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Me, Myself and the Other
Melanesian and Western Ideas on Selfhood and Recognition

vorgelegt von
Anita Caroline Galuschek

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Dekan: Prof. Dr. Klaus Fiedler
Berater: Prof. em. Dr. Jürg Wassmann

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Prologue

> There are no safe paths in this part of the world. Remember you are over the edge of the wild now, and in for all sorts of fun wherever you go (Tolkien 2006: 161).

Do you remember? – No, I have deleted it. In this final part of a dialogue I recently had, I was just asked, if I remember a particular event. But I had to acknowledge that I did not only forget it by accident, I really wanted to forget it, because it was not an afterglow. What was really shocking for me, was not the resurgence of the memory, but the response for my forced oblivion … *No, I have deleted it*.

Is our mind a computer? Do we simply delete events and experiences? In a paper I recently wrote I denied such a conclusion (Galuschek and Lütjohann 2014). In this paper I consider our mind as well, where memories fall in but are not forgotten, rather they are stored in the well's abyss (Galuschek and Lütjohann 2014: 24f). Memories are in the depth of the well, and wait to be set in new contexts (Galuschek and Lütjohann 2014: 25). In fact, memories 'wait' to be recounted in presumed 'new storylines'. I realized, every story I compose of my life – even this one here in the book – is reconstructed from memories and experiences I already had. Sometimes, they seem to be forgotten, actually they are deep in the well's abyss, and they are sometimes hard to find. So, everything in my mind, all memories, all my experiences, is stored. And: I can arrange them freely; I can compose contexts and chronologies, where I did not expect it when I made these experiences. By this means, *I store my lifetime, but in fact, I store countless possible stories of my lifetime.* Thus, I imagined a picture:



Figure 1: my self as a tree (source: CanStockPhoto).

Let us take this picture as example for being ourselves as persons. The tree's branches can be imagined as composed of narrative threads, as though like every single one would be a biography. They merge in the tree's trunk. The roots are hidden in the ground; they are one with the world. Perceived this way, the roots in the ground have paramount meanings. They can be regarded as the unconscious which is hidden from the outer world, as well as they can be perceived as genetic roots which show that we are coming from the earth. But, at the center stage is the symbiosis of being and world which occurs here. This picture is that of me, a human, in the world. I am individual, but without doubt, I am still interwoven with the surrounding world. Take into account this example of a tree: I breathe the air of the world, I nourish myself from the earth, and I have – some kind of –relationships with birds, butterflies, bees etc. All these relationships are mirrored in my experiences and memories. Maybe this analogy is a bit too fantastic, but it perfectly fits in the *image of ourselves* in *our social*

world: we always experience ourselves as both an individual as well as socially related at the same time. But, what does this folk psychological realization actually mean?

Without doubt, nowadays folk psychological realizations and investigations are already used to build up entire scientific constructs, like theories of mind, behavior theories, agency theories and belief-desire-theories, to mention a few (Hutto 2007a). Let us walk this folk psychological path a little bit further.

Experiences and memories are captured in narratives, they can be autobiographic or fantastic, episodic or more or less coherent, but they always constitute a story. Such narratives can even be unconsciouss, and thus only occur in a particular situation where they come to mind. The distinctive thing about these experience-based narratives is that they are always related to others, since no experience is made alone. By recounting these narratives, we also capture the experiences and stories of others, since they were part of a particular experience. In turn, we influence the life of others through our presence and our acting. In other words, we influence another's experiences by interaction. In doing this, we receive reactions for our actions, which we can evaluate. In this manner, we learn "about the flow of relationships" (Josephides 2008: 78). Other's reactions to our actions mirror their evaluation of our acting. From this, we can update our behavior. In addition, through the reactions of others we learn to evaluate ourselves, and compose our self-perception. Thus, we live in a steady flow of relationships with others *and* with our self. However, how does this extreme social anchoring fit in the Western modern pursuit of individuality?

Self-perception composes a particular image of our self with particular desires, needs, and expectations. This composition of our self-perception makes us individuals distinctive from others. In turn, we claim recognition of our individuality and our self-being. In fact, every one of us is striving for recognition of our own individuality, characteristics, abilities, and traits. It is true, however, that most of us already have had mixed experiences with recognition. Assuming that we have an almost complete image of our self-perception, we naturally lack in disclosing our full individuality to others, since we always only have a particular personal habitus in a particular social field (Bourdieu 1984). This means, we are only able to disclose parts of our individuality. Therefore, it never works to be recognized in our full individuality, it is always given a restriction by the social field. Due to this particular action in a social

field, we are sometimes recognized as another, since others miss to recognize other essential parts of our individuality. It seems as though we have to act as another to reach particular *individual* goals. Regularly, such acting does not have significant effect on our self-perception, since we still know who we are. *How does this inner dichotomy of being oneself and being another work?*

In this account, it does not matter "[w]hether the self is real or fictional, one thing or many, it is clearly something that needs explanation" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 213). Apparently, our self is related to experiences, individuality, personality, sociality, otherness, agency, and feelings, to mention a few. By approaching the self from the acting human – this means, to come to the self –, we have to go through the terms 'individual' and 'person'. However, a distinction between person and self is not easy to formulate. A logical and easy way to define personhood could be: "'[p]erson' is an entity denominated from the outside; from the inside, each of us thinks of her or his self. The term 'self', then, has an intimate character that more easily spans the insider and outsider perspective" (Josephides 2008: 23). It is true that the person has a social character, the self makes rather more problems. It refers to the 'I' as oneself as well as it possesses a relational, self-reflexive dimension, which makes it necessarily social.

By this means, I connect Western approaches in phenomenological and hermeneutical considerations as well as narrativity and human biography (like the perception of the life-world as a surrounding environment) and non-Western approaches (like the Melanesian perception of personhood as a relational dividual) to emphasize the 'docking stations' of both approaches. This frame must comply with Strathernian critics: the popular literal term 'the Melanesian' does not exist in reality, rather it is an intellectual construct. 'The Melanesian' thus is

> a manner of speaking, or more precisely the site of certain problems of expression and understanding, peculiar to the cultural problems of anthropology, which is (almost) exclusively a 'western' project, like it or not (Gell 1999: 34).

This, however, should not be the problem of this book. As 'the Melanesian' does not exist in reality, the same might be true of the modern Western subject[1]. Both are concepts or constructs, but in any case, a particular scientific point of view. And, that exactly is the point this book deals with: in fact, either concept has its historical and cultural background. Both have in common the rendering of the human as a social acting entity. Coming to the point: in this case, personhood is bound to particular characteristics, qualities, attributes, or some kinds of personal and social achievements; the notion of personhood in relation to a particular human has longer or shorter downtimes. Against this backdrop, the problem with classical notions of personhood is that the constructed image of the human appears holey: personhood would be turned off and on 'on an hourly base' (Härle 2012: 97f). The premise which I suggest to follow is: "[w]ho becomes a person, is always a person, she or he becomes *as* a person, not *to* a person" (Härle 2012: 98).[2] To ensure the effect of acting within the life-world, a concept of personhood, understood as a shaping concept, accomplishes the anthropological concept of personhood.

In academia, it is common ground that increasing individuality causes an increasing claim to recognition, especially since Axel Honneth's revival and actualization of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's concept of recognition. It is also Honneth who actually is inseparably linked with the recent philosophical discussion about recognition. We are recognized and we recognize others both on a personal as well as on a social level. The leading question, still unsolved and at the same time unsolvably linked with the relationship of individual and society, is: *why are we relying on recognition?* In other words: *what does it mean to recognize me, my self, and the other?*

[1] In German three meanings of the subject can be distinguished: (1) an ontological one as carrier of accidents, qualities, and actions, (2) a logical one as part of a sentence, and (3) as matter of scientific research (Kible 1998: 374). The meaning of subject I refer to is the first one. In this sense, Descartes, the founder of modern subject-theory, used the term 'subject'. For him, the subject is carrier of cognitive attributes, through which the subject recognizes the outer world. From this perception of the metaphysical, ontological subject the way is not far to the epistemic subject, understood as the 'recognizing ego'. It gains this meaning through German Idealism, which also includes Hegel's thinking of the Absolute Spirit. Today, the concept of the subject has an epistemic meaning with all cognitive capacities and imagination. That makes the subject the recognizing figure in philosophical interpretation (Stolzenberger 1998: 383) regarded as comprising unique experience and unique consciousness, understood as an observer in contrast to the passive and observable object.

[2] This passage is translatied by the author; German original: "Wer Person wird, ist immer schon Person, wird also *als* Person und wird nicht zur Person" (Härle 2012: 98).

Western discourse has been struggling with this question for decades. Apparently, it seems that Western accounts are not able to deliver a sufficient answer to this question. I suggest, therefore, a rethinking of the concept of the self. In doing so, other accounts have to be considered. Assuming the premise that recognition is a gift, a strongly subject-based account is limited to move along its way.

> 'Everything is subjective', you say: but that itself is an *interpretation*, for the 'subject' is not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind – Is it even necessary to posit the interpreter behind the interpretation? Even that is fiction, hypothesis (Nietzsche 2003: 7[60]).

What Nietzsche here means, indeed, is already, even if subjectivity means that something is perceived in relation to oneself, an interpretation of the true being of that something. Thus, an objective stance never can be reached. Regarded in this way, Nietzsche's quote should be the keyword of this work, since the *objective of this work* is to look behind and examine what is beyond concepts of subjectivity. Therefore, the central part of this work is the idea of bringing together researches from two scientific disciplines which do not talk that much with each other. "The relationship between anthropology and philosophy is characterized by a complex history that includes mutual attraction as well as mutual mistrust" (Duranti 2008: 490). Both disciplines have one outstanding subject in common: they deal with the human being, her or his emotions, rationality, and performance; but they differ in their approach. Philosophy approaches the human from the rational and transcendental direction, whereas cultural and social anthropology addresses the human being's everyday life. Taking both disciplines together means to receive an image of the human in her or his transcendental view and from her or his performance in the life-world, as she or he is doing in everyday life. Philosophy helps to give sense to the doings of everyday life which is only observeable from the anthropological point of view.

The connection of philosophical and anthropological approaches to identity, personhood, and self-recognition, seems to be very fruitful to develop a holistic approach to mutual recognition. The combination of both disciplines enables, at the same time, a theoretical as well as a practical view. In consequence, the Cartesian Ego is rejected in favor of a decentralised, cosmomorphic and sociocentric approach to

personhood which merges with its surrounding as its life-world. This approach is enriched by the Western philosophical idea of narrative identity. Finally, the center of the life-world is empty, and is replaced by a notion of personhood which is merged with the life-world. The surrounding world is not an object anymore; rather it is considered as *us*: person and life-world build a unity. In such an approach sociality is not an 'add-on' anymore which has to be attached on a solipsistic subject by nature; rather it is inherent. An anthropological model of personhood is called in to insure the cultural framework of the elaborated concept of personhood and show basic principles of a model of subjectless personhood. This anthropological approach is merged with a narrative concept of identity to emphasize the self-reflexive way of personal identity. Such an approach has a direct effect on classical notions of personhood.

Even contemporary approaches to the self remain in the tradition of the epistemological subject (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2012; Henry and Thompson 2011; Legrand 2011). Nevertheless, these approaches attempt to investigate accounts of an embodied perception of the self as person. This includes a sensual and *enworlded* perception of our self-being and the life-world. It is fruitful to follow these approaches, despite their anchoring in the obsolete tradition of the philosophical subject.

Following this way, recognition is strictly bound to our identity, our self and personhood which constitutes the basis for social development and social acting. To show this relation between recognition and our selfhood in dependence of our identity and personhood, I follow Laitinen (2010: 321f) who points out "five further (related) ways in which getting recognition matters". *First*, "recognition is *directly desirable* in itself". Such a desire makes recognition an "intelligent, independent motivational force". *Second*, "recognizing and getting recognition are constitutive of non-alienated horizontal *relationships of unity*, of different kinds (for example, mutual respect, mutual care)" and they are "constitutive also of nonalienated *vertical* relationships of unity, of different kinds (for example, living under just, legitimate, self-governed institutions, living under institutions whose goals and principles one can identify with)". *Third*, "via affecting self-relations of the relevant parties, getting recognition is a *precondition of agency*". *Fourth*, "recognizing and getting recognition is arguably in different ways a precondition of identity formation, self-realization, good life and positive freedom". *Fifth*, recognition has a "possible ontological

relevance for the very existence of groups, institutions, states, even persons". Laitinen shows with these five basic definitions where recognition is virulent. To reach a level of mutual recognition within which we are adequately recognized in our self-being from others, the basis of the concept of recognition introduced so far in scientific discourse has to be renewed and reordered. These five premises being fulfilled, we and the self-related possibility of mutual recognition can be enabled. First, a sufficient concept of our self-being as recognizing self and recognizing other has to be elaborated. Therefore, we should look "for a *theory of personhood* that can articulate, organize, and philosophically justify our deepest intuitions about what makes us what we are" (Ikäheimo 2010: 356).

For that reason, my approach to a self-based model of mutual recognition follows two *methodological paradigms*: phenomenology and hermeneutics.

In this work, the phenomenologist's approach constitutes the first main basis of the approach to a self-based concept of mutual recognition. By this means, our self is explained within the traditional first-person-account. "That is, the phenomenologist is concerned to understand the perception in terms of the meaning it has for the subject" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 7). Perception and related experiences are nothing that happens in the brain. By this means, they are not cognitive processes.

> The typical cognitive scientist […] takes a third-person approach, that is, an approach from the perspective of the scientist as external observer rather than from the perspective of the experiencing subject (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 7).

In the cognitivist case, the perspective is objective, and the purpose of investigation represents only "for example certain objective (and usually sub-personal) processes like brain states or functional mechanisms" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 7). In relation to that, I follow an intrinsic actionism because, according to my main thesis, recognition begins on the level of the single human being; but also, on other levels of mutual recognition, there is an extrinsic actionism which mirrors our perception and acting in every aspect of the life-world.

In a second step, we use hermeneutics as a "philosophy of detour" (Reagan 2002: 5), thus this hermeneutical investigation of our self in relation to mutual recognition

has to start at the current state of the recognition debate and take a detour to the anthropological state of personhood- and self-debate. Since "[t]he self is not a monolith" (Cohen 1994: 2), this scientific multifaceted way through various anthropological concepts has to be made.

I want to suggest a philosophical-anthropological approach, which enables investigations in empathy and care by using an approach to the motivation of recognition. I show how biographies as narratives can help to understand the other within her or his very own life-world, even if the life-world is the very part of the human's personality as a dividual. The Western approach to personhood, on the other hand, can conceive a new concept of personhood that is understood as a category of the human being, with a stronger focus on culturally and historically founded dividuality instead of a mere individuality. Understood in such a way, the act of recognition nourishes itself from the motivation of acting and performance within the life-world. In a classical sense, motivation is conceived as "representing those forces that arouse organisms to action towards a desired goal and provide the reason and purpose for behavior" (Kreitler 2013: 2). Not surprisingly, due to its Western roots, this definition highlights the intentional character of motivation. For the purpose of this work, however, intentionality is not relevant, since action intentionality is a sufficient condition for action, but not a necessary one. There exist many concepts of personhood and action motivation which have in common that people act, but differ in the definition of their purpose (LiPuma 2000: 136–138). Therefore, I would rather suggest to take 'motivation' only as action force, without including the necessity for action intention.

In summary, on the sketched basis of philosophical and anthropological approaches, the purpose of this work is to draw a self-based model of mutual recognition which includes all stages of mutual recognition: recognition of our own identity, recognition of our own acting, recognition of others, and evaluative recognition. Therefore, I begin this journey with preliminary remarks on recognition, person, and self by elaborating the state of the art in approaches to mutual recognition, the anthropological notion of personhood, individual, and self, and the philosophical notion of personhood, identity and self. In the second part of my work, I show how these approaches compose a self-based model of mutual recognition.

Part I:
Preliminary Remarks on Mutual Recognition, Person and Self

In Western Philosophy "[t]he idea of an individual unique self" precedes and founds most of all investigations on being human and personhood (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 233). It does not comply with usual Western thinking to apply personhood to relational frameworks, rather personhood is brought in context with subjectivity (Härle 2012: 96f). First, Descartes in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1990) introduced the later well-established Western philosophical focus on a conscious subject and this conscious subject's ability of introspection and thinking. With this structure, Descartes and his followers attempted to answer the main questions which at the time occupied Western thinkers the most: 'what is the human aware of?' and 'what can the human really know for sure?'.

From doubting and derived from the certainty "that there is nothing certain" (Descartes 1990: 99) has resulted the famous insight "*Ego sum, ergo existo*" (Descartes 1990: 100). This realization "is necessarily true, so often as it is uttered by me or conceived by the mind" (Descartes 1990: 101). By implication, the subject can only recognize what it knows for sure. This epistemological approach to the human perception of the world centralizes the awareness of consciousness: we are the center of our world, from this derives that our perception necessarily is egocentric. As a result, philosophical thinkers like Edmund Husserl and other Phenomenologists try to explain the world as consisting of environment and life-world from the egocentric point of view.

In fact, this is a consciousness-based European idea which became so much popular all over the world through imperialism and mission. The structure of this Western philosophical subject, however, is limited, since the subject stands for itself. It can neither experience nor recognize itself without the outer world, to be more precise, without other human beings. Thinking this train of thought to its conclusion, an egocentric perspective on the world limits the account of this world. It can only

secure the own subjective point of view. Therefore, it seems paradoxically that such an account of the world claims to be absolute and universal in the entire world.

In recent approaches to mutual recognition, which here in chapter one are reported as state of the art within the debate on social and mutual recognition, many social sciences like cultural sciences, sociology, and psychology have focused on traditional Western concepts of mutual – or in this case 'intersubjective' – recognition. Groundbreaking and most influential in recent investigations in this field has been the revival of Hegel's theory of recognition. Honneth (1995, 2003, 2008, 2012), Judith Butler (2005), and, especially in German approaches, Thomas Bedorf (2010) published considerable and influential works about the structure and the concept of mutual recognition. Within this scientific area, Honneth (1995), above all, provides a systematic approach to the *Struggle for Recognition*. All these investigations focus on struggles for recognition from the perspective that recognition of the subject is dependent on the other. Regarding recognition as a social phenomenon, it only can be conceived through the other. Therefore, the recognition of the own self is unsolvably bound to the other. The subject, however, struggles against these bonds striving to be for itself.

The crucial point in these investigations is to include individual motivations to engage in this struggle of mutual recognition. Individual reasons depend on cultural and social heritage, the constitution of personal identity, and preferences, personal objectives and pursuits related with these factors. In this respect, the individual human cannot be ignored. Fundamentally, it might be said that the primary subject of recognition is not society, but the single human considered as person. We might go even a step further by formulating the hypothesis that the primary subject of recognition is not society but the single human. Thus, above all, it has to be investigated how and why the human is motivated to gain recognition. Therefore, my general critiques of these approaches are: individual motives and intentions are not sufficiently investigated because we might forget that the subject is bound to social relations from the beginning. In contrast, I claim to regard mutual recognition as a dialogue, since self-confirmation is not only dependent on ourselves, but also on the other and her or his reaction or 'feedback' to our behavior. Therefore, recognition is based on – well balanced – mutuality (Bedorf 2010: 102). The recognized human has to be naturally involved in social relationships. Indeed, the Western philosophical

subject is bounded by force, since it needs self-confirmation from the other. For that reason, the question arises how and in which role we are acting within the world. To be sure, the centered ego is a Western concept. In other non-Western cultures, however, perceptions on identity, individual, self and personhood – even if not in these terms – have been developed as well. In social and cultural anthropology there are many problems within the perception of the other and related social acting: because within societies where dividual perceptions of personhood exist an opacity of mind prevails which negates an awareness of theory of mind which has a direct effect on empathy, care and agency. In contrast to the Western concept of individuality, dividuality highlights our porosity. We are not one single awareness with one single character, even we are not a single block. The perception of dividuality makes us observable in various situations within a variety of behavioral settings which all belong to us, even if it seems as though we were different persons: in that way, our relation to the situation and the surroundings is highlighted. Here occurs the dichotomy of the Western individuality and the concept of dividuality.The traditional Western individuality is a "view that society is constituted of autonomous, equal, units, namely separate indviduals, and that such inidividuals are more important, ultimately, than any larger constituent group" (Macfarlane 1978: 5). By this means, the human being is not only conceived as isolated individual "in highly non-natural (but carefully controlled) environments", but she or he moves within a cultural framework and thus within a social community with all its permanent interactions (Wassmann and Bender 2015: 17).

In reference to the elaborations and investigations of Maurice Leenhardt (1979), the Melanesian perception of personhood sets the focus on a cosmomorphic approach. The human is conceived as holistic relational. The human life-world does not enclose an 'I' in the middle of the world which perceives the life-world from a central ego. In a certain manner, the world around the pretended subject 'gets human'. This understanding of the human in the world moves away from an *a priori* awareness of mind and cognition to an *a priori* experience through the body. The focus on personhood shifts from a view of a living subject that has consciousness surrounded by mere objects without consciousness and sociality and perception attached to avoid solipsism, to a view of a lively symbiosis of the human and the life-world. The dichotomy between subject and object does not exist anymore: *vivant = vivant*

(Clifford 1982: 174). While this makes the body of the human part of the environment, the environment as the human life-world becomes a part of the human as well.

Life-world is a phenomenological term, taken from Husserl, that refers to the world where things appear as entities in their suchness: "the 'merely subjective-relative' intuitive of prescientific world-life" (Husserl 1970: 125). Every scientific insight is founded on practical and sensual perception. Thus, the life-world is in opposition to "the 'objective', 'the true' world" of sciences (Husserl 1970: 127). Furthermore, life-world enables objectivism and focusing on facts, and thus builds a "forgotten meaning-fundament" (Husserl 1970: 48). The working scientist assumes "the one world of experience, […] [where] every other researcher knows he is in as a human being, even throughout all his activity of research" (Husserl 1970: 126). That makes life-world a "prescientific, intuitively given surrounding world" (Husserl 1970: 27) which consists of personal relations to this world. It is not my intention to use the term in this strict classical phenomenological way. Rather it is used to describe the surroundings or environment in which we live as an everyday world. For that reason life-world has a performative character (Galuschek 2014: 347). It is the world within which we act and perform. It builds the room for social interaction and culture. Even in the eyes of Husserl life-world and scientific world are interdependent, since scientific insight itself on its part becomes a cultural product, and thus part of the life-world (Husserl 1970: 128). In this work it is shown how life-world is a world where things are animated by human custom and arranged as a mirror of our self. This perception of the self demands self-reflectivity and, therefore, the self is narratively considered.

1. Introductory Reflections on Mutual Recognition

Nowadays, it is well known in academia that the act of recognition does not only include two 'players' in relation to each other. In fact, at least three 'players' participate in the 'game', 'struggle', or 'contest' of mutual recognition. The structure of this act can be broken down to the formula

x recognizes y for z.

This formula describes in the usual adequate and concise way the incongruence of me 'y' who wants to be recognized by another 'x', and the part of us 'z' which is recognized. If we take 'z' as particular context or as part of 'y' like an ability, characteristic or traits, we realize that it is impossible to be recognized in our entire identity 'y'. To supply a practical example: Jane (y) is a so-called 'completely normal' human being[3]. Her profession is teaching math. Her students (x) appreciate her teaching style and her ability to make math understandable (z). Thus, Jane (x) receives recognition by her students (x) for her teaching (z). The part 'z' in this formula is important, since Jane as a human is not only a teacher. She also might be a friend, a mother, a wife, the girl in the red dress which always reads a book in the bus, and much more, but only her teaching ability is relevant for the student's context. Thus, the act of recognition encompasses only a particular part of our personal identity, but never the entire one (Bedorf 2010: 122). Phenomenologically speaking, we are not recognized in the wholeness of our personal identity, rather in alterity regarded as part of our personal identity, which makes us to someone else as we are, since the recognized part differs from the personal identity regarded as a whole. By implication, the act of recognition does not necessarily include a congruence with the aspect within we want to be recognized, and the aspect actually recognized by the other. In consequence, there exists always the opportunity to create a complete new aspect of the own identity.

[3] I address the reader to forgive me using such a phrase. We all know that such a description of a human being is folk psychological. But, at the same time, we all have a diffuse understanding of what kind of human is meant. So, to ensure the simplicity of my example, this phrase suggested itself.

As Honneth (2012: 80) points out, in recent discourse about recognition, there is general agreement that recognition is an act as well as "a distinct phenomenon in the social world". Recognition has become a slogan in proactive contexts like – to name just a few – 'struggle for recognition', 'need for recognition', 'interpersonal recognition', 'public recognition', 'recognition of difference', 'institutional recognition', or 'emotional recognition' (Laitinen 2010: 319). Comparing recent approaches suggests that the notion of the act of recognizing each other or being recognized can be defined in several expressions, which all refer to each other or are replaceable by each other: like 'political recognition', 'social recognition', 'intersubjective recognition', 'reciprocal recognition', and 'mutual recognition'. It can be said that political and social recognition are similar terms, since they refer to the act of recognition from a group to a group. They are closely linked to each other, since, on a normative and moral level, the political recognition corresponds to social recognition, *and vice versa*. As 'intersubjective recognition', 'reciprocal recognition', and 'mutual recognition' can be classified as similar terms, it is clear that they refer to the act of recognition from an individual to a group, *and vice versa*. 'Social recognition' and 'mutual recognition' here have a special stand, since they can be interpreted in both ways as an act of recognition from an individual to a group, *and vice versa*, as well as an act of recognition from group to group.[4] Thus, recognition is considered as always executed between at least two humans. For that reason, all these terms deal with a strong social aspect. In addition, since they do not, in first instance, deal with material goods or economy, they rather have in common that they are acts of 'symbolic recognition'. They can be summarized under this term, since the act of mutual recognition as such can be perceived as a social phenomenon:

> [t]he social world gives what is rarest, recognition, consideration, in other words, quite simply, reasons for being. It is capable of giving meaning to life, and to death itself, by consecrating it as the supreme sacrifice (Bourdieu 2000: 240).

[4] In the following work, I only talk about ‚mutual recognition', since for my purpose it is the most general term which covers both kinds of recognition: from individual to group, *and vice versa*, and from group to group. In addition, the term 'mutual recognition' fits more easily in an investigation into the selfhood and recognition which bypasses the subject than the term 'intersubjective recognition' which relies on the subject.

Regarded from this perspective, recognition appears as a form of symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is something non-material, but still socially valuable. For example, if we gain a particular social status, we receive an act of recognition by others. In addition, this symbolic evaluation makes recognition important for our development as social beings, but also for our self-confirmation. Without this confirmation on the level of sociality and on the level of the self, being oneself as well as being part of a social community is hard to realize. As parts of the social community we receive our confirmation from this community, the part we want to play in this community is dependent on our self-confirmation, since we seek self-confirmation in dependence of the way we perceive our self. For that reason, we have a particular way of self-perception which we project on the social surroundings. Therefore, self can be understood as "an encompassing domain term that includes within it virtually all aspects of personhood […] [and] is constituted by acts of identification" (Mageo and Knauft 2002: 3). The self is totally interwoven with its own reflexive and experience related being and with the surrounding social world. By this means, if recognition is not conceived on a social or mutual level, it can be the act of recognizing oneself as an acting human. Here the distinction between ontic and ontological other is adequate: the ontic other is the physical other we meet in our daily interaction; the ontological other is a theoretical distinction between me in this moment and me one hour ago, to take an example. In this manner, we are able to realize ourselves as another, which enables the reflection about our acts and our self-being. Self-recognition is crucial for being aware of the act of mutual recognition, the self is constitutively related to "reciprocal intersubjectivity" (Forst 1994: 413). By implication, the "qualitative self-conception" of the subject is developed by mutual recognition (Forst 1994: 413). This act, thus, enables self-confirmation and self-realization. By referring to the own self through the act of mutual recognition, self-confirmation is possible only through mutual recognition.

Since it is the excellent goal of this investigation to elaborate an approach – with the following presented theoretical concepts – to mutual recognition based on the self, I focus on the position of the self. Due to their affiliation with the Western epistemic subject, all recent approaches to recognition struggle with the notion of the self. Within the numerous approaches and investigations of recognition, there are two fundamental approaches which deserve closer consideration: Honneth's (1995)

approach to recognition as a struggle in the tradition of Hegel (1967, 1977, 1979) and Ricœur's (2005) approach to recognition as a gift. Both offer a special account of the structure of recognition: for Honneth, recognition is a perpetual struggle, which every individual human has to fight. In other words, he aims to elaborate a state of

> undistorted relation-to-self, human subjects always need – over and above the experience of affectionate care and legal recognition – a form of social esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities (Honneth 1995: 121).

Thus, in Honneth's eyes (2003: 176), recognition should be an act of self-affirmation and should be regarded "as the good of personal identity-formation", where the social dimension in which the other appears and claims for recognition is a necessary detour (Bedorf 2010: 69). For Ricœur, recognition is a gift which every individual human likes to give, and gives this recognition without expectation of return. Therefore, Ricœur does not focus on a struggle, but rather on the experience of otherness (Kämpf 2012: 137).

1.1 Struggling for Recognition

Honneth's elaborations on mutual recognition passed through a great turn. He founded his early approach to thoughts the young Hegel elaborated during his years in Jena as the *The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (1967), which subtitles his work about the *Struggle for Recognition* (1995).

> Within Hegel's œuvre, of course, the programme thus outlined never made it beyond the level of mere sketches and proposals. Already in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* the completion of which brought to a close Hegel's period in Jena, the conceptual model of a 'struggle for recognition' had lost its central position within Hegel's theory (Honneth 1995: 5).

Honneth (1995) takes Hegel's approach as initial point to develop a critical theory of social recognition. He deepens Hegel's approach to recognition to elaborate 'an explication of the grammar of recognition' (Berg et al. 2004: 47). To be more precise, Honneth's approach deals with embedding recognition in a socio-pragmatic context. In this manner he aims to investigate social dynamics, since

> [t]he developmental logic of such collective movements can, however, only be discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on the basis of the dynamics of moral experiences (Honneth 1995: 139).

In consequence, the main question is how a normative model of society can be constituted as "moral infrastructure of interactions" (Honneth 1995: 143).

The main concern of Honneth's (1995: 176, cf. 2004: 112) approach to recognition is the idea of "post-traditional, democratic ethical life" as self-realization, which is closely linked to 'personal integrity' and 'autonomy', with 'freedom' being the center of all these concepts. Therefore, Honneth's hypothesis states that 'recognition is intersubjective and reciprocal':

> the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one's partners in interaction, as their social addressee (Honneth 1995: 92).

According to Honneth, subjectivity is essentially social. Traditionally, to be a subject means to be active, the center of the world, self-aware, and independent. Sociality as quality of being and acting within a group of other subjects, contradicts such a definition, since within a group individual and personal desires are not the main concern; rather the desires of the group as a social community. This inescapable situation (or *aporia*) is bypassed by the struggle for recognition. The struggle preserves the qualities of the subject, but at the same time, the struggle describes the subject's movement to sociality, since the subject accepts the struggle.

The young Hegel's approach exactly begins at this point. Based on Fichte, the young Hegel (1967) focuses in his investigation on our self-dependence. Later, Hegel

uses this concept of recognition with his description of the relation of *Lordship and Bondage* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977). To reach the status of self-dependence, on the one hand, we have to confirm our own self-awareness, while, by this means, we have to confirm our self-being as being us as 'human' and all other things we identify ourselves with; on the other, we have to deny the self-awareness of others. To confirm our own being and self-awareness, others are always needed, but the existence of others cannot be fully denied; rather there is a gray area between the confirmation and the negation of the other: "[t]hey *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another" (Hegel 1977: 112). In conclusion, we only can recognize our self-awareness in being able to perceive the other's different being. Here appears a certain mutual respect towards each other. It is about a particular acceptance of the existence of another, but not of another's being as human. The other is perceived and recognized as a random entity being there (*read: object*). In contrast to Martin Heidegger's conception of Dasein in *Being and Time* (1962), Hegel directs the focus on the 'there' as mere existence. To solve the occurring problem of solipsism, Hegel (1967: 201ff) uses the struggle for recognition between subjects to show that everyone of us comes to the own individual, concrete, and true existence through being and caring *for* others (Hegel 1967: 213).[5] The foundation of this struggle for recognition is the hypothesis that 'all humans have freedom in common' – due to the freedom of their consciousness (Hegel 1967: 193).[6] They lose their freedom by being with others and, naturally, by being in the world. In the context of being recognized by others, freedom is lost by being forced to succumb before the shape of recognition the other is giving. In the context of his theorem of *Lordship and Bondage*, Hegel later states "the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle" (Hegel 1977: 113f). For Hegel, this struggle for recognition is so important as to emphasize it, since he aims to underline the fact that the value of independence exceeds our existence in the world.

[5] This paraphrase was loosely translated by the author: "Jeder dient dem Andern und leistet Hilfe, oder das Individuum hat hier erst als e i n z e l n e s Dasein; vorher ist es nur abstraktes oder unwahres" (Hegel 1967: 213).

[6] "Diese Intelligenz ist f r e i , aber ihre Freiheit ist umgekehrt ohne I n h a l t , auf dessen Kosten, durch dessen Verlust eben sie sich befreit hat" (Hegel 1967: 193). Hegel understands intelligence as theoretical spirit, which has no content. It comes to content with activity in the world. However, the price the theoretical spirit pays for that activity in the world *is* freedom, since content is bounded to reality.

> The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a *person*, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other's death, for it values the other no more than itself; its essential being is present to it in the form of an 'other', it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality. The other is an *immediate* consciousness entangled in a variety of relationships, and it must regard its otherness as a pure *being-for-self* or as an absolute negation (Hegel 1977: 114).

Consequently, with independence, we overcome *our own being-for-self* and move into our own sociality. It can be derived that in case of self-confirmation Hegel founds his concept of self-consciousness in "recognitive relations" (Quante 2010: 100). It is double bind, since it is directed to the own self, but only in dependence of the other. "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (Hegel 1977: 111). This process of recognition consists, therefore, of self-confirmation and self-sacrifice.

> Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come *out of itself*. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self (Hegel 1977: 111).

This conceptualization binds our self to recognition, since a dynamic process is given in which we, considered as individuals, move within reciprocal relationships. These relationships enable as well the awareness of our recognition concerning the other. Therefore, the individual "ultimately becomes dependent on the other for his self-consciousness" (Barresi and Martin 2011: 46). This aporia of self-confirmation and self-sacrifice directly results in our struggle for self-confirmation and against the dominance of the other. Though Hegel's model of recognition is based on identity his approach is, in recent research, transferred "onto the cultural and political terrain" (Fraser 2010: 213). By this means, if a group A is discriminated by another dominant

group B, recognition becomes a struggle for A's cultural identity. This struggle is portrayed as follows:

> [a]s a result of repeated encounters with the stigmatizing gaze of a culturally dominant other, the members of disesteemed groups internalize negative self-images and are prevented from developing a healthy cultural identity of their own. In this perspective, the politics of recognition aims to repair internal self-dislocation by contesting the dominant culture's demeaning picture of the group. It proposes that members of misrecognized groups reject such images in favor of new self-representations of their own making, jettisoning internalized, negative identities and joining collectively to produce a self-affirming culture of their own – which, publicly asserted, will gain the respect and esteem of society at large. The result, when successful, is 'recognition': an undistorted relation to oneself (Fraser 2010: 213).

The objective of such a struggle of recognition is intersubjective – or mutual – recognition, which confirms our own self as our personal identity. In reference to Hegel's original idea of recognition, intersubjective recognition can be understood as

> an obligation that requires but does not force subjects to recognize one another in a certain way: if I do not recognize my partner to interaction as a certain type of person, his reactions cannot give me the sense that I am recognized as the same type of person, since I thereby deny him precisely the characteristics and capacities with regard to which I want to feel myself affirmed by him (Honneth 1995: 37f).

We have a particular and individual view of the other's personality. Thus, in the mode of recognition the other is recognized only in the particular mode, by this means, the other is not recognized in the way as the other recognizes her or his own self.

> The line of thought entailed by Hegel's argument here represents a significant step beyond the mere claim, found in theories of socialization,

> that the formation of the subject's identity is supposed to be necessarily tied to the experience of intersubjective recognition. This idea leads to the further conclusion that an individual that does not recognize its partner to interaction to be a certain type of person is also unable to experience itself completely or without restriction as that type of person. The implication of this for the relationship of recognition can only be that an obligation to reciprocity is, to a certain extent, built into such relations (Honneth 1995: 37).

The other is obligated, or forced, to divest her or his own self of being a subject, and to move into an objectivity in favor of being recognized. In this sense,

> Hegel thus faces the question of what these categorial tools must be like, if they are to make it possible to explain philosophically the development of an organization of society whose ethical cohesion would lie in a form of solidarity based on the recognition of the individual freedom of all citizens (Honneth 1995: 14).

Thus, individual freedom is realized in the concept of solidarity, since in such a dimension of recognition the equality of the other is recognized.

Nevertheless, we live in a culturally influenced life-world, therefore, within it objective values cannot exist, rather they are dependent on our subjective perception. According to Max Scheler's (1973a) value realism, Honneth (2004: 107) does not emanate from a cognitive perception of the life-world, but rather from a sensual perception, which includes the perception of values through a cultural background. Simultaneously, we deepen our awareness of the surrounding life-world better and better, not only in a perceiving sense, but also in our awareness of life-wordly values and norms. Since values and norms exist independently from their carriers, they can be attributed to other human beings and found everywhere. Obviously, every object and every entity conveys values, since they are furnished with symbolic character. Embedded in the cultural framework, values constitute a symbolic system of their own. In this way, they lead our perception and recognition in accordance with the cultural framework. In consequence, the more we feel ourselves as a part of a

particular life-world, the more we internalize this life-world's values and norms as our own; and with these values and norms, we claim to be recognized by others.

Such an interpretation of Scheler's value realism is considered as a moderate variant, which means "that different experiences, in a given subject or in different subjects, can have the same kinds of properties" (Engelsen 2011: 11). Values, therefore, can be related to and recognized in different things and entities at the same time. To reach this stage of recognition, we have to struggle for our own recognition.

The young Hegel in the years of his *Jenaer Realphilosophie* (1967) found this struggle for recognition at the stage of the law. Honneth (1995) goes one step further by introducing three theoretical stages of recognition derived from Hegel's *System of Ethical Life* (1979). "[T]he argumentation does suggest a distinction between three forms of recognition, differing from each other with regard to the 'how' as well as the 'what' of practical confirmation" (Honneth 1995: 25), since the theoretical structure of intersubjective recognition is not well elaborated. He finds these stages:

> in the affective relationship of recognition found in the family, human individuals are recognized as concrete creatures of need; in the cognitive-formal relationship of recognition found in law, they are recognized as abstract legal persons; and finally, in the emotionally enlightened relationship of recognition found in the State, they are recognized as concrete universals, that is, as subjects who are socialized in their particularity (Honneth 1995: 25).

In conclusion, Honneth (1995: 25f) formulates three dimensions of recognition in reference to the lifeworldly social field in which they are performed: 'love' in the family, 'law' in the civil society, and 'ethical life' in the state. In order to enhance the transparency of this model of mutual recognition consider table 1:

Mode of recognition	**Love**	**Law**	**Solidarity**
Personal Field	Family	Civil society	State
Personal Involvement	Emotionality	Cognitivity	Affect has become rational
Concept of Personhood	Individual	Person	Subject

Table 1: theoretical stages of recognition (according to Honneth 1995: 25).

Table 1 shows the three theoretical stages of recognition in reference to a particular field within the personal life-world, and the personal involvement according to this stage of recognition. Depending on the *personal field*, the *personal involvement* as affectivity is developed. Within the stage of love the field of family and friends is dominant. Whereas within the stages of law, the perception of the other is on a cognitive level, since, at this stage, the awareness of our own values is virulent. At the stage of the state, affectivity has become rational, and by this means, personal involvement as a personal concern, as is the case in the field of the family, becomes congruent with the concern of the state. Additionally,

Table 1 shows the *concept of personhood* to which each stage refers. At the stage of love, concrete individual needs are virulent, while the stage of law focuses on the autonomous acting human, at the stage of the state, regarded as solidarity, humans act as subjects, one equal to another, regardless of individual particularities. As to the relation of the self, it can be derived that self-confidence corresponds with love, self-respect corresponds with law, and self-esteem corresponds with solidarity (Honneth 1995: 129; Bedorf 2010: 48).

Our individual interaction with others, thus, is the beginning of the struggle for recognition. Therefore, I want to focus in particular on the individual relationship of love, since the stage of love encompasses the part of symbolic recognition as expression of an intimate, mutuality-based stage of recognition, with which the entire further investigation deals.

'Love' as the first mode of recognition links two humans by their love for each other. Here, Honneth takes as example the love between mother and infant. This particular love contains a strong emotional affection. For the infant, this relationship of love is the first experience of mutual recognition by receiving the full loving attention of the mother (Benjamin 1988: 25). Thus, already at an early age the infant is familiar with the process of being recognized and claiming for recognition. According to Honneth, this early stage of infant development already allows a struggle for emotional recognition. He points out that "human infants develop an active willingness to produce interpersonal proximity" (Honneth 1995: 97). By claiming recognition from each other, mother and child enter a symbiosis, even though they are not physically connected anymore, and, in this way, they come closer to each

other. On the one hand, the infant is obviously biologically dependent on the mother; on the other, the mother herself is not biologically dependent on the infant. On a psychological level, however, the mother struggles for her infant's recognition, *and vice versa*. Therefore, the infant claims for recognition by its mother, which establishes an unequal relationship. In the sense of Hegel, both mother and infant recognize each other as ontic other, whose act of recognition is directed to their existence as being. Thus, if the struggle for recognition proceeds successfully, they recognize each other as an autonomous and independent individual. Indeed, mother and infant permanently learn from each other that they are always one single self, and they have to recognize this fact to be able to be together.

It is obvious that not every struggle for recognition is successful; for instance, if the infant does not comply with the mother's claim, a negative circle of recognition arises. The structure of such a process of recognition proves itself to be difficult.

> The mother who jiggles, pokes, looms, and shouts 'look at me' to her unresponsive baby creates a negative cycle of recognition out of her own despair at not being recognized. Here in the earliest social interaction we see how the search for recognition can become a power struggle: how assertion becomes aggression (Benjamin 1988: 28).

To impose its will and to force the mother to recognize its will, the infant has to objectify its mother. Therefore, it has to negate her existence as a human being. However, by realizing that it cannot exist without mother, it has suddenly to affirm her existence as human being – it has to recognize that it is "dependent on the loving care of an independently existing person with claims of her own" (Honneth 1995: 101). The mother is in the same situation: to perform her role as mother she has to realize that her infant is independent. Otherwise, by negating the independence of the infant's own being, she would 'destroy' the infant's existence. Paradoxically, at the same time, she would also destroy her own existence as mother. Thus, mother and infant have to learn to trust each other, as each one is part of the other's life-world. They confirm their existence as far as they know that the other is there, even though the other addresses the own attention to something or somebody else (Honneth 1995: 99). By this means, both mother and infant become self-aware by the certainty of the

other's being. In sum, it can be finally said, according to Honneth (1995: 105), that love as dimension of recognition is not only an "intersubjective state so much as a communicative arc suspended between the experience of being able to be alone and the experience of being merged".

The second mode of recognition is the normative mode of law, which encloses 'scopes of autonomous subjects' (Berg et al. 2004: 47) as a legal relationship between human beings. The objective of this recognition relationship is the development of self-respect as a result of the ability to act autonomously. From this perspective, it is obvious that we recognize another's acting on an intersubjective level. To confirm that everyone knows the rules of interaction, a common normative pool is needed. Therefore, this stage of mutual recognition coins the recognition of law for all humans who participate in a normative community. In reference to Hegel, Honneth (1995: 112) emphasizes the recognition of "'freedom of the will of the person'". This freedom is ensured by normative rules of law, which enable scopes of action for independent acting.

However, each normative order is founded by a moral order which is rooted in traditions and cultural heritage. Every one of us is a legal entity which is equipped with the ability of moral judgment. That enables us as legal entities to act autonomically. Both orders, the moral as well as the normative, restrict the freedom of the normative community's members, but such a restriction is the only way to ensure a coexistence of all members of the normative community. Therefore, all members have to give up parts of their absolute freedom, to allow a peaceful living with each other. This withdrawal of absolute freedom is executed on the level of normative duties and on the level of social regard.

For Honneth (1995: 111), both the level of normative law and the level of axeological law lead to two different readings of "'respect'". Respect as a normative concept is bound to "a universally valid right" (Honneth 1995: 113), and encloses an essential respect for each other without any regard to these particular qualities. On the axeological level, respect as "'social regard'" is bound to values, "insofar it can be measured according to criteria of social relevance" (Honneth 1995: 111). This double-structure of respect on the stage of law allows of regarding respect as recognition of law, which enables the full recognition of the human as a part of a social community. Thus perceived, social community bases on common law. In addition, the concept of

respect as social regard allows of evaluating each other's qualities and character, our values consist of different qualities. Respect defined in this way, we receive recognition for our acting, and thus our self-respect rises. In conclusion, the stage of the recognition of law, allows to "recognize human beings as persons without having to esteem their achievements or their character" (Honneth 1995: 112).

Finally, and here we come to the third of Honneth's (1995: 207ff) *stages of mutual recognition*, recognition encloses expressive and contextual social practice by describing a particular concept of *solidarity at the level of the state*. Derived from the hypothesis that contextualized social practices are manifested in social regard, it has to be stated that social regard also needs an orientation frame in which "social 'worth' is measured by the degree to which [practices] they appear to be in a position to contribute to the realization of societal goals" (Honneth 1995: 122). Therefore, social regard is influenced by normativity and morality. But this makes relationships between "culturally typified members"[7] asymmetrical (Honneth 1995: 123). For that reason, Honneth (1995) avoids the term 'social regard', and prefers the term 'solidarity' to emphasize the equality of all humans (Honneth 1995: 127). The advantage of this account is that 'solidarity' still includes values like those defined within a social community. If all members of a social community believe in these values, the social community is suffesed with solidarity: the members of the community hold together, due to the role a member is playing within the social community, each member has a particular important value for the social community. Therefore, at the present time, and in the case of social regard, values are not parts of a collective identity; rather they are related to the individual human as an individual, but also as a fundamental and precious part of the social community (Honneth 1995: 129). Notably, this shift from 'social regard' to 'solidarity' sketches Honneth's efforts to conceptualize a sociality-founded concept of recognition, where the struggle is infinite in such an extent that everyone confirms and recognizes each other. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the group is still firm, since

[7] In the German original text, Honneth (1994: 206) writes of "lebensgeschichtlich individuierten Subjekten", which shifts the meaning to 'historical and cultural influence on a subject's personal and individual development'.

> [r]elationships of this sort can be said to be cases of 'solidarity', because they inspire not just passive tolerance but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the other person. For only to the degree to which I actively care about the development of the other's characteristics (which seem foreign to me) can our shared goals be realized (Honneth 1995: 129).

On the individual level, a human's self-esteem increases, since this human experiences her or his own value for the social community. According to Honneth, this concept of solidarity fits into the idea of a modern, individualized, and social system, in which social regard as a reciprocal form of recognition is based on individual "accomplishments and abilities" (Honneth 1995: 130); and which finally leads to individual self-realization.

Considering the table above, it shifted to the extended table 2 which describes the stages of recognition with all their characteristics:

Mode of Recognition	**Emotional Support**	**Cognitive Respect**	**Social Esteem**
Dimensions of Personality	Needs and emotions	Moral Responsibility	Treats and Abilities
Forms of Recognition	Primary Relationships (Love, Friendship)	Legal Relations (Rights)	Community of Value (Solidarity)
Developmental Potential	—	Generalization, De-formalization	Individualization, Equalization
Practical Relation-to-self	Basic Self-confidence	Self-respect	Self-esteem
Threatened Component of Personality	Physical Integrity	Social integrity	'Honor', Dignity

Table 2: the structure of relations of recognition (according to Honneth 1995: 129).

The reflexive supplements to the recognition concepts of 'love', 'law', and 'solidarity' are 'self-confidence', 'self-respect', and 'self-esteem', which highlight the personal reference to the self at every stage of recognition. This reference is essential to ensure personal relationships at every stage of mutual recognition. To be *mutually* recognized on a *mutual* level means to be recognized as individual human. Regarded from the perspective of the reflexivity of the self, it is obvious that each human wants to be recognized, since every aspect of recognition contains a self-reference. In this

respect, the attainment of self-affirmation is dependent on the valuation of the social community,

> since individuals must know that they are recognized for their particular abilities and traits in order to be capable of self-realization, they need a form of social esteem that they can only acquire on the basis of collectively shared goals (Honneth 1995: 177f).

However, shared goals are more than mere sharing of common interests. Hence, from this structure of shared goals, group recognition and group affiliations can be derived. That implies that every one of us has special group-related abilities and traits which are particularly appreciated. According to Honneth, the struggle for recognition arises, if certain abilities and traits are more recognized than other abilities and traits.

Nevertheless, in his recent research, Honneth (2007, 2008, 2012) dissociates himself from the assumption "that Hegel's Jena lectures (1967) contained coherent elements of a theory of recognition" (Honneth 2012: vi), and shifts to the standpoint that social reality is "a set of layered relations of recognition" (Honneth 2012: vii), which Honneth finds in the *Philosophy of Rights* (1952), where Hegel expresses

> much more strongly than in his early writings [...] the groundbreaking notion that social justice is to be defined in terms of the requirements of mutual recognition, and that we must take our point of departure in historically developed and already institutionalized relations of recognition (Honneth 2012: vii).

Therefore, Honneth shifts from a focus on the formal and normative subject of mutual recognition to an existential position, where perception precedes recognition (Honneth 2008: 80). This existential turn is also related to the critique of Honneth's early work, since not only recognized abilities and traits are important, but also the crucial point as from whom recognition is received. That includes particular forms of 'negative recognition' or 'lack of recognition' (Kemper 2004: 90). The hippie movement of the 1960's and 1970's, for instance, claimed for negative recognition as

rejection or 'misrecognition' (Bedorf 2010)[8]. Within such a concept of recognition the claim is: "recognize that we renounce your recognition!" (Kemper 2004: 90). That makes a revolt against existing norms or the concept of misjudging recognition by particular social groups a form of recognition. In the case of misjudging recognition, a social group does not recognize another social group in its particular values, but judges this particular other group according to its own values. Within this process, the values can be either recognized or misrecognized, anyhow they are recognized in a certain way. Considering the act of recognition on a mutual level *ex negativo,* every act of recognition is a form of misrecognition (Bedorf 2010). Since, as already explained at the beginning of this chapter, recognition of the entire self cannot be accomplished, the act of recognition can only be executed in reference to the context of recognition. "In consequence, the authentic identity can never be recognized, but only an incoherent identity in its lack of permanence and relation to the context" (Bedorf 2010: 144). In conclusion, the execution of the act of recognition is only possible by misjudging the authentic identity of the other (Bedorf 2010: 144).

In his actualization of Hegel's theory of the legal recognition, Honneth (1995: 86f) explains the motivation of the act of recognition from the standpoint of the legal subject which struggles for self-realization by developing abilities and traits, and from which it can derive "unique value[s] for the surrounding social world". However, this notion does not examine, whether the act of recognition is an act which leads to cognitive awareness, or it is an act which precedes cognitive awareness (Bedorf 2010: 63). The answer is related to the necessary sociality of recognition, and given by Honneth in his later work *The I in We* (2012). Is this critique understood as question, then we should formulate this question as follows: are recognized abilities and traits attributed to us, or do these recognized abilities and traits already exist within us and are they 'discovered'? To make the inherence of values in the human clear, Honneth (2012: 85) choose "a moderate value realism". In reference to Scheler (1973a, 1979), value realism or value objectivism means that values already exist in the life-world, and they can be perceived affectively and intuitively by feeling them. Such a relation to values demands a close relationship to the life-world: the life-world becomes the second nature of the human, since as "we observe and notice on the basis of our

[8] I refer here to the title of Bedorf's book "Verkennende Anerkennung", which is explained below. The title is translated by the author following Bedorf's suggestion (2014, private communication).

socialization" the life-worldy environment we live in, and "the normative level of our relations of recognition rises as well" (Honneth 2012: 83). Here, socialization seems to be used like a 'plug-in': since the human is born as a biological individual and as a cognitive and social 'tabula rasa', socialization happens afterwards through lifetime knowledge and experience. It appears as an attached ability. This thesis implies that we have to 'learn' sociality. In contrast, the hypothesis of this work is that we *are* already social beings from the moment we are born, just as the act of recognition is social. Honneth, however, ensures his learning thesis by only referring to the normative attribution of recognition. Thus, from his point of view, legal existence as well as normativity have to be learned. The grade of social recognition thus is directly dependent on adequate performance within norms and legal rights. Here, Honneth (2003: 186) consults the dimensions of 'individualization' and 'social inclusion':

> either new parts of the personality are opened up to mutual recognition, so that the extent of socially confirmed individuality rises; or more persons are included into existing recognition relations, so that the circle of subjects who recognize one another grows.

The more abilities and traits are recognized, the more we are socially recognized as individuals; in this way social inclusion rises. In other words, by recognizing the individuality of someone, particular personal values are appreciated. Therefore, this individual becomes part of the social community, and has to fulfill a particular role according to the appreciated values. This perspective on the act of recognition shows that recognition is not an exclusive act; rather it is an act of everyday performance. Nearly every act can be interpreted as an act of recognition of particular values: whether because, the whole act itself is appreciated or particular aspects of this act receive our recognition. A value realism, however, in relation to the dimensions of individualization, self-confirmation, and social inclusion harbors the danger of reification (Fraser 2010: 213). In performing countless acts of recognition in our everyday life, we might forget that our act of recognition is always a reaction to a preceding act of recognition – or understood in a negative sense: "we lose our attentiveness to the fact that this cognition owes its existence to an antecedent act of recognition" (Honneth 2008: 59). Within the process of social appreciation, we, our

recognized identities, as well as group affiliations are treated like objects, which are attached to values. What is meant here, is the simple perception of another human "as a thing, instituted by the objectivizing stance of others, the world or the self" (Le Goff 2012: 80). In this context, recognition should be understood as "antecedent self-affirmation" by

> gaining access to our own feelings and intentions. To know what it means to have desires, feelings, and intentions at all, we must already have experienced these mental states as a part of our selves that is worthy of affirmation and should be made known to our partners in interaction (Honneth 2008: 74).

It is exactly this state of losing the awareness or of the denial of antecedent recognition that Honneth (2008: 56ff) calls reification: "[w]e would then even experience our own desires and feelings as thing-like objects capable of being passively observed or actively engendered" (Honneth 2008: 74). Here, the context lies in the social structure, which creates communicative situations. In addition, these situations are structured by "institutionalized practices that are functionally tailored to the presentation of our own selves" (Honneth 2008: 82). Such structures invite to forget our self-affirmation and to expose us in self-reification. As a social phenomenon, recognition creates a contradiction within ourselves: we claim for being recognized within the social dimension, but at the same time we grasp at self-realization. This contradiction results in a social and individual antagonism between our sociality and our self-preservation. Honneth (2008: 152) attempts to solve this problem by claiming

> elementary recognition […] [to] feel existential sympathy for the other, before we can learn to orient ourselves toward norms of recognition that compel us to express certain specific forms of concern or benevolence.

Elementary recognition thus becomes "affective participation" in the tradition of Lukács (Le Goff 2012: 80). It precedes a rational act of recognition, since it is a sympathetically directedness to another. In this context, however, Honneth does not

explain how the primary experience of recognition as antecedent recognition is made (Ohlström et al. 2011: 208): is the subject recognized through the other, or is the other recognized through the subject (Bedorf 2010: 70)? This question is related to the status and the development of the self which still stand in the background, since Honneth's elaborations remain on the level of the subject. Here, Honneth accomplishes an 'existential turn' (Bedorf 2010: 67). He now postulates that "it is possible to justify the hypothesis that a recognitional stance enjoys a genetic and categorical priority over all other attitudes toward the self and the world" (Honneth 2008: 36). Considering Honneth's existential transformation based on value realism, we are able to execute "emotional attachment to a 'concrete other'" (Honneth 2008: 45). In this way, a world is disclosed in which we have to be involved practically (Honneth 2008: 45). Within this perspective, the act of recognition is a primary ontogenetic human quality. In addition to considering the life-world as second nature (Honneth 2012: 82), which ensures our relationship to the world, the act of recognition possesses a phenomenological relation (Bedorf 2010: 67).

1.2 Recognition as a Gift

For Ricœur, recognition is not only understood in a political or social sense, rather it causes a fascination for him due to its polysemy and "its many overlapping uses" (Reagan 2013: 30). Besides its political and social meaning, it also refers to recognize something as this 'particular something'; there is the recognition of particular personal and general rights, as well as the recognition of our self and another's action. Therefore Ricœur (2005) does not follow Honneth, rather he even contradicts him by introducing a state of peace within the concept of mutual recognition, since the "struggle for recognition […] has most contributed to popularizing the theme of recognition, at the risk of turning it into something banal" (Ricœur 2005: 212). In doing so, Ricœur uses a hermeneutical and phenomenological method to investigate the act of recognition. Aiming to bypass the Hegelian struggle for recognition he introduces *agape* as key concept. As the ancient Greek word for love, later adopted by Christianity, *agape* has become synonymouse for God's spontaneous and unmotivated love (Nygren 1954: 45). For that reason, he does not found his concept of recognition

on a basis of struggle, but rather on a peaceful giving of a gift, which accomplishes a state of peace between the participants of the mutual act of symbolic recognition. The concept of 'struggle' is limited in its notion, since 'struggle' involves striving for power and domination.

> At the very least, the experiences of actual recognition in the exchange of gifts, principally in their festive aspect, confer on this struggle for recognition the assurance that the motivation which distinguishes it from the lust for power and shelters it from the fascination of violence is neither illusory nor vain (Ricœur 2005: 246).

'Struggle', therefore, means nothing more than 'mutual respect'. Within the debate of recognition, this notion of struggle first emerged with Ricœur's elaborations (Kämpf 2012: 141).

For Ricœur, recognition has a multi-faceted meaning. He initiates his approach "with the semantic status of the very term *recognition* on the plane of philosophical discourse" (Ricœur 2005: ix). Additionally, the semantic meaning of recognition comprises 'knowing' as well as 'gratitude' derived from the French 'reconnaissance'. According to Ricœur (2005), the recognition can be understood as 'recognition as identification', 'recognizing oneself', and 'mutual recognition' as gratitude, which refers to "i) identity, ii) alterity and iii) dialectic of recognition and misrecognition" (Laitinen 2011: 37). All these of Ricœur's differentiations of recognition are closely linked. Recognition understood as epistemic identification captures the relationship to the world, whereas self-recognition captures self-reference, and mutual recognition concentrates on the relationship of the other (Bedorf 2010: 127). Recognition of the self and the act of mutual recognition are both acts of identification. Considered from the perspective of narrativity, the acting self as a part of the acting human has to be identified as the same human in every moment of this human's lifetime. Therefore, identification is related to the recognition of the self, since both parts of this relation include the hermeneutical act of personal reflection. Thus, 'the course of recognition' is a journey which begins at

> the promotion of recognition-identification, then over the transition from this identification of something in general to the recognition of those entities […], then from self-recognition to mutual recognition, and finally to the ultimate equating of recognition and gratitude, which French is one of the few languages to honor (Ricœur 2005: x).

By examining *recognition as identification*, Ricœur paraphrases the famous saying of Diès (1932: 9f; Ricœur 2005: 27): "What posits itself opposes itself insofar as it distinguishes itself, and nothing is itself without being other than everything else". Thus, Ricœur considers identification as "'relative to itself'" and "'relative to something other than itself'" (Ricœur 2005: 26). Here, 'relative to itself' and 'relative to something other than itself' means that identification always needs a 'feeling of distinction' to be able to recognize the 'identification with something'. The distinction has to be made "between *external* identifications and *self*-identifications. External identifications are made by other persons (A and B are different), self-identifications by the person herself (A and B are the same)" (Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2007: 35).

To illustrate the process of identification, Ricœur (2005: 27ff) relies on two philosophies of judgment, the approaches of Descartes and Kant. Whereas Descartes represents a notion of identification, which "goes hand in hand with distinguishing" (Ricœur 2005: 28) by recognizing something in its uniqueness, Kant actualizes the approach to identification by interpreting the term as "*connecting together*" (Ricœur 2005: 28). Therefore, the notion of identification is understood as synthesis. Since once something is identified, one looks for commonalities which finally are summarized under one term. In both cases, something *is* identified *as* something.

Recognition of the self involves the act of self-recognizing. This part of Ricœur's approach deals with the relation of our selfhood as narration, acting as agency, and our ability to recount a story. The dogma of the recognition of the self thus says: *to be able to recount a story is to be able to act, and vice versa*. By implication, this means if we are able to recount our acting, our experiences and lifetime events, then we recognize our self in our own existence: 'it is me, who acts! It is me, who did it!'. Thus, our identity in our acts is recognized. In consequence, we are placed in our own responsibility (Ricœur 2005: 106ff). Responsibility as an excellent human characteristic is founded on character (Ricœur 2005: 131f). The concept of character

is borrowed from Aristotle whose concept of character elaborated in *Nicomachean Ethics* (2009) involves *good conduct,* which implies an ethic dimension, which means if we have a good character, we act in an educated and sophisticated way by virtue and wisdom (Ricœur 2005: 82). Considering our ability to act which is emphasized by our own character, this relation of character and wisdom means: *if* we execute an act, *then* we are convinced of the necessity and the right placement of this particular act. Thus, we are convinced of our own good character as well as of the goodness of our acting. Furthermore, character is "the set of distinctive marks which permit the re-identification of a human individual as being the same" (Ricœur 1992: 119). By implication, character represents continuity within our existence, but our individual character is also the quality that enables us to be our self. Thus, character makes us unique. It is nearly impossible to assume that there exist two individuals with the same character, because they do not have the same biography and did not make exactly the same experiences. This point is crucial within the development of self-recognition, since

> habit gives a history to character, but this is a history in which sedimentation tends to cover over the innovation which preceded it, even to the point of abolishing the latter (Ricœur 1992: 121).

Thus, referring to Aristotle's *Poetics* (1999: 6.1450a15–1) Ricœur (1992: 152) states: "Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions – what we do – that we are happy or the reverse". In consequence, character depends on our actions and whether we agree with the character, since character is also the totality of distinctive characterizations in opposition to another's actions (Ricœur 1992: fn. 5). Thus, in a first notion, character ensures our awareness of the own identity's permanence (Ricœur 1992: 119); and in a second notion, character enables self-chosen loyalty, "and makes it turn toward fidelity, hence toward maintaining the self" (Ricœur 1992: 121). Thus, "the character holds himself responsible for an action that he does not dissociate from himself" (Ricœur 2005: 71). Therefore, responsibility is recognized. For Ricœur (2005: 110), above all, this recognized responsibility is proved in a promise, since to keep a promise means to take on responsibility for this promise.

Through promising the own identity manifests itself in the permanence of time, since a promise is made to another to be redeemed in a future situation.

The responsibility of acting and the ability to promise generate a bridge to *mutual recognition*. This third part of Ricœur's investigation of mutual recognition (2005: 150ff), which is its main part, is the elaboration of mutual recognition considered as gratitude. To achieve this, Ricœur (2005: 171ff) begins his investigation with Hegel's notion of mutual recognition as a permanent social struggle. He argues, however, for mutual recognition as a state of peace:

> [t]he alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition is to be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, based on symbolic mediations as exempt from the juridical as from the commercial order of exchange. The exceptional character of these experiences, far from disqualifying them, underscores their importance, and precisely in this way ensures their power to reach and affect the very heart of transactions stamped with the seal of struggle (Ricœur 2005: 219).

According to Ricœur (2005: 218), the struggle for mutual recognition complies directly with the claim for justice within the acts of giving, taking, and responding. According to Marcel Mauss's investigations on gift exchange in archaic societies (1967), Ricœur wants to bypass the struggle for recognition by following the paradigm of *agape* as a state of peace. Thus, *agape*

> seems to refute in advance the idea of mutual recognition, inasmuch as the generous practice of gift giving, at least in its 'pure' form, neither requires nor expects a gift in return (Ricœur 2005: 219).

Initially, the Ancient-Greek word *agape* means simply 'love'. Since Christianity has claimed *agape*, nowadays, however, the term is understood as loving gift of God.

By claiming mutual recognition on a phenomenological-existential level, Ricœur does not situate *agape* in God, but in the human being, since it is we who show generosity to the other by voluntarily giving recognition. In doing so, the other is recognized as independent self. Since *agape* does not oblige the other to return a gift,

agape complies with an inner constitution which recognizes the other's equivalence in her or his difference. There does not exist a force or a struggle to return the gift, or to be placed in a situation of dependence. The gift of recognition is only visible, if both participants confirm each other within this act of mutual recognition (Kämpf 2012: 138).

Such a perspective makes *agape* an attitude of frugality out of itself within the acts of mutual recognition as is "to give, to receive, to give in return" (Ricœur 2005: 225). This meaning of recognition can be understood as 'selfless giving'. Thus, Ricoeur's reflections encompass considerations about the act of recognition as a state of peace beyond struggling and fighting for recognition (Kämpf 2012: 137). Regarded as a state of peace, the act of recognition does not focus on a self-affirmative struggle for recognition, since this is 'selfish'; rather it focuses on the experience of the other. Ricœur's concept of mutual recognition (2005: 229) is founded on our own generosity. As a result, mutual recognition becomes a *vis-à-vis* relationship which is based on inner balance and generosity, and thus allows the other to be self-standing.

In Ricœur's eyes, this notion of *agape* should be the basis for symbolic mutual recognition. In doing so, Ricœur exempts recognition from the dimensions of law and general society, and concentrates on the phenomenology of recognition by investigating the symbolic act of recognition between giver and recipient. By choosing this approach, Ricœur moves to the edge of Lévinas' philosophy. Through Ricœur dissociates himself from Lévinas' approach on ethic and ontology in *Totality and Infinity* (1969), while preferring Lévinas' elaborations on ethics and justice in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* (1981), it cannot be denied that, in the context of mutual recognition, the concept of *agape* has an obvious proximity to Lévinas' concept of recognition of the other. Based on Ricœur's (2005: 157) thesis that "life together" is understood, on a phenomenological level, as mutuality, the other cannot be perceived in her or his totality; only in infinity, since the other evades. By this means, the perceiving 'I' is captured in its own necessary subjective total perception. It cannot shift to the subjective perception of the other, since this other's perception is also subjective. Thus, this approach indicates that we cannot recognize the other in an entire manner; we cannot totally grasp and see through the other. For Lévinas (1969), this situation of 'I' and the other leads to the conclusion that the other is infinity. Nevertheless, due to the pursuit of *eros* we are permanently in the situation

to grasp at infinity. In the other's face, however, we recognize our own self, but only as a part of the other. The other's otherness stays infinite, as we realize our own totality. In conclusion, the other stays the other as infinity; there is no chance to take the other into us, as the other would lose her or his own identity (Lévinas 1969: 39). The experience of the infinity or transcendence of the other is our "exteriority" (Lévinas 1969: 24). Thus, we realize that we are caught in our own totality, and "rediscover[s] war in the tyrannical oppression it undergoes from the totality" (Lévinas 1969: 47). Consequently, by realizing this captivity we move to war.

> The force of the Other is already and henceforth moral. Freedom, be it that of war, can be manifested only outside totality, but this 'outside totality' opens with the transcendence of the face. To think of freedom as *within* totality is to reduce freedom to the status of an indetermination in being, and forthwith to integrate it into a totality by closing the totality over the 'holes' of indetermination – and seeking with psychology the laws of a free being! (Lévinas 1969: 225).

Since "[b]eing is exteriority, and exteriority is produced in its truth in a subjective field, for the separated being" (Lévinas 1969: 299), the other is perceived as same but still another. Our openness enables freedom, from which we learn to be for another as seen in the other's face. We recognize ourselves within the being of the other. Our so-perceived freedom is regulated by responsibility for the other (Schaufelberger 2008: 73).

> I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the response – acuteness of the present – engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final reality. This extreme attention does not actualize what was in potency, for it is not conceivable without the other (Lévinas 1969: 178).

The other "speaks" (Lévinas 1969: 66). In speaking, the other claims attention. The other's face makes us attentive to the other. Thus, speaking is transitive by transmitting the face's will to us (Schaufelberger 2008: 47). In the free openness for

the other, we learn responsibility. As we are, in the first instance,directed at ourselves, by opening ourselves for the other, we are going to forget ourselves (Schaufelberger 2008: 69f).

That concept can be applied to Ricœur's approach to *agape* as state of peace within the act of mutual recognition. Through responsibility, we are bonded to the other. This bond based on mutuality creates equality. "It is in the ethical mode of interpellation that the ego is called to responsibility by the other's voice" (Ricœur 2005: 262). Even Lévinas, however, could not solve the problem of *agape*'s generosity and personal related action motivation. As a mode of love, *agape* must involve characteristics "like affection, […] *personal* care and involvement (not mere commitment to procedural impartiality), and yet, like abstract rules and unlike contingent emotions, it must be able to be extended universally" (Davenport 1998: 345). Although their motivation to find in *agape* a generous way of mutual recognition might be the same, Ricœur and Lévinas differ in their method. "Ricœur interprets agape as a universalizing attitude toward concrete others, while Lévinas makes it into a concrete and singular relation with a generalized Otherness" (Davenport 1998: 345). This dichotomy between generosity without evaluation and particularity due to personal relationships remains in both approaches. Therefore, Ricœur seeks the solution within the state of peace, *agape* also offers. In consequence, Ricœur's main purpose is to show an opportunity to execute recognition without moral obligation, for example, a moral dogma of struggling for justice.

In consequence, the solution, which Ricœur offers, is the concept of gift exchange as chance of symbolic recognition. Following Mauss (1967), Ricœur (2005: 225ff) takes the gift exchange in archaic societies as an example of the paradox of mutual symbolic recognition. Mauss' investigations focus on gift exchange as socially institutionalized phenomenon. Though, from this point of view, gift exchange seems to have an obligatory character, it is not related to external constraints. Mauss (1967: 2) is able to conclude

> that the same morality and economy are at work, albeit less noticeably, in our own societies, and we believe that in them we have discovered one of the bases of social life and thus we may draw conclusions of a moral nature about some of the problems confronting us in our present economic crisis.

A special focus deserves the gift exchange of the Maori who maintain a structure of mutual recognition within the transcendence of *hau*. Within the *hau* a system of gift exchange is established which penetrates all dimensions of human society. It creates a bond between the members of a group.

> But for the moment it is clear that in Maori custom this bond created by things is in fact a bond between persons, since the thing itself is a person or pertains to a person. Hence it follows that to give something is to give a part of oneself (Mauss 1967: 10).

Thus, the gift exchange refers to all individual members of a society as particular members of this particular society. Within the *hau,* the act of recognition in its three instances of giving, receiving, and giving in return becomes a ritual. Therewith, the execution of the gift exchange shifts into a transcendental dimension. The *hau* becomes a transcendental power which regulates the gift exchange. Formulated in pragmatic terms, it means that the rules of the gift exchange are concealed behind the notion of *hau*. On this transcendental meta-level, it is no longer sufficient to follow an obligation, but to complete the ritual of the gift exchange. In correspondence with the animated world view of the Maori, the exchanged gifts themselves are animated by having their own names and history (Mauss 1966: 225f).

Here, Ricœur (2005: 262) has to face the problem of symmetry and asymmetry within the act of mutual recognition. His main issue is the asymmetry between the giver of recognition and the recipient of recognition. Through the concept of *agape,* both giver and recipient should give recognition out of their own generosity, but through the gift of the giver the recipient arrives in the situation of reaction. However, such a situation can be misinterpreted as justice, which leads to the notion of recognition as obligatory compensation. That is what Ricœur naturally wants to avoid. Nevertheless, at first sight, in the act of giving the generosity of *agape* and justice seem to be similar. Both *agape* and justice execute this act of giving. The difference, however, lies on the normative level. Justice is subjected to rules; therefore, justice is executed by calculation. Within the modern interpretation of justice, resonates a moral awareness, as it is used in the Kantian categorical imperative. But consider: a human who lives in her or his performance of recognition

in accordance with *agape* does not have an explanation at the point where justice uses a calculation. This situation makes this human unreliable. It seems as if this human who follows the concept of *agape* lacks seriousness, since this act is performed without specific expectations and specific means. To put it down to the point: in the West necessary action motivation and specific intentionality are in the way of *agape*. In addition, deontic ethics conforms to rules and norms, thus, justice is integrated into deontic ethics, which excludes categorically generosity acting. Furthermore, the *hau* incorporates a transcendental ritual far from Western society's understanding, and which cannot easily be followed. To meet this challenge, Ricœur (2005: 243) offers the following solution: neither justice nor the unbounded and spontaneous generosity of *agape* want to fit in with the transcendence of the *hau*. Considering the French notion of *reconnaissance* as gratitude, Ricœur (2005: 243) tends to create a 'back door' for the meta level of gift exchange by introducing the concept of gratitude towards the giver. However, such a concept of gratitude includes an appeal for giving in return. Such an appeal can also be interpreted as demand or claim, but also as order. Considering giving in return as demand or claim, a voluntary giving is excluded. This kind of relationship between giver and recipient underlines the asymmetry between giver and recipient.

In conclusion, the generosity of *agape* is given with the act of the giver, but the receiver experiences an obligation – an appeal – to give in return, which meets with the response as gift. Furthermore, an approach that consists of the inherence of *agape*'s generosity within the human is speculative and ideal, because *agape* cannot come over us as divine knowledge. If every one of us has *agape*, it has to be positioned inside our self-being. *Agape* has to be an intrinsic part of the concept of recognition. Thus, it reaches a psychological depth level in our self. In our modern agetimes, due to the rules of justice there is no space for an attitude of *agape* with its voluntary and spontaneous generosity. The modern interpretation of mutual and symbolic recognition, including the three instances of giving, receiving and replying, is founded on an abstract form of justice by following countless rules and norms. Ricœur's (2005: 227) idealistic conclusion, after all, is that "agape has then to be held in reserve for that moment when the phenomenology of mutuality will claim its rights in the face of a logic of reciprocity". On an analytical level, a mere phenomenological investigation on mutual recognition is not sufficient, and with the integration of the concept of

agape, the risk goes along to arrive immediatly at an ideal religious mantra. The question that remains for further investigations is how personal and individual motivation of mutual pacifist recognition has to be constituted. Ricœur could not solve the problems that arise by linking *agape* with a concept of recognition, since, at this point, normative and reciprocal recognition have to be linked to Ricœur's approach to mutual recognition.

> The experience of the gift, apart from its symbolic, indirect, rare, even exceptional character, is inseparable from its burden of potential conflicts, tied to the creative tension between generosity and obligation. These are the paradoxes and aporias arising from the analysis of the gift as an ideal type, which the experience of the gift carries in its pairing with the struggle for recognition (Ricœur 2005: 245f).

An approach which is based solely on the generosity of *agape within* the human is speculative and idealistic. Hence, *agape* has to be introduced into the state of recognition of the self to establish recognition on a depth psychological level. Thus, Ricœur misses the step of the phenomenological recognition of the own personal acting in the world. The identification with the own acting on a phenomenological and hermeneutical level is an initial condition for the recognition of the self. To illustrate this, Greisch (2009: 149) offers an example to the phenomenology of recognition of the other: there is an old college friend whom we have not seen for years. Maybe, we remember the face of the college friend; she seems to be familiar. However, it might be hard to remember her name or the context her face has a relation to. This example shows very well, on how many phenomenological and hermeneutical dimensions the act of recognition can be performed. Even the act of recognition does not have to be executed at every stage of perception and knowledge. A mere diffuse remembrance is sufficient to have a flavor of recognition, which on an ideological level seems like a fully performed act of recognition.

Since Ricœur's structure of approach to recognition is very systematic and relational, it could be concluded that his approach would outline the founding relationship between self-recognition and mutual recognition. One has to consider that Ricœur's approach, "takes seriously the fact that the semantic field of

'recognition' is broader than 'intersubjectivity'" (Laitinen 2011: 47). But unfortunately, Ricœur's investigation remains on a lexical level, from whence it expands the concept of recognition (Bedorf 2010: 127). Although Ricœur's attempt is to honor, his approach demonstrates a lack of connection between recognition and perception, since the relationship between narrativity and responsibility of the self's acting and mutual recognition is not clear (Bedorf 2010: 129f). The novelty of Ricœur's perception of recognition is that recognition is not an effort of the giver (of recognition); rather the act of recognition is performed in dependence of the perception of the other. That makes recognition a gift that can only be perceived if both the giver and the recipient (of recognition) mutually witness the act (Kämpf 2012: 138).

1.3 Consequences for a Self-Based Concept of Mutual Recognition

Both approaches, the struggle for recognition and recognition regarded as gift, lack in the inherent structure of recognition by ignoring the role of the self within the process of recognition. By approaching recognition from the subject, current approaches on mutual recognition alienate the act of recognition from our original being. The tradition Honneth and others are following alienates recognition by bounding recognition within the dimension of law and normativity. Ricœur, however, tried to solve the problem of alienation by introducing a transcendental dimension into the act of mutual recognition, but the problem of alienation persists.

Considering recognition from the view of the giver, recognition is always connected to a particular power. The term 'power' "invokes politics, history, ideology, domination, resistance, appropriation, struggle, conflict, accommodation, subversion, and contestation" (Conquergood 1989: 84). However, these characteristics of power have not to be interpreted as negative ones. Our everyday performance seems to be built on these characteristics of power. Since performance understood as any kind of human behavior (Turner 1988) "is a site of struggle where competing interests intersect, and different viewpoints and voices get articulated" (Conquergood 1989:

84). Our self as the acting reflection of our being within the life-world can be exposed as the center of the act of recognition.

To overcome the problems of power and asymmetry, Butler (1997, 2005) assumes a non-autonomous subject which is commited to a permanent reproduction of discursive praxis.

> The Foucaultian postulation of subjection as the simultaneous subordination and forming of the subject assumes a specific psychoanalytic valence when we consider that no subject emerges without a passionate attachment to those on whom he or she is fundamentally dependent (even if that passion is 'negative' in the psychoanalytic sense) (Butler 1997: 7).

In consequence, a general virtue cannot exist; and the subject has to struggle with diverse orders of rationality, and, therefore, normative perceptions.

Kämpf (2012: 135) argues in reference to Butler that the act of recognition highlights the other's uniqueness. This uniqueness is confirmed by recognizing another's uniqueness. Such a process can only be performed within social interaction. This means nothing else that the Western subject is normatively and morally bound. By implication, the subject is not sovereign; rather it is socially bounded in responsibility to the other. Butler (2005: 35) argues this relation of the subject by explaining that the temporal structure of our life does not conform to the temporal structure of norms. However, norms influence our life; therefore they continually lead to interruptions of our life. Contemplated in this light, Butler's hypothesis has to be seen in the tradition of Lévinas' infinity of the other (1969) which becomes visible through the other's uniqueness.

> The uniqueness of the other is exposed to me, but mine is also exposed to her. This does not mean we are the same, but only that we are bound to one another by what differentiates us, namely, our singularity (Butler 2005: 34).

Thus, recognition is not based on equality, but rather on inequality understood as recognized alterity and uniqueness. By standing face-to-face to each other, we recognize our being within the other's alterity, since the other seems to be similar to our self, but at the same time the other is unique and different from our self. The other stays in her or his own alterity which makes her or him unique. In this perception of recognition judging and evaluating are excluded, in favor of respect for the other's opacity (Kämpf 2012: 139f). Since the face of the other seizes our self in responsibility to act, the emerging responsibility of recognition of the other precedes acting.

> I am *not* primarily responsible by virtue of my actions, but by virtue of the relation to the Other that is established at the level of my primary and irreversible susceptibility, my passivity prior to any possibility of action or choice (Butler 2005: 88).

This is the basis of a true recognizing relationship. Butler (2005: 41) suggests to "consider a certain post-Hegelian reading of the scene of recognition in which precisely my own opacity to myself occasions my capacity to confer a certain kind of recognition on others". Butler picks up Lévinas' approach to the appeal of the other and the own response to the other, and elaborates a narrative structure of responsibility. "*The means by which subject constitution occurs is not the same as the narrative form the reconstruction of that constitution attempts to provide*" (Butler 2005: 69). The narrative form of the relationship to the other is a voluntary cherishing of the other. It is the look into the other's face, listening to the other's story and responding to the other. This developing 'dialogue' is a narrative, which creates an intimate and open relationship. A relationship based on normative and moral rules, conceived as the classical subject-structure, could not provide such a thick connection. By implication, in the appearance of the other's face, in the other's infinity, the social role as well as the other's way of being cannot be seized. The subject stays within the struggle for its self-being, the other appears as helper to confirm its self, but also as menace for this self-confirmation. Thus, the narrative structure which comes into being through the intimate dialogue between this recognizing 'I' and the other does not include a consistence, rather it is permanently interrupted due to the presence and the address of the other (Butler 2005: 63).

The relationship of the recognizing 'I' and the other is not only based on communicative language, but also on bodily sensation as well as on non-verbal communication.

> In the moment in which I say 'I,' I am not only citing the pronomial place of the 'I' in language, but at once attesting to and taking distance from a primary impingement, a primary way in which I am, prior to acquiring an 'I', a being who has been touched, moved, fed, changed, put to sleep, established as the subject, and object of speech. My infantile body has not only been touched, moved, and arranged, but those impingements operated as 'tactile signs' that registered in my formation. These signs communicate to me in ways that are not reducible to vocalization (Butler 2005: 69f).

By this means, the perception of the surroundings happens before this perception comes to mind. In other words, the unconscious perception of the surroundings precedes any form of mutual recognition. The sense of recognition and the feeling of being part of the surroundings precede any normative and moral form of recognition. Therefore Lévinas

> speaks of a passivity prior to passivity, and there he means to indicate the difference between a subject who undergoes passivity, who relates to that passivity through a certain act of reflexivity, and a passivity that is prior to the subject, the condition of its own subjectivation, its primary impressionability (Butler 2005: 77).

It seems to be true that the subject is prepared to experience the expression of the surroundings by its 'primary impressionability'. However, it is the philosophical distinction of the subject as opposed to the object, which fosters the alienation of recognition. Although Butler's approach in reference to Lévinas and the concept of narrativity seems to be very fruitful to elaborate a concept of recognition whose advantage is its inherence within us as constitutional subjects, it remains within the subject-object-structure. Thus, the focus shifts from a general level of group

recognition to a level where the ideological act of recognition is focused. This step draws nearer to the role of the self within the act of recognition, but such an approach still cannot grasp the point of the self within this act of recognition. By putting the self in the center of an approach of recognition, personal identity is nothing already existing nor is it anything that is preserved, or can be secured for the future (Bedorf 2010: 102); rather it is a process and the permanent and floating result of social action.

Despite his critique on the previously introduced approaches to recognition, even Bedorf (2010: 103f) claims the perception of 'identity as a whole'. In contrast, there also exist perceptions of identity as 'divided', 'broken' or 'split'. But even these fragmentary identity structures refer to a person, whose identity presents itself as a whole, at least on a biological level. At this point, the question arises, how such a perception of identity is able to secure the personal unity of our identity. Thus, the notion of self becomes virulent. A phenomenological, fully self-conscious view of the human enables an integration of conscious and unconscious reflexivity, which is able to substitute the classical subjective perception (Zahavi 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi 2012). Nevertheless, a reflexive personal identity perceived as self-based remains the individual identity of an acting human. Considering the context of a self-based model of identity and recognition and recognition as dynamic process, identity becomes not the basis of recognition, rather recognition constitutes identity (Bedorf 2010: 104f). Thus, in conclusion, it can be asked if "perhaps any feedback from others which is relevant for one's relations-to-self in the readily intelligible way will count as recognition" (Laitinen 2010: 321).

Butler's approach shows that there is a stage of considering recognition not as monolithic concept, but rather as social dynamic, which can be various in its existential expressions (Allen 2006).

Considering the previously introduced approaches and especially taking into account Ricœur's approach, the new move in my account is to put the self, with all its phenomenological and hermeneutical abilities, in the center of the analysis of the act of mutual recognition. Regarded from this point of view, Ricœur's first step, the identification of others as other entities in their own existence within the life-world is still plausible. In reference to Ricœur's second step, the identification of others as equivalent to ourselves without the recognition of our self is impossible, since the

identification of the other on an equivalent level means to recognize the other as a equal to ourselves. If the recognition of our own self is not occuring, others cannot be recognized, not as selves, and further not in their achievements and efforts by evaluating them. Nietzsche (2007: 20) called this feeling of grudging 'resentment'. The feeling of resentment is experienced, if we are in a powerlessness of action. This means that having suffered shame cannot be solved immediately or at any other moment. Through resentment, we re-experience repeatedly a humiliating situation. Therewith, the feeling of resentment contiguous to feelings of inferiority and envy. Such a feeling does not allow to recognize the equivalence of others, it enables only the underlining of our own inferiority and the (false) awareness of never reaching the other selves.

Considering all these approaches to recognition, whether refused or not, they have one thing in common: they all refer to a subject of recognition. Despite this fact, Honneth (1995) follows Hegel and his way of self-realization, and other authors in his wake (like Butler 2005 and Ricœur 2005 exemplarily discussed here), they all end up in the Western subject problematic of mutual or intersubjective recognition. In the following work, I will show a way of recognition taking up selfhood which does not set the act of recognition 'outside' the human in an external social milieu, but rather sets the act of recognition *within* the human. This concrete aspect of the personal and intimate self within the act recognition is not available on the normative and moral level to which Honneth (1995, 2007, 2008, 2012), Butler (2005), and Ricœur (2005), refer.

Roughly, I follow Laitinen's (2010: 337) definition of recognition which I modify at specified positions:

> *[r]ecognizing* is a matter of (more or less adequate) responsiveness to the other as a possessor of normatively and evaluatively significant features, that is, responsiveness to the other which is sensitive to the other's normative standing.

Within this ambit recognition is necessarily related to another, might it be an ontic or ontological other. Since we are social beings, we always move between another's actions and expectations. When necessary processes of mutual recognition of the self

and personhood have been encompassed the evaluative level emerges. Only after recognizing our own self, our own social role, and the social structure we are moving through, can we recognize norms and values, and appreciate these in another.

1.4 Summary

The thinking on freedom and autonomy is very strong in Hegel's elaboration of mutual recognition. In his actualization, Honneth tries to recover this thought from idealism for our modern age. But such an approach misses the fundamental social being of the human. Even Ricœur's approach which aims at the generosity of *agape* misses the human inherence of sociality, since *agape* stands for transcendence.

As Butler shows, a way has to be gone which forces the subject to give up some autonomous attributes to find its sociality. Even Butler's way is not sufficient: if sociality is a fundamental and inherent human quality, we do not have to give up another quality to be social. But, let me ask in other words, *do we feel that we have lost something when we are social?*

2. Anthropological Approach to Personhood and Motivation

For a long time personhood was thought to be a Western construct and therefore a Western singularity. Nowadays, it may be argued, notions and concepts of the person and personhood are not universal. With a rethinking of personhood and a broader look at other societies over recent decades, it has been shown that a concept of the person and personhood also exists in non-Western societies. These developments give a broader access to already existing concepts of personhood, and enable a more pragmatic access to the notion of the person. Therefore, let me begin this approach to personhood and motivation with some central questions and reflections about the essence of the term 'person' and its motivations:

> [w]hat actually defines a person? Does he/she have an inner life? What are the relationships with others like? How are these constituted in the perspective of the personal self? Is a person able to grasp feelings and thoughts of others, is the person I am facing therefore 'transparent'? Or would this violate the person's privacy? (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 233).

These very pragmatic anthropological questions about the meaning of being a person are closely related to the question of what does it mean to be human. Such an approach regards a very practical-oriented notion of the person, which, although it is a scientific theoretical concept, is not lost in theory by setting the focus on human behavior in everyday life.

According to Grace Harris (1989) and Brian Morris (1994) the term ‚person' as a philosophical concept has various aspects, definitions, and, of course, it is strongly related to the terms 'individual', 'self' and 'I'. Whereas Harris makes a strict distinction between these terms, Morris highlights the term 'person' as a foundation of identity, which covers all notions and derivations of personhood.

In her essay *Conceptions of Individual, Self, and Person in Descriptions and Analysis* (1989), Harris distinguishes three different concepts. She concludes, however, that the terms individual (the biological human), self (the psychological human) and person (the social human) are not in a hierarchical order; they refer to and depend on each other (Harris 1989: 608). In doing so, they theoretically compose the human being. Whereas the self is outlined in a psychological context as reflective and self-recognizing, the person can be defined as "acting within cultural norms" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 236). Since culture is a human 'invention', in other words, a disposition, and human sociality is given by a simple living together, Harris' (1989) definition is tautological. At this point Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern (2000a: 9) criticize Harris because her understanding of the individual can be easily and simply replaced by the term human:

> [s]he [Harris] points out that *individual* seen in this light is not the same as the 'Western' concept of individual [...]. Indeed, she at least partly dissolves the idea of separateness associated with this term when she goes to the cross-cultural record and notes that boundaries differ, by way of notions of shape shifting, gender differences, and connections with the nonhuman world.

In consequence, identity is a process, which obviously never ends, and the same holds true for individuality which hardly cannot be reduced to mere biological issues. Additionally, to define personhood just within cultural norms enables to define animals as well as ancestors as persons. By implication, for a living human without social abilities the predicate of being a person can be denied (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 17). Moreover, Harris contrasts her concepts of individual, self and person to the Western terminology without describing their meaning individually and in relation to other cultures. Not only the term 'human' can be divided into several parts as individual, self and person, but also these parts themselves.

According to Morris (1994), the term 'personhood' cannot be understood in only one way. He derives three different concepts of personhood: first, a person is a human; second, a person is a cultural category; and third, a person is an individual self. In this case, one may notice that Morris (1994) uses the term 'person' as foundation of a

concept of identity which includes all three terms of personhood. The human as person is both physical body and mind as well as a social being that has developed language and morality. In this definition, the 'person' includes both the individual and the self. Furthermore, the person is a cultural category and relates to cultural expressions and community through the self. The person as an individual self is a universal category situated in opposition to social contexts. In this way, Morris (1994: 15) abstracts the self as a reflexive category which enables the human to be perceived as an acting and conscious person. However, Morris' distinction of person, human, identity, self and individual is very theoretical, without taking into consideration the floating process and influences between all these concepts.

Each of these approaches builds upon the concept of personhood from a Western point of view. The authors assume a conscious being which 'possesses' sociality, 'possesses' individuality, and 'possesses' the ability to reflect. These theories understand personhood and all its related skills as attributes and categories that can be gained; by this means, both approaches fail to embed personhood – or the practical, everyday performed 'being a person' in the true sense – in the human, or our existence.

2.1 An Anthropology of Being a Person

Founded on the Cartesian cogito, which is understood in the formula "[*e*]*go sum, ego existo"* (Descartes 1990: 100), Western ideas of personhood are rooted in a subject which can only be sure about its *own* consciousness, but it cannot proof the existence of other beings and the consciousness of others (Descartes 1990). Others, so perceived, can only be perceived as objects. There is no assumption that these other 'objects' could have consciousness. Thus, the Western idea of personhood can be broadly defined as egocentric. With such an egocentric perspective comes along the attribution of personhood as "the self-made, self-conscious, right-bearing individual" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2002: 67). Every person is the center of this particular person's corresponding life-world, and every person possesses consciousness of the surrounding world. This perception is enforced by viewing the individual through the body. The body is the particular part of ourselves that makes us an individual distinct

from others on a physically-perceived level. In this conceptual frame, the surrounding world appears as a dead, unanimated sphere. Every subject assumes it lives alone in the world being surrounded by objects. The Western idea of personhood is

> a modernist fantasy about society and selfhood according to which everyone is, potentially, in control of his or her destiny in a world made by the actions of autonomous 'agents'. It is this fantasy that leads historians to seek social causes in individual actions and social action in individual causes (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 26).

In consequence, only the perceiving subject maintains autonomous acting and is supposed to have a free will (Poser and Wassmann 2012; Wassmann and Funke 2013). The ordinary inner perception of the own self as well as of the surrounding world

> is that of a bounded subject that is a personal owner of experiences and a controlling agent of actions, but in reality there is no self that possesses these attributes of ownership and executive control (Henry and Thompson 2011: 229).

Therefore, a dichotomy accrues between the so-called subject and so-called objects. Jean-Paul Sartre (1993) summarized this conflict in his discussion of the look. For Sartre it is precisely the look with which a subject objectifies others. The objectified other, however, struggles against that objectification like in Honneth's struggle for recognition. In everyday situations – in every encounter –subjects try to overcome the subject-object dichotomy. Subject and object struggle in a battle that cannot be won, since the subject as a conscious entity can only think by itself, and not by another's mind, whereas the pretended object does nothing else, since it is also a subject for itself. In this respect, egocentric approaches to personhood might seem to be anti-social, which makes this particular plug-in of social encounter necessary.

Mauss (1985) shows that persons are considered as role players or actors. He elaborated an historical overview of the usage and interpretation of personhood beginning in ancient times. He chooses an alternative way of describing the notion of

a person derived from the Etruscan word *próswpon*. That means as much as 'mask' (Mauss 1985: 15). According to this elaboration, to be a person means to wear a mask and play a particular role. This is an alternative approach to the main thinking on persona derived from the Latin words *per* and *sonare* taken as "through which (*per*) resounds the voice" (Mauss 1985: 14). According to Mauss's investigations (1985: 14), this understanding of the term 'persona' is a "derivation invented afterwards".

Through morality and law, over the ages, the notion of the person has changed from a mask-wearing actor or role player into a representation of the human's real nature. Referring to law, Mauss (1985) describes the notion of personhood in ancient Roman society. The Roman citizen as a legal member of Roman society was a 'persona' (Mauss 1985: 16f). By implication, legal identity was created, since qualities and capacities are rendered by names. Through a name tasks and roles which are played in the social 'game' can be expressed as well as cultural origin and kinship (Fortes 1973: 287). In accordance with Mauss, personhood can be understood in three stages: the mask-wearing actor and role player, the human's real nature and the legal identity.

But, therein lies the difference to the Melanesian perception of the person. The Melanesian person is not defined through the name; rather the Melanesian person is defined through action. Agency is linked to personhood, thus, the "personal name is fully bound up in a system of relations" (LiPuma 1998: 64). Personal names are even never used (Meinerzag 2006: 140). Related to the tribe, there exist several ways like names are used to describe 'life-worldy relations' in social life. So-called 'totemic names' are used to highlight and formulate a "separate context, a special interest" (Bateson 1936: 227). "The naming system is indeed a theoretical image of the whole culture and in it every formulated aspect of the culture is reflected" (Bateson 1936: 228). Today, these traditions sustain, but are also mixed with colonial influences:

> [i]n Melanesia, each person usually has several names, which may include any or all of the following: names given at birth; names by which a person is called; nicknames […]; the aforementioned teknonyms, taboo names, family position names and toponyms; also necronyms (a name of or a reference to a deceased person) or today's Christian names (Wassmann in preparation).

Furthermore, Mauss (1985) describes the moral development of the notion of the person. From the ancient Greeks the term 'person' becomes a personage or character and thus can be interpreted signifying "the true face" (Mauss 1985: 18). One person's true face should be both good and responsible for others. In this tradition, Christianity further transforms the notion of the person. Through Divine Trinity, which means that the human consists of three parts: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the concept of personhood becomes rational, individual, and indivisible. This construct becomes the corner stone for the current notion of the person as an individual personality. Mauss (1985), however, describes the person as a social concept, as Jean Sybil La Fontaine (1985: 124) outlines:

> [t]he social concept, the idea of the person, is a compound of jural rights, and moral responsibility; it also includes what Mauss attributes to the Greek roots of our civilisation, a notion of the actor behind the mask, the unique and transient human being. This is translated by Christianity into the idea of the soul to arrive finally at the notion of a unity, of body and soul, mind and conscience, thought and action which is summed up in the concept of the individual which Mauss labeled ‚the person', ‚*la personne morale*'.

In this context, Meyer Fortes (1973: 288) points out that the person as 'la personne morale' becomes an abstract category through morality. Personality receives an intentional character that is not filled with concrete intentions, but with the quality of purpose towards acting and being good. Exactly this point can be interpreted as a personal quality, which then can be applied to every culture as "common to all societies" (La Fontaine 1985: 125). Therefore, personhood cannot be defined as a status, because it is a distinctive quality. The social context a person is acting in counts for more than the particular social role a person plays.

Despite his extraordinary view and historical elaborations about the notions of 'person' and personhood, Mauss's view is evolutionary, with a very strong Western influence, in that he relates each of his steps to a particular historical epoch (La Fontaine 1985: 123). Furthermore, Mauss determines the person as a moral actor within the domains of law, morality, and sociality (La Fontaine 1985: 124). By this

means, Mauss's approach cannot be taken as universal, but as a fruitful foundation to perceive the theory of person as social actor. In Western classic thought, La Fontaine (1985: 124) sums up Mauss's approach: "[i]f the self is an individual's awareness of a unique identity, the 'person' is society's confirmation of that identity as of social significance. Person and individual are identified in contrast to the self".

Leenhardt's approach (1979) to the Melanesian perception of personhood, in comparison to contemporary approaches to personhood, is even nowadays innovative, since it highlights the perception of the person as totally interwoven with the environment. "The Melanesian knows the being we glimpse in the word only in its human form. He calls it *kamo,* 'the living one'" (Leenhardt 1979: 153). Every person only exists within a network consisting of other persons and the environment (Clifford 1982: 185). This concept of personhood leads to a "fully interlinking of the person" (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 14). Leenhardt presents the idea that there does not exist an individual without a network of other individuals – or a "dynamic interweaving of nature, society, myth, and technology" (Clifford 1982: 40). This moves Leenhardt's concept of personhood to Mauss' notion of the person as social acting, since 'every member of society plays a particular role' (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 14), but without an epochal connection. Such an approach arises from an awareness of mind and cognition and focuses on bodily sensations since the human does not acquire primary experiences through cognitive activities, but through the body (Clifford 1982: 185). That point can be perceived as a second distinction between Western philosophy and the Melanesian perception of personhood. Descartes's Rationalism or Husserl's Phenomenology does not rely on the body. These approaches only focus on human consciousness and conscious perception alone, a way of thinking that can be attributed to Ancient Greek philosophy where Plato glorified the metaphysical world of the intelligible ideas and the human pursuit of recognizing them.

Melanesian people do not have a word for the Western term 'myth'. They do not write down their history; rather they live, they practice, they *do* their history. If they did, they would externalize their past and their cultural heritage, and, thus, their culture would not be a part of them. As a part, it is meant a real part of a real human. Myth is not a personal or autobiographic narrative; it is lived in every community-participating being as a part of identity. Therefore, one cannot speak of a Melanesian

'concept', rather of a 'perception' of personhood. The Melanesian worldview, however, is not anthropomorphic 'from the human's point of view', it is cosmomorphic 'from the nature's point of view', wherein Melanesians accept their surroundings as "mythic representation of a whole genetic ensemble which includes men and the world" (Leenhardt 1979: 66f); they live in a "world of relationality" (Weiner 1994: 24). To put it in simpler words: the world is not perceived from a subjective point of view, it is perceived by taking on the view of the surroundings. In this context appears the word *kamo*:

> [w]e translate it by 'personage' and the term is as applicable to mythic beings as to human beings. The two are always situated in a social or socioreligious ensemble where they play their roles. For example, a lizard sits on the head of the chief of Koné The chief's wife, seeing her husband bent under the burden of the totemic monster, exclaims, *Ne pa kamo,* that is, 'ensemble of personages' (Leenhardt 1979: 153).

The life-world and the single human becomes 'one'. This cosmomorphic view of personhood sets back the human perception from a focus on rationality to an awareness of the surroundings. It is a symbolic and mythical awareness that enables a particular body perception of the human: we become sensible not only for conscious perceptions, but also for bodily sensations, smells and other stimuli.

> Nor is the *kamo* himself better delineated in his own eyes. He is unaware of his body, which is only his support. He knows himself only by the relationships he maintains with others. He exists only insofar as he acts his role in the course of his relationships. He is situated only with respect to them. If we try to draw this, we cannot use a dot marked 'self' *(ego),* but must make a number of lines to mark relationships (Leenhardt 1979: 153).

Two consequences can be derived from such an awareness. We have unconscious perception, which indeed is perceived, but this perception does not find its way in our mind. It stays in the body and enforces reactions like laughter, aching, etc. But we also live in a strong symbiosis with the surrounding life-world. Since we as persons, as

personages are social actors, the Melanesian perception of the person is not only cosmomorphic, but also sociomorphic. The surrounding social community is an instrument of great impact for our development; even more, a person so perceived cannot be imagined without the surrounding community.



Figure 2: location of the person by means of relationships (according to Leenhardt 1979: 154).

Figure 2 shows quite well that a person is in direct interaction with the surroundings. However, since every arrow has its own 'a', the person is divided in each relation (b-e). This does not mean that a person is as divided as a pie. Rather, this figure shows exemplarily how personhood is divided. This includes that two parts of a person (a, a) can refer to b, or b and c can refer to one a, etc. By this means, persons are not a firm and central core within the life-world, but instead merge with their surroundings. The cycle which relates parts (a) of a person with each other highlights the relationality. This cycle also represents our dependence on society. We are in such a way thickly related that it is impossible to imagine an existence external to these relations (Leenhardt 1979: 155f).

It would be wrong to position the body at the center of personhood, since the body is and stays part of our environment. There is no center in the relationship between us and the environment (Clifford 1982: 184). In accordance with Western thinking this means, there is a difference between the subject of the life-world and the environment as contrasted with the object, which is a necessary condition for

subjectivism. Rather, the so-called subject is part of the environment: "[a] person's flesh is the same flesh as that of yam" (Clifford 1982: 173). Thus, the focus shifts from a view of a living subject that has consciousness and which is surrounded by mere objects subjectively imagined without consciousness to a view of symbiosis between human and surroundings, which is experienced as animated life-world: "*vivant = vivant*" (Clifford 1982: 174). In consequence, a cosmomorphic worldview is described as

> [p]eople begin to project their attributes into the cosmos, enlarging their perceptual space in the process. The world begins to be named with parts of the body. The subject-object distance increases; participation gives way to symbolism and representation (Clifford 1982: 174).

The world of mere objects turns into a world of animated entities, which become parts of the human. One might say the life-world is a human's 'home' or "Lebenshaus" (Galuschek 2014: 377). Other people are part of our life, so by this means, they are taking part in the life-world – and thus in life. In consequence, the life-world as the place where humans are getting in touch with each other builds up the social community: others have a particular role, just as we take part in their lives. Our relationship with others is related to certain tasks in the social community and characteristics of personality and character. Other humans are part of our life-world. Hence, the notion of person is defined through the concept of relationality between us and sociality (LiPuma 2000: 136). To better illustrate this special view, I took the descriptions given by Leenhardt (1979) and James Clifford (1982) to sketch the following figure 3:



Figure 3: comparison of Western and Melanesian worldview.

As shown in figure 3, the perception of personhood and life-world differs within the egocentric and the sociocentric worldview. Apart from the egocentric world view where there is a sharp difference between person and world, such a distinction is missing from the sociocentric worldview. A human lives not in an individual world, but in a dividual one (Strathern 1988). The Melanesian perception of personhood assumes that we are 'dividuals' and thus holistically relational. This perception has become very popular in contemporary ethnographies (e.g. Strathern 1988; Wagner 1991; LiPuma 2000; Stewart and Strathern 2000b; Strathern and Stewart 2000; Rumsey and Weiner 2001; Stewart and Strathern 2002; Mosko 2010). All these attempts to capture non-Western concepts of personhood just stand as an example for a plurality of concepts, which are neither universal nor homogeneous (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 19). Just as these concepts differ in their constitution, the underlined and highlighted aspects and scientific perspectives differ.

> In recent times more facets are attributed, like age and aging of the person, the idea of space and time, wherein the person situates her- or himself, the person's relationship to the surrounding topography and to particular places, and finally the question about the 'transparency' of the human, or his or her inspection through others *(opacity of minds)* (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 19).[9]

Like Mauss' approach (1985), Leenhardt's (1979) and his followers' approaches have been criticized for their social and cultural evolutionary roots. All these approaches are lost in focusing on dichotomies between 'us', the Western perception, and 'the others', other cultural concepts of personhood. Nevertheless, with the introduction of this Melanesian perception, these approaches have been offering chances to think through the Western perception of the world. By introducing the Melanesian perception of personhood into the Western anthropological discourse, the cornerstone was laid for a sociocentric and cosmomorphic constitution of

[9] This entire passage is translated by the author from the German original: "In jüngster Zeit wurden noch weitere Facetten beigesteuert, etwa das Alter und das Älterwerden der Person, Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit, in denen sich die Person positioniert, ihre Beziehungen zur umgebenden Topographie und zu bestimmten Orten, schließlich die Frage nach der ‚Durchsichtigkeit' des einzelnen Menschen bzw. seiner ‚Einsehbarkeit' durch andere *(opacity of minds)*" (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 19).

personhood within Western thinking. This approach, however, remained within anthropology. It is still unknown in philosophical discourses.

Considered from a Western point of view, this perception of personhood seems 'unstable' (Hess 2006: 288) and "fractal" (Wagner 1991: 163), which does not necessarily have to be a disadvantage. "A fractal person is never a unit standing in relation to an aggregate, or an aggregate standing in relation to a unit, but always an entity with relationship integrally implied" (Wagner 1991: 163). Thus, the world around the person becomes human in a particular way. There is no center to the human's world. The space where Western philosophy places the subject as a conscious entity seems to remain empty. Indeed, this place is filled up with life-worldy experiences and memories, which make us porous for the life-world. In consequence, we constitute the life-world. For that reason, personhood can be understood as cosmomorphic or sociomorphic.

Perceiving us as dividuals who take part in our life-world necessitates that the perceptual center of our life-world is empty. This is a very sharp distinction between both the Western concept and the Melanesian perception. However, to smooth this exaggerated distinction, it should be concluded that personhood as well as "selfhood is a composite, the constituents of which vary in public and private modes" (Cohen 1994: 2). In this regard, the door can be opened to an adequate investigation of similarities between the Western concept and the Melanesian perception of personhood.

2.2 The Idea of the Sociomorphic Dividual

To perceive the Western-preceived subject of the life-world as dividual, relational and fractal does not introduce a novelty into anthropology. Anthropological approaches since the 1980's deal with attempts to synthesize of the Melanesian word view on personhood and Western views on the concept of the person (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 15). In other words, anthropological approaches started attempts to capture the mythic worldview of the Melanesians in Western terminologies. In recent research, for instance, Edward LiPuma (2000) assumes the differences between the Melanesian and the Western concepts of personhood to be not as big as believed, but

they differ in their premises. The Melanesian perception of personhood is fundamentally social and dividual, whereas the Western concept is fundamentally egocentric and individual; so far the superficial and oversimplified considerations. Indeed, dividual and individual perceptions of personhood exist in every culture, but they differ in grade and reception. For the people in Oceania, for example, there does not exist a subjective consciousness. Derived from their emphasis on dividuality, every part of the surrounding life-world is part of us as well.

In Western concepts of personhood, two approaches can be differentiated: first, "the person is composed, historically and culturally, of dividual and individual aspects" (LiPuma 2000: 134). Second, in an ontological way, as described above, "the person appears as the natural and transhistorical individual" (LiPuma 2000: 134). Fortes (1973: 287) divides these two approaches to personhood into an

> objective side, the distinctive qualities, capacities and roles with which society endows a person enable the person to be known to be, […] [and a] subjective side, it is a question of how the individual [...] knows himself to be – or not to be – the person he is expected to be in a given situation and status.

The Western view over-emphasizes the individuality of a person. "[T]he true ontological form is not, as the West would imagine it, the individual; it is the dual person delineated by both dividual and individual facets" (LiPuma 2000: 135). Furthermore, LiPuma (2000: 131) points out that "the difference between persons in Western and Melanesian societies is a function of the content given this category". It seems rather that personhood emerges precisely from that tension between dividual and individual categorical aspects of the environment of our life-world. As a dividual, we are embedded culturally and historically, since every one of us embodies not only different cultural aspects, but different temporal and historical aspects as well. Therefore, the condition of this tension's terms, and thus the nature (or range) of persons that are created, will vary historically (LiPuma 2000: 132).

Assuming a person – phenomenologically considered – as an individual with own body, own life-world and own thinking, it has to be approved that personhood is culturally and historically constructed. Personhood consists of patterns of cultural

customs and rules. Since the concepts of personhood all over the world are temporally and spatially in co-existence, universal categories of personhood cannot be assumed. Therefore, in anthropological writings exaggerated representations have been very common. In Western scientific thinking the dichotomies like 'we – the others', 'individual – dividual', and 'substance – relation to societies' are still with us (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 18). They are stereotyping, oversimplified, and often ideological (Strathern 1988; LiPuma 2000) or essentialist, and dismiss social changes (Mosko 2010). But, in recent anthropological research, "[t]he juxtaposition of the Western (assumed) autonomous individual and the (imagined) relational or sociocentric person in the Pacific region developed gradually" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 234). John Kirkpatrick and Geoffrey M. White (1985: 9) affirm that "[p]ersons are points of intersection between the subjective and the social". Therefore, persons are necessary "cultural bases for formulating and exploring subjective experience" (Kirkpatrick and White 1985: 9). From that point of view, the concept of personhood appears in its relationship to the social community (Poser and Poser 2012: 37). From the Western point of view, subjective experience is not that hard to investigate through the traditional focus on subjectivity and consciousness. Our individuality has been for very long time a key issue in social and cultural anthropological field studies.

In her book *The Gender of the Gift* (1988), reffering to Leenhardt (1979) and Clifford (1982), Marilyn Strathern describes the Melanesian perception of the dividual in contrast to the Western concept of personhood (Hess 2006). Through Strathern's approach (1988) is "a milestone in Melanesian studies" (LiPuma 1998: 74), hers and other related studies on personhood in Melanesia have to be criticized for postulating a full incommensurability with Western concepts of personhood (LiPuma 1998: 75; Hess 2006). LiPuma (1998: 75) argues that "they compare Melanesian notions of the person not to the Western reality of personhood but to Western ideology". The dichotomy, which occurs here, is one of theory and praxis. Whereas Western approaches to human personhood are derived from "Western written philosophical traditions and not from analyses of experiences of people in the West" (Sökefeld 1999: 418 fn.3), the Melanesian perception of personhood is derived from personal experiences of the Melanesian people (LiPuma 1998: 58). In consequence, the Melanesian perception of personhood is conceived as the complete opposite of the

Western concept of personhood. This view reject the anthropological view on the possibilities and opportunities of commensurability (LiPuma 1998: 75).

> Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually conceived. They […] are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them. The singular person can be imagined as a social microcosm (Strathern 1988: 13).

With this approach, Strathern (1988) reuses a concept already developed by McKim Marriott (1976), and where she stated that the human is not an individual entity, but rather she or her is in a perpetual exchange of social interaction (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 15). Marriott (1976: 111) examines a South Asian–Western dichotomy read as "'dividual' or divisible" in contrast to "'individual', that is, indivisible, bounded units" (cf. Macfarlane 1978: 5).

> To exist, dividual persons absorb heterogeneous material influences. They must also give out from themselves particles of their own coded substances – essences, residues, or other active influences – that may then reproduce in others something of the nature of the persons in whom they have originated (Marriott 1976: 111).

Besides giving here an explanation for the system of tradition as dynamic process of social interaction over time, Marriott shows our deep interwovenness with the surrounding society, for example, a 'child is always a personification of relationships' (Leenhardt 1979: 153–155; Strathern 1988: 268–270; Poser and Wassmann 2012: 15).

To illustrate the relational character of the Melanesian notion of personhood, Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart (1998) refer to the Melpa's perception of *noman*, which simply can be translated as 'mind'. The *noman* is

> variously glossed as mind, consciousness, intention, will, social sentiment, and understanding. The idea of the noman [sic!] is thus an ontology in and of action that engages personhood with history and biography in

> contemporary lives among the Hagen or Melpa people. The *noman* is seen as in a continuous process of differentiation and change over a lifetime, and it encompasses ideas of process, incompletion/completion, relationality, individuality, character, creativity, and identity. Two different life-history narratives are used to show how people seek their personhood over time. We interpret their narratives as stories of how they attempt to achieve 'a strong *noman'* (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 170).

Every human possesses *noman,* but shape and content can differ, even during our lifetime (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 16). However, within the mentality of the Melpa, "[c]hildren are not born with *noman.* It develops in them from the time they begin to understand and use language" (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175). In consequence, *noman* is a social attitude, which refers to social situations and social relationships. The own personal development is influenced by *noman* which becomes more clearly and differentiated the more understanding is accessible. That makes language "the most powerful indicator of the state of the *noman*" (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175). Language should be understood, here, as the most accessible possibility for social interaction. However, what language really is within the context of *noman* is not defined. I suggest language as way of agency or broad interpretation of social acting.

> The means by which the *noman* develops from an undifferentiated, unfocused state to a more fully differentiated, clearly defined state is through the process of interacting with other persons, the environment, and the ancestral/spiritual world. A person's *noman* is constantly intertwining with those of others through a myriad of relationships (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175).

Over lifetime, we make a journey through many different *noman*. "Throughout a lifetime a person will experience many different *noman,* or states of mind, but the aim is to achieve a strong and unified state of the *noman"* (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175). Since the *noman* is developed and further developed through social relationships and social interaction, it is basis of our being human and therefore personhood. We thus are fully integrated members of society. If our *noman* does not

fit in a particular situation, or if we are not able to maintain social relationships, we are, in the first case, considered to be insane, and, in the second case, we are denied to be a human being and thus a person belonging to society (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 176; Poser and Wassmann 2012: 16). Thus, *noman* means "'the achievement of personhood' by means of **relationality**" (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 175), since a particular cognitive effort is needed to find and perform a role within the social community. Within the concept of *noman,* the 'relational individual' appears to be permeable, since the social community has a direct effect on the development of the *noman*. Precisely through this permeability, the partibility as dividuality of the human becomes visible (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 16). Thus, surroundings like "others, places, and things" influences the own being, *and vice versa* (Hess 2009: 61).

> Through this permeability someone's actions, thoughts, motivations, well-being and emotions can be altered. The understanding that one's own action could be influenced by possible external material causes affects how people explain their own and other's actions (Hess 2009: 61).

As Sabine Hess shows here, the relationship to the body regarded as embeddedness or embodiment in the surrounding life-world (Poser and Poser 2012) is essential to understand our relational individuality. We are in steady interaction with our environment, as well as our environment with its things, places, animals and other humans, influences us. Consequently and logically taken one step further, the just cited description concerning the social relationality of the 'relational individual' does not appear only social, since we are formed by relational individualities like the interplay of the different organs the human consists of and composes a unity on almost every stage of being (Strathern 1988: 15). Being human and thus having personal identity can be conceived as personal microcosm. In conclusion, "*noman* is a complex concept, spanning ideas of process, incompletion/completion, differentiation, relationality, creativity and identity" (Strathern and Stewart 1998: 177).

Stewart and Strathern (2000: 63) supplement the current discourse on the concept of the "relational-individual" with "a form of personhood in which elements of relationality and elements of individuality coexist". By this means, dividuality is

interpreted as life-worldly relationality, and, at the same time, all parts of the self are themselves individuals, as well as the person her- or himself is an individual. Elsewhere, Stewart and Strathern (2000a) offer a holistic theory of the reflexive, self-understanding individual human with a strong focus on the self. First, they make a distinction "between a personal and a social sense of the self" (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 8). Such a distinction is theoretical, but in reality, both senses of the self are correlative. Their main premise is that the individual cannot be social, since the egocentric world view prevents a social approach (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 11). Nevertheless, an individual is able to act socially. A cosmomorphic concept of the person, however, is essentially social, because every human possesses a world, and, thus to this world belongs a societas. On this premise, ontological pressures arise.

> By the term *ontological pressures* we mean to combine two ideas. The first is that cultural categories imply ontologies of being […]. Although there may be variable representations of such ontologies, they nevertheless form a framework for people's thinking that is relatively unquestioned. Second, these frameworks are employed by people in their interactions in such a way that they enter into social action and perception itself, thereby exerting pressure on forms of behavior (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 12).

In other words, the nature of every one of us is to stay in existence; by this means, as entities we have ontic nature. Ideally speaking, individuals can physically exist without bothering each other, there would not be any ontic pressure. Through interaction, however, individuals encounter ontological pressure, because each individual has her or his own language of interaction and an own way of interpreting events. This interaction, in fact, involves a certain lack of knowledge about the other. We can know another as well as reasonably possible, but there will always be certain parts – even of our own very personality – that we do not and cannot know.

As ontic entities and acting persons, we are individuals in relation to other ontic entities. As a part of our life-world, however, we are conceived as dividuals, because every part of our life-world is a part of us.

The interpretation of behavior leads to an analysis of our own lifetime experience as our own biography. By this means, we stand in the background and

both, the self and the individuality, stand in the foreground, where they act "and enrich each other in an interlocking manner" (Stewart and Strathern 2000a: 13). Furthermore, perceived as a microcosm, we are not differentiated, indivisible individuals, but rather fractal dividuals, which are connected in permanent exchanges with particles of ourselves and others.

Within the Melanesian world such a thing like subjectivity is hard to find, since within a personal unique individuality, we are perceived as 'relational' or 'whole dividuals'. By this means, within a personal uniqueness, we consist of many parts which we unify; this unity of parts marks the wholeness in personhood. It highlights the strong relationship, and even more: the dependency between the surrounding world and us as living entities. The concept of dividuality enables a holistic view on us and the animated life-world. As Mark Mosko (2010: 219) points out, it "presupposes the absence of the rigid distinction between 'persons' and 'things', or 'subjects' and 'objects', which is definitive of the bounded, possessive *in*dividual of Western ideology". In this passage a reference to Mauss' (1967) reciprocity of the gift can be found, since Mosko (2010: 219) describes the Melanesian perception of our relationship to the life-world in relation to 'the West':

> if the items transacted are not construed as parts of the transactors as persons, relationalist perspectives tacitly recapitulate the subject/object distinction on which possessive individualism in the West is premised. Similarly […] the denial of possible identifications between persons and things in certain contexts has greatly distorted the scope of 'individualism' in the West.

The notion of personhood as a relational dividual offers a way of understanding the relationship between us regarded as social microcosm and the individual as personal microcosm. The problem that appears here is that such a comparison still stays in Western interpretative tradition. Such comparisons continue to 'make' us over life time into persons as social beings (Strathern 1988: 13). Within the Melanesian notion of personhood, however, such a logical and attributive detour does not exist. We are a social microcosm and thus cosmomorphic (Strathern 1988: 268). As Mauss (1985: 3) already pointed out, "the 'self' *(moi)* is everywhere present, but is not expressed by

'me' *(moi)* or 'I' *(je)*". The self, thus, is relational to everything in the life-world, and to the life-world itself. LiPuma (2000: 131) argues "[i]n all cultures [...] there exist both individual and dividual modalities or aspects of personhood". Everywhere the words "'you' as well as an 'I'" exist, and "identity and self-construction are the result of socially created relations (ethnicity, ritual, etc.)". Either can be emphasized depending on the context, within the same culture. Thus, it is not a matter of the structural difference between different conceptions of personhood, like individuality or dividuality.

All the presented notions and other relations of personhood, give an insight to the possibilities and opportunities of a broader concept of personhood as Western thinking in general has been used to so far. Through there are several universal categories in human characteristics like desires, beliefs, and judgments (LiPuma 1998: 75), Jürg Wassmann and Joachim Funke (2013: 237) point out that from point of view presented here, *the* concept of personhood is not universal; and this is only derived from the great amount of possible approaches to the concept of personhood. Though the thinking within these approaches circles within contrasting dichotomies, it has to be said that every concept of personhood highlights specific characteristics of individuals within society. In doing so, these approaches fail to take account of the spiritual as well as the physical dimension of personhood, because in most of the "human social societies ideas about personhood are understood as psychosomatic unities and embedded within a network of social relationships" (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 19). In addition, as mentioned elsewhere also Wassmann and Funke (2013: 237) stress other possible indices constituting concepts of personhood, like "a person's age and aging, perceptions of space and time where the person positions himself, and his relations to the surrounding topography and to certain places". All these perspectives on personhood already mentioned, can function as variants, aspects, perspectives and perceptions of personhood, which enrich and expand all notions of personhood explained above.

Here, it could be shown that we cannot consider ourselves as closed individuals, since we permanently move within social relationships (Poser and Poser 2012: 50). This last sentence can only lead to one conclusion: there cannot be one single concept of personhood which works as universal theory. Concepts and notions of personhood cannot be stereotyped. Furthermore, a clear identification of 'Western' or 'Non-

Western' concepts and notions of personhood is hard to realize, even a contrast between 'individual' and 'relational' concepts (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 35). As it is the thesis of this work just as well, personhood depends on the context. Thus, I do not pursue the aim to elaborate a universal theory of personhood; rather, in the context of narrative identity and agency, I will elaborate a new perspective on the Western concept of personhood.

2.3 Performance of Acting

In the 1970's Victor W. Turner (1986; 1988) founded the anthropology of performance which has roots in ritual theory as well as theater theory. His approach is still very influential in recent approaches to performance theory, and still has a great impact on anthropology, especially in considering motivation to acting from the perspective of social community and reflected acting.

According to Turner, every one of us has always been a *homo performans*. Our "performances are, in a way, *reflexive*" and we reveal ourselves (Turner 1988: 81). From this point of view, we are a reflecting *performing self*. Turner deals with two key terms which are crucial for the motivation of acting: "performance" and its manifold and enhanced definition, and "social drama" in which performance is embedded.

Emerging in the "early to mid-1970s" (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 78), the term 'performance' itself has a young history. "[D]eveloped in linguistic anthropology, performance is seen as a specially marked, artful way of speaking that sets up or represents a special interpretive frame within which the act of speaking is to be understood" (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 73). By this means, in every act a particular motivation is inherent, which results from reflection. Reflection here means a certain consciousness and awareness of our suchness if we are acting, a particular purpose can be reached, or a particular intention can be fulfilled. This consciousness and awareness lead to a permanent state of action motivation. Conversely, in every act exists a part our reflections and a part of our individual characteristics. Since we are totally entangled in social (inter-)action, that state turns our sociality itself into performance: we perform for the audience or the ambience, and from this it can be

derived that every act is a 'message to the surroundings'. We want the act to be heard, seen, and want that it urges a reaction.

For Turner, performance is "interconnectedness" with the social community: it "always intends an audience, and in ritual this might include supernaturals as well as those from the mundane world – performers, ritual subjects, and spectators, among others" (Kapferer 1986: 192). The audience realizes our performance and shows expressions due to the recently made experience. Thus, performance as social interaction has a direct impact on the social community to enforce a sharing of knowledge and understanding (St John 2008: 7). That implies, we are everlasting actors within the surrounding world, since through acting we perform on a stage which informally can be called 'life'. This 'life stage' is *per definitionem* the surrounding world with all its inhabitants as 'audience'. Furthermore, our performance is directly related to particular roles within the social community: we have to fulfill a 'script' according to our role to perform the role within the social community. The performance is accomplished by our acting within the social community. By this means, we convey our purposes by performing a particular role. It is almost unnecessary to say that these purposes and intentions are strongly related to the social role the human is performing.

Depending on which theoretical approach is consulted, there exist uncountable types and classifications of acting. In general, it is not essential to communicate by verbal talking. Communication in a broader, performative sense is more than that: it can also be performed by acting. To push on this issue a bit more: the described interaction with others includes communicative performative acts with others. Here are not only meant verbal communicative acts in the wake of the speech act theory of John L. Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969), as every act is a communicative act, even if an act is omitted. Communication, in fact, is performed in every moment we are acting within the surrounding world. Considering that we are *homo performans*, we are 'communicating' by acting all along. Within a notion of acting as broadly conceived, communicative acts can be divided into several sub-categories like emotions, facial expressions, gestures, postures of the body, or mere physical presence. These types of communication including verbal utterances are always direct expressions to the surrounding world. In turn, through all these performative,

communicative expressions acting is communicated to the surroundings. This leads to the conclusion *communication is acting*.

Another key term of Turner's approach is "'social drama'". To explain his notion of "social dramas" Turner uses theater terms. In a certain way, Turner, also, goes along with the concept of "thick description": a concept developed by Clifford Geertz (1973), who uses the method of "thick description" to analyze the behavior and role-play in social communities. "[P]articipants not only do things *they try to show others what they are doing or have done*; actions take on a 'performed for an audience' aspect" (Schechner 1977: 120). Like a theater actor who receives applause from the audience, we expect particular reactions for our conduct in everyday life. By performing, we create a social plot. In addition, while we are wearing a particular mask – in fact or metaphoric – we play a particular role. Considered as social actors, we follow a culturally encrypted 'script'. We have to know the cultural code that consists of symbols with particular, manifold and, at the same time, paradox meanings.

To perform on a cultural stage is to know the particular culture, and, as understood in the anthropology of performance, it is broken down to the often cited imagination of 'culture as performance'. This leads to the well-known main hypothesis of Turner's work within which performance is conceived "as paradigm for meaningful action" (Conquergood 1989: 82). For us, who are both an individual actor and a social performer, it is important to be recognized by the community: we act in a particular way to receive an adequate or probably an inadequate reaction by others.

Once more, this interpretation of Turner's approach corresponds with the speech act theory. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) point out that speech acts also accomplish acting. Speech acts explain, comment, or are performative acts themselves. Since the surrounding world can only be perceived and described through language, speech act utterances constitute and provide the personally experienced cultural and social life. If we perform adequately, we are able to 'speak' in the cultural and social code of a particular social community. From that it can be derived that "performance as a mode of spoken verbal communication consists in the assumption of responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative competence" (Bauman 1977: 11). Besides, communicative competences are not only consciously performed: according to Erving Goffman (1974), performance in social communities is mostly unconscious experience and knowledge in particular

situations, which are arranged in unconscious scripts or schemes. These schemes Goffman calls "frames".

> I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify (Goffman 1974: 10f).

These cultural scripts, schemes of behavior, or frames "key" performance in social actions (Bauman 1977: 15). By this means, we possess behavioral frames which provide acting orientation. Since most of these frames are unconscious, this kind of performance happens automatically. However, for every situation a particular frame is necessary, which is learned and structured by experience and knowledge. Without this frame, a situation cannot be adequately classified. Such frames "carry instructions on how to interpret the other message(s) being communicated" (Bauman 1977: 15). Only, if a frame does not fit anymore in a particular situation, this frame becomes conscious. By applying such a frame, we become confused and begin to question this particular frame. Through such a situation, a new experience is made and thus further knowledge is gained which can be applied in future within a new frame. In doing so, performance constructs sociality and culture. But, it is not only this construction, which is gained by performance. From the individual's point of view, performance as a type of social acting is experience making *par excellence*.

> Mere experience is simply the passive endurance and acceptance of events. *An* experience, like a rock in a Zen sand garden, stands out from the evenness of passing hours and years and forms what Dilthey called a 'structure of experience' (Turner 1986: 35).

The structure of experience becomes as own biography self-reflexive. Thus, we are conscious about our past and are able to reflect our actions and experiences. Within our personal identity, our self is defined through experiences and lifetime events. In turn, these events and experiences are constitutive for our personal identity. In this sense, meaningful action is understood as "marrying present problems to a rich ethnic

past, which is then infused into the 'doings and undergoings' […] of the local community" (Turner 1986: 40). Our present self is nourished on previous experiences and lifetime events to benefit from these in the present and future. Thus, experiences can be considered as social dramas, and thus as "sources of aesthetic forms […] where the structures of group experience *(Erlebnis)* are replicated, dismembered, re-membered, refashioned, and mutely and vocally made meaningful" (Turner 1986: 43). That corresponds with the performance theory developed by Goffman (1984). He defines performance as each everyday interaction in social life ("continuous presence", Goffman 1984: 32), since in everyday interactions the participants play their roles and behave theater-like: "all social interaction is staged – people prepare backstage, confront others while wearing masks and playing roles, use the main stage area for the performance of routines and so on" (Schechner 1977: 120). Crucial for the definition of performance is that it has to happen in front of "a particular set of observers and […] has some influence on the observers" (Goffman 1984: 32). Performer and audience (observer) influence each other, and every acting has particular consequences for the surrounding others. Thus, performance plays a crucial role in the construction of personal identity.

In a social community, the development of personal identity is fulfilled over years, or more precisely, over the entire lifetime. From the performative point of view, experiences as past events must be reflected in the present and future. That can be called the 'paradigm of reflected perception'. Action motivations, thus, are founded on the contextualization and reflection of experiences. According to theater theory, we as performing and experience-gaining humans follow this paradigm of reflected perception by recounting stories. The stories belong to us, so, in a reflexive way, they are part of our biography. That makes telling a story the fundamental performative act which shows parts of our personal identity (Bruner 1986: 145). Through storytelling we confer meaning on our experiences. In every present situation, the same past experience can be reflected and interpreted in a new and different way. Through recently made experiences the perception of another past experience changes and radiates 'in a new light'. "Narrative structures organize and give meaning to experience, but there are always feelings and lived experience not fully encompassed by the dominant story" (Bruner 1986: 143). Indeed, our perception of the 'present' always is situated "in a time sequence" (Bruner 1986: 141), the

consciously realized – dominant – time structure is strictly subjective, and can never be perceived from a so-called ‚objective point of view'. This does not mean that the past is reconstructed and the future is constructed from the present. Within our own biographical perception, past, present, and future are "connected in a lineal sequence that is defined by systematic if not casual relations" (Bruner 1986: 141). That implies, every recounted story has a particular relevance in relation to new experiences and current life situation (Bruner 1986: 153).

Acting and performance flow through every corner of our everyday life. Social life is enacted, and, thus, a continuous process. Through that, different kinds of processes are initiated. Thus, "[p]erformance is a paradigm of process" (Schechner 1988: 8). Movements and processes of experience and knowledge in everyday life are conveyed by interaction with others. In social communities, through individual performance, parts of the personal biography are recounted: they are shared with others (Kapferer 1986: 188f). This leads to common experiences which can be recounted together with others. "Individuals experience themselves – they experience their experience and reflect on it – both from their own standpoint and from the standpoint of others within their culture" (Kapferer 1986: 189). This ability allows reflections about our own "action through the perspective of another person – by taking the attitude of the Other" (Kapferer 1986: 190).

Turner's approach in performance theory smoothens the way for further investigations in performance theory, acting and practice (Bachmann-Medick 2010). From these researches, recent approaches to praxeology[10] were ultimately developed (Reckwitz 2000, 2002, 2003; Spiegel 2005a; Winker and Degele 2010; Blažević 2011). Praxeology is "a considerable shift in our perspective on body, mind, things, knowledge, discourse, structure/process and the agent" (Reckwitz 2002: 250). The center of praxeological and performative theory is the body. It is not an "instrument" anymore, rather it is "the place where mental, emotional and behavioural routines are inscribed" (Spiegel 2005b: 19; Blažević 2011). Thus, practice, performance and acting

[10] Reckwitz, here, uses the plural form to underline the focus on culture as cultural technique. In this work, the term 'praxeology' is not related to the Austrian School with its roots in Economics, rather the term 'praxeology' used here follows the traditions of Bourdieu, Giddens, and especially in a recent context Reckwitz (see for further reading: Spiegel 2005a; Blažević 2011). Regarded from that point of view, 'praxeology describes practices as "the smallest unit of cultural analysis" (Reckwitz 2010: 189).

are always embodied. Acting as "practice can be understood as the regular, skilful 'performance' of (human) bodies" (Reckwitz 2002: 251); even more,

> [a]t the core of practice theory lies a different way of seeing the body. Practices are routinized bodily activities; as interconnected complexes of behavioral acts they are movements of the body. A social practice is the product of training the body in a certain way: when we learn a practice, we learn to be bodies in a certain way (and this means more than to 'use our bodies') (Reckwitz 2002: 251).

Praxeological theories include and link unconscious behavior and routines as performances (Spiegel 2005b: 19). A special focus is directed to material objects,

> which are conceived not only as carriers of meanings and objects of interpretation but also as indispensable and constitutive elements of social practices simply thanks to their inherent materiality and (non)usability (Blažević 2011: 56).

Practice, performance and acting thus become thickly interwoven with social structures, symbolic representations, and identity constructions. In doing so, practice, performance, and acting constitue individual behavior.

2.4 Summary

Anthropological concepts of personhood do not only deal with Western concepts and approaches to personhood. They also call in concepts and perceptions from non-Western cultures which enrich the anthropological research. Actually, non-Western approaches do not remain in their context. For example, 'the Melanesian perception of personhood' is transformed into the Western context, considering that Western discourses dominate the scientific discourse. It is an idealized concept which does not exist in reality. However, on a theoretical level, it creates a counterpart to the Western subject-theory. Therefore, the dichotomy between dividuality and individuality

seems insurmountable. In fact, it can be said that dividuality is also present in Western cultures – otherwise sociality would not be possible. In this context, life-worldy performance is executed.

In our dividuality or partibility, we are role players on a stage which is constituted by our social community. As anthropological research has been shown, personhood is more than just a perceiving 'Ego': it is the human in her or his social being as part of the social community. To be honest, we are always already born within a social context of our family, later kindergarten, friendships, schools, and our own family.

For the following investigation, the question is how a fundamentally social concept of personhood fits into the Western egocentric theoretical contructs. I solve this question by taking into account several approaches to personhood: as shaping concept (Scheler), self and narrativity (Ricœur), and the structure of the life-world (Schütz and Luckmann).

3. Philosophical Approach to Personhood and Motivation

To understand personhood within the context of action motivation, the function of the concept of personhood and the notion of identity have to be investigated in both a phenomenological – the 'that!' of acting – and a hermeneutical – the 'why?' of acting – approach. For this reason, I have chosen two philosophical thinkers: first, to describe personal actions on a phenomenological level with Scheler, and second, to describe the constitution of personal identity on a hermeneutical level with Ricœur. Both Scheler and Ricœur work with a phenomenological foundation. On a phenomenological Scheler considers that personhood shapes a unity, and tries to link phenomenology with value realism; for him, phenomenology is not a philosophical method but a natural human attitude.

> [P]henomenology is neither the name of a new science nor a substitute for the word 'philosophy'; it is the name of an attitude of spiritual seeing in which one can see *[er-schauen]* or experience *[er-leben]* something which otherwise remains hidden, namely, a realm of facts of a particular kind (Scheler 1973b: 137).

We move actively perceiving through the world. The surrounding world is enclosed intuitively and immediately through our personal presence. Therefore, the phenomenological view excludes a primary cognitive account of the world, and shifts to a primary intuitive account. It is a particular kind of trust which is claimed by Scheler. This phenomenological trust in the life-world provides a particular openness for the world, and enables making experiences.

Perceiving personhood within time and narrative means to perceive our own temporality. The own temporality can only be perceived from a reflective – or let us say hermeneutical – attitude. Ricœur's understanding of hermeneutics does not only include the mode of reflection, but also the mode of – active – interpretation. The emphasis on the word 'active' refers to the cognitive effort of the reader of a text to

perceive and contextualize an entity. To illustrate that, Ricœur deals with the threefold concept of mimesis referring to the three dimensions of time – past, present and future. To comprehend the threefold concept of mimesis, a particular method has to be applied: first, the phenomenological method has to be exercised. Interpretative understanding of meaning is only possible with an a priori perception of phenomena as entities. By this means, phenomena are perceived in their suchness [*Sosein*]. Secondly, a hermeneutical step back is needed to distance oneself from the phenomenologically perceived phenomena. Through this distance, a hermeneutical context can be created. Without this step a hermeneutical – contextualized – understanding is impossible (Galuschek 2014). This method of hermeneutical interpretation is an approximation, "thus genuinely making one's *own* what was initially *alien*" (Ricœur 1991a: 119). Through his extended method of phenomenological hermeneutics Ricœur can draw on a "*concrete reflection*, that is, *the cogito mediated by the entire universe of signs*" (Ricœur 1974: 265). For this reason, symbols do not have an objective truth-value, rather they have a subjective value (Simms 2003: 32). In other words: to conceive a phenomenon without context is fundamentally senseless – not to say impossible (Ricœur 1991b: 32). Thus, hermeneutical interpretation is always followed by approximation to or assimilation in an already existing context. Ricœur stresses the execution of understanding by following the paradigm of language and speech acts. Speech understood as symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1990: 115) can be conceived as an act as well. Therefore, acting itself as a particular cultural and social habitus can be perceived as a symbolic act. By executing an act, however, the human coalesces in a perfect symbiosis with this act. Derived from the thesis that "[t]he person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced *unity* of *experiencing"*(Scheler 1973a: 371), "[*t*]*he being of the person is therefore the 'foundation' of all essentially different acts*"(Scheler 1973a: 383). The human *becomes* the particular act for the moment of execution. Following Scheler (1973a) and Ricœur (1992), the involvement of the existence of personhood with action, time and narrativity is determined. The reasons for a performed act are located within lifetime experiences – which I simply call 'biography'. By this means, we are in a particular manner conscious of the ability to reflect the existential narrativity in time.

3.1 The Person as a Shaping Concept

Our shape conceived as acting person is what the other perceives and recognizes. Thus we can be conceived as an act center in which we live and are able to experience our self (Schütz 1942: 326). According to Scheler's approach to personhood (1973a), the notion of the person is not a category that defines a certain group of characteristics of entities. We cannot just be mind, neither can we be perceived without mind.

> Neither the being nor the problem of the *'person'* would exist if there were beings (whose natural organization we set aside in the reduction) endowed *only with knowing* (as thought and intuition) and those acts belonging to this (specifically theoretical) sphere. (Let us call such beings purely rational beings). Of course these beings would still be (logical) subjects that execute rational acts: but they would not be 'persons'. Nor would they be persons if they had both inner and outer perception and often dealt with knowledge of the soul and nature, that is, even if they found an object 'ego' in themselves and others and could perfectly observe, describe, and explicate experiences of 'the ego' as well as all individual egos. The same would hold for beings whose entire contents were given only as projects of willing. They would be (logical) subjects of a willing, but not persons (Scheler 1973a: 382).

Scheler's statement makes clear that the notion of the person *is not* to be "purely rational beings", but that this notion is also part of us. Consequently, such a notion of personhood belongs to "*all men – in* the same way and as something *identical* in all men" (Scheler 1973a: 371). Nothing individual is to be found inside such a definition, rather it seems to seek to be universal. The objective of Scheler's notion of personhood, therefore, is to define a concrete being which is not lost in an abstract dimension. In other words, the person has to be settled close to the individual. Individuality has, in this context, a specific meaning: it is the particular "essence" – or nature – of a person (Scheler 1973a: 489). Actually, this personal essence belongs to every person, but it is precisely not universal, since it "cannot be repeated again in any other person" (Crosby 1998: 24). "The unrepeatable essence of a person forms a

contrast to every general or universal essence, and it serves to distinguish one person from all other persons" (Crosby 1998: 26). That makes acting both a personal universality as well as a personal individuality, since it is unique in its personal appearance. Considering social communities as cultivating a particular culture, it has to be added that even such communities are individuals in their particularity and uniqueness. Thus, a social community can be considered as "collective person" (Scheler 1973a: 502) which consists of individual persons by itself (Scheler 1973a: 520).

Considering person as the act center, Scheler's notion of the person illustrates the unity of our acting. A person never can be an object of an act, since personhood always exists only within the act (Schütz 1942: 327; Scheler 1973a: 393). Scheler's concept of the person can be perceived as a shape, which puts the personal acting in an individual figure. We incorporate the act, and thus become a unity with this act. Therefore, personhood is the shape of our unity, which by means of our characteristic qualities is 'filled up' with our personality. Personhood as 'shaping concept'[11] involves the unity of particular qualities which are characteristic for us. These characteristic entities are achieved over lifetime by making experiences and gaining knowledge. In consequence, we can concurre with the thesis that personhood is the "immediately coexperienced *unity* of *experiencing*" (Scheler 1973a: 371). That defines person not only as a *noumenon* but also as a living being that lives through experience. What concisely derives from this is that making experiences and being aware of them is a fundamental human quality. Considering action, the person does not act for causal reasons but due to meaning (Ferrer 2000: 76). This statement says something about our value. Since personhood belongs to 'all men in the same way' as an ontological entity, every person has, in the first instance, the same value.

Unless they have a direct effect on the environment, acts, in Scheler's (1973a) sense, are not fundamentally social. Rather, they exist in a social dimension as perceived by others and in their reaction, but they belong to us as act-executing humans and depend directly on us. In consequence, acts cannot be objectified. They can only be given, perceived and analyzed in the act of reflection – and only according to us. Through acting, we make personal parts of us visible. We do not show those

[11] This term is an individual translation by the author of the term 'Formbegriff', which Christian Bermes (2013) used to describe Scheler's notion of the person.

parts directly to the world, but by acting we correlate to the world. One might say that parts of the world belong to us and we belong to the world, to be precise, they are interdependent. Thus, there is a strong relationship between us and the surrounding world.

Gaining knowledge through lifetime experience includes consciousness and the awareness of time as past, present and future. This definition of personhood, however, is broadly conceived. Such a definition levels down the notion of the person to a human entity. Thus, Scheler aims to enclose his notion of the person as a shaping concept which belongs to every human being. In turn, other specific definitions of personhood, which focus on particular qualities a person has to have, depersonalize humans because they lack particular individual qualities. Taking all specific definitions of personhood in sum, they are thus individualized that there only would be one common trait: consciousness. A person, however, cannot only be reduced to mere "rational acts of a certain lawfulness" (Scheler 1973a: 372)[12]. In turn, considering every thinking entity could become a person this would include children and animals. Being defined this way any notion of the person would be unnecessary. After all, we should not forget: personhood is a specific human quality. Thus, Scheler aims to enclose his definition of personhood as follows:

> [f]or the person is precisely that unity which exists for acts of all possible *essential differences* insofar as these acts are thought to be executed. Hence, by saying that it belongs to the nature of the differences of acts to be in a *person* and *only* in a person, we imply that the *different logical subjects* of essentially different acts (which are different only as otherwise identical subjects of such act-differences) can only *be in a form of unity* insofar as we reflect on the possible 'being' of these subjects and not merely on their nature (Scheler 1973a: 382f).

[12] German original: "Denn die Vernunftakte sind ja – selbst nur definiert als die einer gewissen Sachgesetzlichkeit entsprechenden Akte – also auch eo ipso außerindividuell, oder, wie manche Anhänger des Kritizismus sagen, 'überindividuell'" (Scheler 1954: 382). Scheler uses here the term "Sachgesetzlichkeit" (objective necessities), which is translated as 'lawfulness'. He underlines with this term that 'Sachgesetzlichkeit' is situated outside of our rational being.

Here it becomes visible that Scheler goes a step further by defining personhood as an acting entity, which has to be recognized as unity. By this means, personhood does not only mean consciousness and world awareness, but it encloses consciousness of acting as well as taking responsibility for action. Thus, the difference between a person and an animal is made by our consciousness about our own acting. Through acting, we have individuality and specificity in life. With the term specificity Scheler (1973a, 1979) even implies our individuality, because our acting expresses selfhood. That makes us the center of acting. Our entire essentiality is defined through acting. That takes place in an active life-experience as coming of age: "a man is not of age as long as he simply *coexecutes* the experiential intentions of his environment *without* first understanding them" (Scheler 1973a: 479)[13]. Generally speaking, if we do not have "'the genuine being-able-to-understand'" concerning our own acting, but do it anyway, we are not coming of age (Scheler 1973a: 479). Since acting is related to consciousness, acting is not – for Scheler – a behavior or mere conduct which influences accidently the environment.

We know about the personality of others, through we would not think consciously about that fact. It is obvious that in consequence we also know about the life and existence of other acting humans and, of course that all perceived actors – even the own being – are alive. Thus, we have a conscious certainty about our very own quality as a personal being. From this point of view, personhood is not a feature that can be given or taken. Rather, as mentioned above, it is a characteristic of our life.

The notion of the person shapes us as acting entity. Acts do not mean that something has to be done; they cannot be understood as a kind of work or labor. In the moment we act, we recognize our own action. This includes "also acts of the moral tenor, potential moral tenors, intentions, things done on purpose, wishes, etc." (Scheler 1973a: 487). This underlines the relation between character and the human. It enables us

> to measure a factual person and his life-expressions and actions by the *value-intentions immanent to the person himself,* i.e., by his own ideal value-

[13] German original: "Der Mensch ist unmündig, solange er die Erlebnisintentionen seiner Umwelt nur nachmacht, *ohne* sie primär zu verstehen" (Scheler 1954: 484). The phrase "primär zu verstehen" does not mean a 'first understanding', rather a phenomenological understood 'primary' or 'genuine' understanding of the environment.

> essence (both in the case of oneself and in that of another), and not merely by general moral norms (Scheler 1973a: 487).

Scheler's (1973a) notion of the person is autonomous as well as axeological normative. To be a person means to be an entity that owns its proper values. Each personal moral assessment is not only measured by universal norms but also by an ideal image that every one of us possesses by herself or by himself. For instance, we have a certain phenotype. According to that phenotype, there exist certain expectations of our character and behavior. We are able to make the character visible in particular behavior by evaluating the phenotype. In turn, we are able to make assumptions about another's character by evaluating her or his actions. We are even able to infer to a particular phenotype by hearing another talking, etc. Every one of us experiences the own being in the "execution of an act of *inner* perception" (Scheler 1973a: 375). This perception is our 'I' – or in a reflexive mode 'Me'– as the acting self. That I, however, is only one single form of perception. This makes 'I' "only an object among objects. Its identity exists only insofar as identity is an essential *characteristic* of the object" (Scheler 1973a: 375). It is Scheler's consideration that it is neither 'I' nor the essence of 'I' that gives account of the world; rather it is our unity, understood as the unity of acting, consciousness and knowledge that enables experiencing the world. This is still a phenomenological and – according to Scheler's usage of the term 'I' – an epistemological approach to personhood. It lacks an approach of hermeneutical, life-worldly understanding.

For his time, the outstanding issue in Scheler's (1973a: 480) approach is that he takes into account the perception of the world through the body as a "being-able-to-do 'through' the lived body". Therefore, acting is not only an ability of consciousness, but an act through physical presence as well. Scheler calls it the "*domination over the lived body*" (Scheler 1973a: 479): we are aware of our lived body by having our own perceptions of the world (Scheler 1973a: 479). We *own* the lived body and are aware of it, since

> there can be no doubt that the *lived body* does *not* belong to the *sphere of the person* or the *sphere of acts.* It belongs to the *object sphere* of any 'consciousness of something' and its kind and ways of being. The lived

> body's phenomenal mode of givenness, with its foundations, is essentially different from that of the *ego,* with its states and experiences (Scheler 1973a: 398).

We as bodily presences can be perceived and recognized by others. But the body – and this is a novelty in phenomenology – does not only provide that by sensual perception, the body is the primary way of perception and recognition, and, by this means, of the life-world and other humans (Scheler 1979: 254). The lived body manifests this perception by giving physical presence in the world and thus a particular point of view. We make use of the lived body to move, act and perform, but our cognitive content surpasses the lived body (Scheler 1973a: 398). Thus, we never can be reduced to a mere lived body. Both kinds of perception, through consciousness and through the lived body, are an important fact for the further investigation into the notion of the person: it is in particular the phenomenal perception through the lived body within a 'shaping concept' of personhood that enables the reflection and deepens the investigation of a cosmomorphic and sociocentric notion of personhood.

3.2 Narrative Identity and Personal Narration

An individual person is identical with the own self. This sentence summarizes the function of identity. It presupposes the difference between a temporal and biographical diachronic identity and a context- and role-dependent synchronic identity (Straub and Chakkarath 2010: 5). An approach to personal identity always tries to find the answers to 'who am I?', 'who became I?', and 'who I want to become?' (Straub and Chakkarath 2010: 6). Neither a satisfactory reply has been given yet, nor is the claim of this work to give a satisfactory reply. These questions are very personal questions, which can only be answered by our own personal self. Considering the complex structure of identity within a diachronic and a synchronic dimension, it is incumbent upon the self-realization, which timeline of the own biography is highlighted, since "stories constitute who I am" (Zahavi 2007: 179). However,

> [w]ho I am is not something given, but something evolving, something that is realized through my projects. There is no such thing as who (in contrast to what) I am independently of how I understand and interpret myself. To put it differently, no account of who one is can afford to ignore the issue of one's self-interpretation, since the former is (at least partially) constituted by the latte (Zahavi 2007: 179).

For this purpose, I introduce Ricœur's approach on narrative identity as possibility to construct our own personality as personal identity. As Daniel D. Hutto (2007b: 1) summarizes tersly and succinctly our ability to narrate:

> [o]ur world is replete with narratives – narratives of our making that are uniquely appreciated by us. […] Our capacity to create, enjoy and benefit from narratives […] surely sets us apart from other creatures. Some, impressed by the prominence of this phenomenon in the traffic of human life, have been tempted to deploy that famous Aristotelian formula, holding that we are, *inter alia*, not just social or rational or political animals but that we are also rightly distinguished as *narrative* or *story-telling* animals.

Narrative identity is thus understood as mediation between personal lifetime events and personal identity. Every event and every experience have influence on our personal development. Seen this way, narrative identity allows contextualizing these events and experiences within the personal identity.

Ricœur structures his concept of narrative identity on a philosophical as well as cultural foundation: it includes a "practical category" (Ricœur 1988: 246), thus, a reference to the acting 'who' is given: namely the 'I'. This 'I', however, can only recognize itself through an indirect self-reflection. The reply to the 'who' of acting is always 'me'. Therefore, our life has to be comprehended as a lifetime story: everyone of us is the biographer of her or his own story: "history always proceeds from history" (Ricœur 1988: 247). By this means, narrativity rises to a sequenced composition of performances and is able to construct identity (Ricœur 1988: 260). Identity, therefore, is thickly interwoven with time and narrative.

The trilogy *Time and Narrative* (1984-1988) deals with the commonality of the temporality of history and poetics. The primary point is the threefold concept of mimesis as prefiguration, configuration and refiguration. Originally, Aristotle elaborated the concept of mimesis in his *Poetics* (1999). Through splitting up the concept of mimesis in three parts, Ricœur infers the coherence between the aspects of time and narrativity and human existence through acting.

Mimesis as "imitation or representation of action" is an act by itself (Ricœur 1984: 35). If an act is performed, it is not similar to the original act; rather it turns into a reinterpreted – newly created – act. By this means, mimesis overcomes the idea of a mere copy recreating an original act (Ricœur 1984: 45). Mimesis has a specific character as "creative imitation" (Ricœur 1984: 31) by being developed as a newly created self-standing act. Furthermore, it can be interpreted as a mode of representation which opens a "space for fiction" (Ricœur 1984: 45). This unique creative moment Ricœur calls mimesis$_2$ (configuration). Mimesis$_1$ (prefiguration) refers to the pre-mimetic world, which already has been existed, for instance, as culture, traditions, etc. Since mimesis$_1$ is entirely history as prefiguration, it can only be captured when it is narrated as mimesis$_2$. By narrating, we give already an interpretation of the world we try to capture within a narrative: with the choice of words and narrative style we use, we narrow down the other's interpretative field. Thus, mimesis$_2$ as mode of configuration is located within a "kingdom of fiction" as "*as if*" (Ricœur 1984: 64). Last but not least, mimesis$_3$ (refiguration) is the moment in which mimesis is performed on the level of the interpreting other. This is "another side of poetic composition" within the creative imitation and develops a character of efficiency in which the other reconstructs and re-experiences the story as her or his very own experience (Ricœur 1984: 46). The crucial point here is, mimesis constructs "the *mediation* between time and narrative" (Ricœur 1984: 52f). Hence, the threefold concept of mimesis could be regarded as a mirror of human time that connects time and narrative within our life.

The narrative in particular "occupies a middle place between description and prescription" (Reagan 2002: 15). Thus, understanding is not answered in a single dimension with the hermeneutical 'why' of our existence context, but with a phenomenological 'that' of our setting in the three temporal dimensions – past, present and future. This leads to Ricœur's main idea: the elaboration of a connection

between the hermeneutical world of reflexivity and interpretation and our self-understanding as acting and performing persons. We are not thrown in a world of copies in which we only perform our existence, rather in a world of "*as if*" in which we are creative (Ricœur 1984: 64). This world of creativity stands out against a world of mere copy, since it has a particular and permanent creative moment while we are acting in there.

Within mimesis$_1$ the handiness [*Zuhandenheit*] of entities (Heidegger 1962) has "an actual *[effective]* signification" in setting them in relation to ourselves (Ricœur 1984: 57). Therefore, mimesis$_1$ as a historic context is a complete – seemingly unaccessable – whole. By this means, not only actually existing entities become related to each other but symbolic entities by abstracting them as well; for instance, the symbolic structures in the concept of culture. The production of these contexts is not limited. "To understand a ritual act is to situate it within a ritual […], and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of culture" (Ricœur 1984: 58). A symbolic system delivers the "descriptive context for particular actions" (Ricœur 1984: 58). Through a concrete descriptive context, a symbolic system isolates itself from another. By this means, mimesis$_1$ is a mode of abstract present because the world is understood as a place where something happens "spontaneously" (Ricœur 1984: 60) without passing any stage of composition. Practically, without composition the world cannot be understood. It would be similar to a phenomenological life-world in which all is represented without a context, just in its suchness. Since to be in a context means to be interpreted, this means further that an entity is set in context by composition.

Mimesis$_2$ is classified by Ricœur in an "amplitude between the preunderstanding and […] the postunderstanding" or a "mediating function" between the prefiguration of mimesis$_1$ and the refiguration of mimesis$_3$: between "individual events and incidents [mimesis$_3$] and a story taken as a whole [mimesis$_1$]" (Ricœur 1984: 65). If within mimesis$_1$ past and present as a given life-world have already happened, mimesis$_2$ opens up the possibility to understand the very same, but this does not mean that it is perceived as a complete whole. Regarding the life-world as past and present is at the same time to perceive the life-world as a world of history full of past and present events. Only certain parts of the pre-narrated historic context are comprehended and, in this way, can be narrated.

> To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfilment in the 'conclusion' of the story. This conclusion is not logically implied by some previous premises (Ricœur 1984: 66).

Through the mediation of mimesis$_2$ the past transforms into a story. Within the concept of culture, mimesis$_2$ configures tradition by composing the past events of our own narrated culture into stories and contexts. Through the practice of traditions and rituals, we perform mimesis$_3$ by transforming the given sedimentations as traditions and rituals (or cultural heritage) as our own.

Mimesis$_3$ is understood as "intersection of the world" and the world of the interpreter, it refigures the recounted story in "real action" (Ricœur 1984: 71). That seems similar to the concept Hans-Georg Gadamer (2003) called application (Ricœur 1984: 70). It is performed as the final stage in the triad *understanding – interpretation – application*. Based on the hypothesis that understanding includes a whole (Gadamer 2003: 291), application is already included in understanding (Gadamer 2003: 308): "[u]nderstanding here is always application" (Gadamer 2003: 309). Through the interpreter's understanding an application of the understood event is performed (Gadamer 2003: 309). Actually, understanding of an event is performed as very own experience. Considering the relation of understanding and application to the very own experience, understanding and, thus, application should be interpreted metaphorically, since "[m]etaphoric meaning […] has the character of *resemblance*" (Taylor 2011: 113). "In other words, metaphor displays the work of resemblance because the literal contradiction preserves difference within the metaphorical statement; 'same' and 'different' are not just mixed together, they also remain opposed" (Ricœur 1978: 232). From that base, Ricœur (1984: 76) derives the formula: "[t]o follow a story is to actualize it by reading it". The new experience is contextualized through the interpreter because resemblance enables finding metaphors in the interpreter's own history. Thus, Ricœur can conclude that Gadamer's concept of application can be understood as "appropriation" (Ricœur 1988: 158). New contexts are created and new symbolic structures are located. Through this process over time, mimesis$_3$ becomes mimesis$_1$ again. This structure of mimesis in time can be imagined as a helix where any overlaps are an enduring change

from mimesis$_1$ to mimesis$_2$ to mimesis$_3$, which becomes mimesis$_1$ again. If our narrating and acting are regarded through the concept and structure of mimesis, our existence is understood as being in narrative processes. Through the cultural context and background, narration is always situated in a process of practical imitation. As Ricœur (1992: 157) points out, "[t]his is not to say that practices as such contain ready-made narrative scenarios, but their organization gives them a prenarrative quality which in the past I placed under the heading of *mimesis$_1$*". Ricœur (1992: 114f) utilizes the triad "describe, narrate, prescribe" to explain a "specific relation between the constitution of action and the constitution of the self". Narration recounts our action and supports our understanding as acting humans in time. The term 'coherence' becomes virulent, since habits, customs and identifications are situated in a relationship of coherence, without being framed in a constant and stringent lifetime story (Römer 2012: 249f). Both, description and prescription are given, if "ethical considerations are implied in the very structure of the act of narrating" (Ricœur 1992: 115). Thus, the "self seeks its identity on the scale of an entire life" (Ricœur 1992: 115). Nevertheless, coherence is only punctually given. It is possible that the narrative self is coherent or incoherent; it can transform itself completely, or even be lost. But, the narrative self never transforms so much not to be able to recognize itself (Römer 2012: 252) – a different case is mental disease, which I do not focus on here.

The reflexive 'me' as self is the direct object of the 'I'. Through setting 'me' in the accusative, the self is able to reflect, to imagine and to transcend. If our existence is so deeply interwoven with time as Ricœur suggests, the classical philosophical notion of identity has to be reconsidered. First of all, the assumption is indefensible that our identity considered as the same being over time is always the same. Merely a certain part of it stays the same, because our character, behavior, conduct, and even certain parts of the phenotype change. Ricœur calls that the self. With the changing self, two kinds of personal identity have to be defined: one part within which we identify our very own being – this also includes the physis and the other parts of us within which life-experience might introduce changes.

Since, from the phenomenological perspective, the major problem in the narrative constitution of personal identity occurs in the "*permanence in time*" (Ricœur 1992: 116), the question arises how the own identity can be the same over lifetime, under the reservation that identity changes can be guaranteed due to experiences and

lifetime knowledge. This question leads Ricœur (1992: 1ff) to the philosophical roots of the term 'identity' read as 'to be identical': the Latin words *idem* (sameness) and *ipse* (selfness). To assemble both concepts of identity, Ricœur (1992: 116) intents a theoretical discussion between the "two versions of identity", *idem* and *ipse*. Within narrative identity, "every narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, one chronological and the other nonchronological" (Ricœur 1980: 178). Therefore, narrative identity includes our existence as a whole possessing an unchangeable core, but within selfness, the possibility to induct changes is given. By this means, the demand on totality is eluded. With *idem*, our sameness and our constancy over time is described. *Idem* describes a numeric identity, which consists of "*permanence in time*" (Ricœur 1992: 116), since "[t]he search for permanence in time [is] attached to the notion of identity" (Ricœur 1992: 148).

> Here, identity denotes oneness: the contrary is plurality (not one but two or several). To this first component of the notion of identity corresponds the notion of identification, understood in the sense of reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same thing twice, *n* times (Ricœur 1992: 116).

Sameness guarantees a permanence in time, through a chance to change has to be given as well. Thus, Ricœur brings in a qualitative identity, in other words, extreme resemblance. With *ipse*, our unique dynamic selfness in making experiences is emphasized. Both concepts of identity *idem* and *ipse* overlap each other within the human and build up a perspective of the human's personal identity. By this means, every personal identity implies an unchangeable core (*idem*) and the possibility to change (*ipse*). On that basis, this polarity belongs to our person.

This account is the very description of the two steps of narrative identity. First, the phenomenological 'I' means resistance in time and certain sameness over time. Second, in keeping with acting, we are performers, and the narrative self is comprehended as the reflexive me which directs and, at the same time, reflects in an unconscious and conscious way the object of its action. In consequence, it is always me who is in her or his own time with a stable I. We always confirm our self in every time of experiencing our identity, as with 'It was me who was acting'. This makes clear,

Ricœur does not deal with a theoretical notion of identity that is used in philosophical logic; rather, it has to be pointed out that he approaches a cultural definition of identity as personality, or personal identity by stressing identity, concretely as our ability to recount our existence.

Narrative identity seeks in the own biography for reasons of the personal development, and, thus, one could say, narrative identity seeks in the own biography for personal identity. Alternatively, it can be concluded that personal identity, in this particular case, regarded as narrative identity, is constituted by the recognition of our own lifetime story. To consolidate future acts, past acts have to be recognized as our own acts. These are the cornerstones of narrative identity.

The interwovenness of *idem* and *ipse* summarizes our action in recognition of our own narrative identity. In fact, this is Ricœur's intention: recognition of our action in our own identity as the own lifetime story. Identity "can be described in dynamic terms by the competition between a demand for concordance and the admission of discordances" (Ricœur 1992: 141). By this means, we contextualize our lifetime-story. Seemingly, not context related events – discordant events – are set in concordance. For this, Ricœur (1992: 141) uses the expression "synthesis of the heterogeneous". In this way, a so-called lifetime story recounts a lifetime plot. Here, plot is understood as "the intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story" (Ricœur 1980: 171). Thus, a lifetime event that happens during our life and the "sequence of the story" perform successive mediations (Ricœur 1992: 141). This "narrative event is defined by its relation" to the story operation of configuration of the "discordant concordance" (Ricœur 1992: 142).; "it participates in the unstable structure of discordant concordance characteristic [sic!] of the plot itself" (Ricœur 1992: 142). Thus, every event changes particular parts of the story; it changes the course of life *and* story by contributing new aspects and practical parts in an already existing and established process or situation.

The theoretical opportunity to apply Ricœur's concept of narrative identity in practical contexts raises his approach to a level that can be applied in every culture (Mattern 2008). This requires the assumption that the mimetic relaying of our life by storytelling acts like an update of our past. Considered in this way, narratives have to fit within the reality context. By this means, the recounted story must have elements

which can be applied to reality, "it probably cannot e.g. involve being able to get from Paris to Chicago in one minute" (Schechtman 2011: 405).

Traditions are based on redundancy. They are narrated and performed. By handing them down, they will not be forgotten (Assmann 2011). Storytelling becomes cross-cultural and is raised to a universal level, since "[n]arrative thus comes from the community and serves as the vehicle through which an individual can interact with it" (Schechtman 2011: 405). It has to be kept in mind that no storytelling is ever finished or complete. Every interpreter in every age and time has her or his own interpretation of a text. Or, in cultural thinking: every age has its own interpretation of culture and traditions. Theoretically, interpretation has no limits. By this means, the text is never finished, since the world of the text is semantic, thus, the signs have to be construed time after time. "Practices are based on actions in which an agent takes into account, as a matter of principle, the actions of others" (Ricœur 1992: 155).

Thus, acting always includes an ethical stance. By acting, we are always confronted with another who *suffers* our action. The term 'to suffer' is not used here in its daily significance, rather in the sense of someone being confronted with another's action, which has a direct effect on her or his action. This makes us as narrative identities to initiators of action. In acting, we are able to create and perform a plot.

Ricœur's approach to the philosophical problem of human identity provides a kind of solution, as the Cartesian ego only secures a permanence in time, and the Nietzschean notion of the self denies the existence of a human identity. The occurring dilemma can be avoided by the concept of narrative identity, since narrative identity enables configurations, changes, "and mutations within the cohesion of a lifetime" (Zahavi 2007: 182). And this exactly is the correlation between narrative identity and personal identity.

Even if Ricœur's approach to identity with its narrative as well as cultural anchorage is more connected to the level of human perception of time and biographical existence than philosophical approaches to identity have ever been before, he argues that his concept rather names the problem than offering a solution (Ricœur 1988: 271). In context of this tradition of self-development, there exist several philosophical and psychological accounts. To mention a few: "[a]utobiographical self, cognitive self, contextualized self, core self, dialogical self,

embodied self, empirical self, fictional self, minimal self, neural self […]" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 197). Considering the existence of much more concepts of the self in academia, the self can be considered within a "pattern theory" which assumes that "a self is constituted by a number of characteristic features or aspects" (Gallagher 2013: 1). In such a theory the above mentioned accounts of the self can be included and the self can be conceived in particular componentes or aspects. But, even in this work it is only possible to refer to a few, like narrative self, diachronic self, core self, and autobiographical self.

3.3 Life-wordly Actions

Obviously, life-world is a social world. "The everyday life-world is the region of reality in which man can engage himself and which he can change while he operates in it by means of his animate organism"[14] (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 1). Therefore, one can say even more, "[t]he world[15] of everyday life is consequently man's fundamental and paramount reality" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 1), since we act and as we think within the life-world itself as 'human'.

The life-world is a physical and present world which is directly influenced even by our mere physis. Due to this direct relation between life-world and us, our life-world is full of 'lebensraum'. Regarded in this way, life-world is "the province of reality in which man continuously participates in ways which are at once inevitable and patterned" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 1), thus life-world becomes an inside world and an outside world, in which acting is performed. Life-world is not just a world of nature, rather it is a world with plenty of sociality and culture (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 5). Since life-world is taken for granted as unquestionable world, "every state of affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974:

[14] This translation is misleading, since the orginal German version says here "animated body" (‚Vermittlung des Leibes') instead of "animate organism", which highlights the symbiosis of body and soul: "Die alltägliche Lebenswelt ist die Wirklichkeitsregion, in die der Mensch eingreifen und die er verändern kann, indem er in ihr durch die Vermittlung seines Leibes wirkt" (Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 29).

[15] This translation is misleading, since the orginal German version says here "life-world" instead of "world": "Die Lebenswelt des Alltags ist folglich die vornehmliche und ausgezeichnete Wirklichkeit des Menschen" (Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 29).

2). That makes life-world not a scientific, artificial and constructed world, but a world of everyday life, which can be enriched with knowledge and experience.

Starting from the hypothesis that "[b]ehavior, while it is actually taking place, is a *prephenomenal* experience" (Schütz 1967: 56), Alfred Schütz elaborates in cooperation with Thomas Luckmann (1974) a layering model of the phenomenological life-world. They aim at showing that there is not only one life-world, but rather there exist many life-worlds. Everyone is related to us through a specific and subjective province of meaning, which is situated in relevance systems. That converts the system of relevances into a lifetime biography where meaning is figured by experiences and knowledge, and finally evaluated (Muzzetto 2006: 16). Therefore, "meaning is the relationship, born from the act of turning the attention, between one lived experience and the whole life-experience of the individual, an experience configured into the system of relevances" (Muzzetto 2006: 16). The structures of meaning are founded in stocks of knowledge, which are gained through lifetime experience. Schütz is able to show that acting motivation is individually structured by a complex entanglement of experience, life-world, meaning, and relevance.

Considering life-world in this way, three dimensions of investigation emerge for Schütz: *knowledge*, *horizon*, and *experience*. These three dimensions are closely linked to each other. For instance, to recount stories from our life, we must have particular knowledge about our surroundings. This knowledge can broadly be divided into knowledge about the life-world and knowledge about our acting. Attending to this classification, Schütz and Luckmann (1974) distinguish three stocks of knowledge within the life-world.

General knowledge of the life-world: that kind of knowledge encompasses all the unquestionably and undoubtedly given in the life-world. For us, this implies that general knowledge is the source for life experience. Evidently, we do not have access to the entire knowledge of the life-world. By way of consciousness, access is limited to only certain parts. These parts are related to the personal structure of our life-world. By this means, general knowledge includes only the parts of the life-world, which concern us, since the entire stock of knowledge would surmount our horizon. Therefore, the horizon of the personal life-world is a "determinable indeterminacy" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 9). The personal life-world is always within an

impenetrable and all-embracing life-world. That is related to the Heideggerian term 'handiness' or 'readiness-to-hand', "[t]he kind of Being which equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call '*readiness-to-hand*' [*Zuhandenheit*]" (Heidegger 1962: 98). Thus, the personal life-world belongs to us, in contrast to the all-embracing life-world which is impenetrable for us. However, every personal life-world belongs to the impenetrable and all-embracing life-world. Thus, the life-worldly stock of knowledge includes the entire knowledge of the world to which we have access as needed. In consequence, the stock of knowledge is related to our personal life-world. We deduce the life-world by its individual ways neither structured nor fully haphazardly. By this means, the stock of knowledge is not coherent, rather its parts may contradict each other because we make experiences in several 'fields' of the life-world.

Routine knowledge: routine knowledge includes skills, useful knowledge and knowledge of recipes (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 105ff). That kind of knowledge participates in both individual knowledge and the general stock of life-world knowledge. Therefore, all kinds of applied knowledge are useful knowledge (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 135). Here, useful knowledge means "certain goals of acts *and* 'means to the end' that belong to it" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 107). It is unnecessary to have a certain conscious intention to use that knowledge. Customary knowledge, for instance, includes only routinely exercised customs, for example, to satisfy hunger. Schütz and Luckmann place skills in the field of the body. They involve the "fundamental elements of the usual functioning of the body" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 107), for instance, playing the piano, or skating. Skills are close to knowledge of recipes, which includes experience-based familiar assumptions about the world and operational processes like ordering a menu.

These stocks of knowledge encompass the whole horizon of the personal life-world. However, somehow knowledge has to be gained, and experiences have to be made. Schütz and Luckmann (1974: 119ff) did not construct something like a 'stock of experience', nevertheless experience provides the acquisition of knowledge. By this means, experiences are stocked, but "the 'same' experiences deposited in different sequences form different stocks of knowledge" (Muzzetto 2006: 16). In the context of the sedimentation of experience, Schütz and Luckmann list stocks of knowledge that can be complemented by a *stock of experience*. On a personal level, the concrete

subjective stock of experience finds expression as stocks of knowledge. Experiences are biographical events. These experiences are not objective, but previous experiences and a socially and culturally mediated relevance system affect them. With the term 'relevance system' Schütz and Luckmann (1974: 47) refer to "the manifold, mutually interwoven systems of hope and fear, wants and satisfactions, chances and risks that induce men to master their life-world, to overcome obstacles, to project plans, and to carry them out".

These three stocks of knowledge provide help to act adequately in the life-world. With general knowledge, we have a sense for the surroundings and are able to make assumptions about the world. Additionally, general knowledge prevents the problem of solipsism by ensuring our recognition of others, and thus not to be alone in the life-world. Routine knowledge provides the ability to routinize our acting. We manage our awareness and attention resources by acting unconsciously, since certain routines like breathing, walking or opening our door do not need conscious attention to be performed. Thus, we can direct our consciousness towards other things. Hence, the human can focus on other things and make experiences – accumulate the stock of experiences and the stock of general knowledge – and, thus, further develop her or his personal life. Our cognition performs a mnemotechnical abbreviation which allows acting economically.

We are constantly situated in an infinite variety of situations. There are concrete situations in which we are situated in such a moment "as the 'product' of all prior situations" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 100). By implication, we have the possibility, according to the individual standard of knowledge, to manage the situation individually. Thus, the life-world does not remain the same over lifetime. Through knowledge and experience, shifts of horizon [*Horizontverschiebungen*] occur.

> It has turned out that the previous explications stored in my stock of experience (determined by earlier situations and regarded as adequate solutions for these previous situations) do not suffice for the solution of that which is problematic in the current situation. I am now motivated to proceed with the explication until the solution appears to be sufficient as well [sic!] for the actual problem under consideration (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 14).

Thus, knowledge leads to experience, which leads to further experience, which leads to further knowledge (Galuschek 2014: 357). Even if Schütz and Luckmann are not that interested in this process, because they set the focus on the structure of the life-world, one can conclude from the passage above that we as residents of the life-world are hermeneutists who constantly interpret the phenomenological 'readiness-to-hand' of the life-world, because every act has an internal consistent, contextual reason. A particular and previous knowledge-like experience has to be given to come to the decision for or against an act. Life-world, therefore, is fundamentally pragmatic, and a world of interaction. Due to our own experience and experience's reflection, the life-world meets further development by being filled up with our experiences and the experiences of others. Thus, life-world is a constantly evolving environment. Meaning and schemes of interpretation are ensured in the social world (Schütz 1945: 543). This means that "[a]ll interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers, which in the form of 'knowledge at hand' function as a scheme of reference" (Schütz 1945: 534).

Schütz postulates two basic axioms which define the life-world as social world: "first, the existence of intelligent (endowed with consciousness) fellow-men and, second, the experienceability (in principle similar to mine) by my fellow-men of the objects in the life-world" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 59), since in the life-world naturally are fellow-men which phenotypically seem to be like oneself. These fellow-men are considered as "like me" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 17), their acting seems to be "like mine" (Galuschek 2014: 355). Thus, their acting is as subjective as our own acting, and it has to be concluded that the life-world is fundamentally intersubjective (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 17). Intersubjectivity requires an immediate perception of the fellow-man. But, a sharp distinction has to be made between the immediate perception of the other (the "fellow-man") and the mediated perception of the entire social world (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 59). Immediate perception is performed in direct encounters as face-to-face situations, wherein the other has to be perceived in the other's own existence. Schütz and Luckmann (1974: 61ff) call this perception the "thou-orientation".

Thou-orientation is not related to the experience of the other, rather it describes the mere perception of the other from a subjective point of view. In turn, the other

perceives also from her or his own subjective point of view. The mutual thou-orientation is a we-orientation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 64). The we-orientation is the basis for each social acting, since it provides the perception of the other. However, the "'pure' we-relation […] consists of the bare consciousness of the existence of an Other. It does not necessarily include the apprehension of his specific characteristics" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 64). As a result, we-perception builds the basis for knowledge about the other and other particular elements of social relationships: business calls as well as sexual acts are fundamentally we-relationships, since between all participants exists an immediate relationship. The phenomenal existence of we-relations tells us nothing about the duration of we-relations, which lies in the very hands of the immediate participants. In consequence, the development of we-relations traces back to individual experiences and individual knowledge, and thus to individual horizons. Nevertheless, due to permanent interaction with others, we are permanently situated in we-relations. "The life-world is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our *common experience"* (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 68).

If we-relations have been developed, and have become deeper, then 'foreign-experience' is performed. Foreign-experience can be defined as feedback-function. The own behavior causes the other's reactions which can be evaluated as positive or negative by oneself.

> In the we-relation our experiences are not only coordinated with one another, but are also reciprocally determined and related to one another. I experience myself through my consociate, and he experiences himself through me. The mirroring of self in the experience of the stranger (more exactly, in my grasp of the Other's experience of me) is a constitutive element of the we-relation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 67).

In doing so, we modify our behavior, which has direct consequences for the further development of we-relations. "[I]t is thus in the we-relation that the intersubjectivity of the life-world is developed and continually confirmed" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 68). Such relations of operation and interaction result from the dimension of 'we-relation' which can be certainly understood as 'foreign understanding'. In this

way the other is perceived as 'a foreign', but at the same time equally as a 'thou' which possesses a constitution similar to our own personal identity. That 'thou' is the pure perception of the other's existence, this stage of perception does not yet include the perception of individual characteristics (Grinnell 1983: 188). "The Thou-orientation can thus be defined as the intentionality of those Acts whereby the Ego grasps the existence of the other person in the mode of the original self" (Schütz 1967: 164). Considering that we are social beings, it is not possible to make experiences in isolation. Thus, social relations obtain projects of action. By this means "intersubjectivity is tied to the lived presence of the self with the other (i.e., sharing of time in the stream of duration), and […] the 'content' of this 'experience' is related to the being of the other" (Grinnell 1983: 185). At this point, it becomes clear that mutual understanding is relational to the contexts of relevance to which every one of us refers to. For the further investigation, it can be derived that one single theory of mind is not sufficient to surround all existing concepts of minds (Zahavi 2010: 302).

Within the life-world, there are not only fellow-men who know each other. It is hard to imagine, but it is even harder to realize. Most of the people who live on earth are unknown "contemporaries" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 69). Thus, the structure of the life-worldly inhabitants does not end here. Since we cannot maintain thou- and we-relations with the entire world, there is another group category which does not presuppose spatial and temporal immediacy.

> Spatial and temporal immediacy, a presupposition for the thou-orientation and the we-relation, is absent in my experience of contemporaries. Contemporaries are not bodily present; therefore they are not given to me in prepredicative experience as this particular unique person (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 73).

From the own point of view contemporaries are people, who do not belong to we-relations. It is common knowledge that these people exist, because by means of the "synthesis of my explication of the stock of knowledge concerning the social world" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 76), the number of people living on earth is well known. Since a face-to-face situation is not given, and honestly impossible, the knowledge about the contemporaries' existence is mediated. Thus, contemporaries are

anonymous people who walk through the social world. They are perceived within the "they-orientation" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 73). Since contemporaries are conceived from they-orientations, they are anonymous. Although a group consists of individuals, such a group has no individual characteristics. They incorporate a generalized other with specific group characteristics. Groups in they-orientation are important parts of the social world, because they fulfill important roles in social life, like police officers, judges and cashiers. They are also "certain types of contemporaries" with whom we are anonymously in contact (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 76). Each of these groups expects a particular behavior.

> When I conduct myself in a certain way and fashion, or omit the performance of certain acts, to introduce another example used by Weber, I do so in order to avoid the typically established conduct of typical contemporaries (policemen, judges) (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 73).

These expectations are related to particular purposes: money has to be given to the cashier to be allowed to take the purchase home. A particular kind of knowledge is necessary to be able to perform an adequate behavior towards people from the groups of they-relations: the knowledge of the social world. Additionally, it is possible that fellow-men become contemporaries, *and vice versa*. For instance, an old school friend can move away because of her job situation, or she has married, whereas my own lifestyle is bachelor-like. In such cases we-relations break up and the old school friend becomes a contemporary. In turn, due to common interests, a workmate who is also a bachelor steps into the we-relation.

In special cases, typifications are not applied to contemporaries but to fellow-people. Since a particular basis of knowledge and experience is always given, typifications are transferred to fellow-men in thou- and we-orientation. This kind of typifications is a mnemotechnique to categorize knowledge in an economic way. Thus, fellow-people can be 'people like …', but they remain individual in favor of the thou-orientation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 81). In a strict sense, people are aligned according to a coordinate system where on of the x-axis the value of proximity to oneself is decreasing proximity to oneself, while the decreasing value of the y-axis is the position to a particular other.



Figure 4: the proximity-position-scheme.

Figure 4 shows the proximity-position-scheme in the shape of a coordinate system. The blue smiley is our own self. Proximity as well as position is higher, the nearer they are to the blue smiley. Thus, the yellow smiley could be a parent or a sister or a brother, since the yellow smiley has a high value in both proximity and position. The green smiley has a high value in proximity, but a lower value in position, it could be a distant relative or a neighbor. The red smiley has a high value in position, but a low value in proximity. This smiley could be a colleague or supervisor who is held in respect, but has no proximity to the blue smiley. Other people do not just set themselves in these positions, but mostly, are set by others. The decision to set particular people in a particular way is led by acting motivations.

To understand the acting of others and the contexts of meaning, it is necessary to understand our acting motivation. Acts are 'projects' which imply particular intentions. They can be either conscious or unconscious. Since Schütz and Luckmann (1974) do not focus on the execution of the project of action, they highlight the importance of the action intention. They point out two reasons of motivational relevance: *in-order-to-motives* and *because-motives*, which are responsible for acting motives.

In-order-to-motives turn to the future. They are motivated by purpose, condition and the object of an act. Action motivation is founded in contexts of meaning. That correlates with a "*modo futuri exacti*" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 197), since the act

is related to particular expectations, and in the future the act is regarded as completed (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 213): thus, acting requires an already existing stock of knowledge (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 212).

Because-motives refer to past events and experiences. Hence, the motivated or induced experience as well as the motivating experience is situated in the past. The 'because' in the because-motive is an explanation *ex eventu* of the acting human.

Human acting, thus, is contingent on two time perspectives. It is motivated by the past, and of course, it is directed to the future. How to classify an act that is dependent on the act's because-motives (*Why I am acting?*) and the other that relates to the act's in-order-to-motives (*What I want to achieve?*). It was Ricœur (1984: 152) who said "[e]very story […] explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the question 'Why?' at the same time that it answers the question 'What?'". For the in-order-to-motives as well as for the because-motives of an act it is, once again, the sedimentations and the context of meaning that are important, and regarded as "history ('biography') and the conditions for the acquisition of knowledge" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 207).

3.4 Summary

With the philosophical concepts introduced here an excellent fundament is established for a link between philosophy and anthropology. Scheler's perception of personhood as shaping concept unifies the multifarious being of the human in one single phenomenon: the person. Acting, thus, does not stand for itself; rather it is always tied to the human as the author of the act. In this sense, Ricœur's approach has to be understood. Like an author, we recount our life to ourselves and to others. In every moment, we try to create a contingency, even if it lasts only for the moment. Our life is structured in synchronic and diachronic episodes and storylines, we spin red threads, or try to forget some experiences. Nethertheless, through such a treatement of our identity, we confirm our past self as actual self in every moment.

In this regard, from a philosophical point of view, we involve the life-world in our life, and, thus, in our action and interaction with others. This involvement leads to a thick interwovenness with others and the whole surroundings. We gain a certain

'sense' for our action as well as for the action of others, since we are aware of our action and of our role in society. Such a sense for action can be understood as empathic consciousness, which provides understanding of social interaction and our own role in society. Therefore, the next step we have to go is to investigate the aspects and problems of this human ability – empathy –, since empathic consciousness may be a human universal, but in every culture it is treated and interpreted differently.

4. Aspects and Problems of Empathy

Empathy and related concepts are a crucial factor in the humanities and social sciences to understand human motives of acting. Due to the heterogeneous fields of psychology, anthropology, sociology and the various fields of philosophy, there exist many approaches and concepts trying to describe empathy. The problem of the notion and concept of 'empathy' begins with its translation. Whereas, empathy is usually translated as German 'Einfühlung' (Wispé 1986: 315), nowadays, even in recent publications, the notion of empathy remains diffuse: it means "'feeling what we would feel in another's stead'" or 'the ability to understand others' (Keysers and Gazzola 2014: 1). As Hollan and Troop (2008: 391f), for instance, point out:

> empathy is a first-person-like perspective on another that involves an emotional, embodied, or experiential aspect. The emotional aspect is one of the things that distinguish it from other ways of knowing about people […]. It is one of the ways we know how and why people are thinking and feeling what they are, not just that they are.

This broad and general notion of empathy does not seem to have the ability to define the concept of empathy in a scientifically sufficient and adequate way. From a scientific point of view, 'empathy' has become an empty set. It can mean just all or nothing. In other words: "things remain murky" (Hollan and Throop 2008: 292). This statement is more fact than criticism because from such a definition it does not become clear, what distinguishes the concept of empathy from concepts like understanding, sympathy, and care. From the classical phenomenological point of view, empathy is a "distinctive mode of consciousness" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183).

> Empathy is defined as a form of intentionality in which one is directed towards the other's lived experiences. Any intentional act that discloses or presents the other's subjectivity from the second-person perspective

> counts as empathy. Although empathy, so understood, is based on perception (of the other's bodily presence) and can involve inference in difficult or problematic situations (where one has to work out how another person feels about something), it is not reducible to some additive combination of perception and inference (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183).

Approaches to the cultural sciences try to define empathy as a concept which fits every one of us, since they assume that every one of us has the ability to feel empathy. However, we handle our ability to be empathic in an individual way which depends on either our individual preferences or cultural framing. It is not easy to investigate in what degree each of these influences the ability to empathy. That makes it difficult to encompass such a diffuse field. Other recent researches claim that "our primary mode of understanding others is by perceiving their bodily behaviour and then inferring or hypothesizing that their behaviour is caused by experiences or inner mental states similar to those that apparently cause similar behaviour in us" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183). Thus, empathy is brought into a context with bodily behavior and gestures, as well as (intentional) actions, and other diffuse expressions, which are based on experiences and states of mind (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183). It cannot be disputed that empathy, in prior and in some recent research in philosophy as well as cultural sciences, was brought into relation to intentionality, intersubjectivity, capacity to act as well as moral sensations of care and sympathy (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183). In interaction theories, for instance, empathy has not been investigated up to a level where it plays that kind of central role it is supposed to do. Moreover, they are premised on, but not directly and consciously related to interaction. As Julia Thiesbonenkamp-Maag (2014: 119) point out, in social anthropology, the concept of care has hardly been considered. Especially for care, this means that care is understood as 'self-care' and – in the meaning of *caritas* – 'care for others'. Thus, care has an individual as well as an institutional meaning.

Considering all these fields to which empathy is related, it can be defined as "an essentially affective mode of understanding. Empathy involves being moved by another's experiences" (Halpern 2003: 670), and, in the context of care, empathy can "mean 'feeling with' another person or putting yourself in someone else's shoes. The

assumption is that emotional resonance with another clues you in to how they feel" (Halpern 2014: 301), "to see as others see […], to simulate oneness" (Mageo 2011: 69), even if it is for a short moment. In addition, there exist empathy concepts which highlight the opacity of the other's mind. This doctrine of the opacity of the other's mind is common in Melanesia; it stands for the respect for the other's thoughts and opaqueness. However, the problem of opaque minds also exists in Western societies, for instance, if emotional expressions of others are recognized but are not understood, as the motives for that emotional expression are not clear (Niedenthal and Maringer 2009: 122).

With no doubt, empathy is in relation to all these terms and concepts, but in particular empathy is exactly not one of this terms or concepts (Thiesbonenkamp-Maag 2014: 122f). In trying to explain empathy in a rational way, empathy can be understood as "dialogic process, which tends to be precise in the evaluation of another" (Thiesbonenkamp-Maag 2014: 123). In reference to Halpern (2001), Hollan and Throop (2011: 2) describe "empathy as a first person-like, experiential understanding of another person's perspective". Halpern (2001: 85) herself defines empathy as ability "to resonate emotionally with" another. This approach includes a certain imagination of the other's feelings (Halpern 2001: 92). Such a dialogical process cannot proceed with a particular evaluation of the other's feelings, since we have to understand the feelings of the other and find something inside ourselves, which seems similar to the other's feelings.

Since social relationships as a common kind of social phenomena are founded in empathy and related concepts like – to mention the most important – understanding, sympathy, care, ethos and theories of mind, it is not possible to avoid them. In social relations like families, friendships, partnerships, even in business and other professional fields, empathy helps to give understanding of the acting motivations of others and of ourselves, and helps to give a floating sense of interaction with others. Thus, empathy is directed to both the other and ourselves, which includes understanding, particular feelings, caring, but also a certain concept of a theory of mind, which allows making assumptions about the other's mind, thoughts and acts. Thus, empathy involves emotional components which, however, are founded on a basis of understanding as the cognitive component of empathy. Considering ourselves as inhabitants and participants of the life-world, understanding as a mode of

perception of the other, feelings of sympathy and care as modes of empathic directedness to another, and the ability of making assumptions about another's mind – or not, as the case may be – are relevant for establishing social relationships.

4.1 Understanding

Understanding as well as concepts of mind reading, regarded as an attempt to understand the other's behavior and thinking, are closely linked. "Understanding (*Verstehen*) is regarded as the primordial mode of being in the world. Thus, understanding becomes inseparable from human life" (Kämpf 2013: 90f). Traditionally, hermeneutics is *the* excellent classical philosophical method to take a very close look into understanding. However, hermeneutical understanding beares potentialities as well as problems (Angehrn 2008). In hermeneutics the ability to understand is given "only when we have understood the question to which it is an answer" (Gadamer 2003: 370). Understanding requires a deep-going personal as well as historical understanding of ourselves and our vital context. These are assumed to be human characteristics, or a specific human "mode of being" [*Seinsweise*] (Joisten 2009: 141); or in the idiom Gadamer (2003: 259) referring to Heidegger: "[u]*nderstanding* is […] the *original form of the realization of Dasein*, which is being-in-the-world". Or, in other – non-Heideggerian, easier – words: the human constantly *wants to* understand and thus *pursues* understanding. The human pursues this understanding not only of the world, but also of oneself's motives of acting and of one's own self. The world can be understood as a "web of meanings in which man is always already interwoven" (Kämpf 2013: 91). Therefore, Gadamer (2003) considers understanding as human disposition. This includes our attempt or willingness to understand, even if we only possess a limited account in terms of understanding. That implies that even wrong understanding *is real human* understanding. There is no 'mere' or 'vague' understanding; rather we are situated within a permanent dialectic of self-understanding and general understanding of the world. In other words: we are permanently situated between self-description and world-description (Angehrn 2008: 33). This mediation of understanding is not a direct process coming close to full general unterstanding, rather it is a permanent "intermediate stage"

[*Zwischenstadium*] (Angehrn 2008: 33). We are not able to understand the world in general. Like our life-wordly horizons, our understanding is limited. The intermediate stage keeps us on a level of permanent will to understand, since we pursue general understanding. Every time we understand, we are led to a new level of general understanding of the world, which, once again, leads to a new level of seeking general understanding. Thus, we become perpetual hermeneutists who permanently evaluate the world.

To ensure mutual understanding, the own perspectives and the perspectives of the other have to be mirrored in each other's view. From the perspective of the other, we must realize that the other is constituted similarly to us in the life-world. The purpose of understanding, however, is not to unmask or see through the other; rather the purpose of understanding is attempting to understand the meaning of the other's communication, and, by this means, the meaning of the other's acting (Angehrn 2008: 37). If we talk to another, it is not necessary to know this other. If we ask the way, we might ask a complete stranger. It is unnecessary to know the name, the age, or the living conditions of this stranger. The only thing which matters is to understand the stranger explaining the way. This refers to Gadamer's (2003) concept of 'fusion of horizons' [*Horizontverschmelzung*]. It means the symbiosis of biographical narratives between humans. If we meet, then, at the same time, cultural backgrounds and knowledge systems as horizons of personal/individual knowledge coalesce. Actually, it is exactly this moment Gadamer calls 'fusion of horizons'. Our understanding of the stranger's explanation of the way depends on the stranger's and our knowledge of a common language and most likely on the stranger's and our understanding of 'left' and 'right'. It might be even in the scenario that we question or even disagree with the stranger's explanation, but our understanding shall not be affected, since misunderstanding is also a mode of understanding. On this condition, we might understand each other, but we do not have to agree on the subject we talk about. Agreement is definitively excluded; rather Gadamer's purpose is to show that communication is nothing more than mere understanding. In doing this, fusion of horizons approximates the closest point of understanding between humans. Obviously, Jane is not Peter, thus, Jane and Peter can only understand each other about the subject of their conversation. The maximum level of understanding is reached and limited by the phrase 'I understand Peter's opinion according to ...'. It is impossible for

Jane (even in an idealistic sense) to entirely understand Peter. Therefore, Jane has to use the human-inherent empathic ability of understanding to be able to communicate with Peter.

It has to be determined that, in each instance, understanding is bounded by the degree of communication between humans. We are considered as constantly situated in a dialectic process of understanding, but also in constant interaction with the surrounding world. We always gain new knowledge about the world, about our own being, and our history. Therefore, understanding has a meaning-founding quality by filling up the world and its entities with meaning in regard to our self: "there is no self-understanding that is not *mediated* by signs, symbols, and texts; in the last resort understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these mediating terms" (Ricœur 1991c: 15). Such a sign can be the reaction on our action by others, since a reaction is a clear sign for another's evaluation of our action. This evaluation mirrors another's understanding of our action.

A closer look is now required at the performance of understanding. Approaching performance of understanding by linguistics, Ricœur considers that even a single word actually has potential meaning, but it cannot have concrete attributed meaning. Meaning is found in discourses which consist of sentences, and thus means language (Ricœur 1991d: 78). By implication, it can be derived that meaning is constituted by context. Depending on the context, a single word can have different meanings, like 'statistical *table*' or 'dining *table*'. Thus, only by understanding the context, words and, thus, sentences achieve clear and specific meaning.

Within the situation of everyday communication this might be true, the speaker is present to correct misunderstanding. On the communicative level of the text, however, a problem emerges:. "[t]he reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading" (Ricœur 1991a: 107). Thus, the reader has no communicative channel with the author; she or he is thrown back upon her- or himself. Here, another form of understanding occurs. The text as subject of communication can be interpreted always in a new context and so in a completely different way. This strong context-relatedness makes the contextualization of our life and individual lifetime experience possible. In a philosophical context, our ability to reflect can be called hermeneutical reflection. This kind of reflection enables understanding of the heard or read, and putting it in another context. On this highly

abstract philosophical level, hermeneutical reflection can be regarded as mode of empathic understanding. The reader has to understand the text of the author. But the reader cannot understand the text in the genuine meaning of the author's intention, rather it is an understanding of the context which is set in a new context of the reader's life. This means 'empathic understanding': the attempt of understanding another from the perspective of our biography. Since from prior experiences only can we imagine the experiences of others.

4.2 Feelings of Sympathy

To give the most general access to the theories of sympathy, I adopt with Scheler a philosophical approach to fellow-feeling. In this manner, narrow psychological definitions are excluded, and a broader access to sympathetic comprehension is given. Social communities require a deep understanding of the other and a deep consciousness of being part of the community as well as a deep consciousness of responsibility for our social role and for taking care of the other. These necessities lead not only to consciousand logical understanding, or to its negation – but also to emotional understanding. Unlike rational understanding which can be, as I show, emotional as well, sympathy and care possess a strong emotional part in a unique way because it is closely interwoven with consciousness and rationality. To be performed, sympathy as well as care must necessarily have a rational part, since they have to be anchored in our unconscious or conscious awareness.

In phenomenological philosophy, Scheler (1923, 1973c, 1979) elaborates a theory of feelings of sympathy wherein he distinguishes between several phenomena, which in common language have been mistaken for fellow-feeling. This confusion leads Scheler (1979) to a precise concept of "fellow-feeling"[16] which is an authentic sympathetic feeling with another. However, it does not enclose a so-called spontaneous act, a reaction, or a mere reproduction of feeling of the intention of another's act; and, above all, it is "not an action" (Scheler 1979: 67). Since it is directed to the surroundings, fellow-feeling is "*blind to value*" (Scheler 1979: 5) and

[16] In the German original text, fellow-feeling is called '*Mitgefühl*' (Scheler 1973c) which means as much as 'feeling *with* someone' or 'comprehend the feelings of someone'.

"essentially a reaction" (Scheler 1979: 6). 'Blind to value' means that fellow-feeling is not a conscious act, which requires a conscious recognition of the surroundings and an evaluation of a situation. Expressed in Scheler's (1979: 130) own words, it is "an ultimate and *original* function of the spirit, whose empirical genesis is in no way due, in the first place, to other processes, such as reproduction, imitation or hallucination, in the life of the individual". Thus, fellow-feeling is an intrinsic human disposition. Neither is it learned nor is there any one of us who lives without it. Since it is an empathic understanding, fellow-feeling founds social humanity as a human existential. In this manner, fellow-feeling founds human sociality by guiding our attention to someone or something in the surrounding world. Since fellow-feeling is not the only human phenomenon of feeling with someone or something, it is often confused with commiseration [*Mitleid*]. Scheler highlights the distinction between fellow-feeling and commiseration as "[t]he phenomenon of compassion, which is a heightened commiseration bestowed from above, and from a standpoint of superior power and dignity, commiseration displays its characteristic consideration for the *condition* of its object, in a special degree" (Scheler 1979: 39f).[17] From this definition derives, that commiseration as well as compassion operates in a moral dimension. Obviously fellow-feeling, as Scheler has elaborated, has nothing in common with commiseration. Actually, Scheler (1979: 41) calls commiseration a "*spurious* type of fellow-feeling"[18]. Perceived as an act of sorrow, to feel mercy or "[t]o commiserate is […] to be sorry at another person's sorrow, *as being his*" (Scheler 1979: 37)[19]. In contrast to fellow-feeling, commiseration lacks the aspect of reproduction of feeling. In the quotation above, in highlighting the "*as being his*", Scheler wants to underline the mental and emotional distance of commiseration. If we feel commiseration, we

[17] German original: "Besonders im Phänomen des 'Erbarmens' – das gleichzeitig ein gesteigertes Mitleiden von der Höhe herab, von der Höhe einer gesteigerten Macht und Würde her ist – nimmt das Mitleid diesen *seins*bezüglichen Charakter an" (Scheler 1973c: 51). In the English version, the term 'Erbarmen' is translated as 'commiseration' instead of 'mercy'. Commiseration would highlight the affective conversion into someone, instead of Scheler's focus on the suffering with someone, which is highlighted with the term 'mercy'.

[18] Scheler (1973c: 52) here writes about "*Schein*mitgefühl". This German connotation means a phenomenological perception of something A seems like B. In contrast, '*spurious*' means 'wrong', 'false', or 'not real'.In this English interpretation, an evaluation resonates, which the German notion does not include, since if we feel 'Scheinmitgefühl', it is true for us. In the German notion false belief is included, not a perceived value, since Scheler talks here about the phenomenological dimension, when the connotation of fellow-feeling is erroneously to commiseration, mercy, or compassion.

[19] German original: "Mitleiden, sahen wir, ist Leiden am Leiden des anderen *als dieses anderen"* (Scheler 1973c: 48)**.** The English translation is misleading, since it highlights 'to feel sorry'. Scheler means here the notion of 'to imagine the same pain' and 'to feel the imagined same sorrow of the other'.

feel another's sorrow "*as being his*": it is the other's sorrow as another's sorrow. The only thing we feel for this other is simply care for another. Thus, "[a] sympathetic person feels *along with* another person but not necessarily *into* a person" (Buchheimer 1963: 63). Fellow-feeling is not conceived in this way. It includes sharing of feelings, which results from an internalized foreign perception. The feelings of another have been understood. That makes obvious that fellow-feeling is not a mere reproduction of another's feelings. Indeed, it is possible to have, for instance, the idea of someone's toothache, but it is impossible to have the same toothache (Schloßberger 2003: 48).

Nevertheless, in everyday life, we call sometimes our sympathetic expressions 'fellow-feeling', but, indeed, they are emotional attitudes, which seem quite similar to fellow-feeling. Scheler (1979: 46) intends to separate these emotional attitudes from "genuine fellow-feeling" by distinguishing "from true fellow-feeling all such attitudes as merely contribute to our *apprehending*, *understanding,* and, in general, *reproducing* (emotionally) the experiences of others, including their states of feeling" (Scheler 1979: 8). Apprehending and understanding are, "in principle, some sort of *knowledge* of the fact, nature and quality of experience in other people, just as the possibility of such knowledge presupposes, as its condition, the existence of other conscious beings" (Scheler 1979: 8). Thus, we are able to realize and understand experiences of others "*without* any sort of fellow-feeling being entailed thereby" (Scheler 1979: 9)[20]. Even because of lifetime experience and knowledge, the events of others can be reproduced. However, the mere reproduction of another's feelings does not include fellow-feeling. By this means, we realize another's feelings, since "it is not the same as going through experience itself" (Scheler 1979: 9). In the case of reproduction of feelings no participation must be given, we "can remain quite indifferent to whatever has evoked it" (Scheler 1979: 9). Although these sympathetic varieties of curiosity are not similar to fellow-feeling, they build the fundament for fellow-feeling. Since fellow-feeling is a human disposition, it cannot be a mere conjunction or combination of the components of cognitive understanding and of emotional feeling. Without doubt, these components are fundamental parts of fellow-feeling, but fellow-feeling is more

[20] Scheler means here, and this makes the German original text clear – "*ohne* daß darum irgendeine Art des Mitgefühls gesetzt ist" (Scheler 1973c: 20) – that fellow-feeling is set as foundation of particular (affective) emotional expressions.

than just a mere conjunction or combination of all of them. In Scheler's view, it becomes clear that fellow-feeling has an extraordinary position in contrast to 'mere' empathy [*Einfühlung*], "which attempted to explain both [understanding and reproduction] at the same time" (Scheler 1979: 8). Thus, in Scheler's view, empathy is a mere conjunction or combination of apprehending or understanding and the intrinsic reproduction of another's feelings. What Scheler did not intend here was that his approach to fellow-feeling includes a deep-going and enriching approach to modern theories of empathy.[21] This position of fellow-feeling in our acting leads to a graduation of so-called phenomena of fellow-feeling (Scheler 1979: 12). In consequence, Scheler distinguishes four phenomena which are closely related to fellow-feeling: *community of feeling ["unmittelbares Mitfühlen"]*, *fellow-feeling 'about something' ["Mitgefühl 'an etwas'"]*, *emotional infection ["bloße Gefühlsansteckung"], and true emotional identification ["echte Einsfühlung"]* (Scheler 1973c: 23, 1979: 12).

Scheler's notion of *community of feeling* is performed, if we share "the 'same' sorrow, the 'same' anguish" (Scheler 1979: 12). There is not a symbiosis between us. Since we are two separate humans, we have at least two separate feelings. Even in this special case of a community of feeling, we can only emotionally overlap in one particular feeling in a particular situation we share; we have "a *feeling-in-common*" ["*Mit-einanderfühlen"*] (Scheler 1973c: 23, 1979: 13)[22]. This case is given, for instance, if parents mourn for the loss of their child (Scheler 1979: 12f). The overlap of the parents' feelings as community of feeling covers a specific emotional respect, because they will always have each a different consciousness and thus two separate perceptions; therefore, they will stay separately even if they share the same feeling over a certain period.

Fellow-feeling 'about something' is very similar to commiseration. As explained above, fellow-feeling is not commiseration, but both feelings have some aspects in common. "*All* fellow-feeling involves *intentional reference* of the feeling of joy or sorrow to the other person's experience" (Scheler 1979: 13). Even if it *is not* commiseration, fellow-feeling can contain commiseration. To underline this, Scheler (1979: 13) points out that commiseration and the sorrow commiseration is directed

[21] This tier of empathy I will explain later in part II of this work.
[22] Scheler's original term means more than a mere common feeling. It means 'sharing a feeling with each other'.

to are phenomenologically "*two different facts*". On the one hand, there is Jane who suffers, feels sorrow, or pain; on the other hand, there is Peter who commiserates Jane. Scheler (1979: 14) calls this particular reaction "actual 'participation'"[23]. Since fellow-feeling 'about something' can be joy and sorrow, this fact leads to an individual perception of fellow-feeling. Understood in a phenomenological way and in contrast to community of feeling, fellow-feeling 'about something' is a feeling that cannot be shared. Community of feeling demands to react in a proper way. This is not necessary for fellow-feeling 'about something'. Let me show this by Scheler's (1979: 14) own example:

> [t]he *cruel* man owes his awareness of the pain or sorrow he causes entirely to a capacity for visualizing feeling! His joy lies in 'torturing' and in the agony of his victim. As he feels, vicariously, the increasing pain or suffering of his victim, so his own primary pleasure and enjoyment at the other's pain also increases.[24]

It is obvious that the feelings of the cruel man are misled. The cruel man does not feel the sorrow of his victim; rather he *enjoys* his victim's sorrow. Here it is not about moral valuation, according to Scheler (1979: 14) the cruel man has a kind of "defect", because he does not feel what his victim feels. Such a defect has psychological reasons which include the lack of willingness or ability to let the other's feelings come close to oneself (Kruse-Ebeling 2009: 178).

Emotional infection is a case of "no true appearance of fellow-feeling" (Scheler 1979: 14), because it includes "neither a *directing* of feeling towards the other's joy or suffering, nor any participation in her experience" (Scheler 1979: 15)[25]. Emotional

[23] German original: "faktische 'Teilnahme'" (Scheler 1973c: 24). Literally translated, Scheler means a 'factual participation', which rather highlights the phenomenological attendance as participation within the life-world, at a particular moment.

[24] The Schelerian meaning here is: "Dem *Grausamen* ist der Schmerz oder das Leid, das er bereitet, durchaus in einer Funktion des Nachfühlens gegeben! Er hat gerade die Freude am 'Quälen' und der Qual seines Opfers. Indem er im Akte des Nachfühlens den Schmerz oder das Leid des Opfers steigen fühlt, wächst seine originäre Lust und das Genießen des fremden Schmerzes" (Scheler 1973c: 25). Special about that is the passage 'Indem er im Akte des Nachfühlens den Schmerz oder das Leid des Opfers steigen fühlt' which is translated with 'As he feels, vicariously, the increasing pain or suffering of his victim'. This signifies an actually existent reproduction of feeling, but in a wrong way.

[25] In the German orginal Scheler uses here the word 'intention' instead of 'directing': "Weder besteht hier eine Gefühls-*Intention* auf die Freude und das Leid des anderen, noch irgendein Teilnehmen an

infection is involuntary, infectious and unconscious (Scheler 1979: 15): it lets another's feelings look like our own feelings. For a short time a person can feel another's feelings, but not as the other's feelings, rather as her or his own feelings (Scheler 1979: 17). To perceive and to understand another as suffering is to feel the suffering by ourselves. As described above, emotional infection cannot be the same feeling; rather it is an imagination of another's pain. For Scheler emotional infection as phenomenon of fellow-feeling is important, since he uses it to underline the distinction between fellow-feeling and the common understanding of commiseration. Thus, emotional infection is related to fellow-feeling, but not to its 'false-friend' commiseration.

The last of Scheler's phenomena of fellow-feeling is *true emotional identification.* Unlike emotional infection, true emotional identification enables the emotional unity of two humans for a longer period. "[I]t is not only the separate process of feeling in another that is unconsciously taken as one's own, but his self (in all its basic attitudes) that is identified with one's own self" (Scheler 1979: 18). Herein, Scheler (1979: 19ff) distinguishes sharply several different cases. He puts forward, for instance, that emotional unity is given, if we identify ourselves with the surroundings. That is given within the relationship between patient and hypnotist, erotic interactions, etc. Though Scheler (1979: 26) lists the same case as Hegel (1979), and refers at this point to von Hartmann and Bergson, only one of Scheler's special cases of true emotional identification is interesting for this work's further investigation of recognition: the relationship between mother and child. Scheler assumes that "the formula that 'love' of another consist in assimilating the other's self into one's own by means of identification" (Scheler 1979: 26) appears exactly in the relationship between mother and child. This case is "unique", because the child "was once a spatial, corporeal 'part' of the one who loves" (Scheler 1979: 26). Even if they are two self-standing humans, they have a unique relationship with each other. The mother has a certain feeling for her child's needs, for instance, "a mother can make intuitive prognoses for the turn of a child's illness, which often astonish the doctor" (Scheler 1979: 28). From this example an 'unconscious understanding' for the child's needs can be derived. "The

seinem Erleben" (Scheler 1973c: 26). By using the word 'intention' the acting potential is highlighted, whereas 'directing' brings to the fore rather the movement towards someone, which does not necessarily include an acting potential in Scheler's sense.

intuitive *psycho-somatic unity* of mother and child is not so entirely severed by their physical separation that its place can be *wholly* taken by the interpretation of organic symptoms through a system of physical signs" (Scheler 1979: 28). Even though this relationship of mother and child lasts for the time of physical separation, it is the mother's love which enforces the relationship between mother and child (Scheler 1979: 27). The mother's love encourages the child "as an independent being" (Scheler 1979: 27). Here, Scheler contradicts former assumptions that motherly solicitude limits a child's development of independence, because, with her love, a mother mediates security, care, and understanding for the child as independent and self-standing individual. Against Hegel, Scheler points out that

> love 'in its deepest sense' does not consist in taking the other person and treating him as if he were identical with oneself. It is not a mere quantitative 'extension of self-love', nor is it a relationship of parts within a whole, whose collective exertions are devoted merely to its own (egoistic) self-maintenance, self-aggrandisement or growth. This is nothing less than a palpable *misrepresentation of the phenomenon* (Scheler 1979: 70).

Therefore, love cannot be a mode of emotional identification. It is even more. "If I take hold of someone and treat him 'as if' he were essentially identical with myself, this means that I am mistaken, firstly about his status in reality, and secondly about his nature" (Scheler 1979: 70). Perceived in this way, the struggle for recognition within the mode of love becomes impossible, since self-abandonment is excluded. We can only love each other, if we recognize our individuality, and, in mutual love, confirm each other in our individuality.

From these phenomenal classifications of fellow-feeling two compounds of fellow-feeling can be derived: the emotional and the cognitive. Fellow-feeling is performed, if cognitive understanding of the other's situation is given, but the mere understanding is not sufficient to perform fellow-feeling: emotional reproduction as emotional identification between us has to be given. Hence, only through understanding on a cognitive as well as emotional level, a holistic understanding of

the other is possible. And these abilities enable the recognition of "*any* organism as alive" (Scheler 1979: 31).

Finally, as a human disposition and way to perceive, understand and interact with others, fellow-feeling, interpreted as metaphysical cognitive function, appears to serve Scheler to overcome the illusion of solipsism.

> The dissipation of this illusion follows, necessarily and uniquely, from the effect of fellow-feeling in enabling us to grasp how a man, or living creature, as such, is our *equal in worth*; though naturally this does not at all exclude the secondarily given differences of worth between men (or living creatures) in respect of their *character.* This equality of worth once established, the other person also becomes *equally real* to us, thereby losing his merely shadowy and dependent status. But fellow-feeling can only effect this if its intention is directed upon the *essence* of the other person's ego (including its value-essence and the elements which make it up); of which it is no less capable than intuition, in the discernment of essences, or thought, in the contemplation of ideas (Scheler 1979: 60).

Fellow-feeling creates a bond between us, whereas we exist for ourselves. It leads the direction of perception and enables us to recognize others. Therefore, fellow-feeling is our spontaneous, naturally given act to be connected and linked with the life-world.

Scheler even goes a step further and develops a feeling-based model of intrinsic and evaluative perception. Philosophical insight is not only a particular way of cognition; it also refers to eros, understood as Platon's notion for love to knowledge and wisdom. Love as well as hatred provide an excellent account of the life-world's wealth of valuable things. "They represent a unique attitude towards objects of value, and it is certainly not just a cognitive function" (Scheler 1979: 148). Within philosophical insight, love and cognition are internally connected to each other (Albert and Jain 2000: 43). According to Scheler (1979: 152) love as well as hatred "can only be *exhibited*; they cannot be defined". Thus, they stand for our particular ability to perceive the world by our feelings. However, it is love, which precedes hatred, since hatred "is the result of some *incorrect* or *confused* love" (Scheler 1973d: 125). Perceived in this way, love is the fundamental condition of every individual

perception. "For love is that *movement of intention* whereby, from a given value A in an object, its higher value is visualized" (Scheler 1979: 153). "Hate is always and everywhere a *rebellion of our heart* and *spirit*" (Scheler 1973d: 127). Love fulfills the function of perception of the true values of life-worldly – animated and unanimated – things. "'Love is directed upon things as they are'" in their suchness (Scheler 1979: 159). Therefore, for us, things do not appear as 'better', but they appear in a 'higher value'. Such a value is not an additional one, rather it was always there, but it first appears within the act of love.

> [*L*]*ove is that movement wherein every concrete individual object* [thing] *that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.* (Hatred, on the other hand, is a movement in the opposite direction.) (Scheler 1979: 161).[26]

The value of a thing is perceived 'by heart' and by cognitive – epistemological – achievement. Scheler calls this perceptual attitude "taking an interest" (Scheler 1973d: 127). This attitude is always directed to things and their value, but love never is this value (Scheler 1979: 148). Deriving from this premise, Scheler can "speak of the primacy of love over cognition" (Scheler 1973d: 127). That makes love a 'headlight' or "a *pioneer* and a guide" (Scheler 1973a: 261), which leads our epistemological perception.

4.3 Care and Ethos

Related to the phenomenon of fellow-feeling is Heidegger's concept of care as conceptualized in *Being and Time* (1962). Fellow-feeling and care are mutually dependent: care needs fellow-feeling to understand and feel another's needs. In turn,

[26] German original: "*Liebe ist die Bewegung, in der jeder konkret individuelle Gegenstand, der Werte trägt, zu den für ihn und nach seiner idealen Bestimmung möglichen höchsten Werten gelangt; oder in der er sein ideales Wertwesen, das ihm eigentümlich ist, erreicht* (Haß aber die entgegengesetzte Bewegung) (Scheler 1973c: 164). The last part of the quotation "*das ihm eigentümlich ist, erreicht*" means that a value is not only intrinsic, but idiosyncratic.

fellow-feeling needs care to feel interest for the life-world of others. In the social and cultural sciences the concept of care has not been well investigated yet. Thus, I introduce the philosophical concept of 'care' [*Sorge*] and 'solicitude' [*Fürsorge*] developed by Heidegger (1962). His approach is fundamental ontological – strongly based on phenomenology – and – in a certain sense – hermeneutical, thus the Heideggerian conception of 'care' is unique on a high theoretical level. Whereas Heidegger's philosophy is difficult to read on a level of every day life, since it has a high level of abstraction, behind the scenes – as I argue – his philosophy has a high practical claim and implication. Heidegger's concern is to develop a fundamental ontology of our existence in a philosophical way, without being a philosophical existentialist. His philosophy is founded in Husserl's phenomenology, but claims to start methodologically earlier than the Husserlian phenomenological approach. Heidegger aims to explain our existence and our world without presetting a pregiven life-world.

Even more, in his philosophy Heidegger describes the process of our life-world's development as thrownness-in-the-world: according to him, the Being is thrown "into its 'there'" (Heidegger 1962: 174). Thus, our 'being' and our existence as 'there' become one. "The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*" (Heidegger 1962: 174).[27] Derived from the German original, 'delivered over' means to take responsibility for our Being and our being-'there' in the surrounding world. 'There', here, means the place, where the Being-there [*Dasein*] finds its complete expression as project. Thus, Dasein and world are inseparably interwoven with each other. "The 'that-it-is' which is disclosed in Dasein's state-of-mind must rather be conceived as an existential attribute of the entity which has Being-in-the-world as its way of Being" (Heidegger 1962: 174). Dasein is situated in a temporal structure whose foundation is Dasein's 'presence' [*Anwesenheit*][28]. "Entities are grasped in their Dasein as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with

[27] German original: "Der Ausdruck Geworfenheit soll die *Faktizität der Überantwortung* andeuten" (Heidegger 1967: 135). With the word 'Überantwortung', Heidegger underlines the aspect of *respons*ibility (cf. response) for the Being's own existence in the world as Dasein.

[28] Heidegger's term 'Anwesenheit' means more then the mere 'presence' of Being. The German term 'Anwesenheit' has to be understood as a presence closely related to the Being's nature. Thus, Being is not only present in the world with its physical presence; rather it is present with its nature, its character as a living, thinking and perceiving entity (Heidegger 1962: 47, cf. 1967: 25).

regard to a definite mode of time – the '*Present*'[29]" (Heidegger 1962: 47). Dasein is, eventually, in its there with all its being as presence. This presence influences the entire surroundings and the world. Thus, Heidegger develops an ontology of Dasein with high ontic respect. His concept of care is explained as a human existential, this means, care belongs fundamentally to our *Dasein* as factual existence.

Care is deeply interwoven with the Dasein's temporality and Dasein's being-in-the-world. If Dasein is regarded as our being who *is*, to speak ontologically, 'thrown in the world' as projection.

Dasein moves in the ontic world in its everyday life. Through its thrownness in the world, Dasein cares about its own being, since the world mirrors Dasein's temporality and transience. The intrinsic structure of care becomes visible in the nature of Dasein's existence. Through its thrownness and projection, it is a present entity with direction to the future. It seems that it is "constantly 'more' than it factually is"(Heidegger 1962: 185). However, "Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less" (Heidegger 1962: 185). In fulfilling its presence in being, it becomes what it is (Heidegger 1962: 186). Care, therefore, means Dasein's presence and being. By implication, Dasein cares about its surroundings, and through world-related time, Dasein can observe its transience. It stands in a clearing [*Lichtung*], which means a place of consciousness and awareness by illumination. "To say that it is 'illuminated' ['erleuchtet'] means that *as* Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself the 'clearing'" (Heidegger 1962: 171). Here, it is obvious that Dasein has an immediate perception of the world. Dasein 'lights up' its surroundings to understand it. "Things show up *in the light of* our understanding of being" (Dreyfus 1993: 163). Clearing, thus, means a bright focus of understanding the world. "Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark" (Heidegger 1962: 171). Obviously, Dasein, world and Dasein's temporality are deeply interconnected. Understanding and thinking are for Heidegger fundamental human dispositions.

[29] The German connotation of 'present' [*Gegenwart*], is derived from the Middle High German, there it had only the meaning of 'Anwesenheit' without a temporal relation, like the Englisch 'being there' (Hennig 1974: 136).

Dreyfus (1993: 238) offers an interpretation of Heidegger's concept of care by relating Dasein's thrownness in the world to caring as the fundamental feeling of 'there' [*da*]. At this point, 'there' marks a particular consciousness of Dasein. This consciousness is clearly associated with Husserl's intentional consciousness, but Heidegger does not aim to set Dasein's consciousness in a phenomenological context, rather in an ontological context. Thus, Dasein's consciousness is personal and context related, as far as Dasein's own thrownness in the world and the world are connected. Dasein, however, is not considered as a classical subject, or even an object. "Dasein is 'between' subject and object […]. Rather Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is always already outside itself, formed by shared practices, and absorbed in active coping" (Dreyfus 1993: 163). Thus, Dasein utilizes the "*entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand)*" (Heidegger 1962: 120). Dasein "has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this *submission* belongs essentially to its Being" (Heidegger 1962: 121). Submission [*Angewiesenheit*] here means the link between Dasein and world, which has a referential character. Being-in-the-world, thus, has its intrinsic constitution as Being-in (Heidegger 1962: 79). It is a way of active participation, like

> having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining … All these ways of Being-in have *concern* as their kind of Being (Heidegger 1962: 83).

Being-in is a mode of Being, it is the condition to 'get in touch' with other entities in the world. "When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore are *worldless* in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them *'be' 'alongside'* the other" (Heidegger 1962: 81f). 'Present-at-hand' here means actual presence in the world by a given perception. Being-in thus is a necessary condition to perceive and understand the world and its entities. It is the link between Dasein as a single entity and the others considered also as Dasein, or as Heidegger likes to call 'the others': Being-with. By moving in the world, Dasein is not only a being, but also a Being-with by meeting others in the 'with-world' [*Mitwelt*]. Regarding Dasein as a

single entity between others, the concept of Dasein is enlarged by putting a Being-with in the Dasein's world. "By reason of this *with-like* [*mithaften*] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a *with-world* [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is *Being-with* Others. Their Being-in-themselves with-in-world is *Dasein-with* [*Mit-dasein*]" (Heidegger 1962: 155). Being-with thus is the mode of being which enables recognizing the others in the world. In fact, the ontological structure of Dasein and Being-with is the same, since each Being-with is a Dasein, *and vice versa* (Heidegger 1962: 156). In consequence, Dasein in its within-the-world [*Innerweltlichkeit*] is always 'essentially' Dasein-with (Heidegger 1962: 156). Despite arguing that "[t]he expression 'Dasein' […] shows plainly that 'in the first instance' this entity is unrelated to Others" (Heidegger 1962: 156), it is as Being-in necessarily related to others. Thus, "'Dasein is essentially Being-with'" (Heidegger 1962: 156). Considering the essential Being-with others within Dasein, Being-in as 'concern' about entities which are present-at-hand in the world include one's own Dasein (Heidegger 1962: 83).

Interpreted on a phenomenological level, Being-with ensures the recognition of others and ourselves by directing our awareness to our Being as well as to the other Being. Fundamental ontological speaking, this is a fundamental structure of Heidegger's Dasein, since Dasein cannot be the only existence in the world. Thus, Heidegger has to elaborate a connection between all Beings. By integrating a double structure into the concept of Dasein, the Dasein appears, as mentioned above, between subject and object. It is only directed to perceive its own Being-with and the one of others.

The structure of care ensures Dasein's ability to act, but as essentially Being-with Dasein is woven into an immanent structure with others (Rousse 2013: 19). Care and solicitude are in a special way related to Heidegger's notion of 'freedom'. To explain this, it has to be considered that 'freedom' in Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1962) has a dual structure. Freedom lies in the possibility of the mode of being: "Dasein is the possibility of Being-free *for* its ownmost pontentiality-for-Being" (Heidegger 1962: 183). Dasein is free to choose between the given possibilities which arise from Being-in-the-world. By implication, and this point is derived from the precedent one, freedom means 'Being-towards-death' [*Sein zum Tode*] (Heidegger 1962: 311). Being conscious about one's own death, brings Dasein in the situation to

feel the freedom to act, since it is alive. It enables Dasein "*being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude*" (Heidegger 1962: 311). Dasein is free in its Being by means of being independent of others. Nevertheless, it is concerned about other entities within the world as well as about its Being, thus, through the "potentiality-for-Being" it is directed to the future (Heidegger 1962: 159). By this means, Dasein is concerned at using entities, and it is concerned by being free to develop its own Being.

> The world not only frees the ready-to-hand as entities encountered within-the-world; it also frees Dasein, and the Others in their Dasein-with. But Dasein's ownmost meaning of Being is such that this entity (which has been freed environmentally) is Being-in in the same world in which, as encounterable for Others, it is there with them (Heidegger 1962: 160).

In consequence, freedom enables possibilities, but also concern on a social level, since Being-with is being with others *and* oneself as own Being-with. "Thus as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others" (Heidegger 1962: 160). 'Care' as German 'Sorge' has a great holistic connotation as "'cares of the world'" (Dreyfus 1993: 239). Heidegger does not propose an abstract concept of care, but rather wants to show with his ontological concept of care that every being is supposed to care about the world and others. "Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, […] Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as *solicitude* [Fürsorge]" (Heidegger 1962: 237). Even without care Dasein would be Being-with, but without an immediate realization of other Beings, since Being-with only ensures the mediated awareness of others in the world. Thus, care effects that Dasein is not indifferent to other Beings (Marx 1986: 22), rather it "lies 'before' ['vor'] every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially *a priori*; that means that it always lies *in* them" (Heidegger 1962: 238). Solicitude, thus, is a direct reaction to others as Being-with.

Heidegger uses both terms, care and concern, to describe the readiness-to-hand of objects and other entities. One has to consider the ontological difference between objects and other – real living – entities. By anchoring concern as a fundamental

structure in Dasein, there are objects of concern [*besorgen*] and solicitude [*Fürsorge*][30] for others as Dasein as well as the own being as Dasein. Thus,

> [t]his kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a '*what*' with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it (Heidegger 1962: 159).

Thinking one-step ahead, solicitude completes Dasein's (self-)care and Dasein's care of others: It is "the shepherd of being. It is in this direction alone that *Being and Time* is thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as 'care'"(Heidegger 1998: 252, cf. 1962: §44c).

For Heidegger, to put something in language is to fulfill the act of understanding: Something is perceived, thought, and understood, since "in thinking being comes to language" (Heidegger 1998: 239).

> Thinking builds upon the house of being, the house in which the jointure [sic!] of being, in its destinal unfolding, enjoins the essence of the human being in each case to dwell in the truth of being. This dwelling is the essence of 'being-in-the-world' (Heidegger 1998: 272).

Consequently, for Heidegger (1998: 239), "[l]anguage is the house of being". Dwelling is a comfort zone of perception and existence. It makes the clearing appear as a horizon of familiarity. In the context of dwelling, Heidegger sets understanding into relation with language, since language is the ontological and phenomenal expression of Dasein's understanding. Language and thought correspond with Heidegger's notion of 'care'.

> Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all *praxis*. Thinking permeates action and production, not through the grandeur of achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the

[30] In English the similarity between 'besorgen' and 'Sorge' does not exist, here one has to compare the references 'to bring' or 'to provide'.

> humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment (Heidegger 1998: 274).

Thus, dwelling is "in which the essence of the human being perserves the source[31] that determines him" [*Herkunft seiner Bestimmung*] (Heidegger 1998: 247). This refers to the origin of Dasein in its Being, but also to the direction of Being through care. This way shows once more, Dasein is directed to the future with the intention to fulfill the possibilities of Being in concern of its own Being and the Being of others. That moves concern, care, and solicitude to the center, and, at the same time, to the origin of understanding of the world (Heidegger 1962: 273) and of the others as Being-with.

> *Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of* […]. As a disclosure, understanding always pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962: 184).

Interpreted on a hermeneutical level, care and solicitude mirror the consciousness and awareness of Dasein as being-in-the-world and being-with with others. They have a "primordial structural totality", and thus, they lie "'before' ['vor'] every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially *a priori*" (Heidegger 1962: 238). In order to draw a preliminary conclusion: care and Being-with are the basic formal structure of Dasein to perceive the world in which it is moving in. Regarded from this perspective, and also from solicitude as self-care, selfhood is inherent in the structure of care and thus in the structure of Dasein (Käufer 2013: 343).

Through its intrinsic and fundamental function within Dasein, understanding itself has an 'existential structure'. Dasein understands through attunement [*Gestimmtheit*], which is a "'state-of-mind' [*Befindlichkeit*] […] *ontologically* [it is] the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned" (Heidegger 1962: 172). In consideration of the state-of-mind of Dasein as the reference of Being-

[31] The German word 'Herkunft' read as 'origin' or 'source' has stronger reference to 'Zukunft' (future) than the English words ‚origin' or ‚source' and ‚future' would suggest. In the context of Heidegger's philosophy this means, Dasein comes from an abode and moves further through the forward directed care and through understanding to a 'future being'.

in-the-world, the character of understanding thus shifts to a prepredicative and prereflexive mode (cf Marx 1986: 17).

> In the state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has. As an entity which has been delivered over to its Being, it remains also delivered over to the fact it must always have found itself – but found itself in a way of finding which arises not so much from a direct seeking as rather from a fleeting (Heidegger 1962: 174).

By means of a steady Being-in-the-world, Dasein has no choice as to perceive through an 'attuned' consciousness, which leads – or lets Dasein 'flow' – through the consciously perceived world by mood. The state-of-mind as mood discloses the perception of Dasein's world, it "*closes* it *off*", however, by focusing on particular aspects inked by mood (Heidegger 1962: 175). That makes attunement dependent on the state-of-mind, which finally leads to subjective, but also intuitive perceptions of the world.

Understanding as an intuitively felt perception underlines Dasein's moving forward towards possibilities (Heidegger 1962: 184f). To lead this movement, a stock of experience, as explained above following Schütz and Luckmann (1974), is needed. This is the 'conscience'[32]. It "gives us 'something' to understand; it *discloses*" (Heidegger 1962: 314). It is the voice from the inside which tells something already known, since "[*i*]*n conscience Dasein calls itself*" (Heidegger 1962: 320). Conceived from this point of view, conscience is the call of care (Heidegger 1962: 319ff). Or, to put it down more to the point, conscience "manifests itself as an *attestation*[33] which belongs to Dasein's Being" (Heidegger 1962: 334).

[32] In Heidegger's terminology, 'conscience' is the German 'Gewissen'. He changes the meaning of conscience as moral instance to a kind of knowledge (Wissen), which is already prior known and therefore 'in mind'.

[33] 'Attestation' is the English translation for 'Bezeugung'. As with 'Gewissen' and 'conscience', this meaning does not cover the whole meaning of Heidegger's usage. 'Bezeugung' also means 'testimonage', which means here, 'being testimonial for the already known', and 'being responsible for remembrance of the known.'

Heidegger distinguishes here between 'theory' and 'practice'. For him, it is obvious that praxis is related to movements and actions, whereas theory is related, for instance, to "'political action'" (Heidegger 1962: 238). Nevertheless, "'[t]heory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as 'care'" (Heidegger 1962: 238). In conclusion, it has to be said that care, concern and solicitude motivate Dasein's moving and acting on a theoretical and practical level in the focus of its Being-towards-death.

The argument of *Being and Time* (1962) ends at this point, since in this work Heidegger dissociates himself from an ethical aspect, or then an ethical character of Dasein. Since it is on such an abstract level, there is no space for practical moral values and norms in his philosophy. Nevertheless, a relation between Heidegger's structure of Dasein and ethics may be discernible. It has to be asked what are the fundamental characteristics of being human? Considering Heidegger's structure of Dasein, as decribed above, the chraracteristics of being human are mortality and sociality (Marx 1986: 12, 16). These characteristics refer directly to the Dasein's understanding, its conscience and its pursuit of care for itself and for others.

The relation between understanding, conscience and care in Heidegger's philosophy enables the question about ethos (*ἔθος*), which means 'character', 'custom' or 'habit', but also covers the notion of "space, place, or location […] [which] helps to reestablish *ethos* as a social act and as a product of a community's character" (Reynolds 1993: 327). Considering these notions of ethos as human characteristics and the philosophy of Dasein as fundamental ontology, we are directly refered to the fundamental being of the human. For that reason, Heidegger rethinks his position towards Dasein and ethos in his *Letter on 'Humanism'* (1946). The fundamental question about ethos is to ask what does the 'humanum' in the word 'humanism' mean for us as humans? And the complex – Heideggerian style – answer is: "'*humanum*' in the word points to *humanitas*, the essence of the human being; the '-ism' indicates that the essence of the human being is meant to be taken essentially" (Heidegger 1998: 262). And the relation to ethics is explained as follows:

> [i]f the name 'ethics,' in keeping with the basic meaning of the word *ἔθος*, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of

> the human being, as one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics (Heidegger 1998: 271).

Such a point of view makes ethics in a traditional and modern sense superfluous. If in ethics something is furnished with a value, this 'something' is objectified (Heidegger 1998: 265). "Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be" (Heidegger 1998: 265). This position does not mean to negate values or to say everything is worthless, but this position also sets a critical focus on the action of evaluation, which leads to a necessary objectivation of the evaluated thing. Heidegger refuses to begin his argument with the modern interpretation of ethics; rather he begins at the roots of this word: ethos. For Heidegger, ethos

> means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving resides in a nearness to him, to appear. The abode of the human being contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to the human being in his essence (Heidegger 1998: 269).

Considering Dasein as standing in the clearing through its Being and thus gaining understanding, because of having cared for it, ethos describes the mode of standing in the clearing (as described above). Being-in as standing in the clearing of Being, interpreted in this way, is dwelling. Thus, care functions as a kind of 'back door' for ethics understood as ethos. Ethos regarded as situation or place in Heidegger's understanding, means the clearing of being wherein the Dasein dwells. However, for Heidegger, dwelling means more as the mere existence or just standing in the clearing of Being. It means to live in the "house of being" (Heidegger 1998). That house is, as shown above (Heidegger 1998: 254; 272), language which manifests itself by thinking. Thus, for Heidegger (1998: 271), "thinking that inquires into the truth of being and so defines the human being's essential abode from being and toward being is neither ethics nor ontology". Rather ethics and ontology is our original and fundamental being. By situating fundamental human characteristics within theoretical constructs, means to include the possibility that several humans exist who

do not have these characteristics. Every existing human is an existing being in the fact that is true. The same is for ethos, since we possess the ability to perceive, not limited to the eyes but with other senses as well, the surroundings, and over lifetime develop a particular idea of understanding the world. In Heidegger's thinking, as it has been shown, any other assumption is impossible, since Heidegger aims to overcome the Kantian thinking and the related problems of metaphysics. Ethics are for him a part of metaphysics (Heidegger 1962: §1, 1998: 243). In Heidegger's approach to the human's Dasein, "there is no thought without the ethical, without a 'decision' about the stance toward the other, without, in other words, an ethical inflection" (Ziarek 1995: 389). Dasein does not have first to perceive and recognize normative values, rather they are already disclosed (Rousse 2013) and thus already part of Dasein's essence.

Here ethos comes close to Aristotle's "intuitive reason" (νοῦς) as he described it in *The Nicomachean Ethics* (2009: 8.6–7), which does not need further conscious reflection or nourishes itself from experience and other stocks of knowledge; it is a spontaneous, but still intellectually perceiving reaction to the surroundings. In *The Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle regards it as the ability to perceive the fundamental facts of the world or the "first principles"(2009: 1.7). Thus, Aristotle aims to sketch the human ability to think and understand as fundamental human intellect. This human ability can be understood as "reasonable perception" or "reasonable insight" (Marx 1986: 22); but this kind of perception or insight is contrary to sensual perception. It sheds a light of reasonable insight on the perceived world. It is prereflexive and preconscious, even before attunement arises or considering or judging (Marx 1986: 22).

In the context of care and reasonable insight, the movement of Dasein is furnished with a poetic character. From the perspective of the fundamental structure of care and ethos, acting becomes intentional. Since caring about the Being-with is a mode of reasonable insight and introduces an attitude of responsibility, ethics as a sometimes hard to explain construct of rules, maximes, and norms is not necessary at all (Marx 1986: 24). If care ensures intersubjectivity through concerned directedness, Being-with in the with-world, thus, is always the "ontological destiny" (Marx 1986: 28).



Figure 5: trias of Dasein – Being-with – care.

Figure 5 enclosing the trias *Dasein – Being-with – Care* shows that care ensures the intersubjectivity to be able to introduce the concerned directed solicitude towards Being-with; here should be considered once more – as the fountain arrow shows – that every Being-with is a Dasein, *and vice versa*. Thus, Being-with is within the trias of *Dasein – Being-with – Care* the component which ensures sociality. Here it becomes visible how they build up our ability to act. Care ensures the identification of Dasein as Being-with through social interaction. However, it has to be emphasized that due to this structure Dasein is not fundamentally social (Zahavi 2005: 164). It refers rather to a permanent and continuous Dasein with others (Glendinning 1999: 59), with an attached ability to care.

4.4 Theories of Mind

As we have seen above, understanding is a crucial factor to perform empathy. From the cognitive and the anthropological point of view as well as from the standpoint of the philosophy of mind, understanding as a mode of empathy is described in several 'theories of mind' or/and 'theories of mindreading'. Besides the critique of the theory of mind in practical psychological essays (e.g. Apperly 2012), I would like to introduce the term 'theory of mind' as a very generous notion to describe empathy as human

ability. 'Theory of mind' can be understood, in general, as ability to perceive others as being human just like ourselves. In academia, theory of mind is usually defined as our consciousness to attribute mental states to us and others, and thus to understand our and other's beliefs, desires, and intentions (Apperly 2012: 826; Astuti 2012). This is one side of the theory of mind. Astuti (2012) points out another factor within the theory of mind:

> [*w*]*e use Theory of Mind to attribute knowledge and ignorance, emotions and thoughts, intentions and desire to others, and to predict and explain their behaviour (this is the second reason it has been called a theory: because it is used to make predictions)*.

By this means, theory of mind concerns "the human being and his/her possible relationships to others […], the inner life and its transparency for others" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 237). Alternatively, to put it in a more vivid picture:

> [h]aving a Theory of Mind […] means having the capacity to go beyond the surface, beyond the behaviour and the actions to the intentions, the desires, the beliefs that motivate them. From this 'deeper' perspective, the world is not just made up of arms, legs and eyes that move in a coordinated fashion; the world is also made up of a host of mental states – your own and those of others – that direct and animate what those arms, legs and eyes do (Astuti 2012).

Empathy, which can be described with concepts of the theory of mind, is crucial for individual interaction with others, because it ensures understanding and abstract imagination.

Theory of mind has been, and still is, investigated since decades. Even in newer research the strongly criticized (e.g. Träuble et al. 2010; Sodian 2011; Slaughter and Repacholi 2012), most famous example in development psychology to prove or disprove theory of mind for children is the false-belief-test. This task was first developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983).



Figure 6: the false-belief-task.

In this false-belief-task (figure 6), a young child observes how a puppet named Maxi hides a chocolate in a location1. Then Maxi 'leaves' the room, and the experimenter takes the chocolate and hides it in a location2. Now, the child is asked where Maxi would look for the chocolate. A child, which does not have a sense of theory of mind, would answer that Maxi would look for the chocolate at location2, because the child has no idea, even it cannot imagine, that Maxi does not know that the chocolate changed its location. A child, which has a sense of a theory of mind, would answer that Maxi should look for the chocolate where the puppet has left it, since Maxi has not seen the experimenter, and thus Maxi has no idea that the chocolate's location has changed. Thus, an adequate prediction of another's behavior is only possible with a sense of a theory of mind. Nowadays, this task is criticized for only focusing on the explicit development of a theory of mind, therefore, recent research has been focused on investigations of implicit development of theory of mind (Träuble et al. 2010). By this means, the focus of investigation shifts from asking children "direct questions

about an actor's belief" to measuring "'spontaneous' responses" (Träuble et al. 2010: 435).

Nowadays, there exist several theoretical research concepts of a theory of mind (Träuble et al. 2013), thus, *the* theory of mind does not exist (Apperly 2012). All concepts of a theory of mind provide a particular aspect of our affective and cognitive understanding. Birgit Träuble, Andrea Bender, and Christoph Konieczny (2013: 16f) point out five "[d]ifferent accounts" of a theory of mind, which itself differ in method and focus. For instance, they list *modular accounts* of a theory of mind, which assume that a theory of mind is activated by a module within the first three years of life (Träuble et al. 2013: 16f). Thus, it is assumed that there exists a cognitive module which enables the ability of a theory of mind to a particular point in time in child development. There are *theory theory* accounts which assume that infants have 'intuitive theories' about the world, for example, about biology, physics and psychology. This theory assumes an inherent mode of a theory of mind, which allows mental interpretations of perceiving the world and making intuitive assumptions about how the world works. One might say, this theory theory account assumes a theory of mind since birth. Another account is the *simulation theory* which assumes, contrary to theory theory accounts, that mental interpretations are not theory-based, rather they depend on "direct experience of our own inner mental processes" (Träuble et al. 2013: 17). Oriented by interaction theory accounts are *social-constructivist approaches*. These approaches assume that infants or children actively develop their theory of mind by interacting with the surroundings. Last to mention are *domain-specific accounts*. These approaches focus on specific domain which are assumed to be crucial for the development of a theory of mind, like working memory, general cognitive abilities etc. (cf. Träuble et al. 2013: 17; Wassmann and Funke 2013). All of these examples of different accounts refer to the infant development of a theory of mind, but some accounts even might contradict each other. This fact shows that the research on a theory of mind has not reached a sufficient level yet. It is not the purpose of this work to bring all this approaches on a 'green road', even on a philosophical level. Nevertheless, and without doubt, a theory of mind and a broadly conceived ability to mind reading as ability to make assumptions about another's behavior can be regarded as human disposition. This fact is supported by recent research on a theory of mind of infants (Träuble et al. 2010; Wellman 2011). This

research points out that a theory of mind is not a phenomenon which only can be observed in children from three years upwards; rather, a theory of mind is a phenomenon which starts much earlier, even in six months old infants (Sodian 2011). Beate Sodian (2011: 40) lists several experiments with infants from the age of 18 months till the age of six months, which already show "dispositional predicates (the 'helper', the 'hinderer') from behaviors displayed by particular agents, and they interpret subsequent events accordingly". Such developments in recent research can lead to the conclusion "that there is an 'underlying universality of cognitive processes' [and] that 'cultural differences in cognition reside more in cognitive styles than in the existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another'" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 244). This conclusion is in contrast to the assumption that cognition is

> information processing, analogous to how information is processed in a computer. And for a long time, cognitive scientists were assuming that the processor and the algorithms with which it operates are shared by all humans, and that only information and output is culture-dependent (Andrea Bender in Wassmann and Funke 2013: 244). [34]

Actually, the opposite is the case, recent researches have proven that "the cognitive processes depend on cultural input […]. Not only the contents of the processing, but also the processing itself, thus, the basic cognitive processes are influenced by culture" (Andrea Bender in Wassmann and Funke 2013: 244f; cf. Domahs et al. 2010; Haun et al. 2011).

4.5 The Problem of the Opacity of Mind

Only in Western discourses, the theory of mind is recognized and practiced actively. In non-Western cultures, there can exist cultural restrictions, which lead to perceptions of "opaque" minds (Stasch 2008). The "doctrine of 'the opacity of other

[34] This quotation refers to personal communication by Wassmann and Funke with Bender.

minds'"(Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 408) is practiced, since the "sensitivity about not presuming to know others' minds is intertwined with sensitivity about not presuming to impinge on each other's self-determination" (Stasch 2008: 443). Thus, the opacity of mind is the downside of empathy. If we are empathic, then we try to understand the other. Therefore, we impose our thoughts on the other. The other is not free to explain her or his thoughts, desires and beliefs, because the person spoken to is already in the mode of interpretation, and merges her or his own thoughts with the assumed thoughts of the other. In consequence, these assumed thoughts of the other *are not* the thoughts of the other anymore. If we try to understand the other's thoughts, a translation of the other's thoughts to our own way of thinking is performed. Thus, the other's thoughts are merged in our translation. Since we are prone to endless interpretations and have a disposition to understand (Gadamer 2003), the state of truly understanding the other in this others own thoughts, thus, is completely unachievable.

Despite the fact that the phenomenon of opacity of mind has been first observed in the Pacific area, "[t]he opacity doctrine is not limited to the Pacific […], and it is likely that in most societies one can occasionally find people ruminating on how difficult it is to see into the hearts and minds of others" (Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 408). Keane (2008: 475) argues at this point of understanding of the other that "[o]pacity claims, then, would seem to be less about intentions than they are about *talk about* intentions". Thus, speech is regarded as "'mere talk' or 'just talk' – not something one should treat as of much importance" (Robbins 2008: 421). Here, Keane takes for example a woman from Bosavii. He concludes from her utterances that the doctrine of the opacity of mind does not

> deny the reality of other minds and those inner intentions – they are not really the expressions of behaviorism they sometimes seem to be – so much as they respond to a certain phenomenology of mental and social experience" (Keane 2008: 475).

From Keane's point of view (2008), the claim of universality of the theory of mind is proven to be true, because children have to be "conformed" and "[t]hey have yet to learn not to impute intentions to others or at least not to do so publicly and explicitly,

to put those intentions into words" (Keane 2008: 475). The awareness of other minds is given, but these other minds are treaten like "hidden interior" about which one does not like to talk about (Keane 2008: 475; cf. Meinerzag 2006). Considering this 'hidden interior', Keane gives a psychological and a very pictorial metaphor. First, the psychological metaphor, the "inner theater",

> in which the self is divided into a speaker and an addressee. Thought then becomes a kind of reported speech […]. [T]he basic way of talking about one's own thoughts is in a reported speech frame: 'My heart says...' 'My heart told me...,' and so forth. Thus my own thoughts in this inner theater are portrayed as so many words in an introjected social interaction in which I play two parts. The heart is the speaker, and the reporting 'I,' the person who reports on the words of the speaker, is the actor, the person who carries out the action in response to the words of the heart. This might be a folk model of intentionality, and a good candidate for the psychological reading of opacity claims (Keane 2008: 475).

In the case of the opacity of mind, to hear someone talk about her or his inner thoughts – to see this 'inner theater' – is not "just intruding on someone's interior or private space", but also "being made witness to the embarrassment" of losing the ability of hiding this 'inner theater' (Keane 2008: 477). In turn, as Robbins and Rumsey (2008: 408) point out,

> people tend to put little store in the veracity of what others say about their own thoughts, rarely expecting that they can take such reports as reliable guides to how those who make them will behave in the future.

Due to cultural impact the doctrine of the opacity of mind is deeply and firmly embedded in our cognitive structure so that there is no chance to believe someone who talks about the own inner thoughts and to get access to that other's thoughts. To put it simple: it is socially not assumed to talk about inner thoughts, neither about our own thoughts nor the thoughts of others. The opacity of mind thus keeps our thoughts and the 'inner theater' safe. For Keane (2008: 477), it is not about the claim of

unawareness of an other's thoughts, they are truly "unspeakable". At this point the question of morality rises. Keane (2008: 478) points out that it is not about whether thoughts can be put in words adequately; rather it is a cultural claim which is traditionally rooted. Traditional moral norms are speaking here: we are able to talk about our thoughts, others are not permitted to do so. The second 'pictorial' metaphor is about the pocket, and what we all carry with us.

> What have I got in my pocket? In many accounts from Melanesian societies, the pocket is often where I can keep goods out of sight from those who might make a claim on them. We see here a link […] between material exchange and acts of hiding or revealing one's inner thoughts or one's inner self […] The links across semiotic modalities, from words to material goods, develop parallels between thought and its expression, on the one hand, and other domains of social action, on the other. These domains include the exchange of valuables and body decoration. Articulated by semiotic ideologies, the relations between thought and word may be construed as parallel to other revelations of the self (or, say, the viscera in which a meaning might be concealed) in the gift or on the skin (Keane 2008: 475f).

To carry pockets is similar to carrying space for material stuff. Along this metaphor, our own thoughts are in mind as in a pocket we carry with us. If we talk about them, and let people talk about them, it is like giving away all the stuff, which is carried in the pockets.

> To walk around exposing one's thoughts to others in words is like walking around with no pockets, having no hiding places for things. The threat here […] is the threat of chaos that might break out were people to start to confessing freely. Again the issue is not what is *possible* but what are the consequences of losing *control* over these possibilities (Keane 2008: 477f).

From this pocket-metaphor moral obligation ensues. "The opacity claim is responding, in part, to the asymmetry between verbalizing my thoughts and yours"

(Keane 2008: 478). The issue is who has the right to verbalize our thoughts? It is obvious that it is all right to verbalize our own thoughts. But other people hear these thoughts and this is the moment where they begin to interpret and to translate. Now, do they have the right to verbalize, to express the thoughts of others – and do we have it? In turn, do we have the right to bring these people in a complicated situation by uttering our thoughts?

From the Western point of view, the – let us call it this way – 'problem' of language obtains here. Anglo-American philosophical traditions of language, as for example the philosophy of language and linguistic pragmatics, initiated and influenced by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) in particular, have influenced even anthropology. These traditions lead to a focus on language and its role in acting intentionality due to how "people are adept at construing the intentions behind the communications other people produce" (Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 412; Robbins 2008). This hypothesis in the frame of linguistic pragmatics and philosophy of language seems to be incommensurable with the doctrine of the opacity of mind. Thus, the question arises if Western theories can encompass an understanding of the other without making assumptions about the other's mind. With this question, many other questions as to the Western concept of a theory of mind are associated.

> Can our theories imagine that we might approach other people without assuming that we can know something about what goes on in their heads? Or that we might interpret their speech without explicitly making guesses about their intentions in producing it? Or that we can get along with others without assuming that we can replicate their thoughts and feelings within ourselves as a way of understanding how things are with them? Could we ever cooperate with each other without being able to mind-read on all these levels? (Robbins and Rumsey 2008: 408f).

It is a matter of the cultural perception of another's mind. Without doubt, every one of us possesses a concept of a theory of mind. But what really matters is the question if we decide to use this ability without restrictions or not. Thus, according to any theory of mind, it has to be said that the "culturally defined person is in the centre [of

a theory of mind] because it depends on him or her whether a theory of mind applies" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 238).

Considering the concepts of a theory of mind as well as the opacity of mind, it is crucial to point out that awareness/consciousness and knowledge introduce and motivate action or a particular behavior in the social world. Since language is public (Searle 1995), due to performed or omitted speech acts, nevertheless a particular kind of communication *is* performed. The fact that the 'culturally defined person' decides to speak or not to speak leads to the academic conclusion that obviously either the phenomenological or rational *cogito* are not a mere passive function of perception, rather, both *cogito* initiate processes of understanding (Angehrn 2008: 25). Supplementary, Heidegger (1962: §18) calls exactly this process "referential context" [*Bewandtniszusammenhang*] (Angehrn 2008: 25). To understand something means to understand world contexts. In consequence, within the process of understanding, at each moment the world is construed and interpreted.

4.6 Summary

Empathy is a broad and sometimes diffuse field. With the five concepts I have explained here, I approach empathy from the point of social understanding and social feelings. They show the social foundation as well as the own position within the social field. Understanding enables the possibility of communication with each other on a rational level: we perceive actions of others and evaluate them. Feelings of sympathy exhibit a rich variety of sharing feelings. Consciously I have chosen a philosophical account, since it is an intellectual distinction which kind of fellow-feeling or charity I am feeling. In ordinary language, such a distinction may not exist. Important for my investigation is this intellectual distinction. It shows how we are able to distinguish between these feelings, but at the same time they feel like the same for us. In the context of biographical narration, this observation gives us an opportunity to re-interpret our feelings and re-contextualize them. These empathic differences give us a sense of our complex inner life and all the factors of social relation which play a role for our empathy and emotions. A special stand here has care, since care is related to ourselves and to others, thus, care makes us, as being ourselves, fundamentally social.

Once more, here, philosophy delineates in an abstract way the basic structure of human being. In fact, it is Being-with. Since Being-with is the inherent direction toward ourselves and others, the realization that we are *with* us as well as others enables us to be *for* us and others by caring. That makes empathy a social ability and quality which can be regarded as universal. However, its characteristics and shape differ with cultural framing and individual preferences. That is also reflected in research on the theory of mind. In deed, theories of mind have been well-investigated in recent decades, but with the claim to universality of these findings, problems occur. Not only modified and alternative models occur, but also the doctrine of the opacity of mind has been investigated. Thus, the will to make explicit assumptions about another's mind has to be calles in question.

Empathic understanding becomes a necessary basis for living with others, since living in a social community requires a sense of being oneself as well as a sense of another's being. On this abstract level, our need for explicit and implicit understanding becomes visible. In the next part of this work the previously introduced philosophical concepts may help to show an adequate way for empathy and social being, which is not strongly related to cognitive awareness, consciousness and rationality, but to the human *being* itself.

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Part II:
A Self-Based Concept of Mutual Recognition

By setting the focus on the self, and therefore inside ourselves, mutual recognition as a social act surpasses political recognition and mere phenomenological introspection, insight, perception or recognition. The intention of the self-based model of mutual recognition does not only involve the recognition of the ontological or ontic other who has the ability to reflect her or his acting on a hermeneutical level; but it has to recognize this other as an acting human similar to the ourselves.

To introduce the self-based model of mutual recognition, several perspectives on the self are necessary. The first perspective encompasses the recognition of our self as dynamic and developing process. According to Ricœur (1992: 19f, 2005: 69), recognition of our actions is similar to the recognition of our self as narrative identity, since our biography is indeed the story of our actions. The moment we recognize this action, is the moment of the recognition of our narrative identity. Thus, within this concept, we comprehend our ability to act and to recount a story. We also realize our ability to give recognition; in turn, we realize our need for recognition as well.

The next perception of the self seems to be similar to the recognition of our own identity– with the little modification that now the ontological other is replaced by an ontic other, with all her or his abilities to think, feel, and perceive like us. The other is able to give recognition, but also is in need of it. This relation between our self and the other requires a concrete notion of the person, but also an account of empathy which is not only based on conscious awareness, but rather takes into consideration the opaqueness of our self as well as the other.

These prior perceptions of the self enable the recognition of epistemological values. So far, the other is realized as another, but an equivalent acting human. In realizing Peter, Jane performs an act of recognition. In consequence, Peter has to be recognized as another. Thus, Jane has recognized Peter as a feeling and breathing being similar to her own being. To understand Peter in his being means to understand Peter's acting. Hence, Peter is not a mere being among other beings anymore; rather,

he is another equivalent acting human who appears to Jane in his uniqueness. Therefore, Peter appears to Jane as a human with unique value who can be appreciated by her. The self-reflexive line is linked to our experiences and knowledge, which were gained during our lifetime. Personal preferences of particular values are formed through cultural backgrounds and thus experiences. It can be asked which value we receive within a community where we are compared with others, and where particular values are preferred among others. On a social level, this process mirrors social action. Hence, the category of appreciation has to be enhanced by adequate regard.

This entire self-based model of mutual recognition simplies that the act of recognition does not remain on a phenomenological level; rather, on every level of acting, the act of mutual recognition is performed with hermeneutical reflection of ourselves and in a certain sense of the other in the phenomenological life-world. This means that the role of the self has to be recapitulated on every level. The self-based concept of mutual recognition is constituted as follows:



Figure 7: graduation of self-recognition.

Figure 7 shows the basic structure of the self-based concept of mutual recognition. All levels are not strictly divided; rather, they flow smoothly into each other. *Right at the bottom*, the level *identity* symbolizes the recognition of our identity, since it has to be determined who is the self who recognizes ourselves. The lowest common denominator here is our own identity, which is to be recognized by ourselves. In other words, our self has to be recognized as *being oneself as another*. *On the level above*, we recognize ourselves as *persons*. In particular, we have to recognize ourselves as acting persons. An act of recognition so understood includes taking responsibility for one's own acting. *The next level* contains the empathic attitude for our self and for others. It is enough to recognize that others are similar to our self. By not only perceiving the other but also recognizing the other in thinking and feeling, we mean to understand her or him and to comprehend that the other has feelings, wishes and needs. This step cannot be realized without the prior steps of recognizing our and the other's identity and our acting responsibility. Within *empathic understanding as act of mutual recognition* the entire presence of the other becomes evident. Thereby, *social appreciation* is performed. Within this kind of recognition, some of us appear to be more sympathetic than others. So it comes that they are appreciated. Since we are social beings, social appreciation is able to set the focus on our specific values. Within real social existence, by recognizing we can only give adequate regard in comparison to others, since we are always in a social dynamic which only allows preferring of values. In the context of Hegel's concept of recognition of the self, adequate regard is also a mode of recognition. Closer examined, adequate regard is the only possible mode of recognition, since we never can be recognized in all personal aspects, rather only in particulars. "[T]he criterion for *adequate* (as opposed to inadequate) regard is given by the contents of the best possible views and convictions that would be available to the parties" (Laitinen 2010: 323). Adequate regard is given, if these aspects are not placed in a false light, but still appear in the same identity framework.

5. About Being Oneself as Another

In comparison to Hegel's (1977) concept of self-consciousness, Ricœur's concept of narrative identity has some outstanding advantages. Narrative identity has a pacifist account of self-confirmation which leads to a peaceful path of our self-consciousness, since our self confirms perpetually itself through the dialectics of *idem*- and *ipse*-identity *by itself*. In the act of confirmation, there is no need of an ontic other. Of course, such a self-confirmation is not sufficient to operate on a social level, but it shows that a struggle for recognition is naturally excluded. We as permanent others confirm ourselves as being permanently another. This permanent otherness means that self-confirmation begins from the inside: before we are not directly dependent on the other, we recognize ourselves.

Identity is constituted through biography as lifetime story. By this means, we have a history as well as an individual perception of the cultural context in which we were born. Bearing these facts consciously and unconsciously in mind, we individually recount stories depending on the social context, which influences perception and personal reality. This context, as described above with Ricœur, is – in the special case of our personal identity – culture, social community and tradition.

5.1 Cultural Embeddedness of Narrative Identity

Since the mimetic aspect of narrative identity is perceived as metaphorical application of cultural traditions and rituals, storytelling of our life is, if conscious or not, a human universal, and can be applied to every single human (Hutto 2007b). Traditions are delivered from the past, but through the threefold concept of mimesis they can be updated. In this case, they will be refigured in alternate symbolic structures. Consequently, only if traditions are refigured and understood, they can be applied adequately. By the refiguration of traditions we learn "to 'isolate' a closed system from its environment and to discover the possibilities of development inherent to this system" (Ricœur 1984: 135). We reconstruct the given goods as

tradition, notice that it cannot be applied in its current form, and modify it. This process is grasped as understanding.

> To follow a story, in effect, is to understand the successive actions, thoughts, and feelings in the story inasmuch as they present a particular 'directedness'. Let us understand by this that we are 'pulled forward' by the development, as soon as we respond to this force with expectations concerning the completion and outcome of the whole process (Ricœur 1984: 150).

Stories always have a particular directedness, because "narrative answers the question 'Why?'" (Ricœur 1984: 152). "We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated" (Ricœur 1984: 75). If the process of understanding is interrupted, an explanation is needed to keep the process of understanding going on. Here, understanding refers to the comprehension of an act which is performed. This act is an integral part of the process of understanding, since this act is already situated within a social and cultural context, which includes temporal aspects like past, present and future: every act also has a history. This history, which is embedded in the individually perceived social and cultural context, is the story of lifetime experience and knowledge which can be told. Thus, to have a lifetime story means to move in a particular context of experience and knowledge (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 16). In reference to Ricœur's threefold concept of mimesis (1984: 52–90), the acts of reinterpretation, creation and creative imitation are all acts of applied understanding: "[t]o follow a story is to actualize it by reading it" (Ricœur 1984: 76). By repeating this central passage from the chapter about *Narrative Identity and Personal Narration* (cf. Chap. 3.2), it can be said that stories like the cultural and traditional narrations, first, have to be understood – one might say culture and traditions are read and understood. Second, given the hypotheses that we act within the cultural and traditional context, we update contexts by acting and performance. Conceived this way, we create new aspects within cultural and traditional contexts, since our acting and performance of culture and traditions is never exactly the same as another's acting and performance. That makes culture and traditions to substructures in which we are born (mimesis$_1$). Therefore, every act has

its causes and is embedded within culture, socialization and tradition (mimesis$_2$). This causal embeddedness is reinterpreted within cultural and traditional habits as attempts of imitation (mimesis$_3$). To a greater degree, attempts of imitation are always individual and personal efforts to interpret cultural and traditional substructures. By posing acting within time, a tension rises from past to present in our existence. "Debating the past is prolonging it into the present" (Ricœur 1985: 70). Through storytelling, the narrative of an act is extended from its beginning in the past to its fulfillment in the present. This is one part of this tension. Through the directedness of the narrative act, present is extended into the future as well. At this point, once again, the helical structure of narrative identity becomes visible. The structure of the helix is endless, because every time something is interpreted, it passes through a new and individual process of interpretation at every one of us in every age. By implication, culture and traditions are situated in a dynamic process, which results from (inter)action. Redundancy is always present in this process: it seems a bit ironic that we always use something already existing to create something new. By stressing imitation, we always pass through a hermeneutical process of interpretation and creation. Through the execution of an act the act's directedness is not yet attained. Within acting, we pursue our individually intended direction of our act. Not until we reach it, the intended future purpose becomes present. In consequence, becoming a present act, the act immediately has become past.

5.2 The Ethos of the Self

The term 'person' has undergone a change as ethical notion. In reference to Mauss (1985), the notion of the person has been passing through a change of meaning from a social actor to a psychological being, "and further on to the conscious and autonomous unit, the 'individual'" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 235). Derived from ancient Greek, the term 'person' becomes similar to 'personage' or 'character'. This meaning corresponds to the Aristotelian definition of 'character' as good habit. In this respect, the term 'person' becomes moral. For that reason, 'person' is conceived as "the true face" (Mauss 1985: 18). Our true face should be both good and responsible for others. According to Ricœur (1992: 120ff, 2005: 71), who refers to Aristotle's

elaborations in *The Nicomachean Ethics* (2009), acting motivation results from the belief and the conviction of one's own good acting: "the character holds himself responsible for an action that he does not dissociate from himself" (Ricœur 2005: 71).

> The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character (Ricœur 1992: 147f).

This is a direct derivation of Ricœur's assumption that "character has a history which it has contracted, one might say, in the twofold sense of the word 'contraction': abbreviation and affection" (Ricœur 1992: 122). With respect to Ricœur's concept of narrative identity (1992), the self is dynamic, despite its having a permanent part.

Let us remember, how Heidegger understands ethos: "[t]he word names the open region in which the human being dwells" (Heidegger 1998: 269). In a bold and brave interpretation of this quotation, Heidegger's notion of Dasein appears as fundamentally social. That can be explained through the extended notion of ethos, since, in Heidegger's understanding, ethos is considered as situation or place within the clearing of being wherein the Dasein abodes and dwells. From this point of view, Dasein takes up of course a particular situation within the life-world, but, dependent on its social orientation and direction, it can construct a different perception of ourselves. As we do without changing our habitual situation in our 'lebenshaus', we can move from one room to another, and thus construct our angle of view for us as well as for others (Galuschek 2014). As we remember from above: "[t]he abode of the human being contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to the human being in his essence" (Heidegger 1998: 269). Our ethos is Being-in-the-world, and therefore, being for and with others. Within the clearing, the presence of Dasein is not limited to the mere situation of Dasein. By dwelling, Dasein takes direct effect in the world. Thus, Dasein is basically directed to 'being with others'.

The cultural and traditional sedimentation of our personal identity leads to the obvious occurence of the dialectics of permanence (*idem*) and dynamic (*ipse*) within narrative identity. To achieve a syntheses here, Ricœur links permanence and dynamic within our character as a particular, individual stand to past, present and

future, to ensure the recognition of our self as identical in its own acting through time. Within this concept of narrative identity, the recognition of past traits involves taking responsibility for our acts. This recognition is fulfilled through loyalty to our self as *idem*-identity. Without *ipse*, which founds the dynamics of character, the significance of loyalty would be dispensable. Therefore, the ethos of narrative identity is developed within the notion of character, which itself builds a dialectic within the tension of *idem* and *ipse*.

> [M]y character is me, myself, *ipse;* but this *ipse* announces itself as *idem.* Each habit formed in this way, acquired and become a lasting disposition, constitutes a *trait* – a character trait, a distinctive sign by which a person is recognized, reidentified as the same – character being nothing other than the set of these distinctive signs (Ricœur 1992: 121).

By this means, "character has a history" (Ricœur 1992: 122). Situated in the context of history, character needs to "be set back within the movement of narration" (Ricœur 1992: 122).

> It will be the task of a reflection on narrative identity to balance, on one side, the immutable traits which this identity owes to the anchoring of the history of a life in a character and, on the other, those traits which tend to separate the identity of the self from the sameness of character (Ricœur 1992: 123).

Personal identity is conceived as located within a story that is abstracted in a never-caught present combined with past and future. That makes us the performing main characters of our lifetime play. Thus, "[i]t is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character" (Ricœur 1992: 148). Character and narrative identity conceived as 'performing main character' lead to the perspective of our acting as 'habitus', which constitutes our character and enables role playing and identification (Ricœur 1992: 319). Character "designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized" (Ricœur 1992: 121). Thus, *idem* and *ipse* overlap in three

functions of character: *habit*, *acquired identification*, and – viewed from a certain angle – *promise* (Ricœur 1992: 121ff).

Habit gives history to the character by acting in the context of cultural, traditional and social frames, or by mimetic learning of new acting possibilities (Ricœur 1992: 121). "[T]his is a history in which sedimentation tends to cover over the innovations which preceded it, even to the point of abolishing the latter" (Ricœur 1992: 121). By incorporating customs, some habits stay the same; others change or are renewed. Herein, an overlapping of *ipse* and *idem* can be observed.

Acquired identification has influence on the social environment, in which we move around, since it includes a process of identification.

> [T]he identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, *in* which the person or the community recognizes itself (Ricœur 1992: 121).

Through this processes, within a character a certain kind of loyalty arises because we are not "distinct from […] [our] 'experiences'. Quite the opposite: […] [we share] the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted" (Ricœur 1992: 147).

Technically, *promise* is not subsumed under the category of character; rather it is "another model of permanence in time besides that of character" (Ricœur 1992: 123). Promise as *keeping one's word* ensures permanence in time as well, but Ricœur's distinction can be explained through the fact that promise provides the opposite of character. "Keeping one's word expresses a *self-constancy* which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general, but solely within the dimension of 'who?'" (Ricœur 1992: 123). Keeping one's word does not flow *with* the time, rather, it denies a dynamic by standing contrary to the dynamic flow of time. It forces us to stay at a particular point in our history, where a promise has been given: against its nature as dynamic self, our *ipse* is forced to stay *idem*. In turn, promise as keeping one's word can be conceived as a synthesis of both prior points character is constituted of: within promise, both habit and acquired identification with a human and/or a group are related to loyalty. Our self has to cultivate the habit of keeping one's word, and to identify itself with this decision conceived as our own act. In an excellent sense, to give a promise means to take responsibility for our acting. To keep

this promise, resistance in time outcrops. Therefore, a promise is given with the motivation or intention to be performed in the future.

Habit, acquired identification and promise, all share a common requirement: sociality. They all need another human to be learned, fulfilled and confirmed. Therefore, considering the social side of ethos, it includes a concept of 'attitude'. The notion of ethos as attitude does not only include the local situation of the self or Dasein within the life-world, but also the temporal attitude of ethos, since the narration of our lifetime in the context of cultural and traditional experience and knowledge appears in a very thick and complex relationship as recognition of our own identity. We must not only permanently confirm that our identity is still the same, but that it is necessary to allow changes due to knowledge and experience. Every self has a choice of personal narrations it can recount based on experiences and knowledge it gained during its lifetime. The decision to recount a particular story is motivated by personal and individual expectation, but also by answering the questions 'Why I am acting?' and 'What do I want to achieve?'. Decisions are unconscious or conscious motivations, which refer to a particular way to act. The decision to recount a particular story continues our narrative identity, since all reasons for a particular acting decision are found here. So, it can be once more concluded with Ricœur (1984: 152): "[e]very story […] explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the question 'Why?' at the same time it answers the question 'What?'". As explained above with Schütz (1967) and Schütz and Luckmann (1974), the motivation of acting can be summed up in past- and future-motives. However, not only the motives of acting can be found in the temporal structure of narrative identity, but also the decision for acting can be derived from that structure. Here, the triad of *knowledge*, *horizon* and *experience* becomes visible. Stories, which are recounted, mark a particular horizon, since they are based on particular knowledge and experience. This existential interwovenness is thickly related to the already existing knowledge which is necessary to be able to recount a story. However, through this recounting, more knowledge is accumulated, since past experiences are recapitulated and set in new contexts. Our personal life-worldly horizon expands: by acting, we have been been founding ourselves permanently in an expanding world. Since we are life-world, we are in a permanent dynamic by mirroring our knowledge and experience in the life-world. From this point of view,

the Western subject perceived as phenomenological 'I' seems to be completely embedded "in a social context" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 235).

5.3 The Recounting and Relational Self

Surroundings, environments, with-world, life-world – terms for the personalized world we all live in – can change spatially and over time. In turn, it is possible that the life-world stays the same, while the way we perceive the life-world can change. Considering personhood as life-world-filled and life-world-filling sphere, statics and dynamics of narrative identity maintain a very special relation. Through permanence of the *idem*-identity, the life-world as the acting self has a unchangeable core, but through experience and gaining knowledge the perception and recognition – or even structure – of the life-world changes. This refers to Ricœur's (1992: 114) triad "describe, narrate, prescribe". Within this triad, we are always aware of the cultural and traditional setting and are able to understand contexts and expected conducts. In practicing cultural and traditional conducts, prescription is performed, while our life-world is reinterpreted and created. Thus, narrative identity is constituted in a backward mode. We may think about the future, but we are never able to perceive it. Since, our self

> who merely conceives a series of events, however connected, has not yet made a narrative; that requires a coherent representational vehicle – words, sounds, images – capable of making the events and their relations, or some of them, intelligible to an audience. A narrative is an artefact, wherein the maker seeks to make manifest his or her communicative intentions. When the audience grasp those intentions, they have a grip on what the events of the narrative are, and how they are related (Currie 2007: 17f).

The only thing, which can be perceived from ourselves' perspective, is our past through which we recount our biography. This past is represented by ourselves in an individual way influenced by its individual lifetime biography, since "no story

manages (or seeks) to determine the world of its happenings with precision and completeness" (Currie 2007: 19). In so doing, particular evaluations are also communicated. They are expressed by highlighting a particular storyline, event or through chosen words, which lead to an emotional coloring. This approach makes the narrative itself a personal expression of the story we want to recount (Currie 2007: 18f); even more: "narratives *represent* their stories" (Currie 2007: 18). They fulfill two functions within our life: the connection of events and the framing of these events (Currie 2007: 19). In the context of mutual recognition, through the narration, our self recognizes our story and expects recognition of the other through the narrative coloring of expressions and evaluations. This kind of narration guides the audience's attention in a particular way and, thus, leads to a particular perspective of the perception of events. By the attentional guidance we construct, we directly influence the others' reaction conceived as act of recognition, since the other comprehends the narrative framework and is able to understand it emotionally. This concept of guidance of the other's attention can be conceived as Scheler's concept of fellow-feeling as an authentic sympathetic feeling with another.

The downside of such sympathetic feeling with another can be called "the problem of imaginative resistance" (Currie 2007: 21). This problem is distinguished by two aspects: there are situations where the audience does not believe the narrated story; they take the entire or parts of the narrated story as fiction: the audience is "resistant to imagining some component of the story" (Currie 2007: 31). For example, we tell a friend that his girlfriend is cheating on him, but he is still so in love with her that he refuses to believe it. But there are also situations where the narrated story is taken to be true, only the narrated facts are taken as fiction (Currie 2007: 31). For example, the audience by all means believe our trip form New York to Pittsburgh by car, but they do not believe that it took only one hour. Though Gregory Currie here refers to truly imaginative situations, denying or permitting narrated facts can also be applied to real life. Since every narrated story – might it be fantasized, or not – is a fiction for the audience as the other, the audience always has to believe or deny a story or certain parts of it. To say it with Gadamer (2003): if two people meet and they talk with each other, two individual horizons (of knowledge and experience) meet at the same time. By this means, these two people can – even if that is possible – only agree to negotiate about their subject, thus only parts of these two horizons overlap. If this

overlap of horizons does not happen, the two people do not understand each other. They cannot imagine the world, or the way of another's thinking.

Dan Zahavi (2007) is quoted in the chapter about *Narrative Identity and Personal Narration* to outline the interconnectedness of the stories recounted by the self and by others about the self, which constitute the self and, at the same time, answer the question 'who am I?', he, nevertheless, questions "this train of thought" (Zahavi 2007: 179). He aims to expose that "the emphasis on narratives is not merely to be understood as an epistemological thesis" (Zahavi 2007: 180). It should be questioned whether narratives are, in deed, "*the* primary access to self" (Zahavi 2007: 191 emphasis by the author). Considered in a dialogical setting, narratives do not merely refer to the just now existing self, since this epistemological perception would include a pre-existing self (Zahavi 2007: 180), through assumptions and beliefs of the dialogical other, they also enable future assumptions and beliefs. But the time perception of the present remains the same. Perceived through the expanded time perspective of the present in past, present and future, Zahavi (2007: 180) levels down the self to a single time perspective, namely the present. Within the present moment, not all recounted stories are the same. One has to distinguish between "the kind of narratives that characterize our ongoing lives from consciously worked-up narratives" (Zahavi 2007: 180). Such "unacceptable oversimplification[s]" are the argumentative start mark for Zahavi (2007: 185) to introduce his concept of "the experiential self". He takes into account, in contrast to recounted stories, the perspective of experiences, which he perceives as foundation of self-constitution, since "self-consciousness must be understood as an intrinsic feature of the primary experience" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 46).

> Our experiential life possesses a focus of experience, a point of view. It is a first-person perspective in the sense of being tied to a self. Thus, it doesn't make sense to speak of a first-person perspective without speaking of a self. But what does this experiential selfhood amount to? (Zahavi 2007: 186).

A first-person-perspective cannot be separated from both a phenomenological and hermeneutical perception of oneself. Taking into account approaches by Antonio

Damasio (1999) and Metzinger (2003), Zahavi (2007: 187) concludes to an "*experiential dimension of selfhood*", which is already to be found in classical phenomenologal approaches.

Seemingly similar to Ricœur's approach (1992), Damasio's neurologist account (1999) deals with the hypothesis that there does not exist just one mode of perception. He shows that "[c]onsciousness is not a monolith" (Zahavi 2007: 185); rather, it consists of two parts: a stable core consciousness, which is the core self as unchangeable and basic ability to perceive the world through emotions and bodily sensations, and an extended consciousness. Core consciousness

> provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment – now – and about one place – here. The scope of core consciousness is the here and now. Core consciousness does not illuminate the future, and the only past it vaguely lets us glimpse is that which occurred in the instant just before. There is no elsewhere, there is no before, there is no after (Damasio 1999: 16).

Further, Damasio (1999: 16) describes the core consciousness as a "simple, biological phenomenon" with the following attributions:

> it has one single level of organization; it is stable across the lifetime of the organism; it is not exclusively human; and it is not dependent on conventional memory, working memory, reasoning, or language (Damasio 1999: 16).

In contrast, what might be understood in common sense as consciousness, Damasio call extended consciousness:

> there are many levels and grades, [it] provides the organism with an elaborate sense of self – an identity and a person, you or me, no less – and places that person at a point in individual historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world beside it (Damasio 1999: 16).

Extended consciousness thus is directly depending on memory and language (Damasio 1999: 16). With core consciousness there is a biological self, which can be understood as classical phenomenological I, and with extended consciousness a reflexive, conscious awareness of the surroundings. Zahavi (2007: 185) processes an experience related aspect from Damasio's (1999: 17) approach by attributing core consciousness to a core self – similar to the classical phenomenological 'I' – and extended consciousness to an autobiographical self – similar to the hermeneutical 'me'. Both parts of consciousness are dependent on each other.

> Regardless of how well autobiographical memory grows and how robust the autobiographical self becomes, it should be clear that they require a continued supply of core consciousness for them to be of any consequence to their owner organism. The contents of the autobiographical self can only be known when there is a fresh construction of core self and knowing for each of those contents to be known (Damasio 1999: 175f).

One cannot exist without the other. The next step Zahavi has to take is the junction of the perceptions of the self and experience. Despite approaches of the early Husserl and Sartre who assert a non-egological account, they distance themselves from this position by realizing that there exists something like self-experience (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 203). The crux here is that experiences do not have an 'I'. They are realized through the reflexive 'me'. Only if the experience is objectified within the process of reflection, then the experiencing self as 'I' appears (Zahavi 2005: 100f). However, Metzinger argues that experience is not possible without the awareness of "*being someone*" (Metzinger 2003). That leads Zahavi (2007: 186) to the conclusion that "it doesn't make sense to speak of a first-person perspective without speaking of a self", since "it possesses a focus of experience, a *point* of view" (Metzinger 2003: 157). According to Zahavi (2007: 186) this experiential ability of the self is a kind of pre-reflexive awareness, which is a

> *präreflexive Selbstvertrautheit* [pre-reflexive self-intimacy]. […] It is a very basic and seemingly spontaneous, effortless way of inner acquaintance, of

> 'being in touch with yourself', and phenomenally, of being 'infinitely close to yourself' (Metzinger 2003: 158).

The state of conscious self-experience is performed afterwards, since

> pre-reflective self-consciousness is related to the idea that experiences have a subjective 'feel' to them, a certain (phenomenal) quality of 'what it is like' or what it 'feels' like to have them" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 49).

It may be derived from this "selfhood requires more than merely a non-conscious differentiation between oneself and the environment. In fact, the crucial idea is that some minimal form of self-*experience* is essential for selfhood" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 204). In both, the pre-reflexive consciousness as well as the reflexive consciousness, exists a self-relation. In respect to the life-worldly relation of the self this makes the self itself relational. A type of porosity of the self seems inherent in this relationality, which allows of a particular permeability to the surrounding life-world as well as to one's own self (Smith 2012). In consequence, an ontological dichotomy between an unconscious or conscious subject and the objective environment is excluded. But even Karl Smith's (2012) suggestion of a revival and reformulation of Charles Taylor's (2007) porous and buffered selves remains in the metaphysical dimension of subjects. The subject as an ontological entity, which has to be marked with attributes and characteristics, has become a metaphysical concept without any relations to reality.

This explanation of a pre-reflective self-consciousness recalls Scheler's (1973a) material value ethics as unconscious perception of a thing's true value. Love as intentional movement towards something directed to us comes along with the ability to understand love guiding our understanding of the other.

> This understanding love is the great master workman and (as Michelangelo says so profoundly and beautifully in his well-known sonnet) the great *sculptor* who, working from the masses of empirical particulars, can intuitively seize, sometimes from only *one* action or only

> *one* expressive gesture, the lines of the person's *value-essence* (Scheler 1973a: 488).

This poetic description of love's possibilities and abilities shows that only through the intrinsic interest in another the other appears, and can be understood in the individuality of this other's appearance. What Scheler here describes, is not a mere inductive scientific method; rather, it is empathic understanding. We send love as empathic interest to the other. By this means, the other appears as a living human and as a complex whole, and not as an epistemological combination of parts. Perceived on this phenomenological level, this makes us 'relational individuals'. We are relational, since as a phenomenologically conceived unit we are part of a social community, which in turn builds up a unity. By implication, within our personal and individual uniqueness, we consist of many parts which are unified, in our being as a single human; this unity of parts marks our wholeness in personhood. The dividuality within the wholeness can be explained through our phenomenological primary composition, which is exactly the body. Although, at the same time, the body individualizes us and makes us distinct from others, since "each of them [the others] forms a special centre about which the collective representations reflect and colour themselves differently" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 234). In this biological stage, we are formed by relational individualities similar to the interplay of the different organs we consist of. These individualities compose a unity in almost every stage of being (Strathern 1988: 15). This composition is continued on the social level, when we build up and move through a social microcosm within the own life-world. As discussed above, we are social microcosms, and thus cosmomorphic (Strathern 1988: 268). This approach does not exclude our bodily perception, but rather deepens and expands it. Within a cosmomorphic and sociomorphic perception of ourselves, our body is expanded, because the life-world is also perceived as our body. It is animated and included in this dividual perception of the person. To put it simply, the contrast between the individual and the dividual approaches, as explained above, can be summarized as follows:

> the dividual is considered to be divisible, comprising a complex of separable – interrelated but essentially independent – dimensions or

> aspects. The individual is thus monadic, while the dividual is fractal; the individual is atomistic, while the dividual is always socially embedded; the individual is an autonomous social actor, the author of his or her own actions, while the dividual is a heteronomous actor performing a culturally written script; the individual is a free-agent, while the dividual is determined by cultural structures; the individual is egocentric, and the dividual is sociocentric (Smith 2012: 53).

This quotation resembles like an oversimplification of the Melanesian perception of personhood (Hess 2009) – which it is –, but it mirrors the different approaches in anthropology and philosophy, and their statements in a very brief way.

Thinking this dualistic way back in history, it becomes clear that individuality has not biological roots, but rather theological. It is the Christian soul which builds "an individual relationship with God" (Hess 2006: 288). But even the Christian individuality is indeed dividual: the Christian soul consists of the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. But later, besides Christianity, two other forms of individualism occur: the "capitalist notion of individual ownership […], and the Western psychological value that every person has a 'core self'" (Hess 2006: 288). The core self is individual as well as it is in an individual relationship to God, since it participates in God. Conceived like that, even the concept of individuality rooted in Christianity is partible (Hess 2006; Mosko 2010; Smith 2012). "That is, by entering into an exchange relationship with God one becomes part of Him and He becomes part of oneself" (Hess 2006: 294). This concept of the "'natural' Christian person" shows up similarities with the dividual perception of personhood (Hess 2006: 294). "Through acts of believing, repenting, praying, attending church ceremonies, or donating money people engage in mediated relationships with God that can be understood as dividual in a Strathernian sense" (Hess 2006: 294). Due to colonialization, this behavior is similar to the attitudes of sharing with Melanesian people, who want to give parts of themselves to others and receive parts of others in return. In this way, they create a relationship with others and deepen their community. Nothing else happens during a Christian ceremony. And, this is at the center of mutual recognition: recognition is given to another, and by reacting in any way to this act of recognition, we receive the other's recognition. On the simplest level we recognize another's existence by giving

her or him the basket of donation during a Christian Mess. This other reacts by taking the basket, which is the other's recognition of our action. This mutual experiences of recognition are "subjectively experienced as *inner* events and, in standard situations, as one's *own* states" (Metzinger 2003: 267). They directly refer to ourselves, where they are recognized as attributed to us. That suports Zahavi's approach of the experiential self, since the "self is claimed to possess experiential reality" (Zahavi 2007: 188). The self is "closely linked to the first-person perspective, and is in fact identified with the first-personal *givenness* of the experiential phenomena" (Zahavi 2007: 188).

In sum, the simple explanation for this perception is the unquestioned reference to our own experiences. This account is doubtlessly related to our self, our perception and our being. Thus, every experience is perceived in a self-reflexive, self-relational and self-referential way. There cannot be an experience without context. "

> If the experience is given in a first-personal mode of presentation, it is experienced as my experience, otherwise not. In short, the self is conceived as the invariant dimension of first-personal givenness in the multitude of changing experiences (Zahavi 2007: 189).

Zahavi's approach to an experiential self connects on a reflexive phenomenological level not only to Ricœur, but also to Schütz. Considering Schütz's account of life-wordly actions through experience, the junction between the experiential self and the life-world becomes visible (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 202ff).

It is obvious that Zahavi would not agree with Schütz's account, since Schütz's account is founded on understanding. Zahavi assumes a biological self which has experiences on an unconscious level. Nevertheless, the interpretation of our experiences – be they unconscious or conscious – depends on the context. And this context consists of other – already made – experiences. Without doubt, experiences can be unconsciously conceived, interpreted and evaluated, but they take effect in apparent action. Every experience thus flows with a smooth transition into the subjective and personal pool of experiences, here again on an unconscious as well as conscious level. The resulting act, however, is visible within the life-world and has its effects, which fit into the pool of experiences. In the context of Schütz' approach,

action intentions as because-motives ('Why am I acting?') and the act's in-order-to-motives ('What do I want to achieve?') always result from unconscious and conscious interpretations and evaluations of experiences made before.

Although Zahavi (2007: 200) claims an inclusive course of phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches, which Ricœur obviously already has established, there still exists a lack of a deep-going access to the junction of the self and experiences. A solution could be a self-based approach to experience and action. It bypasses the epistemological lack of narratives and anchors the epistemological principle in the self by providing first-person-experiences. Although Zahavi (2007: 200) argues that a so conceived self is "a more primitive and fundamental notion of self than the one endorsed by the narrativists", a multi-level notion of the self designed as a complex self-structure which claims, on every level, an – unconscious or conscious – me considering itself as a reflexive entity. Therefore, an experiential self does not contradict a narrative self; rather it deepens the epistemological structure of the self.

In contrast to the reflexive self-consciousness, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 64f) argue that the pre-reflexive self-consciousness builds a unity, which "involves a form of *self-division* or *self-fragmentation*" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 64), and is contextualized and temporally unified by narratives (Ricœur 1992: 141). Perceived in this way, by completing the narrative self, the concept of the experiential self replaces the concept of the classical phenomenological 'I', since it complements the narrative self.

> The experiential self, although constantly accommodating changing experiences, has a structure (defined by temporality and embodiment) that remains stable across the lifetime of the organism. In contrast, the narrative self evolves across the lifetime of the organism. From a developmental perspective, there are little more than simple states of core self in the beginning, but as experience accrues, memory grows and the autobiographical/narrative self develops (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 205).

Perceiving the experiential self and the narrative self in this way, leads to a correlation between both. In addition, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205) point out that our self has to be aware of our actions, before it can set these actions in a context relating to our lifetime or biography. For that reason, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205) suggest to attribute the classical philosophical term 'personal self' to the 'experiential self', and 'person' to the 'narrative self'. To recount a story is always to recount something personal from our biography. It also always conveys "personal character or personality; a personality that evolves through time and is shaped by the values […] [and] actions" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 205). This view of personhood underlines the concept of the person, already introduced in this work, as a performing actor in a play or in a story. Personhood thus regarded is *conditio humana*, since it is our essential quality to act; but it is crucial to perceive us as persons and thus as social actors. Relationality, here, becomes visible as foundation for personhood as selfhood, since we move within relationships and interact with others. These interactions are reflected in our behavior, for instance, as sharing, laughing, talking, helping and listening.

5.4 Summary

In every moment, with every encounter, we are, indeed, ourselves, but we are also *oneself as another*, as Ricœur (1992) named his famous work. Being oneself as another, means actualizing oneself in every moment of our lifetime. We actualize our life by narration. It is not necessary to recount this story to a factual other, to externalize it; it is more than enough to recount the story to oneself. In doing so, we make our life plausible and contextualize it. In other words, we find explanations for our actions.

Narrating such a lifetime story, and, at the same time, to realize that we are still the same person is our autobiographical effort, but also our cultural framework. Actually, we are influenced by the life-world and its events in the same way as we influence the life-world with our presence. Within the concept of 'ethos', I have shown that our stand is in every moment factual, but at the same time dynamic, as Ricœur shows with his concept of narrative identity. As already said, stories, which are

recounted, mark a particular horizon, since they are based on particular knowledge and experience.

Perceived in this way, the narrative self as person is relational by means of telling stories. It identifies itself with its actions and contectualizes them in accordance to its being. At the same time, experiences and experience-making, and so the life-world, are thickly interwoven in our being. Being related to the life-world as our 'lebensraum' and our social sphere of interaction makes us relational beings. Therefore, the next step is to investigate how selfhood can be conceived as personhood and how its structure of autonomy can be comprehended in respect to Western and Melanesian notions.

6. The Self as Person

Following the suggestion of Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205), the narrative self should be comprehended as concept of personhood. From a phenomenological point of view, to illustrate this in an easy way, I begin with Ricœur's approach to personhood. He understands the term person, in the first instance, as a "'basic particular'" (Ricœur 1992: 31). Following Strawson (1977), he borrows the concept of the person as basic particular to describe the body as phenomenal unity of the human:

> [p]hysical bodies and the persons we ourselves are constitute, in this masterful strategy, such basic particulars in the sense that nothing at all can be identified unless it ultimately refers to one or the other of these two kinds of particulars (Ricœur 1992: 31).

This interpretation recalls the above-described perception of the body as 'dividuality within wholeness through the composition of the human being'. At the same time, the body is both our individual attribution, which makes us unique, and a composition of body parts, which makes us alive. That includes that through the body we feel life; the body is the first instance that links us to the surrounding life-world, and takes effect in it (Ricœur 1992: 30f; Merleau-Ponty 1962).

From this point of view, the body appears as the first characteristic of the person, since the body is the first part of us which is perceived and recognized: it is the first impression. To put it in poetic words: the first thing we see from the person, is not the heart but the body, the person's phenomenal appearance, and the person's charisma through the bodily presence. Being aware of the body as the first manifestation of personhood, throws consciousness from the preceding position of defining personhood. In the second instance, we as persons are aware of our actions and are able to reflect these actions. We may, consciously or unconsciously, decide that we are hungry; however, in both cases we take our wallet and go to the bakery. Here, it is not the objective to deny consciousness, but consciousness is shaped

through bodily sensations and experiences which are made through the physical presence within the life-world. These bodily sensations and experiences are attributed to us as our bodily sensations and experiences. Consciousness enables this self-relation and "self-designation", which clearly refers to personhood, rather than to our perception of being a thing (Ricœur 1992: 34).

Considering the reflexive level, in our acting and through the body we have a particular uniqueness which can only be attributed to our single and unique being. It is this vary uniqueness that enables the awareness of the own personhood as a self. The self-reflection enables the awareness of an acting referent as 'me', 'my' and 'mine'– and no ontological or ontic other (Ricœur 1992: 32f). In this account, in reference to our own self which reflects our acting, the relation between person, self and identity can be expressed as follows: being 'self' is a particular role of a person. The relation of self and person as associated roles build human identity (Perry 2011: 380). The self confirms itself in the moment of acting as being the same as the act (Scheler 1973a): the ownership of the act is directly, but temporally limited confirmed. Thus, a direct relation to our actions is given, without a third party resembling another who has to be confirmed as oneself. Such a permanent self-confirmation, Ricœur (1992: 32) sees fulfilled within the concept of *idem* through which we confirm at every step our self being.

On closer examination, such an approach also corresponds with Scheler's (1973a) notion of a person as shaping concept. The being of the person appears within the act we perform. Therefore, Scheler's concept of personhood should be understood as follows: our actions shape our presence in the life-world. From this derives that the notion of the person is defined through our active presence and participation within the life-world. We are actively shaping and transforming the life-world through action (Sax 2006: 474). These are characteristics and qualities which are attributed to the term 'person'. This self-relation and self-designation enables us to recount a story through action, or, perceived in this way, to perform a play to recount a particular story. Our character confirms the own past action by narration and play.

Scheler's (1973a) notion of the person as shaping concept and Ricœur's (1992) self-attributing approach to personhood support Gallagher and Zahavi's (2012) proposal to consider personhood and narrative identity as the same human condition. They assume that we as persons are able to recount stories, and are able to talk about

our experiences. These are contextualized and involved in our lifetime story. To be precise, experiences are not perceived "as isolated moments but as part of an ongoing story" (Schechtman 2011: 398), since every experience is embedded within an individual experiential context.

Perceiving the person as a fractal dividual, which is merged in the environment, overcomes the dichotomies of individual – dividual, I/me – the other, and entity – society. Such a notion of the person enables new investigations in empathy and mutual recognition as appreciation and adequate regard, since every act, whether it is intended for us or for others, is an act performed within our own life-world. By implication, every act retroacts onto the life-world and influences it. Therefore, acting is always social in order to act for us or for and with others.

6.1 Western and Melanesian Relations

Sociocentrism and egocentrism do not necessarily exclude each other; rather, they are "integral aspects of every self" (Sökefeld 1999: 430). It is quite obvious that we have undoubtedly our own self, which just refers to our own being (e.g. body, reflection, self-relation, self-regulation, etc.), but foremost to the 'outer' life-world, where we can experience ourselves (e.g. agency, feelings, interaction, etc.).

In the tradition of Sartre (1960) and Meleau-Ponty (1962), the body precedes cognitive awareness, since it is conceived as the primary mode of the surroundings' perception as well as conscious and unconscious awareness. It is a naturally given fact that every one of us is "normally aware of his or her own body from the inside" (Cassam 2011: 146). That does not correspond with our natural conscious awareness to think about moving a finger or a leg. Sometimes, the movement of body parts is unconscious like raising or lowering the breast due to breathing. Metaphorically speaking, "most of us can tell, without looking, whether we are moving or not, or whether our legs are crossed" (Cassam 2011: 146). This mode of perception is called proprioception, which "is a tacit, pre-reflective awareness that constitutes the very beginning of a primitive body image" (Gallagher 2005: 73; cf. Cassam 2011: 146). Nevertheless, the sensation of crossed legs, or the perception of somebody as walking

is present. Therefore, "embodiment plays a central role in structuring experience, cognition, and action" (Gallagher 2005: 136).

Like empathy, embodiment is also a broad and diffuse concept. And if it is not enough, perspectives on the concepts of body and embodiment differ widely (Gallagher 2005: 17–23). Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish between "body image" and "body schema" (Gallagher 2005: 17).

> The concept of body image helps to answer the first question about the appearance of the body in the perceptual field; in contrast, the concept of body schema helps to answer the question about how the body shapes the perceptual field (Gallagher 2005: 18).

Both perception and modes of awareness of the life-world, called by Gallagher 'perceptual field', join in the self-reflexive perceptive/awareness of embodiment. From this follows, body image is considered as

> system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body […]. It can include mental representations, beliefs, and attitudes where the object of such intentional states (that object or matter of fact towards which they are directed, or that which they are about) is or concerns one's own body (Gallagher 2005: 24),

Whereas body schema is considered as "system of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring", it "involves certain motor capacities, abilities, and habits that both enable and constrain movement and the maintenance of posture" (Gallagher 2005: 24). Through the body, we have a – conscious – bodily perception of the surroundings, and an – unconscious – perception of our own self as moving entity. According to that, I suggest here the view of embodiment as conscious or unconscious recognition of and reaction to processes and influences of the surrounding life-world (Niedenthal and Maringer 2009: 123). It is therefore no wonder that Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 132; emphasis by the author) can paradoxically, but logically conclude:

> it is certain that *our* cognitive experience is shaped by an embodied brain. Indeed it is increasingly accepted that the brains we have are shaped by the bodies we have, and by our real world actions. *Cognition is not only embodied, it is situated and, of course, it is situated because it is embodied*.

Since from an enactivist point of view, "perceiving is something we do rather than something that happens to us" (Cassam 2011: 153), the life-world opens itself to the perceiving and bodily present human, and "makes itself available to the perceiver through physical movement and interaction" (Noë 2004: 1). This passage reminds one of Heidegger's (1962) concept of being in the world and handiness of equipment, which is situated in the world. Dasein stands in the clearing of being. At the same time, it discloses the world in the general way of just being in the world, and thus it uncloses the world for itself. However, the difference to the enactivist approach is that Heidegger (1962) sharply distinguishes between the exterior life-world and our interior being. The enactivist approach allows the recognition of ourselves and the life-world in exactly one single step, namely through our "sensorimotor knowledge" (Noë 2004: 12), since the border between interior being and exterior world is no longer strictly given.

On this account, the criticism of the classical theory of the subject, as postulated at the beginning of this work, is substantiated. First, the object within the subject-object-relation is abolished; second, the subject is no longer directly related to the surroundings, rather, it is reflexively directed through its self-wareness: "the subject is self-aware in a tacit and non-object-directed manner in and through its being aware of the world" (Henry and Thompson 2011: 234). At this point, another connection to Scheler (1973d, 1979) and his conception of sympathy and love occurs. As a classical phenomenologist in the tradition of Husserl, Scheler (1973a: 372) conceives the body as non-living material or "spatial extension" which is animated by our consciousness. But even in Scheler's concept of a person, the personal involvement in the life-world is essential. Only through the body we become present. Though Scheler (1973a: 479) favors the "*domination about the lived body*", it is the awareness of the lived body, which allows interaction with the life-world; and Scheler (1973a: 398) determined that

> the *lived body* does *not* belong to the *sphere of the person* or the *sphere of the acts*. It belongs to the *object sphere* of any 'consciousness of something' and its kind and ways of being.

this can be understood as our perceived individuality. This understanding of individuality has a dual significance. First, it does not include personal characteristics; it only refers to the phenomenal unity, which is shaped by us. Second, by using the body as presence in the life-world, it is an individual characteristic to reflect the inner-personal characteristics. By supporting the thesis that emotional perception precedes cognitive perception, Scheler must recognize that the body as affective being and 'the human' as conscious being are divided. In the case that emotions are situated in the body, Scheler's concept of personhood and his thesis of primary emotional perception supports, on a basic level, the embodiment-thesis, since the recognition and processing of emotions happens in consciousness. Thus, Scheler's concept of personhood shapes individual unity on a phenomenological level. Our consciousness, which is tied up within our acts, expresses our being in the life-world.

From the enactivist approach sketched here follows that bodily awareness as self-perception leads to self-consciousness (Bermúdez 2011: 166; Noë 2004): through constant self-identification and self-confirmation, which self-consciousness ensures, we are always aware of our selfness (Bermúdez 2011: 168). This refers also to Ricœur's (1992) dialectic of *idem* and *ipse* in which a constant self-confirmation and self-intimacy is given. In addition, bodily awareness influences mental states, for instance, the way of counting with the fingers has a direct effect on abstract mental representations (Domahs et al. 2010). In reference to pre-reflexive self-intimacy and through being oneself, an "effortless way of inner acquaintance, of 'being in touch with yourself', and phenomenally, of being 'infinitely close to yourself'" opens up (Metzinger 2003: 158). Thinking a step ahead, this concept of embodiment completes on a philosophical-theoretical level, the cosmomorphic and sociocentric aspects of personhood as introduced with the Melanesian perception of personhood.

This bodily perception of personhood is supplemented by the temporal perception of personhood. As we remember, narrative identity seeks in our own biography for *reasons of personal development* and thus, one could say, narrative identity seeks in our own biography for *personal identity*. It is a continual search for

contextualization and our concordance with our actual state. Therefore, the state of "synthesis of the heterogeneous" is permanently actual (Ricœur 1992: 141). In other words, diachronic lifetime events are permanently actualized in the actual state of being. Considering our life as narrative, our self "might be both the narrator and the main character, but […] not the sole author" (Zahavi 2005: 109). By this means, experiences are of course self-related but shared since they are made in the life-world. Therefore, narrative stories belong to more than just one human, rather they are multi-authored (Zahavi 2005: 109). In Melanesian communities where the awareness of the relationship between our individuality and the social affiliation is very tight, narratives constitute a "nexus of relations between past, present, self, and other" (White 1991: 4). Through narratives our self and the world are related, since they constitute a relation between personal identity and the past, which consists of tradition and cultural background (Ricœur 1992: 113f). The narratives already investigated in Melanesia work in this manner, since "all myths tell a story" (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 26). The act of designation of oneself to the world "thus renders personal identity a form of historical narrative, which constitutes both the self and the world" (Josephides 2008: 108). In this manner, through collective remembrance, collectivity and social affiliation are created. This can attain the point where the focus of self-recognition shifts from the single human to the social community.

This corresponds with the cultural, traditional and social background and context of every human's existence, since "the differences [between Melanesian and Western perceptions of individuality] are more a product of our (Western) concepts of the person than any given quality of social reality" (White 1991: 5). Another aspect, apparently problematic here, is 'social reality'. This can be a tribe, a neighborhood, a sports club etc. The notion of 'social reality' or 'social field' cannot be defined in a precise sense. Already made dichotomies like 'social culture' and 'individual culture' depend on Western points of view, within a transfiguration of one's own 'social field'. Therefore, I suggest conceiving 'social reality' or 'social field' as a cultural relational notion.

Furthermore, we do not have to move within one social field only; rather, it can be created a synthesis derived from elements of other fields. The opportunities for such acting are given due to the diachrony of personal as well as social and cultural identity, as we have seen with Ricœur (1984). We can compare this improvisation and

creation of behavior along with mimesis[3]. Here, the concept of relational dividuality appears.

In the context of the Melanesian perception of personhood, the diachronic structure of narrative identity is consistent with the concept of relational individuality. The self seeks and pursues relationships of its surroundings. It finds itself within a social life-world where it can create contexts, relationships and concerns everywhere. Through this thick web of meaning, autobiographical, episodical stories are generated which can become a whole cosmos, or just a short, thin, and temporally limited thread. Within the stories a particular storyline is highlighted, which recounts the story of a particular aspect of the personal identity. It must be admitted that not every experience is worth to be recognized and remembered. Even unconscious experiences influence life and lifetime story. Thus, formally, it has to be distinguished between '*mere* experience' and '*an* experience', but all experiences are in a particular stream of chronological temporality as Turner (1986) points out in reference to Dilthey (2002).

> Mere experience is simply the passive endurance and acceptance of events. *An* experience, like a rock in a Zen sand garden, stands out from the evenness of passing hours and years and forms what Dilthey called a 'structure of experience' (Turner 1986: 35).

Each of these experiences can be emphasized and highlighted in our lifetime narration. Every narration of our identity allows of another focus. The structure of experiences can be ordered enew, and we can recount new stories about our self. These stories are not 'inventions'; rather, they are perspectives on our personal biography: in a particular field we introduce ourselves as daughter, in another field as student or Rock-Fan. We configure story sequences out of our own lifetime events. In a storyline, some events may be excluded, whereas these events appear in other storylines. These stories all fit in our narrative identity, but they are only particular highlights of the sum of our lifetime experiences. The only important thing, a story has to refer to is the individual consistence as well as the plausible relation to reality (Schechtman 2011: 405). This "unstable structure of discordant concordance characteristic [sic!]" reflects the mode of self-recognition in a particular social role

(Ricœur 1992: 142). Every narrative recounts social events and highlights particular characteristics.

Thus, from the perspective of narrative identity, personal identity falls into pieces. Identity is never accomplished. As already explained above, every interpretation is unique in time as well as space. It creates in every moment a unique identity which is destroyed in the next moment. But the pieces persist, and are reconfigured within the Ricœurian concept of mimesis. This creative act is situated in a cultural as well as temporal context where style and mode matter.

In relation to the other, our own biographical lifetime, or just certain parts of it, are recognized by our self. By implication, our self has to give up a certain part of its selfhood conceived as wholeness to allow recognizing and being recognized by the other. As Bedorf (2010) already pointed out, the act of recognition always includes also its negation. The self is only able to show particular parts of its personality in particular situations. Therefore, it is only recognized in those parts of itself which it is showing. Since the ontological or ontic other is essential to confirm our identity as well as the one of the other, without the other selfhood cannot be recognized. Only through the other, our self can stand within the permanence of time as self-identical in its personal identity, and confirm itself in its existence. Our self confirms its relationship to the other through the promise as keeping one's word, and through the permanent parts of the character. Heidegger (1962, 1998) already showed that our ethos is our situation and relation to the other, which is care for the other, and for us – if *ipse*-identity is conceived as the phenomenological other. These concepts and perceptions of identity do not contradict the concept of our permeability and partibility. On a theoretical level, narrative identity supports these aspects of personhood, since the self can only recognize itself through the mediation of otherness. This otherness could be the surrounding life-world as well as the other concrete living human. Permeability here also functions as openness for other surrounding influences. Partibility is provided for by the different stories, which can be recounted.

Our self performs a hermeneutical reflection by making conscious both our acting and the relation of responsibility for the other. By taking responsibility for our acting, we are understood as autonomous acting humans. But, what does the term 'autonomy' mean? From a Western point of view, an autonomous acting human is a

human whose acting is self-sufficient, self-confirming, and independent. Bearing in mind that autonomy is a universal human concept does such a Western concept of autonomy fit in with a decentralized and desubjectivated concept of personhood, as illustrated by this work? In the eyes of Taylor (1985: 97) we are a "respondent" who gives a response as a perpetual reaction to the action of another. That makes 'person' a "sub-class of agents" (Taylor 1985: 97). Considering social acting as perpetual process, the perspective on ourselves as perpetual respondents is logically true. Our exceptional quality is, however, that we can act due to acting as creating meaning. By this means we respond out of "the original significance of things" (Taylor 1985: 99), wired by our individual perception. According to Taylor (1985: 105), in the acting role of the person "[t]he centre is no longer the power to plan, but rather the openness to certain matters of significance". This definition goes beyond the standard definition of a person and solves the question of autonomy in a certain kind.

6.2 The Question of Autonomy

Considered from a Western point of view, the Western individual is always provided with the attribute 'autonomy' or 'autonomous acting' (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 35). The previous remarks on the self as 'relational individual', however, show that such an attribution of autonomy to personhood is not that clear and logical anymore. To illustrate this, I begin this argument with a short history of autonomy according to Mauss (1985).

As Mauss (1985) points out, within the context of personhood our name unifies social and personal identity as well as our narrative self and our personhood. The first name is personal and individual, whereas the surname describes traditionally the tasks and roles within the social community as well as the family origin. Thus, Mauss (1985) uses the term 'personnage' to emphasize the social roles we represent. Here, 'personnage' means 'wearing a mask' like actors in ancient dramas used to do, which alludes to the different personal characteristics focused on within particular social fields.

As a symbol, our names show who we are, and why we act. Through our name, we symbolically identify our self as own being, and thus we are able to objectify our

self in a reflective way. By this means, we are able to identify our self as the grammatical third person (Ricœur 1992: 34) or in a accusative as "'It's me here' *(me voici!)*" (Ricœur 1992: 22). Both views of our self refer to a particular kind of objectification, which allows to perceive our self as another through the diachrony of narrative identity. Even if in every stage of self-objectification we confirm our identity with the ontological 'other self', this perception continually allows a new focus on our lifetime, since the 'new self' is enriched with new experiences and knowledge. Thus, we are perceived and perceive ourselves as social and cultural actors who "receive the imprint of society or, in turn, may be regarded as changing and altering the character of those connections and relations" (Strathern 1988: 12). On that basis, Mauss (1985: 18ff) adjudges moral and social awareness only to personhood. With the rise of morality in personhood the problem of autonomy occurs. Thus, autonomy always needs interconnectedness with others, or else it would be a "psychological chimera" (Straub and Zielke 2005: 167).

> Autonomy therefore appears to be dependent on heteronomy, but in another sense of 'other': the other of freedom in the figure of the law, which freedom nevertheless gives itself; the other of feeling in the figure of respect (Ricœur 1992: 275).

This definition of autonomy is not Ricœur's conclusion. Rather it is the beginning of a way; we could walk from autonomy to respect for the other. Exactly this is the point which seems interesting in Ricœur's approach: autonomy is a kind of our self-regulation, which leads to a particular role in society. It is deeply intervowen with responsibility and promise towards us and the other (Straub and Zielke 2005: 168). In this context, it is again visible that we are always situated in relation to the social environment, what makes us necessarily social.

The freedom of autonomy comes along with responsibility, and so is a moral anchor of personhood. The moral notion of the person or 'the moral person' can be conceived in reference to the permanence of the self within narrative identity. As Proust (1954: 80) described it:

> [l]a fille de cuisine était une personne morale, une institution permanente à qui des attributions invariables assuraient une sorte de continuité et d'identité, à travers la succession des formes passagères en lesquelles elle s'incarnait.[35]

As explained in this passage, morality is conceived as something continual and perpetual within our identity, like a never changing character or keeping one's word. Morality binds us to past events and past decisions, to a 'personne morale', an institution of reliability and promise. For this reason, identity corresponds with personal responsibility in acting.

Acting is a behavior we necessarily execute to be and to exist. In a particular way, we act freely, and thus we are able to improvise behavior which we have not learned or experienced yet. By responding to an act performed by others, we attribute meaning to the other's acting. Through this meaning, a human can give responses freely. Therefore, autonomy can be conceived as a universal concept in self-fulfillment. In accordance with Ricœur (1992), identity is a complex, dynamic, diachronic and, at the same time, synchronic structure that is never accomplished. Based on this interwoveness, the execution of an act can be described as follows:

> [o]n the one hand, self-understanding passes through the detour of understanding the cultural signs in which the self documents and forms itself. On the other hand, understanding the text is not an end in itself; it mediates the relation to himself of a subject who, in the short circuit of immediate reflection, does not find the meaning of his own life. Thus it must be said, with equal force, that reflection is nothing without the mediation of signs and works, and that explanation is nothing if it is not incorporated as an intermediary stage in the process of self-understanding. In short, in hermeneutical reflection – or in reflective hermeneutics – the constitution of the *self* is contemporaneous with the constitution of *meaning* (Ricœur 1991a: 118f).

[35] English translation: "The kitchen-maid was an abstract personality, a permanent institution to which an invariable set of functions assured a sort of fixity and continuity and identity throughout the succession of transitory human shapes in which it was embodied" (Proust 1928: 110).

Considering this perspective, our autonomy becomes visible by symbolism and significance of meaning, not only by practical actions, since symbolism and significance of meaning are embedded in traditions and the cultural context as theoretical or tacit knowledge. It is obvious that there does not exist just one single concept of meaning or significance, since

> the lives of selves must be described in ways that make the events and actions in them *meaningful* or *significant* in ways that naturalistic, reductive descriptions cannot. Meaning and significance of the relevant sort are humanistic concepts, not scientific ones, and are related to human goals and projects (Schechtman 2011: 402).

The directedness of acting to reach particular goals and achieve projects, which are furnished with significance and meaning, leads to the conclusion: "autonomy assumes its strong sense, namely the responsibility for one's own judgment" (Ricœur 1992: 275).

In contrast, autonomy as qualitative human autarchy, normative personality or autoplexy, and as being self-responsible and self-acting, is not only a Western concept – it is above all a Western invention (Welker 2002: 9f). The latter, autoplexy, is a postmodern neologism. It means "'playing with' a multiplicity of shifting roles and identities to secure freedom of action and social position" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2002: 79). Autoplexy, therefore, involves autonomous acting and playing with our narratives, whereas autonomy highlights the normative aspects of acting. Both approaches are socially bounded, since particular social roles are related to the structure of society, and therefore, are normatively regulated.

As a social concept, autonomy is not that easy to investigate. Köpping (2002) doubts if it is necessary to use the term. For him, the concept of autonomy is a "European chimera" (Köpping 2002: 48). In particular, the term itself has Western roots. Therefore, it is difficult to integrate such a concept into the understanding of other cultures. An apex of autonomy or the ideal of a full autonomous human would be asocial, because a full autonomous human would be that free in behavior that there would be no social or cultural dependency or restriction that would hypothesize a sense of interaction. Such an ultimate autonomy is – among humans – unthinkable,

since we are social beings, and define ourselves through interaction which has necessarily a social basis.

However, attempts exist to render a universal statement of autonomy that involves not only Western aspects, but includes concepts of autonomy from other cultures. Therefore, autonomy is considered as a social concept (Welker 2002: 10f). Through the prism of normative aspects like acting, normative personality, or a Greek agonistic self, autonomy means free acting in a cultural way (Welker 2002: 9f).

In reference to Mauss (1985), Köpping (2002) compares autonomous acting humans with protagonists in a play. They have a script according to which they behave. Thus, they are acting as if wearing a mask. This approach to perceiving culture as a script has often been criticized, but this is not Köpping's intention. He suggests perceiving such a cultural script as a useful guidance for action, which is contextual, historic, and culturally related. Such a script makes an impact on intertextuality, intersubjectivity and social performance and their habitual behavior (Köpping 2002: 49). Especially this perception on ourselves following a normative script makes the Western concept of individual to a relational dividual. Perceived in this way, human autonomy does not depend any longer on the unlimited freedom of agency; rather, it depends on freely acting in accordance with social scripts, which leads to social acting conceived as masking within a role-play. For this reason, Köpping (2002) refers to Bourdieu's (1984, 1990, 2012) habitus and field theory. According to this theory, simply formulated, in each field, perceived as a structured social space, we have a particular habitus, since each social field has a particular structure consisting of roles, beliefs, expected conducts, and behaviors. According to Bourdieu (1984; 2012), acting is definitively structured, but it possesses dynamic components. Though it consists of only four primary and fundamental elements, Bourdieu's concept is very thick. Bourdieu's approach sets up the concept of *habitus* as our system of dispositions. Habitus means knowledge about specific objects and their reality, but also "common knowledge or theoretical knowledge" (Bourdieu 1984:467). By this means, habitus is both a special status in society and socially influenced by individual and personal everyday behavior. In Bourdieu's approach a transformative act can be performed, if habitus as our action in a particular *field*, like friendship circle, school, or family, introduces an individual change in this particular field, which influences the others' acting in this field.

Through habitus and acting in the field, more knowledge is gained. Bourdieu calls this particular knowledge and the consciousness about this knowledge in a particular dimension *social, economic, cultural,* and *symbolic capital*. In particular, these are types of consciousness about one's own knowledge, experience and life situation so that they have a direct effect on habitus. In consequence, acting seems distinct as well as similar to other particular groups. Thus, the notion of capital expresses knowledge, life style, taste and social status. Through that distinct or similar acting, we possess *social space* where life style and taste are lived and shown. Bourdieu is able to derive a formula of practice to set in context his concepts of habitus, field, capital and social space: *[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice* (Bourdieu 1984:101). Although this formula lacks social space, it is inherent within the combination of habitus and capital. Finally, habitus is a "*modus operandi*" which is not learned in discourses but in practice (Bourdieu 2012:87). Every learned behavior is a deviation from previous existing structures, which are interpreted in an individual way related to a "*style* of a period or a class" (Bourdieu 2012:86).

Köpping (2002) claims that habitus structures a new performance, since it is situated between the given structure of the world and our action motivations. The nature of our habitus is a certain improvisation between the world's structure and our self's desires (Köpping 2002: 52). In this context, we always orientate our habitus towards the surrounding field. Following Köpping (2002: 52), habitus is newly structured in every interaction. This matches with the notion of personnage conceived as a mask wearing protagonist in a play, according to Mauss (1985). Just like a protagonist in a play, we have to highlight particular characteristics and a particular behavior to be recognized in a social field. This is more than mere role-playing along a special script. To emphasize that, Köpping (2002) introduces the term improvisation in this context. Improvisation does not have a script, which prescribes a particular way of acting in a particular social field. In consequence, improvisation requires a behavior that deals with autonomy.

The factor of the social community builds a necessary counterpart to confirm our self, as already shown with Hegel. Thus, social interaction is the necessary mirror for our self to confirm it and to achieve self-legislation. Therefore, against Mead's concept of the 'I' and the 'Me' (1962: 173–178), which says that our 'Me' is related to the generalized other, which is understood as "organized community or social group

which gives to the individual his unity of self" (Mead 1962: 154), narrative identity is characterized through continuous self-relation, without an objectification. For Mead our self is even more related to social structure than to one's own self being (Josephides 2008: 24). Through Honneth in his early work follows Mead in his claim that the self struggles for recognition by complying with the expectations of others (Juul 2013: 88), through the embeddedness in narratives, the narrative self does not necessarily have to externalize itself. We act in accordance with our will, since we are embedded in cultural, social and traditional frames. We obey ourselves to obey the claims of others. Such an argument follows Lévinas's notion of the trail of the third party. The third party is not directly related to the own self or the other, but through the ethical involvement it cannot be understood as a generalized other (Bedorf 2005: 53). The third party has to be understood as

> a double figure: Insofar as it can be an other for the Ego, it maintains on the one hand a relation with the Ego as radical as the other himself (Bedorf 2006: 263).

Here, it becomes visible that the third is not only an external ethical instance, but,rather it also works inside our self as the inherent other. In this way, the third party shows more similarities with the narrative self. It cannot be taken as a 'neutral' or 'objective' position, rather, the third party is the ethical relation of the 'I' and the other, who in her or his self-being only appears in the social dimension, in other words, it "is at the same time an other for the I *and* the representative of the symbolic order" (Bedorf 2006: 260). An objective position would mean to situate oneself in a metaphysical dimension, where one is able to overlook all subjective circumstances in favor of an objective review of all situation. Such a position is equal to God.

Accordaning to Ricœur (1992: 207), this fits in the concept of autonomy conceived as a state where our acts obtain their self-legislation, and which is embedded in cultural, traditional, and social frames. "[W]hen autonomy substitutes for obedience to another obedience to oneself, obedience has lost all character of dependence and submission. True obedience, one could say, is autonomy" (Ricœur 1992: 210). By this means, the self acts according to its own will, which is culturally and socially determined. Therefore, in the context of mutual recognition, full

autonomy "is achievable only under socially supportive conditions" (Anderson and Honneth 2005: 130). In summary, the relation between social context and autonomy can be formulated as follows:

> [i]n a nutshell, the central idea is that the agentic competencies that comprise autonomy require that one be able to sustain certain attitudes toward oneself (in particular, self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem) and that these affectively laden self-conceptions […] are dependent, in turn, on the sustaining attitudes of others (Anderson and Honneth 2005: 130f).

The problem, which occurs here, is, above all, the opacity of mind, since we have to ask ourselves: '*what do I know about the other?*', but also '*how much otherness do I have in myself?*' This question can be answered with Lévinas' (1969) concept of totality and infinity of the other. The self cannot understand the other in the full sense of his meaning, rather, the self can recognize the other as other than the own self.

6.3 Summary

In the way of Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 205), the narrative self complies with personhood, whereas selfhood complies with the experiential self. In retrospect on the personal relationality to the life-world, personal acting appears as always social.

This approach is on its way to meet the Melanesian perception of personhood. Narrativity is fundamentally relational, since when we recount a story, we highlight a particular red threat of our life. This read threat is a part of our identity, but it remains a part. It is exactly this particular part of our life we recount, which is recognized by others. Other parts are not important in this particular situation. Through the other, we gain recognition for our story and for our self. We are in 'divided' in recognized story-parts by being related to the social life-world, but we allow this social process of recognizing because we want to know our self. That makes us permeable for the other. The concept of autonomy fits in this social and cultural framework, since autonomy appears as self-regulation in dependence of the self and the other against

the background of the cultural framework oneself is living in. Here, the concept of autonomy creates a social foundation, in which everyone is interwoven.

We do not only recognize ourselves as persons, but also the other. In this context, empathic understanding becomes an act of recognition. We are aware of the fact that the other is a person 'like me', thus we have implicit and explicit assumptions about the other's action. As I show in the next part, this also works within the dimension of the relational self, which perceives the other as part of itself.

7. Empathic Understanding as Act of Mutual Recognition

What empathy is and how it is performed depends on the social community and its cultural background and traditions (Feinberg 2011; Mageo 2011). Context and surroundings define the particular and culturally limited notion of empathy. In a double sense, understanding is a crucial factor for empathy. Without a diffuse understanding of ourselves and of the other, feelings and actions cannot be comprehended. This applies for acting persons as well as for the structural observer (read: ethnographer). But, what does it mean to know something?

Cavell's (1976) approach to the notion of recognition examines a linguistic account of the question what the expression 'I know' does mean. By not taking the term 'recognition' in favor of 'acknowledgement', Cavell's approach bears a semantic wideness (Bedorf 2010: 130). Within the context of recognition, the term 'acknowledgement' allows to deal with the following question:

> unless we can share or swap feelings, we can't know what that person is experiencing (if anything). I do not say this is a perfectly unobjectionable idea, but I am far from confident that I know what is objectionable about it. And I am confident that if I *have to consider* the question 'Can I have the same feeling he does?' (Cavell 1976: 247).

From the perspective of acknowledgement and understanding, utterances of everyday life deal with the various meanings of 'I know'. Considering the impossibility of access to another's inner life, the soul or the mind, the only means, through which the inner life of the other can be observed is language and bodily expressions (Cavell 1976: 245; Bedorf 2010: 130).

As a skeptic, Cavell asks how we can have an idea about another's pain without feeling it by ourselves. Certainly, if someone feels pain and shares it with others by communication, everyone has an idea about this pain. The response to the utterance 'I have pain' is acknowledgement. From such a reaction, it can be derived that we

know how the other feels. Although it is impossible, as shown above with Scheler's phenomenology of sympathy, to have the same feeling, it is a given fact that the other understands the utterance 'I feel pain'. Thus, the utterance 'I know you feel pain' is logically true. But, what does it mean to say *I know*?

Cavell begins his investigation with an analysis of the different notions of the utterance 'I know'.

> (1) There is 'I know New York (Sanskrit, the signs of the Zodiac, Garbo, myself)'. To know in such cases is to have become acquainted with, or to have learned, or got the hang of. (2) There is, again, 'I know I am a nuisance', 'I know I am being childish', 'I know I am late'. To (say you) know in these cases is to admit, confess, *acknowledge.* (3) There is, again, the use of 'I know' to *agree* or confirm what has been said, or to say I *already* knew (Cavell 1976: 255).

With regard to these three notions of 'I know', the meaning of recognition as acknowledgement is brought into consideration with knowledge, acceptance, praise and respect as ways of empathy. Within the first and the third context, 'I know' means a confirmation or acceptance that a fact is already known or learned (Cavell 1976: 255). In the second context of his interpretation of 'I know', Cavell accomplishes a little masterpiece in his argument by deriving from the structure of knowledge a form of recognition: if we admit that something is known or learned by ourselves, then this knowledge is true for us, and it is recognized as our own knowledge. Conceived in this way, the content of knowledge is respected and praised. However, this perception of recognition as a state or a situation is more than mere knowledge about something. "[F]rom my acknowledging that I am late it follows that I know I'm late (which is what my words say); but from my knowing I am late, it does not follow that I acknowledge I'm late" (Cavell 1976: 256f). In other words, knowledge about something does not mean to acknowledge or to recognize it.

> It is not enough that I *know* (am certain) that you suffer – I must do or reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must *acknowledge*

> it, otherwise I do not know what '(your or his) being in pain' means (Cavell 1976: 263).

Cavell's approach to knowledge and acknowledgement shows that it is necessary for the recognition of the other to perceive the other as a human who acts and feels. Thus, acting and feelings lead to a particular behavior as a direct reaction. The act of recognition as a particular kind of care or sympathy unveils the true content of known facts. Cavell's approach does not show an outline of recognition as knowledge, but it makes visible how the act of recognition is a particular behavior toward knowledge. It is obvious that "*certainty is not enough*" (Cavell 1976: 258); rather an empathic relationship, which ensures the understanding of the other, has to be established. It has to be considered that in each stage understanding is bound to the individual stage of personal communicative relationships between us.

Empathic understanding is led by feelings and biography, and that means it is lead by perception and experience. Since understanding demands some previous knowledge, "perceptual experience presents the world as being this way or that; to have experience, therefore, one must be able to appreciate *how* the experience presents things as being" (Noë 2004: 181). On this foundation, empathic relationships are based on. The empathic level is dependent on the personal motivation of interest which leads empathic understanding. For example, if Jane does not have any interest in Peter, Jane would not understand Peter in the same way as when she would be interested in Peter. Thus, if Jane likes Peter very much, Jane's empathic level is high; if Jane does not like Peter, Jane's empathic level is low. In the context of acting motivation, empathic relationships can be called 'we-relations', where "our experiences are not only coordinated with one another, but are also reciprocally determined and related to one another" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 67). These relationships are based on mutual recognition, since "[t]he mirroring of self in the experience of the stranger (more exactly, in my grasp of the Other's experience of me) is a constitutive element" (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 67). Precisely through this particular act of mutual recognition, the other is conceived as a human being, just like us. Since in this act not only understanding is performed, but also sympathy and care (Bedorf 2010: 131).

Especially in the case of personal recognition it can be reconstructed how we are recognized: through empathic understanding an act of knowledge is achieved, in which the other is perceived and acknowledged as another human similar to ourselves. Through empathic understanding a transformation from a simple being to a full person is performed. To put it down to the point, the utterance 'I know you feel pain' is not an assertion about knowledge, rather, it is an expression of care and sympathy (Bedorf 2010: 131).

7.1 The Ethos of the Caring and Sympathetic Self

The definition of our being through care and sympathy highlights our social wellbeing. We see that the recognition of others is constitutive for the community, as we recognize others and take care of them.

With Heidegger, I argue that care and solicitude are the primary points of understanding the world, since they ensure the interest for being in the world. The life-world is enclosed by naturally given curiosity: "*Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of*" (Heidegger 1962: 184). In other words, care constitutes the relational meaning [*Bezugssinn*] toward the world (Aurenque 2011: 60). Therefore, Heidegger (1962, 1998) links care and action responsibility on an existential level which refers to the good character and results in ethos as our good attitude. Ricœur (1992) extends this approach toward a direction to the other. The relationship between our self and the other within an ethical relationship is described by Ricœur (1992: 192) as follows:

> in the case of the injunction coming from the other, equality is reestablished only through the recognition by the self of the superiority of the other's authority; in the case of sympathy that comes from the self and extends to the other, equality is reestablished only through the shared admission of fragility and, finally, of mortality.

In consequence, the ethical relationship between the self and the other describes mutual solicitude, and in this way mutual self-confirmation.

> On the level of the ethical aim, however, solicitude, as the mutual exchange of self-esteems, is affirmative through and through. This affirmation, which can well be termed original, is the hidden soul of the prohibition. It is what, ultimately, arms our indignation, that is, our rejection of *indignities* inflicted on others (Ricœur 1992: 221).

Our self's solicitude is a reflexive function which ensures the relationship of our own self and the other. Solicitude is always already there, but it can only be there with others, out of sociality (Ricœur 1992: 180). Aditionally, solicitude is tightly bound to autonomy (Ricœur 1992: 18), since the social surrounding brings us into responsibility. In the wake of Lévinas, we are forced to care for the other and feel responsible for her or him. For that reason, Ricœur (1992: 138f) is able to ask, "if my identity were to lose all importance in every respect, would not the question of others also cease to matter?". Our identity is bound to the permanent confirmation of our own self within our identity, even if it is subjected to dynamic changes. Such things like 'carefreeness' cannot exist, since we at least always care about our self-confirmation: through the inextricable relationship of our self to the other, which is based on self-confirmation through the active existence of the other in the life-world, the self cannot be freed from its purpose to care.

Within the context of Heidegger's conception of care and ethos, solicitude in Ricœur's sense, represents the same function of reasonable insight, which confirms both existences, our's and the other's. Consequently, both care and solicitude operate on the level of "ontological destiny" (Marx 1986: 28) to be directed to the other, and thus to ensure mutual recognition. Althrough Ricœur (1992) does not refer to Heidegger's concept of care, a certain similarity appears. Especially through the new perspective provided by Heidegger's notion of care through ethos, care moves close to Ricœur's concept of solicitude. At this point, I take figure 5 as basis into account, and extended it by an arrow to create figure 8:



Figure 8: the self-related trias of Dasein – Being-with – care.

As figure 5, figure 8 shows the trias *Dasein – Being-with – care* with the particular extentions that solicitude is labeled with self-reflexivity. Each Dasein is Being-with for another. Thus, social interaction processes between Being-withs which indeed are Dasein. Considering the context of the self, self-reflexivity has to be integrated into this process of social interaction. By this means, through self-esteem and self-confirmation care for the ontological and ontic other is performed. Based on the premise that every Being-with is a Dasein, *and vice versa,* our being has to be confirmed and recognized through the existence of the other. Whereas, a step 'outside' from Dasein to Being-with has to be made with Heidegger, this step becomes unnecessary with the complete reflexivity of the self, which can only recognize itself through the other in its own existence. Dasein and Being-with appear as the same, since a human without sociality and "worldly involvements" is unthinkable, "is an abstraction" (Barresi and Martin 2011: 49). From the perspective of narrative identity our self is always another, thus, self-reflexivity secures the identity of our self. From Heidegger's view, care secures the social inclusion of Dasein, but if care is directed to Being-with as the ontological or ontic other, Being-with is the purpose of this directedness.[36] Care is necessary to ensure a certain dynamic movement within

[36] Heidegger himself writes: "Der Grundsinn der faktischen Lebensbewegtheit ist das *Sorgen* (curarare). In dem gerichteten, sorgenden ‚Aussein auf etwas' ist das Worauf der Sorge des Lebens da, die jeweilige *Welt*. Die Sorgensbewegtheit hat den Charakter des *Umgangs* des faktischen Lebens mit seiner Welt. Das Worauf der Sorge ist das Womit des Umgangs" (Heidegger 2005: 352).

Dasein (Aurenque 2011: 36). Within a brave conclusion, I claim that in Heidegger's conception of Dasein, Being-with is more social than care, since 'care' is Dasein's ability or quality to be directed to the other. It is the means to be social. Without the other as Being-with, care would not have any sense. But, the point of dichotomy of the self and the other is not bridged yet.

Empathy has not only to be settled in the dimension of our self and the other, it has to be settled in the dimension where our personal self merges with the act itself. By implication, our self has to be conceived as embedded or embodied in the life-world, since it is the body who is present in the life-world.

> Our body, through postures and conventional as well as non-conventional gestures, is a continuous source of information for others to get access to our conscious and unconscious attitudes or to the possible direction of our future actions. Even the most conventionalized of the codes at our disposal, human language, is typically at work at a speed and in a fashion that implies a considerable dose of routine, habitual thought, and encoding (Duranti 2008: 492).

Embodied or bodily communication is performed all the time. By sharing parts of the inner life, "people see and practice introspection" (Duranti 2008: 492). In recent Western debate, such introspection can be performed as 'felt analogy' or, to put it in philosophical vocabulary, in the "argument from analogy", which says:

> the only mind I have direct access to is my own. My access to the mind of another is always mediated by his bodily behaviour. But how can the perception of another person's body provide me with information about his mind? In my own case, I can observe that I have experiences when my body is causally influenced, and that these experiences frequently bring about certain actions. I observe that other bodies are influenced and act in similar manners, and I therefore *infer* by analogy that the behaviour of foreign bodies is associated with experiences similar to those I have myself (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 181).

If the self cares about its own being, it automatically cares about the other, because the other *is* – or is part of – our life-world. Against this background, life-world as the biography of the self is established, as already shown at the beginning of our journey, as our 'home' or "Lebenshaus" (Galuschek 2014: 377). We live in the life-world for a complete otherness. At the same time, we furnish our life-world with memories, beliefs, desires and wishes. The way we arrange these memories, beliefs, desires, and wishes is the style of our narration. We narrate from the past to the present for the future's sake, since every one of us has experience- and knowledge-based expectations and wishes for the future. Thus, life-world is self-narrated, but at the same time, it provides our self with narration: the life-world appears as our own story, where past and present are linked with expectations for the future.

7.2 Still the Problem of Opaque Minds

Until now, we have talked a lot about understanding, reflexivity, care and their social and communicative abilities and qualities, but even such intrinsic human features need to be performed. All these abilities and qualities as assumed human dispositions are acts, which can be performed unconsciously as well as consciously. The unconscious way to perform is to reflect constantly and to set all perceived phenomena in contexts. The latter one can also be a conscious process, but if the context is not self-given, we have to ask questions. Through questioning, knowledge can be expanded which allows us to discover new horizons and to make new experiences (Angehrn 2008: 53,55). Thus, hermeneutical reflection is performed on a social and cultural level. With Cavell, I have pointed out that empathic understanding is already performed in human relationships, because a logical certainty is not enough to understand the other in an empathic way. So, every empathic act deals with understanding. It has to be established an empathic relationship which ensures the understanding of the other. Such kinds of relationships are developed since birth over the entire lifetime. Without doubt, we are moving in and between such relationships without being able to resolve these relationships.

Taking a step back, the act of understanding has to involve phenomena of the life-world. These can be all animated or unanimated things the life-world consists of.

On the phenomenological level, understanding is not only a social act, but also – of course – a conscious act. The classical phenomenological introspection, which involves only the pure conscious act, is not sufficient for the observation and description of natural human behavior and interaction within the life-world. In Heidegger's sense, empathy, however, appears as much more than mere understanding and reproducible interpretation. It is the constant relationship with others. The inherent structure of care secures an intentional directedness towards the life-world with all its animated and unanimated things. Thus, it shows a deep interest in and interwovenness with the surroundings.

Considering that the self is only able to perceive and understand things within individual, personal and relational contexts, the theory of mind provides different frames to 'understand our understanding', since it includes individual, personal and relational framings. At exact this point, it is obvious that a pure phenomenological approach in a classical sense is not sufficient to render the whole act of empathic understanding. It seems more likely to be a combination of classical phenomenology and hermeneutics: *narratives are found in a phenomenological state, since they refer to experiences and knowledge which are gained in the phenomenological life-world. But they are individual, personal and relational, and thus context related, therefore they need to be formulated as hermeneutical reflection on an unconscious or conscious level*.

> [N]arratives are grounded in observable events that take place in the world. […] [N]arrative is a particular mode of thinking that relates to the concrete and particular; it takes the concrete context to be of primary importance in the determination of meaning. In contrast, theories in the proper sense of the term are concerned with the abstract and general, and in this sense they abstract away from the particular context (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 194f).

Here, Gallagher and Zahavi favor the argument from analogy in contrast to theory theory or simulation theory accounts by combining both accounts. Simulation theory is represented through the approach of "an immediate and direct access to the content of our own minds", whereas theory theory is represented through the argument that "understanding of others is an inference to best explanation, an inference bringing us

from observed public behaviour to a hidden mental cause" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 181). However, all these approaches "miss some basic and important capacities for social cognition" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 192). The argument from analogy links both approaches because only life-wordly experiences through the body are observable for us and for our mind. On this basis, we are able to make assumptions about the life-world, and we "therefore *infer* by analogy that the behaviour of foreign bodies is associated with experiences similar to those" we have ourselves (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 181). Since it has not to be a conscious process, the argument from analogy is conceived as universal.

Wassmann and Funke (2013: 240) encourage the thesis that the "theory of mind, the possibility to put oneself in the position of someone else, is probably cognitive and affective, universally present". They point out that without doubt "[t]he cognitive competence exists, yet, and this is decisive, due to cultural reasons it can be made visible only at a later stage or can be entirely unwanted" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241). Emotions, to be more precisely 'feelings', are classified in the same way (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241), since they "operate like overlearned cognitive habits" and are "shaped, to a significant degree, by the environment" (Reddy 2001: 34). Neither the ability to access a theory of mind nor emotional competences are "culturally predetermined […], but they are innate, and according to culture and language suppressed, expressed or differently classified. If a word is lacking, it does not mean that the emotion is lacking" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241). Thus, the degree of development of a theory of mind depends on the cultural and linguistic context. The claim that "theory of mind abilities develop universally among all human populations" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 246) can thus be broken down to the consideration: empathy as ability to focus "on representations as motivators for behaviour […] is a human universal" (Träuble et al. 2013: 25). In this case, *the ability* for a theory of mind, and *not the concept itself* should be in the focus of investigation and observation (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 246).

An issue in the discussion about the concept and practice of the opacity of mind is the idea to investigate the universality of such 'visible' or 'invisible' introspections. Within common everyday life, for instance, even in Western societies, one may observe that people feel uncomfortable while talking about others; or if they know that others are talking about them, they feel uncomfortable, too. We know it by

ourselves. Considering this personal context, the doctrine of the opacity of mind appears "as a defense strategy against the accountability that comes with making claims about what others think or want" (Duranti 2008: 493). We might also guess that this attitude of the doctrine of the opacity of mind is, in reality, an attitude of respect for the other with a moral implication, which "implies a pan-human preoccupation with reducing one's accountability" (Duranti 2008: 493). By implication, the doctrine of the opacity of mind does not limit our ability to understand the other. Understanding, as already shown above, does not implicate mind reading abilities like "comprehending […] discrete 'mental states' but rather their attitudes and responses as whole situated persons" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 193), since the problem with the doctrine of the opacity of mind is that it is a doctrine. It is a folk belief. Strictly speaking, it is a traditional custom which is performed by a particular cultural community. Althrough mind reading is a human universal, which means that every one of us possesses the ability to empathic understanding or mind reading, cultural frame and individual interpretation within which it is realized, lead to the acceptance and usage of this ability or its denial. In many cases, mind reading is an unconscious action which is linked with particular expectations of contextual common behavior (Carruthers 2011). Therefore, Carruthers (2011: 236) argues for considering two systems of mind reading:

> [o]ne is quick and intuitive, and doesn't require the resources of domain-general working memory. The other is slower and more reflective, and utilizes the rehearsal and global broadcasting qualities of the working memory system.

Therefore, transparence is not even given in our own mind, since assumptions are made unconsciously, since during lifetime "*sometimes*" situations occur, where "the actions of others cry out for explanation" (Hutto 2007a: 45). This fact makes opacity of minds also to a necessarily given human disposition, as we cannot know exactly what the other's action motives are. Through intuitive assumptions, we enhance the transparency of other minds; even if we respect the others right for her or his thougths. In reference to Strathern (1988), Josephides (2008: 158) points out that with the expression "'we don't know what's in other people's heads', they [the

'Melanesian' tribe Kewa] mean that they must wait for the meaning of their actions to be manifest in their effects on others". Folk psychological narratives can help here to construct reasons for our actions, and explain them (Hutto 2007a: 45). This account offers a way which even within the doctrine of the opacity of mind allows making assumptions about the other's actions.

Folk psychological narratives refer to "'embodied expectations'" (Hutto 2007a: 44), which are unconscious, enculturated and socialized expectations about another's actions. "In 'normal' contexts these are not only quicker but also far more powerful and reliable ways of relating to others and navigating social dynamics" (Hutto 2007a: 44). A narrative account of comprehending and understanding is given, even if we follow the doctrine of the opacity of mind: facial expressions, bodily movements, or just stress and intonation of particular words or sentences encourage mutual understanding. These narratives are not, like the concept of a theory of mind, inborn traits; rather they are developed. The folk psychological narrative skill requires theoretical and practical understanding of cultural peculiarities. From this point of view, the Melanesian view of the person confirms exactly this embodied understanding. We are totally involved in the social dimension, as social participants we need the understanding of the other's actions or else, judgments about adequate social actions cannot be made.

The argument from analogy makes visible a smooth shift to admit the existence of something like the doctrine of the opacity of mind. This argument grants that understanding, or the mere attempt of understanding, is not sufficient to be able to talk about empathy. The felt corporeal, empathic, conscious and unconscious analogy marks a mere sense of understanding or interpreting another's behavior within our own experiential context. Such a perspective on empathic feelings is reminiscent of Scheler's comprehension of empathy as 'Einsfühlung', "which attempted to explain both [understanding and reproducing] at the same time" (Scheler 1979: 8).

There are still cultural differences in developments of a theory of mind, and – of course – there is still the problem of the doctrine of the opacity of mind. Even if there are cultural differences in behavior, thinking and problem-solving, as shown above, these abilities are universal – they only differ in their ways (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 242). Tasks, which only focus on the development of the concept of a theory of mind, lack in focusing on other developments which are related to theory of mind, but

may have another cultural framing (Mishra and Dasen 2007). This shift of focus leads to the investigation of cognitive styles in favor of theories of mind. Shifting the focus to cognitive styles leads to approaches which do not investigate the ability for decision making, but to inverstigations of the processes which lead to these decisions. Exactly that are cognitive styles: they enable to investigate cultural, social, and individual differences in problem solving and decision making. Such an approach

> could also provide guidelines for finding the right balance between an individual and a cultural perspective on cognition and culture, which in turn would be of utmost relevance for both the field-working anthropologist and the brain-scanning neurobiologist (Wassmann and Bender 2015: 17).

Within the research area of empathy such an approach provides a broader account of empathic understanding, since the research is not only focused on the 'that' of decision, but on its 'how' and 'why'.

Focusing on the ability for empathy and thus to image a theory of mind, cultural frames lose their importance in favor of cognitive styles (Dasen and Mishra 2010). In doing so, the Western concept of a theory of mind is not fitted by force on other cultures, which possibly do not have a concept like theory of mind, or set a focus on other abilities in early child developments. However, empathy and a concept of theory of mind are still culturally bound, since individual ways of thinking and perception are still culturally influenced. What Dasen and Mishra (2010), however, highlight by choosing the term 'cognitive style' is that cultural differences are not only measurable through the presence or absence of an ability for a theory of mind, since such a theory measures only the ability to make assumptions about another's beliefs, intents, desires, pretending and knowledge. In contrast, cognitive style, which "encompasses the meaning of all 'style' constructs postulated in the literature, such as cognitive style, conceptual tempo, decision-making and problem-solving style, learning style, mind style, perceptual style, and thinking style" (Zhang and Sternberg 2006: 3). Or, to put it more down to the point: cognitive style "is one's preferred way of processing information and dealing with tasks" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 241; cf. Dasen and Mishra 2010: 11). This difference in style depends on factors like age, gender,

previous experiences, socialization and cultural framing (Dasen and Mishra 2010: 11). Therefore, it does not have to be conscious, "it is in fact more likely to be unconscious, linked to habits, customs or preferred values – in other words, to 'culture'" (Dasen and Mishra 2010: 11).

Considering the definition by Zhang and Sternberg (2006: 3), the concept of cognitive style naturally includes the concept of theory of mind. With this broader focus of 'cognitive style', the research of cultural differences in a theory of mind and empathical development becomes more precise. With focus on this individuality of cognitive styles, judgments about the preference of a particular style necessarily have to be excluded. There "is not [a] inherently 'better' or 'more advanced'" way to react (Dasen and Mishra 2010: 11). The individual relation to culture, society, biological relation and to our own biography is considered here, as the following figure 9 shows:



Figure 9: comparison between theory of mind and cognitive style.

Here, in figure 9, it becomes visible that the concept of cognitive styles encompasses besides cultural and biological determination, individual relations. The individual cognitive style influences problem solving and decision making at every step, since even here it becomes visible that the personal biography, self-perception and self-reflection have a direct effect on decisions and problem solving processes.

Considering empathy and thus some concept of a theory of mind or cognitive style as universal human ability, "children seemed to be inclined to automatically

compute other people's belief and expectation […], as they grow older, they might gradually learn to abide by culturally specific folk theory" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 242), which denies or teaches the impossibility of taking assumptions about other minds. The problem of the ability to read another's mind or to deny of this ability is culturally dependent, thus it can be concluded that

> [a]ll of this means that (i) a certain amount of figuring out what others are up to is always going on and is necessary for people to manage their daily life; (ii) whether or not this type of thinking should always be glossed as 'reading other minds' depends on the specific situation as well as on our theory of human action, including our view of intersubjectivity; (iii) conscious and explicit reading of other minds is one of the possible routes to understanding a situation retrospectively and prospectively; (iv) communities (and individuals) vary in the extent to which reading other minds is recognized, verbalized, and justified (Duranti 2008: 492f).

All these conclusions do not only refer to the folk psychological perception of mind reading, they also refer to scientific mind reading research, which is founded on folk psychological observations. Especially scientific research has to deal with these consequences. The focus must switch to the cultural framing, to which, (i), (ii), and (iv) refer. Recalling the Melanesian perception of being a person, such a thing like intersubjectivity is not thought in a separate way, rather it is inherent in us, as already Nietzsche claimed: "the 'subject' is not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind" (Nietzsche 2003: 7[60]). Like every other concept or perception of life and human being, the subject is a conceptual invention, a scientific, theoretical assumption to found a base for further investigation. Such a concept can work or not, as the case may be. If the concept of the subject has reached its limit, then another perception of personhood might be useful for further work. In reference to (iii), reflexivity is not only a conscious process; rather, there are several processes and actions, which base on unconscious decisions. Through, we are only able to perceive ourselves as person in relation to others and through our reflexivity, we are influenced by our own unconscious processes, which lead ourselves to actions without knowing the motives or expectations.

7.3 Agency and Social Relationships

The approaches to care and sympathy through understanding and ethos, as well as the construction of theories of mind and the opacity of mind, result in the question of the nature of the acting and recounting self, since emotions play also a particular role within the motivation and explanation of acting. Action can be considered as edged in "affective perception", which means that "an emotion is an occurrent conscious state, with a certain affect, and with a certain kind of intentional content" (Döring 2003: 220). This approach simply means that "[i]t is the emotion's affect which gives it motivational force, rather than any desire being 'part' of it" (Döring 2003: 224).

> It is its affective character in which experiencing an emotion differs from experiencing a sense-perception: unlike a sense-perception, an emotion represents the target's import for the subject, and thus has an interoceptive dimension which makes it an affective perception and gives it motivational force (Döring 2003: 226).

Emotions maintain the state of desires, which can also be conceived as emotional objectives. Even if Döring (2003: 221) excludes moods from emotional intentionality, since e.g. depression lacks an objective, moods color experiences, and therefore they are able to cause actions in a second order. We are not only concerned by thinking in a theoretical way, rather thinking is considered as action, and therefore the acts of recounting and reflecting have always practical consequences.

> Our life is not driven by theoretical wondering, although some philosophers have considered this as our ultimate talent. It is driven by practical concerns. In our everyday lives we are pragmatists. To put it differently, our primary way of encountering worldly entities is by using them rather than by theorizing about them or perceiving them in a detached manner (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 153).

Such a perception situates us within a world plenty of practical motivations and purposes. It makes us from top to bottom to an acting entity. That leads to the question of the human agency.

The definition of agency itself is a diffuse field. In general, it can be said that agency is our capacity and ability to act. Reconsidered in detail, the structure of agency appears more complex. It can be used to describe our capacity to make choices (Dasti 2014: 3), and thus it is related to the free will (Dasti 2014: 3); that leads to the conception of agency related to "practical normativity and the reflexive self-relation" (Rousse 2013: 2). Furthermore, within the concept of agency, it is assumed that every one of us has a particular motivation to act (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 156), which also refers to experiences and knowledge. Motivations, therefore, are related to corporeal and sensual experiences from the life-world. Understood in this way, agency is related to modes of empathy and conscious and unconscious experiences as well as to active and tacit knowledge. However, these action intentions or motivations are not necessary to define agency, in other definitions it is enough to say that agency is the "capacity to perform actions" (Dasti 2014: 3).

If acting is assumed to be motivated – this means action has a particular purpose –, this purpose can only be understood in a reflection thereafter. "'Reflexivity' hence should be understood not merely as 'self-consciousness' but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life" (Giddens 1984: 3). That makes acting reasonable and purposive, but only in the "durée of daily social action" (Giddens 1984: 27). Since acts are fundamentally social and are not performed by "separate intentions, reasons, and motives" (Giddens 1984: 3), reflexivity gives social acting a thick context by marking every act as a result from prior acts. Acts, in turn, are socially constructed, which leads to the flow of social life by reflexivity and reasonable acting. In consequence, the dualism of structure and agency is suspended in favor of a continuous structuration caused by reflexivity (Reckwitz 2007: 315): we do not formulate a prior intention or meaning concept for our own acting motives and intentions anymore; sense and intention are fulfilled during the act. Therefore, action motivations are situated in the life-world, where actions have their effects and cause reactions. Context, meaning, and intention are not pre-formulated, rather they are socially structurized and continuously re-formulated as illustrated in figure 10.



Figure 10: the stratification model of action (according to Giddens 1979: 56; Loyal 2003: 56).

Figure 10 shows "'intentionality' *as process*" (Giddens 1979: 56). By this means, there is a motivation or intention of action with rational reasons which correlate with other unacknowledged or unknown conditions. For a better understanding of the figure, the areas of 'conscious' and 'unconscious' are labelled respectively. After or during a performed act, reflexivity about the acting starts, but it does not help to avoid unintended consequences. The act becomes conscious, but at the same time reactions to the performed act start, even if the act is not fulfilled yet. In this context, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 161) make a distinction between the "*Sense of ownership*" and the "*Sense of agency*" within actions. The first one is "the [phenomenal] pre-reflective experience or sense that I am the subject of the movement (e.g. the kinaesthetic experience of movement)", the latter one is "the pre-reflective [self-based] experience or sense that I am the author of the action (e.g. the experience that I am in control of my action)" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 161). It has to be considered that in this pre-reflexive context only the current state of pre-reflection attracts interest. In this regard, Gallagher and Zahavi can speak about mere experienced movement which – without doubt exists. If we take into account that pre-reflexive consciousness has a particular sense of unconscious perception of the life-world, it seems quite self-evident that even on an unconscious level the pre-reflexive consciousness has a certain acting intention dependent on prior experiences and unconsciously perceived context. Here, a resemblance with Scheler's notion of love becomes visible. Since love precedes cognitive perception, it is an unconscious movement within the life-world

lead by interest. Therefore, movement always is motivated, even if it is unconscious. Gallagher and Zahavi (2012: 163) explain their distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency within "the logic of involuntary movement":

> [s]ince in the case of involuntary movement there is a sense of ownership and no sense of self-agency, and because my awareness of my involuntary movement comes from afferent sensory-feedback (visual and proprioceptive/kinaesthetic information that tells me that I'm moving), but not from motor commands issued to generate the movement (so, no efference signals), it seems natural to suggest that in ordinary voluntary movement the sense of ownership might be generated by sensory feedback, and the sense of agency might be generated by efferent signals that send motor commands to the muscle system.

The objection here is that it remains open what this "involuntary movement" exactly is. They explain it as "I directly experience the movement as happening to me (sense of ownership), but not as caused by me (no sense of agency)" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 39). Here, the next diffuse term: "happening" crops up. The term is not precisely defined, just means as much as '… something does something to me, but I cannot realize it, because I'm not aware of it (Apologies, I'm not even allowed to think of it) …'. But, exactly this 'happening' is caused by unconscious contextualized experiences, which are stored in the pre-reflexive consciousness. Here, hidden motivations may be encountered, and they are just discovered during or after the performance. The question remains why the pre-reflexive consciousness is not used to make a thicker description of agency. Gallagher and Zahavi's approach remains on this epistemological phenomenological level where the unconscious awareness is not taken into account.

However, the question of authorship remains. Are we authors of our acts, or do we act due to social and traditional obligations? The answer lies, of course, in the eye of the beholder. Following a subjectless approach to recognition and action, authorship is social. Therefore, it cannot exist one single author; rather *we all* are 'authors' of *our* actions. For "the Melanesians", there does not exist an indigenous author who tailors their perception of personhood adequately for the Western

discourse. Beginning with Leenhart (1979) or Strathern (1988), or even this work, anthropological approaches always refer to the author's understanding rooted in Western notions. Considering the Western discourse about personhood, self, and the human being, all these approaches need a Western reference framing, since they try to find a place on a traditional thread.

From a Western point of view, motivation of an act is not directly dependent on the expression of an act (Davidson 2001: 47). For Giddens (1979, 1984), it is obvious that not every action intention or motivation is conscious; they could be unconscious till an act is performed. Thus, there is no contradiction to reasonable acting. He explains that assumption with a dual structure: in such a structure, we produce meaning by acting, but owing to the cultural and social frame, meaning is already there. Meaning is never produced; rather it is re-produced. In addition, the environment is already included in our relatedness, thus, there exist always implicit reasons for 'doing for me' and a 'doing for you'. As LiPuma (2000) pointed out, the relational concept exists in Western thinking as well, but it is encompassed by the individual structure of the 'theoretical person'. Therefore, agency can be embedded in a social context as well as in a so-called individual context: within the social context, our acting depends only on individual and social motivations, which are in turn embedded in a social context.

Each of these approaches, even if they contradict each other in some aspects, seems to be right and well founded. So I am asked to consider these approaches against the background of narrative and performance theory, since "selfhood, narrative, and agency" are thickly bound, and therefore, "[s]elves are fundamentally agents on this view, and agency requires narrative" (Schechtman 2011: 395). As already shown in the context of narrative identity, all these stories have to be consistent, the work, which the recounting self fulfills, is to contextualize particular parts of its lifetime story. Therefore it fulfills a "synthesis of the heterogeneous" within the everlasting "discordant concordance" (Ricœur 1992: 141). In recounting these lifetime stories we perform parts of our own personal identity (Bruner 1986: 145). These parts do not necessarily already exist; rather, the possibility always exists to create new storylines, or recount already narrated stories in a new way, a new narrative coloring. In consequence, through action, we are able – or possess the *capacity* – to change our life-world. Even every act changes the life-world, since the

surroundings feed back the acting by reacting. Thus, transformation can be performed by even little changes in behavior caused by reaction. Considering that acting and performance flow through every corner of our life, agency, indeed, "is 'the ability to transform the world'" (Sax 2006: 474). Although Sax (2006) is referring to ritual theory, here 'transformation' can be considered as expressive action which is able to change already existing habits and behavior. Thus, reflecting the our "action through the perspective of another human – by taking the attitude of the Other" is present in all areas of life (Kapferer 1986: 190). This transformation is performed through the paradigm of reflected perception, which indicates that the motivation of acting is founded in the contextualization and reflection of experiences and their recounting as narratives (Ricœur 1992: 141). That particular ability to act with and against others highlights our capacities, motivations and reasons of acting.

From a lifeworldly perspective, agency is fundamentally social, since the life-world is a shared place where sociality is performed. Considering the notions of personhood described above, a solipsistic human is not conceivable. Every human is related to a life-world where other humans necessarily exist. Experiences and recounted stories are shared with others (Kapferer 1986: 188f). Agency has a direct effect on the social environment and, thus, is the ability and capacity to perform transformational action. In the context of the genuineness of social communities, with the concept of agency as the capacity and ability to act, the emergence of processuality could be described.

In the light of the above, the act does not necessarily need a direct author. Narratives are nourished from the life-world; they are built from cultural and social frames. By this means, they are already there, when we 'are thrown' into the life-world. They are given from the given traditional frame, and thus they surround us. They influence – or even initiate – acting by giving reasons for action. Therefore, one might say, narratives lead us to a particular decision to act. Here, autonomy occurs once more to allow and obey cultural influences as traditional narratives, since our will is already wired by culture and traditions. Therefore, Hess (2006: 294) can assume the existence of so-called outside causes for acting even within Western societies: "[w]hile this is not perceived to be the case in all situations alike it is quite common to attribute an outside cause to someone's action that in a Christian moral sense could be deemed a 'sin'". Even if a so-called outside cause is deemed a sin, it is

thinkable and even possible. For the Melanesian person, in particular through the symbiosis with the life-world, an outside cause for actions is quite naturally: "agents do not cause their own actions; they are not the authors of their own acts. They simply do them. Agency and cause are split" (Strathern 1988: 273). This is primarily so because our criteria for acting authorship differs.

> There is a distinction then between a cause and an agent: a cause exists as a single reference point for the agent, in the same way as the effect of a relationship exists as a single outcome. The cause is the 'person' with whom the agent's relationship is to be transformed, a unitary reference point for her or his acts. The one who is regarded as acting, however, is the one who in taking account of the cause – the reason for acting – *also* acts for him or herself. The agent's position is intrinsically multiple (Strathern 1988: 273).

Integration into society overrules agency as a personal and individual attribution. Rather, the cause of action is found in the social relationship. In other words, agency becomes social in its nature. It cannot be considered any longer as individual attribution with social or interactive effect. The act is performed in society, in the social dimension of the life-world. Therefore, the act can be conceived separately; it does not belong to us as individual entity, rather to an individual outcome to enrich society. Agency is situated in the life-world, therefore, action is considered as life-world-influenced. In a strict sense, we as part of the life-world can be conceived as 'authors' in a certain way, but such a perception contradicts the social foudation of the sociomorphic and cosmomorphic human, who merges into the life-world. Although, the Melanesian perception of personhood shows a deeper interwoven sociality, the Western concept of agency secures the sociality of the individual. Each concept links in some way agency with sociality. Therefore, in conclusion, sociality fundamentally belongs to human agency (Thiesbonenkamp-Maag 2014: 125).

Up to this point, there are not any feelings or modes of understanding within the concept of agency here described. Although empathy and its related concepts are human abilities and capacities, to approach agency on an empathic level, capacities, motivations and reasons are not sufficient, one has to go deeper, to understand the

'feelings of agency'. Considering the aspects of empathy earlier introduced, all understanding, feelings of sympathy, care, and theories of mind seem to be deeply bound to either individual or social action. Different modes of understanding and the ability to act motivate and create action; but feelings of sympathy and care provide the ability to perceive and understand our surroundings and thus the other. In the concepts of a theory of mind, but also in the concept of the opacity of mind, all these aspects of empathy find a cognitive and biological basis. Understanding can be understood as empathy, since the ability to be empathic needs to be developed by experience and knowledge. As it has been shown, experience as well as knowledge is context-related by our own reflection. It is obvious that an empathic ability needs a certain grade of understanding. That does not necessarily include communication, however, the mere understanding of the processes of the life-world, and thus the ability to understand our own experience, is sufficient to be empathic. The fact is well investigated within the different approaches of theories of mind as described above.

That leads to the relation of care and empathy, because, as already argued, fellow-feeling as a special case of feelings of sympathy, and care are mutually dependent; care needs fellow-feeling to understand and feel another's needs, while fellow-feeling needs care to feel interest for the surroundings and others. To 'translate' this into a Heideggerian terminology: we care about our being as well as the being of others; even more, the other as being-with embodies the only entity which acknowledges us to be in the world and with others. Thus, through the existence of others, we are reminded of our own transience. In turn, the other confirms in every second our existence by demanding care and calling up self-care. But care, as shown above, is only a supplier to ensure social acting; rather, Being-with is the fundamental social component in Heidegger's ontology of Dasein. For the structure of Being-with within the concept of empathy, this abstract level is a gain, because Heidegger shows the inherence of Being-with within our being. Being-with becomes a fundamental structure of our being, and, as the mode of mutual recognition, it enables empathy on the level of agency which is realized in the sociality of Being-with. The capacity and ability for agency understood as empathic feeling with another, opens a new horizon of recognition of the other. In this way, empathy outlines our cohabitation which is founded on empathic understanding. The other is recognized intuitively for being her- or himself, insofar as the other recognizes our

self for being itself (Marx 1986: 25). Empathic feeling is the measure which determines recognition (Marx 1986: 25). Thus, empathy is a responsible factor to build social relations.

Through acting –the question is not whether through verbal communication, or not – sociality is maintained. If we are fundamentally social, the verbal communication component as explanation is not necessarily given. As with Heidegger's concept of 'care', verbal communication complies an intermediary role. From a non-Western point of view, if acting is fundamentally social, the acting motivation is social as well. Acting has not to be interpreted by an additional construct like communication, since the non-Western concept of personhood as described in this work is relational and socially conceived; the social component is already inherent in acting. In doing so, acting motivation includes the perception of 'I do because …' and 'I do to …'. This applies, moreover, to the doctrine of the opacity of mind, because even in local communities, every member has a particular social role according to which the member performs social acting. The only act, excluded from the doctrine of the opacity of mind, is the verbal communication act according to pragmatic linguistics and philosophy of language (Austin 1962; Searle 1969; Bauman and Briggs 1990; Ahearn 2001; Robbins 2008; for critics see: Robbins and Rumsey 2008). Social acting is not necessarily dependent on verbal communication; rather, it can be said, social acting depends on the point of view. The explanation for a particular point of view or a reason for action is not or cannot only be given through verbal communication, but also through practical action and emotions (Wassmann and Bender 2015: 18). And this point of view may include communication as a Western construct or not, as the case may be. Thus, in Western understanding, social acting is strongly related to communication, since − and that is at Western belief − through acting communication with the surroundings and the others is performed. The communication component of acting is just only necessary to explain the motivation of an act.

Due to the Western concept of personhood, this account anticipates an individual and strongly subjective actor who needs the communication component as 'add-on'[37] to overcome, in a Heideggerian sense the solipsism of our existence,

[37] Here, the term 'add-on' is understood as modular extension.

because in Western thinking sociality is not inherent in the theoretical concept of personhood.

Therefore, the focus shifts to implicit and non-verbal processes which underlie "stereotypical and routine actions" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 249) and are closely related to folk psychological narratives (Hutto 2007a). These assumptions are founded on the idea that "humans are natively endowed with a set of cognitive abilities and behavioral dispositions that synergistically work together to endow human face-to-face interaction with certain special qualities" (Levinson 2006: 44). Language might be one of these qualities, but it does not reign supreme. Levinson (2006) just calls all these abilities and dispositions "human interaction engine", since they are, all over the world, the universal human way to interact. The way this engine works differs according to cultural and traditional conditions (Danziger 2006: 273). As already shown above with regard to the Melanesian view of the person, "actions are often more important than the verbal expression, especially in traditional cultures" (Wassmann and Funke 2013: 249). Thus, it is possible to make assumptions and judgments about another's behavior.

According to the acting motivation and performance related theories of mind and the doctrine of the opacity of mind, mutual recognition can be considered as an intrinsic motivation. By this means, all modes of empathy are defined as personal and social motivated acts of mutual recognition. Derived from that conclusion, empathy is needed to be able to recognize others. However, within the stages of appreciation and adequate regard, an evaluation of the recognized human is implied. In an ideal context, Jane recognizes Peter equivalently.

7.4 Summary

In the concept of a self-based model of mutual recognition, empathic understanding is still the foundation. Such an understanding results from our experiences and knowledge gained in the life-world. In this way, our *ethos*, our stand is marked. The life-world belongs to us, we have no other chance to perceive and recognize our surroundings, but without doubt there is a world which includes all other life-worlds, ours and those we have no access to (Blumenberg 2010: 54f). Concering our being,

ethos means both our phenomenological stand in the life-world and our hermeneutical stand in the face of our relationship to the other. This interwovenness shows our 'being in the world' as Heidegger would say. The life-world as our being enables us to develop a sense of being oneself and being another, since the other as other being becomes part of our world. Thus, the consciousness of the other's being enables us to sympathize and care, not only for us but also the other.

But this circumstance does not address the issue of the doctrine of the opacity of mind on an epistemological level. On the level of empathy, however,our being encompassed by the life-world pushes the scientific distinction of a theory of mind and the opacity of mind into the background, in favor of an empathic understanding of the other's being. Here possibilities become apparent which enable empathic understanding without assumptions or negations of the other's mind. Especially through the perspective of agency, empathy appears as an intrinsic motivation of recognizing and being recognized.

A further problem – which has not been mentioned yet – is the emotional component within the act of mutual recognition. Usually, folk psychology holds it true that we do not only equally respect others, but make differences on an axiological and deontic level.

8. An Outlook to Social Appreciation

By completing the circle, the last stage of the self-based concept of mutual recognition deals with social appreciation. This realm of mutual recognition is already well investigated and accepted in the current discussion on mutual or social recognition following Honneth, Butler, and Fraser, a discussion already described at the beginning of our journey to a self-based model of mutual recognition.

Appreciation describes the factual existence and the degree of the other's value. In the context of appreciation of the other, appreciatory recognition is not arbitrarily given; rather it is linked to particular values. These values belong to the other as social acting human. By this means, the other is recognized in her or his social role, or as individual in the context of the values appreciated in the social community, since every social community has particular values which are appreciated more than other values. Thus, values are relative to the cultural community. On a theoretical level, such recognized values refer to social appreciation, in case that we do something for our social community, or they refer to personal appreciation, in case that we fall in love with another. Such a distinction is strictly theoretical, since every one of us is bound to and acts against a cultural background. But this general cultural background is not the only thing which leads and constitutes our appreciation.

Every one of us has individual desires and beliefs, thus, social value regulations and personal appreciation merge smoothly in our relational self. In consequence, values, norms, and their recognition as practiced appreciation are central issues of social appreciation. They are related to the "idea of the autonomous, context-independent individual" as it is considered in Western politics and law (Poser and Wassmann 2012: 18). In other words: within the act of mutual recognition, others are recognized as 'persons' (Ikäheimo 2007: 225f) who have a particular role within the social community. Therefore, fulfilling of a social role is appreciated. So far the current state of the debate on mutual or social recognition.

In our Western perception values are above all related to the individual. We think *inside* our cultural community within a value universalism, and thus relate values only to individuals. Such a construction highlights the values of the human

biological individual, whereas in other societies, like 'the Melanesian', the value of social relationships and the fulfillment of social duties are emphazised. However, such a perception of social structures and their value management results in an overemphasis of antagonisms. Indeed, in every social community traces of both can be found.

Let us remember our previous conclusions: we have considered mutual recognition as an act of self-affirmation and "as the good of personal identity-formation" (Honneth 2003: 176). With Ricœur (2005), this good can be understood as a gift which is given from oneself to another, *and vice versa*. To construct self-affirmation which forms our identity, mutual recognition has to be established as an act of mutual commitment and sharing. On the basis which has been elaborated so far, mutual recognition is linked to empathy.

On the social level of interaction, mutual recognition is an intrinsic motivation. It has to be remembered, this means that all modes of empathy are defined as personal and social motivated acts of mutual recognition. Undeniably, without being empathic, self-perception, self-affirmation, and recognition of the other are unthinkable. In the face of our empathic abilities to understand ourselves *and* others, we sense feelings of appreciation for the acts of others, but also for our own acts. Every one of us just feels particular sympathy with a particular other, or not. Feelings of sympathy are in fact empathic, since they are, as already shown, the human disposition and way to perceive, understand and interact with others. In our everyday life, we use such feelings of sympathy or antipathy to manage our relationships with others, but also to become engaged in our way of life, and to reflect another's deeds.

Treating feelings of sympathy from an epistemological point of view, as Scheler did, they appear as cognitive functions to perceive our surroundings (cf. chap. 4.2). The difference to understanding results from "enabling us to grasp how a man, or living creature, as such, is our *equal in worth*" (Scheler 1979: 60). By this means, within the feelings of sympathy a particular empathic content, which allows providing a particular value to the other, is given. In contrast to commiseration, feelings of sympathy provide a focus to the value of the other without being emotionally submerged, since a certain distance is given by cognitive anchorage. This cognitive anchorage is our self-reflexive position and awareness of being in the world. This means, we know that we are in a world and aware of our surroundings as life-world.

Following the assumption of the theories of mind, we are also aware of other beings who are 'like us'.

To start thinking from the relational self which is indissolubly linked with mutual recognition, a total individual perception of evaluation appears as biased and far from social reality; we move in groups and derive and adapt values and norms from group behavior. By adaptation, we actualize already existing values and norms, as shown with Ricœur's concept of mimesis. As individuals we take effect on the group, but by adapting, the group takes effect on us. In respect of the concept of the relational self, appreciation has not only a social aspect, but also an empathic one. Here, I give a short alternative reading of social appreciation as a mode of mutual recognition by introducing its axiological and deontic significance, its declarational status, and its role in comparing persons within groups. All threads mentioned here are possibilities which should be further elaborated essays on relational selfhood and mutual recognition. They can be understood as parts which build up social appreciation, since every part highlights another aspect.

Axeological and deontic appreciation decribes a person's worth against a particular traditional, cultural and social background. Within such a structured net of appreciation, appreciation is not only about the evaluation of a person or a group, but it is also executed within culturally and socially assumed 'good values' and a comparison between values of different persons. Such good values also play a fundamental role within appreciation as a declarational act. Perceived from another's point of view, appreciation has a declarational function, since others perceive the act of appreciation, and react. This can be a positive reaction by adopting the prior act of appreciation, or a negative reaction by not agreeing with the prior act of appreciation. *The declarational status of appreciation* seems to be a complex construct consisting of (pseudo-)individual evaluation within a confusing net of traditional, cultural and social 'value defaults' from which some are actually conscious, others unconscious. As already indicated, with the *declarational status of appreciation,* with *adequate regard*, social appreciation receives normative colouring. Here, the normative value of the person herself or himself for the social community becomes visible. The difference between the *declarational status of appreciation* and *adequate regard* is that the *declarational status of appreciation* needs an inclusion of all participants within the act of recognition, whereas *adequate regard* is broader constituted, and can be

performed so to speak 'anonymously', since attributed values are appreciated in respect to a social community's normative values.

8.1 Axiological and Deontic Appreciation

Indeed, we are organized within social values and norms, what basically is considered axiological. Starting from the thesis that the act of recognition is performed on the basis of phenomenal recognition of the other and the reflection of this experience, the other is always perceived on an individual level and afterwards as a part of something, or a unity of parts. Hence, we are always primarily detected in our own individual values against the background of cultural, traditional and social frameworks. Such a structure of the act of recognition always refers to the axiological dimension of appreciation.

With his interpretation of love as a motivational force for realization and knowledge Scheler offers an axiological account of appreciation: it "is the full *understanding* of the person based on love" (Scheler 1973a: 491), then values are recognized through our interest and engaged involvement in the life-world. However, full understanding of the world does not work without understanding ourselves. This is "[t]he highest form of self-love" (Scheler 1973a: 491). It is possible to recognize our value through the love of another, "to show me the path to my salvation[38] through *his completely understanding love of me*" (Scheler 1973a: 491). To understand the values of our life-world, love for others is needed. In addition, Scheler (1973a: 493) – in his own way – takes into account the cultural, traditional and social framework by writing that

> [*e*]*very moment of life in the development of an individual* represents at the same time a possibility for the individual to know *unique* values and their interconnections, and, in accordance with these, the necessitation of moral tasks and actions that can never be repeated.

[38] 'Salvation' here means the full understanding of oneself which Scheler interprets through his phenomenological-epistemological account in reference to Christianity.

By this means, values are objective, since they are not directly dependent on their carrier, but simultaneously they are subjective, since they are only visible through our individual disposition.

> The complete evidence […] can be given only in the *coincidental grasp* of values which temporally are universally valid and of 'historical', concrete situational values, i.e., in the frame of mind in which one continuously surveys the whole of life and listens for the unique '*demand of the moment*' (Scheler 1973a: 493).

An individual value relativism is expressly excluded; values are always there, what makes them universal; only their order differs (Scheler 1973a: 494). Heidegger's concept of care becomes relevant at this point of investigation. As already shown, every act of recognition is an act of empathy and care. That makes every act of recognition also an act of appreciation derected in the face of the other. The recognizing directedness towards the other is coupled with an intrinsic interest in the life-world. In reference to Dewey, Honneth (2008: 36) describes Heidegger's concept of care as follows: "every rational understanding of the world is always already bound up with a holistic form of experience, in which all elements of a given situation are qualitatively disclosed from a perspective of engaged involvement". Considered from this perspective, it is not only Heidegger's concept of care which secures our relation to the life-world within an involvement of care and interest, but there is also an intrinsic interest and engaged involvement in the life-world vouched by Scheler's concept of love. Both Heidegger's and Scheler's concept secure a deep-going relation to the outer life-world. But, whereas Heidegger's care just confirms our connection to the life-world, Scheler's concept of love also allows the recognition of values. A fruitful further development of this path could be a comparison of Scheler's notion of love and Heidegger's concept of Being-with.

These approaches are substituted by the concept of deontic appreciation which says, generally formulated, "when a person *respects* the relevant others and is similarly respected by them as a coauthority of the norms or institutions of a collective, she is *free* or autonomous in the sense of governed by collectively self-authorized norms" (Ikäheimo 2010: 349). In reference to Hegel, Ikäheimo (2010: 347)

points out that we do not only realize and recognize each other on an axiological level, but also in a „*deontic* dimension" by respecting each other. It is fair enough to acknowledge that respect is constitutive for social appreciation, since respect directly refers to our qualities and characteristics (Ikäheimo 2010: 347). The deontic dimension creates a 'bubble of ethical grammar' within which social behavior is organized (Ikäheimo 2010: 349). That makes "the axiological dimension […] dependent for its part on the deontic" (Ikäheimo 2010: 352).

Following this alternative reading of mutual recognition as social appreciation, love has to be considered as the leading factor of engagement and action motivation within the life-world. It levels out the distinction between an axiological and a deontic account of mutual recognition. Both deontic as well as axiological reasons of mutual recognition are led by love. Even on a legal level, where the deontic dimension is situated (Ikäheimo 2010: 348), love as intrinsic interest or engagement leads the awareness for the legal dimension, and thus respect for the rights of others. Ikäheimo (2010: 351) himself writes that

> [i]n caring about the happiness of *another person* one values and wishes those things that she values to flourish. Valuing things, and thereby wishing that they flourish, *simply* because they are constitutive of another person's happiness, or in other words *for her sake*, is one of the basic senses of what we mean by *loving* someone. In loving someone in this way, one internalizes the value horizon of the loved as part of one's own value horizon.

Although Ikäheimo (2010: 351) follows here a very sensual and emotional notion of love, he connects love with the motivation of caring. For our purpose may be significant that care is also the motivational force to follow legal conditions. In addition, considering ourselves as 'social autonomous acting relational selves', it is not relevant, whether our action is either axiological or deontical, since our act – performed in accordance with a cultural, traditional, and social frame – is itself already based within the axiological *and* deontic dimension. Here, the importance of social integration as well as the importance of self-confirmation appears.

It is obvious that it is not that simple to focus only on mutual recognition and derive from this basis conclusions for the subject; rather, it has to be investigated how the social framework and the relational self presuppose each other. To secure that, the life-worldly relationship ensured through care between the relational self and the other is essential. Actually, the act of recognition cannot be performed without respect for another's acting. It is also essential to examine another's special behavior and bodily expressions. And unavoidable as it might be, therewith an intrinsic evaluation comes along. With a closer look at another's performance we apply empathic understanding, actually all the time, which leads to an implicit evaluation of another's action. In conclusion, respect is directly dependent on the phenomenal perception and recognition of a human within her or his own personality.

8.2 The Declarational Status of Appreciation

Whereas the speech act theory has already been criticized as a 'human plug-in' into the subject theory, it seems to be fruitful to have a closer look at the declarative function of acting; "declarations and status functions are connected to the community members' thinking and acting in terms of individualistically conceived collective acceptance (recognition)" (Tuomela 2011: 712). Since appreciation is always bound to individual as well as social relationships, it has a declarative coloration as social esteem. If we are appreciated in view of particular values, these values are highlighted and will most likely be recognized by others (Searle 2010: 102). Thus, social esteem is a symbol whose "'skills and talents'" (Schmidt am Busch 2010: 263) or – as Honneth (1995) already pointed out – "abilities and threats" are socially honored. Considered in this way, social esteem as appreciation is always directly related to self-worth (Honneth 2007: 136). "Someone who is not socially esteemed can therefore not consider him- or herself a valuable human being" (Schmidt am Busch 2010: 263). It is obvious that Honneth's approach does only refer to Western capitalist society when he writes:

> [a] mere glance at studies on the psychological effects of unemployment makes it clear that the experience of labor must be assigned a central

> position in the model emerging here. The acquisition of that form of recognition that I have called social esteem continues to be bound up with the opportunity to pursue an economically rewarding and thus socially regulated occupation (Honneth 2007: 75).

Following this example, Schmidt am Busch (2010: 264) is able to distinguish two different kinds of social esteem: "1. esteem related to specific skills; and 2. esteem related to socially useful achievements". Both kinds of esteem refer to Western capitalistic claims, which Schmidt am Busch (2010: 275) underlines with characteristic examples:

> striving for professional success as well as personal qualities necessary in this respect (discipline, enthusiasm, etc.); striving for the highest possible income; displaying professional success (for example through a specific consumptive behavior); and calling into question social welfare policies and programs.

The distinction of both forms of esteems does not have to remain on a meritocratic level. Esteem related to socially useful achievements is obviously related to work; esteem related to specific skills can also be applied to trivial realms like free-time activities or hobbies. Schmidt am Busch, nevertheless, remains very close to Honneth's approach by just focusing on the economic aspect of social esteem.

The crucial point in Schmidt am Busch's approach is that he assumes the classical philosophical subject by perceiving recognition as attachment, since he offers "a *social* explanation of why people seek to maximize their earnings or profits" (Schmidt am Busch 2010: 276). By this means, people seek to maximize their earnings or profits to receive recognition in terms of social esteem. In Schmidt am Busch's eyes as well as in the eyes of Honneth, this striving for recognition is a social construct and not an intrinsic motivation. Schmidt am Busch's concept of meritocratic esteem, however, offers an account of the performance-related evaluation of ourselves as well as others. While Honneth's term of work is very specific and obviously related to Western capitalist society, work can also be defined in a broader sense. Perceived in

this way, work can be any kind of activity or action. Trivial realms like free-time activities or hobbies as fields of mutual recognition are included.

Therefore, Schmidt am Busch's distinction is ideally suited for a self-confirming and action-based model of mutual recognition and should be further investigated in this context elsewhere. The question that arises at this point is how appreciation conceived as social esteem conducts ourselves within a dividually perceived composition of the self. For the purpose of mutual personal recognition, appreciation as an act of mutual recognition is both constitutive for personal development as well as for inclusion in the social community (Ikäheimo 2010, 2007), since every act causes reactions from others. These reactions are either affirmative or depreciative. Thus,

> [r]espect is related to self-respect, esteem to self-esteem, denigrating feedback concerning one's abilities is related to an internalized sense of incapacity, experienced humiliations are related to a sense of inferiority, and so on. The connection between recognition from others and self-relations is a readily intelligible and interpretative one, although also causal (Laitinen 2010: 320f).

On the kind of experiences mentioned, self-perception and thus personal identity are founded. Whether a reaction to an act is affirmative or depreciative depends on this act's adequate regard. The work-related examples Schmidt am Busch has pointed out, refer to culturally framed values, as in this case of capitalist society. Within this value framework, we strive for self-confirmation by others, and we act accordingly; in this case by working, earning money, attending meetings, etc. In other cultures, values might differ.

The declarational status of social appreciation comes along with some ontological and, of course, ontic − since they are quite real − problems. One of these problems, which occur in this context, is resource management. The context-related regard for particular values can be understood as awareness guiding. Actually, awareness, especially for the moment, is a limited resource which cannot be split. By this means, when we have something in focus of attention, we might miss other things. In a particular moment of attention, only particular values are recognized, which leads

to misrecognition of other values which might be carried by another. This could be a scenario where a struggle for recognition might occur.

8.3 Adequate Regard

Laitinen (2010) describes adequate regard as a further mode of mutual recognition. Adequate regard enables within mutual recognition the evaluation of a society's members as persons. Considered in this way, mutual recognition includes a normative comparison between humans. According to the formula *x recognizes y for z* adequacy can only be given in comparison to other competitors. Thus, adequate regard consists of at least two participants and at least a third party, who distributes recognition. By this means, we have to accept that the other deserves regard more than we do. In consequence, the third party has to be a person of authority who declares adequate regard for another person A, who deserves to be honored, and facing a person B, who accepts the regard given to the other.

In respect to the perception of recognition as an act, adequate regard can be understood "in terms of responsiveness to the real normative relevance of the features of the other" (Laitinen 2010: 325). Thus, we are recognized according to values. It has to be highlighted that adequate regard does not deal with respect, but with the acceptance of adequate regard within a group or social community. If this acceptance is not brought about, the honored person is only appreciated without any adequacy. In this case, it remains open whether adequate regard is adequate or not.

In the context of mutual recognition on a social level, Laitinen (2010: 319) distinguishes between two divergent insights, which he calls "the *mutuality-insight* and the *adequate regard-insight*". Mutuality-insight describes the theoretical structure of recognition, as "ego has to recognize the alter as a recognizer in order that the alter's views may count as recognizing the ego" (Laitinen 2010: 319), which is similar to the description concerning the *declarational status of appreciation*. In turn, adequate regard–insight is "that we do not merely desire to be classified as recognizers, but to be treated adequately, in the light of any and all of our normatively relevant features" (Laitinen 2010: 319). To bring it down to the point, adequate regard can be defined as follows:

> [s]omething is *adequate regard* towards a person if it is an appropriate response to the normatively or evaluatively significant features F of the other. These features generate reasons to respond in certain ways – certain responses are called for or required by the features. The reason-governed 'responses' at stake can arguably be of a variety of sorts of things: there is *a plurality of kinds of responses* that are normatively called for (Laitinen 2010: 323f)

It can be considered as a 'state of peace', as Ricœur already named it. "'Being adequately recognized' is the state that follows when the demands for respect, social esteem and so on are being adequately met, and when that is achieved, all parties may rest content" (Laitinen 2011: 46). Although this state of peace follows a broader definition as Ricœur intended, such interpretation can be integrated into normative claims, without being lost in transcendental idealism. The crucial point in this approach is the broader account of the adequate regard-insight. Laitinen (2010: 320) points out that

> [t]he mutuality-insight leads naturally to a strict conception of recognition (only recognizers can be recognized; recognition takes place only when two-way recognition takes place). By contrast, the adequate regard–insight leads to an unrestricted view (also other beings than recognizers can be treated adequately, and one-way adequate regard is conceptually possible).

The act of recognition can only be performed, if both recognition giver and recognition receiver are on the same 'level'. By this means, they have to recognize each other as potential resources of mutual recognition. Therefore, the mutuality-insight

> leads to the *restricted* view that recognition in the relevant sense concerns quite sophisticated beings only: ones capable of regarding each others (and themselves) as recognizers. That is, recognition of recipients, who are capable of normative expectations concerning the regard and treatment they receive from others. Such recipients can stand in relations of mutual

> recognition and can experience being recognized or misrecognized in the sense which presupposes that the recipient in turn recognizes the recognizer as a relevant judge (Laitinen 2010: 327).

In particular, it is this capability of normative expectations, which can cause Hegel's and Honneth's famous struggle for recognition. Let us take the following example: a musician plays both the piano and the violin. She loves to play the piano, but she is only booked for violin concerts. Thus, she struggles for recognition of her piano playing ability. In this example, the musician struggles for a particular kind of recognition, even if she receives recognition from the audience and concert organizers for her violin play. It is not necessary to speak about restricted recognition, since at every step recognition is performed. According to Bedorf (2010), recognition does not always have to be performed in a positive sense, since recognition is always already misrecognition. In the case of the musician, that means that only the part of her identity as violin player is recognized, whereas the part of the identity which stands for the piano player is misrecognized. Nevertheless, the act of misrecognition is and will remain an act of recognition. This example shows that recognition can be given and received, but if the recognition, given or received, does not fit in our normative schema, the struggle begins.

For this reason, on the level of the act of recognition, a tension between mutuality-insight and adequate regard-insight does not exist. The tension occurs only on the personal level of perception. Since in both cases the act of recognition is performed along normative evaluations, it is the personal perception which leads to a successful or unsuccessful act of recognition. When Laitinen considers adequate regard as unrestricted act of recognition, it is an act of recognition which is based on the pseudo-objective level of society. By this means, the values of society which are set by society determine the act of recognition, and compared to other members of the society – this could be a diffuse crowd – a particular member deserves adequate regard. By implication, mutuality-insight focuses on the subjective level of evaluation, since the recognition receiver considers the attributed values of recognition in reference to the recognition giver. This is the context where both participants have to be recognized.

Within adequate regard, the other forces a particular reaction which Laitinen (2010: 324) calls "responsiveness". The reaction refers to the "normative features of the other that directly call for or require responses" (Laitinen 2010: 324). Therefore, every reaction is a response to the other's attitude or behavior, perceived as initiative. It does not have to be a direct or intentional behavior on a conscious level which forces a reaction in an offensive way. Rather it is the typical everyday behavior which always creates a demand for reaction and can be perceived as 'force', since the other has not any opportunity 'not to react' or 'not to response', "[s]ome initiatives may of course be normatively insignificant, and make no difference to the normative predicament of the other agent" (Laitinen 2010: 324). In this context, Laitinen (2010: 325) assumes that adequate regard is identical with adequate recognition, since particular features of another are regarded adequately within this particular act of recognition.

> [T]he features in question must be *normatively relevant* features (although *any* normatively relevant features will do – they need not be, for example, ones had by recognizers only), the entities in question must be *bearers of normatively relevant features* (although *any* kinds of entities will do – they need not be recognizers), and the responses must be normatively called for or required responses (but *any* kinds of responses, emotional, cognitive, institutional, attitudinal, behavioural, expressive, etc will count as different varieties of recognition) (Laitinen 2010: 326).

From that derives that all human features, characteristics, and attitudes are able to cause adequate regard. Such an account of adequate regard, therefore, offers an account of recognition which is both intrinsic and extrinsic. In this perspective, "*any* kinds of responses that are normatively called for by *any* normatively relevant features may be cases of recognition" (Laitinen 2010: 320).

In view of the above results, the word 'adequate' as it is used here is ambiguous. On the one hand, normativity is set by society. Thus, adequate regard is given in relation to a society's postulated values. Regarded from a theoretical point of view, adequate regard provides an "unrestricted normativist view" (Laitinen 2010: 320). On the other hand, and also in reference to the mutuality-insight (Laitinen 2010: 320),

the term 'adequate' could mean 'in an adequate way of my own values'. Thus, we are considered as adequate, if we suit with the value scheme of another who evaluates.

An aspect, which has not been mentioned so far, is the necessary mutual relevance of recognition. Receiving recognition from someone, who is not recognized by the recognition receiver has no value for the recognition receiver. Without doubt, the act which the recognition giver performs, is in deed an act of recognition, but the evaluation of the recognition receiver sets an evaluated 'normative zero'.

Especially in the case of adequate regard it becomes visible how thick we are related to action and mutual recognition. Since adequate regard shows axiological and normative adequacy with and towards others, the act of recognition becomes socially and individually relevant. Considered in this way, every one of us is situated in a tension between self-confirmation and confirming others. Both sides know that it is necessary for their self-perceived 'surviving', as already pointed out and shown with a sketch of the debate about 'struggling for recognition'. Since, "struggles for recognition are not merely struggles for being held to be a 'recognizer' […], but for getting *adequate* regard from others" (Laitinen 2010: 325), it shows that Hegel's assumption of mutual recognition being generally a struggle is mistaken: adequate regard shows up that, when a struggle occurs, it would happen here. Mutual recognition is the everlasting tension between us and the other. This tension does not have to end in a struggle; rather it is a continuous process of mutual self-confirmation. Thus, mutual recognition builds a continuous belt between single dividual selves to be unified them within a social community.

8.4 Summary

Mutual recognition within social groups is a well-investigated scientific field. All threads mentioned here in this last chapter obviously have connecting links to a self-based model of mutual recognition, despite being rooted in the classical discourse about mutual recognition approached from subject theory. Nevertheless, social appreciation appears in a new light by introducing loosely the concept, elaborated here, of the relational self into the debate on mutual recognition as social appreciation. Actually, we do not treat all of our contemporaries in the same way. We

make differences in respect, relationships and behavior. Thus, we let our surroundings feel by which emotions we are driven. Here, social appreciation is an empathic motivation to show feelings like sympathy and antipathy to the world. Perceived in this way, care as motivational force to move in the world secures the relational account for the world. Appreciation, thus, works as mutual evaluation on an axiological and a deontic level. But, the role of care and love as motivational interest in the world remains open, so in further investigations of self-based mutual recognition this aspect has to be considered.

The same applies to the declarational status of appreciation. Honor and social appreciation are also constitutive factors for the development of social relationships within groups. Nowadays, through time management, economic circularity and pressure, social appreciation becomes a rare value. In this respect, the dynamic of the declarational function of social appreciation in relation to the concept of mutual recognition, elaborated here, has to be further investigated; especially the role of the self, which is developed and confirmed by the social community, has to be focused.

With Laitinen's approach of adequate regard, I brought in an already well investigated and in the current discourse well anchored concept. But even with such a concept, it becomes visible that the concept of the relational self, elaborated here, allows further thinking of mutual recognition far away from struggle.

Epilogue

> There are no safe paths in this part of the world. Remember you are over the edge of the wild now, and in for all sorts of fun wherever you go (Tolkien 2006: 161).

Beginning the epilogue of the path we have been going till now with my opening quote, I like to finish my journey on the path of the self in the same way as it began. This does not mean that we walk in circles, but we have made our round to reach out for the self, and consequently further questions rise which hopefully will lead to further investigations on the role of the relational self within mutual recognition.

Our journey with the relational self and mutual recognition has crossed the borders of two broad and well-established disciplines. In accordance to the Tolkien quote above, such a path is not 'safe', since it goes through areas which have not been linked in this way yet. "[O]ver the edge of the wild" (Tolkien 2006: 161) we crossed the border, and have begun our journey with a simple tree metaphor. Let us just remember shortly the image: the tree stands for our self, and to repeat it: the tree's branches can be imagined as composed of narrative threads, as if every single one of them were a biography. They merge in the tree's trunk. The roots are hidden in the ground; they are one with the world. This image is a metaphor for our being in the world, since, in every moment, we are interwoven with our surroundings. By this means, we do not exist being isolated from others, rather, we are influenced by others from our very early existence. Our mother's nutrition, or maybe even her taste of music, influences us even in the womb. Thus, this journey has shown how the relational self can enrich and even change the discourse of mutual recognition and personhood, which still are based in subject theory.

In consequence, against the general and current flow of scientific debate, this work points out the chances to overcome the subject with alternative concepts, but, above all, this work points out alternative perceptions and their possible involvement in the current scientific state-of-the-art. With an approach from anthropology and philosophy, I show how much a 'multi-cultural' point of view can enrich theoretical fields. In times where theories all over the world, even in the humanties, influence each other, one cannot just proceed from Western approaches and so-called other – spiritual and mythical– approaches. Therefore, my purpose is to build a bridge between philosophical and anthropological, Western and non-Western approaches to selfhood and recognition. Such a path cannot be gone without considering 'personhood' as the acting variable in the human being. Therefore, I have chosen a Melanesian-rooted approach to show that Western thinking cannot hold a predominant position in the human sciences; that non-Western approaches to the subject discussed here are quite similar to the Western ones and they can enrich each other.

All through the structure of my work, I have been able to show how the disciplines of anthropology and philosophy are related. Without doubt, they have a direct effect on each other, since, as already said at the beginning of our journey, both disciplines have one outstanding subject in common: they deal with the human being, her or his emotions, rationality and performance, yet differ in their approach. However, a mere explanation of selfhood, personhood or recognition does not show how these concepts could work together in detail. As already shown in the summary of the last chapter, there are several points which have not been explained yet.

A further journey to the relational self has already begun in the previous chapter. But there are many more starting points for further investigations: as explained in accordance with Gallagher and Zahavi, the first-person-account is not the only account for perceptual processes of the human mind. Through the neurologist's account, which already maintains a tight connection to the philosophy of mind and phenomenology, an additional cognitive account with the help of cultural anthropology is possible. It may be true that the explicit or implicit application of concepts or perceptions like personhood, self, sociality, empathy, agency and autonomy is universal, and in a particular form present in every community worldwide, but it is also true that Western perceptions are not universal. The journey

is not finished here. We may take the disciplinary border crossing initiated here as a starting point for further investigations and deepening of this scientific topic.

With new theories of self-concepts, the relational self can be investigated in its role within the social interactional context. As already mentioned above, Gallagher introduced "a pattern theory of the self". Within this theory he tangibly assumes that "[d]ifferent selves are constituted by different patterns, but within one individual these patterns may change over time" (Gallagher 2013: 3). The theory can work on several levels, as meta-theory, it can pattern already existing theories, or pattern the individual self (Gallagher 2013: 3). This theory is prepared to include existing self-concepts, but also to pattern them. Thus, a question for further investigations would be whether the self itself is a pattern theory of the individual self within a cultural background. Such a perception of the self could help to investigate or specify cultural differences in self-concepts.

An excellent example for a culturally influenced perception is the verbal perceptions of time and space which actually is metaphorical: in Western perception, we speak of 'the future in front of us' or 'we are running into the future'. In contrast, about the past, we talk as if it would lie 'behind us' or 'we are looking back in the past'. Other examples may be

> we may think of time as moving up or down, which we do, or as staggering from left to right, which, under normal circumstances, we do not. It is to be expected that those aspects of space which best conform to our everyday experience in the spatial world are preferentially made use of and typically found across languages (Radden 2003: 226).

Our usage of language determinates our perception of time and space. Western languages, thus, rather support the egocentric perception of our surroundings. In contrast to the Western perception of time and space, verbal perceptions of time and space, already investigated, for example, in Melanesia, Chile and Peru says just the opposite. The future lies behind and the past in front (Núñez and Sweetser 2006: 2). Such concepts may not be "relative, egocentric and anthropomorphic" (Wassmann 1994: 646), rather, their perception of space is "geographically determined" (Wassmann 1994: 660). Thus, among the Yupno in Melanesia the future flows uphill

and the past downhill (Wassmann 1994; Núñez et al. 2012). If the focus shifts from an egocentric to a geocentric perception and recognition of the life-world and oneself, this has s purchase on cognitive concepts. In this way, a new basis for investigations on cognitive time and space perceptions in Western societies is given, since "[a]bstract concepts are commonly grounded in spatial concepts" (Núñez et al. 2012: 34), which are also influenced by embodied perception and recognition.

At the end of this journey, which actually did not take a straight way from anthropology to philosophy, but has taken some detours through neuroscience, psychology, literary theory and performance theory, remains the classical question of authorship. For instance, in her book *Analytical Buddhism* (2006) Miri Albahari, a original Buddhist, introduces a non-egological account into Western discourse. In particular, she writes about the illusion of selfhood from a Buddhist point of view. In this respect, Buddhist spiritual and culturally rooted perceptions of selfhood find their way into Western discourses. One might say, the author of this work is to blame for her approach's being locked in with the Western point of view, since it is formulated in Western terminology. But, by linking here anthropology and philosophy, I introduce 'the Melanesian concept of personhood' beyond anthropology into at Western discourse, and not the other way around. The advantage of such an appropriation is clear: as said at the beginning of this work, 'the Melanesian perception of personhood' is a Western interpretation, anyway. That makes it a theoretical concept which is best suited for usage in Western discourses. Further work might investigate this link from the native's point of view. Thus, with this work and hopefully in further works in this field, it has been shown that despite its spiritual and culturally related roots, the Melanesian perception of personhood enriches the Western debate about recognition, personhood and the self.

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