 184, 251).

Fuchs' anthology includes several theoretical and empirical articles. These contributions work on the systematisation of European identity and its political support. As an overall result, Fuchs and Klingemann state that a simultaneous identification with the nation-state and Europe exists: "[c]ountry first, but Europe, too" (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 110). Fuchs shows several *target objects* of identification and support; among others the *institutions of the regime* and the *political community* (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 32). Keil also works with two dimensions, namely i) the trust in *political institutions* that is based on exchange; "A trusts B to do X": trust relies on the credibility of competence and its evaluation is result-oriented; this kind of trust shows only *weak stability*. The second dimension is ii) the *cultural/community-based* approach; "A trusts B": this concept does not include the evaluation of specific outputs; whereas socialisation, positive narratives, and identification with B is crucial to exhibit this kind of trust which is relatively *stable* (Maloney 2010, p 211, cf. ch. 3.2.2).

The previously presented case study of Guinaudeau on French identification with the EU differentiates *cultural and political identity*. A strong national cultural identity has a negative impact on the emergence of European identity, whereas a strong political identity has a positive one (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, pp 133 ff.)[33]. Many similar dualistic concepts are found, such as *inclusive vs. exclusive, civic vs. ethnic, and complementary vs. conflicting* identities; they all describe a slightly different understanding how to capture identity[34].

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[33] cf. Köngeter (2013)
[34] A theoretical connection of these identity/identification concepts is lacking so far.

'European identity' is difficult to grasp and requires sensitive examination and *systematisation*. Relevant literature differentiates between *national identity type* (inclusive and exclusive), *societal spheres* (political and cultural), *target objects* (political institutions and community), and derived *type of support*.

2.1.3 Explanatory national institutions

This section presents basic literature on macro level approaches that aim to explain country-specific EU-attitude by national institutions[35]. The presented studies indicate starting points for the derivation of the three explanatory models that are elaborated in chapter 3.3 and applied in chapter 5.5.

Many studies refer to Gabel's journal article as one of the most meaningful works of this research realm. He presents five explanatory hypotheses and tests their relevance for EU-support (Gabel 1998). Many scientists have refined these explanatory approaches and three dominant "families of explanation" are commonly identified nowadays. In comparative analyses, the studies' explanatory variables mostly combine i) *economic models, ii) collective identities, and iii) political cues*[36].

The term "economic model" is ambiguous: according to Bücker, it represents the i) *utilitarian* perspective of the 1990s[37]. Therefore, decisive explanatory factors are "sociotropic utilitarianism" - rating economic consequences on national level - and "egocentric utilitarianism" including personal consequences[38] (Bücker 2012, pp 40 f.; Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008; Gabel 1998). Another definition is presented by Christin who describes the "economic model" as the ii) individual's *value orientation* towards the EU which is either based on *materialist* or *post-materialist* values. Post-materialist values are defined as advantageous for the emergence of

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[35] The term 'institution' is used in its broader sense of rules that structure social relationships (Hall 1986, p 7); these rules emerge consciously and unconsciously (Hillmann 2007: 381). There are 'hard' indicators, such as years of EU membership, welfare regime type, and dominant parties; on the other hand, there are 'soft' indicators, such as the country's 'identity type', and value orientation.

[36] Cerutti tests whether economic reasons, national identity or political attitude has an impact on EU-support (Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008). He shows that personal utility (e.g. political and economic stability, personal safety) influences significantly support. Also, European identity and cultural threats are significant.

[37] In conflict with Bücker, Christin argues that cost-benefit approaches were added in the 2000's.

[38] Gabel approved that economic interests reflect the attitude towards the EU. He analysed cost-benefit calculations for two different occupational groups. Interestingly, income has a positive effect on EU-support for managers and professionals, but a negative one for manual workers. Gabel explains this by the fear of stronger competition within the more open European labour market that mainly threatens lower-skilled workers due to exchangeability (Gabel 1998).

EU-identification and EU-support[39] (Christin 2008, pp 31 ff.). This definition on value orientation is applied in the study at hand and chapter 3.3 elaborates concrete theoretical derivations.

Beyond this, Christin checks several independent variables to explain EU-support. Among other macro variables, an economic dimension, the political opportunity cost model (see ch. 3.2.2), and the national identity type (see ch. 3.3.3) are tested. Interestingly, the *'baseline' macro variables* - as duration of membership, federalism, post-communist background, GDP[40], and population size - are *not significan*t in multi-level regressions. *Only the 'national identity type'*, measured as the country's mean of exclusive national identity, and the *'political opportunity cost model'*, operationalized by national governance quality, are highly significant in every regression (Christin 2008, pp 55, 73, 76). In short, a strong exclusive/ethnic national identity and a high average mean of satisfaction with national governance *decrease* EU-support.

Also, several other scholars found evidence for the opportunity cost model with regard to different research units (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Munoz, Torcal & Bonet 2011; Kumlin 2009; Mau 2005). Sanchez-Cuenca focused on variables that measure corruption and social protection to explain EU-support. Munoz analyses the *'trust relationship'* between national and European institutions. This relationship is mostly *positive* which supports the *shortcut model* (see ch. 3.3.2). Only citizens with extremely well-evaluated national institutions show a negative relationship.

On the other hand, Mau's results support the opportunity cost model: he shows that Mediterranean countries are mostly in favour of European welfare politics while the national *welfare regime* is assessed as under-average. On the other hand, 'core' and particularly Scandinavian countries show the expected negative evaluation of a European welfare program[41].

The last paragraphs introduced the three promising explanatory approaches that are elaborated in chapter 3.3. The selection proved problematic with regard to numerous explanatory approaches and - often contradicting - results[42]. *Value orientation* is included since some studies

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[39] Interestingly, materialist motives were particularly important for fresh member states as 'Southern' countries, Denmark, and Ireland. 'Eastern' countries are missing since this study was conducted in 1998.
[40] except a few models
[41] Christin (2008, pp 31 ff.)
[42] These explanatory variables were concurrently tested by Allam, Christin and Fuchs with diverging results. However, the studies' research designs and operationalisations were different so that comparison proves problematic. Christin shows that high national governance quality and exclusive national identity have strong negative effects on EU-support (Christin 2008). Fuchs included utilitarian explanatory variables, European identity and national political institutions. Results are presented by country and reveal that utilitarian reasons for support are prevalent (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011). Allam and Goerres find in a sample of post-communist countries that national political reference points (i.e. satisfaction with national democracy) have a positive

show its significant impact on both EU-identification and EU-support – although this effect seems rather weak. The second explanatory approach is the *opportunity cost model* which is supported by many studies. Although this model has mainly been tested with regard to EU-support it can also be applied to EU-identification. Only a little empirical research has yet been conducted on the influence of *multiple identities* due to problematic retrieval and the topic's abstractness. Nevertheless, the national identity type seems auspicious with regard to its explanatory power. The *utilitarian* approach that deals with cost-benefit calculations is *not* included. This is due to the literature's findings that it merely explains EU-support but not EU-identification.

> The most promising approaches to explain EU-identification and EU-support are the *national value orientation*, the *political opportunity cost model*, and the *national identity type*.

2.2   Research gaps and this study's point of contact

This chapter shows the shortcomings of this scientific realm and introduces relevant starting points for this study. The research field's relevance is reflected by a rising number of publications. One overall 'result' can be taken for granted: the evaluation of national EU-identification and EU-support draws a picture as varied as the number of publications.

Little consensus is identified in this research field and the findings are strongly dependent on the selection of questionnaire items: although the items are supposed to *measure the same latent construct, their figures differ enormously* which leads to inconsistent results[43]. These grave differences have not yet been analysed and point to a *severe research gap*. Undoubtedly, it is pointless to conduct deductive research without valid and reliable operationalisation (e.g. Schnell 2008: 149 ff.). The deficits may be due to *data assessment* itself, but also *missing consensus on concepts* of identity and support are severe issues. Another shortcoming is that the practice of applying transdisciplinary approaches, e.g. political sciences, history, and psychology, is lacking. In particular, available knowledge of psychological retrieval and identifi-

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impact (pointing to the shortcut-model). Interestingly, subjective perception of personal economic conditions has no significant effect but perception of the national economy is significant (Allam & Goerres 2011, pp 1417 ff.).

[43] As aforementioned, some countries as France, Austria, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Hungary are partly said to be euro-sceptic and partly euro-enthusiastic; Christin (2008, p 62); Lucarelli (2011, p 60); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011, pp 70 f., 77, 80 f., 137); Guibernau (2011, p 37); Gabel (1998, p 347); Checkel & Katzenstein (2009, p 205).

cation concepts have hardly been implemented to date (Gigerenzer & Selten 2001, p 53; Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 105, 126 f., 131).

Summing up, the following issues show the research field's shortcomings:

- The assumption of a *one-directional causality* between identity as independent and support as dependent variable is dominant; EU-identification works as a *sufficient* (and partly *necessary*) *condition* for EU-support. This assumption is reflected by many datasets that ascertain either identity *or* support items. Also, *'hybrid' questionnaire items* present both identity and support *at once*.

  In cases where the identity and support variables are available in *one* dataset, they are *hardly combinable* due to *different target objects* (e.g. EU as institution vs. continental Europe vs. Europeans vs. EU policy).

- EU-attitude is almost never[44] analysed in terms of *societal spheres.* Analysing political, cultural, economic or global spheres seems a promising approach to find answers on causalities and national EU-framings.

- A general problem of latent constructs as identity and identification[45] is the individual retrieval. Due to the *interviewees' unawareness* towards questions on this fragile concept, it is difficult to predict which answers can be 'taken seriously'. This calls for well tested and sensitive questionnaire items.

- Psychological modes of *affectual and cognitive* retrieval and reasoning have not yet been tested although they seem enormously important for response behaviour[46].

- The *underestimation of national characteristics* is a very intriguing issue. Although most scholars admit that countries work as *moderating variables,* results are presented in an inadequate way. For instance, they refer to *all* member states or show country dummies.

  The nation-state with its distinct institutions, narratives, media, and historical/cultural background firstly requires *qualitative* case analyses[47].

The presentation of these research gaps shall not disparage the achievements of the single

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[44] Exceptions are Maloney (2010, p 211) and Fuchs & Klingemann (2011, pp 133–136).

[45] The meaning and application of both constructs is explained in chapter 3.2.1.

[46] The results depend on the way of reasoning which can be either affectual or cognitive. For instance, the wording and order of items trigger retrieval modes (Gigerenzer & Selten 2001, p 53).

[47] This calls for more qualitative investigation and makes mathematized multi-level analyses questionable. Also, multiple moderating effects complicate interpretation of results enormously. Methods as 'Qualitative Comparative Analysis' (QCA) seem to be more appropriate with regard to these sensitive latent constructs.

contributions in this research field. Rather, the missing common theoretical fundament proves problematic since it is indispensable as a base for scientific work and its evaluation. To date, there is no common scholarly 'language' in this research field which hampers further development. The study at hand certainly contributes to a minor extent. Nevertheless, some of the points mentioned above shall be addressed in this work:

- EU-identification and EU-support are analysed *independently* as two autonomous concepts. This allows the four *ideal types* of which two have not yet been analysed. They are supposed to reveal insight into national characteristics and more qualitative patterns of national EU-attitude.

- Psychological approaches are considered; the concept of *affective and cognitive retrieval* is a crucial component of the research design.

- Two *societal spheres* are analysed in order to reveal meaningful qualitative insights with regard to national characteristics and EU-framing: the economic-political and socio-cultural sphere.

- The research design's aim is to 'map' characteristic national EU-attitude by combining quantitative and qualitative evaluation. Therefore, country-specific interpretation of results involving institutional macro level background is presented (see ch. 5.2 and 5.3). The elaboration of country clusters facilitates these first 'mapping' attempts (see ch. 5.5).

It goes without saying that it is hard to live up to these demanding aims. Respective general limitations and data restrictions are described in chapter 1.3 and 4.3 pointing to this work's shortcomings.

3 Theory

After presenting the research landscape and its various approaches in the previous chapter, the following paragraphs introduce theoretical perspectives and assumptions. Chapter 3.2 gives definitions of this work's basic concepts and, lastly, the three explanatory models and their estimated effects on EU-attitude are derived in chapter 3.3.

3.1 Theoretical perspectives and basic assumptions

Generally, this work follows the tradition of institutionalist approaches introduced in chapter 2.1.1. *Institutionalism* is however only the 'backbone' of this work: several additional theoretical perspectives are applied due to the present study's *explorative* and *transdisciplinary* alignment. This *eclecticism* is both an asset and a drawback. It is open to multiple complementary theoretical perspectives and not bound to one paradigm. At the same time, the eclectic approach is criticised for being inconsistent and unscientific. Nevertheless, I argue that the *synergies* of the applied approaches overweigh the shortcomings in this stage of research: this way of proceeding provides the required openness to find answers on this unexplored scientific question.

According to the *institutionalist* approach[48], historically unique and path-dependent[49] institutions determine the individuals' habitual ways of thinking. This happens when these individuals 'internalize' these institutions and their rationalities. Thus, attitudes and behaviour are mainly based on - intended and unintended - 'top-down' socialisation. To account for the research question's demands, the 'old'[50] institutionalism's comparative tradition and its focus on both *political* and *cultural* institutions is meaningful for the study at hand (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 382). As aforementioned, countries are the crucial framework that moderates individual action and attitudes[51].

Furthermore, ideas of the *actor-centred* institutionalism shall be considered (Nullmeier 2000, pp 269 ff.). This perspective focuses on individual actors and their action orientation. The individual constructs *actively its identity* – as opposed to the 'old' institutionalist view of 'top-down' socialisation and identity construction. This points to this work's paradigms of *social constructivism* and *symbolic interactionism* which are close to this actor-centred institutional-

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[48] As aforementioned, the term 'institution' is ambiguous in this work. 1) When related to the EU or nations, its *political institutions* are meant. 2) In other respects, the term refers to the broad definition of Hall that describes nearly all concrete and abstract manifestations of society: institutions are "formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between people" (Hall 1986, p 7). Hence, institutions structure social relationships (Hall 1986, p 7); institutions can emerge consciously and unconsciously as a result of culture and sense-giving (Hillmann 2007: 381).

[49] Path dependency describes the assumption that 'history matters': once a historical track of a given institution or polity is established, it is hard to change (Ackermann 2001, p 9).

[50] At first, Max Weber focused on the way how bureaucracy and institutions started to dominate our society. This 'old' institutionalism focuses on analysing formal institutions of the national government in a comparative perspective. Nowadays, the focus has moved to individualistic approaches. In the 1980s, the concept of "new institutionalism" arose: authors like Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell *revisited Weber's iron cage* in the early 1980s. This approach emphasises smaller social groups as organisations in their environment/organisational field (Powell & DiMaggio 1991).

[51] This work's central institution-based factors that affect EU-attitude are *national value orientation* (section 3.3.1), the citizen's *evaluation of national institutions* (cf. section 3.3.2), and the *national identity type* (section 3.3.3).

ism. These approaches explain how individuals *'construct'* their personal *'meaning'* and framing of the EU (cf. Bücker 2012, p 57). Other disciplines also provide meaningful approaches as *psychological* theories ('contrast theory', 'framing theory', modes of retrieval, 'value-identity theory' [see ch. 3.2.1., 3.2.2, 4.2]) and theories of *political sciences* (e.g. the 'political opportunity cost model' [see ch. 3.3.2]).

Max Weber's concept of *ideal types* is the crucial instrument to systematize and analyse complex characteristics (Weber 1984c, pp 19 ff.) and facilitates the comparison of countries. Weber's method is applied to ideal typical EU-attitudes (see ch. 1.2 and 4.2), the two dimensions of EU-framing (see ch. 3.2.2), and country clustering (see ch. 5.5).

Almond and Verba's conceptualisations in their monograph "The Civic Culture" serve as a role model for the study at hand. They analyse the "political culture of a nation [and its] […] orientation toward political objects" within the structural-functionalist tradition (Almond & Sidney Verba 1989, pp 14 f., 358). The present study also examines the national "political culture" of European citizens towards European entities by describing the unique national 'mix' of 'ideal typical' EU-attitude. Almond and Verba likewise use this method: they define 'ideal type orientations' towards political entities and derive 'citizen ideal types' and *'attitude ideal types'* (details see ch. 3.2.2).

Summing up, these eclectic theoretical approaches are applied in a complementary way. Turning to the scientific question and combing it with the institutionalist 'backbone', scheme 1 shows the basal idea of the research design. This causal framework shows that national patterns are assumed to be the crucial precondition for the emergence and character of individual EU-attitude. This EU-attitude consists of both EU-identification and EU-support. National institutions influence both constructs *simultaneously*. Also, there is a mutual interplay between EU-identification and EU-support.

Scheme 1: Causal framework of relevant variables

Source: own presentation

3.2 Definition of fundamental concepts

Due to a lack of consensus for how to systematize and define basic concepts in this research field (cf. ch. 2), the following sections elaborate EU-identification, EU-support and national framing as this work's fundamental concepts of the research design.

3.2.1 EU-identification and EU-support

The construct of EU-identification and EU-support are fundamental for this study. Most studies of this research field do not analyse EU-identification but *European identity* - although it is "marked by emptiness rather than specific content" (Rautenfeld 2011, p 235). European identity is a very *abstract*, nuanced and sensitive concept that is difficult to grasp - theoretically and empirically. Beyond this, there are claims that nothing like a collective European identity actually exists. The term 'European identity' implies that a "*collective* identity" (emphasis added) has already emerged. A "collective identity" is by definition based on *believed* characteristics which find *consensus* among its self-attributed members. In the case of European identity, the demand of a common understanding *is not fulfilled*[52] - it is even unclear what actor(s) might have the authority for interpretation of 'European identity' (Roose 2007, p 126).

Although related difficulties occur when analysing *identification* instead of identity, it is *more accessible* and *applicable* for both theoretical and empirical research. The identification *process* is based on the individual's *subjective perception and evaluation of a target object*. This process relates to the individual's "*personal* identity" (emphasis added) that "bridges [the] gap between the self and the outside world": individuals construct a link to external entities in order to build up a *positive* self-concept. This happens by identifying with positively attributed individuals or groups (Roose 2007, pp 132 f.). "Personal identity" is more appropriate than "collective identity" when analysing identification with the EU, Europe or Europeans. It has 'weaker' demands than the concept of identity and refers to the subjective evaluation which

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[52] A collectively shared perception of 'Europeanness' is *unlikely* due to a nation-specific point of view on the EU and "discriminating particularisms" among heterogeneous nation-states that feature a power disequilibrium. By this, Europe "will never end up in a coherent narrative" due to "diverse backgrounds, beliefs, lifestyles" (Rautenfeld 2011, p 237).
Also, a study conducted by Rautenfeld compares German and UK actors who work for Europe-related university programs as 'European studies'. Even among this Bologna process' new 'European elite' *no* common EU perception is found (Rautenfeld 2011, p 228).
Also, a homogenous identity seems impossible due to the EU's "discriminating particularisms" between very

does *not need a collective understanding* of the target object.

Another point that requires explanation is the decision to examine *EU*-identification - and *not European* identification. Firstly, 'Europe' is a very *broad research object* that lacks sharp boundaries - both in terms of geography and the respondents' associated meanings which range from cultural through political to social 'frames'. Secondly, a general attempt of this work is to provide political implications. The 'closest' research object that is - theoretically - capable of acting and reacting on these implications is the EU.

The definition of *EU-support* is based on the work of Easton. He argues that a political system such as the EU creates "outputs" (decisions and actions) which require the citizens' "inputs" (demands and support) (Easton 1965, pp 154 ff.). Thus, the role of citizens is to evaluate the system's actions and provide support where appropriate. Hence, EU-support is perceived as an *active endorsement* towards political target objects in question (Easton 1965, p 177)[53].

> Due to the nebulosity of 'European identity', the concept of EU-identification is applied. This concept is *not* in need of a shared *collective* identity but based on the *personal identification process*. The concept of EU-support refers to the *active endorsement* towards political and social entities.

3.2.2   Framing the EU - a dualistic concept

The attempt of this work is to find out, how a *predetermined EU-framing influences the national EU-attitude*. This proceeding adds an additional qualitative aspect to this analysis. Two *ideal typical dimensions* of EU-framing are elaborated in the following, namely the *rational* and the *emotional* dimension. This section prepares the theoretical framework and its elements for this *dualistic* concept that is applied in the research design. The presented elements (see table 3) are numerous and rather wide-ranging due to the explorative state of research[54]. Hence, the dimensions' design requires theoretical refinement and further abstraction.

According to literature, every country exhibits a *unique national EU-framing* due to its "public frames" (Bücker 2012, cf. ch. 2.1.1). These "public frames" are initiated by national media and institutions, public debates, and collective narratives. In literature, this framing is usually translated into a dualistic concept. Roughly speaking, there is i) a rather *rational* stance to-

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[53] Since this work analyses a broad scope including the emotional dimension (see ch. 3.2.2), also the European community is analysed as target object of EU-support.
[54] There is a lack of the elements' theoretical connection.

wards EU-institutions and its policy, and ii) an *emotion-driven* stance towards EU-community and its values/principles.

A prime example of research is Kritzinger's analysis of two *societal spheres,* i.e. a political and an economic dimension. The two *dimensions show quite opposed results*[55] which supports the meaning of EU-framing within the research design. A second understanding of framing is prevailing in literature: Bücker *finds 'primary' framings* in her qualitative analysis. This refers to what comes *first* to people's minds when they think of the EU. In the study at hand, it is *not* possible to find these spontaneous 'primary' framings due to restrictions of the quantitative retrieval technique[56].

A starting point for the elaboration of the dualistic concept is "The Civic Culture" of Almond and Verba which serves as a theoretical backdrop of this section. The authors claim that a democratic political culture contains a *set of beliefs and attitudes* that supports the citizens' participation[57]. By this, citizens can exhibit "cognitive", "affective", and "evaluative" orientations towards political objects (Almond & Sidney Verba 1989, pp 15, 178). Two of these orientations are role models of this study[58]: the *"evaluative"* orientation resembles the rational dimension and the *"affective"* orientation is close to the emotional dimension. Further elements of these two dimensions are elaborated in the following paragraphs.

First however, I want to point out a general problem of this concept: scholars argue whether the "affective orientation" towards the EU is actually relevant – if at all possible. For instance, Habermas claims that *only civic identification is of importance* (Habermas 2006). Another point is that Europe is said to be 'only' a "Staatsnation" - usually a "Kulturnation" needs to be established *before* so that emotional attachment and cohesion is ensured (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 208). According to this understanding, the existence of an *"affective orientation"* towards the EU might *not be possible at all*. This work does not engage in discussing the general importance of the "affective" orientation type for EU-support – although this debate is increasingly relevant - but I argue that this emotional commitment towards the EU is i) required in the present and even more in future; and it is ii) actually already 'real' as a citi-

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[55] A *positive* relationship between national and EU-attitude is observed in the *economic* sphere and a *negative* one in the *political* sphere. This means that attitudes towards the nation are *partly 'projected'* and partly reversed into a *'zero-sum-game'*.

[56] Although there are some Eurobarometer items which try to take this consideration into account, the retrieval mechanism shows severe shortcomings. Qualitative analyses are more appropriate for analyses of 'primary' framing.

[57] Debating the democratic quality of the EU goes beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I assume that the EU and its citizenship are based on democratic principles which make this concept applicable.

[58] When transferring this concept to EU-institutions, the cognitive orientation seems too weak for the research design at hand (Almond & Verba 1989, pp 22 f.);

zens' EU-attitude[59].

The previously introduced work of Easton applies systems theory to political science and highlights the importance of the political system's inputs (demands and support) and outputs (decisions and actions) (Easton 1965, pp 154 ff.). A distinction is made between specific and diffuse support. *Specific support* represents the environment's satisfaction with concrete political outputs; it can *change fast* because it depends on the *cognitive evaluation* of present information. *Diffuse support* is based on the "evaluations of what an object *is* or *represents*" (emphasis added); this kind of support is *more stable* and based on *affective emotions* and *socialisation* processes (Easton 1965, pp 439 ff.)[60].

According to Easton, *target objects* of the environment's support are political authorities, the political community, and the political regime (Easton 1965, p 177). Since political authorities play a subordinated role in the EU context, this target object is crossed out for the conceptualisation at hand. Through this, Easton combines the support type with the target object: the *political community* is the target of diffuse support, whereas specific support is directed towards the *political regime*.

The two dimensions are closely linked to *EU-identification*. The rational dimension refers to Habermas' *civic* identification and the emotional dimension to the *affective* identification. Affective identification is based on emotional attachment to a social group, whereas civic identification is based on the formal affiliation to a collective that shares common rationalities[61].

Also, Max Weber's ideal types of 'social action' are relevant as *motivation modes* towards the EU. The active evaluation and attitude formation towards the EU is considered to be an 'action' so that this concept can be applied. The rational dimension relates to "purposive-rational action" ("zweckrationales Handeln") and the emotional dimension to "affectual" and "value-oriented action" ("affektuelles" and "wert-rationales Handeln") (Weber 1984a, pp 44 ff.).

As previously mentioned, psychological approaches are hardly ever taken into account but they play a crucial role in this concept. Eagly describes two modes of retrieval which are processed by the "central" and "peripheral route". The *central route* processes information by *computing* a *cognitive* evaluation (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p 305); the *peripheral route* uses

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[59] The definition as 'real' is meant as *subjective* perception process (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 952 f.) which relates to philosophical deliberations as the Thomas Theorem.

[60] Also, Kumlin suggests two support types: the *utilitarian* one - referring to specific support and featuring a short-termed commitment and *affective* support which refers to diffuse support. This kind is acquired by socialisation and features long-term commitment (Kumlin 2009).

[61] It is to add that civic identification is a very restricted kind of 'identification' since the mere recognition of common rationalities seems very weak condition for 'real' identification.

heuristic shortcuts which results in quick emotional responses[62]. Scholars presume that *affectual* and *cognitive retrieval modes affect the attitude formation* towards the EU significantly (Bücker 2012, p 32; Hitlin & Piliavin 2004, p 379)[63].

These single elements of the dimensions are shown in the first column of table 3. The elements of each dimension are highly *intertwined.* Concerning the rational dimension, civic identification and specific support can be improved by perceived advantages initiated by EU-institutions. With regard to the emotional dimension, it seems difficult to improve affective identification and diffuse support. In the long run, either a consensus on perceived socio-cultural principles or a strengthened attachment to the community might be relevant issues (see ch. 6.2). These deliberations lead to the associated societal spheres of ideal types: the rational dimension relates content-wise to the *political-economic* sphere and the emotional dimension to the *socio-cultural* sphere.

The two ideal type dimensions are defined as follows:

- The *rational dimension* considers content-wise a *political-economic* sphere and is retrieved by *cognitive reasoning*.
  Specific support towards the *political regime* and its policy is dependent on the positive, information-based *evaluation* of its performance.

- The *emotional dimension* focuses content-wise on the *socio-cultural* sphere and is retrieved by *affectual* sentiments.
  Diffuse support towards the *political community* and its ideals/principles is dependent on the positively associated *sense* of belonging.

The described tight relationship of the dimensions' elements is *highly simplified* due to the conceptual decision to work with *ideal types*. It goes without saying that this dualistic concept does *not* reflect all the nuanced complexities of this sensitive research object. Furthermore, application of this scheme to actual questionnaire items contains problematic restraints (see ch. 4.3).

The elements in question are shown below and include the differentiation of evaluative and

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[62] Studies show that these affective, quick answers are more stable over time and are better predictors for behaviour (Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 127 f.).

[63] Bücker also mentions a "behavioural" source of attitudes based on concrete experiences. But since only few individuals directly interact with the EU, she suggests crossing it out (Bücker 2012, p 32).

affective orientation towards political entities (Almond & Sidney Verba 1989), specific and diffuse support, speed of attitude change, target objects (Easton 1965), identification types (Habermas 2006), retrieval modes (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p 305), motivation types (Weber 1984a), and societal spheres.

The rational and emotional dimensions allow retrieval of *two ideal-typical EU-frames* in order to show detailed characteristics of national EU-attitude.

Table 3: Overview of rational and emotional dimension as ideal-typical EU-framing

	Rational dimension	Emotional dimension
'Civic culture'-orientation	Evaluative orientation	Affective orientation
Support type	Specific support	Diffuse support
Attitude change	Short-termed, information	Long-term, socialisation
Target objects	Political institutions, policy	Community, ideals/principles
EU-identification type	Civic 'identification'	Affective identification
Motivation type	Purposive-rational motive	Affectual & value-rat. motive
Retrieval mode	Central route: cognitive	Peripheral route: heuristic
Societal sphere	Economic-political	Socio-cultural

Source: own presentation

3.3   National institutions: Three explanatory models

Following the presented literature, this chapter elaborates three theoretical explanations of EU-attitude and their hypothetical predictions based on institutional assumptions[64] (cf. ch. 2.1.3 and 3.1). Scheme 2 visualizes this idea as causality diagram.

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[64] Scheme 2 shows three explanatory models *based* on national institutions. Thus, the 'political opportunity cost model' refers to the *mechanism* (nation state as reference point) and *not* to a national institution.

Scheme 2: Explanatory models of EU-attitude

National value orientation	Political opportunity cost model	National identity type

EU-Identification ⟷ EU-support

Source: own presentation

National institutions form country-specific contexts in which individual EU-attitudes emerge; this overview shows the concrete factors of explanatory models which are derived from previous research (see ch. 2.1.3). The predictions are in brackets and refer to the four ideal typical EU-attitudes presented in the introduction (see ch. 1.2). The mechanism behind the predictions is elaborated in the following sections.

- i) National value orientation
  - o post-materialist values

    (increases the share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'sceptical EU-Idealists')
  - o materialist values

    (increases the share of 'EU-Opponents' and 'EU-Pragmatics')
- ii) Political opportunity cost model
  - o Negative evaluation of national government quality

    (increases share of 'EU-Enthusiasts')
  - o Positive evaluation of national government quality

    (increases share of 'EU-Opponents')
- iii) National identity type
  - o 'civic' national identity

    (increases share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'sceptical EU-Idealists')
  - o 'ethnic' national identity

    (increases share of 'EU-Opponents' and 'EU-Pragmatics')

These three explanatory approaches are by no means complete, but seem the most fruitful ones with regard to the research question. Since an empirical test with individual data would i) exceed the scope of this work and ii) are restricted by the availability of respective items,

these elaborations mainly serve as theoretical 'offers'. They provide a backdrop during the research process and they are discussed to a limited extent on base of descriptive macro level data (see ch. 5.5). In the following three sections, these explanatory models and their prediction on EU-attitude are derived in detail.

3.3.1   National value orientation

Value orientations shape *attitude* and *behaviour* of individuals. In her social psychological contribution, Hitlin describes indirectly the meaning of values for EU-attitude. The relationship between values, attitudes, and behaviour are crucial. Values affect "readiness for contact with members of an out-group": certain values produce social trust (as attitude) which results in making contact with people from out-groups (as behaviour) (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004, p 382; Forbes 1997, p 9 f.).

Collective ideologies influence and even shape individual values; groups with the ability to create these collective ideologies are social groups, classes but also regions and whole *nations*.

This work regards the entity of the nation-state as crucial which is supported by "identity theory". It claims that modern national identities are based on "value-identities" that heavily influence the citizen's socialisation process (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004). The nation's societal institutions, such as common political and cultural rationalities, narratives, and mass media are decisive in this process.

Scholars argue that values play an important role for the probability of transnational identification and solidary attitude towards other Europeans. But it remains *vague what value* the best predictor is. Several problems arise when working with values: they are difficult to define, to retrieve[65], and to evaluate. Hence, scholars often label attitudes as values or just ignore their impact as a whole.

In literature, there are several value concepts which seem relevant for the study at hand. It goes beyond the scope of this study to introduce all these concepts. Thus, only the work of three authors shall be mentioned: *Inglehart, Hofstede*, and *Schwartz* present elaborated value concepts including questionnaire instruments and *'value maps'* which locate countries within

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[65] The interviewees' accessibility of values is not necessarily possible due to unawareness (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004, p 364). There are numerous psychological instruments to measure values but the results show that their validity is questionable.

two dimensions (Maehler & Schmidt-Denter 2013)[66]. The findings show that countries exhibit *distinct value patterns* and meaningful *country clusters* are identified.

One of the most familiar value concepts is *Inglehart's post-materialism thesis*. This work argues that the country's post-materialist value orientation fosters *openness, tolerance* and *solidarity* towards out-groups[67]. They are hence a positive predictor for EU-identification and EU-support. In addition, post-materialist values 'fit' the European "statement of principles": the EU's "value-identity" is close to post-materialist values which facilitates identification[68] - provided that the individual in question also exhibits post-materialist values.

An additional assumption is that citizens with strong *post-materialist* values emphasize the *idealistic* claims of the EU and the European community[69] due to their biased 'primary' framing. Through this, citizens identify more easily with the EU. However, their high aspirations towards EU policy lead to a lower probability that the EU can fulfil them. Thus, *post-materialist values might decrease EU-support* (as "value-rational action"). In the case of fulfilled value-related aspirations, the share of *'EU-Enthusiasts'* increases or, if not, the share of *'sceptical EU-Idealists'* does.

Materialist values result in *low identification* due to missing openness and mismatch of values. On the other hand, short-termed *EU-support is still possible* as long as advantages are perceived (as "purposive-rational action"). In the case of perceived advantages, the share of *'EU-Pragmatics'* increases, if not, the share of *'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'* does.

Turning to the research question, this work formulates the following prediction with respect to the four ideal typical EU-attitudes:

> The national value orientation influences the four ideal typical EU-attitudes insofar that strong *post-materialist* values increase the share of *'sceptical EU-Idealists'* and/or *'EU-Enthusiasts'*. Strong *materialist* values increase the share of *'EU-Pragmatics'* and/or *'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'*.

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[66] Maehler provides a comprehensible overview of these value concepts while elaborating her own 'value-map'.

[67] Inglehart works with dualistic value concepts: his analyses consider the dimensions self-expression vs. survival values and secular-rational vs. traditional values (Inglehart 1990); (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p 693). According to literature, strong *self-expression* and *secular-rational* values facilitate openness and trust towards out-groups and transnational institutions.

[68] One can argue that the *EU's liberal stance* towards economy is closer to the *materialist* point of view. I argue that these economic actions can be labeled "materialist" in the sense of *capitalist* orientation. But the EU's *value orientation* (see the statements of principles) reflects post-materialist values in terms of *human rights, sustainability, tolerance*, etc.

[69] These causalities are supported by "framing theory" that regards values as promising factor to explain public frames (Bücker 2012, pp 292 f.; Hitlin & Piliavin 2004): post-materialist values let easier frame on idealist and abstract aspects of the EU, whereas materialist values shift the focus to cost-benefit calculations and economic aspects. These 'primary frames' cannot be analysed in this work due to dataset restrictions (see ch. 3.2.2).

Although studies on post-materialist values do not show clear results (Christin 2008, pp 31 ff.; Gabel 1998; Risse-Kappen 2010, p 184; Haller 2009, p 327; Anderson & Reichert 1995), its potential with regard to *country differences* is noteworthy. An interesting study on this topic is conducted by Anderson who found that post-materialist values have a *positive* effect on EU-support in the *original six member states* and a *negative* impact in *the remaining member states* (not including Eastern countries). The author's interpretation is that *idealistic* notions dominate the perception of the EU in the 'older' member states' due to a longer socialisation period and more international contact occasions[70] - contrary to the 'new' members whose individuals perceive and evaluate *material* aspects of the EU (Anderson & Reichert 1995)[71]. Risse-Kappen argues that '*Eastern*' countries' citizens show a special attitude: although these citizens favoured coordinated EU action during the crisis, they seem to change their attitude towards the EU fast when confronted with disadvantages[72]. The supposed explanation is that their predominant frame is based on *rational and economic reasoning* which might be related to materialist values (Risse-Kappen 2010, pp 184, 251). Summing up, the literature suggests that *'new'* member states feature a *materialist* EU-framing[73] and, thus, show a relatively high share of 'EU-Pragmatics' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-Affected'.

3.3.2 Political opportunity cost model

In a newspaper article, the Hungarian intellectual Konrád draws the picture that the darker the sky for the Hungarian democracy, the brighter the EU shines in the eyes of Hungarian citizens (Konrád 2013). This metaphor reflects the general mechanism of the *political opportunity cost model*: since individuals do usually not relate themselves directly with the EU, they use the nation-state as a proxy. Thus, the evaluation of the *countries' performance* serves as *reference point* for the evaluation of the EU (Marks & Steenbergen 2004, pp 54 ff., 58; Kritzinger 2003, p 226).

The political opportunity-cost-model was introduced by Sánchez-Cuenca. He shows that citizens calculate opportunity costs when transferring sovereignty from the national government

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[70] cf. contact hypothesis (e.g. Forbes 1997, p 9 f.)

[71] Gabel also found that materialist motives are rather important for 'new' member states (Gabel 1998).

[72] Also, Haller's ideal type of 'Europe as "end in itself"' gives hints how the EU is perceived in the new 'Eastern' citizens. In general, the evaluation of the EU is positive in most Eastern countries. According to Haller, this is due to the citizens' materialist framing on the economic advantages of membership. Nevertheless, Haller describes these citizens as *"Euroneutral"* featuring a *"passive participation"* without emotional commitment (Haller 2009, p 327). Also, Bücker indicates that Polish citizens frame the EU in a more pragmatic way (Bücker 2012, pp 43, 283).

[73] The value map by Inglehart and Menzel supports this presumption (see appendix).

to the EU (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Christin 2008, pp 34 ff.). Thus, the preferred political entity for decision-making can be identified. The evaluation of national institutions is hence crucial for the acceptance or rejection of the EU. The political opportunity cost model argues that there is a *negative* relationship between national and EU institutions describing a so-called *zero-sum-game*: the better the citizens evaluate their national system, the more probable that they devalue EU institutions – and vice versa[74]. Also, *psychological contrast theory* explains this relationship - in an even more extreme manner. It states that the nation-state serves as a contrast point against which the EU is evaluated. The psychological contrast effect even *reinforces* the positive/negative evaluation of the EU (Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 105 ff.).

There is also a counter thesis: the *shortcut model* assumes a *positive* relationship between attitudes towards the nation and the EU[75]. This model conveys that people create a direct shortcut between nation and the EU describing a *'projection'* from national to European evaluation (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Kritzinger 2003; Kumlin 2009; Allam & Goerres 2011). The individual's 'choice' of these two contradicting mechanisms of evaluation relies very much on the individual's conception of how close the national entities are associated with European ones.

Nevertheless, studies show that the negative relationship between national and European evaluation is *more likely* in the *political realm*[76]. Thus, the political opportunity cost model serves as a theoretical backdrop of this work's research question concerning the political entity of the EU. There are several possibilities to evaluate the performance of political entities. For instance, Sanchez-Cuenca uses national corruption as indicator for EU-support[77] (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Christin shows another convincing operationalisation: the evaluation of *governance quality* seems very promising and is hence used in the study at hand (Christin 2008, pp 55, 62 ff., 76).

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[74] Christin describes this mechanism as follows: "the worse the opinion of the national political system and the better the opinion of the European political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring authority to the European political system" (Christin 2008, p 35).

[75] Boomgarden found that the more intense the attachment to the nation-state, the stronger the individual's EU-identity. This supports the shortcut model. This result is only conducted for the Netherlands but points to the complex relationship between national-state and EU (Boomgaarden et al. 2011).

[76] Kritzinger shows that a positive relationship between national and EU-attitude is observed in the economic sphere and a *negative* one in the *political sphere*.. This means that attitudes towards the nation are partly 'projected' and partly reversed into a 'zero-sum-game' depending on the sphere and nationality (Kritzinger 2003, p 236).

[77] operationalized as 'desired rhythm of integration'

The evaluation of national political institutions serves as a *contrast point* for the attitude towards the EU. According to the *political opportunity cost model*, a *negative* relationship between the evaluation of national *governance quality* and the attitude towards the EU is expected.

Mau shows that citizens of *Mediterranean* countries usually support social welfare programs on European level, whereas Scandinavian citizens are their strongest opponents (Mau 2005). He also explains this finding with the political opportunity cost model: due to generous welfare regimes in Scandinavian countries, their citizens perceive the EU welfare program as step backwards - and vice versa for Mediterranean countries. According to literature and the logic of the presented explanatory model, we expect that EU-attitudes depend on the welfare regime type[78].

3.3.3   National identity type

Literature points to the importance of national identity as predictor for EU-attitude (see ch. 2.1.3). As previously mentioned, identity is a very abstract, nuanced and sensitive issue that is difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, the following examinations will work on a dualistic concept of national identity types.

The ability to identify with a transnational entity depends on the country's identity type: because it affects the emergence of *multiple identities* (Carey 2002). Basically, there are numerous models of multiple identities in literature. For instance, the "marble cake" model whose identities are highly intertwined and difficult to separate from each other. On the other hand, the model of "nested identities" assumes a *hierarchy[79] of multiple identities* (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 45). The study at hand accepts this hierarchical model due to the unequal relationship of national and EU identity: citizens usually identify with their nation – at least to some extent. Additionally, the identification with the transnational entity *might* occur whereas the national identity usually remains *predominant*[80].

In order not to overload this section, only the dualistic concept of civic and ethnic national identity is presented (see table 2). In literature, the concept of *civic identity* is very common

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[78] A noteworthy qualification of the political opportunity cost model is that it better explains EU-*support* than EU-identification.

[79] The model of nested identities is also known as 'Russian Matryoshka doll model' or 'onion model'. The hierarchy is incorporated in the older versions of the Eurobarometer. One item asks with which political entity (city, country, EU) the interviewee identifies with firstly and secondly (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 45).

[80] Also regional identities are partly predominant but too complex to incorporate in this study (Carey 2002).

and refers to the work of Habermas[81]. This identity type perceives EU-identification as *additional, complementary,* and *voluntary* (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 46). The civic identity type is based on the concept of constitutional patriotism. It is *not* induced by similarities but *abstract civic principles* and shared rationalities; it is based on the individual's *cognitive* and *formal* affiliation with a collective. Civic identity thus allows foreign people to become part of a national 'group' by accepting these rationalities and principles (Habermas 2001, pp 15 f.; Almond & Sidney Verba 1989). From this perspective, it facilitates *multiple identities* due to the possibility to share rationalities and principles of *multiple* collectivities. It is even assumed that a strong civic identity 'projects' and thus facilitates identification with the EU.

The *ethnic* identity type reduces an individual to its culture and *descent* (Habermas 2001, pp 15 f.). Since these individual attributes cannot be changed, a foreign person is not able to join this ethnic group. This identity type cannot be combined with additional identities because it leads to c*onflicting* identification processes. By this *emotional* affiliation, other identities such as EU-identity are perceived as *threat*[82] (Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008, p 61; Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 125). From this point of view, the identity's concept can be considered as a 'zero-sum game'.

Table 2: Overview of national identity types

Ethnic identity	Civic identity
- conflictual identities - hampers EU-identification - peripheral route: emotions	- multiple identities - allows EU-identification - central route: cognition
 'Zero-sum game'	 *'Projection'*

Source: referring to (Köngeter 2013, p 15) (modified), own presentation

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[81] Scholars argue that Habermas' work of constitutional patriotism seems overoptimistic and oversees cultural heterogeneity. The concept entails an artificial distinction between the private and public sphere and ignores problems emerging from cultural differences as historical circumstances and religion (Habermas 2008, p 147; Risse-Kappen 2010, p 45).

[82] This affective reaction is based on the related mode of affective reasoning. This leads to rejection and defence against EU-identification - comparable to soccer teams (Fligstein 2008).

The national identity type determines the probability whether citizens exhibit multiple identities. A *civic* national identity makes it more probable to hold multiple identities, and hence, *increase* the probability of EU-identification. This leads to higher shares of 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'sceptical EU-Idealists'. The *ethnic* national identity *hampers* EU-identification. This leads to higher shares of '*EU-Pragmatics'* and '*EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected*'[83].

There is not one well tested way to identify whether a civic or ethnic national identity is predominant[84]. Inconsistent results of this research field reflect this issue (e.g. Allam & Goerres 2011; Christin 2008, pp 70, 89; Roose 2010b, p 139). Ethnic identity is measured as the citizens' fear to lose their national identity. Another operationalisation used in this study (see ch. 5.5).is presented by Haller who analyses the *citizens' pride of being a member of their nation* (Haller 2009, p 306).

4 Methods and data

In the following section, I position this study within the research landscape. Chapter 4.2 presents the derivation and elaboration of hypotheses and chapter 4.3 gives information on dataset, research units, and operationalisation.

4.1 Positioning in research field

Previous research and theoretical perspectives (see ch. 2 and 3) serve as a backdrop to position this work within the present scientific landscape. Therefore, the following points describe this study's classification.

- The *comparative research design* highlights country differences.
- *Interdisciplinary* approaches incorporate perspectives of sociology, social psychology, and political science. This accounts for the explorative character of the research attempt. This leads to an *eclectic* theoretical backdrop which implies advantages (openness, synergies) and shortcomings (accuracy, consistency).

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[83] Noteworthy is the limitation that this variable better explains EU-identification than EU-support.

[84] Another approach is shown by Fuchs and Schneider who present a 2x2 matrix of ideal types including multiple identity (national and European), national identity, European identity, and no identity (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 80). Unfortunately, the authors did not show the shares for single countries.

- The theoretical 'backbone' is the *institutionalist* perspective. Thus, the *macro level* and *top-town* effects play a primary role (e.g. due to national media, values, institutions, public debates, collective narratives, which form a *unique public frame* of the EU).

- National contexts serve as a *'moderating'* framework and affect the link between individual attributes and EU-attitude. Three potential explanatory models are presented in chapter 3.3. The operationalisation of these national institutions is nevertheless based on aggregated *individual* data due to data availability and the assumption that EU-attitude originates on micro level (cf. actor-centred institutionalism).

- The research design's basic *method* is the development and the 'mapping' of *ideal types*.

- During the preliminary research process, inductive and deductive logics have been applied. The actual scientific method of this research design is *deductive* reasoning.

- The aim of this work is i) the descriptive 'mapping' of national EU-attitude, ii) the verification/falsification of hypotheses using the membership duration as 'socialisation' variable (cf. 4.2) and iii) the evaluation of potential explanatory variables on macro level.

- Although the results show *quantitative* data, the work's capability for *qualitative* interpretation is essential.

This overview demonstrates that this study does not follow a scientific 'tradition' but combines several ideas of current literature. This decision does not necessarily lead to a 'smooth' research design and incorporates several shortcomings. I argue that the research design nevertheless provides a pragmatic and synergetic way of proceeding which accounts for severe research gaps in this scientific realm.

4.2   Research design and hypotheses

Many scholars regard a common EU-identification as precondition for EU-support. Hence, EU-support is assumed to be unidirectionally dependent on EU-identification[85]. This means that EU-identification works as a *sufficient* and - depending on the literature - partly *necessary* condition for EU-support[86]. However, there is *no* verified empirical evidence of this strong

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[85] e.g. Mau (2005); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Christin (2008); Lucarelli (2011); Easton (1965)
[86] Christin (2008); Easton (1965); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Lucarelli (2011); Easton (1965); Mau (2005)

relationship (Carey 2002, p 390).

I assume that EU-identification and EU-support emerge *independently* from each other, and exhibit *weak equal and mutual influence*. Consequently, this rather loose relationship can be described in a *matrix* of high/low EU-identification and high/low EU-support. Table 4 visualizes this pattern in a 2x2 matrix[87]. It shows four cells of citizens' ideal-typical EU-attitudes: i) 'EU-Enthusiasts', ii) 'EU-Pragmatics', iii) 'sceptical EU-Idealists', and iv) 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'.

Table 4: Matrix of four ideal-typical EU-attitudes

		EU-Support	
		strong	**weak**
EU-Identification	**strong**	EU-Enthusiasts	Sceptical EU-Idealists
	weak	EU-Pragmatics	EU-Opponents/EU-Non-affected

Source: own presentation

These ideal types have not yet been introduced in this way. Only two 'mainstream' types, i.e. 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected', are identified in previous research. The 'mixed' cells show the n*eglected ideal types* '*sceptical EU-Idealists'* and *'EU-Pragmatics'*. I argue that these 'mixed' individual patterns provide essential insight into the *characteristics of the national EU-attitude* and point to the type of *public EU-framing*[88]. Since 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected' are present in literature I abstain from a detailed description and focus on the two 'mixed' ideal types that require explanation.

Sceptical EU-Idealists

'Sceptical EU-Idealists' do identify themselves with the principles of the EU, but at the same time, they are critical of its actions and, thus, do not support them. Concerning the hypotheses (see below), Risse-Kappen introduces *the independent variable 'membership duration'*. He assumes that the population of *'old'* member states feel closer to European ideals and identify with them due to a *longer social-isation* process (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 46). At the same time, these ideal-typical citizens perceive *EU policy as a step backwards* because of their relatively *high*

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[87] Caiani and Ferrer-Fons present a role-model for this visualisation; their matrix applies to a research question directed to civil society (Maloney 2010).
[88] (cf. Bücker 2012)

national economic well-being[89] (cf. political opportunity cost model in ch. 3.3.2) and *idealistic standards*. Thus, these citizens do indeed identify with the EU but they do not support its actions which leads to this 'mixed' ideal-typical pattern of 'sceptical EU-Idealists'.

Another perspective supports this hypothesis: the way the EU's *top-down sociali-sation* differs between 'West' and 'East' (Karolewski 2011, p 952). Through this, two 'kinds' of EU-attitude are initiated. In - tentatively 'old' - 'Western' member states, socialisation is directed to an *emotional* attachment fostering EU-identification an idealistic EU-framing.

EU-Pragmatics

In contrast, 'EU-Pragmatics' support EU-policy but do not identify with it. Concerning the hypotheses, the short socialisation period of 'new' members' foster this pattern. The *shorter socialisation period* leads to less contact occasions (Forbes 1997, p 9 f.) and weaker internalisation of European ideals and, thus, *less identification* with the EU (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 184; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000, p 168). At the same time, the ideal-typical citizens rather *support EU policy* because they perceive personal and collective economic advantages[90]. This strengthens the 'mixed' ideal-type of 'EU-Pragmatics'.

Another perspective supports this thesis: as aforementioned, the EU's *top-down socialisation* differs between 'West' and 'East' (Karolewski 2011, p 952). An "identity light version" is promoted in – tentatively 'new' - 'Eastern' member states. This socialisation method works with the cost-benefit approach by grants and sanctions. In this way, Karolewski claims that the EU has instilled the character of 'Eastern' EU-attitude which is based on *pragmatic* evaluations of the political-economic sphere[91]. This fosters *rational EU-framing* and *EU-support* – provided that the target objects' actions are advantageous.

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[89] cf. figures on GDP measures (Eurostat 2013)
[90] Actually this perception depends on the country's stance within European economy. Due to comprehensibility and in favour of clear-cut hypotheses, it assumed that EU policy is advantageous for 'new' member states and their citizens.
[91] The promotion of European identity is discussed in chapter 6.1 on political implications.

Two dimensions of EU-framing were elaborated in section 3.2.2: the *'rational' and 'emotional' dimension.* They reflect two ideal typical perspectives how people 'frame' the EU. Turning again to the hypotheses, I present the following mechanisms based on expected outcomes.

Emotional dimension

In 'old' member states, idealistic and emotional top-down *socialisation* fosters a positive *EU-identification* in the emotional dimension. Also, the longer the period of potential interpersonal *contact* with other Europeans has a positive impact on emotional *EU-support*[92] (cf. operationalisation in ch. 4.3) (Forbes 1997, p 9 f.). Consequently, *'old'* member states show a higher share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the *emotional* dimension in comparison to the rational one.

Rational dimension

The EU's rationalized socialisation strategy in 'new' members-states focuses on *economic* issues and installs *cost-benefit rationalities* linked with the EU. This is due to the target object of the rational dimension being *political-economic entities and their policy.* This liberal economic policy is assumed to be perceived as rather *advantageous* in 'new' member states[93]. Consequently, *'new'* member states show a higher share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the *rational* dimension in comparison to the emotional one.

These elaborations lead to the following hypotheses:

H1: 'Old' member states feature a relatively high share of 'sceptical EU-Idealists' compared to the remaining ideal types.

H2: 'New' member states show a relatively high share of 'EU-Pragmatics' compared to remaining ideal types.

H3: 'Old' member states show a higher share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the emotional dimension compared to the rational one.

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[92] Since the target object of this emotional sphere is the *European community*, these *interaction* occasions are a crucial precondition for this mechanism.
[93] This assumption abstracts from actual figures but allows a comprehensible research design and elaboration of clear-cut hypotheses.

H4: 'New' member states show a higher share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the rational
dimension compared to the emotional one.

In order to point to relevant future research, two additional issues are tackled to a limited de-
gree. Firstly, *country clusters* are suggested on base of qualitative and quantitative findings
(see ch. 5.4). Secondly, the three *explanatory approaches* are evaluated on base of macro level
figures (see ch. 5.5).

4.3   Dataset and operationalisation

None of the surveys in question[94] considers *all* relevant variables. Thus, the decision for a
dataset has proved problematic. The Eurobarometer 77.3 (May 2012) offers the most satisfy-
ing items with regard to theoretical aspiration and current data. It was established as "a bi-
annual public opinion survey […] in all member states of the European Union on behalf of the
European Commission" (GESIS 2013)[95]. However, two general problems arise: firstly, the
Eurobarometer is mandated by the European commission - questioning the objectivity of this
poll since it might be used as political tool[96] (Haller 2009, pp 358 f.). Secondly, the interview-
ees' answers are based on cultural-specific understanding and interpretation; hence, nationally
biased answers might occur; also, restrictions through translation inconsistencies might distort
results.

The *unit of analysis* is split in two layers: the *macro level* is reflected by the EU-27 member
states[97] including a split-up of Germany West and Germany East. Thus, the results for two
EU-framing dimensions encompass 56 matrices of national ideal type shares. The *micro level*
includes individuals who live in the EU-27 countries as nationals and are older than 18 years.
Migrants without citizenship of the destination country are excluded from analysis due to the
possibility of biasing the results[98]. In total, replies of n=25.691 individuals were analysed with

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[94] such as EVS, Eurobarometer, ESS, ISSP, etc.
[95] "The standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973" and "[e]ach survey consists in approximately 1000
face-to-face interviews per Member State (except Germany: 1500, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom 1300
including 300 in Northern Ireland)". It is "[c]onducted between 2 and 5 times per year, with reports published
twice yearly" (DG Communication 1995-2012).
[96] For instance, an unbalanced enquiry strategy supports this suspicion, such as leaving out questions on
problematic issues on bureaucracy and corruption.
[97] Croatia (accession in July 2013) is excluded since the used wave of the member state questionnaire does not
include this country.
[98] In future studies, it might be promising to analyse *migrants* of the first and second generation since they are

the statistics program SPSS 21.0.

With respect to *operationalisation*, EU-identification and EU-support are fragile constructs and a "daunting task" (Risse-Kappen 2010, pp 33 ff.): a crucial difficulty of measurement validity is to distinguish between "identities, role playing, [and] interests". Several scholars problematize the measurement of European identification/identity and support[99]. Unfortunately, it seems that no study has yet been conducted which tries to *systematize operationalisations* with regard to *target objects, retrieval modes, framing dimensions,* etc.

EU-identification and EU-support are *latent* constructs that cannot be measured directly (Schnell, Hill & Esser 2008, p 147). After considering numerous items and indices in preliminary investigation, it proves pragmatic to use a *simple* operationalisation. This decision facilitates the results' *interpretation* and evaluation of *validity*.

A limitation is that the chosen items cannot live up to theoretical aspirations. Nevertheless, they provide justifiable validity. Moreover, their *statistical quality* is quite high considering applicability of response scales, number of cases, and standard deviations[100]. It is notable that one concept 'matches' one dimension. The emotional dimension captures EU-identification more adequately while the rational dimension provides better explanation for EU-support.

In the following table, the operationalisation of EU-identification and EU-support is presented by rational and emotional dimension (overview see table 5). These operationalisations are *suggestions* which surely require further testing and improvement.

Table 5: Operationalisation of EU-identification and EU-support by rational and emotional dimension

	EU-Identification	EU-Support
Rational dimension	[Statement:] You feel you are a *citizen* of the EU.	A European *economic and monetary union* with one single currency, the euro
Emotional dimension	Please tell me how *attached* you feel to… The European Union	When compared to other continents, it is much easier to see what *Europeans* have *in common* in terms of *values*

Source: own presentation

'fresh' objects of the socialisation process. Also, the differentiation between *EU-migrants* and *non-EU migrants* might provide fruitful insights.

[99] e.g. Boomgaarden et al. (2011); Bücker (2012); Christin (2008); Delhey, Newton & Welzel (2011); Fuchs & Klingemann (2011); Sinnott (2005)

[100] Some 'popular' item such as "EU is a good/bad thing" were excluded due to these quality standards.

EU-identification

As aforementioned, the *rational* dimension is difficult to capture. According to the dualistic concept of EU-framing (see ch. 3.2.2), the civic 'identification' is retrieved by the "central route" and includes an evaluative and information-based perspective on political entities. Identifying oneself as part of a political entity is reflected by the evaluation of the statement: "You feel you are a citizen of the EU". This variable shows a four-point scale refraining from an 'intermediate answer'. The self-attribution as *EU-citizen* reflects the cognitive acceptance of political rationalities and principles as part of the individual's (role-)identity (Habermas 2001; Nullmeier 2000, pp 269 ff.).

The *emotional* dimension is easier to grasp. This dimension's affective retrieval pleads for the item "Please tell me how attached you feel to… The European Union". Although one can criticise that the wording how somebody does "feel" rather refers to affective retrieval. I argue that i) it focuses on a rather rational and political perspective through the term "citizen", ii) compared to alternative items, the methodological arguments overweigh this content-wise shortcoming, and iii) there is still a sufficient contrast to the emotional dimension's item. This variable also shows a four-point scale refraining from an 'intermediate answer'. Through this, the split-up in two groups of 'high' and 'low' EU-identification is facilitated.

Rational dimension: QD3_1

The literal question is: "For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You feel you are a citizen of the EU".

- The ordinal four-point Likert scale reaches from 1: "Yes, definitely" to 4: "No, definitely not"; (5: "Don't know")
- Descriptives: mean = 2.33, std= .919; the variable split is: high identification 1-2; low identification 3-4

Emotional dimension: QD2_3

The literal question is: "Please tell me how attached you feel to… The European Union".

- The ordinal four-point Likert scale reaches from 1: "Very attached" to 4: "Not attached at all"; (5: "Don't know")
- Descriptives: mean = 2.60, std= .849; the variable split is: high identification 1-2; low identification 3-4

EU-support

The *rational* dimension is conceptually easier to apply: specific support is based on evaluative orientation towards political institutions and their policy. It is retrieved by the "central route" whose evaluations are information-based and purposive-rationally motivated. Closeness to the economic-political sphere is decisive. For this reason, the approval of the statement "A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro" is chosen[101]. This scope of EU policy is crucial for its evaluation as conceptualized in chapter 3.2.2.

EU-support is difficult to measure in the *emotional* dimension. The operationalisation of long-term, diffuse support is the most problematic one: it is hard to grasp by affective retrieval since support is mostly based on purposive-rational motivation. In order to fulfil this aspiration, the following item is chosen: "When compared to other continents, it is much easier to see what Europeans have in common in terms of values"[102]. By this, value-rational motives that reflect long-term commitment towards the target object of the European community are involved. A severe problem of the wording is obvious: it is unclear whether this item measures the degree of *cohesion* – which is the actual aim – or rather the degree of *dissociation* from non-Europeans. This differentiation depends on the individual framing which cannot adequately be tested by this dataset. Another shortcoming is that the *target object* of this question does *not* match the *respective identification item in the rational dimension*: it does not ask for the EU but Europe as continent and its 'ethnic' Europeans. This hampers the dimensions' comparison. However, this operationalisation reflects the socio-cultural sphere quite well and takes the degree of perceived similarities into account (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, pp 37 f.)[103].

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[101] This item is problematic due to its heterogeneous perceptions depending on the country. The answers might be heavily influenced by the fact whether a citizen's nation-state is a net-recipient of the European redistribution process. Nevertheless, it is one of the most meaningful items and a good proxy to measure EU-support (Allam & Goerres 2011).
An optional operationalisation is shown by Sanchez-Cuenca who applies the "desired rhythm of integration" which reflects the approval of enlargement policy; however, this construct contains the problem of heterogeneous framing possibilities (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000).
The item "Do you trust/support [institution]" is not applied since it lies in between the rational and emotional dimension.
[102] An optional item is "EU membership is a good thing" which reflects the emotional dimension quite well. Although often used in literature (Mau 2005; Carey 2002, pp 390 f.), this operationalisation is not suited for this research design. Unfortunately, it does *not reflect the socio-cultural* sphere and, above that, it is a *five-point scale* that offers an *'intermediate' answer that* is chosen by many respondents.
[103] Of course, it is still arguable whether these similarities are needed. Nevertheless, this work regards the perceived closeness as proxy for perceived cohesion and approval of the 'socio-cultural' project.

Rational dimension: QA19_1

The literal question is: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro".

- o The answers are 1: "For" and 2: "Against"; (3: "Don't know")
- o Descriptives: "For": 56.3%; the variable split is: 1=high support; 2=low support

Emotional dimension: QE1_9

The literal question is: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? When compared to other continents, it is much easier to see what Europeans have in common in terms of values".

- o The ordinal four-point Likert scale reaches from 1: "Totally agree" to 4: "Totally disagree"; (5: "Don't know")
- o Descriptives: mean = 2.23 , std= .76; the variable split is: 1 – 2 = high support; 3 – 4 = low support

'EU-Alienated' and 'EU-Out-group': adaption of the emotional dimension

The emotional dimension's titles of ideal types require adaption to operationalisation restrictions. This adjustment concerns the two 'mixed' ideal types: high emotional identification combined with low support is interpreted as the ideal type '*EU-Alienated*'. These citizens *feel attached* to the EU but generally *dissociate* themselves from the European community[104]. The hypothetical explanation is that these citizens think that their national and cultural background does indeed *represent* Europe's 'core values' but they do not perceive that the remaining *European community is close* to these principles.

The ideal type '*EU-Out-group*' shows low emotional identification and strong support of the European community. These citizens believe in the European community's *cultural cohesion* but do *not feel part of it*. These citizens perceive themselves as European 'outsiders'. Various reasons are possible: geographical distance, feeling superior *or* inferior towards other Europeans, strong *national pride* or the feeling of *not being accepted* by 'core' Europeans[105].

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[104] A severe problem remains this item's ambiguity whether it measures the degree of *cohesion* or rather the degree of *dissociation* from non-Europeans.
[105] Delhey (2007)

Rational dimension

		EU-Support	
		high	low
EU-Identification	high	EU-Enthusiasts %	Sceptical EU-Idealists %
	low	EU-Pragmatics %	EU-Opponents/ Non-affected %

Emotional dimension

		EU-Support	
		high	low
EU-Identification	high	EU-Enthusiasts %	EU-Alienated %
	low	EU-Out-group %	EU-Opponents/ Non-affected %

This work's aim of testing *most different EU-framings* reflects the explorative research design. It intends to reveal *diverging results* depending on the applied EU-framing. Nevertheless, it comprises a shortcoming: the presented dimensions' operationalisation relates to *various* dualistic elements (see table 3) which *vary* by dimension - be it the retrieval mode, the target object, or the socio-economic sphere, among others. The direct comparison of the emotional and rational dimension proves problematic: statistical differences *cannot be assigned to one single element which* makes the detection of causal elements impossible.

5   Results

This chapter only presents main findings. The appendix shows detailed results including the single countries' socio-demographic descriptives, means, and standard deviations. Although the following paragraph's wording often refers to 'member states' or 'countries', the unit of analysis is the micro level; the individuals' data is merely aggregated to the macro level.

All results are computed with respective *weighting* variables[106] accounting for the comparative research design. Great Britain and Northern Ireland are merged into United Kingdom[107].

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[106] The Eurobarometer provides the weighting variables "w1" to analyse countries *comparatively* and "w22" to account for the country's relative population size when computing results for *all* countries (Moschner 2013).

[107] However, the used Eurobarometer's abbreviation does *not* change. The abbreviation "GB" is used although

West Germany and the former East Germany are analysed separately due to diverging results and discrepancy of accession years.

The tables below show country abbreviations that are used throughout this chapter. The tables' *country order* corresponds to the member states' accession years. Consequently, the sequence visualizes *the independent variable* of the hypotheses: the *duration of EU-membership*. 'Old' member states with long socialisation period are at the top and 'new' member states at the bottom of the tables.

All countries that have accessed the EU *before 1986* are defined as *'old'* members and the countries that joined *later* are defined as *'new'* members[108]. Accordingly, the 28 countries (including the former East Germany) are split in two even groups. The term 'core countries' defines the six original member states[109] in the following section.

5.1   Overview of EU-identification and EU-support by dimension

Table 6 shows the countries' *shares* of citizens who exhibit *high EU-identification* and *high EU-support* (split-up defined in ch. 4.3) by rational and emotional dimension.

Generally, the shares are surprisingly high and vary enormously depending on item and country. Noteworthy are the ranges of rational and emotional identification: while a strong rational identification as civic citizen shows a rather narrow range of shares (42.6% – 77.8%), the *emotional attachment* to the EU *varies remarkably* among countries (26.6% – 71.6%)[110]. Beyond that, rational and emotional identification differs enormously within some countries. In Finland, civic identification is high whereas the emotional attachment is very low. In Latvia and Bulgaria this pattern is reversed. These findings call for more intense and qualitative examination of EU-identification 'types'. The research field's 'familiar' 'EU-sympathisers' (FR, BE, DE-W, LU) and 'EU-objectors' (GB, GR, FI, SW) do not feature the expected clear-cut results. In particular, FR, NL, DE-W, PT, FI, GR, HU, and BG are very ambivalent cases which require further examination.

Northern Ireland is included and not part of Great Britain.
[108] The split-up is made upon the decision to work with two equally sized groups; furthermore, the period between accessions of DE-E and FI is 5 years which is quite a reasonable duration.
‚Old' members are FR BE NL DE-W IT LU DK IE GB GR ES PT DE-E;
‚new' members are FI SE AT CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SL BG RO.
[109] 'core' members: FR BE NL DE-W IT LU
[110] See appendix for means and standard deviations.

Table 6: Country shares of strong EU-identification/EU-support by dimension

	Rational dimension		Emotional dimension	
	High identification: feel to be EU citizen	High support: Economic Union	High identification: Attachment to EU	High support: Europeans common values
FR - France	🟡 66,2%	🟡 71,6%	🟢 55,7%	🔴 67,0%
BE - Belgium	🟡 69,7%	🟢 76,3%	🟢 58,0%	🟡 69,2%
NL - The Netherlands	🟡 61,1%	🟢 73,5%	🔴 35,8%	🔴 52,4%
DE-W - Germany West	🟢 77,8%	🟡 69,7%	🟢 55,6%	🔴 65,2%
IT - Italy	🔴 44,9%	🟡 61,4%	🟡 44,9%	🔴 66,2%
LU - Luxembourg	🟢 84,6%	🟢 80,2%	🟢 71,6%	🟡 75,5%
DK - Denmark	🟢 74,5%	🔴 28,9%	🟡 43,5%	🔴 58,3%
IE - Ireland	🟢 70,0%	🟢 85,3%	🟡 45,4%	🟡 72,2%
GB - UNITED KINGDOM	🔴 42,6%	🔴 16,6%	🔴 26,6%	🔴 64,3%
GR - Greece	🔴 49,6%	🟢 78,1%	🔴 35,9%	🟡 76,1%
ES -Spain	🟢 69,9%	🟡 59,5%	🟡 47,7%	🟢 78,3%
PT - Portugal	🔴 59,7%	🟡 62,7%	🟡 41,9%	🟢 76,7%
DE-E - Germany East	🟡 60,8%	🟡 60,8%	🟡 43,5%	🔴 63,5%
FI - Finland	🟢 70,6%	🟢 75,4%	🔴 32,9%	🟢 78,2%
SE - Sweden	🟡 65,0%	🔴 27,3%	🔴 38,9%	🔴 55,9%
AT - Austria	🟡 60,3%	🟡 68,6%	🔴 40,8%	🟡 68,1%
CY - Cyprus (Republic)	🟡 61,5%	🔴 54,0%	🔴 33,4%	🟢 86,1%
CZ - Czech Republic	🔴 53,0%	🔴 25,1%	🔴 38,5%	🟡 68,6%
EE - Estonia	🟡 66,5%	🟢 74,0%	🟡 43,6%	🟡 76,2%
HU - Hungary	🔴 51,2%	🔴 51,6%	🟡 46,2%	🔴 65,5%
LV - Latvia	🔴 54,1%	🔴 40,5%	🟢 54,6%	🟡 75,5%
LT - Lithuania	🔴 59,5%	🔴 46,6%	🔴 34,6%	🟢 79,9%
MT - Malta	🟢 72,0%	🟡 64,1%	🟡 49,5%	🟡 74,5%
PL - Poland	🟢 71,6%	🔴 37,9%	🟢 63,9%	🟢 82,6%
SK - Slovakia	🟢 69,8%	🟢 83,0%	🟢 50,0%	🟢 79,0%
SI - Slovenia	🟡 65,8%	🟢 82,5%	🟡 44,5%	🟡 68,1%
BG - Bulgaria	🔴 49,2%	🟡 61,9%	🟢 54,3%	🟢 81,7%
RO - Romania	🟡 62,1%	🟡 72,7%	🟢 55,7%	🟢 77,0%

Source: own presentation

In order to compare the shares in a relative way among countries, three symbols are added column-wise. They display the country shares' assignment to the *tertiles*[111] of *high (green), intermediate (yellow)* and *low (red)*[112] EU-identification/EU-support compared to all countries. At first sight, we notice a very 'colourful' table. Turning to the wide-spread assumption that support is strongly dependent on identification, one expects the *same colour in every row.* This would show that EU-identification and EU-support are 'on the same level' and dependent from each other. This is obviously *not the case.* The findings support this work's basic assumption of the constructs' *independence* of one another.

These deliberations lead to the statistical *relationship between nationality and EU-attitude.* Depending on the item's scale of measurement, Eta^2 or phi is applied[113]. All results are highly significant at the 1% level and show that nationality explains 4.8% of the derivation of rational identification, 3.5% of emotional identification, and only 2.2% of emotional support[114]. Thus, nationality has an *intermediate* impact on these items and shows a stronger impact in the *rational* dimension.

When analysing the relationship between *EU-identification* and *EU-support*, it is notable that they are generally weaker than expected in literature[115]. The correlation between EU-identification and EU-support is 0.268 (spearman[116]) in the emotional dimension and 0.368 (phi) in the rational dimension (significant at the 1% significance level). Interestingly, these correlations differ enormously among countries[117] (see appendix). With regard to the independent variable 'membership duration', no typical pattern of 'old' and 'new' member states is identified.

Since the hypotheses refer to the ideal typical EU-attitudes, this table mainly serves as a starting point; only first impressions shall be noted. *Hypothesis H1* claims that 'old' members show a relatively strong EU- identification. This means that the identification items are expected to be green at the top and turn into yellow and red at the end of the table. This predict-

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[111] Tertiles describe the countries' split-up in three even groups.

[112] The colours do not imply any evaluation.

[113] Phi is used to account for the dichotomous support item of the rational dimension. All other items are four-point ordinal scales. Although a metric scale is desirable for Eta^2, it is applied to estimate the relationship between the nationality's nominal scale and the three ordinal items.

[114] Eta^2 and phi cannot be compared (results of phi: see appendix).

[115] Noteworthy is the spearman correlation of 0.657 between *rational* and *emotional identification*. Although quite a strong relationship, it is surprising that this indicator is not even higher. The *variation* among countries is impressive: In some countries this relationship is extremely high (e.g. ML) and in others rather low (e.g. LV, SW). These figures call for further examination, especially with regard to *national pride*.

[116] Since this work assumes that variables do not show a causal direction, symmetric indicators are used.

[117] In the rational dimension, BE, FR, LU, GR, ES, AU, CY, SK, BG, DE-E show a strong correlation; DK, GB, FI, EE, LV, LT, RO show a weak one.
In the emotional sphere, the correlation is strong in GR, ML, PL, BG, DE-W; it is weak in DK, FI, HU, LU, DK, NE, RO, SW.

ed pattern is cannot be observed since both dimensions remain *too 'colourful'* to evaluate the hypothesis reasonably. *Hypothesis H2* claims that 'new' members show relatively strong EU-support. This means that support items shall be red at the top and turn into yellow and green at the end of the table. This pattern can *tentatively be identified* in the *emotional* dimension. According to the *hypotheses H3 and H4*, we expect that 'old' members show relatively high shares in the emotional dimension compared to the rational one - and 'new' member states vice versa. However, the results point to a *rejection* of these hypotheses.

> Generally, the relationship between EU-identification and EU-support is weaker than literature suggests. The research field's 'familiar' 'EU-sympathisers' and 'EU-objectors' do not show the expected results.

5.2   Ideal type matrices

The ideal type matrices are this work's core result and show the four ideal typical EU-attitudes by country and dimension. Since visualisation of 56 matrices is too extensive, they are found in the appendix. The following tables show the ideal type shares among *all* countries by rational and emotional dimension:

All countries: rational dimension

		EU-Support	
		high	low
EU-Identification	high	42.6%	19.1%
	low	13.7%	24.6%

All countries: emotional dimension

		EU-Support	
		high	low
EU-Identification	high	38.9%	10.2%
	low	30.3%	20.6%

The two 'mainstream' ideal types 'EU-Enthusiasts' and 'EU-Opponents' are generally prevailing. It is noteworthy that the share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' is surprisingly high in the rational dimension (42.6%). The *'mixed' ideal types* are nevertheless *relevant* by representing 32.8% of the European population in the rational dimension and 40.5% in the emotional dimension. The emotional dimension's share of *'EU-Out-group' is particularly strong*.

As aforementioned, this work cannot present all matrices. A short summary of the country-specific results is therefore given by each dimension. In the *rational dimension*, the major ideal type among all countries are 'EU-Enthusiasts'. There are two exceptions among 'old' member states: in DK, 'sceptical EU-Idealists', and in GB, 'EU-Opponents' are the major

group. The 'new' members' exceptions are SE and PL whose main ideal type are the 'sceptical EU-Idealists'; in CZ and LV, 'EU-Opponents' form the majority. Generally, *'old' and 'new'* members show quite a *similar* pattern with regard to *absolute* figures.

The *emotional dimension's* major group are also 'EU-Enthusiasts' (38.9%). Nevertheless, several exceptions are found among 'old' member states: in DK, GB, and GR, the 'EU-Outgroup' type is strongest, whereas in NL the 'EU-Opponents/Non-affected' type is prevailing. These findings show that the emotional dimension is *more heterogeneous* than the rational one. Generally, some nationalities show an *extremely negative* EU-attitude in the emotional dimension. It is striking that *'EU-Enthusiasts'* are the *dominant* ideal type in *'new'* member states. Nevertheless, many exceptions are observed: in FI, CY, CZ, and LT, the 'EU-Outgroup' is strongest. In SE, 'EU-Opponents' form the major group. With regard to the independent variable 'duration of membership', there are *two country groups* among 'new' members: the *'newest'* members' citizens (LV, MT, PL, SK, BG, RO) tentatively *feel as part of the European community*; and the citizens of the remaining 'new' countries whose citizens feel as *European outsiders*.

Suggestions for case analyses

One attempt of this work is to provide *starting points* for *qualitative* analysis of single country's *unique EU-attitude*. These analyses potentially reveal crucial insights - in particular if transdisciplinary perspectives are applied. Since intense discussion of single countries goes beyond the scope of this work, two brief summaries of the exemplary cases of Finland and Poland are given in the following. These *ad hoc* interpretations serve as starting points of analysis by applying the combined findings of the rational and emotional dimension's EU-attitude. The following suggestions require further investigation.

Finland's citizens are mainly assigned to ideal-typical 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the rational dimension; whereas the ideal-type 'EU-Out-group' is dominant in the emotional dimension[118]. One can argue that the Finnish cherish the EU's political-economic sphere; while they perceive the socio-cultural homogeneity of Europeans, they do *not feel attached to this community*. Since bilateral trust towards Finland is high[119] the feeling of being not accepted by 'core' countries

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[118] The *Netherlands* are quite similar but a different interpretation is reasonable. In the rational dimension, its citizens are 'EU-Enthusiasts' and, in the emotional dimension, most are 'EU-Opponents'. It seems that the political-economic sphere is cherished by Dutch citizens. Simultaneously, they do *not feel attached to Europe and its community*. This can be due to a very pragmatic stance towards the EU - however accepting the role as 'political' EU citizen. Another reason might be the *strong national identity* (cf. ch. 3.3.3 and 5.5): suggesting that it is of a rather *ethnic type*, it would not allow an additional 'emotional' attachment.
[119] Delhey (2007, p 269)

is excluded. One can interpret this stance as *superior voluntary out-group* – in contrast to 'new' members who might feel 'expelled' by 'core' countries. Thus, *geographical distance* and strong *national ethnic identity*[120] might hamper emotional attachment.

A very interesting case is *Poland* whose citizens show the highest share of 'sceptical EU-Idealists' in the rational sphere and 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the emotional one[121]. According to the literature, *opposed results* are expected. It is surprising that a rather 'new' member state with short socialisation period scores that high in the emotional dimension – and at the same time specific support remains low. In sum, Poland might be a case in point for several rather 'new' members that are very EU-enthusiastic. Nevertheless, explanations for these patterns remain *open to question*.

5.3 Relative shares of ideal types

Only the absolute shares of the ideal types have yet been analysed. In order to *evaluate the hypotheses adequately*, the following two tables compare to the member states' ideal-type shares in a *relative* way. Therefore, three symbols are added (cf. ch. 5.1) indicating the relative strength of the country's share among all member states. The symbols show to which tertile the country's ideal type share is assigned to. The colours imply a relatively high (green), intermediate (yellow) or low (red) share of the given ideal type.

Rational dimension

Table 7 shows the ideal type shares of the rational dimension by country. We notice that these shares vary strongly. Nevertheless, every ideal type exhibits a certain level and range: the column of 'EU-Enthusiasts' show the highest shares and the highest range, followed by 'EU-Opponents', 'sceptical EU-Idealists', and 'EU-Pragmatics'.

According to *hypothesis H1*, we estimate that 'old' members feature a high share of 'sceptical EU-Idealists'. Since the table is ordered by accession date starting with the 'oldest' members,

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[120] Referring to the item 'pride to be citizen of [nation]' (Finland: 47%, mean: 34%) (Haller 2009, p 306).

[121] It seems promising to combine all these findings with already conducted studies. For instance, Bücker analysed *qualitatively EU-frames in Poland and former East Germany*. According to the author, *Polish* citizens are more homogenous across all milieus due to similar public discourses; whereas a *polarisation of former East German* framing is observable. Furthermore, EU-support is restricted to *higher status groups* in former East Germany. In the Polish case, the "Western Value Community" frames the EU stressing the country's European identity and the EU's "modernisation" and "Protection and Power" frames. Also, the *Polish* EU-attitude is more *pragmatic* since they always rate specific consequences of membership (Bücker 2012, pp 281 ff.). Interestingly, this is *not in line with this work's findings* claiming that this 'pragmatic' framing is rather uncommon among Polish citizens (only 4.2% of 'EU-Pragmatics' in the rational dimension).

the second column's colours are expected to reach from green, through yellow, to red. This order *cannot be verified*: the core countries indeed show *particularly low shares of 'sceptical EU-Idealists'*. Surprisingly, rather new member states as LV, LT, and PL show relatively high shares of 'sceptical EU-Idealists' which *contradicts H1*.

According to *hypothesis H2*, we expect 'new' member states to show a relatively high share of 'EU-Pragmatics'. Consequently, the third column shall show red symbols at the top and green ones at the end. The actual figures neither affirm nor falsify H2 since there is no pattern identifiable. However, there is a tendency that some of the *'old'* members (BE, NL, IT, IE, GR) and the *three 'newest'* EU-members (SL, BG, RO) show very high shares of *'EU-Pragmatics'*. This finding *simultaneously contradicts and slightly affirms H2*. These very 'new' member states' citizens might not have had time to build up EU-identification; at the same time, they support the EU – possibly due to expected economic advantages. On the other hand, 'old' members obtain many 'pragmatic' individuals - which is an unexpected finding with regard to the long socialisation period. This finding may indicate that many of the 'old' members' citizens 'take the EU for granted'. This pragmatic ideal-type implies a 'risky' kind of EU-commitment (see ch. 6.1.).

According to *hypothesis H4*, we expect 'new' members to show a relatively high share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the rational dimension compared to the emotional one. Again, this hypothesis *cannot be affirmed*[122]. The 'newest' members are tentatively more EU-enthusiastic in the emotional dimension (LV, PL, SV, BG) which *contradicts H4*.

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[122] According to the interpretation of tertiles, only FI, CY, and SK are more enthusiastic in the rational dimension.

Table 7: Rational dimension's relative shares of ideal typical EU-attitude by country

	Rational dimension			
	EU-Enthusiasts	Sceptical EU-Idealists	EU-Pragmatics	EU-Opponents / Non-affected
FR - France	56,0%	10,3%	16,3%	17,3%
BE - Belgium	57,4%	12,7%	18,8%	11,0%
NL - The Netherlands	50,2%	11,2%	23,4%	15,2%
DE-W - Germany West	61,1%	17,6%	8,5%	12,7%
IT - Italy	35,6%	10,8%	26,0%	27,5%
LU - Luxembourg	71,5%	13,3%	8,5%	6,8%
DK - Denmark	25,3%	49,2%	3,7%	21,9%
IE - Ireland	64,5%	7,0%	20,5%	8,0%
GB - UNITED KINGDOM	11,5%	31,0%	5,2%	52,4%
GR - Greece	47,4%	4,0%	30,6%	18,0%
ES -Spain	50,9%	19,4%	8,6%	21,1%
PT - Portugal	46,0%	15,3%	16,6%	22,1%
DE-E - Germany East	46,9%	14,0%	14,4%	24,7%
FI - Finland	56,8%	14,3%	18,6%	10,3%
SE - Sweden	22,4%	42,2%	5,0%	30,4%
AT - Austria	52,2%	8,6%	16,4%	22,8%
CY - Cyprus (Republic)	42,5%	20,0%	11,6%	26,0%
CZ - Czech Republic	20,7%	31,7%	4,6%	43,1%
EE - Estonia	54,5%	13,0%	19,6%	13,0%
HU - Hungary	35,4%	17,4%	16,3%	30,9%
LV - Latvia	27,7%	26,5%	12,9%	32,9%
LT - Lithuania	33,3%	27,1%	13,3%	26,2%
MT - Malta	56,0%	16,6%	7,7%	19,7%
PL - Poland	34,4%	37,6%	4,2%	23,8%
SK - Slovakia	64,4%	6,5%	18,6%	10,5%
SI - Slovenia	59,3%	6,7%	23,2%	10,8%
BG - Bulgaria	39,6%	13,6%	22,4%	24,4%
RO - Romania	49,9%	15,0%	22,9%	12,2%

Source: own presentation

Emotional dimension

Table 8 shows the ideal type shares of the emotional dimension. Again, they vary strongly among countries. But this time, the columns display more clear patterns. According to *hypothesis H1*, we expect 'old' members to feature a high share of 'EU-Alienated'. Especially

among the six 'core' countries, *H1 is supported.*

With regard to *hypothesis H2*, we expect 'new' member states to show a relatively high share of the ideal type 'EU-Out-group'. *H2 cannot be verified*: rather the 'middle-aged' countries seem to feel as 'outsiders'. Many of these 'outsider' countries are commonly regarded as Eurosceptic (e.g. GB, GR, PT, FI, CY, CZ, EE, LV) - and they indeed exhibit rather low identification and support shares in the rational dimension (see ch. 5.1). These countries can be split up in two groups (cf. Delhey 2005). On the one hand, some citizens are labelled as *'voluntary' outsiders* (e.g. in GB, FI) who emotionally dissociate from the European community; on the other hand, there seem to be *'forced' outsiders* (e.g. in GR, PT) whose citizens might not feel accepted in the 'club' of Europe - especially after the consequences of financial and state crisis. Admittedly, these are speculative explanations that are in need of further qualitative investigation[123].

According to *hypothesis H3*, we expect 'old' members to show a relatively high share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the emotional dimension. Four out of six 'core' countries fulfil this hypothesis (FR, BE, DE-W[124], LU; exception: NL, IT) which slightly *supports H3*. But the 'newest' members' citizens (LV, MT, PL, SK. BG, RO) also feature extremely high shares of 'EU-Enthusiasts'. This is quite surprising with regard to the short socialisation period. The citizens' 'hopeful' anticipations towards the European community are a possible explanation.

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[123] This is due to the fact that citizens are assigned to one ideal-type on base of their respond behaviour - but actually various causalities might be the reason for the responds. This points to required refinement of this questionnaire items.

[124] DE-W almost reached the upper tertile.

Table 8: Emotional dimension's relative shares of ideal typical EU-attitude by country

	Emotional dimension			
	EU-Enthusiasts	EU-Alienated	EU-Out-group	EU-Opponents / Non-affected
FR - France	44,3%	13,9%	22,8%	19,0%
BE - Belgium	44,3%	13,9%	22,8%	19,0%
NL - The Netherlands	22,4%	15,4%	30,1%	32,1%
DE-W - Germany West	43,0%	14,7%	22,4%	19,9%
IT - Italy	37,1%	10,0%	28,9%	24,1%
LU - Luxembourg	58,0%	15,2%	17,7%	9,2%
DK - Denmark	27,8%	16,0%	30,4%	25,7%
IE - Ireland	37,8%	9,1%	34,4%	18,8%
GB - UNITED KINGDOM	22,2%	6,7%	42,1%	29,0%
GR - Greece	34,1%	2,7%	42,0%	21,2%
ES -Spain	43,8%	7,8%	34,8%	13,6%
PT - Portugal	39,2%	7,8%	37,5%	15,5%
DE-E - Germany East	32,9%	10,5%	30,3%	26,3%
FI - Finland	27,6%	5,2%	50,7%	16,6%
SE - Sweden	26,1%	14,2%	29,5%	30,3%
AT - Austria	35,2%	6,7%	32,8%	25,2%
CY - Cyprus (Republic)	33,3%	1,9%	52,8%	12,1%
CZ - Czech Republic	32,1%	6,9%	36,9%	24,1%
EE - Estonia	38,6%	8,0%	37,5%	15,9%
HU - Hungary	34,5%	13,1%	31,2%	21,2%
LV - Latvia	47,7%	9,2%	27,8%	15,3%
LT - Lithuania	33,5%	4,3%	46,4%	15,9%
MT - Malta	47,3%	8,6%	27,1%	17,0%
PL - Poland	61,5%	7,5%	21,2%	9,7%
SK - Slovakia	44,2%	6,8%	34,7%	14,3%
SI - Slovenia	37,0%	8,4%	31,1%	23,5%
BG - Bulgaria	52,8%	5,6%	28,8%	12,8%
RO - Romania	45,1%	12,0%	32,2%	10,7%

Source: own presentation

Suggestions for case analyses

With respect to the relative comparison of ideal type shares, most countries feature heterogeneous patterns in the two dimensions[125]. Three *ad hoc* interpretations serve as starting points

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[125] Only LU, GR, SW, EE, MT, and SK feature quite homogenous patterns.

of analysis and require further investigation.

Germany-West is a case in point for 'core' countries (cf. FR, BE, LU): its citizens are very enthusiastic in the economic-political sphere, but the socio-cultural sphere, the ideal type 'EU-Alienation' is relatively strong. The citizens cherish the EU within the rational framing; they are also emotionally attached to the EU – but they *dissociate from the European community*. This typical pattern exhibited by the 'core' countries might be due to the perception that the European community becomes more and more *heterogeneous* - and the '*original value-core' gets lost*.

Bulgaria is the typical representative of a 'new' member state exhibiting a pragmatic stance in the economic-political sphere and many 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the socio-cultural one. This unexpected combination raises questions about the explanatory approaches - but also on the Eurobarometer's retrieval method. Supposing the answers are valid and comparable with other countries, the main question is why Bulgarians do *not* feel like EU citizens while emotional attachment and diffuse support are high. This case is meaningful with regard to 'identity policy'[126] (see ch. 6.1).

Greece is another interesting case: its citizens feature a larger number of 'EU-Pragmatics' in the rational dimension and a high share of the ideal type 'EU-Out-group' in the emotional one. This means that Greek citizens support EU-politics and perceive European homogeneity - but they *neither feel like a civic citizen of the EU nor are they emotionally attached*. Support of the EU rests on *unsteady foundations*. This combination is 'risky' with regard to long-term EU-commitment: as soon as Greeks do not see any advantage of membership, they might quickly turn into the ideal type 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'[127].

5.4   Overall results and country clustering

Summing up, the results scarcely affirm the deducted hypotheses. The *unidimensional hypotheses* do not live up to the topic's *complex causalities*. Each country case stands for itself with unique causalities, institutional background, narratives, value orientation, character of national identity, public discourses etc. Nevertheless, the presented findings hopefully represent a starting point for further examination.

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[126] Directorate-General for Research & Innovation (2012, p 4); Karolewski (2011)
[127] Analyses of longitudinal and time-series data during the crises might reveal meaningful results.

Conclusion of hypotheses

- Hypothesis H1 claims that 'old' members show a relatively high share of the ideal type 'sceptical EU-Idealists'/'EU-Alienated'. This hypothesis is only *supported* in the *emotional* dimension, whereas the *rational* dimension shows *contradicting* findings.

- Hypothesis H2 predicts that 'new' members show a relatively high share of the ideal type 'EU-Pragmatics'/'EU-Out-group'. The findings are also ambiguous and show the same pattern as the first hypothesis: H2 is *not affirmed* in the *rational* dimension but *partly supported* in the *emotional* one. There might be two qualities of the 'EU-Out-group': those citizens who can be labelled as *'voluntary'* outsiders and those who feel as *'forced'* outsiders (explanation see ch. 5.3).

- Hypothesis H3 predicts a higher share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the emotional dimension than in the rational one among 'old' members. This prediction is *not supported*. Surprisingly, the *'newest'* members show relatively high shares of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the emotional dimension.

- Hypothesis H4 indicates a higher share of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the rational dimension than in the emotional one among 'new' members. The hypothesis is *not supported*. Nevertheless, there is a picture of ambivalence that the 'newest' members and 'core' countries show relatively high shares of 'EU-Enthusiasts' in the rational dimension which points to two different explanations.

Taken together, the hypotheses *H1 and H2 are supported in the emotional dimension*: *'old'* members are prone to show relatively many citizens of the type *'EU-Alienated'* and *'new'* members of the type *'EU-Out-group'*. The remaining hypotheses cannot be verified or even show *contradicting* results. These findings question the common assumption that 'old' EU member states show a strong emotional identification. In particular, the citizens of *'core'* countries often show a surprisingly *pragmatic* EU-attitude in the rational dimension. This leads to another *unexpected finding* that many citizens of *'new'* member states are more emotionally *attached* to the EU than literature predicts. This result indicates that *'duration of membership' is only one factor amongst many*. Alternative explanations are discussed in chapter 5.5.

Overall results

Beyond these concrete findings, the following points present the main results of this study:

- EU-identification and EU-support vary enormously among countries and are not as closely linked as literature predicts.

- Depending on the country, the strength of relationship between EU-identification and EU-support varies.

- The four ideal types' shares vary strongly among countries.

- Depending on the predefined EU-framing, the ideal type shares differ enormously within most countries. This means that the given EU-framing has an impact on EU-attitude. Since several elements are part of the rational and emotional dimension (see 4.2.2) the single element's impact remains unclear.

- Analyses on single country cases might reveal crucial insights (cf. ch. 5.2 and 5.3).

- The hypotheses are mostly falsified or only carefully affirmed. The unidimensional dependent variable 'duration of membership' does not live up to the problem's complexity. The most important points are:

  o The 'core' countries' and very 'new' members' citizens identify an astonishingly amount with the EU.

  o Surprisingly, not the 'new' but the 'core' countries' citizens show a pragmatic stance towards the EU.

  o The 'newest' members are unexpectedly enthusiastic in the emotional dimension.

  o 'Core' countries' citizens feel alienated from the European community. They possibly see themselves as 'value-core' but regard the heterogeneous European community as culturally overstrained by horizontal enlargement.

  o In contrast, many 'new' members see what Europeans have in common but they do not feel attached to this community. I suggest two internal groups: the first group of 'outsiders' might react to the 'core' countries' rejection of horizontal enlargement and perceive themselves as unwanted 'forced outsiders'; the second group are 'voluntary' outsiders whose strong national identity and geographical distance might hamper emotional attachment.

- Several limitations are identified in the course of the research. Among others, the measurement of latent structures and validity of operationalisation are questionable and call for refinement.

Clustering

Although an individual country approach is promoted by this study, a country clustering shall facilitate systematisation of EU-attitude among countries. Limitations accompany this attempt: the clustering's fundament are this study's operationalisations of EU-attitude. Their validity has not yet been tested. Furthermore, the two applied dimensions of EU-framing are a suggestion and can be designed in various ways[128].

In contrast to previous clustering attempts, geographical closeness is *not* applied. A crucial criterion of clustering is the *duration of EU-membership* which accounts for this work's assumed major independent variable. This clustering is a preliminary suggestion based on *presented results of ideal typical EU-attitude*, a *quantitative hierarchical clustering*[129], and already *conducted qualitative clustering attempts* (e.g. Haller 2009, pp 301 ff.). In order *not to oversimplify* the results, eight clusters are presented:

1. 'Core' Enthusiasts and Cultural Alienation (FR, BE, DE-W, LU, ES)
2. 'New' Enthusiasts (MT, PL, SK, BG, RO)
3. 'Old' Opponents (NL, DK, IT, DE-E)
4. 'New' Opponents (CZ, AT)
5. Pragmatic Outsiders (EE, GR, PT)
6. Political Supporters and Cultural Outsiders (FI, SL, IE)
7. Political Opponents and Cultural Outsiders (GB, LT, CY)
8. Political Opponents and Cultural Alienation (SW, HU)

Notable is that both the 'old' and the 'new' Europeans are split in two main clusters each. Thus, *'core' and 'new' Enthusiasts* seem very close (cluster 1 and 2), as well as *'old' and 'new' Opponents* (cluster 3 and 4).

The other clusters show a pragmatic stance (cluster 5) or a 'mixed' EU-attitude with respect to EU-framing (clusters 6, 7, and 8). These 'mixed' clusters might be meaningful to understand their relevance for EU-framing within national contexts and the causal relationship between EU-identification and EU-support. Another crucial point is that the clusters 5-8 imply particular *risks* and *potentials* with regard to identity policy (see ch. 6.2).

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[128] There are additional societal spheres which are worth examination. In preliminary analyses of this work, a political (referring to democracy, corruption, and human rights) and a global (referring to world politics) sphere were added leading to meaningful results. Due to the restricted extent of this work they are not presented.

[129] See appendix for dendrograms, methods, and measures. The clusters are calculated as hierarchical cluster analysis using the shares of the four ideal types of both dimensions.

5.5   Evaluation of explanatory variables

The three explanatory approaches 'national value orientation', 'political opportunity-cost model' and 'national identity type' are briefly evaluated in this chapter. The evaluation is based on descriptive findings published by other scholars and this work's presented results. The analysed figures refer to the macro level and imply the risk of *economic fallacy*. Bearing this shortcoming in mind, this chapter serves as a starting point for further analyses on micro level.

National value orientation

According to chapter 3.3.1, *post-materialist* values facilitate identification with the EU and its community. Thus, a post-materialist orientation leads to a relatively high share of *sceptical 'EU-Idealists' and 'EU-Enthusiasts'. Materialist* values lead to a higher share of *'EU-Pragmatics' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'.*

In order to confirm this link, Inglehart's 'Cultural Map of the World' is applied. It depicts post-materialism by the two dimensions 'self-expression' and 'secular rational' values (Inglehart & Welzel 2010, p 554). Generally, *Scandinavian* countries (besides FI) show *strong,* the geographical *'core'* and *'Southern'* countries *intermediate*, and most *'Eastern'* members *weak* post-materialist value orientation[130].

Consequently, Scandinavians are expected to be 'EU-Enthusiasts' or 'sceptical EU-Idealists' - but most citizens are 'EU-Opponents'[131]. 'Eastern' countries are expected to feature a pragmatic or opponent stance towards the EU - but the opposite is often the case. 'Core' and 'Southern' countries do not reveal clear patterns.

Summing up, this explanatory variable is *not supported*. Either value orientations are *too abstract* to form concrete attitude formation or *post-materialism* is just *not the decisive value orientation.* In preliminary analyses of this work, several values have been tested without promising result. The future of this approach is indeed compelling but the presented results are underwhelming.

Political opportunity cost model

According to chapter 3.3.2, individuals do not usually relate themselves directly with the EU but use their nation-state as a proxy. The political opportunity cost model predicts that the

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[130] PL, IE, and PT show very strong traditional values. MT is not included.
[131] Exception is FI that shows intermediate post-materialist values and intermediate ideal-type shares.

evaluation of the nation-state is *negatively* related to the evaluation of the *EU*. This explanation primarily targets the support item of the rational dimension and its political institutions. Thus, countries whose citizens value their national system highly are expected to show relatively high shares of 'sceptical EU-Idealists' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'.

In order to review this link, figures on the evaluation of *national governance quality* are used (Christin 2008, p 62). A positive evaluation of the national political system is found in Scandinavian and some 'core' countries. These citizens tentatively feature the expected low EU-support[132]. Also, some of the 'new' countries' citizens show the expected opposite pattern[133]: they are less satisfied with governance quality and feature high EU-support.

The evaluation of this explanatory variable is *rather affirmative* but it is qualified by many exceptions and it targets primarily specific support. However, the political opportunity cost model seems promising for further investigation.

National identity type

The dualistic concept of national identity introduced in chapter 3.3.3 distinguishes between civic and ethnic national identity. In contrast to the civic identity type, the *ethnic* one does not allow multiple identities and consequently *hampers EU-identification[134]*. This explanatory approach aims at the identification item of the emotional dimension. Hence, a prevailing ethnic identity type leads to higher shares of 'EU-Outsiders' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'. An indicator for a strong ethnic identity is the item 'pride to be a member of [nation]' (Haller 2009, p 306)[135].

Indeed, countries with strong ethnic identity show relatively high shares of 'EU-Outsiders' and 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected'. However, several exceptions are found[136]. The results nevertheless point to a *promising* explanatory variable.

6 Discussion

The following paragraphs discuss this study's findings in consideration of further research (ch. 6.1) and political implications (ch. 6.2). The last chapter lets us look beyond the actual results and gives prospects for the future of the European project.

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[132] NL, AT, GB, DK, FI, SE (LU contradicts thesis)
[133] RO , PL, LV, BG, TR (LT, LV, HU, IT, SK, CZ contradict thesis)
[134] e.g. Habermas 2001, pp 15 f.; Cerutti & Lucarelli 2008, p 61; Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 125
[135] Unfortunately, the figures of seven member states are missing and the shares for NL are from another survey.
[136] PL, HU, IE

6.1 Further research

It has proved difficult to live up to the reader's expectations: most hypotheses are rejected and none of the explanatory variables show convincing results. It seems that even more questions have arisen than have been solved. The benefit of these upcoming questions is their potential for further investigation.

First of all, *general limitations* of this research realm (described in ch. 1.3. and 5) affect future studies. *Restricted datasets* and the problem of *culturally/linguistically biased* understanding of questionnaire items are severe issues. Another crucial result is the *rejection* of the *geographic split-up*: the prejudice of pragmatic 'Eastern' and idealistic 'Western' countries seems far *too simple*. This is affirmed by the finding that i) 'core' and 'new' 'EU-Enthusiasts' as well as ii) 'old' and 'new' 'EU-Opponents' are very close - and the remaining four clusters do *not* show any geographic proximity. Also, *duration of membership is not the decisive explanatory factor*. This calls for a change of mind with regard to *'East-West'* and *'old-new' prejudices* in this scientific field.

With regard to this work's research design, the *dualistic dimensions* of the political-economic and socio-cultural sphere are open for *further development*. Preliminary analyses have included two additional promising societal realms which reflect a *civic* and a *global security* sphere[137] (cf. Donig, Meyer & Winkler 2005, p 139).

When discussing explanatory factors on macro level, the risk of *economic fallacy* is implied. Due to its limited extent, this work cannot incorporate auspicious individual variables[138]. In particular, the role of *ethnic* national identity seems fruitful. Further research should co*nduct multilevel regressions* including the *micro level* to reveal causalities and *moderating effects*.

This recommendation contains a crucial limitation: the impact of single institutional factors[139] is indeed interesting but the interpretation of multilevel regressions with several 'moderated' factors is statistically *too complex*. Therefore, the potential of *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA) is promising. This method matches the requirements of this research field by taking *path-dependent decisions, critical junctures, historical formation of interest groups, the history of civil society,* and the role of *public media*[140] into account (Hillmann & Hartfiel 2007, p

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[137] Although these results revealed interesting insights, they are left out for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility.

[138] for instance, 'professional background' and 'personal experience with Europeans' (Bücker 2012, p 77)

[139] such as EU-membership in years, modernisation index (HDI), social inequality (GINI), the strength of civil society (Civil Society Index and Global Civil Society Index), migrant politics (Mipex), and welfare regime types

[140] Also, analysis on the *emergence of mass opinion* is promising (see ch. 6.2). The complexity of this issue is

382). Also, *qualitative methods* such as in-depth interviews are relevant to *understand* the basic concepts of this sensitive research field[141].

Another shortcoming is the low chance of *affective retrieval* by standard questionnaires such as the Eurobarometer. A method of psychological studies is to measure the response speed: the quicker the answers come, the stronger is the mode of affective reasoning[142]. Unfortunately, these psychological methods have not yet been taken into account in this research field - although there are several relevant concepts[143].

> "[C]ontingent, *multi-causal* frameworks" are needed in order to elaborate "nuanced, *cross-disciplinary* inquiries and arguments that more closely approximate the *multiple worlds* Europeans experience on a daily basis" (emphasis added)[144].

6.2   Political implications

The argument of *normative* over-tones should be anticipated beforehand: this chapter regards the EU as a collective actor whose objective is to strengthen 'European identity' in order to build up legitimacy (cf. Easton 1965). According to the publications of the Directorate-General for Research & Innovation[145], this chapter assumes that the EU aims to implement a stable *EU-commitment*.

The results show that EU-attitude and EU-framing diverge among individuals - and *nations* (Kriesi 1999, pp 272 ff.). Thus, the question arises, what *kind of 'identity policy'* is the 'right' one in a *given country?* Although there is no official term for the EU's identity policy, there *are* official efforts by the European Commission to implement a European identity (Directorate-General for Research & Innovation 2012, p 4). I label these efforts 'EU identity policy' in the following.

This work's 'mapping' of EU-attitude might reveal helpful insights to decide on the strategy of identity promotion. According to the institutionalist perspective, the EU is - besides nation-

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shown in Fuchs' model: he includes the system level (political system, media), and the individual level (reception of media messages, its acceptance or rejection based on political predispositions), and the retrieval by survey questions that show the "official" mass opinion on identity and support (Fuchs & Klingemann 2011, p 44).
[141] Rautenfeld (2011)
[142] Studies affirm that these answers are more stable over time and better predictors for behaviour (Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 127 f.).
[143] Such as 'contrast-effects' and 'subject-object relations' (Lucarelli 2011; Gigerenzer & Selten 2001; Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz 1996, pp 105, 126 f., 131).
[144] Checkel & Katzenstein (2009, p 227)
[145] Directorate-General for Research & Innovation 2012

states - regarded as *main actor of top-down identity formation* and 'trans-nation-building pro-cesses'. Therefore, the following *general implications* are suggested in order to strengthen EU-commitment.

- The aim to improve legitimisation of the EU and solidarity among European citizens seems to be urgent with regard to current crises and debates on a widened policy scope. Therefore, *civic identification* shall have priority in identity policy at first: a 'healthy' civic identification is the first step to raise this kind of political support[146]. An advantage of civic identification is that it seems *less affected by strong ethnic* iden-tities[147]. Another upside is that civic identification can change within a rather *short time* by the 'direct route' of cognitive reasoning (cf. ch. 3.3.2). Promising political in-struments are the citizens' civic integration by intensified *democratic* procedures and the improvement of the EU's *transparency*.

- Changeability of civic identification is however likewise both an asset *and* a draw-back: the presented identification process can be diminished rather easily. In contrast, *affectual identification* could be the long-lasting 'adhesive' that *withstands critical junctures*. Building up this kind of affectual identification requires much more time than the civic one (see ch. 3.3.2). Bruter claims that it is important to *"give a face to Europe"* (emphasis added) – for example politicians with whom citizens can identify (Bruter 2006, p 91).

- *Intensified interaction* across borders also strengthens horizontal and vertical commu-nication. Likewise, this concerns the links between citizens, EU-institutions, and na-tional actors of the political/economic/social realm.

- A *common public sphere* strengthens the visibility of European issues in the citizen's daily life. To date, the public sphere usually remains 'national' due to language barri-ers and path-dependency.

  The critical question is *which actor* has the legitimacy to build up this 'European' me-dia. The European Commission might use this platform as a political tool. *Civil society* seems the more appropriate actor - particularly with regard to *constructivist* potential: once established, *a 'European coffeehouse'* might reinvent itself by a mutual and rein-forcing process.

- Another *chance – and risk* - is the on-going *state crises as a critical juncture*. At the

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[146] Although this work highlights the independence of EU-identification and EU-support, the concepts' mutual interplay is crucial for these deliberations (see results in ch. 5.1).
[147] Köngeter (2013)

moment, the crossroad seems to split in two: either solidarity *or* autonomy among the member states is perceived as a solution. Considering the current political developments - especially the financial support of 'failed' member states – the political decisions of the EU have not created cohesion but *reactance* among most politicians and citizens. Nevertheless, there is the chance that the *common narrative* of the crises leads to cohesion in future[148].

Risks and potential of ideal typical EU-attitudes

'Risky' and 'potential' patterns of the countries' EU-attitudes are reflected by the two 'mixed' ideal types 'sceptical EU-Idealists' and 'EU-Pragmatics'[149]. The crucial idea is that *EU-support is more likely to change*. Consequently, 'sceptical EU-Idealists' feature a higher probability to become 'EU-Enthusiasts'. 'EU-Pragmatics' are more likely to turn into 'EU-Opponents'.

Depending on these two ideal types, specific strategies of EU identity policy are recommendable. Due to this research design's institutionalist foundation, strategies on *country level* are highlighted. For reasons of clarity, the footnotes name the countries in question.

- To make use of the described potential of *'sceptical EU-Idealists'*, ideas on instruments are introduced by dimension in the following. Countries with a relatively high share of this ideal type are very heterogeneous in the rational dimension[150]. In the emotional one, many 'core' countries are found[151].

    In the *rational* dimension, EU-support can be strengthened by *democratic decision-making*, more *transparency,* and *information* on the EU and its policy. The *emotional* dimensions' ideal type 'EU-Alienated' is more difficult to turn into 'EU-Enthusiasts'[152]. In order to convince these citizens that the European community is worth solid support and solidarity, affective and emotion-based attitudes need to change. The key might be personal experiences: *interaction* and *communication* among Europeans fosters this affectual and entrenched kind of EU-support. Instruments are, for example, *exchange programs* that involve not only the elite but the *whole* society.

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[148] Also, the psychological concept of 'effort justification' explains how the crises foster solidary commitment (Festinger 1985, c1957).

[149] Of course, the shares of the ideal type 'EU-Opponents'/'Non-affected' indicate severe risks considering European cohesion and solidarity. With regard to identity policy, this population needs particular notice.

[150] DK, GB, ES, SE, CY, CZ, LV, LT, PL

[151] FR, BE, DE-W, LU, DK, SE, HU, RO

[152] The feeling of being part of a community is rather a *bottom-up* phenomenon. Thus, it can hardly be initiated by *top-down* initiatives of political entities.

- In contrast, '*EU-Pragmatics*' bear the *risk* of easily becoming 'EU-Opponents'. This ideal type's support rests on *unsteady foundations*. These citizens could quickly turn into 'EU-Opponents'/'EU-Non-affected' as soon as no advantage of membership is perceived[153]. It seems crucial that exactly this 'risky' ideal-type requires intense identity-policy[154].

  In order to strengthen *civic identification* in the *rational* dimension, *democratisation* processes might, again, be helpful to involve individuals as part of political decision-making. Also, '*giving a face to Europe'* might improve this kind of identification. The implementation of *affective identification* in the *emotional* dimension is surely more problematic. These psychological processes are complex and based on heuristic shortcuts and feelings[155]. Therefore, long-term socialisation processes are crucial. Suggested approaches are the visibility of European *symbols* in daily life and the *(common) public sphere*.

One finding implies meaningful potential for current identity policy: the strong emotional attachment of 'fresh' member states' citizens. This *early* stage of membership might offer a crucial *starting point* to implement long term commitment.

The consideration of a country's predominant ideal-typical *EU-attitude* and its particular *institutional background* are crucial for the development of *adjusted EU identity policy.*

6.3 Outlook

In the case of the abstract construct of European identity, the question on 'real' phenomena appears particularly nebulous[156]. Checkel and Katzenstein describe this circumstance by painting a bleak picture that the "ship of European identity entered unchartered waters". On the ship, navigation is problematic and the crew is "grumbling" while uncertainty and anxiety "define the moment" (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 1). Manifold visions of the journey's

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[153] In the case of GR it might be meaningful to analyse longitudinal or time-series data during the crises.

[154] Many 'old' members feature high shares of EU-Pragmatics in the rational framing (BE, NL, IT, IE, GR). Also, the *three 'newest'* EU-members SL, BG, and RO show the same pattern.

[155] The EU's identity policy needs to consider specific strategies that focus on the *perception of 'other' Europeans*. As a case in point, 'voluntary' and 'forced' outsiders require different 'kinds' of promotion.

[156] This work does not engage in the philosophical debate on detection of 'reality'.

destination seem to hamper the crew's cooperation.

Averting the gaze from this metaphor and turning to the actual European member states, a sobering thought arises: the EU's heterogeneity will always feature "discriminating particularisms" among countries due to inherent power inequalities. Hence, Europe "will never end up in a coherent narrative" (Rautenfeld 2011, p 237)[157]. The logic derivation is that there is no chance that a *homogenous European identity will emerge*[158].

But do we actually need a common European identity? As mentioned in the introduction, Europe is neither a 'melting pot' nor a 'salad bowl' but a mosaic – the question is what *adhesive* forces keep it together (Lehmann 2012). Political actors, civil society, and scientists have not yet found this connecting 'adhesive'. Nevertheless, I claim that *mutual communication* is a promising candidate for this 'adhesive' because social contact across borders can create *trust* among Europeans[159]. Possible contact occasions that reinforce this process are manifold and become more and more part of daily life - be it by common media[160], business trips, Erasmus exchange programs, bank transfers - or on Facebook.

Despite this work's 'top-down' approach, the presented political implications are *not* meant as an *instruction* for how to 'create' EU-citizens 'à la carte'. In contrast, the importance of *'bottom-up'* processes shall be highlighted: the actions of *civil society*[161] will possibly work as the crucial 'engine' of EU-identification (Heinrich & Fioramonti 2008, pp 310 ff.). Civil society promotes - consciously and unconsciously - European identity through various actions. For instance, *active citizenship* promotes abstract *values* as social trust. This makes contact to members of an out-group more probable and, hence, benefits European cohesion in the long run (Maloney 2010, p 130; Forbes 1997, p 9 f.). "European Citizens' Initiatives"[162] are a new 'kind' of action that *confronts* the EU institutions and the European civil society with their *own propagated values*. I argue that this *new form of collective civil action* enables a *search of European identity* on individual and institutional level. Also, *associations*[163] engage in European cohesion. These associations mainly target *academics* and university students. A crucial ingredient of the mosaic's 'adhesive' seems to incorporate a *broad social group.* Hence, these

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[157] National governments perform so called political "EU-blame-shifting" which manifests national ideas of Europe (Risse-Kappen 2010, p 246).

[158] Although this work analyses European *identification,* the role of European identity is a crucial future issue.

[159] cf. Stürmer (2008, p 283 ff.), Forbes (1997, p 9 f.)

[160] cf. the parasocial contact hypotesis (Schiappa 2005)

[161] There is no common definition of civil society (Anheier 2004, p 6). Thus, a very broad understanding is applied which refers to the third sector including all societal spheres that are not assigned to the political or economic sector.

[162] e.g. "Water is a Human Right" (Krupa 2013)

[163] e.g. AEGEE – "European student's forum", the "European Youth Forum", and ERYICA – "European Youth Information and Counselling Agency"

associations shall grasp the opportunity to involve pupils, white-collar workers, and students with lower educational status to strengthen social trust in the *centre of European society*.

The *historical conception* of the EU influences enormously the 'kind 'of identity. Both the EU as political entity and the European community are an experiment: as opposed to most nation-states, the EU currently resembles a political "Staatsnation" – and the "Kulturnation" might not have yet established (Checkel & Katzenstein 2009, p 208). But although the conception of a European "Staatsnation" is prevailing at the moment, it is unclear whether the respective European 'demos' exists.

To date, it remains vague as to what the *endpoint of Europeanisation* is and who the actors in charge are. However, the EU's growing range of competences increase its relevance to citizens and, consequently, the degree of *required societal support*. This will lead to a time-consuming collective decision process concerning the 'route' of Europeanisation.

The Federal President of Germany, Joachim Gauck, recently gave a speech on the prospects for the European idea[164]. Indeed, he senses Europe's demographical, economic, and cultural heterogeneity – but he spots the chance to *"mak[e] diversity more genuinely part of our lives and allowing it to unite us"* by a *"European identity [that] grows out of our deepening cooperation"*. Maybe he glimpsed a bit of the 'adhesive' that supports the European 'crew' to agree on a common destination.

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[164] Gauck (22.02.13)

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