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The Mercedarian Order in the Andes in the sixteenth century •

In the sixteenth century, *The Order of Our Lady of Mercy for the Redemption of Captives* was an integral part of the Christian-Hispanic society that expanded into what for its members was the 'New World' of America. In doing so, the Mercedarians were entering new terrain in two respects: they moved to locations hitherto unknown to them where they encountered different cultures; with their missionary work they undertook a task that had previously not been a part of their Order's duties. As representatives of the Christian church, the Mercedarian friars participated in the negotiation process between cultures that had come into conflict with each other. This process was shaped initially by military force and later increasingly by laws (dictated by Spain), the justice system, and administrative organization.

In the sources, the lore of this 'dialogue of cultures' is told in many voices yet is at the same time biased, because indigenous voices have practically not been documented. The present study, too, cannot provide much information about their cultures and their experience of events – even though the Mercedarians (just like clergy in general) had by far more and more intense contact with them than other groups of residents of Spanish origin. Spanish accounts of indigenous conduct sometimes thematize their own incomprehension of the Other. They provide us with an outside perspective, and in each case the intentions and the level of knowledge of the authors have to be questioned. Reports and chronicles describe events in an evaluating and interpretative manner. Court records and legal contracts offer more direct evidence of the interests of the people involved and their individual sense of justice; these sources represent events comparatively objectively. Indigenous knowledge was in part banned, destroyed, or marginalized. What is more, the natives had no choice but to accept a certain degree of Hispanization – i.e. to adapt to the language and the writing systems of their colonial masters – if they wanted to make sure their voices were heard, and recorded for posterity. Yet the sources also reveal change, or literally a broadening of horizons, on the side of the Europeans: the part of Mercedarian historiography which this study focuses on can be considered as reflecting one such example of change induced by globalization and cultural contact.

In the period under consideration (i.e. in particular the time between the 1510s and the 1610s) the Mercedarian Order changed. In the beginning, it was a divided, unreformed, comparatively small, and highly specialized Order that had little political and even less scholarly influence and whose spirituality was primarily mariological. It grew into a reformed

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Order that was increasingly well off and well educated, and that no longer invoked only the Virgin Mary and the Kings of Aragón to account for its foundation, calling, and role models, but also Pedro Nolasco – its own founder figure. The reasons for this development are not only to be found in Europe; the expansion to America had widened the scope within which the Order operated: first geographically and factually, and later financially, mentally, and also ideologically.

The material presented in this study allows us to compare and illustrate many questions relating to the Hispanization of Spanish America, the development of its institutions, and the colonial economy. While existing theories were cited, the questions discussed in this study were consistently developed from the source material that is known or accessible at present.

The dialogue – which surviving sources allow us to observe and describe – turned out initially to be rather one-sided with regard to the Mercedarian Order too: from the period up until the 1550s, for the most part all we have is third-party statements *about* the Mercedarians in Spanish America. From that time onward, we can identify a dialogue taking place inside the Order that in its transatlantic form primarily took the shape of a dispute. Subsequently, the Mercedarians raised their voice also in the Andean region itself: in dealings with their civil patrons, other clergy, and worldly institutions. The number of available sources increases substantially when we look at the period from the 1580s onward. The reconstruction of the expansion of the Mercedarian Order in the sixteenth century uncovered three characteristic developments or facts:

(1) The present study demonstrated that the expansion of the Mercedarian Order to and within Spanish America was neither a planned nor a continuous process. In contrast to what the Order's seventeenth-century chronicles (which are often cited on this issue) state, the leadership of the Order apparently did not provide continuous political guideline. Only at times, the Order received political, financial, and staff support from the Crown; between 1540 and 1578 there was practically no support at all.

The analysis of the sources indicated that since the 1510s the Order was collecting donations in the overseas realms for the redemption of captives in the Old World. The quick expansion was a consequence of the fact that members of the Order accompanied influential *conquistadors* who gave the friars building ground in the settlements, land, and natives; in this respect, this expansion followed the same logic as the expansion within the Iberian Peninsula. The Crown officially approved the Mercedarian expansion in 1526; and in the 1530s the Crown also repeatedly bore the costs of the friars' equipment and their passage to Spanish America. The Crown made its reasons for doing so explicit: it referred to both the missionary work and the necessity of reforming members of the Order who already resided in Spanish America.

At least during the early phase of expansion, some of the much-lamented problems with observance as well as the occasional lack of licenses and mandates might have been due to disputes about competences and responsibilities between the *maestro general* of the Order

and the *provincial* superior of Castile. The *provincial* of Castile later continued this dispute with the authorities of the Order that were developing in Spanish America. The loyalty of the Mercedarians of Spanish America toward the conquerors jeopardised their relationship with the Crown, in particular when the Order's patrons defied instructions and officials coming from Spain. After a bishop criticized the brethren for their 'too worldly' conduct in the 1540s, the Crown initially prevented all Mercedarians from emigrating to the colonies and compelled the province chapter of Castile to issue drastic reform decrees: all but five houses of the Order in Spanish America were to be closed.

However, the *visitador* ('inspector') sent by the Order failed to enforce this plan. In the aftermath, the Mercedarians in the Andes suffered from a capital drain to Spain and from being deprived of indigenous bondmen as a result of the failed insurrection of the *encomenderos* led by Gonzalo Pizarro. Since the end of the 1540s, securing their financial situation presented a particular challenge for the monks. Up until the late 1570s, the patronage of the conquerors and citizens on individual and local levels was crucial for the Mercedarians' successful establishing of a permanent presence. The Mercedarians provided pastoral care and accepted former soldiers – as well as the latter's sons many of whom were born locally and were mestizos – into their Order; some of the friars played a role in the resettlement of natives and took part in expeditions to the borderland of the Spanish sphere of influence; they also carried out the mandatory evangelization in the *doctrinas*. That the process of reforming the Order in Europe progressed rather slowly was probably another impediment to obtaining support from the Crown during this period. In spite of active efforts from the Spanish-American friars they did not receive significant staff, legal, and financial support until, at the end of the 1570s, Spanish-American born *maestro general* Maldonado took office. That the Order was able to establish a solid economic basis was mostly due to contributions from their patrons and from lay brotherhoods, and the management of land and capital through the friars. In the early colonial period, the Mercedarian Order in the Andes differed from other orders not only because it took an active role in the conquest in the first place (which some contemporaries and later in particular authors of other orders criticized): the Mercedarian Order also adopted a proactive approach to expansion and (consequently) arrived early in the respective 'reclaimed land' (a fact that was repeatedly emphasized by the Order). Most remarkable of all remains, though, how fast and how thoroughly the Mercedarians adapted to local circumstances and the expectations that were placed upon them there.

(2) This study was further able to show that the adoption of new duties transformed the self-perception of the Order's members in Spanish America, which, with some delay, also changed the self-perception of the European parts of the Order. Up to this point, the core competency of the Order in Europe had been the collection of alms for the redemption of captives. While their primary goal was the 'deliverance' of fellow Spaniards and brothers in faith, the Mercedarian Order also played an active role in the creation and maintenance of a negative, frightening image of 'infidels' as 'enemies of Christianity'. In this manner, the Mercedarians also promoted the worldly goals of the Christian rulers in the Mediterranean

area, i.e. military victory, appropriation of resources, and expulsion of political and religious enemies.

Beyond the actual events of the conquest, in the Americas the Order could not continue to deal with 'infidels' in such ways because it was neither possible nor sensible to expulse the people who had been conquered. In addition to that, Spanish law did not allow the indigenous population as a whole to be enslaved as prisoners of war. Instead, the law stipulated they should adopt Spanish customs and religious beliefs; this rule also justified the forced resettlement of natives to places near Spanish settlers, where one could demand a 'tribute' from the natives in return for their 'education'. Of course, the Spaniards in America gave donations and legates for the redemption of captives as well. However, it was now also necessary to introduce these forms of charity, along with the Christian order as such ('orden y policia'), to the 'infidels'.

The friars adopted this task as their 'new mission': at least since the 1560s, they spoke in exchanges with their superiors in Spain of this mission as their primary and most particular task. Evidence for this mindset can be found in self-referential statements in the Andean Mercedarians' correspondence as well as in reports on their apostolic work in the cities, in *doctrinas*, and in areas that were not yet under Spanish control. This new task also justified the Spanish-American Mercedarians' rejection of monetary claims from Castile, and of the rules concerning the leadership of the Order and the individual friars' conduct that the visitors had decreed.

The experiences gained in America seem to have changed the self-perception of European members of the Order only indirectly, i.e. by means of the monies arriving from the Andean region. This money accelerated the rise of the Castilian province, so that in the 1550s its *provincial* drew level with the general of the rest of the Order in terms of influence and monetary power. The legal dispute between the Peruvian province (self-proclaimed in 1556) and the province of Castile in the 1560s was in many respects emblematic of their conflicting interests and the strategies pursued on both sides. On this occasion, the monks of Peru tried to 'redeem' themselves from their subordination to the Castilian province. Spain rejected this request with reference to – among other things – the poor education of novices in Spanish America and the acceptance of former soldiers and mestizos into the Order; from Spain's point of view, the latter in particular appeared undesirable. Castile, however, kept the money that had been intended to buy the Peruvian monks' independence from Spain, and invested it in the university education of friars. As, in the long run, these educated monks rose to the top ranks of the Mercedarians, both the ways in which the Order was governed and ultimately also everyday life in the Order changed. The reform decrees of the Chapter held in Guadalajara in 1574 and the new constitutions of 1588 eventually regulated and reformed the relationship between the provinces as well as their liabilities. However, the new mission of evangelization in America found little echo in these documents. Instead, the ransoming of captives was to be tightly regulated and more widely promoted, and to

receive more financial support. This was enforced on both sides of the Atlantic and led to an increase in prestige and the growth of a shared identity of the Order.

The chronicles produced by the Order in Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth century stand in stark contrast to this disregard or even disdain for the Christian mission. In the end, the need to integrate the 'American experience' of the Order into its self-image was one of the reasons that led to the creation of these works as well as of a specific Mercedarian iconography. The Spanish authors now paid extensive 'tribute' to evangelization: they embellished the lives of individual missionaries in accordance with the ideas and ideals of their own time, and put particular emphasis on these *vitas* in order to increase the Order's reputation: *doctrineros* who had lost their lives in service were now venerated as martyrs – just like friars who had been engaged in the redemption of captives. In these texts, the Christianization of indigenous South Americans appears virtually equal to the redemption of captives; at the same time, efforts were made to suggest continuities between the Order's evangelizing and (earlier) redemptive activities.

(3) This investigation did not uncover any evidence that the Mercedarians possessed or developed an internally binding missionary concept. The veneration of the Virgin Mary seems to have been a consistent practice. It is furthermore notable that individual friars apparently showed great willingness to adapt to local conditions. Both the conduct of Mercedarian *doctrineros* and their missionary methods seem to have merely deviated somewhat from those used by other congregations or from decisions of church councils. The Mercedarians did not, however, present alternative approaches.

One important reason for this conduct is the fact that the Order, unlike for instance the Dominicans and the Franciscans, had no previous experience in and therefore no tradition of evangelization. Instead of trying to persuade people to adopt Christianity, the Mercedarians initially focused on supporting the Spanish troops in their seizing of land and fighting against 'heretics'. In this context it is significant that among the Spanish invaders there persisted a special veneration for the Virgin Mary: she embodied particular ideals worthy of imitation and people prayed to her in emergency situations. Mercedarian preachers in Europe had, of course, already propagated her worship as well as the necessity that for the salvation of their own soul people should give alms and buy indulgences that benefitted the Order's redemptory work. One should also note that during the first decades of Mercedarian presence in America, there was no infrastructure that would have allowed centralizing the friars' training and compelling them to follow a unified policy. It is most likely that a mixture of ideas taken from personal experience, examples set by other religious practitioners, and the elusive 'Mercedarian spirituality' of individual friars led to their adopting a practical stance toward their missionary duties. Three factors helped the Mercedarian Order grow into their new task: (i) the close contact between the members of the Order and the conquerors who were later to become *encomenderos*; (ii) the friars' obligation to educate the native workers who were assigned to them; and (iii) the fact that the *doctrineros* had to

contribute with their income to the monks' livelihood and the maintenance of the convents. In order to accomplish their task, the Order needed people who were able to mediate between cultures and languages. Remarks by Fray Francisco de Bobadilla and Fray Diego de Porres as well as evidence of a high percentage of mestizo friars in the Andes suggest that the Order took it upon itself to train such mediators.

The present study revealed the different stages of this development, which resemble those identified in relation to the process of evangelization in Spanish America in general. During the wars of conquest, friars such as de Francisco de Bobadilla and Hernando de Granada performed mass baptism. As a rule, these baptisms were preceded by use of force and/or an exchange of gifts, as well as short speeches such as the *requerimiento*. The friars threatened anyone who intended to reject Christianity with suffering in this life and the hereafter, and they promised divine assistance and entrance into the Christian heaven to those who wanted to 'accept' Christianity. Sources on Bobadilla and Granada also mention the use of the symbol of the cross, of baptism and holy water, processions, and the veneration of the Virgin Mary.

Subsequently, the Mercedarians build churches in the cities and offered pastoral care to the residents, much like the Order did in Europe. Outside of the cities some of the friars took part in the so-called *reducción* of the natives into village communities. They began to supervise indigenous parishes – the so-called *doctrinas* – and later defended their position there. For taking on these tasks, the Mercedarians were paid a salary from the *encomenderos* or the Crown and received payment in kind from the natives. Until independent provinces of the Order were created, the *comendadores* were responsible for the supervision of parishes; depending on the area, the numbers of *doctrinas*, churches, and convents as well as their endowments differed significantly.

In the course of the analysis it also became clear that baptism, in particular, was considered imperative for achieving salvation: this concept is documented in the manual for missionaries by Fray Diego de Porres, statements made by Fray Gaspar de Torres, and several personal and local *Informaciones de Servicios* of the Order that emphasized the fact that baptisms had been performed in large numbers. The notion that the act of baptism signified and confirmed not only an acceptance of faith but also an acceptance of the pope and a subordination to the Spanish King persisted, and the Mercedarians do not seem to have questioned it. This notion is present in the *Requerimiento*, the descriptions of baptism by Fray Francisco de Bobadilla from the 1520s, and also the manual for missionaries by Fray Diego de Porres, which was written after 1550. The surviving fragments from Fray Gaspar de Torres' sermons of 1597 indicate that the Mercedarians continued to believe in and propagate this amalgamation of religious and political subjugation.

Next to the sacrament of baptism, the Mercedarians seem to have propagated in particular charity as a prerequisite to salvation. This is evident, for instance, from Porres' manual for missionaries, and the observed practice of citizens commissioning the Mercedarians to celebrate Mass for their own (i.e. the citizen's) salvation and for that of others. Charity is, of

course, not a unique feature of the Mercedarian Order or even Christian faith. However, it appears only logical that the Mercedarians would have advocated charity works together with baptism, and the invocation of the Virgin Mary to act as intercessor. As the examples of Fray Diego de Porres and the mission in Esmeraldas have shown, some friars approached their missionary activities rather proactively and even daringly. It is possible that the latter approach was – at least intermittently – perceived to be characteristic of the Order, and that it was, at least in part, adopted to fulfil a duty seen as typically Mercedarian. Later chronicles maintained that potential converts valued the particular courage displayed by some of the friars but there is hardly any evidence in the sources to support this claim. Finally, Fray Martín de Murúa mentioned in his chronicle (pre-1616) that the natives had accepted processions as well as the symbol of the cross, baptism and holy water, and the adoration of the Virgin Mary.

The three main findings described above can be summarized as follows: (i) the Order's expansion was carried out neither continuously nor systematically, (ii) the self-perception of the Mercedarians did change, and (iii) while the Order had no set catalogue of missionary methods, its members engaged in noticeably dedicated missionary efforts also – and particularly – at the limits of the Spanish sphere of influence. The present study furthermore revealed a number of differences between the Mercedarian Order and other orders in the viceroyalty of Peru, as well as particularly distinguishing features of the Mercedarians. For instance, different orders started from different preconditions: in contrast to other orders, the Mercedarians were neither a reformed nor a mendicant order at this point in time – even though the pope had conceded similar privileges to them. Their funding system differed from that of other orders insofar as they did not depend on attracting additional support to meet their basic needs; while individual Mercedarian friars were bound by a vow of poverty, this vow was not always enforced; convents had a right to property.

The Mercedarians also considered economic and legal expertise as indispensable. When looking at Spanish America, two further facts stand out: firstly, there is a lack of theoretical writings by Mercedarians that reflect on the state of society (and it remains unclear whether any such documents were produced); and secondly they showed restraint in debates about the rights and living conditions of the natives as well as about the kings' policies regarding America.

According to their own testimony, Mercedarians of the first generation, such as Fray Francisco de Bobadilla, saw themselves as informants to the king and executors of his duty to evangelize that was based upon the *patronato real*. In testimonials, they also commented on the merits of their sponsors: whether it concerned governor Pedrarias Davila's administration, or the dispute between conquerors Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro; whether it concerned the uprising of the *encomenderos* around Gonzalo Pizarro, or smaller military advances into as yet unchartered areas, such as that of Álvarez Maldonado in 1567 – in cases of doubt, the Mercedarians remained loyal to the conquerors who were closest to them. The friars defended the latter's interests by giving favourable testimonies, carrying

out diplomatic missions, and acting as military chaplains; in individual cases, they even provided military and financial support.

The *procuradores* whom the authorities of the Order later sent to courts and courts of law represented the interests of the Order itself. They do not seem to have participated in debates concerning the natives, such as the one conducted in Valladolid. The superiors of the Order attended church councils, but there is no evidence of their having openly furthered this discussion. Nothing is known, either, about the reception of these debates within the Order itself. Considering the low educational levels in particular of the ordinary Mercedarian monks, it is conceivable that at first literary production was indeed limited. Also, initially no Mercedarian held a high ecclesiastical office, e.g. that of bishop, who consequently would have been (at least in part) responsible for human rights policies. The connection between the Mercedarians and their local patrons, which was by necessity close, and the Mercedarians' tense relationship with the secular clergy as well as other orders seem to have prevented them from criticizing the status quo: if the Mercedarians advocated the case of the natives they did so on a local level and acted as a broker for Spanish interests rather than defying them. Written evidence of Mercedarians addressing indigenous culture and the rights of indigenous people is limited to Fray Diego de Porres' manual for missionaries, sections of Fray Martín de Murúa's works, and a letter by Fray Diego de Angulo that focuses on inheritance law. However, references to writings of cultural mediators, such as the disgraced Fray Melchior Hernández, and the fact that in archives today there are hardly any documents (apart from title deeds) dating to the period before the 1580s suggest that any such writings were everything but carefully preserved or might even have fallen prey to censorship.

The most salient findings of the present study are summarized below with each section focusing on one of the five main chapters (chapters 2–6). The chapters followed the chronology of events and, on occasion, focused on specific regions or personalities; each chapter analysed different source material, and also derived its research questions from this material. The first chapter (chapter 1) served as an introduction: it included definitions of key terminology and gave an overview of the current state of research.

(2) History of the Order

The second chapter retraced the creation of the Mercedarian Order and its history up until around 1500. The discussion shed some light on both the condition the Order was in when it began its expansion toward the Americas and potential motives for this development.

This chapter offers the first summary in German of existing research on the history of the Mercedarians as well as information on relevant sources; in this context, prevailing problems with source criticism are thematized and points of contention mentioned. Chapter Two discusses the following topics: the changes of the internal constitution of the Order, the tasks of the Order, and the Order's position in relation to other congregations as well as to Crown and papacy, and Christians and 'heathens'.

The Mercedarian Order originated in the context of the Christian-Spanish *reconquista* and the crusades. Three factors had a long-lasting impact on the development of the Order: (i) its roots in lay brotherhood, (ii) its organizational structure which was modelled after that of military orders, and (iii) its specific vocation to redeem Christians held captive by Moorish authorities. Both the friars' involvement in 'worldly' affairs, e.g. their acting as mediators in negotiations with Muslims, and their presence at the limits of the Spanish sphere of influence were invariable and visible characteristics of the Order. Legal and economic expertise was indispensable for the Mercedarians, as it allowed them to increase and protect their equities as well as the funds donated to them, and occasionally lead negotiations with Moorish slave traders and diplomats. The Mercedarians' work as collectors of alms and redeemers was facilitated and supported by privileges that had been conceded by kings and popes. Their patrons also assigned benefices to the Mercedarians: they consisted mostly of arable lands and building plots and included the residents who were obligated to pay tributes to the Order. The people ransomed were compelled to accompany the friars on their tours across the country for a specific length of time (such as a year and a day). The idea behind this was that seeing these people – as living examples of the friars' successful efforts – would motivate the public to donate more to their charitable cause. In 1235, the pope had imposed the Augustinian Rule on the Order. The earliest known constitutions of the Order were composed in 1272: they regulated the Mercedarians' internal organization, procedures for ransoming captives, and life in the confraternity. An increase in the numbers of priests among the members of the Order and their rising influence led to the clericalization of the Order in 1319 and the adoption of a new constitution in 1327. These developments evidently caused the Mercedarians to deliberately break with their lay tradition. The current consensus is that the Order's spirituality was based primarily on a strong Marian devotion. As this study has demonstrated, the constitutions of the Order stressed in particular the importance of imitating Christ, in the sense of 'visiting and freeing' Christianity both on earth and in hell.

Despite the growing influence of the papacy on the leadership of the Order, it was the Aragonese Crown that successfully prevented a merger of the Mercedarian and the Trinitarian Order. The merger had been suggested since the Mercedarians had been weakened by plague, wars and bad harvests of these times, as well as by most recent Castilian legislation, and competition with other congregations. Subsequently, the patronage of individual houses and friars both by the popes, and the kings of Castile and Aragón continued to increase. In 1448, Fray Nadal Gaver obtained the exemption of the Order from episcopal authority.

Since 1443, the *comendadores* of the individual houses of the Order in Aragón (and since 1466 the *comendadores* in Castile) retained any revenues that exceeded the quotas of ransom money allocated to the provinces from their commandries and collections of alms for themselves. The conflicts between kings and popes (i.e. the patrons of the Order) played a part in the break-up of the Order, which was codified in the *Concordancia* of 1467: since then, the *provincial* of Castile was able to govern his province virtually independently from

the *general* of the Order. Both parts of the Order remained unreformed: posts were given to friars on the basis of favouritism and often held for life; private property was tolerated which led to great differences between poor and wealthy members of the Order; individual friars enjoyed privileges and protectorates of ecclesiastical and worldly authorities. The scope of the present study did not allow reconstructing the extent to which Mercedarians of different houses were connected to the later *conquistadors* of America through family ties or patronage relations; nor was there scope to determine whether the friars already worked as field chaplains in the Iberian Peninsula and in North Africa. In contrast to the Trinitarian Order, the Mercedarians do not seem to have had a permanent presence in Northern Africa, but seem to have maintained a house in Oran after 1509.

Members of the Order were in charge of congregations in the cities and travelled the countryside to preach about the redemption of captives and indulgences. It is safe to assume that during their irregular visits to the centres of slave trade the Mercedarians also preached to Christian captives who were being held there; there is no evidence to suggest that sermons also took place in front of Muslim audiences. The Order considered it important to show initiative as well as courage in dealings with people of another religion, but it did not have experience in evangelization.

(3) New territories

The third chapter retraced the history of events of the Spanish conquests in Central and South America as far as it concerned the Mercedarians or was influenced by them. Which mission and mandate brought them to America, and what did they do in these new territories?

Firstly, the accounts of Mercedarian chroniclers such as Alonso Remón (1618, 1633) and Tirso de Molina (MS. 1632, 1636) were compared with accounts by chroniclers belonging to different orders. The origins and scope of the Spanish *patronato real*, which regulated the affairs of the church in Spanish America, were also discussed.

Mercedarian chroniclers claimed their fellow brethren had arrived early in the Andes region, in the wake of the Pizarros and with legitimization through the appropriate licenses and mandates; incidentally, the chroniclers also defended the Pizarros' controversial course of action in their conquest of the Inca Empire. According to Dominican chronicler Remesal, the Mercedarians had originally only come to Spanish America to secure any bequests made in favour of their redemption work; Augustinian Calancha even claimed the Order's expansion to Spanish America had taken place without a mandate and against the will of the Spanish monarch.

The chapter then went on to demonstrate that in 1516 the Mercedarians succeeded in having the privileges of mendicant orders extended to include the Order's congregation. Relatively soon after that, in 1518 the Mercedarians' privileges to sponsor ransoming were extended to Spanish-American regions.

The papal bull 'Omnimoda' of 1522 explicitly called upon the mendicant orders to begin missionary work in the New World; it also issued them with comprehensive rights to fulfil this task. In 1526 the Crown approved the convents that the Mercedarians had founded in Spanish America up to this point and placed them under the jurisdiction of the Castilian *provincial*; in 1531 a papal auditor confirmed this decision, which had been challenged by the Order's *general*.

The earliest known documents about the Order that originated in America concern the Mercedarians' activities in support of the redemption of captives. Later documents depict the Mercedarians primarily as field chaplains, confidants of the conquerors and their ambassadors in Spain, and founders of new convents. The friars are also depicted as baptizing natives and acting as pastors of Spaniards who lived in the new settlements in Mesoamerica and the conquered cities of the Incan empire. As early as in the 1520s and the 1530s, the Crown commissioned the Mercedarians to evangelize the American population. In many cases the Crown also bore the costs of passage for the friars.

In contrast to the account given by the Mercedarian chroniclers, the expansion of the Order did not take place in a structured manner, nor did the Castilian *provincial* or his proxy in America, let alone the Order's *general*, regulate it. The source material on Fray Francisco de Bobadilla's activities in Mesoamerica and Fray Hernando de Granada's presence in today's Ecuador and Columbia proves that the foundation of convents in these regions was a direct consequence of the friars' accompanying the conquering armies. A settler from Cali (Columbia) later described these foundations as primarily an act of gratitude of the conquerors towards the mother of God, Mary; she supposedly had rewarded them with victory because she wished for the natives to be 'redeemed' from the rule of their leaders. The warlords tasked the Mercedarians to evangelize the people who had been subjugated. Initially, the friars fulfilled this task by giving short lessons in the principles of Christian faith that were followed by mass baptism. The example of Fray Francisco de Bobadilla showed that the Mercedarians would pride themselves of such 'achievements'. At the same time they publicly disputed the effectiveness and legitimacy of such an approach whenever someone who happened to be their political enemy adopted it.

In contrast to some members of the Dominican Order, for the natives the Mercedarians did not present an antipode to the conquerors, nor were the friars cultural competitors or an alternative to the latter. The Mercedarians shared the conquerors' interests and saw themselves as their loyal fellow campaigners. In Central America and in Peru the Mercedarians also participated in the resettlement of natives into so-called *reducciones* as well as in the foundation of *doctrinas* that served both secular and church interests.

When, in the 1530s, clerical and governmental administrative hierarchies began to develop, their representatives criticized the conduct of the Mercedarian friars as not being very exemplary, and as counterproductive. Although at least one of their friars took part in the

conquest of the Aztec empire, the Mercedarians only succeeded in establishing a settlement in the region after the Order as such had been reformed and flourished. Bishops and governors in Mesoamerica and the Andes recommended expelling the Mercedarians. In reaction to this, the Castilian chapter decided, in agreement with Prince Philipp II, to reduce the Order's presence in Spanish America to five houses only. These reform directives should also be seen in the context of the establishment of the viceroyalty of Peru and the so-called New Laws which were designed to protect the natives. This study further demonstrated that, after a dispute between the Crown and the newly elected Castilian *provincial*, Fray Francisco de Cuevas set off for Peru as visitor – despite the fact that Philipp II had wished for him to be appointed to the office of independent *provincial*. On this journey, the new president of the *audiencia* Pedro de la Gasca and also the *comendador* of Cuzco Fray Juan de Vargas accompanied de Cuevas. La Gasca finally succeeded in putting down the rebellion of the *encomenderos* that had had thrown the region into turmoil. While chroniclers of other orders labelled the Mercedarians indiscriminately collaborators and supporters of the insurgents, Mercedarian chroniclers repudiated this. In doing so, they successfully suppressed the fact, that in 1545 the king had ordered the majority of the Mercedarian houses in Spanish America to be closed. However, an analysis of the known sources showed that there was no consistent directive that advised the friars with whom they were to take sides. It is possible that each convent or even each individual friar acted according to whichever loyalties they held, and that they primarily considered what would be advantageous or disadvantageous to them as well as to the Order. This study also demonstrated that Gonzalo Pizarro actively influenced the staffing policy of the Order in Trujillo and Quito; in these places, he also supported the Mercedarians financially. The letters of Fray Pedro Muñoz as well as testimonials about him show his personal pugnaciousness and his ardent reverence for Gonzalo Pizarro. Other friars acted as messengers of and diplomats for La Gasca's side.

(4) Viceroyalty of Peru

Chapter Four focused on the 1550s and 1560s – a period that has received little attention from historiographers of the Order until now. The first section showed that Fray Francisco de Cuevas' visitation and La Gasca's directives concerning the Mercedarians around Fray Juan de Vargas in Cuzco and Fray Miguel de Orenes in Lima on the one hand led to financial losses, but on the other hand only marginally affected the existing personnel structure. The president of the *audiencia* divested the convents of almost all their indigenous subalterns. However, this did not apply to the convents in Lima and Cuzco, and it seems that other settlements did not always obey the president's orders. The smaller convents were not closed; de Cuevas died on his way back to Spain.

Significantly, all internal sources of the Order that have survived from this period relate to economical issues only; it is likely that these particular documents were preserved because of their long-term relevance for the Order. These sources were examined in the second section. The testimonials of indigenous labourers (*yanacunas*) assigned to the Cuzqenian

Mercedarians shed light on the extent and significance of unpaid labour for the convents; they also provided evidence on the beginnings of the Order's evangelization efforts (in Quechua) in the region of Cuzco. A letter and contracts from the period indicate that citizens of cities such as Lima and Cuzco, as well as Trujillo, Frontera de Chachapoyas, and Arequipa had an interest in the continued existence of the Order: they supported the Mercedarians, e.g. through donations and patronage of churches and chapels, as well as by interceding with the king on behalf of Order and by joining it. The example of Cayo Topa in Cuzco showed that, at least occasionally, patrons also emerged from indigenous gentry.

The third section centred on the question, from where – at a time during which the Order did not receive personnel support from Spain – the Mercedarians recruited new members: it was former conquerors, soldiers, and the children of conquerors who joined the Order. All of them, and particularly the mestizos among them, were able to establish and strengthen ties with local elites. Some of the mestizos successfully rose to offices such as *comendador*. During this time, the adequate education of the novices presented a particular problem: some of them were trained by other congregations, others sent to Spain. Fray Francisco de Maldonado, who became *general* of the reunified Order in 1576, is the most prominent example.

The fourth section of this chapter dealt with the relationship between the friars in Peru and the management of the Order and the Crown in Europe. The negotiations between the three parties about the friars' status were also discussed. In a letter written in 1553, Fray Juan de Vargas described both the divine service and the conversion of 'infidels' as duties of his Order in the viceroyalty of Peru. The city councils of Cuzco, Trujillo, Piura, Lima, and Chachapoyas declared themselves in favour of the Order receiving assistance from Spain; nonetheless, this support failed to materialize. In 1556, representatives of a majority of the convents in the Andes region elected Fray Juan de Vargas as their *provincial*; in doing so, they effectively created a province that was independent from the provincial of Castile. Mercedarian historiography hardly mentions this conflict within the Order, and if historiography does mention it, it describes the conflict mostly as a quarrel about money and power. With the help of court records from Seville, a complaint from Cuzco, and a letter from the Castilian *provincial* to the king the present investigation was able to reconstruct the course of events and the arguments that were exchanged. In the documents, the disputing parties described their goals, duties, and position with regard to each other: the Mercedarians of the Andes portrayed themselves as pastors and missionaries; the Castilians insisted that the regulations of the Order should be observed and emphasized the primacy of ransoming. The complaints from Cuzco purported a suspicion that vicar *provincials* sent from Spain had become corrupt; they also stated that demands to pay tributes and dues prevented the friars in America from performing their duty – evangelization. Castilian *provincial* Gaspar de Torres could not – neither for himself nor his predecessors – claim a history of financial or personnel-related support of the Mercedarian expansion in America. His argument, however, touched on a central point of the actual problem: if the friars in Peru

did no longer consider him their leader, in future it would be neither his responsibility nor his right to send well-educated and 'exemplary' monks to America.

The fifth section of this chapter addressed the 'constitution' of the four provinces of the Order that were founded in Spanish America in 1563. They were established as a result of discussions between *comendador* of Cuzco Fray Juan de Vargas, whom Spain did not recognize as elected *provincial*, and Fray Gaspar de Torres, the *provincial* of Castile and official superior of the American Mercedarians. Large parts of their agreement corresponded to proposals for reform that were discussed in relation to the Order in Europe. The agreement also regulated in great detail the competencies of the American *provincials* that were to be elected. However, even though the agreement widened the scope for action of the new provinces and clarified their precise legal status in America, they remained subordinate to the Castilian *provincial*. The king approved of these plans and allowed a number of friars, including Fray Juan de Vargas, to travel to America.

A comparison with efforts made to reform the Order in Spain showed some parallels with developments in the Andean region: citizens in Lima and in Barcelona acted as patrons and supported the respective status quo in the Order. Seen from today's point of view, one cannot help but draw analogies between the relationship between the Order and the Crown, and the relationship between the natives and the authorities: in the eyes of the authorities, the customs and lifestyle of the natives as well as the conduct of the Mercedarians were equally in need of reform. The Order, too, was subject to being reviewed and assessed and urged to conform to a particular doctrine.

(5) Reform of the Order

The fifth chapter focused on the reform of the Mercedarian Order in Spain and its further development in the Andean region up until the 1610s. The analysis demonstrated that, due to the agreements of 1563, the Order's branches in Spanish America were not only 'pioneers' of the reform but also tipped the scales with regard to the reform process back in Spain. Analogous to the *maestro general* of the Order, the Castilian *provincial* now controlled the fates of several provinces: in fact, his position of power was expanded through the votes of the new provinces in Spanish America that were subjected to him but by now also had gained the right to vote. The acrimonious and long-running dispute about authority and reform in Spain can be seen as one of the reasons why during this period the Mercedarians overseas had little hope of receiving support from the Crown. In addition to that, the liberties granted by the Castilian *provincial* Fray Gaspar de Torres in 1563 were revoked by his successor Fray Juan de Peñaranda with reference to the ongoing process of reform.

Yet, support was asked for, or more precisely demanded: after the first *comendadores* in the Andes had passed away, in 1570 a new generation of *comendadores* commissioned several

'Informaciones de Servicios' of the Order. The *informaciones* unanimously claimed that the Order in Peru had always been loyal to the Crown; divine service and the evangelization of the natives were once more identified as the main fields of Mercedarian activity. While neither the *comendadores* nor their testimonials mentioned the ransoming of captives, Fray Diego de Angulo, Castilian visitor and vicar-general, did use it as an argument in his own efforts to obtain the Crown's support for the Order in the Andes.

In 1574, the reform chapter of Guadalajara decided that all the provinces of the Order be reunited under a common *general*. Spanish-American born Fray Francisco de Maldonado was elected to this office in 1576. In a letter to the king the *general* identified the work in the *doctrinas* to be the primary task of the Mercedarian friars in Spanish America. Maldonado was not only the first to make quantitative statements about the missionary work of the Order, he was also the first for several decades who sent considerable contingents of well-educated members of the Order to Spanish America, who were to implement the Order's reform there.

The second section of this chapter introduced some reformers, reforms, and overall developments from the period from the 1570s to the 1590s. Firstly, the influence on the Order in Peru of vicar-generals, Crown officials, and the inquisition was discussed. During this time, a local educational system for the monks was established and expanded. The members of the Mercedarian lay brotherhoods increasingly took over charitable work in Peru while also raising great sums of money for ransoming.

It seems that in some isolated cases, donations were also invested or lent in Peru, but officially it was the Crown that regulated and controlled the collection of alms and the ransoming of captives from the end of the 1570s onward. This might have limited or prevented corruption and allegations of corruption within the Order. Ransoming expeditions usually took place only in Europe and (North) Africa, but in the seventeenth century the residents of the Viceroyalty of Peru profited from the ransoming of Christians who were captured on the *Carrera de Indias*.

Ambitious building projects and the increasingly grand *décor* of churches and convents in the 1580s indicate that the Order's financial situation improved. One reason for this was support from the government, which the Order now received.

This support was not granted because of the Mercedarians' activities in Spanish America up to this point; rather, they received it because of their commitment to reform, the Crown's interest in redemptive work, and the usefulness of friars such as Fray Diego de Porres who kept defending Spanish interests at the limits of Spain's spheres of influence. In addition to that, the Order registered an increase in donations and contributions from brotherhoods and patrons of individual chapels. This rise was due mainly to three factors: (i) the Mercedarians' long tradition and close ties to the citizens in Peru, (ii) the veneration of the Virgin Mary, and (iii) the improved standing of the Order because of its turn toward

education and its renewed emphasis on their redemptive mission. The latter was developing into a well-known and popular form of charity in Peru as well. The documents analysed also show that the Order engaged with issues that were contentious at the time: such as, for instance, the question whether priests had to be of Spanish or Creole origin, or whether Mestizos or a native could also be ordained as priests, teach, and celebrate mass. At the beginning of the 1580s, prominent members of the Order voiced their opinion on this issue in testimonials given in favour of Mestizo groups. Another contested subject was the question whether secular or monastic clergy should lead *doctrinas*.

The Mercedarians defended their existing rights in several court cases. In their letters to the Crown, the visitors, *provincials*, and procurators asked for legal and financial support, as well as that further monks be sent from Spain. An investigation of all known evidence of Mercedarian statements on the situation of the natives demonstrated that the friars knew both the situation of the natives and their pre-Hispanic customs very well indeed; however, members of the Order commented on this only in individual cases and mostly in a rather restricted manner. An analysis of contemporary surveys showed that around 1610 the Mercedarians equalled the other Orders in the Viceroyalty in terms of care for *doctrinas*, number of personnel, and financial power – in spite of the differences in the circumstances and timings of their settlement. In 1612, the Mercedarian Order disposed of an income of more than 87,700 Pesos, had 50 convents, more than 570 members, and directed 72 *doctrinas*.

(6) Evangelization

This chapter described and analysed four examples of Mercedarian missionary work and also examined the extent to which this work resonated in (the Order's) chronicle writing. The examples discussed differed with regard to location, time, and duration. The topic was introduced with the help of a comparison between the writings of an anonymous Jesuit (after 1594) and the writings of Poma de Ayala (1615), and statements in the *Información* of the Mestizos of Lima (1583): this comparison demonstrated that, at the time, the *doctrineros'* course of action, the state of the missionary work, and the orthodoxy of baptized natives were all subject to controversial debates. In this context, notions of different – and differently assessed – phases in the process of evangelization were also articulated. Taking into account the changing political and ecclesiastical environments of the evangelization process, modern historians usually differentiate three phases of missionary work in the Andes: (i) the missionary work conducted during the wars of conquest (until about 1550), (ii) the period before, and (iii) the period after the Third Council of Lima (1582–1583). The Council regulated and standardized missionary work according to the stipulations of the Council of Trent (1545–1563).

Diego de Porres

Mercedarian Fray Diego de Porres (ca. 1531–after 1590) had come to Peru as a soldier in 1551 and there entered the Order. According to his own account, during his thirty-three

years' service as a priest he carried out more than 68,000 baptisms in all the provinces of Peru. As a legate of his Province, in 1586 he succeeded in having sixteen more friars sent from Spain to Peru; he was also in receipt of a pension from the Crown. The instructions given in Diego de Porres' manual for missionaries (MS composed after 1553/before 1586) aimed at establishing the *doctrinero* as the topmost authority in every indigenous settlement. All other authorities were suspended during his stay and had to account for their activities. At the end of his stay, the priest would appoint persons who had to maintain order (as described in the second part of the manual) during his absence. In the course of the analysis it became clear that de Porres knew and appreciated the pre-Spanish Andean administrative practice: in order to exert control over the population he made use of methods, media, and social hierarchies that local people were already familiar with. His orders aimed at all areas of indigenous life. With his most fundamental requests (i.e. one should love God, perform charitable works, and always bear in mind one's own mortality and responsibility before God), Fray Diego de Porres established a theological minimal programme. This programme might also have corresponded to the basic principles of Mercedarian spirituality. It was, furthermore, propagated in the Order's parishes through the promotion of lay brotherhoods that devoted themselves to charitable tasks such as the ransoming of captives. Regarding the beliefs which were to be entrenched in practice, the manual for missionaries referred to the resolutions of the synods: during the absence of the priest, the propagation of beliefs was left to children or young men who, apparently, were to be prepared for this task by the priest or the Order in advance. Andean practices that touched upon Andean religion were prohibited under threat of penalty. Other practices, such as the collective care for those in need, were claimed to be typically Christian and thus newly established as legitimate within a Christian framework. It is not known whether members of the Order – or even other people outside it – used de Porres' manual. However, even if only he himself followed the manual for most of his time as a missionary, it is safe to say that it had an impact on the life of thousands of natives.

The reconstruction of de Porres' later career showed that the collaboration between Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the Mercedarian proved mutually beneficial. Eventually, Toledo abandoned his negative attitude toward the Order. Since the monks did not now adopt a more reclusive lifestyle, this cannot have been the reason why he changed his mind; instead, his mellowing was due to the zest for action which had already been characteristic of the first Mercedarians in Mesoamerica and the Andes: de Porres' political loyalty, for instance, was proven in the armed combat against the governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra whom Toledo had stripped of his office. De Porres also mediated between native residents and Spanish settlers in the area; the number of baptisms among them was impressive. An analysis of several lists of baptisms (performed in 1578), letters, testimonials (of 1576, 1581), and a *memorial* (1586), which gives an account of de Porres' more than thirty years' life as a missionary, provided an insight into his work at the limits of Spanish spheres of influence and beyond. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Porres learned the language of the *Chiriguanos* [= Guaraní], established contacts with the most influential caciques, and organized a meeting

with the authorities of Spanish settlements from whom the caciques received products they desired as gifts. As a result, some of caciques were baptized together with their subordinates.

A comparison of Fray Diego de Porres' *Información de Servicios* about the course of events during the rebellion of Diego de Mendoza with the description by historian Vargas Ugarte demonstrated both that de Porres had apparently exaggerated his own influence in the matter, and, also, that Ugarte's account is incomplete. A comparison of the source material with the writings of Tirso de Molina and Marcos Salmerón as well as a painting in Cuzco led to a twofold conclusion: firstly, the chroniclers had access to part of these sources; and secondly, they interpreted these sources rather freely and thereby produced allegories of the message they themselves wanted to get across. Finally, a comparison of the sources with the works of historians Pedro N. Pérez Rodríguez and Guillermo Vázquez Nuñez revealed that a continued detachment from the source material not only allowed for a change in discourses but also accelerated this change.

Fray Miguel Troylo and Fray Diego Martín

An account written in 1570 of Juan Álvarez Maldonado's activities and merits during the military *entrada* initiated and lead by him in the Andes' eastern slopes and the Amazonian lowlands northeast of Cuzco served as the main source for a detailed description and analysis of this cultural encounter in the second part of this chapter. This material, in conjunction with a preserved deed of donation about the appropriation of building plots and arable land for the Order, made comprehensible the way in which the foundation of a new Mercedarian house used to take place in newly conquered or founded cities. The present study was able to demonstrate that contacts existed between the *Chunchos* [=Asháninka] and the Incas of Cuzco in pre-Hispanic times, and that Mercedarians such as Fray Diego Martín and Fray Diego de Porres were active as missionaries in the region both before and after the *entrada*. During the *entrada*, however, they worked mainly as military chaplains. Like the ambassadors sent by the natives, the friars were mediators who knew the terrain as well as the language. It seems that thanks to their status as clergy the friars also enjoyed special protection from all parties. They apparently established first contacts to natives who initially did not seem averse to being taught Christian doctrine and maintaining economic contacts. Ultimately, the monks had little influence on the venture: the *entrada* had been planned originally as a conquest that should unfold as peacefully as possible; this plan failed mostly because of rivalries between two competing groups of Spanish conquerors. In their anger on each other, each side did not shy away from requiring the natives to fight alongside them against the other side and their respective indigenous 'subjects'. In this way, the conquerors made a mockery of their promise to protect the natives of this area against their enemies. The author(s) of the report from 1570 tried hard to stress the Spanish considerateness regarding the natives and to explain the Spaniards' failure with the devil's influence. Yet, it became very clear that on the one hand the wellbeing of the native population was of secondary importance to the Spaniards, and that on the other hand the

caciques responded to this situation confidently and actively. For the Mercedarians, this kind of venture – which was based on the pattern of previous conquests – proved to be disadvantageous: the convent they had founded, just like the settlement itself, could not be sustained, and the evangelization effected so far was diminished.

Esmeraldas

Around 1570 the Mercedarian friars of the administrative district of Quito oversaw six indigenous communities most of which were located at the margins of the Spanish sphere of influence. An anonymous report of 1573 showed that the natives of this region were forced with the help of intimidating measures to participate in catechesis. The author held the view that most of them only pretended to be Christians. Two reports of 1582, written by Mercedarian *doctrineros*, illustrated the authors' doubts with regard to their parishioners' Christian faith; the reports also showed that the *doctrineros* in no way had the monopoly on the use of force in their *doctrinas*. This situation contrasted with the demands that had been laid down in Fray Diego de Porres' manual for missionaries and the report of 1573. Rather it was the case that the *doctrineros* were tolerated: their situation resembled that of their brothers in the missions in the Andean slopes northeast of Cuzco, near Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and in Esmeraldas. The authorities often blamed the *doctrineros*' bad example for the dissatisfactory progress of evangelization. An *audiencia* report of 1580 showed that the reform of the Order had apparently not yet been implemented in this administrative district; based on this report, it was possible for the first time to put in concrete terms the kind of criticism directed against the Mercedarians: they were accused of concubinage, embezzlement, and overly permissive behaviour in the indigenous parishes. As this study demonstrated, this criticism was put forward in the context of the so-called 'dispute of *doctrinas*' and was also politically motivated. A visitation report of 1592 showed that at this point the friars maintained a reclusive lifestyle; however, in the course of the 1590s not only the number of Mercedarians doubled: the number of *doctrinas* under their supervision, which had shrunk from eleven to four between 1582 and 1592, rose to nineteen in 1598.

In the course of period analysed, the Spaniards time and again embarked on military forays into the tropical region of Esmeraldas; there, they hoped to find convenient access to the coast and a good location for a harbour town, as well as mineral resources and indigenous labourers. Since 1553 a group of escaped black slaves and their descendants lived there, the so-called 'mulattos of Esmeraldas'. In the 1580s, Mercedarian Fray Juan de Salas advised the organizers of military *entradas* into this territory and also visited the 'mulattos' himself. Since he acted on his own authority and supported the positions of the mulattos, he came into conflict with the *audiencia*. In the course of the investigation it was also shown, that the Mercedarians of Quito both fashioned and influenced in a decisive way the politics of indirect pacification of Esmeraldas, which judge Juan del Barrio Sepúlveda declared mandatory in the late 1590s. Through implementing the pacification plans, the friars produced a result that was acceptable to all parties involved. Subsequently, the Mercedarians continued to mediate between Spaniards and natives, for instance in the

context of road-building expeditions. However, the friars could not prevent violence from breaking out again when, in the end, the parties involved thought that the rights and spheres of influence granted to them had been violated. The Mercedarians' position in society was strengthened due to their engagement in Esmeraldas. While beforehand the authorities had advocated dissolution of the Order or an enforcement of enclosure, they now preferred to employ members of the Order on occasions such as these, e.g. as negotiators or messengers on enemy territory. As a result, the Mercedarians gained royal privileges and grants that ultimately allowed them to focus on what was expected from all orders: sacred buildings, education, worship, and looking after the lay brotherhoods of the cities. However, the friars continued to administrate their existing *doctrinas* as well.

Fray Martín de Murúa

The present study is the first to offer an in-depth portrait of Fray Martín de Murúa – who is well known for his history of the Incas – in his role as a *doctrinero*. The friar, who was born in the Basque country (?–after 1616), lived as a member of the Order in Peru at the latest since 1585. After establishing the known biographical data of Murúa, a short description of his works and working methods as an author was given, followed by some reflections on possible literary models of his from within the Order. The fact that the author had a great interest in dramatic stories resulted in texts such as his description of the volcanic eruption of 1600, which very much frightened the people in and around Arequipa. Murúa described both the reactions of the Christian inhabitants of the city and of the indigenous 'heretics'. Based on this depiction, it was possible to demonstrate how the two groups' respective attempts at interpreting the natural disaster mirrored the conflict between Christian and Andean religious beliefs.

A comparison between Fray Martín de Murúa's statements in his texts, Poma de Ayala's accusations against his former employer, and the documents concerning a court case of 1608 that Murúa – as procurator of the convent in Cuzco – was involved in, allowed retracing the underlying conflict. This conflict also shed light on Murúa's life and conduct in the Aymaran *doctrina* in question: he apparently tried to collect overdue tributes from the natives and make up for any tributes that remained unpaid by forcing women to weave textiles. Poma de Ayala made forced labour and bad treatment responsible for the natives' decision to flee the area in the first place. This situation led to losses in tribute payments about which the Spaniards subsequently complained. The group of people mentioned by Poma de Ayala consisted of *corregidor*, *encomendero*, cacique, scribe, and *doctrinero*, and corresponded with the names mentioned in the court documents relating to the tax dispute; this made it possible to date the situation somewhere between mid-1605 and mid-1607.

The analysis of Murúa's oeuvre firstly compared his statements to the positions of Poma de Ayala and his critique of Murúa's depiction. Murúa openly criticized that the Spaniards had executed Inca Atahualpa and Inca Tupac Amaru. Murúa's pro-Incan attitude, however, was based on a rather sentimental, retrospective admiration of Incan culture and governance; he

did not advocate the idea that they were entitled to restitution. Poma de Ayala, on the other hand, had an eager desire for reforms that would benefit the indigenous population; that is why he portrayed the society of the Inca and – even more so – pre-Incan society as exemplary and particularly virtuous. Murúa employed the vocabulary of the four temperaments to express his negative attitude toward the ‘ordinary’ natives of his day. He also judged the current state of their evangelization negatively.

In a second step, de Murúa’s statements about the activities of his order were for the first time analysed systematically. Basic information about Mercedarian settlements and activities in the Andes, as gathered in the present study, allowed to a certain degree to relate his remarks to the actual history of events. Murúa described the veneration of the Virgin Mary and the belief in miracles; possibly, he had no knowledge of Pedro Nolasco, who only a few years later would so emphatically be revered as founder of the order. It is a well-known fact that Murúa, in order to facilitate the publication of his work, did not only accept cuts, but also added a chapter on exemplary and saintly members of his Order, which had not been part of his original outline. A comparison with the arguments of the chroniclers Remón and Tirso de Molina showed that, in doing this, Murúa brought his work in line with the interests of his potential publisher Remón. It was also demonstrated that Murúa’s work became a (unacknowledged) source for Tirso de Molina.

Desiderata

The present study aimed at describing Mercedarian life in the Andes in as much detail as possible. However, the broad geographical and chronological span made it necessary to exclude a number of aspects. Comparatively little attention was given to the territory of today’s Chile; a comprehensive study of all known *doctrinas* could also not be made.

An analysis and contextualization of legal disputes over land (which, according to Ramón Serratos, were an issue between the Mercedarians of Cuzco and some natives in the 1580s) could broaden our knowledge of indigenous arguments about property, inheritance rights, and land law.¹ The sources available in the Order’s archives on the professions, budget management, and legal transactions would allow for microstudies of individual convents and *doctrinas*, primarily from the seventeenth century onward. It would be particularly interesting to find out if – and if yes, to what extent – the Order used donations (for ransoming) in Peru, and what portion of the funds was sent to Spain. A comparison with other archives in different cities might render possible an analysis of social networks and a retracing of regional economic ties. It would also be possible to examine the role which the lay brotherhood’s respective constitutions prescribed for natives, mestizos, and Afro-Peruvians. In relation to this, one could also ask which role the lay brotherhoods actually played in the evangelization, the collection of alms, and the political life of the cities. With

¹ See e.g. Ramón Serratos, who mentions a lawsuit of the ‘yndios Tambocongus’ from 1581 (‘Los Mercedarios y los Incas del Perú’, in *Boletín de la Orden de la Merced*, 1 (1931), 23–29); see also Severo Aparicio Quispe’s various references to documentation of land ownership from the sixteenth century (‘Archivos Mercedarios del Perú’, in *Revista Peruana de Historia Eclesiástica*, 7 (2001), 155–82).

regard to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an evaluation of surviving sermons and final theses from universities together with inventories from libraries might give insights into the friars' interests and their positions regarding political and theological questions of their time. A comparative assessment of the *libros de provincias* and *de visitaciones* (books of 'provinces' and 'visitations'), some of which date back to the middle of the seventeenth century, might not only allow to retrace the respective norms, as well as the means of their enforcement; it might also provide an insight into the mobility of the friars who signed the records and thereby reveal the kind and strength of relations between individual convents.

The present study reconstructed the actions of members of the *Order of Our Lady of Mercy* in the Andes of the sixteenth century. In the course of the analysis it became clear that in the period considered the Mercedarians were far from directing all their energies toward the ransoming of Christian captives. Even so, the diversity and adaptability of both the Order and its concept of *Merced* cannot be denied; rather, the former should be accepted as part and characteristic of Mercedarian life in this period. This study likewise demonstrated the important role the Spanish-American houses played for the organizational and, in the long term, also the spiritual reform of the Order in the sixteenth century: their influence was due to the fact that they accepted the task of evangelization and that they generated monies which were invested in ransoming captives and education. These findings may encourage future Mercedarian historians and monks to reflect further on the Order's history in this period. Most importantly, however, the present study contributes to our understanding of the early colonial period in the Andes region and the functioning of Spanish colonial rule. For the Crown, the religious orders were important instruments of establishing both a Spanish worldview and social order in the colony: the reason for this was that members of the orders were in direct contact with all sections and classes of the population. The *doctrineros* were of particular importance: not only were they entrusted with educating the natives about Christian 'orden y policia', they often had to enforce this 'law and order' as well. After resistance from the natives as well as revolts by Spanish insurgents had been quelled, the early colonial society continued to develop a life of its own, in which neither settlers nor the clergy always followed the orders of the Spanish Crown. Due to the fact that they had no missionary experience and – at least in the early part of the period analysed here – that there was neither a consensus on the internal hierarchy of the Order nor binding rules on the friars' conduct of life, the Mercedarians introduced an element of incalculability into the early stages of expansion and evangelization. The persistence of the Order in spite of sanctions against it pinpoints the limits of the Spanish Crown's influence and the importance of local political power structures.