Military Retirees in Politics:
A Study on the Rise of *Purnawirawan* in Indonesian Political Parties 1998-2014

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Abstract

Studies of civil-military relations and political parties in democratic Indonesia which gives deeper attention to the role of the military retirees (*purnawirawan*) in the democratization are still rare. The few studies that have been carried out only explore their role in the political contestation of presidential elections as key actors in supporting candidates and mobilizing votes. This study explains the meaning of the rise of *purnawirawan*'s involvement, not only in the political contestation, but also the extent of their contribution to the development of political parties and their performance in legislative institutions and public offices in the government. Overall the study investigates the contribution of their roles in the early democratic transition and the consolidation period.

Three aspects were analyzed. The first aspect was political parties that had a large number of *purnawirawan*. From the dataset produced by this study, there were four political parties that became the units of analysis, namely PDI-P, Golkar, Democratic Party and Gerindra. The second aspect was the roles of *purnawirawan* from those four parties in the elections and legislative institutions. The third aspect was the roles of *purnawirawan* with the parties and non-parties background within the central and local governments.

This study limits the research period from 1998 to 2014. In this period, there were five elections. The discussion begins with the period from 1998-2004 as the background of the emergence of *purnawirawan* in the direct elections and the presidential contest which began in 2004 where full-time participation in the political contestation took place massively. There are three hypotheses in this research. The first is that trends of *purnawirawan*'s participation in politics and political parties were the effects of structural changes resulting from the military reform and the multi-party systems. The second is that *Purnawirawan* contributed to the uniqueness of the development of party organizations that combined thin military values with a model of civilian organization. The third is that the role of *purnawirawan* in political parties and public offices was driven by the importance of continuing military doctrines to influence the state policy-making processes.

This study is an intersection between the study of party organizations and the study of civil military relations in emerging democracy. The analytical framework developed combines the theories of the development of political parties and civilian control over the military to test the causal relationship between the involvement of *purnawirawan* in political parties, their performance in the parliament and the government, as well as their contribution to the democratization in Indonesia.

There are three important findings of this study. The first finding is that in the multi-parties system, *purnawirawan* worked hard not only to gain positions in the parliament and the government, but also to build political parties as political vehicles. This confirms that they were important actors in the party development. The second finding is that some parties established by *purnawirawan* were able to

survive in the elections and obtain parliamentary seats. The parties were managed with a democratic vision, but still colored by militaristic characters. The third finding is that *purnawirawan*'s political participation in the democracy of Indonesia was driven by their personal interests to be posted in public offices and their responsibility as state guardians in the form of civilian politicians.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed forces of Republic of Indonesia)

AD (Anggaran Dasar, Party's Statue)

ART (Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Party rule)

Babinkar (Badan Pembinaan Kekaryaan, Functional Development Agency)

BAIS TNI (Badan Intelejen Strategis TNI, Strategic Intelligence Agency of Armed Forces)

Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Pengendalian Stabilitas Nasional, Coordinating Board of National Stability)

BAMUSI (Baitul Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims' House)

Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, National Development Planning Agency)

Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, the National Development Planning Agency)

BIN (Badan Intelejen Negara, State Intelligent Agency) BMI (Banteng Muda Indonesia, Indonesian Youth Buffalo),

BLT (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, temporary unconditional cash transfer)

BMI (Benteng Muda Indonesia, Indonesian Young Bulls)

BP (Badan Pekerja, working committee)

BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, the Supreme Audit Agency)

DKI Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, Special Capital Region of Jakarta)

DKM (Dewan Kehormatan Militer, Military Honor Council)

DKP (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira, Honor Officers Council)

DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer, Military Operations Area)

DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, Branch Board Council)

DPD (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, Local Board Council)

DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, Central Board Council)

DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, The House of Representatives)

DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Local House of Representatives)

Menhankam (Menteri Pertahanan dan Keamanan, Ministry of Defense and Security)

FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front)

GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement)

GANTI (Gerakan Nelayan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Fishermen and Farmers Movement)

GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, Guidelines of State Policy)

Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party)

Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Group)

Hanura, (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, People Conscience Party)

HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, The Indonesian Farmers Association)

HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student Association)

ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Group)

IDI (Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Index)

IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Independence Supporters)

Isu SARA (Isu Suku Agama Ras dan Antar Golongan, issues on ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group relations)

KAPOLDA (Kepala Kopolisia Daerah, Regional Police Chief)

Kasospol (Chief of Social and Political Affairs of the Armed Forces)

Kasum TNI (Kepala Staf Umum, Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces)

KIB (Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu, United Indonesia Cabinet)

KINO (Kelompok Induk Organisasi, Organizations Parent Group)

KMP (Koalisi Merah Putih, Red and White Coalition)

KontraS (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence)

Koopskam (Komando Operasi Keamanan, Security Operations Command)

Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command)

Korcab (Kordinator Cabang, the branch co-ordinator)

Korwil (Kordinator Wilayah, the regional co-ordinator)

KOSGORO (Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Royong, Unity of Multipurpose Organization of Mutual Cooperation)

Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Reserve Command)

KPK (Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi, Corruption Eradication Commission)

KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission)

KY (Komisi Yudisial, Judicial Commission)

LSM/NGO (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, Non-Governmental Organizations)

Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)

Menkopolhukan (Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum, Minister of Politics and Security)

MK (Mahkamah Konstitusi, Constitutional Court,),

MKGR (Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, Family Spirit Mutual Cooperation Consultative Party)

MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly)

Munaslub (Musyawarah Nasional Luar Biasa, Extraordinary National Meeting)

Murba (Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak, Proletarian Party)

Nasdem, (Partai Nasional Demokrat, National Democrat Party)

NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia)

NU (Nadhlatul Ulama)

OLI (Operasi Lawan Insurjensi, Counter-Insurgency Operation)

PAD (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, regional original revenue)

PANGDAM (Panglima Kodam, Commander of the Military Region)

Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Party)

Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party)

Paspampres (Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden, Presidential Guard)

PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Star Party)

PBNKI (Partai Banteng Nasional Kemerdekaan, Bull Party of National Independence of Indonesia)

PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesia's Democratic Party)

PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle

PDP (Partai Demokrasi Persatuan, Unity Democratic Party)

Pepabri (Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI, military retirement organization)

Persit (Persatuan Istri Tentara, soldier wives association)

PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party)

PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party)

PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party)

PKP (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, Party for Justice and Unity)

PKPB (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, Concern for the Nation Functional Party)

PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party)

PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party)

Polri (Polisi Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Police)

PPDI (Partai Pelopor Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party,)

PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party)

PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, People's Democratic Party)

Prolegnas (Program Legislasi Nasional, National Legislation Program)

PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party).

PSII (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, Union Indonesian Islamic Party)

Repdem (Relawan Indonesia Pro Demokrasi, Indonesia Volunteers for Pro-Democracy)

SATGAS (Satuan Tugas, Task Force)

Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama, Golkar Joint Secretariat)

SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Swadiri Indonesia, Central Organization of Indonesian Self Employees)

TMP (Taruna Merah Putih, Red and White Youth)

TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesia National Armed Forces)

TPM (Tim Pembela Muslim, Muslim Lawyers Team)

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CHAPTER I
Introduction

1.1 Background

After the New Order regime under General Suharto collapsed in 1998, Indonesia underwent a transition to democracy. In the following period, new political procedures were introduced and various supporting democratic institutions were built while cultural changes took place simultaneously. However, the nation still falls short of meeting the criteria of a consolidated democracy. A report by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2016 placed Indonesia as a "defective democracy."[1]

The beginning of the *Reformasi* period indeed witnessed a significant decline of the military's political influence –high ranking officers lost their vetoing power while their political dominance was soon replaced by business groups and oligarchies (BTI report, 2016). Yet during the early transition period (1998-2004), Indonesia's agenda on democracy had a minimum achievement in establishing democratic institutions, particularly due to the presence of the military elements trying to restore the former centralized regime (Kingsbury, 2005). As a result, the post-1998 political reforms ran under challenging situations despite the decline of the actual representation of the military in government branches (Crouch, 2007; 2010; Honna, 2003).

The decline of the military's influence in the government was visible in the number of retired military officers in the cabinet that fell from 14.8% in 1998 to 9.8% in 2004. In the 1998-2004 House of Representative, the share was 8.5% and dropped further to 3.1% afterwards. In addition, the number of active military who simultaneously served as provincial governors plummeted from 43.8% during New Order to zero in the following period (Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz, 2012). On top of that, the military began losing its influence in local governance as its candidates lost to the civilian contenders in subnational elections (Mietzner, 2009). These factors weakened the military's political influence in various state agencies. By 2004, immediately after the TNI Law was passed, the military returned to its initial role as professional soldiers. The end of the military involvement in politics marked

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[1] Acquired from Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report 2016. The index measures a country's democracy status by five indicators: political and social integration, stability of democratic institution, and political participation –each is worth 7.0 points– followed by rule of law (6.3) and stateness (7.3). Indonesia was reported to score 6.9 points, thus categorized as "limited". Further details on this assessment can be found at www.bti-project.org.

Indonesia's transition to democracy and triggered the emergence of a multi-party system.

Indonesian political parties' behavior was showing a mixture of collusive, combative, and moderate features focusing on individuals rather than the party performance to deliver their function. Most parties were estranged from the population and controlled by the elite-led coalition (Tan, 2006: 98, 109-110). The growth of parties was especially recognized and visible at the district level where social diversity and region size alone could not explain the dramatic increase in the number of political parties since 1999 (Choi, 2010: 21-26). Consequently, the Indonesian party system shifted from a relatively moderate type to a more extreme multi-party system. Inter-party competitiveness was high, but studies suggest it might disappear once the parties leave election and enter the arena of interaction. Another study suggests that party competition may end after the election yet creation of cartels might follow (Ambardi, 2012).

The decline of a militaristic regime and the rise of a multi-party system as a result of the transition to democracy are embodied in the attribute of Indonesian political parties that we know existed: a competitive multi-party system invested by retired military officers now seeking to sustain their influence in politics. The party system remained stable but not without defects. Post-Suharto party system was recognized as an atomized multi-party one with some peculiar characteristics: each political party was centered on a charismatic or well-connected leader, lacked internal democratic procedures, and suffered from a low level of legitimacy. Competition between parties was mostly centripetal and was pulling the parties from the edges towards the center, thus resulting in parties with homogenous ideological profiles (Mietzner, 2009: 442, 451). Nevertheless, the centrifugal competition combined with a party system with a high degree of polarization promised better results in ensuring the stability of the party system and improving the performance of political parties.

Military retirees' massive involvement and their consolidation in politics gained the momentum to maximize their political participation in electoral politics when Yudhoyono ran for president in the 2004 election. That ex-members of the military venturing in politics was not a new thing in Indonesian politics as other notable military retirees within Suharto's circle had established political parties as well as participated in the 1999 election, although they were smaller in numbers. General Hartono, one of these top-brass figures, had founded *Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa* (PKPB, or Concern for the Nation Functional Party). Others joined such civilian-led political parties as *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDI-P, or

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and *Partai Golongan Karya* (Golkar, or Party of the Functional Groups).

Although military influence in civilian administration duties was officially diminished, the number of former military elites involved in party politics was still high. Since the 2004 presidential election, several prominent military retirees have emerged as candidates. Some new political parties were established to support ex-military politicians including Gerindra Party that supported Prabowo and Hanura Party that backed Wiranto as presidential candidates (Mietzner, 2005: 15). The retirees' involvement in politics widely caused public concern. A public debate on the 2004 election stated that the retirees' involvement raised fears about whether they would regain their political influence (*Kompas*, 5 February 2004). These concerns arose from their power, networks, and skills in addition to the ability to manage various institutions, run clandestine movements, and handle social mobilization aimed at serving their interests.

The 2004 election confirmed the military retirees' successful entry into the national democracy, as was evident from General Yudhoyono's victory in the presidential election (and re-election) followed by a substantial number of votes that his party gained in 2004 and 2009 election. The party's board and strategic positions are known to be comprised of former military officers. The party's success in both elections also triggered the founding of new military-infused political parties, making the ex-military figures gain more votes in the parliament.

While from 1998 to 2004, military retirees continued to play an important role in the democratic processes, the post-2004 election saw that military retirees were seemingly driven to establish political parties and enter politics with a new motive. It was the level of public distrust in political parties that began to escalate in addition to the ubiquitous corruption scandals in the legislative and ministerial bodies, resulting in more party members being taken to court and parties considered incapable of running the government. The high level of public distrust in politics and political figures might root in the corrupt behavior of political parties in national and local elections (Buehler & Tan, 2007; Hadiz, 2010; Buehler, 2010). This distrust in civilian politician has turned voters' head to the other option.

The decline of public trust in public institutions was recorded in a survey by LSI (Indonesian Survey Institute) in 2012, which showed the level of public trust in political parties and perception of national political conditions. Up to 27% considered the national political condition unacceptable, and only 20.9% stated otherwise. A quarter of the respondents considered the national law enforcement aspects to excel, 31.7% believed law enforcement is poor, and 35% assumed these aspects had stayed relatively the same. These surveys are to be contrasted with LSI's

survey taken a year earlier, which stated that Indonesians' trust in the military was the highest (85.7%), followed by trust in the presidency (72.2%), the police (65%), and the courts (53%). Trust in the government came second last with 51% and political parties sat at the bottom of the list with only 43% (LSI, 2011: 40).

Until 2015 there were at least four parties founded and/or organized by ex-military and had seats in the parliament: *Partai Demokrat* (Democrat Party), *Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (Gerindra, Great Indonesia Movement), *Hati Nurani Rakyat* (Hanura, People's Conscience Party), and *Partai Nasional Demokrat* (Nasdem, National Democrat Party). The achievements of the military retirees-led political parties have proven that contestation for military retirees in the politics was not only in pursuit of executive offices in presidential elections but also in strengthening their political parties –for it was the vehicle to translate their political interests, both personal and public. Constant participation in elections and their political parties proved that maintaining their influence in national politics was still the underlying purpose of Indonesian military retirees.

Military retirees used to appraise political parties as an effective democratic vehicle to sustain their interests or ambitions. Shortly after 2008, election was becoming a year of euphoria where they massively joined political parties and gained strategic positions in party stewardship at the central office through the election held in the same year. This case happened to Democrat Party in 2009 and Gerindra after their Extraordinary Congress in 2010. Most of the figures were not prepared to run for MPs in the legislative elections, but their capabilities were effectively utilized in the organization of their political parties, in getting more votes in elections, and in getting the party leaders nominated in the presidential election.

During the New Order era, retired officers filled public positions based on official assignments by military institutions within civilian government positions. The only channel of their political party was Golkar. Conditions are different after the democratization era in which they show their existence as personal figures with their political motives and ambitions. The awareness to be actively involved in this political contestation, which called the "rise" of networked retirees, organizes itself through various political parties, not just the fulfillment of short-term political targets but confirms their key positions as civilian politicians with a military background.

1.2 Research Questions

Based on the observations above, it is safe to assume that since the downfall of the New Order regime in 1998 the military as an institution has lost much of its supremacy over Indonesian politics. As a result, military officers began looking for

other means of achieving their political interest by either founding or joining political parties. This research, therefore, aims to answer and analyze the following research questions:

1. What factors account for the Indonesian military retirees' involvement in political parties after the *Reformasi*?
2. What are the consequences of the retirees' new political orientation on the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia?
3. How were military retirees involved in controlling political parties and organizing political mobilization for electoral purposes?
4. How did they perform in public offices?

The questions above may develop into three research objectives as follows:
1. To describe the institutional changes in the development of political party and the nature of military retirees' involvement
2. To examine the performance of the military retirees in public offices at both national and local levels; and
3. To find out the retirees' contribution in the democratization.

More specifically, this dissertation examines Indonesian political parties with significant stake of military retirees, either as ordinary members or as party leaders, by looking closely at their involvement in each of the party's development and organization. The roles played by the retirees are then used to assess how the retirees' regrouping would result in the growth and development of the political party: the one directly influencing elite configuration as well as interactions among the political actors in the civilian-military relations. In addition, the study also seeks to analyze the organizations of the military-infused political parties and how democratization functioned upon being juxtaposed with the military retirees' involvement in political institutions.

1.3 Literature Review

Democratic government emerging after the collapse of an authoritarian regime is identified as a "struggling regime" that is heading towards democracy. This "struggle" attribute is reflected in a variety of political forces competing with different degrees and variables using the main instrument of democracy –that is, the election– to obtain power. Hagopian & Mainwaring (2005) discovered that the third wave of democratization in Latin America was filled with conflicting tensions between the pro-*status quo* society and the weak party system institutionalization.

Other studies have also found that democratic regimes in this region were chaotic – political actors were merely attempting to "help themselves" by making democratic institutions function at a bare minimum level (O'Donnell, 1993, 1996). In addition, political institutions ran with low horizontal accountability (Stepan & Linz, 1996).

A comparative study of newly democratic countries in Asia discovered that civil-military relations issue still positioned the military in an influential role. Even not in all Asian cases like the ones in South Korea and Taiwan for an exception, civilian control has stayed frail although democratization has been present for more than two decades. The military officers remain concerned about maintaining their political influence and disrupting democracy (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009). The newly democratic regimes are vulnerable and prone to returning to an authoritarian regime controlled by the military. This is caused by the role of military officers in the political process, and their political influence has been dominant in democratic institutions.

Cases from the Middle East, such as Tunisia and Egypt (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014), have shown that when civilian politicians fail to found democratic institutions and establish the supporting systems and tools, public dissatisfaction to political elites' performance may consequently follow. The protest would focus on socio-economic demand and for greater freedom (Haynes, 2013). Public disappointment would provoke a political turmoil and undoubtedly affect the results of parliamentary elections. These circumstances invite the military to intervene with the conflicts among civilian politicians, which in turn will allow the military to infuse the politics with their own interests and to exert control over civilians.

There is an array of cases in which the new government under democratic transition accommodates the interests of former military elites striving for a share of power or authority in the new administration. Studies have shown that the most successful stage of consolidation ensues the harnessing of military institution under civilian supremacy, thus possessing limited power. The military may then be subject to the democratic control of the civilian government as in Latin America, the Asia Pacific, and Southern Europe (Aguero, 1992, 1997; Gillespie, 1992; Hunter, 1997).

Civilian control over the military can be accomplished through various measures. Issuance of regulations to control military power and to limit their resources to their professional duties is the most basic measure. Providing political incentives on an institutional level for military figures, for instance in a ministry, may also serve as compensation. Should any part of the military be involved in the democratization process, negotiations may follow suit as the Philippines demonstrated in 1986 and South Korea in 1987. As Pion-Berlin (1992) suggested,

the contemporary model of transition management places democratization and demilitarization in reciprocity –both military leaders and civilian politicians must cooperate under a mutual relationship.

While the political incentives for military officers and their engagement in the newly democratic government remain an appealing topic, this research is seeking to explain three aspects supporting the comprehension of the relationship. The first is understanding how a democratic regime provides space for political institutions to grow, demonstrated by the progress in political party development. The second concerns the different political roles played by political actors in organizing their political parties. The third aspect explains the factors that affect the arrangement of both civilian and former military officer politicians within a political party and their involvement in party organization.

This research divides the scholarly works on Indonesia's democratization into three types. The first category contains the debates on the democratic transition process. The main argument of this perspective believes that the political process in post-authoritarian Indonesia has been a major consequence of the political transition and that it takes time before it achieves ideal democratization (Bresnan, 2005). The discussions emphasize on social and political changes as well as the relationship between economic crisis and political reform (Manning & Diermen, 2000), the region's economy, society, and political structure (Emerson, 1999). Liddle (2001) provided a theoretical assessment of the political transition process that led to what he describes as "the phenomenon of crafting democracy."

The second type argues that the post-Suharto Indonesia was the end of the political spectrum of religious authoritarianism –in which radical groups continued to be seen as a threat. Conversely, the end of authoritarianism is often influenced by the military to defend their interests that, more often than not, cause political fragmentation within both military and civilian-politician oligarchy. Several important works represent the second type. A study by Aspinall and Mietzner (2010) explored an assessment of the consolidation issue while studies focusing on civil-military relations during Abdurrahman Wahid presidency are found in the works of Bhakti, *et al.* (1999) and Anwar, *et al.* (2002). Examination of these studies concludes that the military was still interested in maintaining their political influence in democratic procedures despite having decided to "disengage from practical politics and to focus on improving its war-making abilities, especially those related to external defense" (Bradford, 2005: 19). This condition has justified this perspective to believe that "fundamentally nothing has, in fact, changed since 1998" (Liddle, 2003).

The third category investigates the relationship between different variables involved in democratic transition and consolidation, as well as the ones of military reform. This perspective explores the influence of the initial generation of military officers on the political direction of the military (Chandra & Kamen, 2002); politics, the military, and the contribution of Muslim political power (Mietzner, 2009); and the reorganization of the power of political and oligarchic patrimonial elites (Hadiz, 2003). Other studies explain the political development, cartelization of parties, and democratic institutions during the transition period (Goshal, 2004; Slater, 2004; Tan, 2006; Ufen, 2008a; Liddle & Mujani, 2009). Furthermore, King (2003) underlined three factors that may neutralize and control any hardliner factions, namely, modes of transition, extensive mass mobilization driving the transition, and the success of moderate faction in the military.

Apart from the three types above, the study of the role of military retirees is inseparable from the debates of civil-military relations or in party organization development in the context of Indonesia's democratization. A study by Laksmana (2008) suggested that we need to comprehend at least two variables when explaining civil-military relations in Indonesia. The first is the military's internal factors. These factors include the military's self-conception and understanding of "national interests," the degree of military unity and cohesion, and the institutional or individual interests of key military leaders. The second factor is the variable of political leadership. This variable consists of the degree of civilian interference to internal military affairs, civilian strength *vis-à-vis* the military, and how the civilians manage domestic political conditions.

Both variables are valuable in explaining circumstances during the transition period of 1999 to 2004; including the event in which President Habibie and the then commander of the armed forces, General Wiranto, faced pressure from high ranking officers, who balked at civilian control of military budget, to tighten military revenues from non-state sources and to revise territorial and judicial systems against crimes of military personnel in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Kim, Liddle, & Said, 2006).

What also become the concern of the military officers was the expansion of civilian control over the military when their representation in the parliament was reduced during the period of 1999 to 2004 –the number of seats for the military was 75 out of 500, and a total of 2,800 non-elected seats in provincial and district/city parliaments (Crouch, 2010: 133). Another study by Nainggolan (2011) focused on the relation between the performance of civilian regimes and the military's response to their reforms, but the study did not take the role of military retirees into account.

Studies on civil-military relations in the early period of transition resonate similar findings. The transition undoubtedly affects military leadership, and the political leaders' intervention to the military institution in the early stages is crucial (Callahan, 1999). Singh (2000) argued that the effort of returning the military to the barracks may not yield the expected results if the civil administration is still dealing with a major problem in controlling domestic security while social and political situations are still unstable. Regarding this, Indonesia has a more dynamic situation compared to Thailand, for example, considering the vital factor of the formation of new alliances initiated by the military equipped with their social and political powers (Heiduk, 2011). In this case, the military only intervened in politics when political institutions failed while civilian politicians and parties were weak and divided (Lee, 2000).

During the consolidation period following the withdrawal of military representatives from the parliament in 2004, the military no longer dictated policies. However, there has never been a single president with a civilian background who was able to govern without military's assistance. Rinakit (2005) underlined that pragmatic alliances are needed to secure presidential election or to prevent a military move that potentially upset national policies. Therefore, it was necessary to give autonomy to the military to organize its institutions.

Some scholars argued that the military reform seemed quite significant, although it was only superficial (Crouch, 2010; Honna, 2003; Mietzner, 2006). The elimination of the dual-function doctrine that the military exploited to vindicate their intervention to politics (to be discussed in details below and Chapter Three in length) did not immediately lead to any changes or recovery in the military organization's culture –the doctrine had long been invested in the mindset of the officers (Chrisnandi, 2007).

Questions arise from civil-military relations in post-1998 Indonesia to explore the current findings and further examination. When the power of military elites grew weak, and their control of military institutions started declining, what encouraged them to embrace a democratic option to regain similar power in electoral contests? Is there any correlation between former military elites' choice to establish political parties and run in the election *and* the military doctrine stating their responsibility in the administration of the country? What was the role of military retirees in the face of fluctuating strength of civilian control over the military? To what extent did they co-operate with civilian power to advance democratization?

Existing studies investigating civil-military relations in Indonesia after 1998 have modestly explored the role of civilian politicians in political parties and the

extent they interacted with the military elites on institutional and/or personal levels. Mietzner (2006) discussed the causes and effects of democratic control over the military as one of the main agendas of the 1998 reform. Mietzner's subject was Islamic groups as the dominant political power representing civil society. He found out not only that the agenda of civil-military relations was determined by internal military reform and the change of attitude in their elites but also that civilian control was advanced by civilian politicians. The latter effort is crucial.

Mietzner provides a compelling argument concerning the dynamic of the relationship between Islamic groups and the military, which fluctuated yet was mutually beneficial. His thesis offers a fresh viewpoint. He argues that civil-military relations *à la* Indonesia is somewhat unparalleled with the classical theory of military intervention in politics –the latter focuses on the open intervention from the military and their formal ways of participation in politics. His research, nevertheless, skips the discussion on the integration of military reform performed by officials on key positions. Mietzner also failed to provide an adequate discussion as to how civilian politicians reinforced civilian control over political parties and the parliament. Therefore, his claim that the political power of Islamic groups demonstrated the political power in the parliament is frail.

Debates on military politics during the final days of New Order regime show various responses military officers had towards democratization. An important work of Honna (2003) analyzed the implementation of *dwifungsi* (dual-function) military doctrine and agreed that military reform has changed the nature of the military's political engagement. An internal clash in military institutions was found, and it was accountable for the various responses to the reform's demands. Military factions were divided over those who wished to maintain military domination in politics against those who desired the military to become an institution that supported democratization. Honna (2003) discussed the circumstances internal to the military during the democratic transition and the extent to which military factions contributed to democratization. Several high-ranking officers supported the military's withdrawal from politics, although several names like Gen. Wiranto still wished for the military's involvement in the parliament (Said, 2006: 178).

Another research on military politics conducted by Sebastian (2006) elaborated the implementation of military doctrines. Institutionalized military doctrines dated back and were culturally embedded in senior officers, causing military reform to proceed slowly and eventually becoming a critical obstacle in the reform. *Dwifungsi* placed the military under a territorial command structure parallel to the administration of civic governance. The dual function included tasks

in the military, defense, trade, and intelligence (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002; Sebastian, 2006).

Crouch's (2003) seminal study supports the argument that the nature and origin of *dwifungsi* had become the military's stake in state administration. Crouch's study confirms and successfully evaluates the effectiveness and continuity of the doctrine. *Dwifungsi* was used to vindicate military intervention in politics, establish systematical and ideological agendas, and shape civil-military relations during Suharto's administration (Honna, 2003: 3). The regime successfully embodied the doctrine when the military implemented a deployment policy (*kekaryaan*) that placed officers in legislative and non-military administrations. *Dwifungsi* allowed active military officers to occupy strategic positions within national and regional bureaucracies ranging from cabinet ministers to heads of village. They were also stationed in central management of state-owned enterprises. Up until 1999, there were 6,800 active officers and 5,500 military retirees sitting on non-military bureaucracy positions (Bhakti *et al.*, 1999: 143). The parliament at national and regional level was another stage for the military. Before their representation quota was reduced between 1999 and 2004, the military had acquired 75 of the 500 seats in national parliament and a total of 2,800 non-elected seats in provincial and regency parliaments (Crouch, 2010: 133; Robinson, 2001: 234).

The termination of *dwifungsi* did not immediately change the organizational culture or cancel the existing impacts. The indoctrination was thought to have been embedded in the practice of the military and, thus, in the mindset of the officers (Chrisnandi, 2007: 72). Rinakit (2005) observed military politics from a slightly different angle and classified the roles of the military into three: spoiler, critical supporter, and political tool. These roles were only observable within the scope of the military as an institution. The military's bargaining power against civilian groups was developed institutionally with the help of military elites sitting on key public positions. These roles did not facilitate the military to dictate policies to civilian government, yet facts showed that all the presidents governing during the transition period suffered from a high dependency on military assistance. This situation led to a more pragmatic alliance between the civilian government and military authorities, particularly in agendas on national security and public order. For instance, acknowledgment of the alliance was vital during presidential elections to prevent the military from acting as a spoiler in the formulation of national policies.

When the civilian government finally gave privileges for the military to organize their institution (Rinakit, 2005: 39), the following military reform also revamped the institution (Callahan, 2002). Consequently, it confirmed that when

faced with a new arrangement, the military as an institution formerly obedient to democratic mechanisms may give birth to possible involvement in politics, such as officers gaining bargaining position in political parties. This resonates well with Callahan's (2002) argument that civil-military relations on the transition were somewhat manipulative towards the more open political system.

Those studies have revealed the configuration of civil-military relations during the democratic transition period as well as the proceeding democratic consolidation in Indonesia. This dissertation aims to address the gaps between the role of military retirees (further referred to as *purnawirawan*) in civil-military relation and democratization studies –thus it is looking forward to bridging current findings, especially regarding former military actors who had transformed into civilian politicians capable of managing a political party. This research will also analyze the consequences of the military reform and civil-military relations configuration to constraining military retirees from entering the politics and political parties.

The post-Suharto reform has also brought a degree of changes in the face of Indonesian politics. The military, party leadership, interest groups, and finances were variables as well as consequences of these transformations. The emergence of political parties with various ideologies was the result of the Suharto's downfall and the 1998 Reform. After the general election in 1999, Indonesia began to accept a multi-party system that was portrayed as an open political system. This system was led by political elites who previously received pressure from the authoritarian regime to operate political movements under political parties.

Studies conducted on political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia still find the "stream politics" (*politik aliran*) perspective relevant. Ufen (2004) considered how this type of politics underwent reconfiguration under the military reform as well. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, part of the support that political parties provided had streams of Muslim ideologies running; although this was a weaker stream compared to the ones in the 1955 election (Ratnawanti & Haris, 2008). Ufen (2006) argued that stream politics began losing political significance and started experiencing de-alignment when "presidentialized" parties emerged and authoritarianism within the party body grew. Ufen later examined the relationship among internal organizations of the party when the state converged on the issue of party financing. The state had already begun cutting financial subsidies for parties, urging parties to make efforts to meet their own financial needs by utilizing sources of funding from cadres who occupy executive and legislative positions. Mietzner (2007) added that this method of party financing had transformed the party into a kind of rent seeker who brings low internal coherence

into their democratic agenda, and concludes that this method has worsened party's organization.

As it happened, how voters perceived party leadership and party identification during the transition period had a stronger value than other variables, such as the party's religious orientation and political economy (Liddle & Mujani, 2007). The study showed that the aspect of leadership is ever-dominant in the party seeing that the characteristics of a party tend to be shaped by its leading figure. Yet how does this relate to the party's performance? Tan (2006) researched this question in the seven years following 1998. She found that the strength and weakness of the party and the party system rest in their political legitimacy. Institutionalization is weak inside the party due to the presence of strong personal figures in the election –this figure may either be the president or even the head of a local government. Regarding accountability, nevertheless, the election allows the "reward and punishment" mechanism to operate, exercised by voters towards the parties and political leaders. Despite its weakness, internalization of political parties in Indonesia remains stronger than those in the Philippines and Thailand where inter-party competition is more stable (Ufen, 2008). Thus, the party's functioning is conflicting with its leading figures' performance.

Mietzner (2013) explored another dimension of Indonesian political parties. This study starts by questioning previous studies that claim political parties' alleged dysfunction and reputation for poor management. He instead questions the contribution of these studies to the consolidation of the democratic system. Mietzner discovered that there has been little empirical evidence about cartel party –parties in Indonesia do not adopt the cartel type of organization and competition among parties is still fueled by ideology. His arguments resonate well with studies on the management of Islamic parties –which are built and consolidated in a high level of cohesiveness and enjoy a high degree of party institutionalism.

These tendencies are detected in a study by Noor (2012) on PKB and PKS where he found indications of existing leadership in the policy-making process, a systemic cadre regeneration, and a strong commitment to shared values. Further research by Fiona (2014) investigated party organization at the local level. Conducted in Malang of East Java, the study investigated Golkar Party, PDI-P, *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, or National Mandate Party), and *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, or Prosperous Justice Party) by focusing on the parties' activities, administration, and regeneration of membership. Fiona concludes that the difference in party management practices among the ones observed is rooting in the ideological difference of each.

Studies on the organization and development of Indonesian political parties skipped the discussion on how party development actually takes place and how party elites organize its structure. This particular discussion is directly related to how the parties perform in elections. It may as well contribute to the understanding about post-authoritarian political elites and their decision-making process in establishing a political party. Party organization may demonstrate how well it performs in elections and whether it yields desired election results, thus confirming the party's development.

Two aspects justify the importance of party development discussion in democratization. The first is based on Hellman's (2011) study of political parties an electoral politics in East Asia. Democratization process has formed a new electoral system which may trigger proliferation of new political parties; regardless of whether the newly created parties lack substance, direct and specific programs, and strategic goals. The observed loyalty to these parties is merely bound by two key factors: the leader's charismatic figure and money incentives –the essence of party organization is abandoned. He argues that political parties as a strategic response to electoral market have driven politicians to develop different strategies in mobilizing voters; each strategy requires a different type of party organization for implementation (Hellman, 2011:15). In the context of Indonesia, this research agrees on the empirical fact that political parties are an interest group and their politicians still utilize the party as a political vehicle to mobilize only during elections. In other words, the party solely aims to serve the political ambitions of its elites.

The second aspect rests on the answer of whether the parties in Indonesia have been founded on the power of elites and serve as a fulfillment to their political ambitions, or instead to the ambitions of their respective oligarchs. During the early days of the 1998 *Reformasi*, a party was commonly founded on an ideological basis. The work-program and strategies needed to be stated on paper on this formalization stage since this was the first requirement to be met for eligibility for participation in the election. Organizational development then usually followed suit. This stage included board composition, governance structure, and shaping the unique political culture of the organization. The process of structuring a firm social and political constituency base was completed during the campaign period preceding the election. This pipeline explains the rise of political parties and political elites in number –it was easy to set up a political party to serve as a vehicle in the election.

One key aspect that is necessary in understanding party development is history; which includes the dynamics of the institution, a network of actors, and structural pressure that were shaped by what had happened during the New Order.

Mainly related to the underlying pre-condition of democratization, it arose from the influence of force –whether personal in nature or emanating from the institutional regime of the previous period. As a precondition inherent in the shape of the system, the actors and lingering effects inherited from the previous regime are persistent. This legacy seems to be dominant in countries that have experienced a total grip of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. An important contribution to legacy factor from previously authoritarian regimes subsequently undergoing democratization was conducted on the development of political parties in former Soviet Union countries (Ishiyama & Kennedy, 2001). The authors noted that the major obstacle in the development process of the party under such conditions is the inevitable legacy of totalitarianism. Political parties are still constructed as repressive political monopolies. Civil society as a party sustainer is also very fragile unless independent business groups and workers' associations become the backbone of the party.

In general, the issue of the legacy from post-authoritarian states formerly controlled by military regimes reveals a common phenomenon that potentially disrupts democratization. In the post-colonial state, Duverger (1965) argued that the construction of the party has no authenticity since the colonial periods. There were no representative institutions that had political power. He sees the development of the party to have been evident, however, and follows the patterns of relationship between parliament and the electoral system, citing the relevance of the opinions found in Poland (Lewis, 1994), where *Solidarność* emerged as a social and extra-parliamentary movement of workers and autonomous trade unions in the 1980's. The communist regime's collapse in 1989 was connected with the interests of the movement as a part of its political representation in the parliament.

This dissertation explains two important matters that were absent from the previous studies of political party organization and development in the post-New Order Indonesia. The first is the dynamics of political parties during the transition to democracy and how the parties have developed afterwards. Additionally, it includes the assessment of military retirees' role in organizing their political parties in central offices. The second addresses the electoral mobilization conducted by military retirees employing party structure and resources. This will be a proof that the model of party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia was influenced by two dominant factors, namely, 1) the legacy of *dwifungsi* in party organization, and 2) the structural pressure for political parties to reduce dependency in certain political figures.

The introduction section explores military retirees' experience in political parties and elections in the post-1998 Reform. An existing study regarding military retirees and their involvement in national politics is offered by Terence Lee (2015)

who investigated the role of former high-rank officers who participated in presidential elections. He regards the former Generals as strategic players. However, he does not conduct a more extensive research on retirees' contribution to political parties during democratization. Another study is a dissertation by Soesilo (2013) who attempted to identify sociological factors that motivated retired Generals to enter politics. He recognizes that the figures still retain strong militaristic traits including doctrines, discipline, and networking disguised under the endeavor of serving the nation. Soesilo trusts that these former officers held a somewhat idealistic, personal motive instead of pragmatic intentions –they also generally tended to support the process of democratic consolidation. Both researchers limit their studies to political competition of military retirees.

The literature review in this subsection suggests that there are few studies focusing on the role of military retirees, especially on their crucial role as the communicator in civil-military relations, as the leader in the development of party organization, and as a political actor during democratization. This study is looking forward to proving that they had a particular role in Indonesia's new democracy and that an examination into this involvement may contribute to a better understanding of civil-military relations within a democracy.

This dissertation will proceed to explain the specific role military retirees played in party organization development and the consequences of their contribution to the democratic consolidation. The investigation will not be limited to the role of major figures of General rank –which were dominant in the elite circle– but will also extend to the lower officer rank levels of those who were engaged in the organization and mobilization of the party. This research aims instead to further investigate the role of military retirees in politics from 1999-2014 within the investigation of democratic transition and consolidation. The scopes of the research are: 1) post-1998 Indonesian political reform which directly affected military reform and political participation of military retirees in politics; 2) the consequences of political reform on multi-party electoral politics, as well as on the shifting dynamics of party organization development; and 3) military retirees' engagement in party central offices, mobilization during election, and an assessment of their performance in executive and legislative branches in both national and provincial governments.

1.4 Thesis Organization

The research questions posed in this chapter will be discussed in the remaining seven chapters. Chapter Two provides a profound theoretical and analytical framework, discussion on methodological setbacks, and the selection of

research method and analytical tools the dissertation employs. In this chapter, I also provide an exploration on *purnawirawan* dataset that includes their number, frequency, political background and political party affiliation. Chapter Three presents an analysis of political conditions during post-New Order Indonesia in order to provide a historical analysis of *dwifungsi* (dual-function military doctrine) and historical background of military engagement in building political parties. The chapter advances to an analysis of the structural impacts that military reform and civil-military relations had on the multi-party and electoral system in Indonesia. This section concludes that political and military reform was a strong motivation for *purnawirawan* to enter the political realm. Chapter Four continues the discussion to the role of military retirees in party organization development in Indonesia. The chapter provides visualization of how political parties were managed at central offices in an attempt to explain the circumstances underlying the selection and engagement of *purnawirawan* in political parties.

Chapter Five contains the core of the dissertation regarding the assignments of *purnawirawan* in political parties. The chapter analyzes their political party affiliations, the positions they were assigned to within the board of the party (thus in the control of the organization), and a description of their contribution in political party management at national level. The analysis will mainly outline their networking and mobilization efforts in elections for provincial governments, legislative elections, and presidential elections. Chapter Six contains an assessment of *purnawirawan* role in public offices both in central and provincial governments and as legislators at the national parliament. Chapter Seven continues the preceding general assessment by outlining the *purnawirawan's* contribution in the consolidation of democracy. Chapter Eight concludes the contribution of this dissertation on the study of democratization, Indonesia, civil-military relation, and political parties.

CHAPTER II
Theory and Methodology

This chapter reviews theoretical explanations, empirical results, and methodological issues in the existing literature on party dimension in post-authoritarian democracies. I assert that while party dimension and new democracy research in general, and the study on civil-military relations in particular, has reached a broad scope in terms of methodological and theoretical advances, this growing number of studies has not resulted in a better understanding on party development and organization in Indonesia for two reasons.

Firstly, the broader party system literature discusses general symptoms of such system, which are identifiable in both advanced and new democracies as they have much in common. The specific literature on new democracy party system inclines towards the vulnerability and instability of the system while missing out the explanation on the formation and development of party during a democratic transition. That this represents a shortcoming of the literature becomes visible by looking at studies specifically focusing on factors of party creation in democratic transition and what advances party development under such party system, because such studies provide a better understanding on party dimensions relevant to a post-authoritarian democracy. Secondly, those works largely vary in the exclusive experiences and statehoods of other regions, resulting in an even wider range of party characteristics, behavior, and actors. While Indonesia's case might learn from these comparative studies, it also motivates this research to address a particular focus on party competition in a politics colored with military retirees in Indonesian political party.

In proving the validity of the thesis, I carry out my exploration in four stages. *First*, I introduce the reader to how theoretically a political party is founded and subsequently developed in democratic transition as well as what factors contribute to the process, and how this discussion relates to party competition in a political environment inhibited by military retirees. *Then*, I review the uniqueness of party dimension in a new democracy and reflect on the relationship between this study and the broader debates on the topic –particularly in party's links with electorates, party organization, and party performance– identifying similarities and differences of studied models. *Next*, I reassert the analytical framework on party formation and development to explain the impact of the military reform and democratic transition on the creation of a party with the involvement of retired military figures. This section proposes three hypotheses of the relationship based on the dynamics of party dimension during democratic transition and the involvement of military

retirees. *Finally*, I outline the shortcomings of past researches and present the design of how I address those shortcomings and advance the existing research theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. I conclude by describing preliminary facts and figure based on the *purnawirawan* dataset.

2.1 Political Party: Formation and Development

There is a wide array of elements contributing to the formation of a political party in a democratic administration. The distinction of events experienced by advanced and new democracy appeals for a specific understanding of each –yet both experiences agree that identifying the shape, phases, and result of political party development is essential to help politicians achieve their objectives and obtain access to political office (Schlesinger, 1994; Aldrich, 1995). Hence this agreement is the starting point of the theoretical approaches to explain why and how a party is created, consolidated, and developed in a post-authoritarian democracy.

Current studies on party formation and development highlight the cases of advanced democracy (Sartori, 1976; Cox, 1997; Boix, 2007) –ones that underscore the identification of interaction between parties in electoral rule, programmatic dimension of competition, and social cleavages that determine demographical support for certain parties (Lupu & Riedl, 2013: 1349). Party formation in post-communist and post-authoritarian states, however, departs from a different point. For parties in these states –developed in contexts of frail civil society, states under re-development, and low organizational resources– the challenges to develop and function are more acute. Here, political parties are often as weakly institutionalized as they are susceptible to organizational failure and replacement by new parties. Elite instability and party system volatility tend to be high, and accountability of party democracy depends on the turnout of democratization underway.

The extensive literature on post-communist states has reflected various challenges faced by political parties including the legacy of one-party communist state, the continued presence of successor parties, as well as instability stemming from simultaneous political, economic, and even national reform –causing social cleavages to be absent and party identification becomes weak among electorates (Spirova, 2007: 3). Similar tendencies were found in political parties in Poland, where the subsequent political pluralism was still strongly influenced by the previous communist rule. The immediate post-communist political order had to endure the development of tensions from the previous regime during the transition (Lewis in Wightman, 1995: 29). This has proven to be one of the critical points of consideration when discussing party formation and development in a new democracy. Parties in new democracies must cope with the vulnerability of

institutionalization that disintegrates due to internal conflicts arising from the lack of supporters' loyalty and a weak party institution. Consequently, party elites have to regain control of party cohesion through an "enforced discipline" (Sartori, 1994: 191), and have limited opportunities to organize political involvement and participation of its members (Krouwel, 1999: 110).

The case of Eastern Europe also helps us understanding party competition in new democracies. In post-communist Eastern Europe, support for new parties is a response to voters' frustration toward existing parties. However, the number of new parties decreased as the democracy grows more established. Party competition in new democracies then becomes a matter of the relationship between different social bases, dimensions of prevailing issues in the society, and the stability of competition that might take different shapes. In the Eastern European case, this competition is determined by marketization, ethnic homogeneity, and established statehood (Evans & Whitefield, 2009). Socio-economic reform may also affect the aspects of party representation and effectiveness in post-communist societies. This tendency is less detrimental in Western European and Latin American experience, since theirs is not characterized by numerous contending new parties, weak political actors, and floating constituencies (Bielasiak, 2006). Such conditions have motivated important works that aim to identify the extent of opportunities and constraints in party development (Biezen, 1998).

When their volume was published in 2013, Lupu and Riedl added to the debate an additional analysis of party development using political uncertainty approach. They divided the uncertainty into three types: regime, economic, and institutional (Lupu & Riedl, 2013: 1342-1343). Regime uncertainty focuses on the discussion of political competition and competitors. Economic uncertainty highlights economic events and outcomes and the elite's abilities to respond. Institutional uncertainty underlines the rules of political interaction and their durability. This approach elaborates the period of transition to democracy in which the power of authoritarian actors is still dominant[2], and is a necessary contribution to devising a party development model in new democracies.

In their research, Katz and Mair (1995) elaborated the cases of Western democracy that have produced a model of party building deriving from a reactive dialectic that involves the interaction of parties of various types rooting in social,

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[2] In Indonesian's case, however, this approach is lacking in momentum for two reasons. Firstly, the democratic transition ran more smoothly after the military was successfully taken over by the civilian power after the former was abolished by 2004. Secondly, socio-economic and institutional changes inside political institutions still took place within the procedural corridor. Hence the period of democratic consolidation in post-2004 was able to form a stable government by means of a functional legislative and presidential election.

economic, and political factors. Democratization outside the Western tradition, however, sources party building in the retroactive dynamics of the legacy of authoritarianism –which is why in countries that have experienced authoritarian regimes, political parties tend to be centralized and possess characteristics different from their Western counterparts.

What is, then, the model of party organizational development local to post-authoritarian democracies and how do we define various problems that exist therein? Lewis (1996), in his work on Eastern European experience, has developed an organizational model coined as a "traditional mass party" after analyzing the success of Social Democratic Party of Poland (SDRP) and the Hungarian Socialist Party. The characteristics that Lewis examined include high membership levels, reliable financial resources, and an elevated degree of organizational development. Yet, even in this case, the votes in the election were not significant due to the strong dominance of party leaders (Kopecky, 1995; Kitschelt, 1995). This makes us confident about one thing, among others –that the model of party development and its organization in a new democracy is inseparable from the existing structure of political forces in countries formerly ruled by authoritarian regimes. The regime has generated a distinct attribute to the succeeding political transformation –thus democratization affects political institutions, such as political parties, in its unique ways, representing the legacy of the respective authoritarian regime.

The observations on the challenges faced by party development in both advanced and new democracies then narrow our attention to the grounds on which a party is founded and the stages at which it is developed. According to Harmel and Svasand (2007), party development phase is affected by either the expertise or leadership orientation of the party elites. The two scholars brought entrepreneurial party typology issues in case studies they cited in Denmark and Norway, where parties were built in three stages: development of party identification, organization, and stabilization. Another study by Hesli, Reisinger, and Miller (1994) argued that political party development is an attempt of integration to the democratization process as evidenced in Ukraine, where political parties were initially founded as formations mainly based on former dissident groups with national-democratic orientation. Poland's experience in political party development –although one may argue that initially elections only appeared to give citizens a choice, when, in reality, they were merely pseudo-democratic charades– was, more specifically, a gesture of political institutionalization (Lewis, 1994). In Indonesia, party development tends to be influenced by different pre-conditions in every turn of the political situation, especially after elections take place.

From the perspective of an election, the electoral system plays a deciding factor in party formation. The reason is that the proportional representative system should enhance the formation and success of new parties (Mueller-Rommel, 1993: 116). The inception of a new political party is the outcome of a process in which a group, an organization, or a political entrepreneur comes in conclusion to present candidates at a general election (Hug, 2001: 14). The formation process of a new party is embedded in the institutional arena, that is, in the electoral arena, and is an underlying logic defined by constraints, strategic aspects, and interaction among parties (Hug, 2001: 5). Hug took the emergence of new parties to be a sign that old parties have failed to incorporate new issues or assimilate new cleavages. He even argued that new parties would not necessarily appear if old parties were fully knowledgeable of the popularity of the newcomer or aware of the new issues, as it would always be rational to incorporate the issues the new parties stand for (Ibid: 50).

This holds true in the advanced democracy where party formation is tied closely with the electoral democratic model. In a new democracy, on the other hand, parties tend to appear in a setting where the existing parties and party system have little or no influence, for institutional framework still mostly affects party formation (Kitschelt, 1998). This resonates in Indonesia's case. Providing an analysis of the institutional framework gives an overview of not only the election system but also the general post-reform political parties in Indonesia. It helps in explaining the party-building phase, particularly for new parties that involve actors with a military background.

Specific identifications to observe in the internal dimension of party institution include party goals, electoral strategy, organizational structure, and social base (Diamond & Gunther, 2001). I will limit my attention to the role of actors and their performance in running the party organization, that is, in managing the party structure, winning elections, and running a public office. In dimensions external to the party, I observe the structural devices of electoral and constitutional changes, considering their importance in ensuring that political elites have the political legitimacy to negotiate with military elites during the democratic transition.

There are three points of this subject matter that I will address and explain in chapters two, three, and four. First, I will analyze the effects that the changes in the party system have on the aspects related to the elections. These effects take place in the context of democratization in which new parties emerged, that is largely determined by the interests of their elites. Second, I will discuss the type and model of political party development that has been affected by a political structure left by

an authoritarian legacy. Third, I will assess the impact of party formation and development to political party organizational model, especially in the management of party control and mechanisms at the central office.

2.2 Assessing Political Party Performance in New Democracies

The dimensions that measure political party performance have become the basic institutional features to explain the effectiveness of party development and party organization in the new democracy. The role of electoral politics, how the party is organized, and how it performs within the political system are the determining factors of party characteristics in a democracy.

The changes brought by democratization, as found in a study by Webb and White (2007), have shown that parties vary in their level of adaptation to democratic institutional change. For example, the historical stages of party development in the first wave of democratization in Western Europe, featured by cadre formation in the elite parliamentary party, have transformed the socialist-mass party into a catch-all party –which may not be the case in other democracies. The formation of new parties in a democratic country demonstrates an explicit form of a uniqueness resulting from their own respective democratization process. This uniqueness comes from the variation of actors and the driving institution of the preceding authoritarian regime before democratization took place.

Webb and White's contribution to this discussion is their conceptualization of three party dimensions which are crucial in evaluating the effectiveness of the party system. The *first* is the assessment on party's linkage to the electorates. This link draws the attention to the vibrancy and health of linkage between parties and the society at large. Party's link to the electorates also examines to what extent the popular legitimacy of political parties, identification, institutionalization, and fragmentation level in the parliament have been built. This will help us identify the aspects of electoral volatility and explaining the map of public support for political parties. The variables are based on data acquired from electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979), party system fragmentation, and the effective number of party members in parliament (ENPP) (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). Additional factors such as the level of party membership, as well as the ration of partisan identification of membership and election will also be examined (Poguntke, 1996; Katz et al., 1992). All these variables are representing the dynamics on the national scale.

The *second* party dimension suggested by Webb and White is the development and strength of party organization. The reason why it is crucial lies in a party's capacity to maximize existing resources to optimize the achievement of its objectives. Party organization includes party finances, party management staff, and

party membership. These aspects and their variations shape the respective party's effectiveness in carrying out numerous functions in central and public offices, as well as in the field. Ishiyama (1999) contributed to this topic with an assessment on the level of party organization using the primary indicators of party membership and adding the degree of coherence of party ideology internal to the party –the latter has several caveats when discussing Indonesia's case.

When it comes to analyzing the development of party organization in Indonesia, the pursuit of examining the degree of ideological coherence has proved to be a challenge due to three factors. First, there tends to be an issue of biased internalization of ideology within the party itself. In other words, no party is able to maintain consistency between the party's ideological *conceptualization* and platform *formulation* on the one side and the level of policy implementation on the other. Second, the shape and format of inter-party coalition in the parliament mostly rely on public pressure in order to balance the interests revolving around the placement of party cadres in desired executive government posts –while the format of the coalition in a stable executive government supposedly needs at least three-quarters of votes in parliament. Third, weak party identification is positively correlated with party-backing. The socio-political cleavage of constituent parties did not have the advantage of a good aggregation process. As a result, there is a noticeable vulnerability in the articulation of elite interests *vis-à-vis* those of grass roots, which causes a division within the elites. Due to these caveats, the elaboration of party organization in Indonesia will focus only on party finance and management staffing.

The *third* party dimension is also the particularly inclusive one, that is, party performance, which contains within it the systematic function of political parties. Performance of a political party in itself and in offices confirms the legitimacy of the party and its organizational strength and is an indicator of success in the governance process.

This dimension serves as an analytical framework that complements most significant findings in party organization in Western democracies, as Katz and Mair (1992) proposed. Katz (1987) described the critical role of political parties in democratization, that is, as a means for power holders to achieve their specific goal to optimize their presence in power. Democratization emerging from post-authoritarian countries creates a key position for political parties as the only political organization that should be recognized in order to prop up the establishment of a democratic state. The performance of the party, consequently, will determine the sustainability and stability of votes in the government-building process. Fuchs, in his published volume (1993), added a component in political

party observation that emphasizes the role of principal actors and reviews their environment, functions, and their products. Fuchs' contribution keeps the attention on the political parties not only on the limited number of those participating in elections but also on the general situation and internal dynamics of parties.

In party performance dimension, Katz and Mair (1994) divided party's faces into three: 1) the party in the field, 2) the party in central office, and 3) the party in public office. These three party images contain the structure of the organization, its linkage with society, and its performance in the government. According to Katz and Mair (1995), existing studies are preoccupied with the weakening of parties' links with the state. Mair (1997) further argues that "party in the field" is undoubtedly weak regarding these links, but "party in central office" and "in public office" are stronger than ever due to the substantial party income mainly derived from state subventions, access to, and control over state-run media. Furthermore, parties in the last two images possess the capacity to erect barriers to new entrants in the party system.

Although competition among parties persists, this categorization is present in another study. V.O. Key Jr. noticed the difference of party faces in the electorates, in the government, and in party organization (Key, 1964). The categorization drawn by these three scholars pay attention to political parties present in American and Western European democracy, i.e., advanced and established democracies. However, significant criticism of such categorization in Western democracies is not deemed adequate to explain the dynamics of party periodization without ordering an institutional change. Regarding this matter, Jean Blondel (2002) argued that the party plays a role in different contexts, especially in patronage models relating to various institutional settings for its performance and its decline, and party dimensions must be observed under such circumstances and consideration. Blondel's criticism ensures that envisaging political parties in new democracies urges to find relevance in delivering an outcome that is different from each other.

2.3 Analytical Framework and Hypotheses

This dissertation discusses the theoretical aspects of party formation and party organization development to analyze their structural effects on military reform and to assess the electoral and party system changes during Indonesia's democratic transition. This aims to identify the extent of the impact that structural changes had on the formation and development party organization. I will examine what role military retirees play and how they function as civilian politicians to advocate the structure of political parties. After identifying the formation and development of the parties, the analysis continues to use the variables of party

dimensions to evaluate party organization. Finally, it will answer the question of how internal institutional changes affected inter-party competition.

This dissertation agrees with the analysis of party dimension in new democracy proposed by Webb and White (2007), with the main argument that in new democracies there were no firm mechanisms or procedures that could be used as a foothold for observing political parties' performance partially –one has to include the dimensions of the internal party organization, in public institutions, and in the organization of parties at grass-root level. The categorization made by Katz and Mair (1994) of the three faces of a party is valuable in building up the analysis of party and the division of roles in its management, in public office, and at grass-root level.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework

Source: Development by author

Figure 1 represents an analytical framework of this dissertation. It starts by stating that military retiree political participation in electoral politics is influenced by two major things: 1) the structural pressure of electoral system changes and the impact of military reform that restricts their influence within the military organization; 2) the political party system and the development of post-authoritarian party are still based on a charismatic figure elite and this situation strengthens personalistic-party type. Political participation of military retirees starts by the establishment of a new political party supported by their network,

included in it are civilian elites. They integrate the existing military doctrine and hierarchical chain command with civilian democratic values. Their primary political goal is to fortify the political party to occupy public offices, especially by means of presidential elections in which they run for president or vice-president. Once they reach the desired positions, they offer an incentive for their supporting network key positions in the management structure at the central office and party nomination for positions at other public offices, both in executive and legislative branches.

Deduced from the aforementioned points, three hypotheses will be tested in the dissertation:

H1. The trend of military retirees' participation in politics and political parties are the consequences of structural changes –especially in military reform and the competitive multiparty system.

H2. Military retirees contribute to party organization development with a higher degree of acceptance for democratic values, favoring the creation of political parties compatible with democratization.

H3. The role of military retirees in political parties and public office is driven by their interest to continue the pre-existing military doctrine so as to influence state decision-making process.

In order to test the validity of the hypotheses, the current analytical framework needs to be reinforced with three key explanations. First, the framework of party development and dimension aims to outline the posture of the party and party system in Indonesia during the period of transition and consolidation. An analysis of this regard identifies the position and role of political parties, their elites, and party oligarchies in contributing to the placement of military retirees in party management and in public office. Second, the analysis of research findings will focus on the activities of military retirees in political party management at the central office, during electoral mobilization, in networking during the election period, and in their agendas in public positions on various levels. Third, the analysis will also include a comparison of military retirees' performance at national level legislative with the one at provincial level.

2.4 Methodology

This research studies the relationship between *purnawirawan* and party politics in Indonesia- one of a handful of new emerging democracies in South-East

Asia. The *unit of analysis* employed in this dissertation is military retirees (referred to as *purnawirawan*). The research focuses on political parties that are "relevant" to the research in the sense that they achieved significant parliamentary representation and had a recognizable number of *purnawirawan* among their ranks.

Purnawirawan is a name for members of the military or police who have retired from service. Usually, they join official organizations such as *Pepabri* or similar organization from the armed forces branches. This organization is independent, so they do not have a cadre or hierarchy level as active military members do. It allows them to have freedom in defining political orientations and other personal motives. I identify the influence of purnawirawan in Indonesian politics into two roles: First, their role as individuals who are involved in mobilizing candidates during presidential elections to gain incentives such as position in public office or cabinet. Second, their role as active members of political parties by which they can run as candidate and hold positions in parliament or other elected positions through electoral mechanisms.

I limit the definition of the role of *purnawirawan* as civilian politicians with a military background. This dissertation is not paying much attention to specific explanation on the role of *purnawirawan* organization but will focus on their role as individuals. They act personally in their capacity as an intersection between the ex-military and civilian worlds. I rely on the notion that military values in the Indonesian military tradition come from the belief that "soldier was born from the people in their struggle for independence." Each member of the military is obliged to defend the state as a manifestation of the pretorian guard. Actually, such military values are maintained by the purnawirawan organization based on the doctrine that "old soldiers never retire or die". All organizations of military and police retirees such as *Pepabri* and LVRI (Veteran organization) still adhere to the Indonesian soldier's oath: *Sapta Marga* (seven paths, for the military) or *Tribrata* (three duties, for the police). Overall, *purnawirawan* as a person also apply the doctrine of *Catur Dharma*, namely, the concept of dual political struggle in the sense that they always have to be involved in defending the state, as well as to take part in socio-political development.

The doctrine of *Catur Dharma* is a bridge between the *purnawirawan* organizations and the TNI in accordance with the Decree of the Indonesian Armed Forces Commander of 24 June 2005, which stipulates the *purnawirawan* to: 1) assist the TNI through the provision of defense policy advice. 2) provide a bridge between the TNI and other national actors, 3) help realizing TNI's traditions and idealism, and 4) serve as a reserve component in the national defense system.

Based on the explanation of the relationship between *purnawirawan* and their organization, I affirm two distinct definitions of "military values" that means the basic values of the military doctrine attached to each soldier without retirement age. This value is different from the definition of "military interest" that translates the short or long-term interests of military institutions to voice, advocate and sustain the military interests in democratic governments such as military budget, military business and military involvement in domestic security.

There are, however, some caveats in data collection. First, the availability of data on the *purnawirawan* profiles which contains their engagement in the political competition is minimal, and the accessible data from the political parties' central office is limited. More adequate data from the national parliament office does include the *purnawirawan's* party background and other detail information as Members of Parliament. Meanwhile, other information –such as who ran for executive or legislative positions, as party leaders, or as a coalition of independent and regular members in party management– was not found. Due to these caveats, the dataset urgently needs an immediate update.

This research defines military retirees as the retired military officers ranging from Lieutenant up to General under the Indonesian term of "*purnawirawan*". The remainder of this thesis will use this term as synonymous with military retirees. *Purnawirawan* indicates that the former officer has completed his active duty; either due to retirement age or the choice of early retirement with honor. This term does not apply to former military officers who have deserted the force or have been discharged from their duties. *Purnawirawan* roles will be assessed in three main roles: 1) in internal organization of a political party in its central board, where the role becomes more significant after entering into the elite circle of the party, therefore is able to participate in party votes to decide on strategic policies; 2) in public offices of the executive and legislative bodies, which enables *purnawirawan* to actively bring political agendas into policy formulation and implementation; and 3) in organizing voters through the party as well as through wing organizational supporters and electoral mobilization.

Furthermore, the research will observe the *purnawirawan's* role in politics by detailing the categorization of their roles, including: 1) their role in political parties from 1998 to 2004, during which the parties were fully supported by board failing in elections; 2) the role in political parties that survived past 2004 election and the newly established parties of the 2004 election up until the 2014 election; 3) the role of those who sat in the national parliament between 1998 and 2014 (their roles as legislator on crucial issues will be discussed in accordance with their positions in the parliament); 4) the role of those holding an executive office who sit

in the national government, focusing on Yudhoyono presidency from 2004 to 2014; and 5) those who were elected governors in provincial government from 1998 to 2012.

This study will observe and compare several political parties which had a significant number of *purnawirawan* as members. With regard to the analytical methods, this research used systematized procedures and a case-study building method that structures "focused comparisons case." This method of comparison in the proposed case study followed Alexander George (1979a, 1979b). Under this method, a researcher needs to systematically: 1) describe the research problems and classes of events to be studied; 2) provide the independent, dependent, and intervening variables of relevant theories; 3) select the cases to be studied and compared; 4) decide on the best way to characterize the variance in the dependent and dependent variables; and 5) formulate a detailed set of standard questions to be applied to the case. Conforming to this method, the present dissertation proposes the involvement of *purnawirawan* in electoral politics as an *independent variable.* The *dependent variable* is the changes in the development of party organization models, the use of military expertise and network during election and the actors' contribution in democratic consolidation.

The research will continue to assess the engagement of *purnawirawan* in strategic positions. In terms of continuity, not all the parties having competed in elections in Indonesia since 1999 have had the success in sending their party members to the parliament –therefore we only focus our attention on the ones that had seats in the parliament. Accordingly, this dissertation examines four political parties, namely, PDI-P, The Democratic Party, Golkar, and Gerindra –all of which are a selection of parties which meet the criteria and availability posed by the five roles delineated above. Regarding the performance at national parliament, the variable is their performance when acting as a Member of Parliament on issues related to the military agenda –that is, defense and security– and human rights issues. It becomes important to review these issues to recognize how far military interests could be integrated into national policies. Conversely, regarding the *purnawirawan*'s performance in provincial government, the variables of their governance are 1) civil liberty, 2) the development of democratic institutions, 3) the accountability of the government, and 4) the effectiveness of the government. These variables are intended to conform to how military retirees perform in handling power in local governance.

Discussing retired military figures in politics without relating it to the political situation and the military as an institution may lead to a loss of highly relevant linkages and networking at precisely the process of their formation when

the figures were actively serving in the military. Additionally, reviewing their next role after retirement in political parties also involves their relationship with civilian politicians. As a result, the unit of analysis has to undergo an expansion in the course of the retirees' networking with other organizations or political parties.

2.5. The *Purnawirawan* Dataset

Since there is no data on *purnawirawan* in Indonesian politics available, a starting point dataset on their participation in politics that covers their membership in political parties, participation in presidential election campaign team, and their candidacy in parliamentary and provincial governments is necessary. The only setback in preparing the dataset comes from the unavailability of official data that clearly specifies the background of party officials or candidates with a military background. The dataset was collected from official data released by political parties, legislative elections candidacy by the Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*, KPU), and data collected from reliable media. All data are compiled and processed with a strict cross-verification by official sources obtained from the Current Data of Indonesian Military Elite released by Cornell University to confirm the validity.

The dissertation then proceeds to validate the findings and tabulate them. The dataset contains the names, ethnicity background, education background, military background (rank and last position in the military), political party affiliation, positions within the party, nomination for elections, and position in offices. The military retirees' dataset will also be used as the baseline for the selection of political parties that become the units of analysis in this dissertation, from 1999 to 2014. The period allows three election periods. In each election, one party with the following categories will be chosen as the unit of analysis: 1) the highest number of military retirees on the national board; 2) the largest number of party candidates in legislative and executive elections; and 3) the highest number of positions in public offices[3].

From the data collected between 1998 and 2014, at least 388 *purnawirawan* were recorded to enter the political stage. Their participation in the politics could be classified into three categories: 1) those who were registered as board members or cadres of a political party; 2) the ones who only ran for election through a political party or independent faction; or 3) those who were engaging as a part of campaign

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[3] Details on this statistics can be accessed in
<http://aminuddin.lecture.ub.ac.id/publication/dataset-military-retirees-in-indonesian-politics-1998-2014/>. Or
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313366680_Dataset_Military_Retirees_in_Politics_A_Study_on_the_Rise_of_*Purnawirawan*_in_Indonesian_Political_Parties_1998-2014 />

team for a candidate during the campaign period of a presidential election. Table 1 shows that the ranks ranged from Generals to Second Lieutenants. The most significant number of *purnawirawan* came from the Army (reaching 243 members), followed by the police (63), the Navy (39), and Air Force (24). On the religion variables, Muslim *purnawirawan* occupied the top place with 289 individuals, followed by Christians (50 individuals), Catholics (17), Hindus (11), while the remaining 21 consisted of members of other religions and beliefs. The distribution shows that the domination of the Army is because the number of Army officers has always outnumbered that of the other military branches or police, which enables their continued role in the political arena.

Table 1 shows the composition of *purnawirawan* with the total of 261 General Officers. The highest number of General Officer retirees was Major Generals while as many as 122 people belong to the category of Field Officer retirees, with the highest number filled by Colonels and a few lower ranks such as First/Junior Officers (*Perwira Pertama*) along with several First and Second Lieutenants, Captains. This distribution pattern was different from the military representation in the parliament in the New Order which followed the shape of a pyramid consisting of high-ranking officers at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the officers with lower ranks. This represents the interests of middle-to-high-ranking officers who held office or other similar territories, interests, or political ambition was greater than the political competition. *Purnawirawan* distribution patterns after 2004 were not concentrated in one party, but rather it was based on aspects of the network that was firstly built in the party.

Table 2 shows an interesting finding that a large number of *purnawirawan* from the Army were found in the Democratic Party, followed by Hanura. The rest were scattered in various other smaller parties competing in the 1999 and 2004 elections. From the Navy, the highest number of *purnawirawan* was found in Gerindra, followed by PKPB, PKPI, and other smaller parties. Golkar had a large membership of those from the Air Force while the *purnawirawan* of the Police origin was mostly present in PDI-P and PAN. Based on variables in the management boards of parties, most of the positions filled by *purnawirawan* were at the national level. However, for Democrat, PDI-P, and PAN, *purnawirawan* in the provincial board were more dominant than in the national one. Upon a further examination, there appeared to be double-posts, or replacement for the management at the provincial level by persons in charge from the national board, who were appointed for temporary acting roles, as provincial board leaders.

Overall, the number of *purnawirawan* in national boards was over 137 people, 33 in provincial boards, and 23 in regional/ local boards. A total of 43 people

ran for public offices as independent candidates. A significant number may be found involved in a winning election as parts of the campaign team –both in presidential and legislative elections– but did not hold positions in the party's structural board. They initially joined as regular members or additional members recruited to the management as a tactical team. A total of 152 people fell into this category. The Army dominance within the parties indicates that the intention and the obsession to be involved in the playing social and political role were still strong. In the 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections, *purnawirawan* with an Army background could be found in almost all the competing parties. The Police retirees began moving into the party, especially after the 2004 elections. The Navy and Air Force retirees were brought massively by Prabowo into Gerindra and by Yudhoyono in the Democratic Party after the 2009 election.

Table 1: Purnawirawan by Last-Rank in National board of 14 political parties

Last Rank	Democrat	Gerindra	Golkar	Hanura	Nasdem	PAN	PBB	PBR	PDI-P	PDK	PKB	PKPB	PKPI	PPP
Major General	20	9	8	3	3			4	10		3	4	1	1
Colonel	8	4	1		10	2	2	1	4	2	2	5	3	1
Brigadier General	8	4	3	6	3	5		1	3			4	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	2					1			2	2		1	1	1
Lieutenant General	5	3	4	1			3						1	2
Inspector General (Police)	1			1	3	1	1		3					
Rear Admiral	1	1	2		1	1								
General (Army & Police)	3		1	4	1				1				2	
Vice Admiral	3		2	1	1									
Senior Commissioner (Police)		1			1	2	2			1				
Air Vice Marshal							1	1		1	1			
Captain	1			1										
Commissioner General (Police)	1						1		1					
Commodore	1		2						1		1		1	
Air Commodore		1				1							1	
Adjunct Senior Commissioner (Police)	1				1		1							
Commissioner (Police)						1								
Major									1					
Air Marshal		2		1										
Admiral	1			1					1					
Air Chief Marshal	1				1									
First Lieutenant														
Second Lieutenant														
Frequency	57	25	24	21	16	15	11	9	26	7	6	21	12	5

Source: Calculation by author from MR Dataset 1998-2014

Notes: Not affiliated: 38, Other Parties: 34, .5 *Purnawirawan*: 361, N: 388

Table 2: Purnawirawan Distribution by Position

Position	Branch				Level			Party Affiliation							
	Air Force	Army	Navy	Police	National	Provincial	Local	Democrat	Gerindra	Golkar	Hanura	Nasdem	PDI-P	PKPI	PKPB
Member of National Board	4	23	1	9	36	1		5	3	4	2	4	6		
Head in National Board	2	22	5	5	32			6	8	1	8			1	1
Vice Chairman		8			8	1	1		1	4					1
General Secretary		6	1		6			1		2				1	1
Founder and Chairman		6			6			1	1		1			1	1
2004 Election Task Force		5	1		3	2		6							
Vice General Secretary		2	1		3			2	1						
Head of Party Wing Organization		1			1			1							
Highest Council		1			1			1							
Treasury		1			1				1						
Chairman in National Board		2			1		1	1							2
Advisory Board	3	13	2	3	19	2	1	7	3	1	2	7	2	1	1
Chairman in Province	1	12	1	5	2	16	1	7	1	1	2	2	2		
Vice Treasury		1			1					1					
Candidacy Only	20	90	22	25	11	4	9	13	3	8	4	2	12	9	15
Ordinary Member	4	50	5	16	8	8	11	7	3	3	1	1	4		

Source: Calculation by author from MR Dataset

Table 3: Purnawirawan Ranks Distribution by Party Affiliation during 1998-2014

Party Affiliation	General Officers	Field Officers	First Officers	Settled	Moved	Total
Aceh Party	3	-	-	-	-	3
Democrat Party	44	11	1	58	2	56
Gerindra	20	5	-	25	-	25
Golkar	23	1	-	25	1	24
Hanura	20	-	1	21	-	21
Independent	39	13	4	56	-	56
Nasdem	13	3	-	16	-	16
PAN	8	7	-	15	-	15
Partai Sarikat Indonesia	-	1	-	1	-	1
PBB	6	5	-	11	-	11
PBN	1	-	1	2	-	2
PBR	8	1	-	9	-	9
PDI-P	19	6	1	28	2	26
PDK	2	5	-	7	-	7
PDS	-	3	-	3	-	3
Pelopor	-	1	-	1	-	1
PIB	2	1	-	3	-	3
PKB	4	2	-	6	-	6
PKPB	15	6	-	21	1	20
PKPI	9	4	-	13	-	13
PKS	2	-	-	2	-	2
PNBK	3	-	-	3	-	3
PNI Marhaenisme	1	-	-	1	-	1
PPD	-	2	-	2	-	2
PPN	4	-	-	4	-	4
PPP	3	2	-	5	-	5
PPPS	-	2	-	2	-	2
PRN	1	-	-	1	1	0
Unverified						42

*) **General Officers**: Brig. General-General, **Field Officers**: Major-Colonel, **Junior Officers**: Lieutenant-Captain.
Data collected from 1998 to February 2014. **Settled**: never moved to another party, **Moved**: switched to another party.
Table calculated from Dataset of Military Retirees in Indonesian Politics 1998-2014 (will be referred to as MR Dataset).

From May 1998 to February 2014, there were at least 388 military retirees involved in politics (Table 3). They were categorized into those who were registered

as a board member of a political party, those who ran for election through a political party or independent candidate (for executive position only), and those who were engaged as a task force member for presidential candidacy contests through temporary membership in a political party. Of these facts, the data are unable to verify party affiliation of 42 retired military figures. Those who ran from coalition of parties in local elections were also unable to prove that they were registered as a board member, member of a party, or their party wing organization affiliation. The number of those who were not affiliated with any political party and ran independently seems to be significant with the total of 56. They had run for a local election in either gubernatorial or head of local government positions. A few Independents were promoted by party coalitions.

However, despite their considerable number, independent-candidacy *purnawirawans* are omitted from the unit of analysis since their level of success in elections was very low, and when they advanced through a coalition of parties in elections and won, the following relationship between them and the nominating party was more transactional. Party policies were of a less significance to them, and they could not be controlled by the party as a guarantor of the implementation of the party's platform.

In all the parties competing in the 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections, it is observed that there was an uneven distribution of military retirees. They either got themselves absorbed in a party with a clear constituency base or established a new party instead. Therefore, the four selected parties will serve the analysis and will be reviewed in depth according to their significance. Other parties will be reviewed in accordance with their strategic contribution to the discussion.

Table 4: Purnawirawan in Four Major Parties

Party	Position in Party		Candidacy		In Office	
	Board of Leader	Board of Member	Executive	Legislative	Executive	Legislative
Democrat Party	28	11	25	21	8	14
PDI-P	2	7	12	17	3	6
Golkar Party	10	4	9	10	4	1
Gerindra Party	17	3	4	11	2	1

Board of Leader: Top positions in the Central Office e.g. Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary-General, Treasury. **Board of Member**: middle-low position in party wing or agencies e.g. Head of Information, Head of Department of Youth and Cadre, Head of Election. Source: MR Dataset

It is evident in Table 4 that each party had different characteristics. The starting point is the amount of *purnawirawan* politicians in each party. The Democratic Party had 58 members of ex-military figures, followed by PDI-P with 28

members. Golkar and Gerinda come next with 24 members each. All numbers are calculated before deducting the ones that switched or were transferred to another party.

In terms of leadership, the Democratic Party was pioneering as it filled the Board of Leader with 28 *purnawirawans*. The positions in the Board are strategic since it directly manages the daily activism of the party. In Board of Member, the board responsible for running party's decisions in accordance with corresponding department or section, Democratic Party placed 11 *purnawirawans*. The Democratic Party also had a higher number of *purnawirawan* candidacy in elections and in public offices than Golkar, PDI-P, and Gerindra. Although the last three had fewer civilian politicians sitting in the boards of leader, civilians wielded authority of the office in the party they have founded; occupying key positions as party chairman, secretary general, chairman of the advisory board, and other roles in the central board or other executive positions.

Exploring the role of *purnawirawan* in these four parties will give us a perspective on civil-military relations in new democracy as is. The exploration of their roles as party core members at the national level, or in central offices, may help us understand the strategic moves *purnawirawan* did in order to achieve their political interests. Their candidacy in executive positions –such as president, governor, or a regent/mayor– is steady. Candidacy for legislative positions is most advanced on national level, but fewer ran for provincial parliaments –or rather, there is no reliable source indicating a significant number of military retirees running for local parliaments.

Strategies and placement of figures in different positions within the party vary from one party to another. The Democratic Party and Gerindra, both founded by *purnawirawan*, placed a large number of these figures as officials. Golkar, the ruling party during the New Order regime, still maintained *purnawirawan* support to occupy strategic management within the party until 2009. PDI-P, which was the previous military regime's opposition, chose to compromise by engaging those who had an ideological proximity to the regime and those who came from the nationalist military factions. All these political parties' characteristics and individualities contribute to the sundry of circumstances that affected Indonesian politics post-1998.

2.6 Data Collection and Analytical Method

The dissertation employs several techniques of data collection; which is acquired from *purnawirawan* dataset development, archival and official reports, and statistical data from reliable sources. The primary source for this research is official documents accessed from each political party. These documents come in the

form of annual reports of political parties, legislators, and official publication of official statements issued by the respective party. Data relating to the performance of public officials of each party is taken from the minutes of parliamentary hearings, parliamentary legislation, and executive policy products with the complementary addition by official reports submitted by the government. Data contained in biographical works of political parties are also utilized and random validation was conducted on issues considered important by other sources (such as mass media, official reports, and opinions from other parties).

Quantitative data used in this research are acquired from the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) created by the National Planning Agency (*Bappenas*) and the Indonesian Governance Index (IGI) by Partnership (*Kemitraan*) –both are supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Other supporting data for a discussion on the elections are obtained from the Election Commission (KPU) and the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). An analysis of *purnawirawan* in executive positions as governors are provided and are based on secondary data obtained from official reports released by the government, and are compared with data from other sources for validity.

For the purpose of data collection, resource people are necessary since they are able to provide adequate information about their role in party organization at the central and local boards. To gather adequate information, I interviewed figures who are directly related to the focus of the research, namely, *purnawirawan* who became the central board members of political parties. As a comparison is equally important, interviews with civilian politicians were also conducted. The type of questions asked was not designed as general, descriptive questions. Instead, the questions seek to cover issues that facilitate the exploration of their roles as actors in any related events and were prepared with an emphasis on detailed specifications. In-depth interviews, consequently, will be conducted after the initial descriptive part in this study is obtained.

In processing the information obtained, all data collected was analyzed in three steps. First was analysis of the dataset using descriptive statistics to obtain the information of *purnawirawan* distribution in political parties and elections. This dataset is the gate to choosing which political party we will use as the unit of analysis in this research. The study used descriptive statistics to describe the tendency, the distribution, and frequency of deployment of political parties; and will map *purnawirawan* in both elections and public offices. Descriptive statistics was used to summarize and organize the data in an effective and meaningful way (Nachmias & Guerro, 2010). The analysis of this dataset provided information on the distribution pattern of *purnawirawan* in political parties, and thus making it easier to keep track of the network they have created –both for the sake of political party

development and for electoral competition. The distribution also helps us recognize the strength of previous positions and their significance to party organization.

Completing the dataset analysis, quantitative method was used to measure and explain the performance of provincial government, thereby creating a technical measurement on the Provincial Governance Index (PGI) at provincial level. The variables necessary for this measurement are civil liberties, functioning democratic institutions, and effective and accountable governance. This indexing was intended to observe the performance of governors and make the data easier to understand by drawing a comparison between civilian and military retirees governors background. It is arguably worthwhile to keep track of how far military aspects still runs in the veins of local government administration.

To test the effectiveness of the mobilization of *purnawirawan* in elections and provincial governance, a comparison was drawn between presidential elections and legislative elections since 1999. As for the provincial government, 17 provinces were considered –these are the provinces in which governor's role has been held by a *purnawirawan* since 1999– out of 38 provincial governments in Indonesia. The data analyzed were acquired from the national survey data that is presented in the indexes of democracy and governance. The methodology used in the national survey was tested and multiplication was performed in accordance with scientific principles that have been validated to obtain a general overview of all the provinces in Indonesia.

CHAPTER III
Purnawirawan in Democratic Political Stage:
The Impacts of Military Reform on Electoral Politics

By the end of 1999, hallowed concepts such as *dwifungsi* ("dual function", the three-decade-old doctrine assigning the military responsibility for social and political development as well as providing for national security) and *Pancasila* (the state ideology adopted by the New Order era) quickly became artifacts of the New Order era. During the period of democratic transition, the civil administration allowed flexibility for military elites to take responsibility in the military reform by means of "New Paradigm," which would decrease the armed forces' direct political and developmental roles, yet still allow them to retain military privileges and prerogatives. Regarding civil-military relations, *Reformasi* led to some very authentic changes that have shifted some power away from the military and towards civilian institutions. There was a widespread recognition inside and outside the military that its role has to change under more open, democratic governance – yet there remained equally widespread ambivalence towards tackling any significant reform of the military by members of the military leadership and political leaders.

The subsequent political changes brought by the post-authoritarian *Reformasi* electoral system provided a space for retired generals to continue their political participation by contesting in elections. Between 1998 and 2004, some established a new party under their full control while others chose to join existing parties with a traditional constituency base, such as nationalist or Islamic-based parties. There was a widespread belief among military members that *purnawirawans*, when involved in a political party, tend to be more resilient and generally more capable of having strategic reviews of their functions. *Purnawirawan*-led parties founded after 2004 –The Democratic Party, Hanura, and Gerindra, to name a few– have tried to combine civil and military actors in party management. Having competed in elections, these parties successfully gained seats in DPR (House of Representatives) during the next period of administration, as they also succeeded in obtaining positions in public offices for their figures.

This section aims to conduct a descriptive analysis of the political conditions in the period following the fall of the New Order. The underlying assumption is that the success of civilian control over the military was strongly influenced by the internal military reform. To uphold this assumption, the research proceeds in four steps. First, to explain the evolution of *dwifungsi* military doctrine and to what extent it affected the politics which offers a historical overview of the doctrine –in

which the research elaborates the initiation, its instillation within national institutions, and its legacy. Second, the research attempts to answer the questions of how the military reform taking place afterwards was carried out, and what the impacts that the reform had on the democratic transition period were. The answer to these questions reflects the extent to which civil administration was successful in putting pressure on the military reform, and how the latter overlapped with the internal reform within its own institution. I provide an evaluation of the *reformasi* and democratization efforts throughout the administration of three presidents (from 1998 to 2004) to track the progress. Third, addresses *purnawirawans'* political participation in political parties in order to provide essential clues to recognize party development phases and response capacities of political actors in increasing their political participation during the electoral system changes during *reformasi*. Finally, a description of political party and party system is provided to obtain general portrayal of multiparty system result. I conclude with a summary of findings, while the research continues to conduct a subsequent analysis that evaluates the findings in line with *purnawirawan* control in central office discussed in Chapter Four.

3.1 Understanding Military Doctrine before 2004

Military involvement in politics is an integral part of the history of the Republic of Indonesia as it was one of the key players in the Indonesian fight for independence and in politics with Sukarno (Kahin, 1952, Feith 1964). In the period of the New Order government, supported by the military, as Crouch notes, during the New Order territorial units routinely take steps "to prevent political parties, NGOs, trade unions, student organizations, and religious groups from challenging the regime" (Crouch 1999: 145). Military mobilization was evident when in 1977, more than 21,000 military personnel were assigned to civil works, with a gradual decline over the next two decades (McFarling, 1996: 145). The military also controlled the bureaucracy. In 1973, a third of cabinet ministers, provincial governors and two-thirds of the ambassadors were both active and retired military officers. At the end of the New Order, in 1995, this number decreased to 24 percent in the ministry, 40 percent in the provincial governorship, and 17 percent as ambassador or same level at Indonesian Embassy (Lowry 1996: 188). The House of Representatives (DPR) also did not develop into an independent branch of government, separated from the executive, but served only as a rubber stamp for Suharto's increasingly sultanistic regime. Elections thus served as a "useful fiction" (Liddle, 1996).

Existing literature on the military in New Order regime has highlighted the dominant role of the military in civilian government bureaucracy that was backed

by a strong military organization rooting both in the military institution and in the government. Although the New Order has ended, internal factions were less capable of controlling the military, hence the instability of the government (Honna, 2003). The military also had a deep connection with religious organizations that were mostly based on Islamic factions as Mietzner (2009) pointed out. He proposed an argument on the dynamics of the relationship between the military and Islamic groups with their ups and downs, as well as periods of mutual advantage. Mietzner offered a profound criticism and stated that what happened in Indonesia is somewhat different from the classical theory of military intervention in politics –the latter is more attracted to the open intervention of the military and their formal mechanisms of political participation.

In Indonesia's case, the key variable to explain why military actors had high interest and connection in politics is the dual function military doctrine –the implementation of which had a long tradition of instillation and was culturally embedded in the minds of senior military officers, thus justifying any political intervention by the military (Sebastian, 2006: 329). The policy of "functionalization" (*kekaryaan*) that placed officers in both legislature and non-military administration was a translation of the doctrine implementation. The policy allowed both active and retired officers to occupy strategic positions in national and regional bureaucracy; ranging from cabinet ministers, heads of village, to the board of directors in major state-owned enterprises. Up until 1999, there were 6,800 active officers serving in non-military positions in the bureaucracy in addition to 5,500 retired officers occupying those posts (Bhakti et al., 2009: 143).

A closer look into the role of the military during New Order regime has resulted in two critical notes: there was a fragmentation of elites within the military institution and its roots within the socio-political forces of the society could be reactivated in political mobilization. The New Order regime was not entirely driven by the iron hand of military law, but still used this instrument of power within a democratic framework of political parties, elections, and the media. Throughout the reins, the institutional development of military affairs had been set up to serve simultaneously as praetorian soldiers and for political missions in order to co-opt civil society through the civilian society –a measure taken to ease out controlling of the state. Both tasks extended their scope of work along with the increasing power of the regime in the first half of the 1970s.

The expansion of the military's political role had been steady under the doctrine of *dwifungsi* (dual function). The doctrine was inspired by the legacy of post-independence military politics in 1945. A seminal study by Crouch (2007) suggested that the concept of *jalan tengah* (middle way) was introduced and developed in the late 1950s as a military doctrine involving the construction of a

military territorial command system for dealing with local politics. It was General A.H. Nasution who coined the doctrine, suggesting that the military participate in policy-making in order to avoid a coup, as occurred in Latin America and the Middle East during the 1950s. The early period of President Sukarno's government was filled with various separatist movements driven by local military figures since Jakarta practically did not accommodate their needs and interests. The military headquarters, which held the control forces around Java, had made a significant contribution to handling the separatist movements, and thus the armed forces elites were given the rights to participate in policy-making process.

The concept of military intervention to civil governance was not designed in a model similar to the one that became the base of a military junta, where the military had the right to veto a presidential or parliamentary decision. The military as an integral part of the government bureaucracy was a middle-way concept, bridging the armed forces and the bureaucracy sector. This role was supported by the declaration of *Undang-Undang Perang Tahun 1957* (Martial Law of 1957) (Crouch, 2007: 344). Consequently, the military was actively involved as a member of the National Council and was given the responsibility to form government and to restore order at the local levels, starting from areas where the separatist conflicts arose. This marked the beginning of the military's involvement in civilian governance until after security was restored (Pauker, 1962; Lev, 1964; Sundhaussen, 1971). In 1958, Gen. Nasution resolved the political legitimacy of such middle-way practice –it was decided that the practice was the amalgam of the praetorian military dictator model and the Western models of the military that are excluded from politics (Crouch, 1988).

Between 1949 and 1954, the military underwent internal reorganization and President Sukarno eliminated the military elite factions. The reorganization continued with the current military command structure. A number of officers who had already been dismissed from the military service set up *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (IPKI, Association of Indonesian Independence Supporters). Under Gen. Nasution's support, the association contested in the 1955 election, nevertheless failed to obtain significant votes. During the following transition period from Sukarno to Suharto's administration, the exponents of IPKI were then functioned as a part of a militant network under the military command. They were the initial component that built the former Golkar Joint Secretariat.

The collapse of Sukarno-led Old Order was marked by the events of *Gerakan 30 September 1965* (known as *Gestapu*), which allowed the military to regain their dominance during the regime change. The parliament, led by Gen. Nasution, then appointed Gen. Suharto acting president in 1967. The military took advantage from the interim parliamentary session between 1967 and 1968 to strengthen its position

in the state by controlling the government and suppressing the socio-political forces for alleged national security reasons. In the following year, Suharto was elected president and his control over civil administration as the head of state and government was christened as he was aided by military officers in the principal cabinet positions. Although other ministries were controlled by civil authorities, strategic posts remained in the hands of the military. The same thing happened in strategic diplomatic positions and in consular missions (Sundhaussen, 1978).

The implementation of dual function had affected all social and political institutions as well as their infrastructure in the society. The governing process was conducted by the military, civil bureaucracy, and technocrats. This composition built a synergy to enable the structure of the government to reach the lowest level. The military was at the forefront of leading the strategy to destroy the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. This was quickly followed by pressuring other community groups and associations deemed as *dangerous*. The military then practiced a form of psychological terror to create political isolation in rural communities after the traumatic events of 1965.

On top of the military's dominance, the lack of political power other than Golkar had created a limited room for any movements to develop. In 1973, a total of nine political parties were forced to merge into two parties: *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party) and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party). Golkar was regarded as a political organization representing the civil bureaucracy, local administration, and the force behind the armed forces (Suryadinata, 1989; Antlov, 1994). Golkar did not call itself a political party, but rather a political force or a socio-political brotherhood. Golkar passed the bill of Regulation No. 20/1969 which prohibited civil servants from joining a political party and the New Order regime restricted the political activities of any parties possessing potential bargaining power –as a result, the opposition remained abysmally weak. The military had become Golkar Secretariat's backbone for mobilizing the support for the military, bureaucracy, and the floating voters who were not represented by any political party or other political currents –the latter gave rise to a group known as *Golput* (*golongan putih*, a group akin to undecided voters). The military mobilization paid off in the 1971 general election when Golkar got 60% of votes (interview with Akbar Tanjung, June 30, 2015).

Such an arrangement was only possible with Suharto's patrimonial ways of managing political power with him at the very center, controlling various channels under his rule. The military became more and more consolidated with clear patrons to complete their control over the state. Political elite ranks were held by a group of technocrats and military officers, who composed the New Order government from top-level bureaucracy to local governance (Liddle, 1978). The military's close

involvement with the lives of the society became the motive behind the expansion of Golkar internal faction into three pillars called ABG (*ABRI, Birokrasi* dan *Golkar* – which stood for armed forces, bureaucracy, and civilian power in Golkar that included civilian politician and party officials from various wings and supporting organizations) (Gaffar, 1993; Haris, 1998).

To manage the key positions under his administration, Suharto designed a cyclical pattern of military elite circulation that was supposed to minimize rivalries among military officers. The pattern of internal conflict management utilized not only the hierarchy of military command but also the personal leadership of the branch, corps, and unit commanders. The internal conflicts Suharto experienced within his institutions emerged from the circulation of leadership and clashed with the interest groups he associated his reign with –that are syncretistic Muslims, nationalists, and the military. One particular instance of conflict was when Gen. L.B. Moerdani acquired control both as armed forces commander and as military intelligence chief. Gen. Murdani was a Catholic and had to deal with factions of military officers from both nationalist and Islamic backgrounds. Another internal conflict occurred at the end of Suharto's administration in 1995 following the renewal of the relationship between Golkar and the military. The Chief of Social and Political Affairs of the Armed Forces Let. Gen. Ma'ruf had opposed the proposal submitted by Gen. Hartono to support Golkar in the election. Gen. Hartono argued that the military had an obligation to support Golkar as a historical mandate, while Gen. Ma'ruf insisted that the military was supposed to stay in a neutral position. Having previously backed by Suharto's family, Golkar politicians, and his network with Islamic groups, Gen. Hartono expressed his support for Golkar in 1996 (Liddle, 1996; Said, 1998).

The pursuit of power, clash of interests, and weak social cleavage covering the New Order regime could be traced back to the legacy of Sukarno's administration. Sukarno's centralistic policies had castrated the power of parliamentary politics, rendering political parties only complementary to the political dynamics of the state. Top this with poor party organization and party's inability to maintain a constituency base due to the constant conflict between political elites; the result was that it had become easy for the regime to cut their political power base in the community entirely.

In the late 1950s, the politicians of a few major parties started to create and run party program activities to manage this issue and strengthen civil community's connection with political society. They formed a wing of the party organization where the constituency base of labor groups, farmers, fishermen, traders, women, and students converged (Budiarjo, 1956). However, the political conflict at the national level made the bases of this constituency especially susceptible to collisions

due to ethnicity, religious, and classical ideological affiliation differences. Feith (1967) asserted that constitutional democracy in the 1950s was overthrown by its opponents and abandoned by those who upheld it earlier.

Under such conditions, the New Order government became free to engage in the de-bureaucratization of government officials at village administration level. The resulting undeveloped informal institutions under government control were unable to deliver high resistance to authoritarianism. The New Order government cut the base of its constituency of political and civil society with a floating mass policy that combined the strategy of coercion, persuasion, and exchange of interests. The approach means that the authoritarian New Order regime was able to control all the socio-political forces that existed within the community (Liddle, 1992).

The dawn of *Reformasi* in 1998 led to the increasing demand for a military reform as an important agenda of the successive government. The early period of democratic transition inherited from the previous administration period, nevertheless, could not be completely ignored. The effects of dual function implementation that legitimated the military's control of the state were instilled deep as the military was already integrated into various social and political functions. The doctrine had established a systematic program of politics and ideology, and it had become the institutionalized form of civil-military relations during Suharto's presidency (Honna, 2003).

Before their representation was reduced from 1999 to 2004, the military had 75 of the 500 seats in the national parliament and a total of 2,800 non-elected seats at provincial and regent/municipal level (Crouch, 2010:133; Robinson, 2001). Dual function doctrine placed the military under the territorial command structure parallel to the administration of civil governance. The functions included tasks in the military, defense, trading, and intelligence (Misol, 2006; Rabasa & Haseman, 2002; Sebastian, 2006). The distribution of basic needs was regulated from the central government that also controlled the government news agency. Suharto, as the military's political patron, had the authority to elect parliamentary candidates and the chief of the armed forces, as he was also capable of vetoing the nomination of a legislator if considered threatening the national security.

The significant pressure of civil society during the mid-1990s and the entertaining discussions of democracy had influenced the mindset of young officers. Soon after the fall of Suharto, this critical group of officers held that the continuation of armed forces tradition should be reviewed (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 152-154). Besides, Suharto's elements were no longer strong enough to control the military elite. Several officers had already started having a modern and open way of thinking and agreed on four important points. They demanded that the armed forces needed to rethink its own identity and that it did not need to act as the spearhead of political

development. They also agreed that the concept of *occupation* (*pelibatan*) should be transformed into *influencing* (*mempengaruhi*). The conception of influence in political process should also not be done in a direct manner. Lastly, the armed forces were ready to assume the role of political division from the civil power (Musakabe, in *Kompas*, September 8, 2001). These four agreements were what later constituted the New Paradigm of the military's dual function (Wirahadikusumah, 1999, Mabes TNI 1999: 23-25 in Rinakit 2005: 105-106). Although senior officers preferred the previous dual function setting, this preference was rejected.

Throughout the 1990s, Suharto's regime shifted from a strong state leadership backed by a powerful military command into a weaker, old establishment unable to keep up with modern demands. He was no longer capable of properly controlling the situations happening between the military as an institution and the military in socio-political functions. Under this saturated stir-up, the military did not stand on a crackdown against the increasing demands for a reform –an act which led to Suharto's resignation. This situation was clearly different from the 1980s, when any criticism of the government would immediately result in the full force of military retaliation.

There had been indications that Suharto had prepared his dynasty through alienating army officers with weaker links and allegiances to the Palace (Sidel, 1998). The rise of criticism from within the military came from Maj. Gen. Wirahadikusumah when he declared that the armed forces took responsibility for good and bad government alike, and that the fall of Suharto's New Order would also mean the end of the superiority of the armed forces.[4] From the military, a number of high-ranking officers contributed to the military reform. They supported the military's withdrawal from politics –although few still desired the military to be involved since they still had a position in the parliament (Said, 2006). This situation marked the beginning of the fall of New Order regime and its intertwining role in civilian sectors under dual function doctrine.

Alagappa's point (2001) concludes this section: New Order military politics, divided into a praetorian military role and an administrative role during the regime, was made possible under dual function doctrine. Based on my observations, subdivisions of both functions were run separately. Yet there was a special role for the officers within Suharto's inner circle, who served as a liaison between the military institutions and the socio-political role the military assumed. During an event of crisis among the inner circle, the mediator officer jockeyed for position to control the military networks under their coordination unilaterally. This had caused

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[4] Presentation by Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah at the seminar of "*Mencari Format Baru Hubungan Sipil-Militer: Visi, Misi, dan Aksi (1951-2001)*" ("*In Search for the New Format of Civil-Military Relations: Vision, Mission, and Action*") at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Politics University of Indonesia, May 24-25, 1999.

the division between the military as an institution and the military as the officers who sat in civilian government; therefore, it simply weakened Suharto's power. Dual function doctrine, then, becomes our focal point for understanding the political orientation of military retirees and the debate throughout the military over reform efforts taken during the period of democratic transition.

The internal military debate in post-Suharto resulted in two things to revamp the military to take part in the push for democratization while others remain concerned with the territorial authority. Officers like Let.Gen Agus Widjojo and the circles of Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wanted to be involved in the process of political change and military reform. In fact, some circles of Yudhoyono has been involved in discussions on the military reform since the 1980s during General L.B. Moerdani's term as Commander of the Armed Forces. General Wiranto considered it necessary to carry out the assimilation of the political changes and exit with slowly outside New Order anachronistic political format (Honna 2003: 74-81). Wiranto occupied a strategic position as the official stance of the military decision while Suharto's advocates such as Lieutenant General Prabowo, former Armed Forces Commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung, and former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Hartono mobilizes Islamist networks (Schwarz, 2004: 337).

In 1997, for example, Army Chief of Staff General R. Hartono issued a statement that all soldiers and officers were Golkar Cadres and should wear the yellow jacket (yellow being the color associated with Golkar). In 1998, there were around 40,000 retired military officers in such a position: a year later, the number declined to about 15,000 (Sulistiyo 2002: 18). The debate ended when Armed Forces Commander, General Wiranto announced the decision in 1998 about a new military paradigm that includes four important points: first, the Armed Forces have not felt the need to the forefront of political struggle. Second, the military has limited influence in politics, not in determining the political decision-making. Third, the process of influence only for indirectly affects; and fourth, the military will share role and joint work for decision-making as institutions with civilian[5].

The role of the new military position is taken impact on the emergence of cartelization in politics due to the configuration of the civilian political elite goes unstable (Slater 2004). As a result, the problem appears in the work of public institutions to ensure the fulfillment of accountability. The split between civilian politicians during the early period of reform can be seen in the impeachment of

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[5] More analytical works can be found, including Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, www.ifes.org or Anwar, Dewi Fortuna et al. 2002. *Gus Dur versus Militer: Studi Tentang Hubungan Sipil Militer di Era Transisi.* Jakarta: Gramedia and Pusat Penelitian Politik – Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan. Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa, et al. 1999. *Tentara Yang Gelisah: Hasil Penelitian Yipika tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gerakan Reformasi.* Bandung: Mizan. Said, Salim, ed. *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak* (pages 333–64). Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan

President Abdurrahman Wahid by a coalition of Islamic parties in the parliament. Wahid refused to align himself with the Opposition against Suharto and even attacked the student movements for their unwillingness to compromise with the regime (Mietzner 1998). Let.Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, who According to Bourchier and Hadiz (2003: 280 in Mietzner 1998) was "in favor of much more sweeping reforms than his commanding officers were prepared to countenance," led the Faction of rapid Reformers. The goal of this group was to accelerate the assimilation of military structures and norms to the conditions of the new democratic polity. To achieve this, Wirahadikusumah aimed to interact with politicians and state institutions, create a favorable public image in the media, and develop ties with civil society groups (Mietzner 1998, 2004).

During the late New Order period until early democratic transition, I noted at least three important things. First, the military still wants to maintain their political influence for widespread in democratic procedures. It is characterized by the inclusion of their high officers in almost all political parties after 1999. They occupy strategic positions in political party as Chief of party, General Secretary or Vice Chairmen. Civilian politicians are aware of the interest and recognize their influence and networks. Therefore, they have to accommodate them in the strategic positions in the party. Nevertheless, institutionally, for instance, the TNI's decision to disengage from practical politics and focus on improving its war-making abilities, especially those related to external defense (Bradford 2005: 19). Several facts suggest that the military elite, especially the retired general officers, still wanted to play a role in politics, making any democratic process always involved the presence of the military. This condition resulted in "slowly dawning recognition that fundamentally nothing has in fact changed since 1998" (Liddle 2003).

Secondly, retired military officers kept using their networks and create collaboration and establish cartels, not only in politics but also in the economic area. They did so in their attempt to secure their investment in the past, goodwill to entrepreneur or the more normative reasons, they wanted to get a profit share of the turnover of capital for economic prosperity. They have a strategy to establish a corporate network by cutting the chain between political parties and the society. This was done when they were active as members of the military during New Order where they posted and controlled civilian administration and castrated political parties (Liddle 1978; Crouch 1978; Ward 1974). At that time, the way as revealed by the David Reeve's study (1985) of Golkar has shown that the idea of corporatist representation predates the New Order. Regarding the use of Golkar as a political vehicle to reach out and mobilize the corporations, Andrew MacIntyre wrote that the military has been the most active proponents of a corporatist approach to the management of interest representation in recent decades, and the most significant

identifiable grouping of reform-oriented civilians in positions of influence in recent years has been the collection of civilian leaders within Golkar promoting a more progressive position within the party at the expense of conservative military elements (MacIntyre, 1994).

Third, the military still relies on figures and potential network within the political society and civil society. This is why some military officers founded political party as a vehicle for their political existence and to compete in elections. Since November 1998, a policy was issued and gave limit to the active military in bureaucratic positions. In the 1999 elections, the military cut its formal relations with Golkar and declared neutrality in the election. That move is significant as it formally is, as the military does not have the legitimacy to engage in the political process. During the New Order, military and Golkar relied on the procedural elements as the basis of authority, which would indicate the growing strength of the regime and progress in the legitimization (Alagappa, 1995: 53). The military played a particularly important role in supporting Golkar in elections due to its territorial organization, command structure and authority to deal with social and political affairs (Sulistiyo, 2002).

3.2 Military Reform in Early Democratic Transition (1998-2004)

Military reform was one of the mandates of the 1998 *reformasi* (O'Rourke, 2002). During the initial phase, military elites temporarily returned to the political arena by partnering with political figures in order to safeguard national stability. Even up until 2004, the military doctrine had not changed substantially (Honna, 2003). Other scholars argued that the military reform internal to the institution was quite significant, although there had been only a few substantial changes (Crouch, 2010; Mietzner, 2006). The removal of the dual function doctrine was considered the most important achievement of the period although it did not directly change the military's organizational culture –the indoctrination had long been embedded in the mindset of the officers (Chrisnandi, 2007). The military was no longer involved in civilian governing process –although studies have shown that during the period of transition to democracy, the ruling president tended to have a high dependency on military aid and could not do well without it. This condition led to a pragmatic alliance between the civilian government and military authorities –particularly in national security and public order, such as during the presidential election or to prevent the military acting as a spoiler in the formulation of national policy. The civilian government finally granted the military the privilege of organizing their own institution (Rinakit, 2005).

After the abolition of dual function doctrine, military leaders emphasized the need to improve their institutional performance, especially in dealing with their

involvement in human right issues. Civilian politicians also tended to compromise in the process of military reform, which means they allowed the military to hold their own responsibilities to carry out the military reform. Whilst the military's interest in quotidian politics gradually weakened, their level of interest in politics ebbed and flowed depending on the behavior of civilian political elites. This would influence the military's attempts to disengage from the political tray (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013).

The successive government and the president leading it, then, were responsible for carrying out governance in post-Suharto Indonesia and for making sure that the changes were consolidated and the democratic transition ran smoothly. In the next sub-sections, I will elaborate the administrations of three successive presidents after New Order in how they dealt with the regime's legacy in politics and in civil-military relations in particular: what challenges they faced, how they performed during the democratization period, and what their achievements were.

3.2.1 *B.J. Habibie's Presidency (1998-1999)*

President Habibie was appointed as interim president after Suharto's resignation from his decades-long reign. Habibie benefitted from the sharpening factional feud between the military officers who were pro-democracy and those who sought to maintain the *status quo*. He was able to take advantage of the proposal of the Commander of the Armed Forces, Gen. Wiranto, to compromise public demands for ending the military-backed government, followed by internal military reform (Mietzner, 2006: 5-6). Although Habibie was close to Suharto, his denial to public demands would lead him to "political suicide." His prominent actions included the prosecution of Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, the former Commander of Special Forces by the Honor Officers Council (*Dewan Kehormatan Perwira*) –a council initially formed due to the military-related kidnapping of pro-democracy activists during New Order regime (Tempo.co, June 10, 2014). The good relations Habibie maintained with Wiranto also provided benefits in times of crisis in a special session of MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) in November 1998 that endorsed the regulation of gradual withdrawal of military representatives in MPR. There was an indication that several pro-*status quo* senior officers gave support to a student protest outside the MPR building. The protest was supported by the National Front, an organization founded by *purnawirawan* along with civilian activists. Their demand was for Habibie to step down and be replaced by a presidium of senior leaders.

According to an assessment based on a report released by the International Crisis Group (ICG), Habibie's presidency conducted at least three military reform

steps (ICG Asia Report, 2000). The first was the massive reduction of military representatives in the parliament. In 1998 there were 75 military officers in DPR (People's Representative Council), 2,800 in the provincial parliaments, and 306 in DPRD (Regional People's Representatives Council) and district/municipality governance combined. In 1999 there was a further reduction of up to 38 people in DPR under Law No. 4/1999, while the number went from 20% to 10% in local parliaments. The number MPR seats also decreased from 1,000 to 700 seats, including 500 members of DPR, 135 functional groups, and 65 in regional representatives.

The second step Habibie took was the transfer of active military officers from civilian bureaucracy positions. Prior to 1999, as many as 4,000 active military officers were sitting on civil government bureaucracy positions. On April 1, 1999 Commander of the Armed Forces obliged these officers to re-activate their military service and gave them the option to either resign as a military officer or to remain in civilian positions. The same regulation also contained the separation of the police force from the military, although both were still under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense and Security. This decision was the beginning of other steps of separating the police from the military. In turn, the police became a separate institution reporting directly to the president. Nevertheless, many senior officers rejected this policy, including Maj. Gen. A.M. Hendropriyono, the Ministry of Transmigration at that moment. Another policy was the elimination of the Chief of Military Office for Social and Political Affairs, a position that was used to control political parties, mass media, and political and social groups in the society. The agenda was followed by a massive reduction in active military-civilian government posts.

The third step was to confirm the military's neutrality from political interests or party affiliation. The fall of Suharto provided the momentum for military leaders to affirm the termination of the relationship between the military and Golkar. In the 1999 election, Gen. Wiranto as Commander of the Armed Forces ordered military personnel not to get involved in the campaigns or in any electoral mobilizations. During this election, the armed forces and the police faction in DPR/MPR chose according to their individual preferences and could not choose as a group or produce the same vote. The concept of military neutrality in accordance with their career path of professional soldiers who supposedly do not seek for positions in the government would also indirectly influence policy. The military also emphasized its separation of authority from civilian politicians dealing with their own internal reforms (Department of Defense and Security, 1999).

Military reform under Habibie's governance embraced the Commander of the Armed Forces Gen. Wiranto. This closeness resulted in a strong base for military

institutions to organize their officers who supported the reform and to fortify the civilian government from the pressure exerted by conservative factions in the military. The concept and practice of dual function doctrine was not regarded as an error, but rather as a response to the national political situation in the early period after independence. In a speech in 1999, Wiranto stated that dual function was cited by Prime Minister Amir Sjarifoeddin as a maneuver to encourage the continuing involvement of the army in politics. Wiranto stated:

> TNI's [the armed forces] involvement in politics began as a reaction against efforts by politicians to control or at least subordinate TNI, which since its founding had been relatively independent in its internal affairs, to their political influence. The efforts to control TNI became especially apparent when Amir Sjarifuddin became Minister of Defense and established an armed wing of leftist groups named TNI-Masyarakat. He also tried to... create splits within TNI through all sorts of slander and intrigues (Crouch, 2007: 39-40).

The official stance of the military on this matter was given by figures from the military factions who held positions in civilian government, such as Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, former head of the military faction in the parliament whom President Habibie appointed as the Minister of Home Affairs. In 1998 he stated that the military was still needed in DPR to act as a mediator between the political parties controlling the influence among power holders (Rueland & Manea, 2012:128; *Tempo*, February 2, 1998). To a certain extent, support for the military still had a socio-political significance in Golkar, which did not want to be harmed by the departure of the military as one of the supporting elements. Golkar Chairman Akbar Tanjung insisted that during the transition period, DPR/MPR still needed the contribution of the military and the police. The conservative military faction which became Golkar supporters also wanted to keep military representatives in the parliament (Tanjung, 2007:272). Instead, the military institution that was under the supervision of Wiranto's faction had the opposite attitude. Wiranto had authority in the armed forces command hierarchy, and it was much easier for him to control the military and to compromise with Habibie to run the military reform.

Habibie, however, was a weak presidential figure during his administration as he failed to gain support from the civilian political power in the parliament. His cabinet was composed of the same members that Suharto had in his regime. Golkar cadres were dominating the cabinet posts, and the government tried to balance the composition by incorporating elements of Muslim intellectuals from *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals). Habibie was supported by the "green" faction of senior military officers who had the network and the capability to mobilize Islamic organizations.

Of the five generals in his cabinet, three were associated with the faction closest to Habibie, including Gen. Feisal Tanjung (Pepinsky 2009:179; Anderson, 2001).

In addition, Habibie was considered a rival of *purnawirawan* from the nationalist faction (Suryadinata, 2002:53). The opposition was apparent during the election of Golkar chairman, in which Habibie supported Akbar Tanjung, granting him the position of Ministry of State Secretary in his cabinet. During the election period, Akbar Tanjung was met with resistance from Gen. Edi Sudrajat, a former Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Security, who had support from the former vice-president, Gen. Try Sutrisno. Gen. Sudrajat attempted to apply pressure on the vote through Gen. Wiranto, then Commander of the Armed Forces. Gen. Sudrajat came from Golkar faction at the provincial level. Wiranto was expected to use his influence to push the territorial military commanders to influence 22 of the 27 provincial Golkar chairmen with military background. However, with the endorsement from Gen. Feisal Tanjung, Habibie was able to block the pressure from the military and Akbar Tanjung was elected Golkar chairman. Had Gen. Sudrajat won the chairmanship of Golkar, he could have easily taken control of the DPR members from Golkar that had the majority of seats. As a response, Wiranto planned impeachment of Habibie, believing that replacing him with a candidate from the military would create turbulence that would be hard to overcome (Mietzner, 2007).

The relationship between Habibie and the military leaders did not last long and increasingly experienced tension when the proposal for East Timor referendum was submitted. Habibie's agreement to conduct a referendum was considered jeopardizing senior officers and military families who had sacrificed a great deal in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor –a move supported by the USA and their allies. Gen. Feisal Tanjung and Wiranto refused the President's proposal, who approved the referendum in 1999 (Kingsbury, 2000; Crouch, 2010:26). In the parliament, political support for Golkar was also declining with the bid submitted by PDI-P to form a coalition with Akbar Tanjung as Megawati Soekarnoputri's running mate. The absence of support from the military and Golkar led to the end of Habibie's administration, culminating in the rejection of his accountability reports by MPR.

3.2.2 *Abdurrahman Wahid's Presidency (1999-2001)*

The continued military reform efforts undertaken by President Wahid focused on weakening the influence of the military through ruffling elite circulation within the hierarchy of the military leadership. Wahid replaced military commander Gen. Wiranto and appointed Admiral Widodo A. S. from the navy –a move that was improbable in the previous regime where the military commander always came

from the army. The position of Ministry of Defense was given to Juwono Sudarsono, a scholar from the University of Indonesia. In order to erode the domination of Gen. Wiranto in the military, President Wahid gave the strategic posts of commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command position to Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah (a reformist officer) and the position of the Army Chief of Staff to Gen. Tyasno Sudarto (a counter-intelligence officer and rival of Wiranto) (Haramain, 2004: 233). The repositioning maneuvers that Wahid conducted in managing the strategic positions in the armed forces were not without serious obstacles due to the complicated internal polarization of the military. In addition, political factors weighed heavily in the decision to carry out reforms for military positions.

It is worth noting that President Wahid had no systematic strategy. His maneuvers resulted in the consolidation of the conservative faction in the military and had affected the withdrawal of military support against him in the impeachment. Wahid tended to take decisions regarding policies without consulting the commander of the armed forces or their leaders in the military headquarters. Several cases, including Maj. Gen. Sudrajat's dismissal as TNI spokesman, were justified as the accusation that he ordered the territorial representation in his cabinet, with the removal of Admiral Freddy Numberi in August 2000. Shortly after, however, Lt. Gen. Luhut Panjaitan was appointed Minister of Trading and Industry to restore military representation in the cabinet (Chandra & Kammen, 2002: 110).

The military institution's response to Wahid's policies, although quite subtle, affected the president's policies regarding the internal problems of the military. The crucial issue was the existence of a hierarchy in the army that could only be regulated by the Commander of the Army, as long as the subject was associated with officer charges in all positions in their corps. The dismissal of Kostrad Commander Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah by the Commander of the Army, after only being in office for four months, did not push Wahid to lobby authorities. Wirahadikusumah was widely known for his statements in the inner circle of reformist officers. He has written a book publicly discussing the ideals of a military reform in Indonesia. His attitude –and the attendant publicity– had created resistance from conservative military leaders. Wahid, who granted the new position to Wirahadikusumah as the Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces, had to cope with the demands of the 45 senior officers who created the petition to establish the Military Honor Council and issued sanctions against Wirahadikusumah (Crouch, 2010: 139). This series of events proved that the military still refused political intervention into their internal affairs.

After the appointment of Admiral Widodo as the Commander of the Armed Forces, the army corps' ego seemed to harden and they openly rejected the intervention of the president into their internal affairs. The combination of the Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces played a crucial role in

initiating the implementation of the military reform within the body of the armed forces. In a meeting involving senior officers in April 2000, Widodo stated that the military no longer had its former power in social and political roles. The statement received extensive support from most senior officers who supported civilian supremacy in the government (Lanti, 2002:118).

It is also worth considering that Wahid's military reform strategy had no clear long-term implementation plan. Six *purnawirawans* filled his cabinet and Wiranto was reappointed, this time the Co-ordinating Minister for Politics and Security. Under Widodo, internal military policies in the context of military reforms focused on strengthening the support of the navy corps from where he rose from. He proceeded to continue the policy of military neutrality during Wiranto era. In February 2000, Admiral Widodo used the term "civil supremacy" to strengthen the civilian government without the involvement of the military. He approved the dissolution of the Co-ordinating Board of National Stability and further withdrawal of military officers from the Political and Social Affairs Directorate at the Ministry of Home Affairs (*The Jakarta Post*, April 11, 2000; *Kompas*, April 11, 2000).[6]

Wahid's presidency, however, has made a significant contribution to the security sector reform by separating the police from the military under Presidential Decree No. 89/2000 –both forces were previously combined under the control of Ministry of Defense and Security in Habibie's cabinet. In his speech on the decree, President Wahid stated that the Chief of Police has reported directly to the President as stated in Article 2, Point 3 (*Kompas*, July 2, 2000). This decision was fortified by TAP VI/MPR/2000 concerning the National Police –a law stipulating that the police commando drawn from the Ministry of Defense was now under direct order from the President. In MPR annual session, it was decided that the deadline of withdrawal of the military and police representatives from the Assembly would be no later than 2009, while the deadline for the seats in MPR and DPR was 2004. The rise of conflicts of interests in the parliament as a response to the withdrawal of 38 seats of military representatives in DPR/MPR was closely related to the interests of political parties to obtain additional support from the military fraction in the parliament for securing the passing of their political interests.

By the end of 2000, Wahid's leadership had failed. The failure was coupled by the emergence of *Buloggate* case in relation with the president's alleged involvement in rice distribution allegations (Budiman, 2001). Almost all parties voted to the impeachment of President Wahid or of his defenders –such as *Partai*

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[6] The Board of National Stability (*Bakortanas*) was dissolved in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 38/2000 on March 10, 2000. The consequence of it was that a number of mid-rank officers lost their jobs. About 330 personnel in the Board had to be deployed to other military institutions.

Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), which was thought to have received significant support from military representatives in the parliament.

In the time of political crisis during the MPR Special Session (*Sidang Istimewa*) held for Wahid impeachment, the military was back and under the control of the army, with commander's position held by Gen. Endriartono Sutarto. This was closely related to the strengthening of the military fraction in the parliament to a party coalition that wished to impeach Wahid. When Wahid was on the verge of failing due to the Special Session, he issued a decree ordering the armed forces to secure the president's power. However, Endriartono openly criticized the presidential decree, issuing a statement that the army would decline to impose a state of emergency and would refuse to prorogue a democratically elected parliament (Kartasasmita, 2013: 324; Malley, 2003; Honna, 2008). Another figure deemed unable to ensure the support of the military for the president at this juncture was Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who served as the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security. He was later dismissed by the president for not supporting the implementation of the decree. Wahid had filed to replace Yudhoyono with Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, but no approval was given by the parliament (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002: 44-45). Wahid's administration ended with the impeachment by MPR and he was removed from the office due to the lack support from either military or parliamentary parties.

3.2.3 *Megawati Sukarnoputri's Presidency (2001-2004)*

The attempts for military reform were carried out in two short periods before finally Megawati made significant progress. At the very base, the military was made to realize that it was no longer serving as the dominant force in policy-making. They learnt that they must be willing to compromise with civilian politicians in political parties and in the parliament. Megawati, backed by her party PDI-P, established a good relationship with several of the senior officers on the basis of loyalty to the nationalist ideology. The sentiment of this ideology was then used as the entry point in any military reform policies undertaken during her presidency. In the preparation of the cabinet, military representatives still obtained their share of positions, which amounted to four seats. PDI-P and Golkar, the supporting parties for the former President Wahid's impeachment, each secured three posts as ministers and *Poros Tengah* (Central Axis) party coalition received a share of four ministers (Slater, 2004:70). The remainders of the posts were given to professionals from various backgrounds.

Military support from the nationalist faction in the army was quite significant. This was visible when Megawati was faced with an Islamic separatist conflict in Aceh that required immediate resolution (Miller, 2008). Megawati's

decision to conduct military operations was inseparable from her proximity with military elites and from the nationalist faction in general. The policy was made with the full support of senior officers such as Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo and Maj. Gen Ryamizard Ryacudu (Jemadu, 2006). Military elites strongly opposed separatism since this was closely related to the positioning of central government in terms of nationalism and the borderline integrity of the state. However, the government's policy on the war on terrorism and separatism was perceived differently by other military factions in Megawati's administration, such as that of Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who served as the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (Abuza, 2006: 67). Whilst in fact, the choice for a military operation in Aceh was a strategic policy to continue strengthening the military's support for the government.

However, the military used a stronger bargaining position to assert their purposes in order to retain their privileged status in politics. TNI Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto still attempted to refuse any withdrawal plan by military representatives from the parliament. The main argument was that the military had obtained a major significance in the resolution of the separatist conflict and other conflicts the police was unable to handle. The military justified its refusal to leave the parliament early on by stating this would be harmful to state stability under existing circumstances. However, apart from this military augmentation, a number of convert actions also transpired, and would consequentially be investigated with relation to military involvement in communal violence in several episodes of conflict and violence (O'Rourke, 2002). At MPR session in 2002, the issue of the armed forces' representation in MPR resurfaced. Endriartono asked for a return to the 1945 Constitution. At that time, the issue had become a serious threat to the process of a constitutional amendment. However, external pressure intervened to generate consensus to end the military's representation in MPR until 2004 (Ziegenhain, 2008: 151).

Military reform in the democratic transition under Megawati period showed significant changes –she managed to disallow the military from political activities and strengthened civilian control over the military. Although there were records showing that the progress of military reform agenda stagnated, two caveats need to be explained. First, we need to consider the fragmentation among the civilian political elites, who practically hampered a consolidation amongst themselves –this fragmentation affected the institutionalization of democratic values in the government. Second, we need to note the resistance from the military who insisted on retaining its privileges. During the initial period of transition to democracy, military reform was faced with internal conflicts between factions within the military. Despite the advances of Yudhoyono's two-term presidency between 2004

and 2014, the military was able to be controlled and the government allowed flexibility to the military's internal reform.

Shortly, Yudhoyono became one of the core figures who contributed to the military reform. In his administration, the proposal to change the TNI commander from PDI-P faction in DPR which nominated Commander of the Army, Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, was a severe test. Yudhoyono withdrew the nomination of the new commander from the DPR, which was controlled by a coalition of Golkar and PDI-P. After Ryamizard retired, he sent a nomination to replace Endriartono with Marshal Djoko Suyanto, the former Commander of the Air Force. Overall, Yudhoyono's performance of structural achievements seems essentially unimportant (Sidel, 2015). The combination of internal control over the military due to Yudhoyono and Kalla's persuasion of Parliament, together with the support of Golkar, meant that the TNI reform agenda could run relatively smoothly. The 2004 presidential election was considered as a landmark reform of political institutions in Indonesia and an end to the democratic transition that began in 1998 (Aspinall, 2005). Despite the weakening of the democratic transition with respect to the *purnawirawan*, the strategy to keep control of national politics was unfinished.

During the transition period of 1999-2004, Habibie and Wiranto faced pressure from high-ranking officers who relinquished civilian control of the military budget, thus tightening military revenues from non-state sources, allowing revision of the territorial and judicial system against crimes of military personnel in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Kim, Liddle & Said, 2006). The latter is the example of the expansion of the boundaries of the negotiations in civil-military relations during a democratic transition. In terms of history, during periods of transition, the military's political interests could always and easily be unconsolidated. As a result, they were able to take over control of the government with a wide range of variation and control the implementation, as seen in the late 1960s (Lev, 1964). In the post-1998 era, the military's internal consolidation experienced shock over the lack of a central figure after Suharto. As a result, various forces within the military polarized in support of *reformasi*, while the rest stood in resistance to demands annulling the military's influence in politics.

An important factor that led to the success of high-ranking officers in the military reform was their ability to blockade their former senior officer who had high political aggressiveness. They positioned their senior officers as *purnawirawans* with the option of entering into a political party. However, the *purnawirawans* did not have much power to intervene and to influence active military personnel who had become their subordinates while serving in military branches. On the other hand, outside the military, they had influence in both national and regional parliaments. Some scholars claim that military reforms were

quite significant, although in reality the change was less substantial (Crouch, 2010; Honna, 2003; Mietzner, 2006). Elimination of dual function doctrine does not directly lead to changes in the military organization's culture, due to the decades of indoctrination successfully instilled in the officers' mindset (Chrisnandi, 2007).

It is important to note that the initial period of reform in 1999 became an important point of a massive change in the military institution when they decided to support civilian government. The early stage of military reform did not necessarily indicate that the conditions were more open and had high accountability to both military elite and political leaders. Generally, the limit of civil-military relations lies in the separation of political power from the military institution and makes the military as subordinate to civilian authority. The boundary also appears in the reform demands with respect to civilian supremacy. In this respect, until 2004 Indonesia had experienced success with a total withdrawal of military representatives from parliament, which reiterated the neutrality of the military from politics. However, as an institution, the military still could not be supervised strictly by civilian government. Yudhoyono's two terms of presidency in 2004-2014 seemed to make progress in managing the military's internal conflict over the limits of military reform, including its political and economic dimensions (Sebastian, 2004; Honna, 2012; Sidel, 2015).

After Golkar decided to cut its structural relationship with the military, the military gained a bargaining position aimed directly at the civilian government. Military officers temporarily returned to the political arena by partnering with the political elite in order to secure national stability. The military entrance to the government was part of the civil authority's attempt to accommodate and maintain military interests, in order to control domestic security. For example, the function of the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs was entrusted to *purnawirawan*. In general, several other strategic ministries were often held by *purnawirawans*, such as those related to defense and security, government affairs, the state apparatus, and state intelligence to name a few.

Regarding Indonesia's case, civilian control was not determined solely by the strength of the civilian politicians and their ability to determine the course of military reform. Institutionally, the military was also often positioned as a dominant force, exposing the weakness of civilian control. This was the case, for example, in the closure of military businesses, giving greater power to the purchase of weapons, and maintaining territorial command system. The *purnawirawans* in political parties also played an important role, that of a mediator in negotiations and by their internalizing military reform –either through the involvement of high-ranking military officers in the office of the State or through parliamentary debates. It is noteworthy that the *purnawirawans* successfully participated in guarding the

legislation on the withdrawal of the military representatives from parliament in 2004.

In the context of the involvement of *purnawirawan* in politics, the civil-military relations in Indonesia during the period of transition were marked by efforts to negotiate the limits of military reform. This endeavor was based on respect for the civil administration to give freedom to the military institution to manage its own internal reform shortly after the withdrawal of military representation from parliament. In the next period, the arrangement of the party system and elections provided a platform for the retired military elite to engage in the development of political parties. They established new parties to compete in the election and used political channels to actualize their political interests. Although the military no longer dictated policy, no single president with civilian background could govern without military assistance. Pragmatic alliances are needed to secure the presidential election or to prevent military from hindering national policy. In other words, it has been necessary to give privileges for the military to organize its institutions (Rinakit, 2005).

Post-2004, the military reform process was showing concrete results. Military withdrawal from the national and local parliaments was the result of negotiations between the civilian government and military institutions. The success of control over the military suggested that the civilian government had the capacity to determine budgets, force levels, defense strategies and priorities, weapons acquisitions, and military curricula and doctrines. This implies that the national legislature must at least have the capacity to review these decisions and monitor their implementation. Military intervention in politics begins where the political institutions fail because civilian politicians and parties are weak and divided (Lee, 2000). In fact, the political leadership was weak in the period of transition and consolidation. In Indonesia until 2004, the military was aggressively involved in policy decisions, especially in the resolution of social conflicts and security problems domestically. However, military aggressiveness was not aimed at acquiring government positions, and did not intend to hijack national security. Consequently, there is a need to explain that the scale of aggressiveness was linked to the two aspects ⸻the internalization of military reform and the successful canalization of former military elites into political party and electoral contestation.

It is essential to examine the efforts to limit the expansion of military reform and the rising tide of civil-military relations caused by the fragmentation of the former military elites in the political power. It points to the important role of the *purnawirawan* actors involved in the political contest, as they could be called upon in order to maintain their influence in politics. This was done not in the context of the romance of the past power, but rather aimed at building political organizations

as a part of the distribution of political interest after their military service is over. Relationships built by *purnawirawans* with the military elite and civilian politicians are usually informal. This was still the case, despite the great benefits of maintaining a large stock of military families in the area of formal authority in politics, after removal from the parliament.

After *Reformasi* movement in 1998, the military proceeded with internal reform under public pressure. Although the process was gradual, the reform nevertheless showed reasonably concrete results. The reform proceeded in three steps. The first step was the withdrawal of military support for political parties, especially the immediate limitation of Golkar authorities (Suryadinata, 2007). The second step was the total withdrawal of TNI and police fraction representatives in the parliament up until 2004. The third was the institutionalization of reform within the military institution through fundamental changes to the military doctrine in order to gain a neutral position from the political process and to change from praetorian to professional soldiers (Mahroza, 2006:45).

As it was observed, the military's involvement in politics in the early period of democratic transition was still substantial. The number of military personnel who were members of the legislature at the national and local levels in 1999-2004 was around 1,244 people (Table 5). Of these, there were 36 General Officers at the House of Representatives in addition to two colonels. In Provincial Parliament there were 185 colonels and another eight at the Regency/City level. Lieutenant Colonels could be counted up with others at the same level scattered in Regency/City (Research and Development levels, *Kompas*, 5/10/2000).[7] The type of rank determined the level of military positions in public office. The hierarchy was designed to follow the chain of command of the military institution. Table 5 shows the military in the provincial legislature and the district/city in each instance is supplied by the regional military command where the province is located. One form was the withdrawal of the military reform members of parliament, and in 2004, a total of 1,047 active military members was pulled out of their posts, from the national to the local parliaments, and were given the option to return to the rank of military official or to resign from the military official rank with some 176 retirees being able to continue their tenure, thus completing their duties as legislators. Not every one of the total number chose to join a political party. Most of the parties only recruited middle-rank officers and senior officers. All members of the military in Parliament were controlled directly by the TNI headquarters in Jakarta. The TNI Commander

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[7] Those numbers were used by Crouch, Honna, Mietzner and Ufen. But there were other sources through which legislative mechanisms could absorb 1,290 TNI members in a local parliament (DPRD) or a regent/municipality. About 175 people were in provincial parliaments and 38 people in the DPR. The height of TNI personnel in 27 provinces in provincial government until 2004 was around 11, or 40.7 per cent.

issued decree number STR: STR/1064/2004 on June 28, 2004, concerning the assignment of FTNI/Police members in DPR and DPRD during the 1999-2004 period.

The military's involvement in politics was officially over since the enactment of Law 34/2004 on TNI, the formulation of which also involved the military. Chapter 39 of the Law prohibits members of the military from being involved in: a) the activities of a political party, b) practical political activity, c) business activity, and d) activities or being elected as members of the legislative elections and other political affairs. As the next step, internally, the TNI Commander issued Decree No. Kep/21/VI/2005 dated June 1, 2005 to liquidate the military staff of social communication. The involvement of other military members received attention from TNI headquarters, especially due to their participation in the elections following the adoption of Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government. In Article 59, Paragraph 5, the provision of opportunities for soldiers/military civil servants to participate in the elections is mentioned. The TNI Commander responded by issuing Decree No. STR/222/2005 dated February 13, 2005 concerning the provision of TNI members to be nominated in the elections. The most important part of the decree is Article 4, which confirms the attitude of military neutrality in the elections, including no military involvement in any form of a series of elections. Active military members did not participate in any campaign nor provide assistance to the candidates of the military. They are not allowed from leaving a comment or directives related to winning a seat and are prohibited from placing campaign materials to military installations and the military leadership of the local area.[8]

Table 5: Military Officer in National and Local Parliament 1999 to 2004

No	Military Institution	Number	Details Active	Pre-Retirement	Retirement
1	DPR RI	33	10	-	23
2	Iskandar Muda Territorial Command	66	53	-	13
3	Bukit Barisan Territorial Command	212	173	21	18
4	Sriwijaya Territorial Command	178	163	-	15
5	Siliwangi Territorial Command	118	92	-	26
6	Diponegoro Territorial Command	183	161	-	22
7	Brawijaya Territorial Command	186	186	-	-

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[8] TNI Commander Decree No. STR/222/2005 dated 13 February 2005 followed with technical guidance through JUKLAK/3/VII/2005 dated 21 July 2005 on head local election for TNI/civilian corps in TNI.

8	Tanjungpura Territorial Command	103	72	-	31
9	Wirabuana Territorial Command	153	126	-	27
10	Udayana Territorial Command	132	132	-	-
11	Pattimura Territorial Command	29	25	-	4
12	Trikora Territorial Command	34	27	-	7
13	Jakarta Territorial Command	34	24	-	10
	TOTAL	1244	1047	21	176

*) Source: TNI Headquarters

The TNI's "new paradigm" as the result of military reform consisted of the withdrawal from political activity, the withdrawal of military officers from administration and bureaucracy of civil government, the separation of the police from the military, and the military neutrality in elections (Rinakit, 2005; Sukma, 2003). An emphasis on professional soldiers can be observed in the changes in military doctrine of *Catur Dharma Eka Karma* (translated to "Four Noble Works for A Great Purpose") to *Tri Dharma Eka Karma* ("Three Noble Works for A Great Purpose"). The changes were significant in two respects: First, it obliged TNI to work towards force projection strategies with "deterrence" and "denial" capabilities as key objectives to defend state sovereignty, as well as to maintain territorial integrity against foreign and domestic threats. Second, it omitted militia training, law enforcement, and the maintenance of public order missions.[9]

Military representation in the parliament had an impact on military reform because its existence determined the issuance of law (Ruland & Manea, 2013). The period of 1998 to 2004 was the early period of the military reforms undertaken during the regimes of President Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati respectively. The military no longer had a strategic position and were not a solid representation of the military, preferring to work as independent legislators in parliament without much intervention from the military institution. This became one of the factors leading to the relatively smooth military reform process in parliament. On the other hand, the lack of military influence in the policy-making process in the parliament during this period had invited *purnawirawans*, who had been members of TNI/Police faction, tried to retain its influence. This particularly concerned the sensitive issues of national defense and national unity. *Purnawirawans* were present in Golkar, but they became an integral part of the engine driving all political parties, through formal positions inside the latter, or via organization inside party wings. If they were not active in Golkar, they still had vehicles such as retired military organizations: *Pepabri* (*Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI*) or the Family of Armed Forces, *KBA*

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[9] TNI commander decree No. 21/I/2007 on TNI Doctrine *Tri Dharma Eka Karma*.

(*Keluarga Besar ABRI*), containing either retired or active members. However, these organizations were politically weak.

3.3 Party System and Party Performance in Democratic Indonesia[10]

Before we enter the discussion of the role of *purnawirawan* in party development and their control of the central office, there should be an elucidation of the conditions revolving around political parties in the newly democratic Indonesia. According to Webb and White (2007), three party dimensions are serving as the basic requirements for assessing the effectiveness of the political and party system spectrums in a new democracy, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. The first is the dimension of party connections with its electorates. The second is the development of party organization, which considers the strong component of the organization. The third dimension is party performance, which embraces the systematic function of political parties. The dissertation is going to examine Indonesian party system dynamics since the 1999 election from these three dimensions.

Since the elections in 1999 to 2014, the major Indonesian political parties examined had never had more than 25% number of votes nationally and never had the majority vote in the parliament. In terms of the average number of votes, there was a significant gap between the parties that earned the most votes and the ones who gained the least, resulting in a higher number of middle-tier parties. In the 2009 election, the Democratic Party won more than 20% of votes whilst PDI-P and Golkar had to share votes and came up as the major electoral winners.

The immediate cause of the political fragmentation was not the ever-increasing number of small political parties or splinter groups, but rather the decline of the previously dominant parties and the increase in the amount of the mid-sized ones. Consequently, the increased electoral threshold did not have much effect on party fragmentation because the new threshold was too high, given the already fragmented structure (Choi, 2010).

Three index measurements are employed to examine the party system characteristics and performance which depart from different dependent variables. The effective number of parties in parliament (ENPP) is calculated as the party seat share in legislature (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) and is described as follows:

$$N = \cfrac{1}{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2}$$

Where,

N: Effective Number of Parties in Parliament (ENPP)
si: percentage of seats acquisition by each political party in parliament

Properties of the party system through Pedersen Index and Rae Index for structures of party system can also be measured by the degree of volatility and fragmentation indices. Volatility denotes the attitude and consistency in selecting the party's voters in the election while the fragmentation aims to measure the number of political parties in the party system. According to Rae, fragmentation, which measures party number and size, is *the proportion of pairs of members in a system which contains persons who have voted for (or belonged to) different parties in the last previous election* (Rae, 1968 in Aminuddin, 2016). Therefore:

$$F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2$$

Where,

F: fragmentation index
si: percentage of seats in parliament

Another way of presenting party's strength is using Pedersen Volatility Index, which reflects the change in the share of votes (or seats) per party per election (Pedersen, 1979 in Aminuddin, 2016), which computes as:

$$V = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}|$$

Where,

pi, t: party votes in the election
pi, t-1: party votes in the previous election

Table 6: Variables in Party System from the 1999-2004 Elections*)

	Electoral Volatility	Fragmentation Index (Rae)	ENPP
1999		0.788	5.1
2004	31.22%	0.859	9.6
2009	32.01%	0.839	8.6
2014	28.78%	0.877	8.7

Source: Calculation by author based on election results. See also Aminuddin (2016)
*) for detail of party vote and parliamentary seat obtained, see Appendix

Table 6 reflects the calculation of party variables in the three measurements. In the 1999 election, 21 parties gained parliamentary seats with 5.1 ENPP while in the 2004 election, although the number of parties involved was less than 17, the ENPP was significantly higher. Departing from Coppedge's (1998) perspective, Indonesian party system, therefore, was moderate in 1999 and 2004 it was more on the extreme spectrum. The degree of fragmentation of the parliament in 2004 was 0.859 and the number was 0.839. These measures were higher than the parliament in 1999, which only reached 0.788 although the number of political parties in the House of Representatives that year was much higher than that in 2004, 2009, and 2014.

Table 6 also shows that the volatility in the election from 1999 to 2009 reached 31.22%. This high volatility may express the weakness of both party rooting in the society and party institutionalization as well as the lack of loyalty to the party. This is general finding for first post-founding elections in new democracies. The results in volatility become important seen from the perspective of party system stabilization and its level of institutionalization. Among the factors causing high and low volatility may lie in the consolidation of the elites that move the wheels of party organization or such external factors as the on-going formation of the government or government support coming from a party with a poor performance. In general, the factors that tend to degrade the image of the party in the eyes of the public have a direct impact to the emergence of a negative campaign against the party itself (Mair, 1996). In Indonesia's case, from both 1999 and 2014 elections, the highest total volatility (32.01%) was found in the period of 2004-2009. The number never declined below 20%, proving that there was a serious problem with all the major parties associated with party institutionalization and support.

The argument was proven legitimate in the 1999 election in which the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) adopted a simple multi-party system with 5.1 points. Political fragmentation was low at 0.788 points. In fact, this period was an opportunity to build a stable coalition government. PDI-P as the winner of the election happened to possess the highest number of *purnawirawan* membership, most of whom had a seat in the parliament. Nevertheless, the strong

dominance of Golkar-ian *purnawirawan* made it difficult to have a coalition winner of the election. The classical problem of *factional difference* lurked between the two parties.

The determination of electoral threshold above 1% for a national vote could have been examined had the Democratic Party won the 2004 election and Golkar the 2009. Both elections clearly showed the stability of the party system. Volatility was still high, but this was due to major parties competing for swing voters that predominantly consisted of urban voters with relatively higher education level.

On the other side, polarization and fragmentation variables are unlikely to yield a high discrepancy. Quite interestingly, several phenomena exhibited sharp differences regarding ENPP. In the 2004 election, ENPP reached 9.6 points, compared to 8.6 in the 2009 election. The explanation for this is that after the 2004 election, many new parties were a combination of parties that had gained few or no seat in the parliament. Thus, the votes gained by each party were relatively stable, however evenly spread with the additional votes for intermediate parties. In general, the party system in Indonesia during the post-*reformasi* era as reflected in the four elections analyzed here had the average ENPP of 8 points, and thus the system is categorized as a *moderate-high multi-party system*. *Purnawirawan* would then be motivated to join a party that gained high votes, whereas the opportunity to create new parties slimmed down.

The second dimension of political party examines party financing and staffing. In this context, the details of parties' financial and staffing process in terms of the nominal amount of their financial statements will be spared. Instead, we will analyze the report and financial audit carried out by the Election Commission (KPU) and Finance Inspection Board (BPK). The finance in a party is a crucial issue in building party accountability. This general perspective becomes relevant considering the change of party financing under New Order government, which injected huge subsidies to political parties and to Golkar in particular. Post-*reformasi*, parties had to obtain their own sources of funding since state subsidies were limited. Hence, parties typically tended to rely on funding from MPs and cadres who were in public offices in the executive level (Mietzner, 2007). The assessment of regulations on party financing conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) observes several categories including prohibition and restriction of private incomes, regulations on public funding, regulations on the use of party funds, reporting mechanisms, and sanctions (IDEA Political Finance Report, 2012). These regulations narrow down party funding to come from members' incomes, non-binding donations, and state subsidy which is determined based on the number of obtained seats in the parliament.

Table 7: Transparency Index by Party[11]

Political Party	Information (mandatory to provide)	Information (mandatory to publish)	Information (mandatory reporting to the state)	Overall Score
Gerindra	3.50	3.88	4.00	3.74
PAN	3.47	3.50	4.00	3.64
PDI-P	3.67	1.00	4.00	3.10
Hanura	2.14	1.00	4.00	2.41
PKB	2.13	1.00	3.67	2.31

Scoring used: **1**: no information, **2**: incomplete information <50%, **3**: incomplete information >50%, **4**: complete information

Source: Transparency International Indonesia Report, 2013

Based on Transparency International Indonesia report in 2013 as shown in Table 7, only five parties completed the questionnaire –four of them provided complete financial information to the mandatory state report, which is sent to Elections Commission for administrative requirements and the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia in order to audit state subsidy funds to each party. However, none of the parties provided all mandatory information required as most of the information was partial and there was not even widespread publicity (*Kompas*, March 12, 2015) –this information reflects the lack of financial transparency among political parties in Indonesia. Gerindra, led by *purnawirawan*, performed with the highest score due to the party's most transparent financial statement. It was also the only party in question that submitted financial audit reports for publication (*Kompas*, April 16, 2013). The party's audit report has also revealed that government funds are typically spent for political education of cadres and

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[11] The survey was conducted by Transparency International Indonesia in cooperation with the Central Information Commission (*Komisi Informasi Pusat*) to measure the level of transparency of party finances. The survey was conducted from June 2012 to April 2013. The data was collected through several ways, such as: a questionnaire with in-depth interviews conducted to party officials in the DPP related to party finances, examination of party financial statements and Party Constitution. In the questionnaire, 27 questions were asked regarding the Accessible Information (15 questions), Information Publicly (8 questions), and information reported to the Government (4 questions). Each answer and its completeness will get a score of 1 (if information is not available at all); score 2 (if information is available, but not complete or less than 50%); score 3 (if information is available but not more than 50% complete); and score 4 (if the required information is complete). In terms of scoring and data analysis, the proportion is 45% for the accessible information (15 questions); 25% for information publicly (8 questions); 30% for information reported to the government (4 questions). All the data collected analyzed according to the criteria of weighting that have been determined and presented in the form of index 1-4 at each point question. See the details on <http://www.ti.or.id/index.php/publication/2013/04/16/peluncuran-indeks-transparansi-pendanaan-partai-politik >

operational costs at the national secretariat (IDEA Political Finance Report, 2012; Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia Report, 2010). In contrast, the Democrat Party came across as a non-cooperating party as they did not allow public access to its financial budget.

Thomas Reuter suggests three models of party financing from private funding to understand the financial conditions of a party. These models are, however, difficult to detect as funds are generally used directly to finance the election campaign. The first category is privately owned party, referring to the parties founded by the political elite in order to serve its political interests –as is the case with Gerindra, Nasdem, and Hanura. Financing of parties is often supported by private funds. The second category pertains party rental vehicle category used as a political vehicle of ruling elite –for example, Golkar. Party power holders use this kind of funding to finance the organization of the party for office functioning until the election. The third category is heritage parties, such as PDI-P, which uses a political dynasty as a source of funding, in this case, the family of Taufik Kiemas, Megawati's husband (Reuter, 2005).

In analyzing the third dimension (party performance), the electoral success variable is necessary to comprehend the trends in *purnawirawan's* party diaspora and displacement. It also includes the products of government regulations involving the parliament. The regulations made from 1999 to 2004 can be classified by the scope of the economic, social, political, and regional governance, as well as security and military involvement. In addition, as a means of attaining an overview of the performance of the party in the parliament in general, the dissertation also assesses the scale of priorities of issues in the process of establishing legislation.

From Table 5, it is evident that the military still had representation in the parliament from the 1999 election, which means that military's political interests could be represented. Nevertheless, *purnawirawan* began to join parties controlled by civilians –such as PDI-P, PKB, PAN, and PPP– or controlled by a combination of *purnawirawan* and civilian –such as Golkar. In the parliament, *purnawirawan* qualified in the elections mainly came from PDI-P and Golkar, as both parties were the mouthpiece of the actual *purnawirawan* interests. It was apparent from their role that *purnawirawan* from PDI-P functioned as active actors in the legislation. Golkar was closer to the military/police faction in the parliament, therefore legislation to optimizing the political agenda of their MPs met the military's interests.

Other parties obtained various numbers of seats in the parliament. The most were achieved by the Democratic Party with 57 seats. In the 2009 election, two emerging parties, Gerindra and Hanura, also posted good results with the acquisition of each 26 and 17 seats each in the parliament while Democratic won

148 seats. In the 2014 election, the number of Democratic seats drastically declined while other parties, such as Gerindra, managed to acquire additional seats of 73 and the new party Nasdem gained 35 seats. The rest, such as PKPB and *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia* (PKPI, Indonesian Justice and Unity Party) got one and two seats each respectively.

Table 8: Electoral Success by Parties

1999 Election			2004 Election			2009 Election			2014 Election		
Party	Vote	Seat	Party	Vote	Seat	Party	Vote	Seat	Party	Vote	Seat
PKU	0.28%	1	PNI	0.81%	1	Hanura	3.77%	17	Nasdem	6.81%	35
PPP	10.71%	58	PBB	2.62%	11	Gerindra	4.46%	26	PKB	9.16%	47
PSI Indonesia	0.36%	1	PPP	8.15%	58	PKS	7.88%	57	PKS	6.88%	40
PDI-P	33.74%	153	PDK	1.16%	5	PAN	6.01%	46	PDI-P	19.20%	109
PDKB	0.52%	5	PNBK	1.08%	1	PKB	4.94%	28	Golkar	14.95%	73
PAN	7.12%	34	Democratic Party	7.45%	57	Golkar	14.45%	106	Gerindra	11.975	73
PPII Masyumi	0.43%	1	PKPI	1.26%	1	PPP	5.32%	38	Democratic Party	10.32%	61
PBB	1.94%	13	PPDI	0.75%	1	PDI-P	14.03%	94	PAN	7.69%	49
Partai Keadilan	1.36%	7	PAN	6.44%	52	Democrat Party	20.85%	148	PPP	6.61%	39
PNU	0.64%	5	PKPB	2.11%	2				Hanura	5.33%	16
PNI-Front Marhaenis	0.35%	1	PKB	10.57%	52						
IPKI	0.31%	1	PKS	7.34%	45						
PNI-Massa Marhaen	0.33%	1	PBR	2.44%	12						
PDI	0.33%	2	PDI-P	18.53%	109						
Golkar	22.44%	120	PDS	2.13%	12						
Partai Persatuan	.62%	1	Golkar	21.58%	128						
PKB	12.51%	51	Pelopor	0.77%	22						
PDR	0.40%	2									
PKP	1.01%	4									
PBTI	0.34%	1									
TOTAL		462			550			560			560

Source: Compilation from official releases by the Election Commission from the 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections

How cohesive was each faction in the parliament? It is important to make sure that the volume of the parties' influence in the parliament is controlled through factions. This reveals the extent of support for the executive government in the parliament. Voting was introduced in the House of Representatives in 2004. However, there has been no official record that can be accessed related to the number of decisions taken by voting. A voting at the commission level is carried out to elect the corresponding executive officers in accordance with the commission's work, and a parliamentary voting was followed by all MPs. A final voting decides on important decisions, such as the Constitution Act and other matters related to the issue of responsibility of the parliament.

The cohesiveness of the party in the parliament is measurable by the Agreement Index (AI) and Rice Index (RI). RI measures party unity using data on those voting "Yes" and "No" (%Yes-%No) and reliance on roll-call votes (Scarrow, Poguntke, Webb, 2017:291). RI ranges from 0 (completely divided) to 100 (perfectly cohesive) (Muller & Saalfeld eds, 2013:50). The RI calculation is used extensively to measure party cohesiveness in parliament by including "Yes" and "No" options and ignoring "abstention" options. The problem with RI is that it does not work when parliamentarians have three voting options, as in the case of the European Union Parliament. To solve this problem, scholars developed the Agreement Index (AI) as an alternative to RI which employs three voting options, as it takes all three voting choices into account and yields the cohesion scores on a scale from 0 to 1 (Hix, Noury, Roland, 2007:92).

The variables in AI consist of Yi denoting the number of "Yes" votes expressed by group i on a given note, Ni for the "No"s, an Ai for the number of "Abstained" votes. AI equals 1 when all members of a party vote together and equals 0 when the party members are equally divided between the three voting options (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005: 209-34 & 215-2016). AI acknowledges the Abstained votes while RI does not include this variable. RI is rather measured based on the proportion of the group's reduced votes from the majority and minority groups (Hazan, 2013: 67; Martin, Saalfeld and Strøm, 2014: 223-24).

In the Indonesian context, the comparison of RI and AI results reflects the cohesiveness of the factions in parliament. Indonesian parliament is filled by elected political party members through legislative elections. In the parliament, there are factions (*fraksi*) representing a single political party or a coalition of political parties formed to meet the minimum requirement for the establishment of a faction in parliament. Large parties have their own factions while smaller parties have to merge to form one faction. The factions become an extension to the political party strategic policy in the parliament. All party policies related to the discussion of

legislation, lobby, and negotiation to passing the law are conducted through their faction.

Observations have shown that Indonesian parliament, in terms of a coalition building, does not possess a clear structure; therefore, the basis for assessing the coalition is a coalition of parties in the nomination of the President. Even in the parliament, it is possible that the coalition could disintegrate. The following assessment presents the Rice Index for each voting faction in the parliament in order to assess the level of cohesiveness of Agreement Index and Rice Index in each issue of the sampled period in different parliamentary administrations.

Table 9 shows that the variation of party cohesiveness was evident in each period of parliamentary administration. In the six laws observed there are four things to analyze. First, in the laws of *NatBud*, *CenturyCase*, and *SocOrg* in 2013; the AI and RI values show full cohesiveness. This demonstrates the success of a coalition party led by a Democratic Party in organizing support from parliamentary factions. Second, in the case of *EvList* 2009, there are two parties that had low cohesiveness such as PKB and PDS. Both parties were supporters of President Abdurrahman Wahid, to be replaced by Megawati who was backed by a strong parliamentary support from PDI-P. Third, in *ELAw* 2009, the fractional cohesiveness decreased significantly. The debate over the election law is considered detrimental to small and medium-sized parties such as the factions of BPD, PDS, PPP and Democrats. Four, in *LocEl* 2014, only Democratic Party had lower cohesiveness in addition to the weakening of the party's dominance as it did not benefit from the votes in 2014 election.

With respect to AI variable, an interesting question arises: why is the AI score during the 2004-2009 period lower than that of the rest? The phenomenon may not have been caused by the type of issues raised in the voting since a high AI was identified in other periods. The most probable explanation to this outcome was the heterogeneity of the political forces in the parliament in 2004-2009 and the weak majority support to presidential powers. Major parties –such as PKB, PPP, and Golkar– became the factions in the parliament that had a low level of group cohesiveness. A voting by *ELaw* in 2009 resulted in Golkar being the fraction with the lowest cohesiveness level. This could have been caused by the disintegration due to Wiranto's loss in the 2004 presidential election. In addition, at that time, Jusuf Kalla did not garner full support from MPs in Golkar. As the majority party that gained 21% of the votes in the election that year, Golkar's bargaining position against Yudhoyono-Kalla administration was very high. This condition was not found in the period between 2009 and 2014, in which Golkar decided to join the Democratic Party in the grand coalition in the parliament. The impact was the jump in AI of the period. In the current 2014-2019 period, Golkar is experiencing the same

issues as it did in 2004-2009, that is, AI = 0 and RI = 73.81%. In 2014, however, Golkar suffered from an internal split in which the faction of Chairman Aburizal Bakrie supported Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa while another faction led by Luhut Panjaitan supported Joko Widodo-Kalla.

Based on these observations, this research argues that the size of AI and RI is not affected by different perceptions of MPs and factions in perceiving policy issues that become the subject of voting. The most dominant factor seemed to be the unresolved issues in the previous political events regarding the internal party support in the presidential election. The faction authority was very decisive, and decisions were rarely taken through voting. A faction may have easily expressed party interest in accordance with the instructions of party authorities through horizontal intervention.

As Golkar showed a low level of cohesiveness, it was not the case with the Democratic Party, PDI-P, and Gerindra. In these three parties, the factions had a full representation that chose and implemented strategies from policy debate to decision-making in the parliament. This further proves that the effective party control lies in central leadership, which controls the party's political agendas through factions in the parliament. Another factor leading to MPs rarely having a voice different from that of the faction may be the threat of sanctions by party leaders. In certain party culture, having a different vote from the what the faction decided could result in dismissal as a Member of Parliament, and the party leader has the rights to withdraw party members for party discipline violation.

Table 9: Party group[12] Cohesiveness in the Parliament

Fraction	EVList 2009		ELaw 2009		NatBud 2013		Century Case 2013		SocOrg 2013		LocEl 2014	
	AI	RI	AI	RI	AI	RI	AI	RI	AI	RI	AI	RI
Hanura					1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
Gerindra					1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
PKB	0.65	88.23	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
PPP	1	100	0.82	83.33	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
PAN	1	100	0	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
PKS	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
PDIP	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
Golkar	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100	1	100
Democratic Party	1	100	0.72	83.33	1	100	1	100	1	100	0	73.81
BPD	1	100	0.5	60								
PBR	1	100	1	100								
PDS	0	33.33	0	100								
Mean	0.86	92.15	0.7	92.6	1	100	1	100	1	100	0.88	97.09

Source: See Aminuddin (2016) Calculation by the author, compiled from the official page of DPR at www.dpr.go.id

Notes: **EVList**: Electoral Voter List (*Hak Angket Daftar Pemilih* 2009), **ELaw**: Electoral Law (*Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Pemilu* 2009), **NatBud**: National Budget on Oil Price (Change of UU No. 19/2012 on APBN 2013), **SocOrg**: Society Organization (*Rancangan Undang-Undang Organisasi Masyarakat* 2013), **LocEl**: Local Election (*Rancangan Undang-Undang Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung* 2014)

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[12] Indonesian term "Fraksi" or Fraction is similar with party group

In general, a presidential multi-party system, as is the case in Indonesia, can produce a relatively high level of party cohesion. In a sample of voting on important issues for this study, the lowest mean AI was 0.7, and the RI was 92.6%. Despite this, the AI and RI values may vary when calculated based on groupings of factions on each issue that becomes the subject of voting.

Table 10: Number of Bills Passed to Law

Legislation Issue	Period		
	1998-2004	*2004-2009*	*2009-2014*
Economy	28	19	12
Social & Welfare	5	1	6
Politics	9	10	10
Human Rights	17	6	4
Law	27	20	22
Government	95	64	21
Military	3	6	4
Press	2	0	0
Security	5	4	4
Others	28	48	54
Technical	24	15	19
Total	243	193	179

Source: Compilation by author from Parliament Official Reports 1998 to 2014, www.dpr.go.id

Notes:

Economy: trading, tax, monetary, industry

Social and Welfare: social organization, conflict, prosperity

Politics: election, political party, local election, national bureaucracy

Human Rights: women, children, labor

Law: courts, international law, penal code, judiciary

Government: national and local government related with accounting, new government administration

Military: courts, discipline, defense agreement, armaments, industry

Press: mass media

Security: intelligence, anti-terrorism, domestic security

Others: education, health, disaster management, tourism

Technical: annual national budget

Table 10 shows the level of productivity in the period of administration in the parliament. The 1999-2004 period was characterized by high productivity level with 243 results. In addition, during the 2004-2009 period, there were as many as 193 legislation products. This difference was caused by the performance of MPs in each period. When the category type of legislation is analyzed, it appears that the legislation on government, law, and economy was predominant, followed by the legislation on politics, military, and security. These categories are marked as non-technical legislation because they depart from public strategies issues. On the other hand, technical legislation was diverse and included, for example, the State budget.

Non-technical categories, such as education, health, disaster management, and tourism, also had sizable amounts. Finally, analysis of legislations related to the *purnawirawan*'s interest and in the context of their political interests must include the type and content of legislation in the categories of military, security, and human rights.

During the 1999-2004 period, PDI-P had the largest number of *purnawirawan* in the parliament. In addition, PDI-P had the majority of seats as it obtained the largest votes in the 1999 election. Under these circumstances, PDI-P played the dominant role in the discussion of legislation. The type of legislation most relevant in identifying the relationship between the interests of *purnawirawan* with militaristic values within political organizations was related to human rights issues, the military, and security. Between 1999 and 2004, there were 17 recorded legislations related to human right issues, two on the military, and five on security. Compared to the 2004-2009 period, only the military legislation was more frequent (an additional six legislations).

However, the numbers were declining during the next period of 2004-2009. This observation shows that during the democratic transition there was an institutional arrangement that gave particular attention to all aspects. For example, the laws on human rights had two more bills than those relating to the military. Nevertheless, legislation on the military during this period was more substantial since it regulated the fundamentals of the separation of the military and police as well as the political neutrality of the military. Some laws that were sensitive included the Human Rights Court Law, the Law on National Defense, and Law on the TNI. On the other hand, in the next period, the laws set about structuring the organization and professional military devices, such as the armaments production.

From the assessment description of the party system and political party performance, four crucial facts deserve particular attention. First, in the dimensions of the connection to party electorates, electoral volatility was still relatively high. Political parties have failed in reforming stable infrastructure with strong political support. Consequently, the parties relied solely on the strength of the dominant leader for strengthening the organizational capacity. Parties tried to create a more centralized organizational hierarchy that reinforced oligarchy. Second, in terms of party development, the parties were not managed with good managerial systems and they lacked transparency.

In fact, the party machine worked in activating political support only during elections. As a result, important agendas aimed at strengthening organizational capacity, improving the recruitment system, regeneration, and selection of candidates did not function properly. In addition, in terms of party financing and

structuring, the various aspects of party organizations that demonstrated accountability of the parties were not managed properly. The implications of elites using the party as their political vehicles are noticeable in these problems. Third, the party dimension of performance, as measured by its performance in the parliament, has revealed differences in the horizontal control of the party factions in the parliament. In general, the level of party cohesiveness was high, except Golkar. Despite producing legislative products, this party was highly dependent on the performance of membership in the parliament in each period. Other factors, such as political coalition, did not have much impact on productivity since the horizontal control of the party in the government coalition parties had a relatively high degree on cohesion.

3.4 *Purnawirawan* Political Participation

Political parties post-1945 Independence and party contestation during New Order were showing a historically weak foundation for constructing accountable political parties, and many parties were lacking sufficient institutional capacities. Poor discipline and weak structure seemed to dominate party characteristics, except for the Indonesian Communist Party. Several major parties, such as Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), Nadhlatul Ulama Party (NU), and Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi), faced an on-going problem in their lower level organizational management (Lev, 2009: 23-24). Herbert Feith (2006), in his published work, described political parties in the 1950's as an organizational shamble in which party elites dominated politics using the party structure as merely a vehicle to join the bureaucracy. Cohesiveness was abysmally low, and each party was fragmented into various cliques. The party system failed to work properly; the failure led other state-function-governing institutions (such as professional groups, functional groups, and other community organizations) to weaken (Lev, 1967, 2009). They were incapable of gaining an independent position but were highly dependent on the government. The existing parties, even those who did not have the strongest national support, were still influential in some areas –these areas eventually became the basis of their support. Nevertheless, the New Order regime (1966-1990's) practically had castrated the parties.

After the fall of the regime, the democratic transition was faced with political parties which dwelt on internal problems that were yet to be addressed, namely: the parliament's poor track record, the high rate of corruption, and the lack of development for better formal institutions (Tomsa, 2010a). Johnson Tan (2002) argued that after the fall of Suharto, there was a certain antipathy towards political parties due to their widespread corruption and their disengagement from the general population, and thus had formed a separate layer from the society. The

parties were almost uniformly elite-led creations whose legitimacy was dissipating. This analysis notes especially that the model of corporatism was less common in the Indonesian parties. For instance, PDI-P and Golkar were categorized as catch-all parties (Ufen, 2008b). PDI-P was the largest party, embracing non-Muslim supporters and those who were not religious (LSI, 2008). Apart from the existing social and religious cleavages, the discussion of political parties could not be separated from the regional spectrum between the center and periphery in the distribution of votes in locally (Ananta et al., 2005). Golkar became the controlling party and it had a robust infrastructure outside Java, unlike either PKB with a strong presence in East Java or PDI-P's main base in Central Java (Liddle & Mujani, 2007). Although the bases of the parties could be mapped, post-New Order elections had shown the dynamics and shifting support for parties. For example, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, Golkar lost a significant number of votes in Sulawesi and Sumatera due to the rise of new parties in *reformasi* period. A high level of competition to reach constituency also occurred between PKB and PDI-P in East Java. The 1999 election resulted in 65% of MP's in this province were from Golkar, and 55.3% of PPP members inherited their positions from the party's constituency base under the New Order (King, 2003: 95).

Four laws have regulated political parties since 1998, namely Law No. 2/1999, Law No. 31/2002, Law No. 2/2008 and Law No. 2/2011 on the amendment of Law No. 2/2008. These regulations are intended to facilitate the creation of an organized political party which can manage a clear constituency base, enable the aggregation structure, and are organizationally accountable in issues ranging from human resources to self-financing. The implementation of the law was limited to administrative and technical matters that were less influential to the formation of the party system and to significantly improve the quality of the party. In fact, the opposite was true, and the party system de-institutionalization increased. A party that was less rooted in the community and its constituents would cause the widening gap of party votes in the 2004 election (Tomsa & Ufen, 2013).

Party structure was weak and relied heavily on high levels of personal leadership. The machine of the party did not work effectively under low internal discipline. Institutionally, the party was not well-established at the bottom level of the management board. The cases of direct local elections since 2005 have shown that the acceleration of the relationship between candidates and political parties was increasingly slow and the social barrier was blurred (Pratikno in Erb, et al, 2009: 25).

Party system after the reform was affected by the level of competition between the parties and the effects of the electoral law. Mietzner (2008) argued that post-Suharto political party system has developed centripetal dynamics that had

stabilized and perpetuated its structures. In his review of the position of political ideology of the parties competing after 1998, he found that most parties were either a central or catch-all party who used their constituency base solely for the purpose of winning elections. All political spectrums of the constituency base were accommodated within the party. He concludes that Indonesian party system was dominated by the three major political parties: Golkar, PDI-P, and the Democratic Party. Megawati's presidency in 2001-2004, where PDI-P emerged as a strong political party power, saw the shift to the *middle*, moving away from the prevailing populist and nationalist views; and flowed from polity, economic, and international relations considerations. Pragmatism, during the period, was considered necessary to keep the government wheels running well.

The identification and mapping of post-1999 parties based on their ideology was more complex. This is due to their unclear political orientation –that is, whether they should be categorized as center parties or by the terminology developed by Kircheimer (1966). Many of the currently existing parties have emerged in this period and had a variety of party principles. In official records, the ideological categorization –which refers to the ideology stated in party constitution– is limited since it does not reflect the characteristics of each party's ideological formulation. Some parties clearly stated that they adhered to *Pancasila*, but in reality, they have been representing more Muslim voters and advocating programs based on their Islamic platforms. The elites of such parties also had religious backgrounds and favored Islamic groups and interests. For instance, the National Awakening Party (PKB) was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid, who was the former executive chairman of NU. Similarly, National Mandate Party (PAN) was founded by Amien Rais, who was the former chairman of Muhammadiyah.

There were 48 political parties in the 1999 election. Ten parties formally used Islam as their platform, namely, Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party (KAMI), the Party of Muslims (PUI), New Masjumi Party, United Development Party (PPP), Syarikat Islam Indonesia Party (PSII), Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII 1905), Islamic Political Party of Indonesia (Masjumi), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), Justice and Unity Party (PKP). Two parties were based on Pancasila and Islam ─the Nahdlatul Ummah Party (PNU) and Community Awakening Party (PKU). The remaining 35 were parties with *Pancasila* as their ideology. A striking exception was found in the People's Democratic Party (PRD), which had a popular-social democratic ideology as its base (Profil Partai, 1999).

However, most parties chose to appear less ideological in their public trajectories as part of their strategy to obtain constituents. The parties positioned themselves as nationalists, pro-*Pancasila*, or combined the two ideologies simultaneously in their attempt to garner widespread support. This was a strategic

response after they observed that typical voters are no longer interested in ideology. The inception of PKS (formerly PK), for example, is obvious. In the beginning, PKS was one of the parties that called for the enforcement of Islamic law (Shihab & Nugroho, 2008) but in the 2004 and 2009 elections the party labeled itself as anti-corruption (Homayotsu, 2011; Machmudi, 2008). In fact, their electoral campaign featured gifts and expressions that were not Islamic but more popular, such as featuring the punk community. Similarly, The Democratic Party positioned itself as a nationalist-religious party at the beginning of its emergence in 2004. In addition, PDI-P and Golkar, which no longer positioned themselves purely as nationalist-secular parties but rather as religious nationalist parties, followed suit. This strategy was used until the 2009 election. Eight of the nine parties, except PPP which had a seat in the DPR, could be classified catch-all parties (Aminuddin, 2016:6).

Table 11: Electoral System in Post New Order Indonesia

Election year	Chamber Structure	Chamber names	Districts				Vote Methods	Electoral Threshold
			Number	*Type*	*Size*	*Total seats*		
1999	Unicameral	DPR	26			462	PR-Closed	None
			Total seats			MPR (620)		
2004	(soft) Bicameral	DPR DPD MPR	69		3 to 12	550	PR-open	3
			32		4	128	SNTV	
			Total seats			678		
2009	(soft) Bicameral	DPR DPD MPR	77		3 to 10	560	PR-open (most votes sequence)	2,5
			33		4	132	SNTV	
			Total seats			692		
2014	(soft) Bicameral	DPR DPD	77			560		3,5
			33			132	PR-Open (most votes sequence)	
			Total seats			692		

Source: compilation by author, based on the Commission on Election (KPU) election results and Law on Election. Taken from Aminuddin (2016)

There are three ways the election regulations affected *purnawirawans'* behavior in politics. First, the law on political parties fostered the establishment of new political parties. Law No. 2/1999 was followed by the establishment of new political parties to contest in elections and regulated several aspects on the management, verification, memberships, and other prerequisites that must be approved by party endorsement. That requirement secured the rights of parties to participate in elections. On top of this, Law No. 31/2002 demanded party verification and accountability to be more strict. Second, a law was passed to

regulate the electoral threshold in national elections, which became eliminated due to their low vote acquisition. To re-run in elections, these parties subsequently changed their names while keeping the old management in order to pass the verification and compete in the next elections. In addition, several parties chose to merge into one larger party. Thirdly, there was a law regulating presidential elections and direct gubernatorial and head of local government elections. Competition in the executive candidacy became tougher, pushing the *purnawirawan* who was not associated with a party to run independently. *Purnawirawan* polarization within the political parties and political competition in the legislative and executive elections was therefore affected by changes in the electoral system.

Based on Table 11 that tabulates the electoral system changes, this research will discuss the impact of regulatory changes and to what extent it affected the trend of *purnawirawan* political participation in political party and election, especially on the implementation of the electoral threshold since the 2004 election and the introduction of new vote conversion method.

Table 12, on the other hand, provides evidence and describes the rising tide of *purnawirawan* in political competitions as the result of the changes in the election regulation and electoral system. In the 1999 elections, the rate of participation was still 0.26% with only a small portion of *purnawirawan* ran as legislative candidates. *Purnawirawan* then advanced in candidacy, most came from PDI-P and parties established as splinters of Golkar. The military's simultaneous withdrawal from the parliament and other public offices in 2004 had attracted significant bearing to the increase of *purnawirawan* contesting in the elections. In the 2004 elections, for instance, the percentage of participation increased significantly to 19.85%. The same tendency was followed by the establishment of new parties by *purnawirawan*. In addition to personal motives, which had been the motivation behind *purnawirawan* involvement in politics, there was a boost from structural changes in the system and electoral rules. Likewise, other factors such as the lack of accountability of existing political parties are relevant –there was a tightening of the regulations of party establishment and enactment of new regulations that hampered small parties in the elections, such as the electoral threshold. In the 2009 elections, there was a sharp decline of *purnawirawan* participation to 8.76%. In addition, due to the tightening of the regulations, the application of the rules on direct local elections was far more attractive for *purnawirawan*.

In the 2014 elections, an increase of 15.72% was due to the reorganization of the established parties that supported *purnawirawans*, such as Demokrat, Nasdem, Hanura, and Gerindra. Within these parties, *purnawirawans* were accommodated and given wider space in the legislative candidate positions. A more detailed discussion to strengthen the argument relationship between changes in the

party system and elections to changes in political behavior *purnawirawan* will be made in the following chapter.

Between 2004-2009, following the enactment of the law on direct election for head of local governments, the number of *purnawirawans* for candidacy rose slightly. They expected to become members of the national parliament, as can be seen in their participation in the 2004 general elections. As a high number of *purnawirawans* failed to be elected Members of Parliament, they changed their orientation from legislative candidacy to other strategic positions, such as the head of local government. Unfortunately, a high number of *purnawirawans* lost most of these elections as well, and it was explicable from two important factors. Firstly, the public perception continued to perceive military leadership to be particularly threatening because of the trauma caused by the military regime during the New Order. Secondly, internal military reforms prohibited military commanders in all levels from using facilities, their authority and active military networks to support candidates, even though they were former military commanders.

Table 12: Purnawirawan in legislative election by year and branch

Election	Branch				
	Air Force	Army	Navy	Police	Total
1999	*0*	*1*	*0*	*1*	*2*
2004	*9*	*41*	*12*	*8*	*70*
2009	*3*	*24*	*2*	*4*	*33*
2014	*4*	*27*	*11*	*19*	*61*
Total	16	93	25	32	166

Source: MR Dataset. N=166 from 388

In Table 12, there are three interesting findings indicating that the level of political participation of *purnawirawans* was greatly influenced by changes in the election system. In the 1999 election, the participation was very low and only 2 candidates were. Although among those there were members who were already involved in a political party, especially Golkar and PDI-P, their nominations in elections by party was low. The rise of participation level could be explained with the power of TNI/Police in the parliament. After the complete withdrawal of the military from the politics in 2004, including the elimination of TNI/Police in the parliament, many *purnawirawan* ran for office through the new parties they founded. In 2004 election, 70 *purnawirawans* ran for legislative candidate. In general, the level of success in the elections was low, and it indicated *purnawirawan*'s interest to improve in the next elections in 2009. However, in the

2009 elections there was evidence that *purnawirawans'* electoral participation was low with 33 candidates, less than a half of the number in the 2004 general elections.

The disaster of reviews of their loss in the 2004 elections was another important factor. Even though the number of votes attracted was not sufficient in the 2004 general elections, it was proven that *purnawirawans* had good potential. The period of 2009-2014 was optimistic, nevertheless. The success of the Democratic Party from the elections of 2004 and of Yudhoyono for presidential office were influential factors explaining the rise of the number of *purnawirawans'* participation in party as board members and as candidates in elections. In addition, external factors of public perception of *purnawirawans* had changed, as could be seen by the poll done by *Kompas* in 2007, which reported that around 46.6% of respondents chose military figures for president, while 43.5% would rather choose civilian figures. This should be compared with the same poll by *Kompas* in 1998, in which 64.1% of respondents refused presidential candidates with military background. In the 2014 election, *purnawirawan* optimism arising from the success of Yudhoyono and his party as well as the establishment of new parties such as Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem, was followed by their increased political participation, resulting in the rise of purnawirawan candidates to 61.

3.5 Summary

This chapter summarizes three findings. First, from a review of the historical pattern of military politics before 1999, there is an important aspect that can be used to view as background for the political recruitment and participation of *purnawirawans* in the democratic political stage. The dual function of military doctrine still had deep roots among military officers who had important positions in the previous authoritarian regime. The officers sought to transform the implementation of this doctrine, even when they were no longer active in the military. Their retired military network was cultivated and used to mobilize constituents, developing new political parties, especially in structuring their organization and expanding their constituency base.

Second, military reform ran reciprocally between political intervention by civilian government and internal pressure from the military institution. There were significant impacts on the *purnawirawans'* decision to retain their political existence. In the early democratic transition period, *purnawirawans* were polarized into two camps: those who had joined political parties and those who had some success in parliamentary candidacy. The latter set up new parties to take advantage of the New Order's military networks, but this faction failed. *Purnawirawan* interaction with political parties elevated their level of adaptation to the dynamics of democracy. In the parties established after 2004, *purnawirawans* embraced

civilian politicians and various groups, including plural constituency bases and their new parties had clear signs to prove their democratic commitments.

Third, changes in the electoral and party systems also had an impact on the percentage of the *purnawirawan's* political participation. This can be recognized from their participation rate in candidacies, both in national and local election as well as in the executive offices at the national and local levels. The analysis on the historical and structural factors that drove the *purnawirawans'* involvement in politics in this chapter leads to an explanation on their role in party development and how they control the party's central offices.

The Development of Party Organization:
Role of *Purnawirawan* in the Central Party Offices

This chapter analyses the role of *purnawirawan* in party development and its organizations, with a particular focus on the "party in central office." The presented data from the *purnawirawan* dataset in Chapter 2 includes the frequency and distribution in political parties that will reveal the magnitude of their significance in party control in accordance with their positions in the leadership structure at each national board level. The dataset serves to describe the type of their party control, success as candidates and as elected-politician in public offices, and the time span in which the distribution and displacement occurred.

This chapter also contributes in at least two discussions. First, there is an exploration of *purnawirawan's* role in the party's central offices and how they contributed to party organization development which focuses on four major parties: PDI-P, Golkar, the Democrat Party (PD), and Gerindra. Two points will be explained, namely: 1) the role of *purnawirawan* in the central office of each of the four parties and how they achieved control of party management, and 2) *purnawirawan* division of roles in the central offices which demonstrates the unique characteristics of each political party. Secondly, I will see how the rise of such *purnawirawan* control within their respective political parties –with indications of each party's different internal dynamics– can be categorized into the type of organization that is a mixture of military discipline on the one hand and party orientation as a political force by democratic civilians on the other hand. The chapter also describes how *purnawirawan* utilized organizational authority to set their agenda –both vertically through the party hierarchy and horizontally through the intervention of party cadres in the parliament.

4.1 *Purnawirawan* Role in Party Development[13]

By 2004, the military reform had abolished the military representatives in the parliament. This was followed by full neutrality in elections and, consequently, the military had to cut its political network with Golkar. This was the first driving factor of the faltering military power. It was only in Golkar that *purnawirawan*, during their active service, enjoyed positions of a socio-political function with

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[13] Part of this sub-chapter also appear in Aminuddin, M. F. (2017). The Purnawirawan and Party Development in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, 1998–2014. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36*(2), 3-30.

themselves as the main supporters. The option to remain in Golkar may have been strategic since the party got a relatively stable number of votes. However, with the military's political channels in the parliament closed and distributed to other channels, some military factions including Suharto loyalists preferred to set up a new party as a political vehicle. A few other Generals continued their leadership in smaller parties they had established to garner the support of a large family of military individuals. Despite the reform, politics had become inseparable from the military. Even during their military training, they received education related to politics –although this was initially intended to stem communism. The military had an instinct to participate in politics, where through *reformasi*, every military leader freely entered any political party (interview with Akbar Tanjung, 30 June 2015).

In terms of political organization, there were shifts in organization model that are important to note. There are various analyses of how the New Order regime organized the military to control the political power through various social functions as previously described, and Golkar seemed to undergo a few changes. The party became more open when the military could not dominate control of the party (Tomsa, 2008: 73). Civilian political forces became stronger and their bargaining position was high. Military factions had to compete with civilian politicians for influence in the party. This of course caused the organization's strategy to become more developed. In addition, the party also has become very sensitive to demands from public pressure.

The *purnawirawan* were joined by other parties such as PDI-P, PPP, PAN, and numerous smaller parties in their attempts to fill the absence of expertise in the membership. Given their position as a supplement, the parties did not have a strategic position within the office or management. As a result, they could not move freely due to their inferior position. *Purnawirawan* would prefer a pragmatic attitude to make the party a political vehicle for advancing in elections, and in a party that has a traditional constituency base like PDI-P, *purnawirawan* electability was very high. This is because the party provided more space for them to take care of their party constituents' bases and a good number of votes can still be obtained in the next election. As long as they were able to maintain their position as the members of the parliament, they also played a strategic role in the formulation of legislation in the parliament.

In relation to the military elites' background and their fragmentation during the democratic transition period between 1998 and 2004, three phases driving *purnawirawan* diaspora in political parties could be identified; all concerning party construction and development. These phases focused only on the role of *purnawirawan* who either joined parties controlled by civilian politicians or established new political parties. An explanation of the construction phase of the

party includes a precondition that the antecedent factors, namely the pressure of structural and institutional changes that affected the behavior of actors and dynamics within the political parties, were followed by the consequences of the preconditions that led to the development phase of the party. Also, some other variables to explore are the typology of roles within the parties of retirees, survivability in elections, and the duration of their service in politics. These variables will strengthen the argument that constructs the parties' development phases.

The democratization period from 1998 to 2014 had resulted in three phases of party development with the involvement of *purnawirawan* that I explain in Table 13. I refer to the term "Joined Civilian Party" to distinguish the parties controlled by civilian politicians and those controlled by *purnawirawan*. Civilian-controlled parties had specific characteristics in which *purnawirawan* were recruited mainly to fill management positions within the party. Meanwhile, the other group of parties where *purnawirawan* held control was categorized into highly militarist parties (HMP), semi-militarist parties (SMP), and militarist parties (MP). Into these parties were *purnawirawan* able to inject military values, doctrines, and organizational models. All categories of the party also mobilized the large family of the active military members during elections, even if the parties no longer had a caretaker from active military officers as the Golkar-ian New Order. These parties shared three generic characteristics: strong military leadership, central office management dominated by *purnawirawan*, and party organization under *purnawirawan*. As a side note, it is worth noting that in some cases these parties had a direct relationship with a military organization based on a personal level network between *purnawirawan* and an active military commander.

A brief comparison to making the position of Indonesia's case to elaborate the model of party organization is needed. Mudde in his work (1996) argued that the militaristic party dimension is on the extreme right-wing spectrum. This kind of party is easily found in the interwar period and in the era in which traditional power prevails, such as in China with Kuomintang (Radek, 1932). The existence of parties belonging to the extreme right side in a democracy is strongly influenced by the political culture of the country, as in the cases of Turkey (Dagi, 2008) and Israel (Kimmerling, 1993; Eliezer, 1998). The situation in vulnerable countries during a political and military conflict also contributes to the strengthening of militarism within political parties. However, militarism can be minimized to some degree through political actors capable of maintaining complete civilian control over politics in countries transitioning to democracy. When the involved military actors have direct control of a political organization, they bolster the inclusion of militaristic aspects, values, doctrines, and organizations. In Indonesia's case, the

pivotal political actors were not active military officers but the *purnawirawan* who utilized their military network and brought their political ambitions, carrying the mindset of the military organization into political parties.

In Indonesia, the phases of party development could be delineated in three stages (1998-2004, 2004-2008, and 2008-2014) starting with two essential preconditions as the major contributing factors to the following period: the abolition of dual function military doctrine and the termination of Golkar's ties with the military. Further institutional changes had caused *purnawirawan*, including Suharto's loyalists, to found a party of HMP type with certain characteristics: *purnawirawan* as the founders and power holders dominated the party's central committee, placing loyalists in the office of executive structure responsible for the daily control of the party and complete dominance of the structure of the party. The circumstances during this early phase drove many *purnawirawan* to join the parties controlled by civilian politicians. In these parties, *purnawirawan* were recruited based on their ideology and cadre loyalty from their usual position as the party's executive management. An exception to this treatment was Golkar –with their historical ties with the military, *purnawirawan* were given more strategic positions, such as Secretary-General.

Some military exponents were not accommodated within Golkar since they failed to gain internal support for the party and supported the New Order during the transition period. Following the failure of the former Armed Forces Commander Gen. Edi Sudrajat in his nomination as the Chairman of Golkar to Akbar Tanjung in 1998, a political faction in Golkar then split from the party and Gen. Rudini emerged as the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors in the new faction established as *Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong* (MKGR, Family Spirit Mutual Cooperation Consultative Party) (*Forum*, April 5, 1999).

Table 13: Development of Party Organization by Purnawirawan

Characteristic	Phase I		Phase II		Phase III
Pre-Condition	Post-authoritarian condition with *Reformasi* movement a. Abolition of dual function of military doctrine b. Termination of Golkar from military ties		Democratic Transition a. Elimination of military representative position in parliament b. Issuance of military act (Undang-undang TNI 2004) as professional soldier		Democratization Settlement a. Issuance of Act related to direct presidential election and electoral system b. Establishment of Constitutional Court
Purnawirawan Diaspora	*Build Highly Militarist Party (HMP)*	*Join Civilian Party (CP)*	*Build Semi-Militarist Party (SMP)*	*Join Civilian Party*	*Build Militarist Party (MP)*
Purnawirawan Role in Party	a. Founder b. Chairman on Executive Board c. Full domination of another board	a. Recruitment by ideological loyalty b. Ordinary member on national board c. Has partial control on executive board as general secretary	a. Founder b. Partial control on executive board as chairman and general secretary c. Dominant on highest board	a. Recruitment for public office candidacy b. Ordinary member on board	a. Full domination in highest board b. Partial control in Executive Board as Vice-Chairman c. Control over party bodies and party wings organization
Survivability	Failed a. Traumatic factor with previous military regime b. Electoral threshold 2.5 % in national vote c. Merger or regrouping with other party of same type	Survive a. Engagement in party elites' circulation b. Success in public office candidacy	Success a. Successful in election with total votes beyond electoral threshold b. Military-moderate figure recruitment c. Introduction of civilian politician exponent in strategic position	Decline a. Pressed by domination of civilian politicians b. Expertise in defence and intelligence policy no longer needed by party	Success a. Military-moderate figures considered as equivocal in their leadership b. Combination of military discipline and popular democratic vision by civilian politicians
Time Period	1998–2004		2004–2008		2008–2014
Party Name	HMP: (PKPB, PPN, PKPI, PDK) CP: (PPP, Golkar, PBB, PAN, PKB, PDIP)		SMP: (Democrat, Hanura) CP: (PDIP, Golkar)		MP: (Gerindra), CP: (Nasdem)
Prominent purnawirawan figure	HMP: (Gen. (ret.) Hartono, Gen. (ret) Edi Sudrajat). CP: (Maj. Gen. Theo Sjafei, Lt.-Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, Gen. Budi Harsono)		SMP: (Lt. Gen. (ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Gen. (ret.) Wiranto) CP: (Gen. AM Hendropriyono, Lt.-Gen. Sumarsono)		MP: (Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto), CP: (Gen. (ret) Endriartono Sutarto)

Source: Developed by the author. See also Aminuddin (2017)

When Golkar came under the leadership of Akbar Tanjung, the party massively reduced the influence and presence of the military component in the party decision-making process. The pressure from *reformasi* to disband Golkar had become a severe threat to its existence and future. Golkar's policies under Akbar Tanjung worsened the ties with the military and cleaned out the influence of the New Order loyalists. Nevertheless, this was a strategic move to prove to the public that Golkar was not anti-*reformasi*. A few *purnawirawan* who still held positions on the party's board, due to their previous background in political and social functions, no longer held strategic positions and only served as the consultative board maintaining political communication between the party and military representatives in the parliament.

Regarding affiliation with interest groups, especially Islamic factions and nationalists, *purnawirawan* joined parties by their ideology. The choice for nationalists was PDI-P while Islamic factions joined PPP and PAN. The positions they obtained varied, but in general PDI-P *purnawirawan* found it easier to get public office positions as members of the parliament and could enter the elite circle of the party due to their personal ties with the party leaders. Meanwhile, *purnawirawan* in Islamic-based parties found it more difficult to enter the elite circle of the party and did not have machinery support. Consequently, their involvement in the parties did not last long. Several figures also incorporated into the government appointment in public office as a representation of the military institution. During in office, they build a new political support. It was reflected in the establishment of the Democratic Party by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Hanura Party by Wiranto.

During the transition, the military was given a quota in the ministries. This was an informal consensual arrangement. Yet after 2004, circumstances shifted since the military no longer sent representatives to sit in the cabinet. *Purnawirawan* who had sat as ministers during the transition period had an extended opportunity to build networks with civilian groups and utilized the connection to form a political force that would be useful for the parties they founded. The Democratic Party and Hanura were the ones that combined the moderate-military leadership model, with party organization being managed through the involvement of civilian political groups.

Purnawirawan-led parties survived and thrived only when they were founded after 2004. The Democratic Party was able to reap 7.45% of votes in its first election debut in 2004. Hanura got 3.77% in its first election in 2009 and Gerindra obtained 4.46%. In 2014, Hanura got a slight increase while Gerindra rocketed with 11.81% of the votes, higher than Democratic Party (KPU, 2014). This success was the fruit of the model of party organization which was based on an ideological platform compatible with democracy. This has made the party acceptable to its

constituents. The inclusion of civilian politicians and their moves have expanded the party's support base to reach not only large military families but also professional organizations, youth, women, and socio-religious groups. The parties also benefitted from the de-legitimation of public trust in civilian-led parties for various cases of corruption. The success allowed *purnawirawan* a wider recruitment opportunity to acquire more strategic positions in party organization. Many of them were previously members of civilian-controlled parties but moved to parties led by their ex-military colleagues. The organization was conducted under the strong military influence combined with the political work of civilian politicians. The combination produced new organizing patterns that have been effective in keeping the parties electable while maintaining the old values in the background. New parties that tried to become the vehicle of lower-ranked military figures with a robust nationalist agenda usually failed to get adequate votes in the elections and did not survive due to their weak structure, unclear organizational patterns, and minimal infrastructure.

The contributions of *purnawirawan* to their respective political parties were relevant to the period of transition for two reasons: they tended to have a dynamic response in the face of political change in democratization and the implications of their role in the party indicated a shifting model of party organization. In other words, *purnawirawan* responded rapidly to the changes in the current political situations for what interests they fought for. Their distinct management of the party, by and large, transformed the degree of party discipline, ideological consistencies, party platforms, and political choices taken as the basis for the formulation of public policies.

The three-phased party development during democratization gave us a clear understanding of how *purnawirawan* were involved in the parties. In Phase I (1999-2004), *purnawirawan* were polarized into two groups: those who had set up their highly militaristic parties and those who joined established parties. The highly militaristic parties did not last long and failed to gain significant votes. The political situation did not favor them due to the pressure of *reformasi*. The failure was mainly caused by the high dominance of *purnawirawan* in party hierarchy and staffing – something the *reformasi* movement refused. Their constituency was narrow and was limited to military-based targets, especially military personnel and their families –who were also contested by Golkar, and others who opted to be politically passive. Those who joined civilian-led parties found it easier to survive since the parties valued their political expertise to run the party's machine. This success was reflected by PDI-P that was able to maximize the role of their *purnawirawan* both within the party and in the parliamentary commission for defense and security.

Phase II (2004-2008) witnessed the military's withdrawal from the parliament and the following enactment of Law No. 34/2004 on TNI, which

stipulates the military's status as professional soldiers. As a result, the militaristic party organization had to undergo a management modification. The two main standing parties, Democratic Party and Hanura, recruited civilians to develop the parties' establishment before the 2004 and 2009 election in order to have a moderate military leadership and to expand the network of civilian constituency base to gain adequate support.

The semi-militarist party type in Phase II had several characteristics. In the establishment, civilians played such important role as in the formulation and preparation of the party's constitution and platform. The contribution meant that their presence in the management board was high and their bargaining position within the policy-makers was as strong. This composition in the party management board was divided more equally on all levels between *purnawirawan* and civilian party members. That said, competition for influence did take place although space and competition model have been elucidated in party constitution. Phase II eventually witnessed the decline in the number of *purnawirawan* in political parties along with the strengthening of civilian power dominance. In parties like PAN, PKB, and PPP, the significance of *purnawirawan* gradually declined and disappeared. The party no longer needed their capacity, expertise, or network due to their losses in the former elections or receding reputation. Although *purnawirawan* were still involved in PDI-P and Golkar, the all-time *purnawirawan* base parties, their popularity and significance were, inevitably, receding.

Phase III of party development during democratization (2008-2014) was marked by the establishment of Gerindra in early 2007 –a potential new party which particularly attracted *purnawirawan*. Gerindra had a different model of party organization from Democratic Party and Hanura. The main difference lies in the level of authority of the Board of Trustees. In both parties, *purnawirawan* were granted the position in the Board, or an equivalent board, with a balanced composition of civilian politicians. Gerindra, however, raised the typical organization of the militarist party where *purnawirawan* obtained full control of the party and the central authority was in the hand of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees. The operational organization of the party had to execute the policy of the party under full supervision of the Board. The Executive Board, however, was filled with many civilian politicians and a few *purnawirawan* on lower positions. Gerindra successfully passed the threshold in the 2009 election and sent only civilian politicians to the House of Representatives. In the 2014 election, their vote rose from the bottom level to one of the top-ranking parties after PDI-P and Golkar.

Purnawirawan contribution to party development reflects their great interest in gaining power and their involvement included elements of the military such as doctrines and organizational models for strategic party objectives. Their

active participation in political contestation through the party was understood as part of an effort to continue the doctrine of military intervention in political organizations in the new era of democracy. Since the military institution no longer possesses the constitutional rights to intervene and influence the policy making in the state, they preferred taking the current constitutional path for building and forming a party to contest in elections. They built mutual compromise, negotiated and competed in some cases with civilian politicians within the party. A compromise was made because they no longer possessed a controlling network in the society and could not move the state apparatus as they did in the former New Order era.

Some military institutions, originally used to maintain influence and power in the society, have been removed in accordance with the military reform agenda. Such military institutions included Babinkar (the military personnel placement agency) that manages the placement of military officers in the structure of civil government, Kaster TNI (Chief of Staff of Territorial Command) and Bakorstanas (the National Stability Co-ordination Board) –an institution used to control political life (Kontras Report, 2008). In addition, the military reform by the civilian government during the transition to democracy had a significant impact. The military privileges exercised through constitutional process, resulting in military representatives in the parliament, was also dissolved. The national consensus was formulated in MPR Decree No. VI/2000 on the separation of the military and the police, MPR Decree No. VIII/2000 on setting the role of TNI and the Police, and in Law No. 34/2004 on TNI. The impact of these regulations institutionally influenced the choice of active military personnel. In the early period of military reform, as described in the previous chapter, military institutions had managed their personnel's interest in politics. If such activity of serving military personnel falls into the realm of politics, a military member has to relinquish his post and retire, or choose a permanent career in the military institution without interfering in the political affairs of the state. What occurred during the post-2004 democratic consolidation showed that interest in politics was still increasing, as high-ranking officers tended to join a political party after retiring.

The transition period resonated the military's political interests that were carried out by the evolution of political parties. The normative argument asserts that the military still felt as if they had the responsibility to defend the state, to protect national interests as a stabilizer for the conflict, and to provide protection for the implementation of public liberty (Samego et al., 1998: 63). These were the principles developed in the military during the New Order regime that *purnawirawan* should not politically overlook. In terms of expertise, they had several skills that could be a good bargaining power that a political party needed. Their experience in the government structure through military organizations

perceived as the prototype of a modern and well-organized organization was also used not only party organization in the competition but also in elections. They were regarded as individuals who had strong leadership tradition, discipline, and competence in strategic and intelligence work (LIPI, 1999).

The *purnawirawan*'s entrance to political parties produced involution in the development of political parties. Since Golkar was no longer the only party with a direct relationship with the military and had become a political home for *purnawirawan*, there was hybrid polarization. Military ideology was embedded in the character of *purnawirawan* and it had become more varied as it was dealing with the parties' ideology of different characteristics. The emergence of the party organization models was influenced by the *purnawirawan* contribution, which induced the process of democratization in Indonesia that produced political parties managed by clear values, goals, and military discipline. These principles, sometimes along with war strategies, were applied through organizational strategy. This was acceptable since the main goal was to gain support from constituents in the electoral competition.

From the ENPP calculation, it appears that after the 1999 election, the movement was geared towards the national party system. The elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 increasingly resulted in an extreme case of multi-party system. The electoral system in 1999 (without an enforced ET) produced a simple multi-party system with 44 contesting parties. In the 2004 and 2009 elections, ENPP was in the 7-8 range, reaching 8 only in the 2014 election. We can say that party institutionalization was weakening where no major party could achieve a stable share of votes in four consecutive elections. These conditions also resulted in a lack of loyalty among party cadres; thus, many politicians decided to cross over from one party to another, even if this meant adopting vastly different ideological views. There is also evidence that *purnawirawan* followed this trend of choosing to join or switch to the party that had more potential to gain votes and secure seats in the parliament.

According to the results of the 1999 elections, parties controlled by civilian politicians had the opportunity to commence internal reorganization as a means of ensuring that the party was more accountable. During that period, the highly militarized party suffered from a crushing defeat, giving civilian parties the opportunity to control the parliament. With a simple, or at least moderate, multi-party system, the need for a coalition of parties in parliament increased, so that the ideological polarization, the platform, and the party's governance programs could be clearly defined. This ensured that a relatively more stable government could be formed. Due to the civilian politicians' failure in the internal consolidation of their respective parties and in building coalitions across parties, their public image

suffered. Various instances of corruption by civilian politicians in public office, security instability, and the lack of economic recovery created a poor image of the weak capacity of politicians and civil-controlled organizations. This had a great impact on the rise of the military exponents to power, along with the recovery of public confidence in the figures that emerged as strong leaders, as well as prominent organizations taking control of the state. The 'escape' of Democratic Party and Hanura in the 2004 elections signaled a change in the party system, whereby moderate-simple became moderate-extreme. In 2004, President was elected directly and confirmed by the Indonesian presidential system characterized by an extreme multiparty system. This combination led to the executive being held hostage by the legislature. In the next sections, the differences in the candidacy system within the parties are explained to provide an overview of the recruitment mechanisms and candidate selections that influenced the choice of *purnawirawan* and to establish to what extent party support affected their success in legislative elections.

The impact of the electoral system in Indonesia may be used as structural-institutional factor to explain the failure of *purnawirawan* candidacy in national legislative elections. First, the electability level of parties classified as highly militarized was very low. The public still had vivid memories of the trauma caused by military leadership. In the 1999 election, in fact, parties had full authority to determine candidates and thus opted for supporting strategic legislators that would provide very high desirability opportunities for candidates. Most of the candidates who advanced from new parties that did not have an established base of traditional constituency but possessed good numbers in the nomination still failed because the party did not have a sufficiently strong voice. During this period, *purnawirawan* who joined and advanced to the candidacy of a civilian-controlled party had a better chance of qualifying and obtaining seats.

Second, in the 2004 elections, the electoral threshold (ET) of 2.5% of the national vote was set, restricting the selection of legislators in parliament. However, this limit became increasingly difficult to achieve for small and medium-sized parties for, at the same time, the district magnitude was set at a range between 3-10. In practical terms, this meant that the candidates that joined the biggest parties, or the party controlling the infrastructure, had the highest chances of victory. In each party, as argued earlier, *purnawirawan* positions and roles were different. Some of them who become wing-party officials had a greater opportunity to mobilize the support of the constituent parties. With authority, they could move the party machinery in the campaign to enhance their chances of winning the maximum number of votes. They were also involved in designing campaigns, building a support network, and directing support for party logistics. On the other hand, those

who did not become party officials would compete freely with other candidates who lacked significant support from the party machinery. As a result, they needed to expand their constituency of support from outside parties and must particularly focus on gaining floating votes. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this strategy in increasing the number of overall votes gained was still minuscule.

4.2 Political Party in Central Offices

Except Aceh Party and various parties local to Aceh, all political parties in Indonesia control their organization from the capital city. The parties are generally established at the national level and spread to the areas under central management. No party was born locally and developed into a national party, so none of the parties has major constituency in local areas. All parties operate nationally despite voting results have shown that only Golkar has a support base evenly distributed throughout the region. Other parties are still managed by a traditional support base that came from the power of the political ideologies relevant to Sukarno's Old Order legacies, such as PDI-P that represents strong nationalist groups in Central Java, East Java, and Bali (King, 2003: 151, Van Klinken, 2007). This nature of centralization has caused party structure to be constructed by giving enormous authority to the central board management. Conflict within the party usually occurs internally within the central committee but affects the local boards. Even in cases where a party split –as was with PDI-P, Golkar, and Democratic Party– the new splinter parties cannot reach the required votes in the election and will eventually fail.

How, then, are the parties controlled? The classical studies of Ostrogorski (1902), Michels (1915), and Duverger (1954) have provided different answers. Control of the party has an impact on party organization and determines the typical model and its characteristics. Therefore, the party is usually seen as a whole organization with a unique identification determined from a variety of variables of party organization, the role of a leader or executive of the party, to the behavior of the party itself. Yet, how are parties in Indonesia controlled from their central management? In general, Indonesian parties have problems in internal management to restructure the party organization (Bunte & Ufen, 2008). The management of a more centralized structure follows the model of the pyramid, which gives great authority to the central committee of the party (Choi, 2011).

From the organizational side, parties rely on two formal aspects that serve as a control apparatus: vertical control and horizontal intervention (Katz, & Mair, 1995: 5-28; Saalfeld, & Strøm, 2014: 223-24; Wolinetz, 2002: 136-65). Vertical control is an aspect of organizational mechanisms that is regulated through the party constitution to control the party structure and its management to the lowest level. Each level of board management has the authority to execute policy. On the

management at the central level, the board, which has authority over vertical control, can have different names but in general, the board has higher authority than any other councils do. This board has two functions at the same time. First, it is the owner of the highest authority outside the party congress that determines the direction of the party and the handling policy for personnel appointments. Second, they have the function to execute the course of the party organizations and other strategic policies. In the Democratic Party and Gerindra this board is named the Board of Trustees (*Dewan Pembina*), while in Golkar and the PDI-P it is attached to the position of the Board of Executives (*Dewan Pengurus Pusat*), or to the party executive. The name and authority inherent in the controlling actor can be attached to the central figure of the party — whether oligarchic or collegial.

The second aspect is horizontal intervention. This is the organizational mechanism of vertical authority that ensures party cadres have a position in public office or other important positions in the party's subordinated network. This intervention does not take place reciprocally but in a linear way and often creates defiance of party cadres of the vertical control holder. In general, these interventions include control over the party cadres or over networks that do not follow the hierarchical structure of the party management. These controls are more discretionary, in which the placement of party elements in another organization or public institution aims to achieve the party's goals. Most of them are the party cadres or actors who have proximity to an agency, and are considered to represent the interests of the parties in an outside agency. Among these agencies are public offices in parliament, in state institutions, or in other institutions such as the *Lembaga Sampiran Negara* (SAI — State Auxiliary Institution). The latter is usually more informal.

Political parties regulate all the party affairs from their headquarters in the Jakarta. Parties also organize the structure of their staff, as part of vertical control, by following the hierarchy of the government administration of the central (national), provincial, district/city, township, and village levels.[14] It is noteworthy that all parties have achieved the same model of vertical control by focusing on three things. Firstly, all national board decisions are set up, with consequent binding down to the lowest level of party board management. Secondly, the daily management of parties at the central level is supported by institutions in the form of agencies to coordinate technical works at the lowest level in areas as well as for specific issues. Thirdly, the party elite has an agent in charge of the province to provide an informal monitoring of the underlying management (Romli, 2008).

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[14] Regulated in Article 17, Law 31/2002 on Political Parties and Law 12/2003 on Elections.

In the implementation of vertical control, each party has used different procedures. Modifications were carried out in line with the political support base areas, the prevailing political culture, and the dynamics of the party held in each period of stewardship. Therefore, vertical control handling has been placed in different positions. Nevertheless, the general structure of the central board can be divided into three categories. First of all, power is concentrated in the highest institutions of the party. Gerindra and the Democratic Party put the top level of the party's authority in the Board of Trustees (*Dewan Pembina*). Second, the delegation of authority to control the party is given to the *Dewan Pengurus Pusat* (DPP — Board of Executives) as is with the PDI-P and Golkar, although they have different degrees of implementation. Gerindra, PDI-P, and Demokrat have the type of political leadership attached to the figure of personal leader. Third, the implementation of the organization mechanism through the establishment of agencies and strategic institutions to make the party work effectively. All parties have a sub-department with an executive function, which is attached to the central party board through sub-departments, autonomous bodies and other institutions like party wings. Besides the above three categories, parties have developed additional structures with supporting functions such as consultative, expertise, party judicial forums, and task forces formed under specific conditions and durations. These categories are complementary and are not included as part of the vertical control.

Table 14: Number of Party Board Members

Party	Period	National Party Board	Number of Party Wings (Supporting Organization)
Golkar	1998-2004	139	14
	2004-2009	65	
	2009-2014	380	
	2014-2019	150	
PDIP	2000-2005	NA	9
	2005-2010	128	
	2010-2015	190	
Demokrat	2005-2010	79	20
	2010-2015	128	
	2013-2015	190	
Gerindra	2008	34	14
	2010-2015	323	

Source: Each respective party's official documents

Table 14 shows that each party has a different number of officials at the national level. The parties with the highest number of officials are Golkar, that is, over 300 people in stewardship during the periods of 2009-2014 and 2010-2015,

while Demokrat and PDI-P had a relatively equal number of officials. Furthermore, the number of supporting organizations in Demokrat was 20, PDI-P had nine party wings, while Gerindra and Golkar each has 14 organizations. All the party wing organs had a constituency base that included youth, women, professionals, workers, peasants, religious and political cadres, and civil society. The leader of each wing of the party organ usually served as a board member on the Board of Executives or Board of Trustees. This is done to prevent any insubordination against the party command line and the entire political organs. All the organs also operate nationally and have branches in accordance with the hierarchy of the management representative party at local level. Golkar has had different types because its party wing organs can also be called separate factions within the party. The factions have autonomy and high bargaining power against the party board and often viewed as threat againts party elite consolidation (Tanjung, 2007:341). This pattern is unique and arose as a historical part of Golkar's formation. PDI-P has also inherited some political factions, but these are not considered wing organs as in Golkar.

4.3 Civilian-controlled Parties: The Cases of PDI-P and Golkar

This subsection describes the dynamics in civilian-controlled parties, especially PDI-P and Golkar. Primarily, civilian politician has controlled these parties since the beginning of their establishment –except for Golkar that has had a close tie with the military. As seen in Table 13, in every phase of incoming *purnawirawan* in civilian-controlled parties suffered from instability regarding quantity. In Phase I most of them were incorporated into the party as it took place in PDI-P, Golkar, and PPP. During this phase, *purnawirawan* were recruited based on their ideological loyalty and were placed in positions as ordinary members or in executive management in non-strategic roles. A detailed explanation of how *purnawirawan* played their roles in the two most popular political parties during the transition period will follow.

4.3.1 *PDI-P*

The discussion on PDI-P should start with its historical formation. The party claims that it is a continuation of the nationalist ideology established by Sukarno's PNI and a re-actualization of the constituency base that is culturally based in Java from the *abangan*[15] voters. Herbert Faith's categorization, which is based on Geertz's, mentions that after Indonesia's independence there were at least five

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[15]*Abangan* is a term used by Clifford Geertz. He divided the Java community into three socio-political and economic categories: *abangan* to refer to the followers of Javanese and Islamic animist-syncretism, *santri* for devout muslim, and *priyayi* for the educated groups of administrators and Javanese aristocrats. See Geertz (1976).

major developing political flows each represented by a political party. They are the national radicals under PNI, the Islamists under NU and Masjumi, Javanese traditionalists under Partindo, social democrats under PSI, and communists under PKI (Feith & Castles, 2007).

At the beginning of the New Order, the political power of the nationalists forced them to cluster into a new party named *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party). The parties merged into PDI were *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia* (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party), *Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (IPKI, Association of Indonesian Independence Supporters), Catholic Party, *Partai Kristen Indonesia* (Parkindo, Indonesian Christian Party), and *Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak* (Murba, Proletarian Party).

PDI's principle was the adoption of the basic ideology of *Pancasila* – containing the values of democracy, nationalism, and social justice (Eklof, 2004; Abeyasekere, 1973). This was not uncommon for political parties. In 1994, one of the merging parties, IPKI, declared that it was returning to identify with organizations that were independent, non-political, and non-affiliated (Ramage, 1997). PDI brought the seeds of hard factionalism in its political fusion process since its ideological spectrum extended to the struggle for hegemony over the parties' internal control of the various factions that had existed therein (Samson, 1974). Along the way, PDI became more preoccupied with the prolonged conflicts between the internal factions (Lay & Parlindungan, 2010). New Order responded by emasculating the role of political parties through its determined campaign of frank de-ideologization of parties by requiring them to use *Pancasila* as their sole foundation –hence, making these truncated political parties to become more uniform since a party ideology that determined the preference of voters and constituents was considered more convenient for party loyalty that was weak (Winarno, 2008).

From the establishment until 1995, PDI was practically controlled by the government. The new changes taking place in Suharto's early phase of administration were weakened due to the failure of the military to stop the flow of constituent support for Megawati Sukarnoputri as the winner of the Chairman's election at the 1996 Congress. PDI-P was born after the events of July 1996, which was the culmination of a feud between Megawati and Soerjadi, PDI Chairman of the factional Congress in Medan who was supported by the New Order regime. The event later evolved into broad violence causing many fatalities. The party then developed with a spirit of opposition to the New Order government. The vision outlined at its establishment was reflected in its mission statement contained in the party's constitution preamble.

PDI-P is a party with a strong mass base –solid and loyal, but suffered from weak managerial aspects. Its typology was similar to that of PNI during Sukarno's era. Mietzner (2012) emphasized that PDI-P, in addition to having a definite constituency, also possesses strong roots in the community and has a functioning process of interest aggregation and articulation. The involvement of young progressive groups in the party management was most likely an important part of the assessment. PDI-P was ruled by a traditional concept of power concerning who sat on the national board. The Chairman, sitting on the central position of the party's power structure, has the power to nominate the authorities in charge and is responsible for the party's existence, programs, and performance. The leadership on the DPP (Central Board of Executives) has the authority to suspend or dismiss the underlying management of the party. To complete the board, PDI-P has built an Ideology Assembly formed by Central Board officials and chaired by the Party Chair. The job of this assembly has been to keep the party direction in tune with the spirit of *Pancasila*.

Generally, the party is managed by a centralized model, concentrated on the figure of the DPP Chair. In such circumstances, there is no other figure that stands out to balance power within the party. The party management models tend to be driven by oligarchs surrounding the Chair. The role of the Secretary-General is limited to coordinating the organization as the representative of the Chair (PDI-P Party Constitution Article 24). Under this condition, *purnawirawan* cannot go through the regular recruitment process and are included in the management structure of the DPP, which is balanced in proportion to the division of the old factions within the nationalist PNI group. *Purnawirawan* entry through the Chair by request is based on the closeness of a *purnawirawan's* past relationship and a proven track record in the ideological background. PDI-P is an ideological party, in which all recruitment is based on a commitment to the ideology of *Pancasila*. Once entered the party, all cadres, civil or *purnawirawan* are given space to work. Assignment or appointment within the party highly depends on the integrity, quality, and their contribution (interview with Maruarar Sirait, June 27, 2015).

There were *purnawirawan* on the Central Board, including A. M. Hendropriyono, Adang Ruchiatna, Agum Gumelar, Tritamtomo, Theo Sjafei, R. K. Sembiring, Sidarto Andusubroto, Karel Albert Ralahalu, and Sutjipno.[16] These were members of PDI-P during the democratic transition era. Although the period of their involvement varied, they were considered loyal to the party. The involvement of *purnawirawan* in politics is part of the *sapta marga* (soldier's oath) stating that the responsibility of guarding the state does not stop when they are retired. *Sapta marga*

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[16] Compiled from dataset PDI-P national board member and legislature 1999-2004.

doctrine is personalized, so that when soldiers or ex-soldiers get into a political party, they are more influenced by a desire to remain involved in the management of the State. In PDI-P, they are positioned as guardians of State ideology and as nationalists (interview with Erwin Muslimin Singajuru, June 29, 2015).

Most of the *purnawirawan* incorporated in PDI-P were those who formerly served as *Pangdam* (territorial military commanders) or as *Kapolda* (chiefs of the regional police) among whom the PDI-P had a strong mass base. Adang Ruchiatna held his position as Chief of Territorial Military Staff (Kaster TNI). Theo Sjafei was the former Pangdam Udayana in Bali, where PDI-P won a significant number of votes in the election. The same penchant is also seen in the position of Agum Gumelar as former Pangdam Siliwangi in West Java, Karel Ralahalu as the former Pangdam Trikora in Papua, Bibit Waluyo as the former Pangdam Diponegoro in Central Java, and Sutjipno as former Kapolda of North Sumatra (Current Data Indonesian Military Elite, Indonesia, 2001). The party elite had a good knowledge of areas where PDI-P has a strong constituent base.

There was also a great political social network that could be used by parties to maintain their dominance in the votes. Among these *purnawirawan*, most have been projected as Members of Parliament or to run in a gubernatorial election. *Purnawirawans*' contribution to PDI-P was to strengthen and maintain the constituency base in areas where they had developed good network during their previous tenure as either a territorial commander or regional police chief. The exception to this was a small elite circle in the DPP (such as Theo Sjafei and A. M. Hendropriyono in 2004-2014), who exercised influence in the period of 1999-2004. They played a significant role and made a major contribution to the Party Chair in determining the strategic policies of the party.

PDI-P has placed *purnawirawan* in the central office as important actors in the preparation of the strategy to win the election. They were able to mobilize support, both from internal military institutions or the extended family of the military. The role appeared when Megawati-Prabowo ran in the 2009 presidential election in which 20 *purnawirawan* among Generals joined the campaign team chaired by Theo Sjafei (*Kompas*, May 28, 2009). In the 1999 elections, *purnawirawan* in the party were more widely functioned as principal communicators who were concerned with military dominance in politics. This worked not only in the Central Board management but also in the parliament. Several prominent *purnawirawan* already had a track record as Members of Parliament in the New Order era. Theo Sjafei, for example, began his political career as a member of the military faction in DPR/MPR in 1995-1997. He was appointed as a member of Commission I DPR and a member of Commission IX/MPR in 1996-97 (*Parlementaria*, vol 28, 1996).

Another purnawirawan that has quite earned a reputation in PDI-P was Hendropriyono. During the transition period, he was appointed the Minister of Transmigration and Settlements from 1998-99. In September 2000 he joined the party and only retired shortly after. For PDI-P, active military status was not a problem. The party has only paid attention to the closeness relationship of a person and his perceived nationalist commitment (*Kompas*, September 14, 2000). Meanwhile, if we look at Hendropriyono's organization background, he in fact worked actively in Muhammadiyah socio-religious organizations although he always emphasized that he was a Muslim nationalist, making PDI-P a good place for him. The same was true to Theo Sjafei. PDI-P relied on his ability and Hendropriyono's experience as a former head of the BIN (State Intelligence). PDI-P recruited him for the 2004 elections.

Civilian-controlled model in PDI-P was effective in selecting *purnawirawan* who attempted to occupy roles as party board members. The Party Chair carries out the selection on her own. Recruitment may originate from ordinary channels or from the network of *purnawirawan* that are already in the party, although this does not appear to have happened in large numbers. This condition allows the party to retain control of civilian supremacy in the party. *Purnawirawan* were placed in a strategic position as long as the party needs their contributions (*Kompas*, April 14, 2014). Due to the difficulty in becoming part of the elite and party oligarchy, most of those who wanted to join the party chose it as a political vehicle in their candidacy in elections or in their nomination for local elections. However, the party also seeks input from their experience and networks in the preparation of the strategy at each election —both legislative and presidential.

Purnawirawan who do not occupy a position as part of the party elite, choose to sit in leadership positions or other positions that allow them to take advantage of the party organ as the supporting machine. Apart from the daily political structure in the Board of Executives and party agencies, the party wing organs have a significant role of direct engagement with the organizing of the masses in the field of their working area. This function is the mandate given to them to empower their party constituent base. In order to keep track of the coordination with the central board, the heads of the organ wing also have their seat as board members.

PDI-P has several organ wings to support the movement of the party such as Indonesian Young Bulls (BMI, *Banteng Muda Indonesia*), Red and White Youth (TMP, *Taruna Merah Putih*), Indonesian Volunteers for Pro-Democracy (Repdem, *Relawan Indonesia Pro-Demokrasi*), Indonesian Muslims' House (BAMUSI, *Baitul Muslimin Indonesia*), and Indonesian Fishermen and Farmers Movement (GANTI, *Gerakan Nelayan Tani Indonesia*) (*Tempo*, Vol. 37, 2009). Overall, *purnawirawan* are placed in inferior positions within the party, and they have tried to achieve

"mastery" of the organ wing of the party, which is not an easy task. Previously, they had to have a political investment in the party and deal with influential civilian politicians in the long term. Maj. Gen. Tri Tamtomo, for example, was a *purnawirawan* who was able to maximize the strategic role of an organ wing of the party. He was sitting on the Board of Trustees of *Banteng Muda Indonesia* in North Sumatra. By the time he was running in the elections, BMI had developed into an effective support machine that made him a Member of Parliament.

The 1999 elections resulted in PDI-P becoming the winning party with 153 seats in the DPR. About 36 or 23% of the new Members of Parliament were newcomers that joined the party between 1998 and 1999 (RAW Kaligis, 2009). They consisted of professionals, businessmen, and *purnawirawan*. Other source mentions that the number of newcomers who had been neither party activists nor party officials was 47. The newcomers had expertise in the fields of governance, party administration, funding support, and administrative or organizational strategy as they also met the needs of party politicians in these fields. During this period, PDI-P had grown into a major party with the majority of its politicians having strong constituent support but with poor managerial experience in party and state.

Two parameters are used to trace the newcomers' contribution to the party. The first is their contribution to the formulation of party platforms and policies decided at party Congress. The second is the strategic positions they obtained in the party management or public office, either in the parliament or the cabinet. In the first parameter, the contribution of ideas at the party Congress was not obvious. Moreover, as is typical of the other parties in Indonesia, it is difficult to track formulations at the party Congress and their consistency with the party's policy formulation and with programs run by its cadres in public office. The basic principles of the party's policy direction as set out in the *Dasa Prasetia PDI-P* (PDI-P, 2013)[17] have shown a normative formulation. An example of this is the issue of the popular economic policy through the structuring of food production, agrarian reform, and access to affordable health services (LIPI, 2014). There does not appear to be a specific formulation related to such sensitive issues as prosecutions of human rights violators or better handling of corruption cases.

Between 1999 and 2004, many corruption cases swept PDI-P cadres in parliament and government, resulting in a significant decrease in the number of votes for them in the 2004 elections. The failure in translating the ideal values into more concrete policies was one of the factors that caused faltering cadres who were in a public office to develop programs that could be aligned with the party's

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[17] *Dasa Prasetya* is the general direction in implementing the Party's struggle ideology of "*Pancasila* June 1, 1945". *Dasa Prasetya* means ten pledges of allegiance, reflecting on nationality and about the empowerment and equitable welfare of the People (PDI-P, 2013).

platform. This was reflected in the outcome of the Third Congress in 2013, which proposed several recommendations to overcome socio-economic inequality. The recommendations were still normative and were already mentioned in the party's platform on the issue of inequality, as found in the party's constitution.

The second parameter of the newcomers' contribution to the party regarding their securing strategic positions in party management was easier to trace and recognize. These can be either a consultative role or parliamentarian role. Consultative role was played by *purnawirawan* holding positions in party management at central level in which they had good access to provide input to the Party Chair in relation to strategic policy that revamped the party's internal management. In this regard, for example, Theo Sjafei's position as Chairman of Cadre and Organization was crucial in laying the foundation of PDI-P's cadre organizing models. More significantly, parliamentarian role was executed by *purnawirawan* who sat as members of DPR, in which they become Commissioners in the sectors related to defense and security, local government, and law and human rights. Some purnawirawan MPs were given position in the economics, trading, or social welfare commission depending on the their non-military education in university (interview with T.B. Hasanuddin, December 3, 2015).

The fall party votes in the 2004 elections and the failure in the presidential election drove PDI-P to reposition itself as the Opposition, as mandated by the 2005 Congress in Bali. The affirmation role as the Opposition had severe consequences since the party no longer had access to the state resources commonly used to support the party. The 2005 Congress recommendations emphasized internal improvements and regeneration. Practically, between 2005 and 2014, PDI-P criticized the policies of the ruling government and did not put their cadres in the government posts.

In carrying out its control of the central board management, PDI-P has the supporting agency known as Party Body (*Badan Partai*). According to Article 39 of the Party Constitution, the Party Body entity is:

1. The party supporting work that was formed to assist the Board of Executives in carrying out its duties and responsibilities according to its function;
2. Autonomous and has responsibilities to the Board of Executives of the party at its level;
3. Agency/Organization/Working Unit/Community Organizations/ Organization Wings may be established by the Central Board of Executives (DPP) in accordance with the party's program, and
4. Outside party bodies; DPP formed *Dewan Pertimbangan Partai* (Party Advisory Board).

Party bodies with administrative tasks assist the board member. These bodies are arms of the party's daily officials on the Executive Board. This board also has the authority to supervise the performance and relationships created by its underlying bodies. The bodies play a major role in ensuring the exercise of authority by the Board of Executives, through running their vertical control.

The party is interested in expanding their support base by cooperating with other organizations such as cooperation over strategic values or just engaging in regular communications to promote network expansion. In the phase of building co-operation, the party provides opportunities for initiatives that emerge from the party bodies, autonomous institutions, or party wings. The party's constitution clarifies that, in establishing relationships with other community organizations, functional organizations, and professional organizations, the party does so by the principles and aspirations of the parties and may place party cadres within the organizations concerned. The party constitution also stipulates all the matters relating to the mechanism of the relationship, and the assignment of party cadres as referred to above will be regulated by party regulations (PDI-P Party Constitution, Chapter 40). Although the party bodies have the flexibility to build and expand their co-operation and network with other institutions outside, their function is more to provide inputs for the formulation of party policies that are often not considered necessary, except for election bodies (Bappilu, *Badan Pemenangan Pemilu*). Inputs from party bodies are very dependent on the party stewardship board at all levels. This leads to the existence of such bodies being not deemed to have the prestige necessary for them to significantly impact on strategic policy-making in the party.

The horizontal intervention is also controlled through the structure and hierarchy of the party. These interventions are intended to safeguard the interests of the institution and the party platform on which cadres can be placed outside. The institution or agency could include public offices in the executive or the legislature and non-state institutions. Party cadres placed on assignments within the organization or in institutions outside of the party fall into three categories, namely the legislature, executive, and non-executive roles (PDI-P Party Constitution, Chapters 51, 52, 53). For cadres who reside in the executive and legislative bodies, they must work in the corridor towards policies and programs at all levels. Whereas in the non-executive agencies, both in the legislative or non-state institutions outside, each party cadre has an obligation to promote and advocate the party's policies and programs. Party wings could be included as part of the horizontal intervention because their position is relatively more autonomous. They have their own management hierarchy and a clear territorial authority, making it easier to utilize and organize constituents. However, the existence of the executive board of the party in the party wings tends to enable vertical control to work effectively.

As stated earlier, PDI-P has the type of leadership that combines the centralized model of organization and charismatic factors, resulting in their management being run with a high degree of patron-clientilism (Kim, Liddle, & Said, 2006; Mietzner, 2012). This is reflected in the power that the Party Chair possesses and in the political elites controlling the party's mechanism. Personal loyalties and ideological considerations in the board mold the party's structure. The party constitution also provides a large authority binding on the central board of executive and covers all party management to the lowest level (Schiller, 2003). PDI-P is a typical mass party that is not fully democratic, however, since the highest political legitimacy is in the hands of Party Chair who is considered to be charismatic and has the authority to make the party's decisions. Several attempts were made to reform the party in the hope that it is managed in more modern and democratic procedures. All these attempts failed because the internal party mainstream wanted to keep the party management unchanged. The large split in the PDI-P causing some central board members including Eros Djarot, Laksamana Sukardi, and Roy B. B. Janis to establish the *Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan* (PDP, *Democratic Renewal Party*) as a splinter party. Unfortunately, the splinter parties contesting in 2009 elections only got 0.86 percent of vote (Mietzner, 2013:67). One possible explanation is that, despite the charismatic factor of Megawati, the power of the splinter groups was not that strong.

From the description of the mechanism of party control in PDI-P, we can infer that the most important factor in filling positions in the central board management is cadre loyalty, which could be interpreted more broadly as the proximity and a degree of adherence to the patron of the party. Mere internal managerial models such as organizations do not provide adequate space for the *purnawirawan* to sit on the executive board. They are recruited into the elite circle because they have a personal connection with the Chairwoman. *Purnawirawan* recruitment for the post of subnational Chairman is also very limited, except for those having a strong support base in regional areas such as Karel Ralahalu in Maluku. Despite *purnawirawan* that have doubled positions held both as Chairman of a provincial board but in the same time also held as Chairman in Central Board. Their existence is just temporary, subject to their replacement or nomination as Governor candidate as — such as T. B. Hasanuddin, former military secretary of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who became Chairman of West Java province (*Pikiran Rakyat*, September 19, 2012).

4.3.2 *Golkar*

Golkar has had a long and winding history with the military. As discussed in the previous sections, they were utilized as a political vehicle of the New Order

regime with the unique formation as a political party (Reeve, 1985; Suryadinata, 1989; Boileau, 1983). The number of *purnawirawan* in Golkar was higher than in PDI-P, and they were in control of strategic positions within the party –not only in the consultative council but also in the Executive Board and Secretary-General. As Golkar had a long history with the military, the influence of the military exponents cannot be ignored. Since 1998 Golkar has continued creating an institutional transformation with a new organizational model. This includes significant changes in the position and authority of the Board of Trustees. While the Board of Trustees in the New Order time was the highest authority in the party, the agency has been limited to a consultative role and function since 1998. Party control is directly under the Chairman of the Executive Boards (DPP).

From 1998 to 2004, Golkar was still the primary choice in elections for the extended family of the military. That condition drove Chairman Akbar Tanjung to appoint several prominent *purnawirawan* as party officials of the central office in 1998-2004. In contrast, almost no *purnawirawan* advanced in the nomination of public office. In this period, they played the role of a representative for the military whose interests were still represented by Golkar. The role and function of purnawirawan within the party were significant and strategic as seen from the positions they held, from Secretary-General to members of the Central Executive Board (DPP). This made Golkar's bargaining position against the government and their military and police partners in the parliament remained high.

In the democratic transition period of 1998-2004, the imperative goal to restore the solidity of the organization through such initiatives as termination of the military exponents, whether personal or institutional, could not be done strategically. However, these roles were discretionary because *purnawirawan* who held positions in Golkar were previously members of the TNI/Polri in the parliament. In these roles, their most crucial partners is military where they had historical relationship during New Order were placed military as backbone for Golkar to dominate the legislative process in DPR.

Military influence in the party cannot be ignored. It has even become part of an unwritten convention within the party to provide a strategic position with a balanced composition. Thus, if the Chairman was from the military, the Secretary-General had to be civilian, and *vice-versa*. The combination was used to maintain the sizable military family support in order to secure their votes. In the 2004 elections, 40% of the Armed Forces family still voted for Golkar (*Kompas*, February 6, 2008). Despite Akbar Tanjung and Jusuf Kalla's leadership in the party still provided the purnawirawan with strategic posts on the board of executives, their overall existence was less dominant. In the end, they were also increasingly pressured by

the strong dominance of civilian politicians in the party (*Tempo*, November 2, 2003).

Purnawirawan dominance in the party was still strong until 2005, but afterwards civilian politicians' pressure from various wing organs and the political factions within Golkar replaced the traditional role of military exponents in party control. Some of them, like Prabowo Subianto, just sat as members of the Board of Trustees without the authority to determine policy. The limited space in the party's strategic positions had an impact on *purnawirawan* displacement to other parties, especially to the Democratic Party. In 2004, a total of 48 MPs who had been Golkar members since 1998 shifted allegiance to Democratic Party. They considered the latter to be a new party that offered more promising political positions. An additional factor was the relatively good relationship with the network elites, ensuring that the retirees were able to keep their constituent base of the military family.

It is interesting to analyze why the military networks failed to maintain their influence in the party. Historically speaking, the military was one of the founders of Golkar. The Sekber Golkar (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya* (Sekber Golkar, Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) was established by the military, including Lt. Col. Suhardiman. Sekber Golkar had various organizations and later became a political organization that supported the New Order regime. Sekber Golkar's first chairman was Brig. Gen. Djuhartono, then succeeded by Maj. Gen. Suprapto Sukowati in the first Congress in 1965. In the early period of its establishment, Golkar only accommodated 61 organizations, but it later evolved into an organization in its own right. Those organizations were then incorporated into the *Kelompok Induk Organisasi* (KINO, Group Parent Organizations). Seven KINOs in Golkar assisted the party to compete in the 1971 elections: Kosgoro, SOKSI, MKGR, Gakari, *Gerakan Pembangunan* (the Development Movement) (Nishihara, 1972). Such organ wings played a vital role in the anti-communist campaign during the early period of New Order (Krishnamurthy, 1977; Murray, 1981). Despite the simplification process, many faced opposition because every organization wants to retain its identity. Post-1998 some of the KINOS left Golkar to found their own party.

Public pressure from *Reformasi* in 1998 demanded that the state must dissolve Golkar. The party responded by breaking the relationship with Suharto family network and cronies. On March 7, 1999, Chairman Akbar Tanjung, who defeated Gen. Edi Sudrajat at the 1998 Extraordinary National Meeting (*Munaslub*, immediately took a position to restore Golkar's reputation and public confidence. Golkar was rebranded as Partai Golkar and delivered a new paradigm as shown by its tagline *Golkar Baru* (New Golkar). Akbar Tanjung's term still accommodated the *purnawirawan* by placing Lt. Gen. Budi Harsono as Secretary-General in 2002. This

appointment had a strategic role in maintaining good relations with the military/police fraction in the DPR/MPR.

The overhaul of the platform and organization was frontal to the old oligarchs. The concept of Golkar Baru declared by Akbar Tanjung still retained the old party platform as a secular-bureaucratic organization. Golkar also still maintained its base of support outside Java while also defending the a more proportionally balanced composition of the Central Board by region. As is well known, that model has been the core strength of Golkar since its inception in the New Order era. In fact, the model means that the party organization could effectively present itself as a pluralist party with a high degree of heterogeneity. Golkar's strategy to strengthen its constituency base outside Java by accommodating local elites in the Executive Boards was further supported by the significant role of *purnawirawan*, who still maintained the support of several provincial governors outside Java. These things mean that Golkar has relatively stable support –even after its vote eroded in the 1999 and 2004 elections, they made significant increase in the 2009 and 2014 elections.

In the critical period of 1998 to 2004, the important things to elaborate concerning Golkar were the re-actualization strategy and its organizational restructuring. Golkar took a significant step in 1999 to adapt to changes in the post-reform repositioning, internal restructuring, and consolidation of the organization.

Prior to the 1999 elections, Golkar introduced various policy statements and emphasized its position as a pro-reform party. This repositioning was done to deal with the intense demands for the dissolution of the party. Under Akbar Tanjung's leadership, Golkar's new paradigm had shifted in a democratic, fair, and transparent direction (Effendi, 2003). Some aspects of the reorganization were the bottom-up mechanism for choosing a leader, the termination of the old system of centralized power in individuals who have power in the government, and correcting the deviations of the past. Akbar Tanjung's contribution to the restructuring steps of Golkar was identified in his writing, that outlines his systematic plan to reorganize the party. His contribution could be grouped into four areas: (1) disconnecting Golkar from the traditional party supporter from the military, (2) consolidating of the organization by involving factions and civil political groups under the party, (3) documenting the membership of the party as part of the consolidation process, (4) establishing wing organization after the dissolve of KINOs (Tandjung, 2007: 112-117; DPP Golkar)

In the first step of reorganizing Golkar, Akbar Tanjung's leadership gradually moved away from the party driven by actual military strategy to secure the party's political image in public. At the same time, the historical relationship with the military exponents was repackaged to make it more acceptable. Internal conflicts

were managed, so that they did not demonstrate the tension that led to the eruption of most of the political factions within Golkar. *Purnawirawan* who participated in driving the party in the military factions, in the last period of New Order, rejected the retention of military integration in Golkar. The party gained two advantages at the same time: it improved its public image and enabled smooth consolidation of the party, while still taking advantage of the power game in public institutions. After Akbar Tanjung's term ended in 2004, Golkar only used *purnawirawan* to complement its staff or opened up to the aspirations of their colleagues without giving them a strategic role within the party. Some of them were only involved in the presidential elections. Gen. Wiranto took this nomination path and ran for president in the 2004 election but lost to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Democrat Party.

After the defeat of Wiranto and Golkar in the the 2004 elections, Jusuf Kalla, a businessman and a notable figure in Golkar's entrepreneurs wing, succeeded Akbar Tanjung. After the Congress, Kalla composed a new management structure at the Plenary Session IX. The central board members included some *purnawirawan* who were Golkar officials during the New Order. In the the advisory board, Prabowo Subianto became the representative of *purnawirawan*. On the Boards of Executive, Kalla appointed Sumarsono as the Secretary-General. Their contribution in this period, especially in the institutional improvement of the party, was not too obtrusive. They were more involved in the formulation of the party's strategy to win the election.

As was discussed, the composition of the military and civilian members must be maintained at all cost to ensure the balance. However, the first's role became less dominant in the Board of Executives. They were also increasingly pressured by the substantial domination of their civilian counterparts in the party emerging from internal party cadres. Civilian politicians split the elite proportion more evenly, and they possessed a significant power base within the party supporters, wing organs, or other supporting organizations.

It is worth noting that Golkar does not have an ideology as binding as PDI-P does. The party has a relatively pragmatic characteristic with most of its *purnawirawan* members joined the party with the aim of nomination for public offices or Members of Parliament. Under Aburizal Bakrie's stewardship, their pragmatism was evident when their members led by Luhut Pandjaitan and Agus Widjojo diverted support in the presidential election of 2014. As Golkar could not nominate its own presidential candidate do to the threshold, the *purnawirawan* network provided full support to Joko Widodo. During this presidential election, a total of 22 *purnawirawan* of General Officers declared their support to Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla's candidacy and some of them were actively involved in the campaign

team. Up until 2014, there had been no formalization of the role of *purnawirawan* and political consensus between them and the civilian politicians in the party structure and management alike. The party maintains an open position as a party that orients the votes in election. This party policy provides a free space for each element of the party leaders and cadres to optimize victory in elections (Bappilu Golkar, 2004).

4.4 Semi-Militarist Party: The Case of Democratic Party

From the beginning of its formation, the Democratic Party has been a political vehicle that was prepared to elevate Lt. Gen Yudhoyono in national political contestation (*Kompas*, April 18, 2002). Yudhoyono started to gain popularity among civilian groups when he served as Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security (Menkopolkam) in Megawati's cabinet. The interesting matter to be explained was the factors that led Yudhoyono to join neither Golkar nor PDI-P. As explained in the previous discussion on PDI-P, Yudhoyono has no background, ideology, or personal loyalty that identified him with PDI-P. This is in contrast with Golkar. As he defined himself as belonging to the reformist group of military officers, he would have had good access to join Golkar. However, from a political viewpoint, this was not profitable since Golkar had already incorporated many senior officers. The impact of his role was little, and not much opportunity was left for him to gain a strategic position.

The formation of the Democratic Party leadership model favors the party's image as moderate, but with military discipline. Yudhoyono, who sat as a minister in the Wahid and Megawati cabinets as a representative of the military, seemed concerned about establishing a political party as a political vehicle after retiring from the military service. His tendency to engage in politics was visible when he ran for Vice-President and was defeated in the Vice-Presidential elections in the 2001 Session of the Assembly. That was an important factor for him to initiate the establishment of political parties and to organize a new political network. This party used Yudhoyono as the central figure for the identification of loyalty to the organization of cadres and managers. This position has a typical party leadership that is not much different from what PDI-P utilizes to foster loyalty to the party (Liddle & Mujani, 2007). The slight difference, however, is the Advisory Board as an element separating the party and the executive board from the party's day-to-day organization.

The Democratic Party is registered as a political party and participated in the election on 25 September 2001, following the publication of the Decree of the Minister of Justice and Human Rights ratifying the party's status. Ratification was

conducted on October 9, 2001 by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, which issued State Gazette No. 81 of 2001 on Ratification. After establishment, it became a new party, which had great success that qualified it to secure seat in parliament in the primary elections. The declaration of the party on 17 October 2002 officially confirmed Yudhoyono's candidacy in the 2004 presidential election (*Kompas*, October 18, 2002). In this declaration, Democratic Party already had a management structure in twenty-nine provinces and the entire local leadership of the provincial boards (DPDs) were present at the declaration. In 2003 it had local offices in 230 districts/cities throughout Indonesia. On the same occasion, it also conducted the national meeting (*Rakernas*) aiming at dissemination of party strategy and supporting Yudhoyono's candidacy. This progress placed this party as one of the few parties with a relatively rapid development. It was not supported by the old and established organizations and did not receive support from the political elites of the old parties who switched sides. Instead, new people in politics and party management conducted mobilization and organization development.

In the early process of the party's establishment, Yudhoyono gave a great opportunity to civilians in the formulation of the party's constitution, principles, and platform. *Purnawirawan* dominance was not found in the drafting team or among the founders, including in Yudhoyono's personal networks. A team named "Krishna Bambu Apus" coordinated by Vence Rumangkang formulated the basic concept and the party platform (DPP Partai Demokrat, 2016) and conducted an administrative discussion.[18] The involvement of civilian politicians in the party organization had an encouraging impact, because the party was able to reap 7% of the votes in the 2004 elections and formed a coalition of Yudhoyono-Kalla that won the 2004 presidential elections. Under Yudhoyono, the party grew increasingly large and was able to attract many heads of local government to join. Its ideological position as a catch-all party made it easier to attract support as it was able to accommodate differing platforms, ideologies and political values. The heads of local government who joined were mostly disappointed with their previous affiliation with the parties or were not able to be part of those parties' cadres. The influx of new members who held public offices was a significant force that had to be managed properly. Shortly after the 2004 legislative and presidential elections, *purnawirawan* who had been on the campaign team were finally inaugurated as Central Board members in the 2005 Congress. In this phase, the type of semi-militarist party began taking shape.

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[18] They were: (1). Vence Rumangkang; (2). A. Yani Wahid; (3). Achmad Kurnia; (4). Adhiyaksa Dault,; (5) Baharuddin Tonti, and (6). Shirato Syafei. An early precursor of the organization was called the "Nine Team" (Tim 9). New people who were included early after the formation are: Ahmad Mubarok; Subur Budhisantoso; Irzan Tanjung; R. M. H. Heroe Syswanto Ns; RF. Saragih,.; Dardji Darmodihardjo; Rizald Max Rompas, and T. Rusli Ramli.

After the 2004 presidential election, the party seemed to be in need of experts in organizing party support. In addition, this was due to the need to obtain the party's political incentives. A more in-depth discussion of the role of *purnawirawan* in the presidential elections will be included in the next chapter. Massive recruitment of *purnawirawan* following the 2004 presidential election shaped the party's character with a pattern of military strategy aimed at the presidential election. For example, a three-way approach to the concept used in the presidential election begins with intelligence operations or data collection as material for the winning design (Democratic Party constitution, 2003).

After Yudhoyono's victory in the 2004 election, this party was reorganized that the *purnawirawan* could strengthen their control. In the central office, there is a Board of Trustees chaired by Yudhoyono. This council has the function of providing guidance, advice, and counsel to the party executive in the Central Executive Board (DPP). A similarly functioning body as the local board is the Advisory Councils (MPP, *Majelis Pertimbangan Partai*), which provides advice and counsel to the party leadership at all levels of local governance, whether requested or not. This party has a charismatic figure attached to Yudhoyono's party as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. However, in the Executive Committee, the Chairman of the party has responsibility to control party organization. In the era of Hadi Utomo's stewardship in 2004-2009, only few *purnawirawan* held strategic positions in the central board management as Chairman, Ordinary Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Secretary-General. Party co-ordination can still be achieved by the Board of Trustees as a determinant of the direction of the general policy of the party, with the Executive Board as the executor of the policy. Conflict began when the 2010 Congress in Bandung elected Anas Urbanigrum Chairman. Upon being elected, Anas Urbanigrum recruited his activist network and civilian politicians to the central board management. He also attempted to separate and eliminate the control of the Board of Trustees of the party over the Executive Board.

The Democratic Party emerged in the second phase of *purnawirawan* party development. They took valuable lessons from the collapse of the parties their colleagues built in 1998-2004. Within the Democratic Party, the *purnawirawan* built mutual relationships with civilians and worked not only with politicians but also with social activists, academics, businessmen, and student organizations. In the preparation of the central board management structure, civilian groups could also make arrangements. This resulted in a higher degree of civilian control over them and impacted the balance of power in organizational control. This situation pushed them to modify their core military pattern from strong to moderate leadership.

Under Hadi Utomo's leadership in 2005 to 2010, *purnawirawan* controlled the Board of Trustees and no longer dominated the party organization at the

Executive Board level (Democratic Party Structure, 2005 to 2010). This proportion makes the party became more open in accepting democratic values and affirming its commitment to achieve political objectives through constitutional mechanisms. The leadership combination of Hadi Utomo as Chairman and Marzuki Alie as Secretary-General had a significant impact on expanding membership and winning the 2009 elections. In addition, important aspects of the *purnawirawan* involvement are based on their military networks for support mobilization in Yudhoyono campaign of 2009, especially the Echo Team under Djoko Suyanto (*Kompas*, April 28, 2009).

The *purnawirawan* roles can be grouped into three. The first is their role as party controller. In the key positions in the Board of Trustees and the Executive Board, this role function consists of the period of stewardship when *purnawirawan* occupied the position as Chairmen and as Secretary-General. Through their control, the party became a stable political organization internally and is responsive to the dynamics of political change as the input from civilian politicians were taken seriously. Besides, the bargaining position of civilian politicians in the party was high. Second is the role of distribution, with which the *purnawirawan* had the freedom to recruit new *purnawirawan* and projected them into the political candidacies. Third is the role of transforming the military organization with the party vision. This role or function was only effective under Hadi Utomo stewardship (Aminuddin, 2017:22). He expanded the network, not only to the new political groups from across the political spectrum but also to a political group that had been established previously. In addition, an important aspect of the involvement of the *purnawirawan* was seated in military networks for mobilization of support in Yudhoyono campaign in 2004. The former successful team members in the presidential campaign were then recruited to strategic positions in the party, and many of them were distributed to legislative candidacies.

Democratic Party leadership lies in Yudhoyono as the Chairman and as the party symbol capable of mobilizing civilians in preparation for the party's establishment. At the same time, he was also fully engaged in formulating the underlying ideology, vision, and mission of the party platform. There are at least two important factors that can be seen in this leadership model. First, Yudhoyono involved the *purnawirawan* in the elite circle of the party to avoid the past conflicts of interest that would have an impact on the polarization of the leadership. Second, by involving civilians it was easier to manage and organize the party elite. Furthermore, the Democratic Party wanted to present itself as a new political force driven by the civilian spirit in party organization and to meet the demands of the *reformasi* movement.

The *purnawirawan* dominated the leadership in the initial period of 2004 to 2006, and then in 2009 to 2014. The first tension between the *purnawirawan* and

civilian groups occurred in the first Congress of the party in May 2005 in Bali. The Congress was led by Subur Budhisantoso as Chairman, with E. E. Mangindaan as Secretary. The Congress also enacted the selection and separation of authority between the Chairman of the Executive Board of the DPP and the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Congress did not divulge details of this decision –that this facilitated the election of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees– since it was certain that Yudhoyono would occupy the position.

The Congress could be seen from two different perspectives, namely, civilian perspective that wanted to maintain Yudhoyono as the central figure and a group of *purnawirawan* who wanted to confirm that the party's direction would not depend on the figure of Yudhoyono. Congress eventually chose Hadi Utomo the first Chairman for the 2005-2010 period.[19] Discordant voices emerged, who assumed that the *purnawirawan* faction supported the rise of Hadi Utomo. They prearranged illicit games, which tackled the opportunities of other candidates, through trial orders made by the chairperson.

Post-Congress, there was a rejection of the new Chairman. In another faction led by Sukartono, candidates who failed in the Chairman election tried to consolidate their followers by establishing a breakaway party, believing their aspirations could no longer be accommodated. However, this faction's founder never created the party. Hadi Utomo structured organizations to optimize the network of civilian politicians and to bring in political activists to raise the party. He reiterated his view through a speech at the Congress:

> There should be no dependence on anyone. Slowly we are trying to break the dependency to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is currently the President… The fate and future of the Democratic Party depend on us all, administrators, and party cadres (Utomo, 2007;5).

Compared with the other existing parties, Democratic Party has had a higher number of *purnawirawan*, as Dataset confirms. They sat on the management and acted as the Founder and Chairman, Ordinary Chairman, Secretary-General to the chief party bodies and the organs of the party wings. Even though it has a high number of *purnawirawan*, in general, the representation of public image as a reformist party has been quite successful. In the recruitment of *purnawirawan*, a small elite circle in the party and Yudhoyono were more selective. Among those

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[19] Congress regulation of 1st PD Congress, Bali. Final result cited in party decree No: 02/Kongres Ke-1/Partai Demokrat/2005, May 21, 2005, The meeting was chaired by Subur Budhisantoso, Vence Rumangkang (Vice), E. E. Mangindaan, (Secretary) and members: Ahmad Mubarok.; Rizal Max Rompas; and Soekarnotomo.

included in the management are former members of the military or police who were not involved in human rights violations or other issues in the past.

Hadi Utomo and *purnawirawan* in his staff have made a generous contribution, and their efforts paid off in the 2009 election, not to mention the fact that Yudhoyono won the presidency for the second term. *Purnawirawan* exponents playing important roles in the 2004 presidential elections are still with the party. Among them is Rubik Mukav, former *Kapuspen* (Information Centre) of TNI who was in Yudhoyono-Kalla campaign team. Rubik Mukav was the responsible for the party's data collection, mass communication, and media briefing (*Tempo*, Vol 8, 2004). Several other prominent *purnawirawan* chose to run in the legislative election, such as Salim Menga an elected MP from West Sulawesi and served in Commission I overseeing defence, foreign affairs and information. He was actively involved in the discussion on the modernization of the defense equipment for the military. He also ran for governor in the West Sulawesi election despite failing. Other names are Syamsul Mappareppa, an area coordinator for Yudhoyono-Boediono's team in South Sulawesi. He coordinated 24 parties who supported Yudhoyono, administrators, a team of volunteers, and party cadres in Sulawesi. In the same year, he was appointed Acting Chairman in the province.

On the central executive board there were *purnawirawan* such as Cornell Simbolon, the Head of the Department of Defence, Amir Adiyaman Saputra who was a Member of Parliament representing the constituency of Banten in the 2009 election and was placed in Commission IV in charge of agriculture, plantation, and food. Members of the Central Board were also deployed to the Provincial Board. In party internal conflict in the Banten local election, he was appointed Acting Chairman in the provincial board of Banten and chaired seven teams, whose candidates won the local election in Banten (*Kompas*, 2010) In Hadi Utomo's period of stewardship, the *purnawirawan* in the party management were fully utilized and won strategic positions.

The third function of the *purnawirawan* in transforming leadership was implemented consistently. In the 2010 party Congress, Hadi Utomo chose to rotate leadership by providing support to the civilian politician Anas Urbaningrum. The party's direction was changed on a large scale under Anas' leadership. He preferred to build a party network with civilian politicians and social activists from his old connections in a Muslim student association (HMI). Anas's policies that eliminated the *purnawirawan* from the Board of Executive resulted in the weakening of political support from the Board of Trustees, which was still dominated by *purnawirawan*. At the time when Anas was entangled in corruption scandals, some of the *purnawirawan* board members urgently convened an Extraordinary Congress in Bogor, which led to Anas' dismissal as Party Chairman.

Anas did not completely negate the role of *purnawirawan* in party staff, but gave non-strategic positions to them. On the Central Board of 2010-2015, there were *purnawirawan* such as Cornell Simbolon, who held the position of Head of the Department of Politics and Security. In the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial election, he mobilized 182 *purnawirawan* to support Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli who chaired the retired military-police community. Anas also appointed Nurfaizi, another purnawirawan, Chairman of Defense and Security on the Central Board. After he failed to run for Governor in 2012, he switched position to become a member of the Board of Trustees (*Tempo*, July 4, 2015). From controlling the party, the positions of the *purnawirawan* were downgraded to middle-rank positions, such as Head of Department and head of Party Bodies with only limited authority in strategic decision-making.

The limitation in *purnawirawan*'s role under the new leadership ignited a polarization between purnawirawan and civilian groups in the party, to which Yudhoyono responded. In the case of Anas Urbaningrum, party officials urged the convening of an assembly through the recommendations issued by the *ad hoc* committee known as the Council of the Party (*Majelis Penyelamat Partai*). Before the assembly, it was created and appeared on the Honorary Board (*Dewan Kehormatan Partai*) of the party, which contains the party's rescue agenda. The recommendation was immediately followed by the convening of the High Council (*Majelis Tinggi*) chaired by Yudhoyono with Silalahi as Secretary. The results of the High Council's decision were published on 8 February 2013 (*Tempo*, February 8, 2013). It stated that the entire Central Board's authority was in the hands of Yudhoyono, as the Chairman of the High Council, who had the authority and responsibility to lead the rescue and consolidation of the party. All party organs, from central to local, now experienced either vertical control or horizontal interventions, making them under Yudhoyono's control. Party organization in the central board was temporarily carried out by a Presidium, led by the Chairman of the DPP and the Secretary-General –a role occupied by Edhi Bhaskoro, Yudhoyono's son, who had been on the leadership with Anas Urbaningrum.

The Extraordinary Congress assembly in Bogor in March 2013 had the sole agenda of the election of the Chairman. The Extraordinary Congress urged Yudhoyono to resolve the succession in the party and chose him as Chairman of the DPP. This unanimous election was followed by the appointment of Sharif Hassan as Acting Chairman of the DPP, Marzuki Alie as Vice-Chairman of the High Council and E. E. Mangindaan as Acting Chairman of the Board of Trustees. After Hadi Utomo's administration, the Democratic Party became a party that is highly dependent on Yudhoyono as the holder of party authority.

4.5 Militarist Party: The Case of Gerindra

Gerindra (The Great Indonesia Movement) was founded before the 2009 elections. The party is the brainchild of Fadli Zon and Hashim Djojohadikusumo, a businessman and Prabowo Subianto's younger brother, in November 2007 (Gerindra, 2010). At the time Prabowo was still a member of the Golkar Board of Supervisors under Jusuf Kalla. In the early formulation of the party establishment, all the initial team members were civilians. After the creation of normative form of organization and the already visible completeness of the party constitution, Prabowo invited Muchdi P. R., a former commander of the Special Forces Command (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*, *Kopassus*) and in the discussions, including providing Gerindra's name and designing the eagle's head as the party's symbol. The beginning of party establishment was similar to Democratic Party where civilians formulatng the party establishment recruited the *purnawirawan* figure who was asked to become an icon and leader of the party.

Gerindra looks to integrate two poles of political ideology –nationalism and religiosity. We can see the same way-of-looking in Democratic Party's ideology. Gerindra's constituency base in 2009 election was gained from Golkar, Democratic Party, and PDI-P since it did not have its own organized mass base. Vote acquisition from Golkar was obtained from the support and the vast network of military families and rural voters. The jargon the party broadcasted to target farmers, fishermen, and small economic groups has been proven to generate support.

Motivated to win seats in the 2009 elections, Gerindra began creating its organizational structure. In the central board management, the Board of Trustees holds the highest authority of the party. The Executive Board of the DPP only implements policy from the Trustees after getting the mandate to run the party's policy direction by the Congress. The Gerindra Board of Trustees is led by Prabowo and consists almost entirely of *purnawirawan*. The Executive Board, nevertheless, are controlled largely by civilian politicians and a small number of *purnawirawan*. Then in the post of Deputy Secretary-General there was Colonel (ret.) Dalkijo. The stewardship composition resulted in a militarist party organization. Civilian politicians have no significance in the major policies of the Board of Trustees. Prabowo's Army loyalists overwhelmingly predominated the party management, for example, Chairawan Nusyirwan, who was a Group 4 Commander/Sandi Yudha Special Forces involved in the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in 1998. After a judicial process, he became an officer in the TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS, *Badan Intelijen Strategis*). After retiring as a Major General, he entered Gerindra and served as a member of the Board of Trustees and concurrently the Chairman of the *Organisasi Solidaritas Rakyat Peduli Indonesia* (Sorpindo, People's

Solidarity Care Indonesia). In the 2014 elections campaign, he garnered support from Aceh (*Tempo*, July 1, 2014).

The Board of Executives does not have dominant control over the party bodies or organ party wings. Compared with PDI-P where the party bodies have coordination with party officials at each subnational level, Gerindra's management is more centralized. It was confirmed in Gerindra's constitution that the bodies and party wings are established by DPP to carry out certain tasks. As for the wing organs, the endorsement of member composition may be determined by the Central Board leadership overseeing those wings (Gerindra, 2012, Article 27). Within the management structure of the party, another influential factor is the central figure of patronage in which the leader still hovers over. The impact is that the party was managed centrally and created a party oligarchy that works by ignoring the principles of democracy. In addition, the selection of candidates cannot be executed without confirmation from the party leader; meanwhile, the procedure has consistency with the transparent mechanism. The rotation of the party leadership has tended to be closed since the circulation is hampered by the party's oligarchy, which is dominated by *purnawirawan*.

The party applies an organizational pattern that similar to that of the New Order's Golkar. The highest authority is in the hands of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees. The party's constitution states that the Board of Trustees is the supreme leadership council (Aminuddin, 2017: 23). They have the authority to establish the constitution of the party, the Congress, appoint the Executive Board Chairman, the Chairman of the Advisory Board, the Chairman of the Board of Experts, and to nominate cadres for public office until there is a recommended candidate for Governor (Gerindra, 2012, Chapter 18). Under the Board of Trustees is the executive board of DPP, which has limited authority to implement policies and collectively work with the Advisory Board and Expert Council, as stipulated in Article 24. Another party body is *Mahkamah Partai* (the Party Court), which was formed by the DPP and the Board of Trustees must approve its composition.

Within the party structure, the *purnawirawan* have a dominant role. Some of them also occupied a strategic position in the management of DPP and the Advisory Board. Tohar Amin, the former commander of Presidential Guard, sat as a Deputy-Chairman of the DPP and Asril Hamzah occupied the advisory board. In the initial recruitment until 2012, Prabowo preferred to collect his counterparts in the Army, mainly from *Kopassus* and Kostrad. From the beginning of 2012, new recruitment occurred on a large scale done by including all the elements of the military corps. Most of the *purnawirawan* inside the party each recruited a new member who retired after 2004. From the Navy, in the rank of the advisory board, sat among others, Suharto, a former commander of the Marine Corps and Moekhlas Sidik, Chief

of the Eastern Fleet of the Navy (*Berita Satu*, February 12, 2012). The expansion of support from outside the Army made this party a large-scale shelter for *purnawirawan*. In addition to the new party members, there were displacement of other parties such as Golkar and Democratic Party. The impact can be seen in the massive influx of military family support to Gerindra.

In addition to suffering from a lack of party cadres who organized astutely and possessed reputations of high integrity, Gerindra was capable of displaying a different shape of party organization. In the 2014 elections, the acquisition of significant support placed it as the highest vote-gaining party after PDI-P and Golkar. The implementation of military discipline in the party management proved to have its own charm. The centralized leadership model allows party leaders to ensure the organization chain of command works effectively. This produces a level of discipline and a cadre of high officials, the emergence of prudence in maintaining organizational accountability, and the integrity of party cadres when ran in determination. For example, in terms of party funding sources and financial management, Gerindra has well documented the related source of funds in the annual financial statements. As described in the party constitution, the party's financial resources come from membership dues and other non-binding contributions as well as formal assistance from the government and supporters. In addition, each party member serving as a legislator at either national or local parliament is required to give 25% of his or her income (Gerindra, 2012, Chapter XVII of Finance Article 58). Between 2008 and 2013, Gerindra became the party with the highest financial transparency. In a survey conducted by Transparency International Indonesia (TII) on political party funding, of the nine other political parties surveyed, the highest transparency index is Gerindra with 3.74, followed by PAN (3.64), PDI-P (3.10), Hanura (2.41), and PKB (2.31) (*Kompas*, April 16, 2013). The party tries to maintain accountability for its cadres on financial issues. Institutionally, the party office's annual release routinely contains statements of income and the use of party funds. This is a sign of good performance for the administrative purposes of reporting to the Election Commission or when made public.

Purnawirawan role in the party can be categorized as one of co-optation where they dominate the party's hierarchical structure. The dominance is of a high degree, causing civilian politicians' bargaining position to be very weak. Furthermore, the role of distribution functions is similar to that in the Democratic Party. In the 2014 elections, *purnawirawan* began to appear in the nominations for legislators in the DPR. They also ran in the gubernatorial elections. Their existence in the nominations for public office was a result of the distribution and arrangement of resources from *purnawirawan* in the party. The distribution in public office

nominations was followed by *purnawirawan* stewardship in party bodies, agencies, and organ party wings. Optimizing the performance of the party through the body and organ wings showed that Gerindra has the scope to extend and organize the basis of a new constituency. This party has a plural constituency base and includes many community groups thanks to Prabowo who initiated most of the establishment wing of party organs. Up until 2014, Gerindra gave birth to thirteen party wings –most of which placed Prabowo as the Chairman on the Board of Trustees.

The massive *purnawirawan* recruitment in the Democratic Party's KLB 2012 only became a formal endorsement of their contribution in the presidential election of 2009. They were involved as part of a successful team that won the presidential candidate from PDI-P and Gerindra coalition, Megawati-Prabowo. They had a strategic position and were intended to encounter *purnawirawan* in Yudhoyono's camp. Prabowo included those who had a strategic position in the Army, such as Amir Tohar. In the 2009 presidential elections, Amir provided support to nineteen *purnawirawan* of General rank for Prabowo (*Solo Pos*, April 8, 2009). In the 2014 presidential election, he was informally involved as the unrecorded architect of the formal campaign team, mobilizing the tactical organs that were formed to support Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa candidacy.

In connection with the function distribution, there was a particular case of the pattern of distribution of *purnawirawan* tasks. Among the existing, not all were placed in the position of winning the election as the first team led by Suharto, the former commander of the Marine Corps who sat as Chairman on the Board of the National Campaign 2014 legislative elections. Some of them were even more active in raising mobilization and intelligence operations outside of the official campaign team. The role of Asril Tanjung was organizing the political base of social networks in the community. He was known to have an effective network among registered organizations such as *Yayasan Dharma Putera Kostrad.* In the 2014 election, he was active in several organizations and successfully mobilized them, including *Garda Nusantara*, *Laskar Merah Putih*, *Front Betawi Rempug* and *Gardu Prabowo*.

4.6 Summary

This chapter provides an analysis of how *purnawirawan* were involved in party development. The distribution and polarization of retired generals in political party membership and management, including within the political parties and their involvement in political mobilization, have been discussed. Analysis of the overall *purnawirawan* contribution shows their activities remain dominant. This chapter has answered the question of how they got involved in political parties and how they

organized political parties through the central offices. It is evident that *purnawirawan* have made an important contribution as the transforming power of the development of political parties. They have transformed parties through employing the military values in terms of organizational discipline, the selection of candidates and the winning strategy, and handling parties' interests in public institutions. They were able to build up the parties with new models of party organization, namely the highly militarist party, which only survived in the first phase of 1998-2004. Then semi-militarist party type started becoming popular in response to the failure of the party in the first phase of development. The model's success in the second phase led the party development into militarist party, where *purnawirawan* dominated over civilian politicians. In the third phase of the party development that actively involved *purnawirawan*, they were included in party that was controlled by civilians. However, their presence only lasted from 1998 to 2009.

The analysis of the four political parties with *purnawirawan* in their central offices brings about three important findings. First, the *purnawirawan* who were in a civilian-controlled party, such as in PDI-P and Golkar, had complementary functions, although in some ways both parties have a differentiation in the more specific functions. They were involved in organizing the party in policy implementation. In these parties, they had clear and strong ideological ties, so their mingling with civilian politicians may have given them an advantage in the candidacy. Second, in parties categorized as semi-militarist, *purnawirawan* still desired to dominate and control the party by placing a central figure at the center of patronage. However, civilian politicians also had a solid bargaining position in controlling the party. In this party, they have more control function than in the other models due to the expansion of the spectrum of political support. This involved the composition of the constituency base that varies from civilian politicians.

Third, the militarist party model was founded as a function of co-optation by *purnawirawan* domination in controlling the party. The party was managed in models similar to the New Order's Golkar. The central figures as the holder of supreme authority have built the party in such a way that it would still be under the management of centralist parties in authoritarian countries, although the opportunities for the emergence of pressure from civilian politicians works in minimizing the dictatorship of the party leader.

The next chapter will continue the analysis to the role of *purnawirawan* in political mobilization in the candidacy. The discussion on the issue may prove the effectiveness of the network built in the community and party constituency. It will also consider the influence of *purnawirawan* in moving the party machine, so they can determine the factors that helped these parties survive, gain votes in the election, and place candidates in public offices.

Patterns of *Purnawirawan* Networks:
Mobilization and Effectiveness in Electoral Candidacy

Following the discussions on *purnawirawan's* roles in party development, this chapter explores their involvement in electoral candidacy either in legislative or executive positions. The exploration covers several aspects including the *purnawirawan* involvement in legislative candidacy. The review includes the selection and nomination process in their political party. In addition, the different political participation mechanism in the four parties is also examined. The assessment also involves party member recruitment and the motives of each party to nominate an individual to run for elections. Covering the other parts of the election, the project identifies *purnawirawan* network in the presidential election as candidates for president and vice president, as well as campaign manager and supporting team. The variables observed under this project are the patterns of network building in voters mobilization and campaign, the roles in tactical organization, and the utilization of military expertise in designing a winning strategy. Furthermore, a discussion also focuses on the withdrawal of military institutional support for *purnawirawan* candidates and the degree of its impact to their electoral competitions and success.

This chapter explores their strategic roles in struggling for success in elections and in turn gaining access to public offices. The analysis highlights four elections as to defer competitions for executive and legislative offices. With respect to the legislative election, *purnawirawan* candidacy is analyzed through a comparison of the four parties competing in four consecutive elections taking place in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. The objective of the study is, therefore, to explore their task as a board member of a party and as a candidate running for the parliament. Existing observations show that only *purnawirawan* holding the main position in central office would be likely to get elected. The main question is whether the condition or opportunity for winning the *legislative election* differs between those who acted as ordinary party member and those who held position as party officials since it is evident that *purnawirawan* typically made extensive contributions to win the election.

In the context of *presidential election*, the analysis begins with the first direct presidential election since 2004 while focusing on *purnawirawan's* roles in the campaign team of the presidential candidate. There are indications that being a core member in the campaign team would give some post-election benefits –especially if

the member had previously served as a board member of the party, the benefit might have been different or better than those who were ordinary supporters. Therefore, the spotlight shifts to *purnawirawan* who has taken charge of the party rather than those who belonged to a party and recruited as a part of the winning candidate's team. A question we need to answer in this context is whether party development had a relationship with the recruitment process and polarization support.

How was the cross-party management of *purnawirawan* implemented in practice and to what extent were political motives recognized for the support? This chapter highlights events of presidential elections in 2004 and 2009 as well as gubernatorial election in 2014 in which the candidacy is analyzed in terms of the winning models and the relationship between the interest to pursue a position and the support for the candidate's nomination for governor. Therefore, the analysis aims to identify the extent to which party support determines success in the election.

5.1 *Purnawirawan* in Electoral Candidates

Purnawirawan mobilization during elections has been extensive. Their involvement was mostly personal *via* a network of their former classmate, branch, corps, or loyalty base chain of command. Most newly recruited *purnawirawan* come from the outside of party management. The short-term goal of their involvement is winning the election. The model of mobilization support and the expansion strategy carried out by the elites is bounded by time and target. In that sense, the selection strategy is based on so called-military working instruments that are well-organized and have a clear and measurable target.

Utilization of the party as a political vehicle for short-term interests was only done by *purnawirawan* joining the party during the limited recruitment process for presidential election. In fact, the recognition of joining the party and the electoral system are important factors in institutionalizing the party system, which result in legitimacy. Policy-making authority is mainly made in the central office of the party, particularly in persuading political actors to function in strategic positions. As a result, it has some serious flaws. For example, it affects the functions of other organizations that are not very well established (Tan, 2006). In other cases, some of charismatic party figures simply tend to only gain voter support in the presidential election, then coopt parliamentary political parties in the legislation process (Liddle & Mujani, 2005). The impact of this approach is visible in legislative elections where a voter might cast his vote in favor of a certain party symbol and also opt for a candidate from a different party (Ghoshal, 2004). The strengthening of the charismatic figure is essential in identifying voters with the party. The downside of

using the party as a personal vehicle by wealthy businessmen, as it occurred in Golkar and PAN, was also evident in the case of well-networked retired army officers in Gerindra and Hanura. For political parties, the problems become more complex because the management level of local party had very little influence on the decision-making at the central party management. The pattern of cadre recruitment and selection of candidates was thus dominated by party elites without involving the management of the local levels.

Figure 2 shows that *purnawirawan* started to shift to political contestation in the 2004 elections, which were the first to be conducted after the withdrawal of the military from the parliament. From 1998 to 1999, the number of *purnawirawan* who joined political parties and contested in national or local elections for the parliament was very low. Starting from 2004, the number rose precipitously to 19.8% from the total of 388 people. In the local elections during the period of 2004-2009, either for executive or legislative positions, there was a higher-than-average rate of candidacy from *purnawirawan* than in the former period of 1998-2004. In the 2009 elections, the percentage of participation decreased to 8.76%; however, the average participants in local executive elections between 2009 and increased significantly reaching 15.72% in 2014.

Figure 2: Percentage of Purnawirawan in Candidacy in the Legislative elections of 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014; Head of Local Government 2005-2014

Source: MR Dataset

Before 2004, military politics was represented by TNI/Police faction in the parliament as legislators. In the gubernatorial election through local parliament, the participation of *purnawirawan* was very low and only involved a few people who was in retirement. Most of them were former military commanders at provincial level. Due to the law on direct elections for Governors and Regents/Mayors effective starting from the 2004-2009 period, *purnawirawan* nomination rose slightly in the local elections. This number increased to 9.79% in 2013. Those who pursued public office were more oriented towards becoming a member of the national parliament as in the 2004 elections. In some cases, those failing at national election level changed their orientation and ran for gubernatorial election candidacy, and the position of Head of Regent or Mayor of Municipality.

During the election period of 2009, the number of *purnawirawan* participating was less than half of that in 2004. Failure in the 2004 elections and the results of local elections between 2004 and 2009 led to the declining interest of contestation for the same positions. Only those who became board members in new parties, such as Democratic Party and Hanura, did compete again. Some ran for PDI-P or Golkar and smaller parties. As Democratic Party and Hanura achieved victory and Gerindra was established, their participation in the legislative elections increased significantly. Their number was not as high as in 2004 but they could compel their party machines to provide support for them. The *pilkada* (local elections) period of 2009-2014 showed a high level of their participation. The

impact of Democratic Party's victory and Yudhoyono's second term of presidency were very motivating for their participation in elections. The public's positive perception of military retirees was recognized in the poll by *Kompas* published in 2007. The poll stated that around 46.6% of the respondents chose military figures as the president and 43.5% would prefer civilian, compared with the same poll in 1998 where as many as 64.1% respondents refused the possibility of a military person becoming president.

Beside a stronger military involvement in political parties post-2004, many were involved in *pilkada* although most of them did not succeed. The popularity and strength of the military network, even when figures such as military commanders, were not a guarantee for their success in winning political contestation. In general, two important things affected most of the *purnawirawan* being defeated in direct elections. The first thing was the trauma reflected in public perception of the country's previous military leadership. This was especially the case in the election periods from 2004 to 2009. The other factor was the internal military reform where military institutions prohibited the use of their facilities or the authority of active military networks to support candidates –even if they were formerly part of the military. The military has been criticized for granting permission for officers who were still in active service to nominate themselves. It was considered superfluous since active officers should perform their main duty instead to support military professionalism in military institutions.

5.2 Legislative Candidacy

Regarding legislative elections, studies found that the factor motivating candidates to nominate themselves was the existence of a political party that was open to candidates; a party that was capable of helping them achieve their goals by increasing their desirability (Downs, 1957). Parties have the infrastructure and the agency to reach voters directly whicn eventually contribute to the candidate's success in elections. Even in systems represented by a small number of political parties, their support is still beneficial for political candidates. Therefore, in general, party machine's capacity and the resources a political candidate possesses both play an important role in the election outcome (Shefter, 1994). The candidacy objectives can be broadly defined into an effort to maintain candidates' influence in the context of public welfare, regional and national development, and democratization and law enforcement (Magaloni, 2006; Scheiner, 2006). For candidates who oppose the incumbent government, participation in elections can become a means to demonstrate the skills and the adequacy of their resources to engage in competition. This is often the case in the race for space and dynamics within the opposition party

(Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). From this perspective, an analysis of *purnawirawan* candidacy in elections is conducted to discover how they can situate themselves as part of political parties.

In Indonesia, the inclusion of *purnawirawan* as candidates is generally not achieved through the bottom-up recruitment process and their commitment to pursue a "career path" until they are nominated as candidates in the election. Rather, they should join the election nomination through the recruitment of elites based on their connection with party chairman or key party figures. Moreover, the nominated candidates are to represent the party due to either the range of their networks and related resources or the party's high considerationto grant them the position of a political candidate. According to Norris (1997), there are important factors involved in legislative recruitment including the political system that affects opportunities, internal recruitment process within the party that allows cadres to achieve candidacy, the supply of social and political capital owned by the candidate, and the demands of the electorates with respect to the characteristics an ideal candidate should possess. However, despite the recruitment and nomination process, the party retains a central role as the final decision-maker. The party maintains control over the candidate selection process, as most parties still function as the owners of internal authority (Rahat & Hazan, 2001).

Two inherent factors have an impact on the number of votes acquired –the compatibility between the party's organization and structure of the party machinery, and the placement of a candidate in possessing certain appeal and charisma. The electoral system and tendencies affect those two factors although the results may vary. The data reported in Table 15 confirm that a) *purnawirawan* preferred to take positions in the central office or board management (i.e., at the national level) rather than at provincial or local levels; b) *purnawirawan* who competed in national legislative elections were much more prominent than those who chose to advance to positions in provincial and local parliaments; c) historically speaking, *purnawirawan* more likely won the elections for local executive positions, both in gubernatorial elections and elections for head of local government, than at national level; d) *purnawirawan* elected as members of the national parliament had greater power than those at the provincial and local levels; and e) with regard to executive positions, *purnawirawan* were more likely to obtain positions in the provincial and local governments than in the national one. Based on this data, it is viable to analyze mobilization and candidacy networking formation in the process of winning public office occupancy.

Table 15: Purnawirawan in Politics, 1999-2014

Purnawirawan in Politics	Level		
	National	Provincial	Local
Political Party Board Member	137	33	23
Legislative Candidacy	150 (DPR) 3 (DPD/Senate)	13	1
Executive Candidacy	5 (President/Vice)	59	64
Legislative Office	24 (DPR) 1 (DPD/Senate)	6	1
Executive Office	1	12	14

Data collected from 1999 to February 2014. For specific positions in legislative and executive office, please refer to the next chapter. Source: MR Dataset.

In analyzing *purnawirawan* candidacy in the election, two aspects inducing the electoral system changes are evident, such as the effects of the candidate selection model adopted by each party and the support of the party's political machinery for them. In the 1999 elections, the proportional representation (PR)-closed list was the prevailing system as it allowed each party to put its cadre in strategic positions and made sure that they were qualified as Members of Parliament. Since the 2004 elections, the PR-open list was in use allowing the inclusion of popular figures in the party. In the 2009 elections, however, the open-list PR system was coupled with the imposition of a majority vote. As can be seen in Figure 2, the total number of *purnawirawan* running for election in the national legislature was 19.59% (out of 388 people), followed by prospective members of the provincial parliament at 3.35%. For local parliament, this figure was below 3% and the same tendency was observed for those who advanced to senatorial positions. The prestige of Member of Parliament at the national level comes from their involvement in the formulation of national policies. In the provincial parliament, which deals only with political and local government issues, their roles were limited to provincial level and limited acces to national level.

Purnawirawan candidacy in legislative elections was less than 20% of the total number of those who were in charge of the party. Moreover, most of these individuals were recommended as candidates in national legislative elections. The phenomenon may be attributed to the lack of interest among them in running for the parliament due to lower bargaining power in policy-making positions in the legislature which is relative to the one attained through executive positions. Their existence within the party was understood as for merely the purpose of acquiring the management and control of vertical and horizontal interventions against civilian

cadres who occupied legislative and executive positions. It may also be caused by the process of recruitment and selection of candidates in which the party avoided nominating *purnawirawan* as a prioritized candidate, as was evident by Democratic Party in 2004 and Gerindra in 2009. There were indications of fear that the poor image of the military would affect the overall image of the party and the overall acquired votes.

The aforementioned observation prompts the need to analyze the extent of their success while most *purnawirawan* did not achieve great success to obtain parliamentary seats. It is worthexamining the influence of the electoral system and its fluctuation effect of their candidacy. Legislative elections provide a platform for intense competition between candidates. As a result, they no longer had special privileges and had to compete for a source of support from party organizations or strive for a secured expansion of support from voters outside the party's constituency. They also had to compete with civilian politicians in the race for Member of Parliament position. The conflict between *purnawirawan* and civilian politicians from various backgrounds was so extensive that it influenced their success at the election. Among hundreds of those who have competed in national elections from 1999 to 2014, only a few dozen who succeeded in becoming Members of Parliament. Moreover, given the poor public image of the military, it was a challenge for *purnawirawan* to gain large number of votes in their candidacy.

5.2.1 *Candidacy in PDI-P*

PDI-P is regarded as a party mostly controlled by civilian politicians. In the period between 1998 and 2014, it nominated around 16 *purnawirawans* in electoral candidacies for national parliament and one person for provincial parliament. Five of these candidates were also qualified as members of the national parliament as they were Central Executive Board (DPP) officials who previously held positions in the board of executives. During the time they served in the military, they held important positions such as commander of the territorial military, provincial police, or other high military ranks. The other candidates were listed only as regular board members and did not hold important positions while they were in military service. This observation indicated that their victory was the result of a combination between *purnawirawan's* network during the candidacy and the support from party machinery gained from their position as board members.

Basically, the party had difficulties applying the military style in running an institution and its discipline. But compared to the other parties, PDI-P was a doctrinaire party and their organizational hierarchy is the one most similar with the military. According to TB Hasanuddin, who was appointed as Head Deputy of Campaign on Intelligence Affairs, PDI-P applied rallying theory that the military

employed. He noted further that there were fundamental problems such as low degree of organizational discipline and voluntary aspects within political party. Unlike the military which had command chain, high loyalty, discipline, and logistic support, the good modality in PDI-P was only military cadres (interview with TB Hasanuddin, December 3, 2015).

PDI-P is an established party with a number of members ranging from national to the village level –especially in the traditional constituencies in Central Java, East Java, Bali, and North Sumatra. The party constitution regulates the nomination of candidates to the national parliament is governed by the Central Executive Board (DPP). In the case of the provincial parliament, party candidates are designated by the management at the provincial level and are determined by the local parliament under the supervisory of the local-level officials.[20] *Purnawirawan* who joined the party which later became full members and party officials were subject to an elite recruitment process to be appointed directly by the Chairman and granted a strategic position, as the party required the expertise and network they possessed. This mechanism of candidate selection resulted in the selection of *purnawirawan* focusing only on personal lobby with the party elites. Their acknowledged aim was not to join and create political integration from lower levels of the party board or management but to involve in structuring the organization.

The result of this elitist recruitment process was that *purnawirawan* advancing to candidacy had no support from the party constituency in specific regions. Thus, they solely relied on the party vote to guarantee a sufficient number of parliamentary seats. They maximized the scope of their roles to increase the number of party votes by being involved in the formulation of strategy, resource mobilization, party organization, and logistic distribution.

In the 1999 elections, *purnawirawan* joining PDI-P benefitted from gaining a very large party vote share and this had an impact on their successful candidacy as MPs. Of the 48 political parties contesting the election, PDI-P emerged as the winner gaining around 33.7% of the national vote, allowing the party to appoint 153 of its people as members of the House of Representative (DPR) (Election Commission, 1999). PDI-P's victory could be explained by the mobilization strategy of the party machinery, along with the support for the identification of PDI-P as a party that represented the *reformasi* agenda and, thus, became a single agent for nationalist political forces (Sebastian, 2004). In the 1998 Party Congress in Denpasar, Megawati held great authority to run the party organization which made her easier to run the

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[20] Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in recruiting legislative candidates has a mechanism that is described in the Assessment Letter No. 061/TAP/DPP/III/2013 which discusses the methods applied for netting, screening, determining, and registering candidates in the national parliament, as well as at the provincial and district/city levels during the 2014 election.

internal consolidation as to attract support from PDI elites, who previously supported the New Order regime. This had significant impact on the process of consolidation of the party elite and also positively influenced the level of acceptance by the party's constituents. The party's claims of being the main group of nationalist political forces received an enthusiastic response from various sectors, including economic and political, in the form of support for the party agenda. In the agenda, for instance, the implementation of various programs had a direct connection with PDI-P constituents from low-middle economic groups. The party built *Posko Reformasi* (Central Command of Party for *Reform*) that extended to the rural areas and provided basic food at lower prices (APCHR, September 15, 2014). This program was very popular and affirmed partisanship towards a group called *wong cilik* (grass-root voters).

The nationalist constituency base supporting PDI-P played an influential role. Megawati, as Sukarno's daughter, was already struggling against PDI and countering against the New Order regime. In particular, in the early 1990s, the periods of nationalist mobilization already started, allowing PDI-P, which followed the nationalist ideology, to successfully compete against other parties which was driven by Sukarno's other daughter, Sukmawati. In the 1999 elections, there were four parties with nationalist ideologies based on the lines of PNI or Indonesian nationalist party (in the Old Order) or PDI or Indonesian democratic party (in the New Order). The nationalist parties winning parlimentary seats were PDI-P with 153 seats, PNI Front Marhaneis (one seat), PNI Massa Marhaen (one seat), and PDI (two seats). Only Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which was led by Supeni at the time, did not win a seat at all. In the 2004 election, PNI-Supeni was renamed as PNI-Marhaenisme and appointed another of Sukarno's daughters, Sukmawati Sukarnoputri, as party leader. PNI Marhanisme's position could be considered important because it is one of the parties led by a daughter of Sukarno, along with the Vanguard Party (*Partai Pelopor*), which is led by Rachmawati Sukarnoputri (*The Jakarta Post*, April 2, 2009). Neither PNI-Marhaenis nor Partai Pelopor, whose party ideology is based on former President Sukarno's left-populist *Marhaenism*, attracted many supporters and sympathizers.

In the 2004 elections, only 16 of the 24 parties contesting in the election won seats in the House of Representative. Among the nationalist parties that won seats were PDI-P, PNI-Marhaenisme, and *Partai Pelopor* (Vanguard Party). Other nationalist parties, which were splinters of PDI-P Semarang Congress, failed to win seats. These parties included *Partai Banteng Nasional Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (PBNKI, Bull Party of National Independence of Indonesia) and *Partai Pelopor Demokrasi Indonesia* (PPD-I, Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party). In the 2009 elections, the number of political parties participating in the election increased to

44 parties. Although the number of political parties increased, the number of those who were able to obtain seats in the parliament were fewer. The implementation of the electoral threshold regulation resulted in only nine parties winning seats in the parliament. Of the three parties led by Sukarno's daughters, only PDI-P gained widespread support, and still remained a party with a relatively large vote.

The creation of public image on Megawati as a symbol of civilian group of resistance and her consistent fight against the New Order regime was a strong factor contributing to PDI-P's popularity. supporting such good perceptions of PDI-P was the *Kudatuli* incident on July 27, 1996, when dozens of PDI-P loyalists were killed or injured during an apparent military attack on the party headquarter with the involvement of the police force and the armed forces (Heryanto, 1997: 115-117). According Indonesian Human Rights Commission, there were 5 death casualties, 149 injured, and 23 missing (www.komnasham.go.id). *Kudatuli* was a direct reflection of the existence of opposition parties against the military regime, and the party was an institution who represented the interests of ordinary people who were oppressed by the regime. This dedication was emphasized by the spirit of resistance, symbolized by the events of *Kudatuli* delivered in the Congress in Semarang in 2000, along with the continuous demands for an investigation of the incident with the formation of a special advocacy team. Unfortunately, the investigation process is still vague and yields no success in bringing the perpetrator to justice. The proposed establishment of a special investigation team and ad hoc judiciary was not realized even since Megawati served as president in 2001-2004 period (Kompas.com, 27 July 2016).

Generally, among the problems PDI-P faced during the democratic transition period was the lack of technocratic ability possessed by politicians and cadres emerged as the most prominent ones. This was further exacerbated by the vulnerability in the national political circumstancespositioning PDI-P as the political enemy of New Order regime.

In the other context, *purnawirawan* recruitment for strategic positions that PDI-P elites conducted between 1998 and 1999 mostly based on the perception that recruiting them may become party resources in facing resistance from military institutions, which were still interested in weakening the party. Recruitment of military retirees indicated that PDI-P still needed the protection of military networks. The PDI-P needed figures such as MajorGenereal Theo Syafei to block the infiltration of military groups who were unhappy with Megawati and the PDI-P. Syafei withdrew from his position as a military representation in the parliament in 1997 after he protested the election results which he considered the existence of electoral fraud. Beside Syafei, there were other retired military officers who defended Megawati and PDI-P including Mayor General R.K Sembiring, Sunarso

Djajusman, and several officers from the Marines and Navy branch. In the past, the Navy had long been the ideological sympathizers of Soekarno, Megawati's father (McIntyre, 2005:197).

The second criteria determining the recruitment of a candidate was a belief that *purnawirawan* could be used to establish communication with those outside the party and would have a major influence on the great military fraternity. The third consideration for recruitment was the perception that these individuals were capable of taking advantage of their expertise during discussions on strategic issues in the parliament. While serving as president, Megawati did not fully carry out significant military reforms. She was very careful with the evidence of the impact of the military court on military abuses in the past and also kept a distance from the successful internal military leadership (Huxley 2013: 23). *Purnawirawan* within the party could play an active role in all of their three assumed areas of expertise and increase confidence when dealing with external party repression. Megawati, in some degree, was too weak to overcome her party's problems–especially when facing pressure caused by the military from "green factions" like General Feisal Tanjung or Suharto loyalists such as General R. Hartono (Aspinall, 2005: 164).

PDI-P still maintained its traditional constituency base and projected Megawati as the party symbol. Her personal claim of being Sukarno's ideological heir was still effective in finding support among the voters of nationalist groups. In addition to this cult element, the organizational network built by the party for the management of branch levels was also instrumental (Ziv, 2001). The distribution of PDI-P voters was particularly pronounced in Central Java, East Java, and West Java as their traditional base. Outside Java, its position was also well-established in North Sumatera and Bali (Mujani & Liddle, 2010; Soesastro, 1999; Choi, 2010; Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015). The existence of stewardship in the branch levels could effectively persuade the floating and rational voters when the party's image was improved. For example, after 2009, alternative prominent figures, such as Surakartan Mayor, Joko Widodo, started to emerge. However, PDI-P's landslide victory in the 1999 elections was not followed by the success of installing party chairman Megawati as the president-elect. At that time, the presidential election was conducted by the 700-member assembly (MPR); comprising of 500 members of parliament, including 38 military and police representatives, 135 special group representatives, and 65 special envoys from the provinces (Suryadinata, 2002: 140). While PDI-P gained 34% of votes in the election, it secured only 27% of the seats in the assembly. On the other hand, Golkar won 24% of the votes, yet obtained 26% of assembly seats. In the presidential election of 1999, a coalition of Islamist parties and Golkar, along with the military, succeed to assist Abdurrahman Wahid winning

the president's seat with 373 votes (Rinakit, 2005: 131; Liddle, 2000; Mietzner, 2008).

The Assembly's support for Megawati in the presidential election was similar to the expression of mass fanaticism by the traditional voters of PDI-P. In defense of Megawati, for example, various acts of support emerged as the blueprint of the bloodshed in Surabaya, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Manado, and Bandung. It continued with an extra-parliamentary movement to support Megawati to ascend to the presidency that occurred in Bali where a brutal action took place on October 20 and 21, 1999. The riot involved thousands of people taking over the streets and destroyed a number of public facilities including government-owned buildings in Buleleng, Badung, and Denpasar municipalities. This riot was followed by the emergence of a mass support base for PDI-P in Central Java who threatened to resign and dissolve if Megawati's faction in PDI-P lose (Gautama, 2000).

Between 1999 and 2004, the internal credibility of the organization suffered severely. Reorganization of the party was unsuccessful and the arrangement of cadres' integrity did not work well. PDI-P's public image got worse because of the bad reputation of party cadres occupying public office –many of whom were named as suspects in corruption cases. The cadres lacked competence in good governance while the party lacked a systematic and sustainable program to ensure integrity. The cadres assumed to have too much power and in turn acted beyond what the party dictated. PDI-P's cases of corruption and various other bad behaviors undoubtedly declined the party's image, creating a particularly worse reputation of the party (Hadiwinata in Croissant & Martin, 2006: 112; Henderson & Kuncoro, 2011; Klinken, 2009a). This urged the party leadership to nominate qualified external cadres to the party to compensate for the lack of professionalism among its own internal cadres. In the local elections, former Golkar officials and politicians from other political forces were nominated in large numbers and were supported to run as PDI-P candidates for public office.

After 2004, the party did not recruit more *purnawirawan*; but allowed those who previously held stewardship positions and continued to occupy a position in the party, even after becoming Members of Parliament. *Purnawirawan* played a significant role in PDI-P management from 1999 to 2004. In the following elections of 2009 and 2014, the number of new *purnawirawan* nominated as legislative candidates in the national elections were limited. On the other hand, *purnawirawan* within the party and the parliament remained loyal to the initial constituency base. Following the discouraging 2009 polls, the results of the 2004 election showed a drastic deterioration of PDI-P's votes share. The impact of Megawati's popularity during the election and her next defeat in the presidential election from Yudhoyono prompted the party to change its political orientation. The party decided to occupy

the position of opposition, although this was not a particularly feasible choice since the party did not possess access to public resources. Up to the 2014 election, the party prioritized the re-arrangement of cadre selection, careful recruitment, and thorough maintenance of the image of public integrity. In addition, *purnawirawan* who were already in the party failed to recruit new colleagues. Due to the minimal ideological ties and personal loyalty to PDI-P, Democratic Party and Gerindra began to look more promising for *purnawirawan* aspirants.

5.2.2 *Candidacy in Golkar*

After 1998, civilian control in Golkar was stronger. From 1998 to 2009, eight *purnawirawan* stood for election for national parliament and two for provincial parliament. Most of these individuals were daily administrators in the executive and advisory boards in Golkar's Central Executive Board (DPP). After 2009, civilian politicians increasingly started to emerge as the dominant group in the organization, leading to a shift in the strategic role of *purnawirawan* in the party. Golkar's support for them was mainly due to their bargaining power –a power that was still high until the 2004 election. In contrast to PDI-P who relied on their expertise, Golkar retained the position of being a representative of the large fraternity of military voters. Moreover, the party benefitted from the support extended by the New Order. A majority of *purnawirawan* held prominent positions such as secretary-general, vice-chairman, or chairman in the executive board of the organization and focused on electoral candidacy. They still enjoyed great opportunities because of the continuing support from their traditional bases comprising of the military fraternity and a section of civilian bureaucracy.

Even when the military no longer became an official part of the politics, the military family instinctively supported Golkar. That was why this party particularly endorsed *purnawirawan* to join as board members. According to Akbar Tanjung, *purnawirawan* as military personnel were encouraged to occupy a party or political office because the retired military figures possessed four important traits. First, in terms of leadership skills, they already acquired pertinent experience as military officials. Second, they understood the context of the on-going political and social issues since they had sufficient training on the politics. Third, they had experience working with the territorial control system. Forth, they had higher education equal to a university degree. These categories ensured that the military or its retired members had the necessary capabilities to mobilize civilian government institutions, both in executive and legislative branches (interview with Akbar Tanjung, 30 June, 2015).

Golkar was concerned with its candidacy model, which was based on the representation of supporters of political power. The electability of *purnawirawan*

who ran for candidacy was relatively high because they had a clear base of support and controlled the mobilization of the party machinery. Most of the *purnawirawan* in Golkar decided not to run for candidacy with the exception of high-level functionaries on the party board as their work was more effective as active party officials in the organization. One result of this decision was the increase of the party vote gained in the 2004 election. For this reason, the discussion on their candidacy did not refer to them as *candidates*, but rather it concentrated on their role in the selection mechanism of candidates of civilian politicians.

In the 2004 election, Golkar implemented strategies carrying a militaristic political character as these traits can be seen from several events happening around that period. The first event was the attack on the Wahid-Megawati administration as a product of reforms that failed to achieve better political stability in the country. It delivered a clear message of the government's poor management of the economy and the low public review of Megawati's governing performance. In addition, social stability and national politics also contributed to the public assessment of the incumbent government. Attempts to resolve the ethnic and religious conflicts in Ambon, separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, and other horizontal social conflicts occurring during the administration were slow. In this regards, Golkar politicians claimed that they had resources within the party far more ready to improve the current bad governmental condition running by incumbent government. Wiranto's entry as a presidential candidate strengthened the discourse on the weak government (Tomsa, 2008). During the campaign, the party elites enjoyed a solid organization and relied on the mobilization of the party machinery. The elites also emphasized the need for a firm leader. The process was culminated with an open assessment by Wiranto, who criticized Megawati-Hamzah Haz administration as particularly frail in law enforcement, and in turns allowed criminals to have more power than the police force (Wanandi, 2004; Kleine-Brockhoff, 2004).

Second, presidential candidates during the 2004 election period competed through the party convention to mobilize voters. This further strengthened the power of the party elites. It also allowed the party to obtain financial support from each candidate to provide financial support for the campaigns. In a closed-door event in Jakarta on 27 January 2004, the chairman of electoral campaign agency, Slamet Effendy Yusuf, stated that all the presidential candidates financially supported the winning party (*Tempo*, Vol. 33, Issues 48-52, 2004). The contributions of the presidential convention attendees were high in value since each had an extensive base support within the political organization, comprising party supporters and support from those sharing their socio-political backgrounds. Likewise, Prabowo was capable of directly organizing military support particularly

of large military family. The party was also keen to gain votes in Java, where the role played by Sultan Hamengkubuwono X was highly strategic and may help reaping the benefits of the vote share of 69 Javanese communities as a solid constituency of voters.

The party invested into efforts to improve its public image by maximizing democratic policies in every important decision. During the selection of the presidential candidate in 2004, Golkar was the first to hold a party convention in order to select a partner for the election candidate package (Bunte & Ufen, 2008). This strategy generated unexpected results because Akbar Tanjung, who served as party Chairman, failed to gain majority supportalthough Tanjung played a key role in saving the party from bankruptcy. As a part of the convention, Wiranto won 315 votes against 227 for Akbar (Ananta *et al.*, 2005: 94). *Purnawirawan* support for Wiranto was still very intense and confirmed that tensions simmered between the factions with different opinions on the process of democratization inside the party.

The mechanism of the party convention was not ideal. The systems and procedures applied were unclear and did not provide the certainty to the candidates in a more open and fair manner (DPP Golkar, 2003). In turns, the mechanism became more closed, changeable, and potentially loaded with tactics that were alien to the formal mechanisms. Internal party dynamics were converged into two interests: the determination of the presidential candidates created after the 2004 election and the other faction that demanded its execution before the election. Some participants from outside the party, such as Nurcholis Madjid, resigned from candidacy, reasonably arguing that there was a gap in practice. According to Madjid, this gap was evident because party Chairman had also nominated himself and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X backtracked. This decision was due to an on-going court case on corruption involving Akbar Tanjung as a suspect. The Supreme Court, however, acquitted him. Of the 19 candidates, the committee passed seven while six managed to bypass this process –they were Aburizal Bakrie, Surya Paloh, Wiranto, Akbar Tanjung, Jusuf Kalla, and Prabowo Subianto (Suryadinata, 2007. *Kompas*, January 19, 2004).

Third, their training on campaign dialogue maximized the role of the team of campaigners. The training was conducted for thousands of campaigners distributed throughout the territory. The preparation of campaign materials and visualization with mass media support was useful in expanding the party's socialization and social media integration. The elite ranks of the party were also actively involved in technical preparations and implementation of the agenda. Moreover, the campaigners came from the ranks of recruited party cadre, becoming both candidates and party officials. The model of direct campaign carried out through dialogue was adopted extensively. Similar to what was done in Central Java, 80% of

the strategy comprised of a dialogue campaign within limited spaces in campuses, homes of political figures, and meetings between cadres and voters in a particular area. The remaining twenty percent pertained to open meetings or public campaigns (*Kompas*, January 19, 2004).

The result of the 2004 election placed Golkar at the top with 21.6% of the vote –followed by PDI-P, which only obtained 18.5%. The support base was evenly distributed in each province, with the party winning in 26 of the 32 provinces. The campaign tagline of "New Golkar" was effective in regaining the original support base of New Order Golkar. Political positioning as the central party and its moderate development of ideology made it easier to remain flexible in its political movement to the right and left of the spectrum. The party's dynamic structure and organizational improvements, responding to current political changes, played important roles in projecting Golkar as a party undergoing transformation, particularly from its former support to an authoritarian regime into a political force supporting democratization. Wiranto's failure to emerge as the party's candidate for the presidential election was an evidence that the party's internal dynamics were successful. The entry of Jusuf Kalla, who won the election as the Vice-President to Yudhoyono, greatly affected the internal working of the party. In addition, the outcome of National Conference VII in Bali in the late 2004 placed the party in the position of government supporter (*Kompas*, April 28, 2004).

Until the 2004 elections, Golkar was open to a plural ideology with the aim of attracting all types of voters. This pluralism showed its importance when the party won the 2004 elections. They were able to attract the support from middle-class voters initially sympathetic towards PDI-P. They also gained votes from parties with religious ideology in their political discourses. In the 2004 elections, the party ideology was akin to that of Democratic Party, filled in by former exponents of the New Order Golkar. Although Democratic Party's support base was different from Golkar's segmentation, the choice of positioning as the central party had a positive influence on vote gain. With the advent of Democratic Party, most of the *purnawirawan* joining Golkar began to shift towards the new party because of Yudhoyono's figure. Moreover, they were allured by its prospects as the ruling party, which promised them a better prospect.

Purnawirawan's candidacy declined dramatically in the 2009 elections, in which Golkar gained votes in 27 of the 33 provinces. The number of seats in the national parliament grew significantly –however, very few of them were included in party candidacies. In addition, their number declined because of their migration to the Democratic Party. Internal party and constituency bases also decreased with the establishment of new parties, such as Hanura and Gerindra. However, the mechanisms and organizational culture remained well-established since civilian

politicians in the party had always found a way to maintain their presence inside the ring of power.

5.2.3 *Candidacy in Democratic Party*

Between 2004 and 2014, Democratic Party had promoted 19 *purnawirawans* for candidacy for national parliament and 2 for provincial parliament –showing the party with the most nominees when compared to others. Their performance was quite effective in counteracting the negative campaign against Yudhoyono and his background of active military service at the time. In the 2004 election, the party did not appear to seek candidacy in elections but focusing on leading a way for success for Yudhoyono to contest in elections following the reorganization of the support base for the newly established party. Although *purnawirawan* control appeared dominant ahead of the 2004 election, they were only involved in the organizational arrangement in order to frame the rules that guided the organization in the nomination of legislative candidates. As a newly established party, Democratic Party was vurnerable to internal conflicts in the selection of candidates because of the various characters of candidates and groups that had to be accommodated in the list of nominations for public office. This is the aspect of internal dynamics in the elite circulation that shaped the party formation unconventionally (Honna, 2012). Neither Golkar nor other smaller parties had run in the previous election. With a view to prepare for the 2004 election, the party organization was formed in December 2003 during the Third National Executive Meeting of Golkar in Jakarta. During the event, three strategic party actions –administration verification, recruitment, and socialization of the winning candidates– were discussed. All activities were coordinated by the board for electoral campaigns.[21] To gain 3-5% of the national vote was Yudhoyono's main target. In the 2004 election, they exceeded the target since the party managed to get 7.5% of the national vote (Democratic Party DPP, 2005).

In the elections in 2004, Democratic Party was placed among lower-middle ranking parties together with PPP, PKB, and PAN. The options of embracing Islam and the presence of nationalist groups enabled the party to gain some votes from the support bases of PKB, PAN, and PDI-P. Viewed from the distribution of voters, the figure of Yudhoyono became a major factor in securing the votes. Liddle and Mujani (2007) note that leadership was correlated directly with party identification during the 2004 presidential elections. In the locations where Yudhoyono shared personal or professional historical ties, the party won a significant margin –for instance in his birthplace in Pacitan and in Palembang where he had been a military

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[21] Decree of Democrat Party DPP No. 46/SK/DPP.PD/XI/2003.

commander in 1996 and 1997. In these two cities, the party was able to subvert PDI-P, which had previously dominated the areas in the previous elections. In other locations, such as Jakarta, his image was significantly boosted following his dismissal by President Megawati. The party also won the elections in Manado, North Sulawesi, where the two main civilian party figures –Vence Rumangkang, co-founder, and EE. Mangingaan, Secretary-General– were originated from (Boroma, 2011).

After the 2004 elections, the party held its first Congress and successfully placed *purnawirawan* in key positions in the party management. The ability to manage the party leadership was evident during the era of Hadi Utomo, whereas EE. Mangindaan further strengthened the party constituent base in the countryside. Consequently, the party managed to graps the traditional bases of PDI-P and PKB in Java and of Golkar outside Java within less than five years. The organization was structured so well that the party secured victory in the 2009 elections. In addition to the factor of Yudhoyono as President, the party organization was able to run a program to broaden its voter base. According to a national survey conducted by *Kompas* from February 20 to March 3, 2009, 26% of the rural electorate was comprised of party voters. The party machinery managed populist policies issued by the Yudhoyono administration, for example, the policy of direct cash assistance (BLT, *Bantuan Langsung Tunai*), a key policy to promote the party's influence at the village level. BLT through cash rewards were given to 19 million recipients, the majority of whom lived in villages.

In the 2009 elections, most of the *purnawirawan* who held key positions in the party had the chance to be nominated as candidate members for the national parliament. In these elections, Democratic Party's acquisition target was 20% of the national vote. Those who were fully involved in the determination of the party strategy had compiled a detailed target acquisition of minimum seats per constituency. For a region having a quota of three to eight seats, the acquisition target was at least one seat, with two seats for places with a higher quota.

The election board of the party in the DPP was set up with three tasks: Firstly, the team, regional co-ordinator, and co-ordinator of branches with an area board in each electoral district which should run activities and community mobilization twice monthly, in addition to provide reports to the DPP. Secondly, if the imaging campaign and raising community activities did not meet the expectations of the team co-ordinator (Korwil, *Koordinator wilayah*); the regional co-ordinator, the branch co-ordinator (Korcab, *Koordinator cabang*), and party officials from the constituency (electoral district) would be evaluated. Thirdly, the determination of all these co-ordinating structures that had greatly influenced the effectiveness of

raising support accelerated the achievement of the objective of a minimum of ninety-eight seats in the House of Representatives (Sacawira in Hafidz, 2010).[22]

Though the party strategy of the vote acquisition target set for the 2009 election seemed very ambitious, given the size of the new party, in fact the party had almost all the instruments ranging from government to public image. Its winning strategy was based on a militaristic approach, akin to a ground attack and to air warfare. The head of the winning team was Major General (retired) Yahya Sacawira, confirming that there were three components in a ground attack. The first was to use the access to the Yudhoyono administration through the infrastructure of bureaucracy and informal involvement of actors in government. Second, the political party ensured that the management structure from the national to the village levels was implemented in a more systematic manner. Third, the strategy also relied on the image of the candidates nominated by the party, who also worked to gain as many votes as possible. For the air warfare, party conducted party imaging campaigns through mass media and social networking platforms. Yahya mentioned the campaign tagline as attacks from the air, saying: "A simple example, air campaign says '*Lanjutkan!* [Continue!], campaign tagline of Yudhoyono-Boediono presidential candidates. In the ground attack team promoted the simple logic — if you (voters) are happy with Yudhoyono, then you should choose Democratic Party because then it would be nominated, as was the party's president, as an integral part of his soul" (Sacawira in Hafidz, 2010: 36).

Until 2009, the party ran an effective program known as 3R (reconciliation, recovery, and reform) that was very popular to the public, because it offered new compromises that engaged all stakeholders in the country's development (*Kompas*, 16 April 2004). The party projected the image of a party that was founded not to seize power, but to uphold democratic values. The figure of Yudhoyono, rather than what the party program offered, became the main factor attracting the support of voters.[23] However, after Anas Urbaningrum replaced the Chairman of the Executive Board, *purnawirawan* dominance began to decline drastically. Their numbers of engagement decreased both in the central board and in candidacy. In the 2014

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[22] This is an excerpt from an interview with Yahya Sacawiria, Head of Bappilu of PD in Election 2009, cited in Hafidz, 2010.

[23] Data obtained through a telephone poll by *Kompas*, conducted on February 25 and 26, 2004. About 1,080 respondents aged 17 years up were selected using the systematic sampling method. The survey respondents resided in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Padang, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Manado, Jayapura, and Bali. The number of respondents in each city was determined proportionally. Using this method, a 95% confidence level was achieved, with a research sampling error of 3%. Nevertheless, non-sampling errors were possible and were not accounted for (*Jajak Pendapat Kompas*, March 16, 2004).

elections, the party vote declined drastically, and it shifted from the top position to a lower-middle ranking party.

The *purnawirawans*' role in candidacy can be classified into two functions: first, to guide public perceptions to build a good image of the figure of Yudhoyono, andsecond, to focus on maximizing *purnawirawan* role in mobilizing the support of a large fraternity of military, Golkar and floating voters. They made a major contribution in strategic planning and effective utilization of the party machinery. This function can be seen in their role as a successful team in the presidential election of 2004. Their expertise in developing strategies and mobilizing networks and political actors was instrumental in the success of the former team in the management of party.

5.2.4 *Candidacy in Gerindra*

Gerindra contested its first election in 2009 in which the party did not release any *purnawirawan* candidates. They started to promote *purnawirawan* for candidacy in the 2014 election, for instance, Major General (retired) Asril Tanjung, qualifying as members of the national parliament. He advanced to the candidacy from Jakarta for the national parliament by mobilizing the support of the party organization wing that he headed. He managed to qualify as a member of parliament with as many as 24,957 votes (*Tempo*, May 16, 2014). According to the dataset used in this analysis, in the 2014 election, there were at least ten *purnawirawan* who joined the national parliament and the provincial parliament from Gerindra. During the initial establishment period, they were still fully involved in the structuring and organization of the party to win the 2009 elections. They also held an important position in the structure of the party's Board of Trustees. After the party crisis of 2010, they began to get involved in the structure of the party's Executive Board.

To qualify as a Member of Parliament, it was a prerequisite for *purnawirawan* to hold a strategic position in the Executive Board and in other party organs. In this context, such individuals had a greater chance to be nominated as a candidate in the elections and had considerable authority in running the party machinery effectively. However, based on the percentage holding various party positions, fewer of them contested in elections. This fact supports the initial indication from the foregoing discussion that *purnawirawan* in the party were not interested in engaging directly through the position in public office. They were primarily focused on gaining control of the party and its cadres in public office. The role of *purnawirawan* in supporting the mobilization of constituents in the 2009 elections was still limited by the size of the military fraternity's constituency. Civilian politicians, who were in the Board of Executives, conducted the expansion of the party's constituency base among rural voters. In the 2014 elections,

purnawirawan candidacy was part of a general campaign aimed at ensuring that Prabowo won as a presidential candidate, rather than in the form of specific mobilization of each candidate. The issues related to the integration of their role, either as a candidate or as a figure in charge of the party machinery to gather support for Prabowo, will be discussed further under the later section of party mobilization in the 2014 presidential election.

5.3 *Purnawirawan* Network in Presidential Candidacy

An interesting pattern of candidacy in the first direct presidential election can be observed in 2004. Almost all of the *purnawirawan* running as presidential or vice-presidential candidates were in the position of the founder of a political party with the exception of one candidate. There were strong indications that their involvement in political parties stemmed from their interest in using these organizations as political vehicles to gain power, as was the case for Yudhoyono. The weaker performance of Megawati's administration affected national instability and worsened economy which in turn made Yudhoyono more popular (Liddle & Mujani 2005). Parties that participated in elections since the beginning of *reformasi* enjoyed good access only to Golkar as the main supporter of the New Order Regime. The option to establish a new political party amidst the main alternatives was for the fulfillment of *purnawirawan's* purpose to follow the presidential election contestation.

From the comparison presented in Table 16 regarding the composition of candidates, party supporters, and party votes –which was based on voting results during the presidential election–three analyses from the apparent polarization of support for *purnawirawan* can be inferred. First, during the 2004 elections, their support was concentrated on certain candidates such as Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid (Golkar), Megawati-Hasyim Mujadi (PDI-P), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Kalla (Democratic Party, PPP, and PKPI). In the first round, there was a high correlation between the support for political parties and the number of votes each candidate managed to obtain. Wiranto-Salahuddin, supported by Golkar secured 21.58% of the total votes, 22.19%. Likewise, PDI-P with 18.53% found Megawati-Hasyim acquiring 26.24%. Neither Golkar nor PDI-P was able to utilize their respective party machineries effectively to reflect on their performances. Meanwhile, Yudhoyono-Kalla supported the party that had 11.33% of the votes share and managed to obtain 33.58% of the votes polled. In the second round of the 2004 election, Golkar decided to support Megawati-Hasyim, but the pair was defeated by Yudhoyono-Kalla, who won 60.62% of the votes in the previous election. Yudhoyono's victory was an evident since the *purnawirawan* bloc in Golkar did not fully support Megawati.

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Second, in the 2009 presidential elections, Megawati-Prabowo pair was forwarded as candidates by PDI-P and Gerindra, along with several smaller parties accounting for a total of 18.49% of party votes in the election. Yudhoyono paired with Boediono carried by Democratic Party, along with more medium- and small-sized parties, gained 45% of the ballots. The outcome was Yudhoyono and Boediono won a landslide victory with 60.8% of the votes. In the 2009 elections, PDI-P and Gerindra supported only a small part of ~~the~~ Prabowo's loyalist faction and exponents of the nationalist faction in PDI-P. Megawati-Prabowo managed to gain only 26.79% of the vote.

Third, in the 2014 elections, Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa, supported by Gerindra coalition by a vote of 46.85%, failed to beat Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla, who gained 53.15% of the vote. In the 2014 elections, the strength of support for the respective *purnawirawan* candidates appeared balanced. It is thus evident that, in the presidential elections of 2004, 2009, and 2014, *purnawirawan* polarization of support offered to the candidates did not follow the trend of political party support for candidates. In addition, in candidacy for the presidential elections, the support given was determined by the candidates' figures.

Table 16: Party Support throughout Presidential Elections

Presidential Election	Party	Party in Parliament		Vote result (%)
2004 (first round)		% Votes	% Seat	
Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid	Golkar	21.58	23.27	22.19
Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi	PDIP	18.53	19.82	26.24
Amien Rais-Siswono Yudo Husodo	PAN	6.44	9.45	14.94
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	Democratic Party, PBB, PKPI	11.33	12.55	33.58
Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar	PPP	8.15	10.55	3.05
2004 (second round)				
Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi	PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PDS	50.39	55.81	39.38
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	Democratic Party, PKPI, PBB, PNBK, PPNUI, PPDI, PKS	21.29	21.09	60.62
2009				
Megawati Sukarnoputri-Prabowo Subianto	PDI-P, Gerindra, Partai Buruh, PNI Marhaenisme, Partai Karya Perjuangan, Partai Merdeka, Partai Kedaulatan, Partai Sarikat Indonesia, dan Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	18.49	21.6	26.79
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono	Democratic Party, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, PBB, PDS, PKPB, PBR, PPRN, PDP, PNBKI, PKPI, Partai Republika Nusantara, Partai Patriot, PPPI, Partai Pelopor, PKDI, PIS, PPDI, PPIB, & PPI	45	56.07	60.8
Wiranto-Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	Golkar, Hanura, PKNU	18.22	22.32	12.41
2014				
Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa	Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, PPP, PKS, PBB	59.12	63.54	46.85
Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla	PDI-P, PKB, Hanura, Partai Nasdem, PKPI	40.,88	36.46	53.15

Source: Compilation from KPU

In the 2004 presidential elections, the contribution of votes from the large family of military residing in Golkar was still visible. Without a coalition, Golkar supported Wiranto as a presidential candidate and attained 22.19% of the vote.

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Golkar's acquired votes in the 2004 elections of 21.58% gave a clear indication that a president figure with a military background was still acceptable. Correlation between votes given to Wiranto and Golkar was high and confirmed the effectiveness of the party machine rather than being solely ascribed to the expanding support of other political figures. Moreover, the expansion to another political base was not successful. This was different from Yudhoyono's strategy, which combined the work of a political machine of Democratic Party in the elections with a new team of *purnawirawan* recruits. Nonetheless, he was a very popular figure. This can be seen from the discrepancy between the party votes and the total number of votes in the presidential election, which reached 39%. The same results were obtained by Yudhoyono in 2009, which strengthened the indication that his figure, Democratic Party political machine, and his campaign team were successful. Prabowo's failure in the 2009 election as Vice-President and 2014 Presidential candidate was a result of a failure to manage his personal image. Wiranto experienced the same issue in 2009. The previous discussion on the role of *purnawirawan* in the presidential elections of 2004, 2009, and 2014 included the recruitment process as a presidential candidate or vice president, the position and function in the campaign process, and the pattern of the relationship between the team of *purnawirawan* and party political machines in organizing and mobilizing support for the candidate.

An interesting case that could explain the phenomenon of *purnawirawan* pragmatic choice was the 2004 presidential elections in which their support was polarized for Wiranto nominated by Golkar and Yudhoyono nominated by Democratic Party. The group of *purnawirawan* who provided support for Wiranto predominantly from social and political functions that had proximity to New Order Golkar. Thus, their interests, which were against the rising Wiranto, had direct consequences for their important position in the party.

Nonetheless, *purnawirawan* also strived to gain seats in various public offices and state-owned enterprises controlled directly by the President (*Tempo*, October 28, 2007). Conversely, the *purnawirawan* group that supported Yudhoyono camp aimed to strengthen the party organization. This was evident in the outcome of Yudhoyono's victory, when they gained prominence in the management of Democratic Party. *Purnawirawan* mobilization patterns were different from those noted in the mobilization of civic groups, and were bound by political interests in a patron-client relationship. Political culture within the organization also affected the degree of acceptance by the organization's members of elite maneuvering. The outcome was political mobilization, which often went uncontrolled. This behavior change is in line with the view of Przeworski (1975) noting that any change in political behavior is based on the type of membership in the organization, the ability

of the organization to accommodate old and new members, and the dominant norms of behavior.

5.3.1 *Presidential Elections of 2004*

In the presidential elections of 2004, *purnawirawan* involvement was significant as joining through the Democratic Party or Golkar. Their support for candidates can be measured by identifying *purnawirawan* positions in the candidates' campaign teams. In the case of Democratic Party, support was more solid for Yudhoyono while Golkar nominated Wiranto as the winning presidential candidate through party convention. Yet, ahead of the 2004 presidential elections, Akbar Tanjung no longer held the party leadership since Jusuf Kalla defeated him in the party's Congress. Appointment of Kalla as vice-president had the strategic value in breaking the internal support for Golkar asit triggered dynamics within the party under the stewardship of Kalla. By defeating Akbar Tanjung, Kalla was able to garner support from *purnawirawan* who previously supported Akbar's rivals in Golkar *Munaslub* in 1998. The military faction as a traditional exponent or Golkar supporter in the New Order regime began to provide support for Jusuf Kalla.

The winning team of Yudhoyono-Kalla's camp was comprised of many *purnawirawan* from various backgrounds, parties, and political forces. In the positions of the steering and advisory councils who came from Democratic Party were Major General (retired) Budi Santoso and Vice-Admiral (retired) EE. Mangindaan. Others who came from PKPI were General (retired) Edi Sudrajat and Major General (retired) Moergito. In this party, those who came from PKPI were also affected by disappointment at Golkar for failing to provide support to the election of Vice-President Yudhoyono through the assembly in 2002. At the time, Yudhoyono was only supported by representative factions that were only able to obtain 122 votes and he was ranked third. Aside from being the party leader, Yudhoyono induction into his inner circle military group. *Purnawirawan* support from the internal network of Yudhoyono, the management of Democratic Party, and the pro-Kalla faction of Golkar was a significant initial capital (Ombara, 2007). At least, it succeeded in encouraging an effective winning machinery of the party, where the expansion of the network was well managed by *purnawirawan*. Most of these individuals came from large fraternities of the military and civilian bureaucracy, and religious social groups with a potentially large vote count. This successful teamwork contributed to sustaining Yudhoyono's high popularity.

There were at least two factors that ensured Yudhoyono's popularity in the 2004 elections. The first was the longing for a military figure and the presence of a "strong man" at the helm of national affairs in contrast to the weak civilian leadership evident in the previous government led by Habibie, Wahid, and

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Megawati. Second, the political conflict between Yudhoyono and Megawati had led to his dismissal from the cabinet. After the period of democratic transition during 1998-2004, the impact of the 1998 rage against the worsening image of the military, as well as anything that could be potentially linked to militarism, mellowed. In these circumstances, Yudhoyono was displayed as a democratic military figure; the establishment of Democratic Party and the efforts he put into reforming the military were the evidences of this fact. On the other side, Wiranto did not own the combination of moderate-military leadership and commitment to democracy. Post-2004 election, public assessment of military figures' leadership began to shift. Their popularity was directly linked to the image of military institutions, in line with their resignation from the political arena. A poll in September 2003 by *Kompas* revealed that as many as 63% of respondents believed that the military was no longer a threatening or frightening figure (Research Kompas, 2004).

The 2004 presidential elections were an inaugural event for the people to elect the President directly. An important factor in this process was the role of mass mediain providing free public information and thus leading independent preferences more dominant for people. The media held a central role in shaping the image of the candidate, along with the expansion of public access to television, radio, and other mass media, extending even to the countryside. In the second round of the presidential election in 2004, Yudhoyono-Kalla challenged Megawati-Hasyim, who had strong traditional support bases in Java, Bali, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Bali, and North Sumatra. The Megawati-Hasyim pair further strengthened its support base by relying on the mobilization of political parties who were members of the National Coalition. Compared to the dissemination of information through mass media, the party network had many inherent weaknesses. Apart from its slower speed, targeting voters solely on the basis of constituency resulted in less ability to influence floating voters.

The acceleration of information and mobilization of voters was unbalanced because Yudhoyono-Kalla preferred sharing primary access through the mass media and managing image through the media rather than simply relying on the party network (Urbaningrum, 2010). By 2003, Yudhoyono's popularity continued to surpass those of other national figures, such as Megawati, Wahid, and Amien Rais. In various polls, his name became increasingly popular as a presidential candidate. In March 2004, Yudhoyono beat Megawati in terms of popularity (*Tempo*, April 30, 2004). Clearly, the mass media played an important role in shaping the image of the figures of Yudhoyono and Megawati. In particular, Yudhoyono's campaign team carried out a public campaign to speak about the issues more persuasive and emotional. The rivalry with Megawati provided a political advantage because voters were faced with the issue of ineffectiveness in the latter's administration.

There were at least two important phenomena that were managed well by the Yudhoyono campaign team. The first was regarding tensions with Taufiq Kiemas (President Megawati's husband), who had asked Yudhoyono to immediately report to the President, owing its obligations as an assistant to the President. The second was the decision of President Megawati not to involve the *Menkopolkam* in cabinet activities. In this sense, Yudhoyono's position was viewed as victimization. Nonetheless, owing to the "Smart General" image he perceived, he was able to gain the public's sympathy (*Kompas*, March 3, 2004; *Kompas*, March 24, 2004; *Kompas*, June 30, 2009). At the time, he promoted this scenario in order to be accepted by the public. Implications for the Democratic Party as the new party were also significant because, the day after being dismissed by President Megawati, Yudhoyono directly campaigned for his party and was subsequently nominated as a presidential candidate.

In the presidential elections of 2004, one of the factors that positively affected the Yudhoyono-Kalla victory was the central figure of Yudhoyono. It also benefitted from the mobilization of support by a team that worked in the Democratic Party and external teams around Yudhoyono himself. In the second round, which was originally located in Wiranto's *purnawirawan* camp, many shifted to Yudhoyono's camp because of Jusuf Kalla and other Golkar exponents. In addition, some figures were included in the team's first round. *Purnawirawan* included in a successful team could occupy key and strategic positions, such as Major General (ret) Herman Musakabe, Lieutenant Genereal (ret) Samsir Siregar (former head of the military Strategic Intelligence Agency, BAIS TNI), and First Marshal (ret) Suratto Siswodihardjo (head of the board of winning elections of Democratic party). There was also a campaign organizer in the ranks of Lieutenant General (ret) Moh Ma'ruf as the head of a team with several prominent *purnawirawans* as members, such as Major General (ret) Achdari (former head of BAIS TNI), Major General (ret) Djali Yusuf (former Commander of Kodam Iskandar Muda), and Brigadier General (ret) Robik Mukav (former Kapuspen TNI) (Maeswara, 2010: 79).

Composition and placement of *purnawirawan* on the campaign team were tailored to their skills and position in the military. This allowed the division of labour and synchronization of campaign programs. Thus, their position in the team structure had a significant strategic value. Most of the core campaign team members were former high-ranking officers with relatively clean records during active military service. Some even disregarded the instructions of the military commander associated with military assignment in order to control the functions of government agencies and civilian institutions. *Purnawirawan* from Military Academy senior class of 65 graduates that were never evicted by the New Order as a counter to the Golkar program are Moh Makruf and Samsir Siregar. They were officers dismissed

by the commander of the armed forces, General Feisal Tanjung, because of their refusal to fully engage in the winning campaign of Golkar in Central Java during the governorship of Soewadi (*Suara Merdeka*, March 14, 2004). In the Yudhoyono-Kalla campaign, the *purnawirawan* worked in a team called the "Eagles Team," whose tasks were to co-ordinateand supervisethe implementation of the strategy of the winning team.

Wiranto and Agum Gumelar were also candidates in the elections, but only Wiranto had significant large military fraternity and *purnawirawan* because he had been a TNI commander and former Minister of Defence. On the side of Wiranto, who also had a large network among the military and its extended family, the engagement of *purnawirawan* always had a history of conflict, in which Wiranto played strategically to break the elite support of the others. In addition, Yudhoyono gained the involvement of *purnawirawan*, who understood the characteristics of the holding area network. Support from Central Java, for example, was more geared towards Yudhoyono-Kalla than the other *purnawirawan* candidates. The large military fraternity was comprised ofthe military retirement organization (Pepabri), the soldiers' wives' association (Persit), and FKPPI with nearly one million voters (*Tempo*, August 20, 2004).

The 2004 elections was the first opportunity for Indonesia to conduct a direct presidential election. The prime contest was among five pairs of candidates and took place in two rounds. Among the competing candidates, there were three with *purnawirawan* background, such as Wiranto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for the position of the President, and Agum Gumelar, candidate for the position of Vice-President. The 2004 presidential elections were important for shaping the political existence of *purnawirawan*s, which was demonstrated by three important trends, one of which was strengthening of political parties in *purnawirawan* polarization. Wiranto was promoted by Golkar and Yudhoyono was by the Democratic Party whereby the coalition became a magnet to attract the political interests of *purnawirawan* to be directly involved in the mobilization of political support. Second, the organizational support within the party was very keen on including *purnawirawan* in the winning team. Each candidate performed two models, namely the recruitment of *purnawirawan* derived from personal networks or friendship with candidates from the supporting party, and an open recruitment from outside the party and candidate network. In this election, there were also some non-*purnawirawan* parties, who were more dominant and active in expanding their base of support than of those who took charge of the party. This caused the *purnawirawan* to be included in the winning team, to be recruited as the new parties' officials, and to occupy strategic positions. The third trend was the emergence of political incentives to boost the support provided by the

purnawirawan to the candidates. They provided full support to gain a strategic position in the management of the party and to be bound by the provisions of compensation or incentives in the form of a position in public office.

5.3.2 *Presidential Election of 2009*

In the 2009 presidential election, Yudhoyono ran for a second presidential term pairing with Boediono, who did not have any political support. The other two candidate pairs were Megawati-Prabowo and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto. A significant support from *purnawirawan* was concentrated to Prabowo, who was regarded as a new figure with a better chance of victory than Wiranto. Among the three presidential candidates, Yudhoyono-Boediono was the most prepared pair in formulating their winning strategies. Their success team campaign was often referred to as "The Silent Operation" ran by a team of nine people comprising of members from the internal team of Yudhoyono, Democratic Party, and the party's supporters. The teams were mostly led by *purnawirawan* who worked directly in the field. Their tasks ranged from strategic planning to evaluation of the success team.

The teams controlled field operations and consisted of six teams with particular individual roles as follows:

1. "Team Echo", which adopted a military territorial functioning style to boost the vote acquisition of Democratic Party at the local level and scope. They carried their function in the military command hierarchy structure and there was only one person in control of each district/city level. All team members were under the command of former TNI Commander Marshal (retired) Djoko Suyanto;

2. "Pro-SBY Movement", which was driven by former Chief of National Police General (retired) Sutanto; a former Air Force Commander, Marshal (retired) Herman Prayitno; and other notable former military officers such as Lieutenant Genereal (retired) Suyono and former Territorial Military Commander Lieutenant Genereal (retired) Agus Wijoyo as advisor;

3. "Delta Team", which was tasked with campaign logistics and was led by former Assistant Logistics of Armed Forces Commander Major General (retired) Abikusno;

4. "Team Romeo", which was in charge of promoting policies that had been carried out by the Yudhoyono administration on his first term and was considered to be widely accepted by the public. The team was led by Major General (retired) Sardan Marbun and managed the communication lines with the public through mail and short message service;

5. "Barisan Indonesia", which was designed as a community organization initiated by Lieutenant Genereal (retired)M. Yasih. The team involved Akbar Tanjung, who acted as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees; and

6. "Dhikr Foundation Nurussalam SBY", which was fostered by Major General (retired) Kurdish Mustafa, the military secretary of President Yudhoyono with Cabinet Secretary, Major General (retired) Silalahi. In addition to these teams, there was an addition of three teams controlled by civilians (Kompas, April 28, 2009).[24]

Yudhoyono and his party were attractive to *purnawirawan* because of their advantageous position in several respects. Yudhoyono's popularity was high due to the brilliant performance of his governance in his first period of presidency. The Democratic Party emerged as the party winning the 2009 general election with a majority vote in the national parliament. Regarding the composition of his team, Yudhoyono felt the need to build a solid winning team even though he was already strongly favored by initial estimates of his support. However, his opponents was seriously counted because of the strong network of the conservative bloc and New Order loyalists supporting Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto. In addition, most high-ranking officers of the nationalist faction in PDI-P also collaborated with Prabowo loyalists. From the composition of Yudhoyono's winning team, most of the *purnawirawan* in control of the winning teams were relatively new and just entered retirement periodso that they still had better access to the active military exponents who were their subordinates during their time of active service.

In the camp of Megawati-Prabowo, the winning team was still dependent upon old *purnawirawan* and their nationalist network. Newcomers from the Prabowo network were mainly comprised of special forces group (*Kopassus)* and a formation of the Indonesian Army (*Kostrad)* loyalists with strong expertise in intelligence and counter-intelligence. In terms of the winning teams' composition, such as A. M. Hendropriyono acted as an adviser, and team leaders were led directly by Major General (retired) Theo Sjafei. The team included the former military secretary of Megawati's administration, Major General (retired) TB Hasanuddin. Adang Ruchiatna held the position of handling the organizational campaign, and the task of mass mobilization co-ordination was entrusted to M. Yasin. They had direct control of the formal winning team. The Prabowo team was primarily engaged as a

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[24] These teams included: 1) Tim Sekoci (Lifeboat Team), where Democratic Party supporters achieved 20% of votes. The team's duty was to collect data on public figures, businessmen, religious leaders, women leaders, farmers, and fishermen. Chaired by the President Commissioner of PT Indosat Soeprapto and Irvan Edison; 2) Team Foxtrot, Democratic Party political consultancy, known as Bravo Media Center, with primary caregivers Choel Mallarangeng, also serving as the director of Fox Indonesia; and 3) Jaring Nusantara, managed by former student activists.

shadow team and worked underground. The team was not officially registered in the Election Commission (KPU) and was directly under the co-ordination of Prabowo, who was assisted by Muchdi P. R. and Major General (retired) Kivlan Zen. Both were trained in military intelligence while they were still in active service in *Kopassus*.

Megawati-Prabowo had superiority in the utilization of intelligent functioning in their winning campaign. In the large military families, Megawati took more advantage by promosing a meritorious policy to the military through the restoration of order by ex-combatantsand the improvement for the welfare of soldiers. However, generally speaking, Megawati's image in the face of the public was still far less popular than Yudhoyono's.

The polarization of *purnawirawan* in the 2009 presidential election could be grouped in to three segments. First, Yudhoyono's camp, who enjoyed the maximum access to the resources needed for a winning campaign. The main factor in this success was thatYudhoyono still served as president andofficials could ensure mobilization of support in large numbers. The second polarization was Golkar and Hanura's camps coordinated by Wiranto, who lacked sufficient capacity to expand support. In addition, *purnawirawan* bloc in Golkar was influenced by the internal dynamics of the party where the influence of Akbar Tanjung rebounded. In Golkar's Congress in 2010, Akbar had succeeded in carrying Aburizal Bakrie as party Chairman. The third polarization was *purnawirawan* grouping in PDI-P, who could build cooperation with those who supported Prabowo.

5.3.3 *Presidential Election of 2014*

In the 2014 presidential election, there were two pairs of presidential candidates: Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa promoted by Gerinda coalition and Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla promoted by the coalition of PDI-P.In Prabowo-Hatta's winning team, the *purnawirawan* composition was distributed to several positions. The Advisory Board positions were occupied by at least eight generals with one holding one of the expert council positions. In the field team, the post of Deputy Chairman and his assistants and the positions of the spokespeople of the team were also occupied by *purnawirawan*. *Purnawirawan* predominantly came from Islamic factions in the military (*Kompas*, April 13, 2014), unlike Jokowi-Kalla's camp in which the majority was comprised of nationalist factions.

In the latter's team, *purnawirawan* involvement and support extended along three lines. First, there were *Purnawirawan* who strictly adhered to PDI-P line. Hendropriyono chaired the steering committee responsible for the structuring of a winning team. They held the position as the core team, who worked directly under the direction of the Chairman of PDI-P. In this circle, there were several other

renowned *purnawirawan* names such as Ryamizard Ryacuddu. Second, there was the team who won support from Golkar exponent network coordinated by Luhut Pandjaitan. Most of them came from TNI Research and Development division and the Board of Experts in Golkar. They extended support to Widodo as the party had failed to bring their presidential candidate. The third line was the group of *purnawirawan* who were new in politics joining National Democratic Party (Nasdem) led by the former Chief of Staff of the Navy. While Wiranto and Hanura also gave support, their network was not very significant and failed to make an important contribution to the winning team.

Between both pairs of candidacy, Prabowo-Hatta's camp made a major breakthrough in raising voter support. They pursued mass mobilization by destroying Jokowi's strong public image. The solid organization of PDI-P's political machinery appeared to be instrumental in leading a party emerging as the prospective winner of the 2014 presidential election. Although the party had an advantage in mass organization and possessed intelligence infiltration into mass organizations and religious social elites, Prabowo camp was more successful in the control of public opinion. This pattern was the repeated version of failure of Megawati-Hasyim, who had invested more trust in direct mass organization and did not have sufficient access to the mass media. Prabowo had the same problem of not reaching sufficient support of the mass media. Some of them even provided resistance, for instance from *The Jakarta Post*.

Prabowo's track record during his active military service was a major drawback for his image development in the eyes of the public. He was accused of involvement in the kidnapping of activists and a series of human rights violations leading to his worse image in the public space. However, all the allegations submitted by the counter-discourse resistance were answered. For example, Kivlan Zen gave a different opinion on the charges of kidnapping of *reformasi* movement activists in 1998. In addition, Lieutenant Genereal (retired)Yunus Yosfiah also accused the former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto of leaking confidential state files in the form of documents on Honor Council Officers (DKP, *Dewan Kehormatan Perwira*) (*Republika*, April 20, 2014).

The issue of human rights violations in the early process of democratization subsequently led pro-Prabowo camp to develop it into a mass campaign, although they were not included in the winning team as a part of the campaign. Major General (retired) Djasri Marin, who was involved in the investigation of kidnapped activists, helped answering the issue by issuing a statement about the evidence indicating that the activist kidnappingwas done by the "Rose Team" (*Tim Mawar*) of *Kopassus* – implying that the action was not ordered by Prabowo, *Kopassus* Commander at that

time. In addition, a former Army Vice-Commander, Lieutenant Genereal (retired) Suryo Prabowo, questioned the responsibility of the commander, Prabowo, in kidnapping cases conducted by *Kopassus* in 1998. He questioned the responsibility of other generals who served as Prabowo's superintendents at that time. According to Suryo, Prabowo had already proved himself responsible at the DKP by admitting the mistakes made by his men.

The organizing political task force committed to Prabowo-Hatta team engaged in strategies that functioned effectively. They implemented a greater number of models of mass mobilization to support networks and community organizations developed under the wing of Gerindra party. *Gardu Prabowo* (People's Movement Support for Prabowo) was the organ that performed the function of mobilization. This organ was established in 2008, ahead of the presidential election in 2009, to collect solidarity and support for Megawati-Prabowo. During the early period of its existence, the Chairman's position was not controlled by *purnawirawan*, but rather by civilian politicians who had no affiliations with Gerindra (Gerindra Party, September 1, 2014). After the 2009 election, Prabowo took direct control of the organs and the position of Chairman of the Board of Trustees. In the ranks of the Executive Board, the management structure of Gardu Prabowo was recasted with a large influx of *purnawirawan* in the National Executive Board. In addition to Prabowo, Major General (ret) Abraham Octavianus Atarury also held a position on the Board of Supervisors. The advisory board positions were occupied by Asril Tanjung, Admiral (retired) Bernard Kent Sondakh as a member of the Advisory Board, Rear Admiral (retired) Soemarno, Major General (retired) Tayo Tarmadi, Major General (retired) HR Sitanggang, and Rear Admiral (retired) Mualimin Santoso. Major (retired) La Ode Ilham also served as a member of the Department of Organization, Regeneration, and Membership.

Gardu Prabowo played an important role in Gerindra's victory in the 2014 elections. In addition to carrying the presidential campaign, Prabowo also organized a legislative candidate from Gerindra to gain votes in the respective constituencies. As stated by Asril Tanjung, the party was thus able to pursue a target of 23% of the national vote share in the 2014 elections. To that end, all the party candidates shared the responsibility to reach as many voters as possible and adopted concrete steps comprising of doing real work in the community, along with socialization of Prabowo as the. The campaign focused on supporting programs for farmers and improvements in the agriculture sector. This organ was a designed to guard against disputed presidential election results in the Constitutional Court with mass rallies in large numbers.

In addition to Gardu Prabowo, another group was established under the name of "Tunas Indonesia Raya" (TIDAR). This was another party wing-organ

whose task was mobilizing support on the basis of a broader constituency and pluralism. Its strategy targeted the segmented voters by gathering activities in the field of sports, religion and spirituality, communication and information, culture, and education (TIDAR, 2016). TIDAR also provided scholarships in the primary, middle, and upper levels of school education. Their organized activities included massive events focusing on strategic issues for youth, such as the dangers of AIDS and drugs and environmental issues. In addition, widening support to seize bases of female voters was organized by the organ "Indonesian Women" (PIRA). This organ effectively moved to obtain the support from existing organizations and women's groups through religious and social discourses. PIRA support base was successful in connecting full involvement by holding meetings that allowed the gathering of various women's organizations. The campaign also effectively attracted the support of many organizations, either independently or those that were already affiliated with another political party. This consortium of women supporters included Majelis Taklim (BKMT), Salimah, Islamic Women, Muslim Al-Irshad, Mathlaul Anwar, Guppi, Persistri, Al-Ittihadiyah, Al-Hidayah, and HWK, as well as a number of other prominent women activists. In general, an organization for the mobilization of support mainly came from religious groups and social conservatives.

The empowerment of *purnawirawan* roles in the party was carried out in accordance with the capacity and cultivated fields where they enjoyed a good network. The "of the Indonesian Christian feast" (KIRA) wing was formed to gain the support of Christians. Major General (retired) Glenny Kairupan and Brigadier General (retired) Abraham Octavianus Atururi were elected as trustees of this organ. While this wing previously had 366 branches, a further 120 were added before the 2014 elections. The mobilization of support by KIRA effectively received support from religious authorities, such as the Fellowship of the Pentecostal Church of Indonesia (PGPI). The chairman, Jacob Nahuway, stated that PGPI had issued a circular letter to the 12 million-strong congregation to extend support to Gerindra and Prabowo (JPNN, September 4, 2014).

In addition to Christian groups, an organ-wing accommodating the support of Muslim groups was also formed and channeled through the Indonesian Muslim Movement (*Gemira*). Even though this wing organ included several *purnawirawan*, Prabowo directly monitored it in order to attract the support of famous preachers, such as Zainuddin M. Z., who had shifted from PPP to Gerindra. Among other party organs that saw *purnawirawan* involvement was Indonesia Raya Volunteer Force (Satria), which was originally formed as a party militia unit known as *Satuan Tugas* (*Satgas*, Task Force). During the 2009 elections, this organ was effective in spreading its cadre to the village level to disseminate information from the

Megawati-Prabowo coalition. In these organs, Muchdi P. R. acted as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, an executive position typically held by civilians.

In addition to utilizing the party organs of Gerindra as noted above, Prabowo also activated other organized networks where he acted as a leader. *Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia* (HKTI, Indonesian Farmers Association) was an important organ whose members were evenly disseminated across rural areas. Prabowo himself acted as the Chairman of the national farmers' organizations during the entire 2004-09 period. HKTI, which was originally an independent organization of farmers, was eventually involved in providing political support for Gerindra and Prabowo. HKTI's delegate gave legitimacy to Prabowo for his political commitment to a group of small farmers. Political advertisements distributed through this organ were very intense and persuasive among rural voters. For example, the trilogy advertisements by Prabowo were designed to achieve this aim. In the first advertisement, Prabowo as Chairman of HKTI was shown trying to popularize the preferential production of farmers. The second advertisement illustrated Prabowo, as Chairman of the Association of Traditional Market Vendors (*Asosiasi Pedagang Pasar Tradisional*), inviting the public to buy domestic products. In the third advertisement, Prabowo introduced the vision and mission of Gerindra. In the 2014 elections and the presidential election, a vigorous advertising campaign by the winning team was effective in gaining public interest, especially among rural groups. In particular, advertisements that emphasized the independence of national agriculture and improvement of the quality of farmers' lives as the party program were accepted with enthusiasm (*Jakarta Post*, October 16, 2008).[25]

A relatively comprehensive overview of the general strategies of Prabowo-Hatta can be obtained from the description of the Deputy Chairman of Prabowo-Hatta winning team, Moekhlas Sidik. This involved: 1) transforming the party machinery in order to place the elected candidates of the coalition in the national parliament, 2) mobilizing the coalition parties of the management structure to the village centre, and 3) mobilization through formal volunteers formed by the winning team or organ to accommodate outside coalition parties that had committed to provide support. Although the organization ran a massive and effective campaign, it was not fully able to target the middle class and urban voters who preferred figures such as Jokowi. As a result, in the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi-Kalla defeated Prabowo-Hatta by a small margin of votes in the range of five to six per cent.

Based on the distribution of *purnawirawan*, Prabowo-Hatta's camp was superior because of three factors. First, those who had positions in the central board

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[25] The survey also showed that, of the country's relatively new political parties, Gerinda was the most popular, with 3.2% of the respondents indicating that they would vote for the party. The second most popular party was Hanura, with 1.2%, followed by the National Sun Party (PMB) with 1%.

had confirmed their capacity to gain large vote for Gerindra in the 2014 elections. They could successfully drive the party machinery having high effectiveness with solid organizations to reach a wider constituency base. Second, the candidates were supported by a coalition of parties, whose combined total number of votes was greater than that acquired by PDI-P coalition support that went to Jokowi-Kalla. *Purnawirawan* support could also be derived from Golkar and a small portion of Democratic Party. It should be noted, though, that the latter party did not officially provide support to either of the two presidential candidates. Third, the scope of consolidation by *purnawirawan* was based on corps background and expertise, making it possible due to their position as the main controller of the winning team.

5.4 *Purnawirawan* in Gubernatorial Elections

In addition to candidacy for the national parliament, provincial governorship candidacy was also attractive for several *purnawirawan*. In direct gubernatorial elections that began in 2004, many of them were advanced for candidacy to a higher position than that for the local elections of district and cities (Table 17). From the table, it can be inferred that the public offices purnawirawan mainly targeted was the provincial governor and regent, followed by head of regency and municipality (*Bupati / Walikota*). Purnawirawan who ran for governor candidates was around 54 people and regent candidates reaching 49 people. The data also shows that among all candidates, as many as 95 people had an army background and 20 people had a police force background. Most of the army retired officers who advanced in the candidacy were former Commander of the Military Region (*Pangdam*), and from the police. This trend was observed in those who have served as Regional Police Chief (*Kapolda*).

It should be noted that active military involvement as a head of the province (governor) was part of the policy of the New Order government in which active military officers with the rank of two-star occupied various positions as governor of the province. After *reformasi*, however, the policy changed. Military officers no longer had the privilege of occupying civilian positions such as governor in whichthe election for governors was chosen by the parliament. Post-2004, after the direct election of governors, *purnawirawan* needed a political party willing to carry them in the gubernatorial election. Among those who managed to become governors were those who had a strong network and links to local political groups. According to the analysis of the traditional network of military bureaucracy at the local level (Antlov, 1994), the relationships between local superintendents in the military hierarchy (Sidel, 2004) are relevant to how successful *purnawirawan* were in utilizing their existing networks.

In the direct election of governors, *purnawirawan* could not mobilize resources and the military network they possessed. They could only rely on the good offices of the relationships built during the time they were in service. The option to compete in local executive positions was an important indication that they were just as concerned with gaining political control as they used to have in the New Order regime. Based on this background, gubernatorial elections were primarily attractive to former chiefs of the police and military commanders, followed by those holding territorial command positions in the Navy. Although it did not have the territorial scope of the police or the army, the navy also had territorial command of the naval fleet under a naval base commander. The trend of candidacy also changedwhere previously, the army as the holder of the territorial command dominated gubernatorial positions and the commander had great power at the provincial level. However, in the democratic transition period of 1998-2004, when the gubernatorial election was conducted by the provincial assembly (Provincial DPRD), most of the governor's offices were won by former military commanders. The *purnawirawan* influx of police in gubernatorial elections could be explained on the basis of the role and functions of the police force dealing with internal security. This persuaded the chiefs of regional police to look for better access to and network with local elite politics and social organizations that existed in the area of their jurisdiction.

There are several identifiable important factors leading to the effectiveness of political mobilization by *purnawirawan* in the elections. Their importance was due to the fact that they departed from the activities of party coalitions, the complexity of the political characteristics, social, and cultural force in a region. Supporting parties occupied a very limited portion of the sphere of influence. The public preferred discretion of the figures to the image of background and political power supporters.

The discussion that followed therefore focused on elucidating the effective strength of their power in the elections. Did the evidence of more than 50% of candidacy failure to achieve victory indicate *purnawirawan'sde facto* of less influence? Or was this failure the result of the neutrality of the military that did not allow military institutions to provide any support for them? Did this cause them fail in utilizing the network of institutions and active military commanders in an area? In the category of candidates who won the election, the discussion will focus on the dominant factors that led them to victory in the election.

In a 2005 report, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI, 2005) noted that the party or coalition that lost in the national legislative elections won 72.3% of direct local elections. According to the results of the research by P2P The Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) carried out during 2009 to 2010, the major parties that

previously gained overwhelming votes in the national elections suffered a crushing defeat in the gubernatorial elections (Bhakti, Yanuarti, & Nurhasim, 2009). This was an interesting observation since the parties were carrying their own cadres. The crisis of confidence in political parties was related to various cases of corruption in the parliament which had a significant impact on voter preferences. The party carried most of the candidates derived from an internal cadre with integrity problems. These conditions provided a space for the entry of outsiders into the parties and allowed them to be nominated as candidates in the elections. These findings could explain why the parties provided greater opportunities for candidates from outside the ranks of party cadres. As a result, *purnawirawan* without a strategic position within a party could also be easily nominated if they were considered to have a strong logistical support and sufficient electability.

Table 17: Purnawirawan in Executive* Candidacy

Office	Air Force	Army	Navy	Police	Total
Governor	3	34	5	12	54
Presidential Candidate		4			4
Regent	2	40	1	6	49
Vice Governor		4		1	5
Vice President		1			1
Vice Regent		12	2	1	15
Total	5	95	8	20	128

Source: MR Dataset
*Executive refers to head of government such as president, vice-president, governor, regent, and mayor

Among the political elites, reconfiguration occurred when the dominance of the old elite supported by the military and bureaucratic power could no longer guarantee a higher level of desirability, as shown in studies conducted by Buehler (2007, 2009). Local elites also began to gain greater awareness of their political rights and would often take up the fight against the central government's centralism (Fealy & Aspinall, 2003). The impact these factors had is visible in the phenomenon of "localizing power", where the ruling local political actors started acting as predators (Hadiz, 2010). Of the total number of *purnawirawan* competed in the governor elections, the Army no longer dominated. In fact, the Police force had a higher number of *purnawirawan* than any military branch. Post-2004, the Police attained the authority for territorial and law enforcement, which outweighed the power of the Army, and thus enabled the Police to acquire the traditional network that the Army previously benefitted from and used in political agendas.

5.5 Effects of Military Support Withdrawal to *Purnawirawan* Candidacy

The impact of the withdrawal of the military from the political arena was particularly strong towards *purnawirawan*. Yet, according to Honna (2013), their withdrawal was still incomplete. The quality of the military's withdrawal from civilian functions depends on the democratic order that positions the military away from the politics (Sundhaussen, 1984). Indonesia's democratization has given an important place for the success of the military reform agenda and initiated the withdrawal of military representatives from the parliament, but did not immediately stop the support from the military. Internal reform of the military seemed to indicate that it was more active in asserting its commitment to withdraw its support for political activities. In his research, Finer (1985) noted the importance of preconditions for military withdrawal, as these could generally be effective when a civilian-controlled political organization is visible. However, this was not the case in Indonesia. Consolidation of the political elites and civilian-controlled political organizations was still weak. Political parties were not accountable, as indicated by the low quality of the recruitment and selection of candidates at the same leadership level. Under these conditions, the initiative of the military institution to oversee the withdrawal from the political process must be gradual and follow the political dynamics. For instance, the withdrawal of representatives from the parliament in 2004 was not immediately followed by the withdrawal of support for *purnawirawan* who took part in the legislative and executive elections. Withdrawal of support was gradual during the period between 2004 and 2009.

As a part of an ongoing internal reform of the military institutions, the military set the terms for officers who wanted to run for governorship. These directives included the requirement to obtain a permit from their corresponding military commander. The military fraternity itself expressly prohibited the involvement of institutions in providing support in any form to *purnawirawan* in advancing to candidacy. There was no indication that the military withdrawal, even performed gradually as mentioned by Barany (2011), took place since the Armed Forces tried to continue its influence through their *purnawirawan* exponents. Withdrawal of the support from these institutions resulted in a situation in which *purnawirawan* could only rely on two sources of support: their personal network and mobilization of supporters by the party machinery. However, the drawback is that not all parties had reliable political machinery, and many of their staff structures were limited in their capability to reach all corners of the region. This was in sharp contrast to the command structure of the incumbent government bureaucracy or military/police that supposedly possess the infrastructure, people, and logistic to cover the entire region. However, since 1993 Golkar had attempted to win elections without relying on the military. Military withdrawal from the

politics was a crucial element. It resulted in Golkar having to essentially change the strategy of starting utilizing the large network of military families for mobilizing voters and their significant contribution in winning the party until the 2009 election (interview with Fahmi Idris, June 1, 2015).

The military institutions no longer played an essential role in political mobilizations. However, as individuals, the support of the military commander in the territorial regions could still be obtained unofficially. This was especially the case if the commander had an organizational relationship with the *purnawirawan* candidate during his active military service. This personal support, nevertheless, was only limited in unofficial settings and was socialized to military families only. The result was the lack of open support to a candidate. Withdrawal of military support for the creation of a broad impact base led to fairer electoral competition. The *purnawirawan* candidates had to work harder to manage the potential support from various groups and the power of personal networks, which previously built as commanders during their serving time in the territory.

The neutrality associated with the military in the 2014 elections and the gubernatorial elections was based on the guidelines of Article 39 of Law 34/2009 on the TNI. Such article specifically bans members of the military from engaging in activities and membership of political parties, business events, and political activities with the aim of being elected as members of the legislative and other political positions. TNI Commander Instruction INS/1/VII/2008 had also strengthened the position of neutrality and avoided conflicts of interest by prohibiting members of the military from using their right to vote in the elections. Nonetheless, the military still played a strategic role in the election process. They were still authorized to carry out intelligence operations aimed at equalization operations performed by the military strategic intelligence (BAIS). In addition, they ran security operations that were in the domain of the police and provided assistance in the distribution of logistics in conflict-sensitive and remote areas. Similar to the military, the police were also imposed neutrality under Article 28 of Law No. 2/2002 on the police. The active members of the police force were thus mandated to be abstain from voting. In addition, should an individual wanted to run for politics, he was able to do so under the circumstance that he had to resign from the service as provided for in Article 12 in the same Law.[26]

The iimplementation of the regulations of military and police neutrality in politics allowed *purnawirawan* candidates to rely on support through the party machine in maximizing their mobilization. Therefore, being a part of a party capable

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[26] Short Report, Working Meeting of Special Committee of DPR over Law No. 10/2008 on DPR, DPRD, and DPD with National Police and TNI, November 16, 2011.

of carrying its own candidate meant that the contestant was required to distribute his profits in order to utilize the coalition's engines. It was a challenge to havethe presence of various frictions resulting from differences in ideology, politics, and political culture among the coalition parties. Most of them, in turns, chose to embrace and provide distribution and logistics tasks more evenly or proportionally to the amount of the contribution during nomination. This strategy, however, required greater cost effectiveness. In practice, the costs often stopped at the party provider and contributions were not distributed according to the proposed allocation of use.

Opportunities for *purnawirawan* who held positions in the management of a party were greater than for those who did not. For candidates who had stronger support through their position as a party's executive committee, it was easier to consolidate party machinery to gain votes from the party's base constituents. On the other hand, the coalition parties were influential in gaining voters. The role of party elites could be found in the provision of support for candidates promoted by main parties. In the case of Aceh gubernatorial election in 2011, the party directly escorted the candidate supported by Gerindra. Major General (ret) Soenarko, who served as Chairman of the Defence of DPP Gerindra during ther period of 2012 to 2017, has become an important figure in the provision of support for the party candidate. His experience was widely recognized during both conflict and peace in Aceh. In his position as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Gerindra Aceh, he was active as a campaigner for Zaini-Muzakkir pair proposed by Aceh Party (DPP Gerindra, 2010).

Purnawirawan with proximity to party elites at the national level had a greater opportunity to gain support from the party machinery. However, the impact on the emergence of internal conflicts in the management of a designated candidate faced resistance from party cadres at the lower levels in the organization. This was the case in parties such as PDI-P, who was organized with a more centralized pattern. Consequently, when Agum Gumelar ran for the position of governor of West Java in 2008 through PDI-P, he failed. Agum's expectation was to attain the ideal composition of the leadership of the civil-military combination or otherwise. The main argument was that a military figure was needed to maintain the stability of the country. He was the chairman of the military retirement association of DPP Pepabri. However, Agum's proximity to PDI-P elites affected his chances to run for the post of governor of West Java in 2008. Party cadres of PDI-P West Java DPD exchange also rejected him as their vice-governor candidate. In the revised decree, DPP paired Agum Gumelar with Nu'man Abdul Hakim as Vice-Governor (*Tempo*, January 17, 2008). This strategy led to disappointment among the previous PDI-P cadres, who had expected a local candidate to be promoted as his deputy. In the election, Agum-

Nu'man attained 34.55% of the vote, admitting defeat to Ahmad Heryawan-Dede Yusuf promoted by PKS coalition winning with 40.50% of the vote.

Purnawirawan success in mobilizing political support to win the election for governor was affected by at least three contributing factors. First, purnawirawan must have an important role in the management of the party, whether at the centre or in the provinces. In details, he should be able to communicate the pattern of relationships between the interests of the central committee and party cadres at the provincial level. Second, he must have certain political and social investments from the time he served as commander of the military/police in the province. As was evident from Bibit Waluyo's victory in the province of Central Java, I Made Pastika in Bali, and Karel Ralahalu in Maluku indicating that all the *purnawirawan* in PDI-P and among supporters of the coalition parties in this particular election has moved over to other parties. Third, beside having a strong influence as an individual, a *purnawirawan* possessing adequate logistical support is also instrumental in the potential for victory. Pragmatic voters and money politics that deemed the norm in the community add to the political costs incurred by candidates.

The parties in Indonesia are mostly operated on a voluntary basis, rather than professionally. Hence, salaries are given to a limited number of office staff at the provincial level. Yet, extensive works involving the party functionaries in preparation for the election are highly dependent on the availability of operational funds and sufficient numbers of volunteers. When the mobilization of *purnawirawan* in a presidential election is driven by pragmatic short-term interests, it diffuses from the internal party mobilization into the legislative elections, which is mostly driven by ideological goals. Generally, the *purnawirawan* willing to work in activating the party machines are those who have a position in the management office of the party. This is because they are also involved in elections as parliamentary candidates or share interests with many MPs representing the party. Thus, changes in the electoral system inevitably affect the mobilization strategies of political parties.

Overall, the consequences of the proportional representation (PR) electoral system used in Indonesia can be categorized into two main effects. The first effect applies to the 1999 and 2004 elections in which *purnawirawan* participation in candidacy as MPs was low. In those elections, closed list PR was used, where the party has the full authority to nominate the favourite candidate by providing the degradable number from the top most favorable candidate to less favorable candidate (represented in number). As a result, *purnawirawan* participation in candidacy was significant only in PDI-P, PPP, and Golkar. Most of these *purnawirawan* could win against the competition because of the support of the party. The second case relates to the elections of 2009 and 2014 in which the open

list PR system with the most votes was used. In two election periods, most *purnawirawan* from Democratic Party and Gerindra were qualified as members of parliament. Even if the party was not able to determine the favorable candidate, a *purnawirawan* could use the position as a party official, by utilizing the party machinery to support their campaign.

In the context of strategic behavior, it should be noted that each party and the elites are responsible for the party's winning strategy focusing on the level of electability of each candidate nominated in the election. This resulted in a system where candidates who played a role in the party officials at central level would have a great chance of being nominated. Such affirmative patterns were commonly used as a part of a political incentive for contributions inside the party. Stewardship of the party at the local level only accepted candidates who have been determined from the central. On the other hand, a candidate member of the national parliament from local party management was rarely nominated. Nevertheless, the PR system that produced more competition was predominant in forcing the party to nominate a figure that was considered to have the popularity and strong logistical support,.

5.6 Summary

This chapter has outlined the role of *purnawirawan* in building networks when mobilizing political support for candidacy. It revealed four key findings on their roles in legislative and presidential elections. First, *purnawirawan* have provided certain benefits to their political party in military strategy, tactics in mobilizing support, and organizing their campaign team. This included an addition of the expertise required by the parties and candidates to win political support in the campaign and to gain significant vote. Second, *purnawirawan* who joined the campaign team in the presidential elections were usually represented in larger number than their participation in legislative elections as candidate. There were strong indications that their strategic role in the political battle was still dominant in the race for presidency. Their interest in contesting a presidential election stemmed from the platform for gaining political incentives in the form of opportunities in strategic positions within the party or government jobs.

Third, there were differences in the *purnawirawan* networks formed, depending on the institution of political parties and political events. Networks within political parties were still based on the aspects of the military academy classmate, branch, corps, loyalty, and ideological commitment. In political events, the networks they built supported their short-term pragmatic interests. Fourth, in political parties, *purnawirawan* mobilization was limited to the internal party involving administrators, party cadres, and sympathizers. Direct contact with

constituents and communities was still conducted by civilian politicians. This pattern has made it difficult for the *purnawirawan* to build strong roots of political support among constituents. They mainly played their roles in utilizing the space of elite policy makers in the party.

In general, the involvement of a high number of *purnawirawan* in national politics had implications for the effectiveness of a candidate's winning campaign in the presidential election. In the context of general elections, the two parties where *purnawirawan* functioned effectively were Democratic Party and Gerindra. In PDI-P and Golkar, their roles were less significant because civilian politicians took more control and consolidation in winning the election constituency base. The development model of organizing the party had also a significant influence on the pattern of *purnawirawan* activities and roles in elections, including in the presidential elections. In a semi-militarist party, such as Democratic Party, most *purnawirawan* controlled the party structure, and were in charge of designing winning elections to distribute potential colleagues in public office with measurable goals. In Gerindra, moreover, *purnawirawan* tended to occupy most internal functions and concentrated on building the capacity of the party organization and the winning number of votes in the election. The chain of co-ordination in activating party's political machinery was also effective in the gubernatorial elections.

In the following chapter six, the discussion on *purnawirawan* performance in public office continues. It focuses on their public positions in either executive or legislature at both national and provincial governments. The goal was to empirically test the relationship between the engagement of *purnawirawan* with incentives and political concessions received, and the compromises made to ensure consistency within the party power dynamics.

CHAPTER VI
Purnawirawan in Public Offices:
Transforming Military Interests or Compromising with Democracy?

The previous chapter has discussed how *purnawirawan* and their respective parties performed throughout periodical legislative and executive elections held since 1999. To continue the assessment, this chapter will elaborate their political views expressed in policy implementation as they sat in three different positions: 1) executive positions in the central government, 2) legislative positions in the national parliament, and 3) executive positions in the provincial government. To complete the assessment, the research will compare *purnawirawan*'s two opposing positions: the ones who sat in the "elite circle" at central party boards and the ones who served in various public offices but never held any official position at the party's central office. This additional assessment may give us a perspective on the effectiveness of opposing parties' horizontal control. There is a new evidence that strengthens some findings in Western democracy in which the political party's central office invariably exercises control of its cadres in public offices via a group of party elites who engage in the crossroad between extra-parliementary institution and public office (Biezen, 2000). This chapter seeks to figure out whether this also happened in the aforementioned three case studies.

The first case observed took place during the Yudhoyono-Kalla's presidency from 2004 to 2009. The case began with Yudhoyono's policy orientation of appointing former military leaders to his cabinet. Yudhoyono's two periods of administration allowed *purnawirawan* to hold power in the national governance for almost a decade. It is likely that his presidency administered programs and policies that translated his political position into civilian politician. We are searching for possible traces of militaristic legacy as main characteristics in his policies on security, human rights, and military defense.

The second case study reviews national legislations passed from 1999 to 2014. The role of MPs and party factions from PDI-P, Golkar, Democratic Party, and Gerindra during this period will be outlined. The question the research seeks to answer is how they were involved in the formulation of national legislations and to what extent *purnawirawan* MPs contributed to the formulation, discussion, and approval of the legislations. The analysis of both case studies aims to develop an overview of the construction of *purnawirawan* political views in public policies that they produced. The analysis will also give a general idea of the extent to which a

political party as a creator of public opinions provided support for the measures taken by their members in public offices. The discussion will focus on the aspects of defense, security, social policy, and administration. The third case study analyzes the performance of governors to comprehend the relationship among candidacies, relationship between political parties, and leadership orientation at provincial level governance.

6.1 Representative Politics: The Military in the Cabinet of 1998-2004

After the fall of New Order in 1998 up until 2004, the military was still represented in the parliament. The military faction consisted of MPR and DPR members, coming from the TNI and the police force. The faction numbered 38 members and they were quite a significant political force in policy-making process. They had an important role in the process of political negotiation, especially when they became a "key voice" in the rejection of President Wahid's impeachment. In policy formulation process, most of them tended to be oriented towards supporting reforms and actively supporting all legislations aimed at speeding up the enactment of pro-reform laws, such as the Law on TNI. The only exception was Brigadier General Sembiring Meliala of the PDI-P who wanted the TNI to have permanent representatives in parliament (Ziegenhain, 2008: 131). In addition to their involvement in the parliament, the military also had institutional representatives in the cabinet of the ruling president. They were part of the interest of directly influencing the policies during the period of transition to democracy. In addition, military members serving in the parliament and the cabinet still held the status of active service. Thus, there was a direct relationship between the military chain of command and its members in public offices.

During the transition period of 1998-2004, the tendency of appointing active military representatives in ministerial positions varied from one presidency to another (Table 18). In Habibie's administration (1998-1999) there were six military representatives in the cabinet. Three of them held the position in strategic ministries, such as Co-ordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Home Affairs. Two military institutions were under the command of former armed forces commanders: General Wiranto as the Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces Commander and General Feisal Tanjung as Minister of Politics and Security. The other two, Syarwan Hamid and Yunus Yosfiah, were in command of TNI and police force factions in the national parliament. The military was still concerned with the issues of security and control of state defense while state bureaucracy was maintained under the Ministry of Home Affairs. This period displayed the evident patterns of communication between factions of the military/police in the national parliament and military institutions.

Table 18: Military Officers in the Cabinet during Reformasi (1999 to 2004)

Presidential Cabinet	Name	Ministry	Last Position in Military
B.J Habibie (*Reformasi Pembangunan* Cabinet)	Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid	Home Affairs	Vice-Chairman of national parliament from military representatives.
	Gen. Wiranto	Defence and Security	Commander of Armed Forces
	Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah	Information	Member of national parliament from military representatives (head of military faction in national parliament)
	Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono	Transmigration	Commander of Army Education and Training Command
	Gen. Feisal Tanjung	Co-ordinator of Politics and Security	Commander of Armed Forces
	Lt. Gen. Andi M Ghalib	Attorney General	Head of Legal Development of Armed Forces
Abdurrahman Wahid (*Persatuan* Nasional Cabinet)	Gen. Wiranto	Defence and Security	Commander of Armed Forces
	Maj. Gen. Agum Gumelar	Co-ordinator of Politics and Security Defence and Security Transportation	Governor of National Resilience Institute
	Lt. Gen. Luhut Pandjaitan	Industry and Trade	Commander of Army Education and Training Command
	Vice Adm. Freddy Numberi	State Apparatus	Commander of Naval Base in Irian Jaya-Maluku
Megawati Soekarnoputri (Gotong Royong Cabinet)	Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Co-ordinator of Politics and Security	Chief of Armed Forces Territorial Staff
	Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno	Co-ordinator of Politics and Security Home Affairs	Head of military faction in national parliament
	Maj. Gen. Agum Gumelar	Transportation	Governor of National Resilience Institute
	Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono	State Intelligence Agency	Commander of Army Education and Training Command

Source: Compiled from various sources

During the term of President Wahid (1999-2001), the composition of the military representatives in the cabinet witnessed a change. Though the position of Minister of Politics and Security was still under the military, the other two minister positions were handed back to civilians. In terms of numbers, there was a decrease from six to four, three of whom were taken from various military factions and not from a pool of officers with direct control over military institutions. Wahid had wanted to create a balance and reduce dependency on and domination of military factions when it came to matters of defense and security. Civilian weaknesses or lack of expertise in the security and defense issues were deeply felt when discussing military reforms that led to the passage of the TNI Law and other regulations governing the breakdown of military relations from political activities (Mietzner in Lloyd and Smith, 2001: 36). The entry of Lt. Gen. Luhut Panjaitan and Vice-Admiral Freddy Numberi from the navy was a part to gain military support in the cabinet. It was understood that Wahid's governance faced great pressure from military headquarters as well as from military/police faction in the parliament regarding their positions in the government. Looking at the ministerial positions given by Wahid, the inclusion of those Generals was aimed to strengthen the presidential working team in their political communication with military institutions.

Following the fall of Wahid's administration and the beginning of Megawati's presidency (2001-2004), the dominance of Ministry of Politics and Security rebounded with Ministry of Home Affairs to guarantee the effectiveness of control. During her term, Megawati placed military reformists, such as Yudhoyono as Minister of Politics and Security and Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, chairman of military/police faction in the parliament, as Minister of Home Affairs. Sabarno was a supporter of Megawati by mobilizing the votes of the TNI Polri faction during the presidential election by the MPR. Through the post of minister, Sabarno was able to organize support for some military men to win the election of governor by the DPRD (Woo, 2011:173).

In addition, two other military officer sharing a close ideology with PDI-P were also promoted as Minister of Transportation and Head of State Intelligence Agency. Besides promoting reformist military figures, Megawati also embraced military hardliners like Gen. Ryamizard Ryaccudu and supported Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso in the election of governor of Jakarta. Sutiyoso was known as Commander of Jakarta Military Command who was allegedly involved in the chain of command in the case of *Kudatuli* (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010: 126).

In terms of performance and policy orientation, ministers with military background were actively involved in the implementation of public policies that encouraged democratization. Horizontal conflicts which happened during the implementation of regional autonomy laws in 1999 were adequately managed by

institutional approaches. Providing more authority for local governments indeed may generate social and political instability. During upheavals in the forms of social conflicts and separatism during 1999 to 2004, the average number of military operations conducted per year was 2.5 and they were entirely geared to cope with internal threats (Widjajanto & Wardhani, 2008: 41).

In learning the role of ministers from military background during cabinet transition periods, we focus on the analysis of how major issues were managed by the government in domestic security sector. By and large, ministers with military background showed better performance and compatibility with democratization in the sense that they took unconventional steps as their actions were within the scope of the military doctrine. There are at least two indications that they gave greater attention to dialogue- and persuasion-based solutions. First, they respected constitutional norms when determining resolutions to socio-political conflicts; and second, they tended to avoid policies that contained the violation of human rights.

The aforementioned indications are based on several observations on the performance of ministers within Megawati's cabinet. The choices regarding the establishment of policy-based constitution can be identified in the policies on domestic issues. In the Mutual Assistance (*Gotong Royong*) cabinet of Megawati, Hari Sabarno as the Minister of Home Affairs faced a multitude of problems related to the implementation of regional autonomy, which was introduced in 1999 (Rasyid, 2004: 73-75). The management of personnel and assets of the local government led to high operational costs and funds for development was grim. There were fundamental differences in perception between central and local governments. The latter was positioning itself as the major determinant of the regional policy line with the view that the regional government should enjoy the autonomy of broad rights to govern itself as it pleased. Instrumental regulations, at that moment, were still vague and proved to be an obstacle in the management of this issue. This was evident in the resolution of the conflict in Aceh (Mietzner, 2007; Miller, 2008).

Publication and completion of the regulations were the priority. Although the implementation of laws could not be done entirely in his tenure, the formation of the regulations was already done. For instance, the government implemented a law that led to the establishment of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. The law governs the privileged Islamic Law in Aceh and its technical implementation. In addition, there was the formulation of the presidential election as a separate bill from the electoral law (*Kompas*, January 9, 2002; *Tempo*, August 27, 2001). Mediatory steps were implemented in regions hit by issues of elite conflicts including Papua. Hari Sabarno was so careful not to rashly approve of the pressure to validate the results of the gubernatorial direct election in 2004 won by Brig.Gen. Abraham Attururi. He chose to ensure that the president's approval was related to the special autonomy

provisions granting the Papuan People's Council (MRP) right to elect the governor (King, 2004:93-94).

The prominent military member in *Gotong Royong* Cabinet was Hendropriyono, Head of State Intelligence Agency. This position enabled him to have control over the collection, process, and dissemination of information to ensure national security and the existence of a democratic society. Under Hendro's leadership, the Agency fully engaged in the weak situation in which Megawati's administration faced the issues of political stability. Although his appointment drew criticism from a number of quarters, especially institutions and activists concerned with human rights issues, they were ignored by the president's office. According to an NGO, *Kontras*, Hendro was allegedly involved in Talangsari Lampung incident in February 1989 (Avonius, 2008; Hamid, 2012). Referring to Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights Articles 2, 8, 9, 17, 71, and 100; Hendro's appointment potentially hindered the progress of human rights enforcement. His tenure was marked by several prominent cases, including Bali bombing on October 12, 2001; bombing at JW Marriott Hotel on August 5, 2003; and the murder of a human rights activist, Munir. Various quarters demanded Hendro's resignation and questioned the president's motive for not doing so. In Munir's murder case, the investigation of the fact-finder team named Hendropriyono, M. As'ad, Bambang Irawan, and Muchdi P. R. as the alleged suspects of the murder (*Tempo*, June 27, 2014).

During Megawati's administration, issues pertaining to the stability of national security and public order were crucial since they had a huge impact on the performance of her governance (Smith & Ling Han, 2002). In managing the separatist conflict in Aceh, Yudhoyono as the Minister of Politics and Security at the time preferred settlement through persuasive dialogue between elements rather than handling the issue military-wise. Presidential Instruction No. 8/2001 and Law No. 18/2001 on Aceh decreed the measures based on non-military approach. A recovery program, as far as it was possible in view of militaristic option, was the potential to open up more intensive talks between the Indonesian government and Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, GAM). The law became the central government's strategy to provide additional options for peace-keeping efforts in Aceh. Megawati's administration preferred a militaristic solution rather than the expansion of political policies that might have led to dysfunction of the state infrastructure, a culture of severe corruption, and economic war (Miller, 2004: 334). In another analysis, the approach of the central government regarding this particular conflict was to secure the control over local elites ("fueling secessionism") rather than pursuing settlement carefully (Mietzner, 2007).

Moreover, the military option taken at the beginning of Megawati's government to decipher rebellion in Aceh province did not show signs that Free

Aceh Movement would accept an offer of a dialogue from the central government. Compared to the initial phase with the opening efforts to reduce tensions of military operations, dialogue seemed to have borne fruitful results. It was proven that in 2002 both the Indonesian government and Free Aceh Movement agreed on a peace agreement mediated by Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in Geneva (*Kompas*, February 8, 2002; *Kompas*, February 6, 2003). The Indonesian government was represented by the Chairmans of the Negotiating Committee, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo and Yudhoyono. The agreement, however, was not a smooth process due to various problems in the field, which further worsened the situation. Yudhoyono was firm against Free Aceh's assessment that condemned the government for denying a peace agreement and committing violations of the principles of demilitarization. In response to Free Aceh's violation to the peace accord formerly agreed upon, the Indonesian government extended the military operation, though in a softer manner, known as *Operasi Lawan Insurjensi* (OLI, Counter-Insurgency Operation). OLI generated policies to establish a new military territory in Aceh after TNI commander approved the establishment of a military territorial command Iskandar Muda on January 29, 2002, which was taken as the failure of the central government to manage the conflict in the province (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003).

The position as Minister of Politics and Security was strategic since it served to coordinate various ministerial institutions, especially those directly related to political and security stability. These include the Ministry of Home Affairs, State Intelligence Agency, TNI, and the police. Yudhoyono's persuasive approach was more influenced by the politics of the middle way, that is, to bridge the reformist military with the civilian government of which he had become a part. Several different options were aired by the nationalist military elites incorporated in PDI-P and the nationalist military wing included in negotiations with Free Aceh Movement. However, the persuasive patterns were also chosen in the resolution of another conflict: in Poso, Central Sulawesi. It took six months of the operation to usher in results, including two months to stop physical violence and four more for recovery operations run by disarming warring actors and controlling the local security and law enforcement. The military did not get a place to dominate operations for Poso where the conflict status was not a part of the area of military operations, unlike in Aceh. Although the military seemed to be concerned, an integrated task force of the military and the police under the control of the latter was formed. These persuasive tactics led to 'Malino declaration' incorporating the peace agreement between Islamic and Christian groups (*Tempo*, December 12, 2001).

Papuan separatist conflict was also resolved by granting privilege models as outlined in Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for the province of Irian Jaya, to

be known as Papua.[27] During the implementation, the first step was the formation of a working group of local men to spread the concept of Special Autonomy (*Otonomi Khusus*), while the central government, in order to finalize the regulations, supported the immediate execution of the Law. Megawati issued Presidential Decree No. 1 of 2003 to follow up Act 45 of 1999 on the division of Papuan territory into West and Central Irian Jaya Province issued during President Habibie's reign in answer to Papua independence movement (Bhakti in Adam & Anwar, 2005: 233). The sensitive agenda of a military tribunal trying members of *Kopassus* charged with the killing of the Chairman of the Papuan Presidium Council, Theys Eluay, was also completed in a military court, in which all the involved members of the *Kopassus* could be sentenced.

Political representation of the military during the period of transition was a constant tug of war among three great interests: 1) accommodation of the democratic transition government to reform demands, especially military reforms; 2) the military maintained a defensive stance internally so that it secured a significant role in state control through its participation; and 3) negotiation of parliamentary political forces who wanted to assert civilian supremacy in politics. Of the three interests, the government in the transition period made some efforts with varying levels of progress. The internal defensive attitude in the military began to weaken when the military was filled by some visionary officers who contributed to the elimination of the faction of military/police in the national parliament. At the same time, the repeal of the military's continued dual function in the rate of change of doctrine in the respective military corps was approved. Civilian political forces in the parliament were polarized along lines of the nationalist camp and within the camp of Islam, and the tension between them peaked with the ouster of President Wahid though some cases still needed military support. Their consolidation did not give tangible results in providing products and government policies that had good capability.

6.2 Securing Military's Interests: A Case Study of Yudhoyono's Presidency (2004-2009 and 2009-2014)

Yudhoyono won the presidential elections in 2004 after defeating Megawati in the second round. The new *Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu* (KIB, United Indonesia

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[27] This law is supported by the implementation of the regulations as a guideline with two laws, nine government regulations, and two presidential decrees, which include symbols of the area, special areas, international treaties, the House of Representatives of Papua, the Papuan People's Assembly, the province, the Parliament, and the Assembly, the formation of political parties, the procedure of making *Perdasus* and *Perdasi* (both are local regulations), foreign loans, land rights, intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Judicial Power, and Accountable Governor as the representation of the Central Government.

Cabinet) was the first cabinet after 1998 that no longer provided a niche for active military representation. Yudhoyono inducted *purnawirawan* directly in his campaign team as a part of the cabinet. However, strategic ministries directly related to the coordination with the military were still held by ministers with military backgrounds. Admiral (ret.) Widodo A. S., the former TNI Commander, was appointed as Minister of Politics and Security and Lt. Gen. (ret.) M. Ma'ruf was named Minister of Home Affairs (2005-2007), and was later replaced by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Mardiyanto (2007-2009). Comparing KIB I and II (Table 19), the representatives of *purnawirawan* in the cabinet KIB II was more in number than those in KIB I. A number of them had joined cause with the Yudhoyono camp in the presidential election of 2009, when Yudhoyono-Boediono faced Megawati-Prabowo. In addition, the *purnawirawan* did not only serve in Yudhoyono's camp as the winning team, but were also given Central Board members' positions in Democratic Party. In KIB II, two of them held strategic ministries, namely Marshal (ret.) Djoko Suyanto, as Minister of Politics and Security, and Let. Gen. (ret.) Sudi Silalahi, as Secretary of State.

Table 19: Purnawirawans in Cabinet during Consolidation (2004 to 2014)

Presidential Cabinet	Purnawirawan (Party Affiliation)	Ministry	Last Position in Military
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Indonesia Bersatu I)	Lt. Gen. (ret.) M. Ma'ruf (Yudhoyono Campaign Team)	Home Affairs (2005-2007)	Chief of Social and Political Affairs of the Armed Forces
	Adm. (ret.) Widodo A.S. (Yudhoyono Campaign Team)	Political and Security Coordinator	Commander of the Armed Forces
	Vice. Adm. (ret.) Freddy Numberi (Partai Demokrat)	Sea and Fishery	
	Maj. Gen. (ret.) Mardiyanto (non-partisan)	Home Affair (2007-2009)	Commander of Diponegoro Territorial Command
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Indonesia Bersatu II)	Marsh. (ret.) Djoko Suyanto (PD)	Political and Security Coordinator	Commander of the Armed Forces
	Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudi Silalahi (PD)	State Secretary	Commander of Brawijaya Territorial Command
	Vice Adm. (ret.) Freddy Numberi (PD)	Transportation (2009-2011)	
	Let. Gen. (ret.) E.E. Mangindaan (PD)	Transportation (2011-2014)	Commander of Trikora Territorial Command
	Brig. Gen. (ret.) Taufiq Effendi (PD)	State Apparatus	
	Gen. (ret.) Sutanto (non-partisan)	State Intelligence Agency	Head of National Police
	Maj. Gen. (ret.) Marciano Norman (non-partisan)	State Intelligence Agency	Commander of Presidential Guard
Joko Widodo (Kerja)	Adm. (ret.) Tedjo Edhy Purdianto (Nasdem)	Political and Security Coordinator	Commander of Navy
	Gen. (ret.) Ryamizard Ryacuddu (non-partisan)	Defence	Commander of Army

Source: Compiled from official sources

The need for military members and strong *purnawirawan* figures holding cabinet positions related to politics and security as well as the bureaucracy remained. Emerging conflicts that occurred during the elections of local government heads in many places were a part of the chain of problems inherited from the implementation of regional autonomy. The existence of these figures would ensure

better communication and control exercised by the civilian government over the military and bureaucratic institutions. It would take some more time for people to understand The process of institutionalization of the rule. Minister of Home Affairs, M. Ma'ruf, was directly involved in the implementation of the direct election law and gave it priority. During his tenure, he issued a government regulation in 2005, which set the technical details of the implementation of direct elections (*Kompas*, October 22, 2004; *Kompas*, February 14, 2005).

The selection of ministers with military background and placement of *purnawirawan* in powerful positions in domestic politics and the Security Ministry was done to minimize the risks associated with the emergence of insubordination in state agencies. An important example is a case that took place during the presidency of President Wahid. Gen. Wiranto was dismissed from his cabinet on February 14 and later, the TNI spokesman, Maj.Gen. Drajat Sudrajat stated that "if the current government is unable to overcome the political and economic crisis, the TNI will consult the DPR and take over the government temporarily until elections are held" (Honna 2013; 179-180).

In addition to the conflict resulting from the direct elections, the administration of the state still faced several conflicts associated with regional expansion and ethnic, religious, and racial unrest (SARA; issues on *Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar Golongan*). One of the highlights of the Minister of Home Affairs's achievements was the issuance of the *Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9/2006 on Guidelines for the Implementation Task Regional Head/Deputy Head in Maintenance of Religious Harmony, Empowerment Forum for Religious Harmony, and Construction of Houses of Worship*. One of the highpoints was a rejection of the latter by several groups of the Christian (Protestant) Church, who deemed it discriminatory and a cause of upheavals among religious groups (*Tempo*, February 26, 2006). During his tenure in the cabinet, Ma'ruf cancelled sixteen local regulations made for five provincial governments and districts/cities in South Kalimantan, despite conflicting with the regulations of the central government (*Kompas*, June 22, 2006).

A severe conflict arising from separatism movement was resolved with a persuasive approach and dialogue that resumed in Yudhoyono's administration. Minister of Politics and Security (*Menkopolkam*) Widodo A. S. was engaged in conflict resolution. *Menkopolkam* also had experience with military operations, and was considered to have the ability to continue fruitfully deploying his high level of cultural intelligence (*The Conversation*, July 17, 2014). At the beginning of his tenure, he managed to minimize coercive military approach against armed conflict in Aceh, Poso, and Papua by downgrading the status of *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM, Military Operations Area) to a civil emergency, placing the conflicts in the realm of

civil order. Practical handling of conflicts with military operations continued only in Aceh until the signing of Helsinki Peace. Until 2005, the status of Aceh remained that of a civil order situation, which was cancelled after the passage of the Law on Governing Aceh.

In 2006, the government set up a special agency to deal with cases of violence and terrorism – Security Operations Command (*Koopskam*) in Central Sulawesi – as part of the management of horizontal conflicts in violence-prone areas. The three main tasks of the agency were law enforcement, intelligence activities for law enforcement and the disclosure network, and security. The existence of the agency, however, was not free from criticism over human rights violations. In 2007, *Tim Pembela Muslim* (TPM, Muslim Lawyers Team) termed it overrated and accused it of violating the law and human rights. The government answered the criticism on the pretext of the law that had established procedures for handling conflicts (*Kompas*, January 6, 2006; *Kompas*, January 31, 2007).

The management of various conflicts pushed Yudhoyono's government to propose a legislation to encourage *RUU Keamanan Nasional* (*Kamnas*, National Security Bill) which stated that the role of the military in managing riots would be enlarged again. However, various NGOs involved with human rights issues triggered a public response that rejected the idea of military involvement to settle a state of unrest and to ensure order in the country. They instead recommended a solution for strengthening police resources to enable the police to control law and order and to provide security. Crucial discussion of the Bill in conjunction with the military reform agenda needed to be finished by the Military Court (*Peradilan Militer*) Bill, the revision of Law No. 23/PRP/1959 on the State of Emergency, and the bill related with military assistance (*RUU Perbantuan TNI*). The polemic on the National Security Bill finally stopped because the government, through *Menkopolkam*, did not give any response and continued with the discussion (*Kompas*, February 15, 2007).

The beginning of Yudhoyono's administration faced a major challenge with the main agenda of the restoration of national security (Huxley, 2005). He continued to maintain military exponent or *purnawirawan* domination in his cabinet, especially for the posts of Interior Minister and *Menkopolkam*, which ensured stable communication between military and civilian institutions related to domestic security issues. In addition, Vice-President Jusuf Kalla inserted *purnawirawan* who were affiliated to Golkar into key roles; such as Brig.Gen. (ret.) Muhammad Basri Sidehabi, whom he made Assistant on Security Affairs (Sebastian, 2004:3). From 2009-2014, in addition to the two ministries, the position of the Head of State Intelligence Agency was held by *purnawirawan*. Their entrance to Yudhoyono's ministerial office can be traced starting from 2010, during which Democratic Party

incorporated large quantities of *purnawirawan* who took charge of the party. They formed a successful team in 2009 presidential election. This situation transformed the party into a political channel of military or *purnawirawan* families for securing their long-term interests, in addition to building careers as politicians and in other strategic areas, such as state companies and private businesses that utilized *purnawirawan* and military networks.

6.3 Strategic Players in the National Parliament from 1999 to 2014

During the parliamentary period of 1999 to 2014, the military enjoyed political representation in the DPR/MPR through the military/police factions. There were thirty-eight *purnawirawan* representatives in these institutions and they were active in discussions and formulating legislation. During the same period, there were also *purnawirawan* who were serving as Members of Parliament elected in 1999 to represent political parties. The following section will elaborate the extent of their performance as MPs representing various political parties. The section will also attempt to answer the questions on whether they played a strategic role in parliament on issues related to military reforms and their position on other issues.

6.3.1 *Parliamentary Period of 1999-2004*

During the parliamentary period of 1999 to 2004, DPR formulated 169 bills of legislation, thus placing a considerable weight on the transitional government in charge of implementing them. As it turned out, the old regulations were considered to be opposing *reformasi* and the general regulations that became the basis for the development of the parliamentary period thereafter. Military reform was crucial in this period. In 2000 the bill of MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 was drafted. The content sought to formulate the separation of the military and the police as individual institutions. According to Article 1 Point 1, the military is an instrument of the state in national defense while the police force is a tool of maintaining security (Point 2). Defense and security activities carried out by both institutions respectively require a cooperative effort from both state institutions (Point 3). The decisions of the Assembly, as the highest institution, had very powerful implications due to the political power of the military exercised either through the military institution or through the military/police factions in the parliament.

In PDI-P, there were prominent *purnawirawan* who combined the two mentioned roles. One of them was Mayor Geneneral (ret.) Sutjipno, who was a Member of Parliament from 1998 to 2004 – a representative of PDI-P for Pangkal Pinang region. He had served as vice-chairman of the parliamentary faction of PDI-P and was involved in the organization of 2001 MPR Special Session that resulted in

the impeachment of President Wahid. As a party spokesman, he was most active in pushing the agenda of the Special Session in response to the president's controversial decisions, including the appointment of the Chief Deputy of the National Police at that time. In the Session, PDI-P asked President Wahid to assume responsibility for this particular policy (*Kompas*, June 22, 2001). PDI-P faction in the parliament, during a discussion on state financial audit, appealed for Sutjipno, who came from a police force background. His stated view was that, in accordance with the 1945 Constitution and in terms of the relationship between the parliament, the president, and the Supreme Court, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK, *Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan*) associated with the parliament was an integral part of the control (MPR, 2002). Meanwhile with the president, BPK was assumed as an external audit.

In the political process in which there was a close crossing point between military doctrine legacy and democratic vision within post-*reformasi* political parties, *purnawirawan's* perspectives proved to have a loud voice. Sutjipno delivered PDI-P's views on the establishment of the Constitutional Court (MK, *Mahkamah Konstitusi*), which expressly supported the creation of MK as the sole authority to conduct judicial reviews of the Act (BPK Report, 2012) – therefore pronouncing judgment on the conflict between laws. It provided a decision on the dispute between the authority of state institutions, the central and local government, and other authorities granted by law. The testing of the regulations under the Act was conducted by the Supreme Court (MA, *Mahkamah Agung*).

In general, *purnawirawan* Members of Parliament from PDI-P had come up with several contributions. Along with improving the party's performance on policy issues requiring the expertise of its MPs, this bloc also gave voice to the party's ideology in the parliament. Regarding the establishment of Judicial Commission (KY, *Komisi Yudisial*), PDI-P proposed that KY served as a supporting element in establishing an operational balance within the judiciary while being in charge of the behavior of its judges in maintaining the dignity of the rule of law. KY's objective, in fact, was only to judge the aspect of personnel administration and not to monitor the judiciary's operations. KY was no more than an administrative apparatus to oversee personnel development in the implementation of the code of conduct of its judges in all levels of the judiciary.

A distinct shift was ushered in by PDI-P platform's increase in citizen participation in matters related to defense and state security. In the Amendment of the Constitution, the party that rode to power on a nationalist ideology initiated the discussion of Article 30 Paragraph (1). According to the Second Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, "Every citizen has the right and duty to participate in the defense and security of the state". In Amendment II, the formulation of the new phrase

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'national defense effort' was based on PDI-P's proposal at the first meeting of the Working Committee of the Assembly (BP, *Badan Pekerja*), namely the Minutes of Meeting (*Risalah Sidang*) dated June 20, 2000 (*Risalah Sidang MPR*, 2000). Sutjipno argued that the main idea behind the amendment of the Article was that defense was the subject of every citizen, so that he as a person has the right and duty to participate in national defense efforts. The method envisioned a system of people's defense and security, incorporating a national defense policy encompassing all citizens. According to this idea, people may lend support to national defense by participating in the functions carried out by the military and the police.

In PDI-P, *purnawirawan* were also tasked with internalizing the support of the party. Some of them, much like Sutjipno, took over the controlling party's faction in the parliament and formulating policy directions. Another figure, Maj.Gen. (ret.) Theo Sjafei, was handed the job of internal consolidation of the party. He later became a member of the parliament and member of PDI-P faction of 1999–2004 as the representative of Kendari; eventually proceeded for a second term from East Nusa Tenggara. His experience spanned in the fields of broad territorial military, as well as political and social intelligence. From various public statements included in the elite discourse in the nationalist party, he was often considered controversial because of his firm and confrontationist attitude towards religious groups. Ideological similarities triggered PDI-P yet, at the same time, the party also gained much from his expertise on statecraft. In the parliamentary period of 1999–2014, PDI-P had approximately eleven *purnawirawan* members. Another key figure was Maj.Gen. (ret.) Sidarto Danusubroto, who has been the longest-serving Member of Parliament since 1999. Sidarto retired with the rank of Inspector General of Police and had served as Chief of Police twice, in West Java and South Sumatra. He was first drawn towards the nationalist ideology when serving as an aide to President Sukarno during the transition of power in 1967-1968. PDI-P placed him in DPR Commission I, where he was often outspoken on policies relating to state sovereignty. For example, he asked the military to immediately shoot down any intruding plane or ship following a series of incursions by the Malaysian Army into Indonesian territory.

Sidarto's experiences also included being a former head of international co-operation in Interpol. He was utilized by PDI-P in the formulation of the bill relating to defense and security. The crucial issue protruding at that time was the abuse of Indonesian borders and a corresponding increase in military armaments. Sidarto was involved in the discussion, formulation, and determination of Police Act (Law No. 2/2002), Defense Law (Law No. 3/2002), TNI Law (Law No. 34/2004), and as Deputy Chairman of the Special Committee on Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 15/2000). In matters of human rights enforcement, he held key positions in various

formulations of laws: as Chairman of the Special Committee on Justice, Ad-Hoc (Law No. 26/2000), Chairman of the Special Committee on the Truth and Reconciliation Bill/TRC (Law No. 27/2004), and Chairman of the special committee of the Draft Law (Bill) Military Court. By the time he became the Chairman of the *ad hoc* committee on Defense Bill in 2002, he was able to make compromises on the demands for military reform and the repeal of the military's dual function with internal pressure of the military in the negotiations 'stripping off' their social-political authority (*Intelijen Magazine*, June 21, 2014).

The compromise was a particular challenge, and it eventually led to the formulation of Law No. 34/2002 on Defense to accommodate people's aspirations in accordance with the demands of reform and, at the same time, the internal military's aspirations. Sidarto successfully led the Defense Committee Bill, thus gaining significant support from other parties and keeping it at the head of the discussion of the other sensitive Bills, especially those related to military interests. In the discussion of sensitive legislation concerning the military, Sidarto was proven to be trustworthy. Even in his position as Chairman of the Special Committee of the Act of Creation of Indonesia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), it was not easy for him to discuss the Defense Bill. The bill was finally passed into law in 2014. Besides being a sensitive issue, this Bill would have had the potential to dismantle the military action in 1965 during the suppression of PKI and the forays of military violence on behalf of other countries throughout the New Order government. The civil society organizations that had actively supported the military violence in the past at that time expressed their grave reservations.

Sidarto was appointed by the Chairman of PDI-P as Chairman of MPR in 2013, replacing Taufik Kiemas. In this position, he was limited in his influence on specific legislations. The function of MPR as the highest institution of the state had shifted to that of an umbrella organization to oversee DPR and DPD; nevertheless it did not possess legislative authority or influence directly. Another agenda in Sidarto's capacity as Chairman of MPR allowed PDI-P to strengthen the commitment of democratization on the foundation of national values. This materialized from Sidarto's proposal to set up a body to manage the four pillars of nationality –that is, *Pancasila* as state ideology, the 1945 Constitution, the formation of *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI, Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia), and national consensus on unity in diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) (*Tempo*, July 8, 2013). The agency could be placed under the Ministry of Education and Culture. Politically, PDI-P supported the concept of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature and additional agencies in the concept of soft-bicameralism as long as they are placed within the framework of strengthening the unitary-state model

(Rich 2013: 169). In practice, of course, the concept of strengthening institutions, such as the Council, was never as clear as the implementation of bicameralism.

Sidarto's another proposal was the establishment of a presidential decree aimed at general rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations conducted under the state's instructions. Also proposed was that the government should broaden the criteria of a national hero so as to encompass other categories, such as human rights activists, environmental activists, and members of law enforcement bodies, including the military. Sidarto also fought for MPR being accorded the role of the highest state institution, while 1945 Constitution Amendments had removed this function. Similarly, there was the desire to restore the general guideline in order for the executive government not to "stray" off the track of the jointly agreed MPR goals, as formulated by New Order government through Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN, *Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*). With the Guidelines, the direction of development could be clearer and more focused. However, the direction of development remained unchanged following the experience of alternate governments every five years; not to mention the changing tastes of the elected President. Policies generated by the president-elect did not overlap as the president and MPR both formulated a medium-term and a long-term program.

During this period, *purnawirawan* were blocked from the PDI-P-dominated parliament. They proved advantageous as Members of Parliament in the acquisition of a large party vote. They were also placed in DPR Commission in accordance with their individual expertise, capacity, and networks. In this period, their role in political parties can be categorized into two categories. Firstly, they played the role of technocrats to fill the void in PDI-P's expertise in the management of the state. Their capacity and expertise guided the party's performance during the discussion of legislations in parliament. Secondly, their political role established their earlier networks to secure the party's interests.

6.3.2 *Parliamentary Period of 2004-2009*

During this period, *purnawirawan* Members of Parliament from PDI-P continued to hold strategic positions, despite its less importance.

Besides Sidarto, Major General (ret.) R. K. Sembiring Meliala was another member who sat in DPR from 1999 to 2009. In the first period of 1999-2004, he left Deli Serdang and Irian Jaya Barat regions in the second term of 2004-2009. He was inducted in Commission I and became Chairman of the Special Committee (Pansus, *Panitia Khusus*), requesting the government to issue a decree as the legal framework for comprehensively resolving the violent conflicts in Poso and Central Sulawesi. The decree also required creating an integrated set of all potentials and efforts to involve various institutions in dealing with Poso conflict. A Special Committee

assessed the riots in Poso as the outcome of poor and disorganized governance, especially by local government bodies. R. K. Sembiring Meliala was specialized in handling domestic conflicts and he was trusted with the conflicts in these regions. After his stint in Poso Special Committee, he was asked to take over as Chairman of the Working Committee of the Aceh Government Bill (*RUU Pemerintahan Aceh*) in 2006. Some of the agenda discussed in the Committee Draft Law on Governing Aceh concerned the authority of the central government in the restive region, where the parliament retained the authority to deal with six functions of central government; namely foreign affairs, religion, monetary, financial, and legal and defense. He approved the reactivation of Iskandar Territorial Military Defense Area Command (*Komando Daerah Militer/Kodam Iskandar Muda*) in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) within the corridors of powers and with functions optimization defense by TNI adjusted to the new paradigm of the military (Kontras, June 28, 2014). In this period, *purnawirawan* played a less strategic role.

6.3.3 *Parliamentary Period of 2009-2014*

During this period, Democratic Party was accounted for most *purnawirawan* elected in the parliament. Nevertheless, the dominance was still held by Members of Parliament from PDI-P. One of them was Maj. Gen. Tri Tamtomo, who sat as a member of DPR from the electoral district of North Sumatra III and sat in Commission I. He was a participant in the discussion on the Crime Prevention and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Bill, chaired by Adang Darajatun, in 2013. On the occasion, he became a member of the *ad hoc* committee to represent the Special Committee of Tri Tamtomo, giving him an opportunity to express opinions on a meeting in the building of MPR/DPR. Some important points cited were:

1. *Important issues related to this bill that needed further attention; one of the purposes of international co-operation that should still give priority to the national interest;*
2. *A monitoring mechanism for allegedly sending money to fund terrorism; it is necessary that the institutions are not arbitrary;*
3. *Determination of the list of terrorist suspects should be through a mechanism that can be accounted for and also must be objective* (*Antaranews*, June 22, 2014).

Maj. Gen. (ret). Tri Tamtomo was also among the MPs who did not agree with the integration of the Islands Development Acceleration Bill (*RUU PPDK*) with the Bill on local government. He argued that:

"If the bill of PPDK is incorporated into the Local Government Bill, the spirit to accelerate the development of the islands will be lost. People on the islands still lag behind, are still weak and backward, so there is the need for a breakthrough by producing PPDK Law, to address the conditions of underdevelopment that have left the islands unstable and prone to disruption of social order and harm to the state (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, DPR, October 23, 2013)*.

He was also listed as a member of the special committee in RUU *Organisasi Masyarakat* (Mass Organization Bill). On the issue of defense, he fought for the construction of military bases in the region of Temajuk, West Kalimantan, which is on the border with Sarawak, Malaysia, to monitor the movement of the Malaysian military and prevent them from doing activities deemed harmful to Indonesia's national interests.

In addition to the list of *purnawirawan* legislators was Adang Ruchiatna, a retired Major General who was elected to DPR in the 2009 election from the electoral district of Jakarta I. He sat as a member of Commission VIII in charge of religious affairs and social and women's empowerment. He also played a crucial role as a sitting member of the Special Committee on the Mass Organization Bill. He saw various problems associated with disturbances that required strict rules, especially when they were imposed by mass organizations. The Organizations did not want to set up and carry out unilateral actions about sweeping provisions, but at the same time, officials seemed to be silent because of the powerless existing law. This Bill arose out of concern for rampant police action undertaken unilaterally against the mass of faith-based organizations, such as Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, *Front Pembela Islam*) in Jakarta, which then spread control over every aspect of the area. Other groups advocating the issues of anti-communism and repelling LGBT groups were similarly grouped together.

Another prominent member was M. Nurdin, a retired Commissioner General of Police who was elected to DPR from the electoral district of West Java 3 and sat as a member in Commission III. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections and served until 2014. He became a member of the Select Committee that designed the Advocate Law and was vice-chairman of the Special Committee on Corruption Bill (Tipikor, *RUU Tindak Pidana Korupsi*). He also rejected the regulation proposed by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court because he considered several points to be opposing the 1945 Constitution (*Antaranews*, June 28, 2014). A law that regulated the work of advocates became necessary because of the arising conflicts triggered by some of the provisions in the Bill, which sparked a feud between lawyers' organizations. The placement of *purnawirawan* with police backgrounds in the Commission in charge of security affairs and law enforcement was part of the party's

strategy for maximizing their role in the discussion of legislation. Although there were several other *purnawirawan*, most did not contribute much to the discussion of legislation. They preferred to finish the discussion that contained their proposals within each faction in the parliament and came out in the debate on legislation as a factional voice.

During the 2009-2014 period, Gerindra did not manage to elect a single *purnawirawan* sitting as a Member of Parliament. In the 2009 elections, it gained 4.46% of the national vote with 26 seats. Despite having a relatively small number of members, the Gerindra faction in DPR was active in discussing the issues emerging in society. Since the members of Parliament from Gerindra served as first-time members from 1 October 2009 to 29 September 2014, as many as 126 of the party's 248 drafts were enacted into law (*Kompas*, December 27, 2012; *Hukum Online*, September 30, 2014). Gerindra faction also actively voiced the proposed legislation in various fields. The proposal emanated from the faction that was directly controlled by the party Board of Trustees, which was mostly under the jurisdiction of *purnawirawan*. Control over the party's faction in the parliament can be considered to see how far this particular bloc dominated party policy.

In the area of defense and security, the issue of National Security Bill was a particular issue of concern for Gerindra faction. Most of the pressure came from pro-democracy and human rights advocacy groups that did not want to hold back military dominance over security, causing Yudhoyono's administration to passively continue the discussion on the Bill. Gerindra has given its approval to the Law on National Security, on the condition that it should only be imposed when the State is faced with dangerous situations and circumstances. But they provided a different assessment by stating that the articles contained in the National Security Bill had the potential to open up opportunities for the reemergence of the New Order. Gerindra's caution followed the public reaction to the draft as being likely to restore the military's importance in internal security affairs (*Kabar Gerindra*, January 2013). The party also paid great attention to the issue of national defense, as well as to the bill's proposal on the issue of maximization of the defense budget. This formulation aimed to maximize the potential of the national defense industry in order to reduce the dependence on weapons from overseas manufacturers. In addition to budget efficiency reasons, it also carried the message that strategic aspects of the defense industry were crucial for increasing military strength.

Overall, Gerindra faction in DPR tended to position itself in accordance with the pressure of public discourse. This was especially true for sensitive policies relating to the interests of farmers, fishermen, villagers and other potential voters since the party sought to increase its support base among this segment. Moreover, both the *RUU Pemerintahan Desa* (Village Government Bill) and the Presidential

Election Bill were aligned with the purpose of projecting Gerindra's image as the party of pro-populist policies. The support from Gerindra faction, together with PDI-P, for the Village Bill was motivated by the reason that village government was spearheading the development of the people in the bottom of the scale. Moreover, in a self-contained village, residents did not have to move to urban areas. Gerindra, together with PDI-P, as opposition parties in the parliament, made an important contribution to work towards the legalization until the law was passed. In this regard, Gerindra faction also offered a draft bill on the protection and empowerment of farmers (*RUU Perlindungan Petani*). As an agricultural country, Gerindra faction argued, the direction of the government's development should focus on community empowerment and the independence of farmers rather than *vice versa*, even to the exclusion of the real sector and the welfare of the farming community.

Another populist policy appeared to be the presidential election law proposed by Gerindra faction in the national parliament during the period 2009-2014. According to the proposal, there should be a threshold reduction in nominating presidential candidates. In other words, the party called for the abolishment of the eligibility of 20% of the popular vote for each parliamentary party, arguing for wider opportunities for the emergence of presidential candidates from various political forces. As for the Party Electoral Threshold, they proposed 3.5% of votes in national elections. This policy option gave the message to the public that it would see the emergence of more and more alternative figures carried by a wider variety of parties in the nomination of presidential elections. Presidential candidacy would no longer be dominated by the candidates promoted by the major parties, which closed the door to the emergence of alternative candidates supported by medium and small parties. Despite the discussion of the Party Electoral Threshold for the presidential election, Gerindra softened and accepted a fixed threshold of 20%.

The positioning of pro-populist policies, however, was not that integral to the party's ideology as compared with the continuing dominant line taken by Gerindra in retaining control of the party's Board of Trustees. After Prabowo's defeat in the 2014 presidential election, the party line changed in parliament with Gerindra's allies in Red and White Coalition (KMP, *Koalisi Merah Putih*) moving towards the exact opposite direction to the policies they had set before the 2014 presidential elections, most prominently the Election Bill. Previously, Gerindra faction gave its consent to the mechanism of the direct election of governors, strict requirements to prevent the emergence of a political dynasty, and setting the shape of the campaign to be more prone to dialogue and education to prevent money politics (*Kabar Gerindra*, February 2013). Under such circumstances did Gerindra's faction in 2014 reverse its stance by approving local elections of either governor or regent/mayor

to be carried out by a local Parliament in order that they could be more easily monitored and controlled by the Commission. Direct elections had proven to give rise to a number of suspected corruption cases. Gerindra argued that the law on election through Parliament did not violate the Constitution since it was in accordance with the fourth principle of *Pancasila*, populism, led by the inner wisdom of deliberations/representatives, and the corresponding 1945 Article 18, Paragraph 4, regulating that the governors, regents, and mayors are elected democratically (*Kompas*, September 10, 2014).

The parliament's metaphorical role as a rubber stamp (O'Rourke, 2002:8 8, Ziegenhain, 2008) in the era before 2004 was partially true. But it was less accurate when seen from the process and internal dynamics in the various party factions within the parliament after the 2004 parliamentary institution, which tended to become more robust and not dependent on the executive administration (Sherlock, 2004; 2007). In a review of the role of *purnawirawan* in the parliament, there was an identified tendency that could not be seen simply as their playing a strategic role in various processes of legislation relating to defense and security issues. They were able to act as spokesmen for party policy once they secured representatives in parliament. Their strategic role greatly depended on the model of party control. PDI-P gave a greater role for *purnawirawan* to escort the party's political agenda. A special relationship with the military or the police was necessary in passing legislation. Democratic Party has a larger number of *purnawirawan* in the parliament, especially during the period 2009-2014, but their position was only that of a faction arm; in other words, improvisation and individual ideas did not stand out. The same pattern was recorded in the performance of members coming from Gerindra and Golkar.

In general, *purnawirawan*'s role in the parliament can be classified into three main roles: as initiators of legislation, then designing and overseeing the process of discussion, and the ratification into law. These roles seemed to be dominated by legislators from PDI-P. MPR and DPR legislative products in the period 1999-2004 related to the military reform agenda as well as the issues of defense and internal security could not be separated from the involvement of PDI-P legislators. Second, Golkar and Democratic Party showed the role of dynamists within party factions in parliament. The parties as a whole did not put them solely in the committees for security and defense issues in parliament, but also in commissions, which were outside of the fields and capacities. Third, the role of *purnawirawan* as negotiators in managing the relationship between *purnawirawan* as civilian politicians with military institutions appeared in the critical period of 1999-2004, when the military still had a representative in the parliament. Specifically, for *purnawirawan*, Fahmi Idris noted that the military group could be a part of a group which was not yet ready

for democracy and was carried by military retirees ——either those who were incoming or those who were already active in the party. With a few exceptions, they were less agile in impact in a democracy. In general, their role and function in the development of democracy in Indonesia were still minimal when compared with civilian politicians (interview with Fahmi Idris, July 1, 2015).

6.4 Governing Local Politics: Comparing Purnawirawan's Performance in Gubernatorial Office

This discussion focuses on the gubernatorial administration in assessing the performance of *purnawirawan* in public office at the local government level. In terms of number, those who had served as head of region in district/city level were relatively comparable to those having served as head of the province (governor). There was a lack of available data from agencies conducting surveys and evaluating *purnawirawan's* performance in district/city level. When the data is available, it is partially complete, except for the cases in larger provinces like East Kalimantan, East Java, Central Java, and South Sulawesi. These evaluations are rather focused on the economy and regional development factors. In addition, the scope and coverage of these surveys of district/city level are too limited to have a slight direct impact on national policy. The provincial government is a direct extension of the national government, and it has greater coordinating autonomy within its own territory.

6.4.1 *Mapping: Provincial Governance Index*

In order to examine the general trend of provincial government's performance, the calculation of the Provincial Governance Index (PGI) will give an overview of the work of governors and provincial officials. PGI construction employs the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) data prepared by the Central Statistics Bureau in collaboration with National Planning Agency (*Badan Perencanaan Nasional*, Bappenas) (*Berita BPS*, July 4, 2014). IDI, which started in 2009, is an index measured on an annual basis with different indicators in several variables used each year that are slightly different from one year to another. Due to the differences in these indicators, the IDI results compared in this project are those in 2009 and 2011 since in both years, the indicators and variables used are the same.

IDI relies on three "Aspects" of civil liberties, political rights, and institution of democracy. The three aspects are divided into 11 "Variables" and 28 "Indicators". Methodologically, IDI preparation is done by 1) a review of local newspapers, 2) a review of regulatory provincial and district/city documents, 3) focus group discussion, 4) in-depth interview (*Berita Resmi Statistik*, No. 55/07/Th. XVII). The method used is analytical hierarchy procedures (AHP) to determine the weight of

the score. The procedure continues with the method of "pair ways comparison" between assessment indicators conducted by 14 experts in their respective fields. The final scaling scale used was 1-100 with "Good" category (> 80), "Moderate" (60-80) and "Bad" (<60). (IDI, 2011; 24). The data used herein for the preparation of PGI is on the variables of civil liberties, political rights, and democratic institutions. Several variables for each aspect will be used (See Appendix).

Other sources used for the purpose of this particular research are the Indonesian Governance Index (IGI) in 2008 and 2012. IGI consists of 4 areas (government, bureaucracy, civil society and economic society). Each area consists of 6 principles that are viewed with various indicators. The weighting method used is Analytical Hierarchy Procedure (AHP), which is a statistic method indicated by the judgment/opinion of experts towards the contribution of each arena, principle, and indicator. Through pair-ways, each arena, principle, and indicator is compared to one another. The weight of arena, principle and indicator is determined by AHP through perception data from 27 experts. Index scale ranged between 1-10 with the folowing categories: 1-2.29 (Very poor), 2.29-3.57 (poor), 3.57-4.86 (nearly poor), 4.86-6.14 (So-So), 6.14-7.43 (Nearly Good), 7.43-8.71 (Good) and 8.71-10 (very good). This research only uses three areas, namely: bureaucracy, civil society, and economic society. All the information and data access on IGI measure provincial governance performance and describe its performance in 89 quantified indicators. *Kemitraan* (Partnership Indonesia) is supported by the UNDP and AusAID. All information related to IGI data report is taken from www.kemitraan.or.id/igi.

IDI index 2009 and IGI 2008 could be used to gauge the condition of the provincial government in the previous four years. Likewise, IDI 2011 and IGI 2012 measure IGI in the previous year. The research looks at the role of *purnawirawan* in the provincial administration from 1998 to 2012. There are interesting things that can be compared with the provincial governments where governors were selected through the Provincial Parliament in 1998-2004. Then the direct election of the Governor began in 2004. Some provinces did not have direct gubernatorial election simultaneously as shown by the tenure of some governors – for example, 2003 to 2008 – but still selected them through the Provincial Parliament. This is not a drawback for the project because the focus of this research is the performance of the *purnawirawan* governor in the provincial government.

This project takes a few of the IDI and IGI variables related to the performance of the governance aspects related to the performance of *purnawirawan*. Regarding IDI, the variables taken are civil liberties (CL) and the Institutions of Democracy (ID). As for IGI, the study variables are the accountability component (AC) and effectiveness (EF) of variable government. As a methodological note, the scores for IDI and IGI have been multiplied on different

scoring scales. IDI uses a scoring percentage in the scale of one to 100, while the IGI uses a scale of one to ten. The scoring of IDI and IGI multiplication follows a scale of one to ten, while the final result of PGI uses a percentage scale of one to 100. For multiplication rules combining two different source indices, a multiplication technique is employed as mentioned in Munck (2009). Munck argues that operating combinations with many variable indexes is followed by two things: (1) theoretically meaningful and (2) empirically valid in connecting a concept to its theoretical correlates (Alexander, Inglehart, & Welzel, 2012: 41–62). The scores for the PGI scale can be categorized as follows: <40 as bad, 40–70 as fair, and >70 as good. The formula used to compile PGI is:

$$PGI = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{(CL + ID) \times (AC + EF)}{n}$$

The preparation of PGI helps in mapping the provincial government's performance and conducting preliminary identification of the position of governor in his administration. The mapping can show the difference between governors with civil backgrounds and *purnawirawan*, according to the impact of their governance that falls into 'effective' category, and prove their leadership model as characterized by military style.

In Table 20, there are 17 provinces in which a *purnawirawan* led as governor from 1998 to 2012. In PGI 2009, which included the performance of the provincial government beginning in 2004, the highest point was occupied by Jakarta with 75.7 points followed by Gorontalo with 63 points. The province of West Nusa Tenggara was ranked the lowest with 37.3 points, preceded by West Sumatra with 39.03. Aceh has experienced a sharp decline from 44.3 in 2009 to register 29.2 in 2012, which means a very significant decrease of 15, only equaled by the province of West Kalimantan.

There are three provinces where governorships were held by *purnawirawan* in the period 1998-2003: Riau, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan (Table 19). In areas of the province, retired generals who served as governor had points above 55. Over a longer period, there were four provinces in two consecutive periods, including North Sumatra (1998-2003 and 2003-2008), which were held by the same governor and Central Java (1998-2013), which was held by two different governors. East Java (1998-2008) had the same governor. Similarly, the governors of other regions, such as Lampung, Bali, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku, and West Papua served from 2003 to 2013.

Table 20: Provincial Government Index

No	Province	PGI 2009	PGI 2012	PGI2012-PGI2009
1	Aceh	44.32	29.22	-15.09
2	N. Sumatra	42.35	40.01	-2.33
3	W. Sumatra	39.03	41.69	2.66
4	Riau	52.66	40.86	-11.8
5	Jambi	51.16	54.99	3.83
6	S. Sumatra	59.24	44.38	-14.85
7	Bengkulu	53.46	34.14	-19.32
8	Lampung	50.34	55.56	5.21
9	Babel Islands	54.61	51.47	-3.145
10	Riau Islands	59.02	38.83	-20.18
11	D. K. I. Jakarta	75.71	53.38	-22.33
12	W. Java	39.88	45.85	5.96
13	C. Java	56.78	43.71	-13.07
14	D.I. Jogja	46.78	60.57	13.79
15	E. Java	48.58	40.27	-8.31
16	Banten	51.36	50.94	-0.41
17	Bali	58.27	44.71	-13.55
18	W Nusa Tenggara	37.39	30.75	-6.63
19	E Nusa Tenggara	55.91	43.01	-12.89
20	W. Kalimantan	59.39	44.14	-15.24
21	C. Kalimantan	47.91	51.31	3.39
22	S. Kalimantan	41.33	38.63	-2.70

23	E. Kalimantan	60.47	37.30	-23.16
24	N. Sulawesi	56.21	50.28	-5.92
25	**C. Sulawesi**	**59.53**	**50.38**	**-9.15**
26	**S. Sulawesi**	**46.48**	**49.76**	**3.27**
27	**S. E. Sulawesi**	**51.43**	**36.54**	**-14.88**
28	Gorontalo	63.01	41.77	-21.23
29	W. Sulawesi	52.46	48.02	-4.44
30	**Maluku**	**45.37**	**54.55**	**9.17**
31	N. Maluku	52.31	32.77	-19.54
32	**W. Papua**	**39.06**	**25.45**	**-13.61**
33	**Papua**	**45.38**	**31.35**	**-14.03**

*) Provinces under *purnawirawan* rule are in bold
Source: PGI developed by author

In four provinces, the PGI interval did not drop too far such as in North Sumatra (-2.3) and East Java (-8.3) with the only exception being Central Java (-13.0), which dropped by over 10 points. On the other hand, Maluku recorded a significant increase of 9.1. In other provinces, Lampung (at 5.2) recorded an increase from the previous governor, while Bali experienced a significant decrease of (-13.5) points. In the *purnawirawan*-held provinces, significant decreases were measured in Southeast Sulawesi (-14.8), Papua (-13), and Central Sulawesi (-9.1).

From the data acquired from PGI in Table 20, three important pictures are subject to further analysis. First, the governor leadership from *purnawirawan* in all provinces in Indonesia during the period of 1998-2003 recorded the lowest PGI number in West Papua with 25 point and the highest in DKI Jakarta with 75 points. The interval is due to different factors. One of the factors is that DKI Jakarta had a much better level of literacy and economic establishment than the new West Papua Province, which became a province only two years earlier. Second, *purnawirawan* leadership was not much different than that of civilian leaders. For example, West Nusa Tenggara Province had 37 points in 2009 and declined to 30 points in 2012 and it was not under *purnawirawan* rule. Third, *purnawirawan* governors in their second term in office had a declining PGI score; for example, the governors of West

Java, Central Java and East Java, although the declining number was not significant. There was only one province, Southeast Sulawesi, in which PGI decreased significantly.

The drop in PGI in other provinces was found in larger number in the cases of Bengkulu (-19.3), North Maluku (-19.5), Riau Islands (-20.1), Gorontalo (-21.2), and East Kalimantan (- 23.1), where *purnawirawan* never governed. While a significant increase was not evident in the provinces headed by a civilian governor; Lampung (5.2) and Maluku (13) were exceptions. The index reports a provincial average PGI of over 50 points. PGI result is a macro picture of the performance of the provincial government that could be used to identify the degree of progress or setbacks in the political development and governance of each governor.

6.4.2 *Analysis of 17 Provinces*

Among the 17 provinces led by *purnawirawan* from 1998-2014, the results can be described in PGI-specific variables of civil liberties (CL), the institution of democracy (ID), government accountability (AC), and government effectiveness (EF). In CL variable, all the provinces were in the range of 8 to 9 points. It is a proof in general that democratization in Indonesia has been running well in terms of civil liberties, not only at the national level but also at the lower levels. However, according to the data of CL in 2009 and 2011 from the provinces once led by *purnawirawan*, 10 provinces registered decreased values. Only Lampung, Bali, and West Papua showed an increase. Despite the rise in West Papua, it is very small in number and the reign of Governor Brigadier General (ret.) Abraham Atururi in the first period was not until the end of the term of office; while Lampung and Bali were both led by persons of police backgrounds. In the ID variable, there was an increase in all provinces except West Papua. CL variable and ID assess the condition of internal democracy beyond government institutions, and it was visible that the institutionalization of democracy was more successful with the emergence of institutions of society that are increasingly accountable, including NGOs and the press presence in the regions.

In the variables of government accountability (AC) and government effectiveness (EF), which assess the capabilities and functions of government in their administration, the disparities among provinces appeared. In these variables, the model of the governor's leadership is crucial. In EF variable, the government performance requires a bureaucracy that can provide faster and more efficient public services; whereas AC variable seeks to ensure all public complaints and public budget spending more accountable. The engagement of *purnawirawan* figures in these two variables indicates a compatibility between democratization demands to produce good governance and their leadership that governs in

accordance with the constitution. In Lampung and North Sumatra, AC increased. In Central Java, under the reign of Governor Lt. Gen. (ret.) Mardiyanto, AC reached 8.08 and therefore fell under the 'very good' category. Mardiyanto was appointed by President Yudhoyono to serve as Minister of Home Affairs in KIB II. During the rule of governor Maj. Gen. (ret.) Bibit Waluyo, the AC of Central Java slumped sharply to 5.17. In general, 11 provinces showed a decrease. The condition is caused by the proliferation of various cases of corruption from the head of the local government in the region/municipality and its legislators. It has an impact on the decline in the level of public trust for government accountability (Smith, Obidzinski, Subarudi & Suramenggala, 2003; Rasyid in Hofman & Kaiser, 2006).

In EF variables assessing the effectiveness of provincial government's development program, only the province of Maluku increased from the previous significance of 4.67 to 7.97. Bali experienced a decline from 7.75 to 4.83. Most provinces experienced a decline in the value of the EF due to division of powers issues that were not fully clear between the provincial government and the county/city. The public, however, judged the policies and programs of the provincial government as not effective enough because the space was limited for the coordination of the local governments that lacked sufficient authority to execute their own programs. A study by Buehler (2010) mentions such circumstances under which actions by the local elites in political parties resulted in the marginalization of the public participation. In addition, public institutions can be easily controlled and exploited as a political force that are more co-optative in order to strengthen the influence of the political elite longevity in power. Another explanation from Hadiz (2003) called the mistake of "technocratic rationality" as the cause of the failure, so that the dissemination of democratic values, such as a good governance agenda, cannot find a place in its implementation.

According to Table 21, there is an interesting tendency observed in the displacement of party affiliations between the present governor and the former governor. This trend resonates with the discussion in Chapter III and Chapter IV that examined the incorporation in *purnawirawan* parties that did not qualify for seats in parliament for being highly militarized; so they switched to parties where they sat as holders of control, such as Democratic Party and Hanura. Likewise, many *purnawirawan* from the Democratic Party and Golkar opted to switch to Gerindra and Nasdem.

Table 21 also provides an overview of three important findings: *first*, there is an invariably high point on civil liberty score in all provinces led by *purnawirawan* governors. This indicates that their leadership was compatible with democratization where civil liberties received wide recognition and assurance. Some provinces led by *purnawirawan* from the police force also witnessed similar

trend, such as Lampung Province where civil liberties score reached 9.06 (2009) and increased to 9.31 (2011). This increase could also be observed in Bali Province which recorded CL number 9.40 in 2009 and 9.54 in 2011.

Second, the institution of democracy (ID) variable shows an upward trend for all provinces. ID in 2011 shows a constant increase and gives the sense that all governors had a good level of adaptation in establishing the institutionalization of good governance values in the bureaucracy. However, in the year after (2012) the increase of ID score was not accompanied by a linear increase in the AC score – even in 2008, AC was on average higher than in that in 2012. This explains that the successful institutionalization of democratic values in the ID variable is not directly related to the increase of government accountability.

Third, fluctuations in government effectiveness (EF) score occured in all provinces with varying degrees of change and interval. Therefore, in some provinces the effectiveness of governance was adequate to support ID variables while in some other provinces, it failed.

During the era in which a governor was chosen directly through the provincial assembly elections, a candidate for governor from *purnawirawan* affiliated to Golkar still possessed a great influence. Most of these candidates departed from the territorial office of the military, but still retained their power and networks among the local political elites. Although they might not have been directly affiliated with Golkar in some cases, they commonly ran for governorship after retirement. The governors between the periods of 1998 to 2003 were affiliated closer to Golkar than other existing parties. Governors elected by the parliament did not face obstacles in the form of the relative fragmentation of political power supporters outside the parliament. The integration of government and the bureaucracy were still relatively stable. The PGI 2009 of the provinces governed by *purnawirawan* generated stable points. Good relationships and loyalty to one particular party were also not necessary since the governor had gained wider support from various political forces in the local parliament.

An interesting point of research would be to analyze the performance of the governors elected through gubernatorial polls in the period immediately after 2004. They should have begun to rule in the political situation in which local democracy has begun to show dynamism. Did the military background of *purnawirawan* governors still stand out when they governed the civil administration at the local level? How far did they adapt to local democracy by establishing a credible government? The aspects that stood out from PGI data were classified into four criteria: 1) their background in the military; 2) case studies based on geographical distribution; 3) their political party affiliation and displacement, and 4) extremes of

success and setbacks to PGI data. Of the four classifications, the areas that will be explored are Lampung, Maluku, Bangka Belitung, Bali, West Papua, and West Java.

Table 21: Performance of Purnawirawan Governors

Province	Governor	Party Affiliation	Period	CL2009	ID2009	AC2008	EF2008	CL2011	ID2011	AC2012	EF2012
Lampung	Sjachroeddin Pagaralam	Golkar	2009–2014	9.06	6.33	5.88	7.21	9.31	7.06	6.01	7.56
C. Java	Mardiyanto Bibit Waluyo	Non-partisan PDI-P	1998–2007 2008–2013	8.65	6.44	8.09	6.96	8.40	7.30	5.17	5.96
E. Java	Imam Utomo	Democratic Party	1998–2003 2003–2008	8.33	5.46	7.65	6.44	7.15	6.12	5.73	6.4
Bali	I Made Mangku Pastika	PDI-P Democratic Party	2008–2013 2013–2018	9.40	7.32	6.19	7.75	9.54	8.57	5.04	4.83
S. E. Sulawesi	Saleh Lasata (VG)	PAN Gerindra	2008–2013	9.22	5.84	7.78	5.88	8.58	6.71	4.89	4.67
Maluku	Karel Albert Ralahalu	PDI-P	2003–2008 2008–2013	9.28	6.63	6.74	4.67	9.07	7.56	5.15	7.97
S. Sumatra	Rosihan Arsyad	Nasdem	1998–2003	9.54	6.98	6.71	7.63	8.40	7.70	4.91	6.11
N. Sumatra	Rizal Nurdin	Golkar	1998–2003 2003–2008	8.42	6.01	5.61	6.13	7.92	6.03	6.52	4.95
Riau	Saleh Djasit	Golkar	1998–2003	9.31	7.07	6.57	6.29	8.31	8.31	4.34	5.49
C. Sulawesi	Bandjela Paliuju Sudarto (VG)	Nasdem	2006–2011 2011–206	9.85	5.71	8.31	6.99	9.22	7.13	6.11	6.21
W. Kalimantan	Aspar Aswin	Hanura	1993–1998 1998–2003	9.83	6.99	7.8	6.33	9.71	8.73	4.95	4.62
S. Sulawesi	M. Amin Syam	Golkar	2003–2008	8.29	6.49	5.82	6.76	8.09	8.68	5.8	6.06
W. Papua	Abraham Attururi	PDI-P Gerindra	2006–2011 2012–2017	9.31	6.65	5.39	4.4	9.35	5.00	2.46	4.63
D. K. I. Jakarta	Sutiyoso	PKPI	1997–2007	9.16	8.60	8.74	8.3	8.99	9.35	7.49	4.15
Papua	Freddy Numberi	Democratic Party, Gerindra	1998–2001	9.28	5.89	7.95	4.01	8.77	7.00	3.43	4.52
W. Java	Nana Nuriana	Non-partisan	1993–2003	8.58	5.66	5.39	5.81	7.89	8.15	5.73	5.7
Babel Island	Eko Maulana Ali	Golkar	2007–2013	9.65	5.96	7.58	6.41	8.82	7.23	6.33	6.49

Source: developed by author

6.5 Governors' Performance

In direct gubernatorial elections that began in 2005, the governor candidates had closer ties with the party they were affiliated with or to the coalition of parties that advanced them in elections (Bunte & Ufen, 2008; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010). *Purnawirawan* governors were different from their civilian counterparts, who were party cadres from the beginning. The recruitment for candidacy was based more on a party's need to carry the figure considered to have the resources and expertise in the field of local governance or leadership. The recruitment pattern lowered loyalty level to the party and often resulted in the displacement in party affiliation. In the period between 2004 and 2014, the rate of switch in party affiliation was very high. These switches were mostly carried out by the governor figure derived from the non-party cadre, including the *purnawirawan*.

The party machinery did not contribute much to the process of winning – very much unlike the legislative elections in which the party machine plays a very decisive role in moving elements of their cultural and social forces, such as *Jawara* in Banten and *Kiai* in East Java (Haris, 2005: 111). Candidates viewed the role of the party only as a ticket granting recommendation to stand for election. There were two problem areas that made the parties prefer cadres from outside rather than from its own in-house pool. First, in the direct local elections, the average number of seats held by a party in the local parliament was limited and insufficient to carry its own candidate. Some evidence from South Sulawesi have indicated that in areas where candidates had a personal network up to the bottom level of government and possessed a good political class domination, they had a high chance of victory (Buehler, 2007). The second reason was the limited party resources. The party only released funds to finance the payment of witnesses (*biaya saksi*) in the promotion of national legislative and presidential elections. For local elections, the responsibility of fund and resource mobilization was handed over to each candidate. This proved advantageous for the candidates with extensive networks, influence, and financial support as they easily got tickets on the recommendation of the party. In fact, in many cases, candidates promoted by the party's cadres for the provincial or regional level elections were defeated, such as in Riau and Maluku (Choi, 2007; Tomsa, 2009). Moreover, all of the parties focused on the final recommendations provided by their Central Boards on promoting the gubernatorial candidates.

Governors who did not belong to party cadre category needed enough energy to maintain the balance of communication with the elite among party cadres at the national and local levels as well as the party's board members. The party elite at the local level had direct access to members of the local parliament. Likewise, the level of local party structures had greater legitimacy in securing government policies. At the beginning of the 2004 to 2009 period, it was not a challenge to find a governor

who also served as chairman of the party's provincial level in order to secure the support of the provincial Member of Parliament and the underlying structure to make it easier to support the smooth performance of his governance. As long as the provincial board party was under control, it did not create much trouble. Those who did not have a hold on the party structure at the provincial level or were not part of the management at the national level tended to be vulnerable to dissatisfaction from the internal party cadre. The issues raised were based more on financial contributions and the uneven distribution of concessions among party elites at the local level.

6.5.1 *Mastership of the Local Politics: Cases of West Java*

The pattern of local government in the New Order was characterized by high patron-clientelism concentrated in central government (MacAndrews, 1986; Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Antlov, 1994). The governor enjoyed great power in his territory and co-opted the existing political forces acting as mastership of the local politics. The relationship with the party was determined by the contributionor material support given to move the organization and the financing of political events. In meeting the needs of the party, the governor had the right to manage the budget, thus commonly performed the distribution of public funds for the benefit of the organization or party. In addition to maintaining the consistency of support, he also secured long-term political interests.

In the province of West Java led by Governor Maj.Gen. (ret.) Nana Nuriana in the period of 1993–2003, the continuity of the pattern of military power in local politics under the New Order regime is interesting to observe. Nana was one of the many active military members who occupied the office of governor as part of the military's dual function of framing policies under the New Order regime. Nana's influence on the gubernatorial election by the local parliament in 1998 was still strong, notwithstanding the fact that *reformasi* was at its height at that time. He ran for Governor with sixteen other candidates, including eight active members of the military who came from West Java, such as Adang Ruchiatna, Tayo Tarmadi, and Agum Gumelar. In the election, he scooped seventy votes out of a total of ninety-six votes in the provincial assembly (*Kompas*, April 23, 1998).

Although considered successful, it should be considered that Nana was involved in a corruption scandal. From an early indication of his involvement, the provincial parliament formed a special committee to conduct an investigation and it concluded on the basis of initial evidence that there were financial losses. Among the prominent ones are the Situ Cipondoh case and the case related to the misappropriation of the street lighting tax fund (PPJU). There were interesting findings on funding corruption that was originally intended to pay for insurance for

residents affected by electrical accidents. In the case of PPJU, the findings of the parliamentary committee revealed that in addition to the distribution of funds to areas that should have received them, money was not given in completely, and he allegedly poured cash into the account of Golkar Advisory Council where he served as the Chairman (*Kompas*, December 14, 1999). Despite indications of corruption, he escaped from the accusations in the plenary session of the parliament. However, the case was still being investigated by the High Court. During the New Order regime, it was common for the political process to be the main instrument in various resolutions of cases involving violations by the leader of the party or state officials. Cases of corruption in the government during his first period caused the former Provincial Secretary to be taken into police custody (*Kompas*, September 9, 2000; *Kompas*, January 25, 2001).

Active military personnel who held the position of governor between 1999 and 2004 had somewhat different functions during the heyday of the New Order during which military civilian positions ranging from governor down to the district/city level ran aspects of governance with full control. Sub-districts (*kecamatan*) delegated some governing power to civilian village administrations with tight supervision by the military (Jackson & Pye, 1978). Democratization weakened military control functions and their impact on institutional support to military personnel who were in public office. Notwithstanding the ongoing circumstances, the contacts and network of military governors or *purnawirawan*, who served until 2004, which were built by the local political elite, were proven to be still very useful. These were mainly used to strengthen their political position. They still occupied positions of "mastership" in the local political configuration, as seen also in the governors' administrations of Maj. Gen. (ret.) Bibit Waluyo in Central Java and Major Geneneral (ret.) Imam Utomo in East Java.

There were three differences between the military personnel or *purnawirawan* in the governor's office and the ones with a civilian background in controlling the local political elite. First, the network utilization of state institutions was strong in the cases in which the governor came from a military background. This enabled the bureaucracy to be controlled more easily. Second, most of them eventually became Golkar cadres after retirement from active military duty. Through this party, they started careers as civilian politicians to further political agendas. Third, mastery of the political elite, supported by social, cultural, and economic strength, began to be weakened by domination of the police on the territorial control in the field of local security. This provided minimal impact on capital accumulation effort that could be used to finance the political agenda.

6.5.2 *Pursuing Economic Development: The Case of Lampung, Bangka Belitung, and Bali*

There are few references that can be used to review the performance of *purnawirawan* governors in the provinces who actually influenced local development. The performance of governors in boosting development can be seen as a personal choice or as an extension of the main party program that carried them, including the extent of implementation of the program. Governors were elected through direct gubernatorial elections and had a large set of responsibilities towards the public. These conditions have led to the planning of programs related to economic growth, which was a priority. For example, the consideration of ecological damage should not become a barrier to the pursuit of economic profits for the region, as was found with ease on the stance of the province as a result of expansion of new provinces, including Bangka Belitung Island (Babel). During the reign of First Adm. (ret.) Eko Maulana Ali in 2007 to 2012 and from 2012 to 2017, Babel Island Province experienced relatively rapid economic growth with major contributions obtained from tin mining.

In the 2007 gubernatorial election, Eko was carried by a coalition of PBB-PAN-PD-PKS; and in the gubernatorial election in 2012 he was carried by PDI-P, Golkar, and PKS. Babel has high potential in the tin mining sector. It was developed massively with mining licenses that caused severe environmental damage. The policy of opening and expanding mining licenses was intended to increase local revenue. Commission IV of the House of Representatives finally asked the provincial government to organize mining. Eko did not terminate the licenses directly because of the social unrest that was triggered by the cessation of mining operations. He rejected the proposal of a moratorium on granting mining licenses and permitted all submission processes that were completed to be allowed to continue running. In other areas, he also successfully raised revenues from the tourism sector. The growing hospitality industry also shored up income and, according to the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) of Babel Island, this sector contributed as much as 4.84% of the provincial Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 (*Bappenas*, 2012). He ran a leadership model that combined strong support of PDI-P and Golkar as the dominant parties, issuing policies related to tin mining. At the same time he also established co-operative relationships with local investors and state agencies in Jakarta to ensure that his policy was workable (Erawan in McLeod & Macintyre, 2007: 62).

Governors in new provincial governments tended to lean towards populist policies because these had an immediate impact on the higher chances of their electability in the next gubernatorial nomination. However, a critical assessment will reveal that the governor too had a direct economic interest in the development

of the production sector, especially mining. In addition to oil and natural gas, mineral gas mining became a common type of franchise that largely contributed directly to local government. In the case of Babel Island, the incumbent party did not have a dominant force, both in the capacity to attract political support, let alone to encourage tougher sanctions against mining explorations that resulted in environmental damage.

The Governor of Bali also faced environmental issues and problems of economic development. In 2008, I Made Pastika was carried by PDI-P in the gubernatorial election, defeated two other candidates by winning 55.04% of the vote. The other candidate in the pair was Brig. Gen. (police) I Nyoman Gede Suweta, supported by Golkar and PKB. Pastika was a former commander of *Densus 88 Anti-Teror* (Anti-Terror Special Detachment 88) and former chief of Bali's regional police. The province of Bali is known as a support base of PDI-P and Pastika was strongly popular among the citizens in Bali (*Kompas*, June 21, 2013). His reign notably stood out on the issue of availability of energy.

Bali is a province that absorbed most electricity subsidies and energy needs. Therefore, the issue of the development of the energy sector to cover domestic needs became important. In 2012, BPK found that there was an electricity budget of IDR 20 trillion per year, in which Bali was the province with the highest consumption in the national budget (*Bisnis Indonesia*, May 14, 2013). Electricity subsidies were utilized by the tourism sector without tariff differentiation between the needs of households and businesses. In an effort to meet domestic energy needs, the proposal to use energy from geothermal sources was rejected by the governor since it entailed sacrificing development plans for four hectares of protected forest as well as the potential threat to the existence of 30 temples around the area. Instead, the governor continued to rely on electricity supply from Java while continuing with the development of a proposed steam power plant at Celukan Bawang in Buleleng. Political pressure exerted by the incumbent party and the majority of members of the provincial parliament pitched PDI-P against Pastika's policy which led to the worsening of their political relations.

In the gubernatorial election of 2013, Pastika went ahead with Democratic Party coalition after breaking out from PDI-P. He defeated the PDI-P candidate by a narrow victory margin. The results caused election dispute and was challenged in the Constitutional Court. The court, however, decided in favor of Made Pastika and Ketut Sudikerta, notwithstanding objections raised by PDI-P. Pastika's position in Democratic Party was becoming stronger, since he had been appointed a member of the party's Central Board of Trustees. Overcoming the differences between catering to the public interest and following the interests of party politics was a common problem faced by the governor. It would have been easier for a governor to overlook

the political interests of the incumbent party considered to be too dominating in a coalition. In contrast, for the governor who has advanced from an incumbent party or coalition where there is a majority party in parliament, the most widely adopted strategy is to go for a compromise. For governors who feel stronger public support than the party, as Pastika did in Bali, it would be easier to raise their bargaining position in another party.

As was the case of Babel Island province, Lampung also faced the problems of economic underdevelopment. Major General (ret.) Sjachroeddin Zainal Pagaralam served as Governor of Lampung after winning the election in 2008 with 43.27% of votes. He ruled in a second term of 2009-2014, but spent almost the entire period of his first term in political and legal conflicts. During his first term, selected by the provincial parliament, he had been facing legal conflicts and political disputes since being sued by another pair of contenders for winning the candidacy. In his five years in term of office, Sjachroedin faced legal challenges against the gubernatorial election of 2008. In the first period of his reign, many of his programs did not see a successful implementation. In the direct gubernatorial election in Lampung in 2008, Sjachroedin-Joko appeared as the winners by managing to scoop up 43.27% of votes (*Republika*, September 18, 2008). But problems arose soon afterwards since he was suspected of indulging in money politics and of using budget funds for his campaign. However, the protest process stopped and he was still appointed governor by the Minister of Home Affairs. From a political perspective, there was a relationship between the supports from party officials at the central level with local political dynamics. Sjachroedin got support from Golkar elites in Jakarta, provided in the settlement of political issues and legal disputes. The issue that really stood out is the use of a political settlement of the allegations of money politics in 2008 without a protracted legal dispute.

Up until 2010, Lampung had 201,271 unemployed workers –the highest jobless rate in the island of Sumatra (Ministry of National Planning, 2012). Development in the education sector experienced significant improvement until 2009, yet the average length of school education was 7.7 years and no increase was registered in 2011. Only the literacy rate of 94.37% in 2009 showed a slight improvement of 0.65% in 2011. HDI (Human Development Index) from 2006 to 2010 was below the national average. In 2006, HDI of Lampung was 69.38 compared with 70.10 points at the national level. HDI of Lampung Province in 2010 amounted to 71.42, while the National IPM was 72.77. It also impacted the level of poverty in the province. Within the time frame of 2006 to 2011, poverty rate reduced approximately by 5% in 2006, amounting to 22.64% and became 16.18% in 2011. But this figure was still below the national poverty average of 11.96% in 2011 (BPS, 2012). In terms of economic development, Sjachroedin was known as a governor

who used the "intoxicated god" strategy of taking grave risks (*Kompas*, January 5, 2005). The opening of an inter-provincial research agreement with the province of Banten launched infrastructure improvements, such as the expansion of Raden Intan Airport, ushering in change to facilitate the entry of investors. In politics, regarding the government budget in 2013, Lampung implemented a balanced budget so that regional original revenue (PAD, *Pendapatan Asli Daerah*) experienced significant growth from 2009 to 2013 of 29.5%. Lampung also used the budget for capital spending of an average of 29%. The province recorded an economic growth of 5.98% in early 2013, which contributed to the development of inter-regional exports, manufacturing, and agriculture (Bank of Indonesia, 2013).

The assessment of the development orientation in the regional level shows that incumbent party support was only utilized during the gubernatorial election and when political conflicts related to the elections arose. Public policy and regional development orientation was controlled by the popular interests than party elites. This indicates that populism was a more valuable asset to be considered even if it is compared with the interests of the party supporting its candidates. Relations with the party almost certainly loosened and were highly dependent on interests and security policy formulation in the local parliament. The position of the incumbent party could easily be replaced by a compromise with the other party that controls the local parliament.

6.5.3 *Leading in Conflict Areas: Cases of West Papua and Maluku*

The leading performance of *purnawirawan* in areas with a high tendency for conflicts is an area worth looking at. As in West Papua and Maluku, separatism and ethnic conflicts became a national issue. As part of conflict resolution strategies, the governors of both provinces were instructed to expand the scope of dialogue rather than supporting the central government's military option. Persuasion was considered more effective in minimizing the risk of divisions among political supporters or traditional support groups; a move that would endorse a particular candidate as governor.

West Papua emerged as a consequence of the expansion of the new province of Papua and it was, therefore, a part of conflict resolution and socio-economic inequalities in Papua. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Abraham Octavianus Atururi was Governor of the West Irian Jaya serving from 2002 to 2005, and went ahead to win the gubernatorial elections of West Papua after the period of 2006 to 2011 as a PDI-P candidate. The 2004 election results placed Golkar as the winner with 24.8% of the vote, followed by PDI-P at 13.1%; while among other parties, PPDK secured 10.5%, PDS 8.2% and PPP 5.8%. In the gubernatorial election of 2011, Atururi was re-

elected for the administration period of 2012-2016. In 2012, he joined Gerindra as a member of its Central Board and served as a member of its Board of Trustees.

In new area divisions (*pemekaran*), local elites played a key role in the establishment phase of these new administration areas. West Papua emerged after the passage of Law No. 45/1999 on the establishment of West Irian Jaya province, Central Irian Jaya province, Mimika regency, Paniai, Puncak Jaya, and Sorong. Through Presidential Decree No. 1/2003, Irian Jaya Barat began to establish itself legally. Commencing on 6 February 2007, Irian Jaya Barat changed its name to West Papua Province. The province is part of the subject of the Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy in Papua. The central government published Instruction No. 5/2007 on the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua as a set of policies to accelerate development in both the provinces and improve the effectiveness of co-ordination, synergy, and harmonization of programs and policies across sectors and central regions conducted by ministries/institutions and local governments. The presidential instruction emphasizes the new policy approach (the new offer section policy for Papua) with five strategic aspects. These are: 1) strengthening food security and poverty reduction; 2) increasing drive for implementation of quality education; 3) improving the quality of health services; 4) improvement of basic infrastructure to improve accessibility in remote areas, inland and border states; and 5) special treatment (affirmative action) for the development of human resources among Papuan native sons and daughters (Presidential Decree No. 65/2011). Special autonomy, however, failed because: 1) the law was not the product of negotiation but of a solution that the central government imposed; 2) Papuans remained divided on its utility and, ultimately, they failed to seize the opportunity provided; and 3) the central government undermined the law in its attempts to curb secessionism, ultimately failing to make it credible (Bertrand, 2014).

The technical implementation of the gubernatorial election in West Papua was a sticky issue. It relates to the Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy, where the provisions of Article 7 Paragraph 1 (a) stated that the Governor and his Deputy were elected by *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua* (DPRP, Papuan People's Assembly). The law, however, was later revised by the publication of Law Substitute (*Perppu*) No. 1/2008 which stipulated that the gubernatorial election in Papua was to be conducted *via* direct elections. The law was challenged by DPRP who submitted a copy for testing to the Constitutional Court, which ended with the court's decision in strengthening laws governing direct gubernatorial elections. In 2011 election, Atururi was still elected by DPRP. Given the complexity of governance in Papua, the governor was considered to play a dominant role. He must have a strong traditional support base in addition to the support of political parties and

officials at the national level (*Media Indonesia*, July 26, 2005). This support base becomes high bargaining power against the bearers of political parties, as was evident from the example of Pastika in Bali. Although he switched support from PDI-P to PD, he retained his popularity and was able to win the gubernatorial election for the second time. PDI-P is a nationalist party that severely limits the campaigns of its candidates, preventing them from bringing the issues of Papuan nationalism in national and local elections (Chauvel as cited in Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010: 307-310). Commitment to the central government becomes difficult for a candidate with community following, especially those who feel let down by the Indonesian government; for instance, in the rules and centralized control from both the government and military institution (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004: 36-40).

In Papua, Abraham Atururi was an active military officer when he went to occupy position in the bureaucracy. This experience made it quite easy for him to adapt to run local government. According to the performance report during his term (2004–2012), the GDP of West Papua increased by over 10% and the unemployment rate continuously went down, registering 5.49% in 2012. In the same year, however, poverty rate was still very high, amounting to 27.04%. Commodities were still the mainstay of the accounts as development came from the exploration of oil and natural gas in Sorong and Bintuni Bay. This potential was greatest in Merdey District, Aranday, and Babodengan (Ministry of Finance Report, 2012). The need for development still meant a lot of imported materials. With a growth of 11.67% per year, the sector managed to cover the performance of government and private imports. Although abundant explorations were carried out in potential areas, local budget and the contribution of revenue (PAD) until 2009 only accounted for 3% of the total budget. Thus, to finance the construction area, the province still relied on equalization funds from the central government and special autonomy funds (Bank of Indonesia, 2013).

Although Atururi was a military figure, his policy on the resolution of the separatist conflict was in contrast to the strategy followed by the central government. In West Papua and Papua in general, local problems remained a cause for concern from the security perspective. The group that advocated for the interests of a free Papua had received extra attention from the central government. The region of West Papua has historically been a concern because of the emergence of a Papuan Independence Movement (*Gerakan Papua Merdeka*). The Dutch colonial government formed volunteer battalions based in Arfiai Papua, Manokwari. The battalions were armed and trained in Indonesian government terminology and were called Papuan Separatist Movement in Politics (GSPP) and Papua Separatist Movement Army (GSPB). The movements were launched with sporadic resistance to the Indonesian government with the goal of independence from Indonesia and

establishing a state of 'West Papua'. As an extension of the central government, the governor of West Papua simply could not resist intervention and the military option from Jakarta (*Kompas*, June 6, 2012).

In an effort to minimize the impact of military options in the completion of independence, Atururi preferred reconciliation and an open dialogue with all parties, especially with some factions within the Papuan organizations willing to communicate. The consequences of that choice, in some cases, went to the exact opposite of the option of armed operations pursued by Jakarta. As it is known, the central government categorizes Papua's aspirations as being in violation of Penal Code section 106, 110, and 116. In the field, local police, both in Papua and West Papua, performed several activities categorized as a violation of the Law No. 12/1951 and Act No. 9/1998 (Widjojo, 2014). Local elites who distrusted the implementation of special autonomy in Papua promised by Jakarta led opposition efforts through casting votes for political change (Timmer, 2005).

The support of PDI-P for Atururi was unreliable, for his policy choices tend to be persuasive against separatism in West Papua. PDI-P is known to have a tough policy in dealing with armed separatist movements as it did in Aceh and Papua. Despite this situation, Atururi's switch from PDI-P to Gerindra might have been caused by many political interests that, in terms of network, were closer to him since Gerindra became the main representation for the *purnawirawan* family. In addition, the political position offered was strategic. At the very least, he was given a position as chairman of the wing-organ of Christian in Great Indonesia (KIRA). In terms of policy and ideology, Gerindra and PDI-P are not too different in the provision of solutions for the separatist conflict.

Maluku had a slightly different case from its brother in Papua. One of the *purnawirawan* who were successful in consolidating peace in the conflict area of Maluku was Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu. He has served as the Chairman of DPD of PDI-P Maluku during the second period (2003-2013). In the 2014 elections, he was successful in getting PDI-P to acquire the maximum number of votes and put seven of the 45 PDI-P cadres as legislators of the Maluku Provincial parliament. His popularity started after engaging in inter-religious conflict resolution in Maluku in 1999 with the signing of Malino II Peace Treaty in 2002. In the first period of his reign, he faced internal pressure from the party for failing to build the party. The internal conflict lasted long enough to demand his resignation from the post of Chairman of DPD.

The factors causing the emergence of these demands were the drop in the number of PDI-P votes in 2004 and 2009 elections. His position as governor was deemed to have contributed a lot to internal party reforms. His assertive attitude towards the party cadres with the aim to improve them came in for sharp criticism.

There was a variety of assessments stating that Ralahalu was generally considered to be abusive since he brought party cadre lacking in popularity and reliability into the election. In fact, in many elections held in the Maluku region, PDI-P only won a head of district/city position while other candidates failed (Widjojo, 2014).

In terms of government performance, Karel Ralahalu was a governor who was well aware of the conditions in his territory. Most groups accepted his contribution in the resolution of the conflict in the province. He did not only enjoy good networks and reputation among the Christian community from which he came, but also among Muslim groups. During his reign, the greatest challenge was to institutionalize reconciliation among previously warring groups. Sidel (1999) emphasizes the role of informal institutions as a system of alliances between local settlements in Ambon, known as *pela*, which helped to sustain peaceful relations of reciprocity and co-operation between Muslim and Christian villages and neighborhoods. In addition, there was the need for a guarantee for the implementation of a controlled social life. In support of the acceleration of reconciliation, development focused on aspects of the infrastructure that were badly damaged during the riots. As many as 65,910 families were displaced in the religious conflict in Maluku during 1999-2004. Within a year, the number of remaining refugees numbered only 3,850 families. But overall, the number of refugees untouched by the government policy numbered 8,596 families in early 2006 (*Kompas*, November 13, 2006). Ralahalu had genuine popularity which he was able to use to build an important network of patronage among the various groups and organizations among indigenous communities, Muslims, and Christians. Gubernatorial elections became a political instrument that was considered legitimate by political groups and religious organizations (Tomsa, 2009). Even the acceptance of the political instrument is the role of political education and peace campaign (Amirrachman, 2012).

He won the gubernatorial election of 2008 and served as governor for a second term until 2013. Most people judge PDI-P as having solid political machinery. But the reign of the first period, in which Karel directly moved to bring in improvements in the countryside, proved to be an important factor for voter support. The issue was taken by a representative, Said Assagaff, who became leader of the Muslim groups in the region, but he was not as decisive as Karel. A total of three other pairs of candidates for the governor and his deputy also comprised Christian-Muslim pairing and vice-versa. Karel remained in PDI-P because of his political position; in addition to PDI-P's nationalist ideology that provided a more convenient space for him to stand above the interests of the group.

The cases in Papua and Maluku have shown two important aspects of the pattern of relations between *purnawirawan* who became governor and their party

supporters. First, given political party ideologies considered compatible with the common interest in the areas of conflict, the governor could easily take advantage of the political party's support for the implementation of programs and policies. Second, the internal pressure from the party's majority faction leaders indeed determined the party line harshly and had the potential of suppressing *purnawirawan* governor's positions in order to always be careful in adjusting the distance between the professional interests as the government and political interests within the party. The case of Atururi in Papua has shown the option to switch parties from PDI-P to Gerindra as a response to the failure of party internalization to compromise on facts and the objective interpretation of the policy of the central government in Papua.

6.6 Summary

This chapter has examined *purnawirawan*'s performance while being situated in public office. In the executive office of the central government, as the case studies of the Yudhoyono governance has indicated, the military character of *purnawirawan* has experienced moderation. Various policy options were taken as far as possible from authoritarianism as evidenced by the handling of sensitive cases, such as the separatist conflict and other horizontal conflicts in society. This was made possible since Yudhoyono was a humble figure. It had an impact on *purnawirawan* who occupy positions in the cabinet. Policies were made and *purnawirawan's* responses to sensitive issues tend to demonstrate a careful militaristic approach.

PDI-P placed *purnawirawan* in the national parliament in commissions tailored to their area of expertise. This has raised questions regarding the use of *purnawirawan* in the party to cover up for the weakness of resources and lacking of experience in the legislation-making process. In the democratic transition period from 1998 to 2004, the *purnawirawan* bloc in PDI-P played a key role during the initial process of military reform through the parliament. They served as mediators in political communication among the military, civilian government, and the parliament. During the consolidation period after 2004, *purnawirawan* of Democratic Party dominated the parliament and contributed significantly to the institutionalization of democracy through the strengthening of public institutions.

In terms of horizontal intervention from political party against *purnawirawan* in public office, there is a difference of treatment between the parties assessed. In PDI-P, the *purnawirawan* bloc presented itself as legislators who brought out the interests of the party platform more clearly. On the other hand, party interests through the faction in the parliament were represented by Democratic Party. This demonstrates their capability in contributing to legislation

in the parliament to be more significant. Nevertheless, Democratic Party turned into a party wielding stronger control on its *purnawirawan* in the parliament. This study has proven that *purnawirawan* incorporated within parties and controlled by civilians could, in fact, influence the legislative process more effectively than those who were in parties that were controlled by the *purnawirawan* themselves. The placement of *purnawirawan* in parliamentary committees according to their expertise affected the identification of their significant contribution as can be seen from the ones at PDI-P faction.

In governorship, the vertical control and horizontal intervening party to *purnawirawan*'s performance was low. From the case studies this research has raised, it was evident that the governor, who at the same time held a particular position in the party, only owned organizational proximity with the party's power-holders without being integrated wholly to the party supporting him. In terms of the performance of their local governance, *purnawirawan* have transformed from the military leadership model to a leadership closer to the civilian leadership model. This is especially true if we look at the governors who were elected from direct gubernatorial elections. The interests of the military who had retired from public office underwent a transformation. The degrees of the transformation of interests from one *purnawirawan* leader to another were different and the differences were due to their political parties' organizational models, strategic choices, and civilian pressure groups within the executive and legislative institutions. The transformation not only was seen at the national government level, but also expanded to the provincial governments.

The *Purnawirawan* Contribution in Democratization: General Assessment

This chapter discusses the *purnawirawan*'s contribution in Indonesia democratization from two point of views: first, in what area their contribution can be tracked, and second, how far their engagement in the process of democratic consolidation can assessed?

It is important to assess the involvement of *purnawirawan* in the democratic process. The question to be answered is no longer *why* they were involved but rather *what* changes they have made in terms of their contribution to build or establish a "good" or better democracy in Indonesia. While there is no absolutely objective way of laying out a single framework for gauging democratic quality, Morlino and Diamond proposed eight dimensions of democracy quality which vary across countries: freedom, the rule of law, vertical accountability, responsiveness, equality, participation, horizontal accountability, and competition (Morlino & Diamond, eds., 2005). These dimensions are closely linked and likely moved together, either toward democratic improvement or decay. This chapter is intended to use these dimensions become the parameters to track the *purnawirawan*'s involvement in democratization. Specifically, these criteria of democratic consolidation are complemented by Schaedler's (1998) describing the consolidation of democracy as the success in the challenge of making new democracy secure, longer life expectancy, immunity against the threat of authoritarian regression, and building dam against eventual "reverse wave".

The concerns regarding the quality of *purnawirawan* in bringing about the democratic consolidation revolved around the questions of the extent to which they adhered to the rule of law, taking accountability when acting as public official, and whether their political participation in electoral competition produced policies that support democracy. These concerns, along with the dimensions of democracy quality lead the evaluation of *purnawirawan*'s contribution in the process of democratic consolidation be classified into four aspects: 1) the implementation of laws relating to military and security sector reform; 2) the contribution of political parties and members of parliament in advocating issues related to democracy matters; 3) the commitment in establishing law enforcement and combating corruption; and 4) fair process and acceptance of election results. Therefore, this chapter is to review the roles and contribution of *purnawirawan*, in their positions

as *politician* in political parties and Member of Parliament as *individual* sitting in government, and as candidates competing for general elections.

7.1 Origin of Contribution

Tracking the origin of the rise of *purnawirawan* involvement in democratization is illustrated in the figure 3 below. It provides a logical flow of the transformation of *purnawirawan*'s roles from military officers to civilian politicians. This includes their role and function in civil institutions such as political parties and public offices. This logical flow provides a base for further assessment of their contribution in democratization.

Figure 3: Purnawirawan in Democratization

Source: Developed by author

Traces of *purnawirawans* in politics could be identified from their roles within three main dimensions: military institutions, political parties, and public offices. System changes in the governance brought by democratic transition - such as military and constitutional reform including changes in the electoral system– unquestionably affected their political pratification. Democratic transition has resulted in the demand for military reform, which prompted a change in the military institution. In the first mechanism, military institutions withdrew their representativenesss from all levels of the parliament, as was the case in 2004. These conditions has brought about the military's internal instability, especially for officers who were assigned to positions in socio-politic field with the responsibility of handling the previous civilian government affairs. Furthermore, the effect of military involvement in determining governmental (*state*) policy was increasingly confined to the elite military appointed by the president in the cabinet body only. This mechanism produced renegotiated boundaries in repositioning the civil-military relationship in which the military had the right to internalize military reform without the intervention of the civil administration.

Changes in military institutions affected the constellation of political parties in which many military elites who entered politics in their retirement, approached the political party's elite to get a strategic position in party structure. In general, *purnawirawan* infiltration caused parties to become more dynamic in a sense that parties may either accommodate or limit their entrance and roles in politics. For instance, some parties restricted to accomodate *purnawirawans*, and as a result some major figures –such as Wiranto, Prabowo, or Yudhoyono– chose to establish a new party by including their colleagues and participated the party election since the 1999. In this regards, the total number of *purnawirawans* recruited in a political party was determined by the level of acceptance of civilian elite in the party and their dominance in the parties they founded.

The next mechanism is the public office in which *purnawirawans* promoted strategic interests through the party. Most of which aimed at attaining a public position in order to preserve their influence in public-policy making process. They were involved in candidacy for national roles, such as president, members of the parliament, and heads of local government. Their participation in this context illustrated their capacity to take an advantage of political parties to reach personal political ambition to get a stragetic position in either national or local government. However, this condition allowed *purnawirawan* to contribute to democratization in a way that specifically amplified the military values, doctrine of militarism and strategy within the party organization.

Assessing the contribution of *purnawirawan* during the democratization using their position and role in the political system is inseparable from the political

institutions they involve. At least, there are three layers of *purnawirawan's* contribution in democratization which are interesting to note.

First, their contribution was limited to the formulation of legislation in the parliament. In the period between 1999 and 2004, PDI-P had the largest number of *purnawirawan* as Members of Parliament. Their existence was visible in their representation of interests in support of democratization. *Second*, their role was exercised through the institution in establishing a party and strengthening the organization as seen in the case of Gerindra party. *Third*, the perspective of their political orientation was taken from their involvement and victory in the presidential election and obtaining a strategic position in public office. This evidence is adequate to explain the transformation of *purnawirawan* political interests in the political contest, such as politician, officials, and individuals as loyal citizen. -

We can derive the effectiveness of *purnawirawan* contribution in the parliament from their position and active participation in discussions or in legislative debates. The current book utilizes these activities as a basis to justify their active role in parliament and legislative products.

In terms of quantitative effects, between 1999 and 2004 a greater number of laws produced in parliament were suggested by *purnawirawan* as Members of Parliament; compared with the periods of 2004-2009 and 2009-2014. The previous chapters have outlined the particular success of *purnawirawan* in representing PDI-P in their performance in the parliament. This tendency has prompted the question of why *purnawirawan* were more successful in carrying their legislations when they were under PDI-P during democratization process. Previous chapter presented an observation of recruitment process in PDI-P that was based on ideological proximity with the party elite circle, and thus only a few of them could enter the party. In addition, the factor of interaction with civilian politicians also contributed greatly to the change of mindset in the formulation of interests and values that the military brought in party. The interaction between *purnawirawan* and civilian politicians had a positive effect on the management of the party organization.

The contribution of *purnawirawan* in the formulation of legislation can be classified into two categories. The first category includes those who were members of civilian-controlled political parties who had a better chance to transform ideological interests in encouraging democratization, and especially those who had nationalist faction while serving in the military office. Most of them participated in parliamentary commissions which in charge of human rights, defense, security, and governance. As a result, PDI-P benefited from purnawirawan roles in leading issues and policies leaning toward pro-democracy. In this regards, they played a significant role in maintaining the interests of *Reformasi* brought by PDI-P and the interests of

the military institutions within the parliament or when carried by other parties, such as Golkar.

The second category involves *Purnawirawan* who resided in parties which had little chance of transforming their ideological interests because the party did not explicitly declare their ideological position except as normative as religious-nationalist; such as Democratic Party and Gerindra. This should be the main cause of centralism within the party illustrating strong and full control of the party faction vote in the parliament. As a result, their vote was barely identifiable. Consequently, it is very important to keep track of their contribution in the formulation of legislation and the extent to which they were related to the party's general policy intervention in the discussion of legislation in the parliament. This was especially the case for Democratic Party, given that the party's policies were mostly geared toward issues of economic and governance improvement. In addition, this party apparently had no pretension to positioning themselves in their specialized field of expertise, but rather spreading its members within other commissions. Gerindra, who had *purnawirawan* in the parliament in the period between 2014 and 2019, did not show a significant contribution in legislation in the parliament for the period of 2009 to 2014, as none of them served as MPs.

Purnawirawan in Democratic Party and Gerindra had a greater role and could thus attain more party control. Their contribution was particularly pronounced in the organization of the parties and their various wings. Models of organization adopted by Democratic Party and Gerindra had distinctions in terms of management structures, which had a repercussion on the discipline of party cadres and the parties' respective images in general. In the context of organizational management aspects, Gerindra positioned *purnawirawan* as the backbone of the party's internal arrangement so that the organization could be managed with a higher level of discipline. Their involvement was not only in the presidential elections, as these elections were contested by Democratic Party (where *purnawirawan* were given the responsibility of controlling the party structures from the national to the local level), but also in legislative elections. This strategy resulted in a high level of cadre discipline. There was an apparent improvement in the transparency of party management as well, as the selection of cadres was well monitored and the integrity of MPs was better than in any other party.

It is evident that *purnawirawan* have promoted their own agendas by using political party as a part of an effort to reinstate militaristic values within another organization. It is generally to maintain the integrity of the concept of the unitary state and national defense. When military role in politics is restricted, the party becomes an effective means in realizing their normative interests. Military reform has limited the involvement of the military in politics so that power could be more

effectively obtained based on the supremacy of the civilian government. Structural pressure was more dominant in pushing their political choice.

There are three factors that can demonstrate this effect. The first relates to the failure of the military institution represented by TNI/Polri fractions in the parliament to maintain its position. Efforts to retain that position were supported by several Golkar members in the parliament. Military institutions in the period of 1999-2004 were not powerful enough to provide support for Golkar and TNI/Polri factions in the parliament. Second, an open political system has created an opportunity to establish political parties. This option became part of the canalization of the interests of the former military elite to remain in politics. Third, political system changes that were responsible for the declining number of party votes, in addition to party-switching tendency, revealed *purnawirawan* as an alternative to compete in the elections. In short, the structural changes resulted in the adoption of different strategies in order to defend their interests and remain involved in politics. Having discussed the *purnawirawan* contribution in political parties as discussed above, we will proceed to the immersion of this involvement into the process of consolidating democracy, and the overall quality of Indonesian democracy in the years to come.

7.2 *Purnawirawan* Contribution on Democratic Consolidation
7.2.1. *Implementation of Military and Security Sector Reform Law*

Military reform and security sector reform law (SSR) happened in a certain period during the democratic transition. Understanding the implementation requires our assessment of the political context in which the reform took place. Although substantial military reform (achieved by a complete withdrawal of military and police elements from the parliament) was successful in 2004, the reform was rather only in an institutional withdrawal from the formal political processes (Honna, 2013: 198). As a matter of fact, civilian authorities were unable to ensure that the implementation of military reform and SSR could be throughly implemented (Ruland & Manea, 2013: 139). During this period, civil authorities also lacked of the capability to fill imporant positions in the governance which is abandoned by the military. They were forced to conduct a trial-and-error policy to build a model approach to conflict resolution (Kurniawan, 2017: 5). These studies have proven that there was no solid stability during the reform process.

The civilian president successors such as Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati all had their own issues, respectively, regarding the implementation of regulations related to the subject of military reform and SSR. Their *purnawirawan* colleague like Yudhoyono was able to further attempt to bridge the interests of both military and civilian goups. The implementation of Law No. 3 of 2003 on Defense is one good

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example of a law that regulates all military expenditures financed only by the central government budgeting. The State is the only source of funding for the TNI (Misol, 2006: 93). As a consequence, mechanisms and powers of budgeting policies ranging from the procurement, recruitment, and management of national military resoures would be carried out by the Ministry of Defense led by civilian and non-military active officials. In practice, the appointment of civilian officials as defense ministers was confirmed to defeat the purpose since the military could directly get in touch with the president (Yudhoyono) through TNI commander, leading to crucial positions in the department being given to military officers or individuals favorable to the military institution.

The inconsistency continued. Even in deliberations in the parliament, national security bills produced a heated debate between state institutions; mainly between the Ministry of Defense, TNI or Police Headqquarters, and the parliementary commission on security. The issue of the debates was related to the role that could be actively ran by each institution on the national security task and responsibility. The policies positioning the police force under the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Law and Human Rights, for instance, was rejected by the police force (Widjajanto & Keliat, 2007: 28). In the legislation process, civilian leaders, especially those with parliementary authority, experienced a knowledge and expertise gap when compared to their military colleague counterparts on defense and security issues. Thus, among civilian leaders, a qualified leader was high in need (Muna in Donais, 2008: 238). The underlying idea was that this lack in knowledge and expertise may have been bridged with *purnawirawan* active involvement in parliementary debates. This, then, confirmed that civilian-led parties endorsed the engagement of *purnawirawan* as speakers, as was the case in PDI-P and Golkar.

There are three important issues to observe regarding the performance of *purnawirawan*. First, the most sensitive issue that could not be immediately resolved by the civilian president was military business. Following the passing of 2004 Law on the TNI, the points cautiously addressed by President Yudhoyono were related to military business control. The closure of military-run businesses could not be done within 5 years after the issue of the law. Both Yudhoyono and his Minister of Defense, Sudarsono, mentioned that it would take another 10-15 years until the state budget was sufficient to finance all military expenditure (Misol, 2006: 127). This was a part of negotiation process between the government led by *purnawirawan* and pressure from a military institution. In 2005, Yudhoyono formed a business transformation supervision team of TNI led by Said Didu, Secretary of Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and General (ret) Sjafrie Samsuddin, Secretary General of Ministry of Defense. In its development in 2006, the team discovered a

new fact that TNI reported a growing inventory of military businesses from 219 to 1,500 pieces of military-controlled company. Unfortunately, the government eventually decided to postpone the completion of military business (Misol, 2006: 128). At the end of Yudhoyono's tenure, military business began to be controllable. He himself provided space with the placement of *purnawirawan* in positions in state enterprises in the board of director or as commissioner.

The second issue was the granting of political rights to active military and police officers in the general election. Publicly, Yudhoyono often emphasized on military duty as professional soldier. This is related to the bill proposal to grant political rights in elections to active members of the military and police force. This proposal was considered part of the fulfillment of the political rights of citizens who are properly given to active military and police personnel. In 2012, President Yudhoyono was a figure who had the tendency to reject the option of granting political rights to vote for active military and police personnel. He wanted to wait until the country's political system became mature enough and democracy has been fully consolidated. Eventually, preventing military and police from voting was based on the false premise that it was a political act, rather than a basic democratic right. Several *purnawirawan* and notable politician agreed that it was time for Indonesia to accept such political rights and leave its historical baggage fears behind (*Strait Times*, 10 June 2014). The reform movement that swept over the country in 1998 required the TNI to engage in democratic process and stayed out of practical politics. The TNI and the National Police were required to withdraw their representatives from the House of representatives. If active military members desired to run as candidates in election, they must first resign from their duty (*Jakarta Post*, 25 October 2013).

In the process of discussion in DPR, there were proposals to support the active military or police personnel without having to retire or to resign from their duties when they became candidates in the election. Some political factions in parliament agreed that members of TNI or police were not required to retire or resign when they decided to become candidates. The idea of allowing members of the military and police to step forward as candidates for election without having to retire or resign was conflicting against the Law No. 34/2004 on TNI and the Police Law No. 2/2002. TNI Law No. 34/2004, Article 39 Paragraph 2 states that "Soldiers are prohibited from engaging in practical political activity" and in Article 47 Paragraph 1 states that "Soldiers may only occupy civilian positions after resigning or retiring from the active service of the soldiers". In addition, Police Law No. 2/2002 Article 28 Paragraph 1 states that "the Police of the Republic of Indonesia are neutral in political sphere and do not engage in any practical political activities" and in Article 28 Paragraph 3 of Police Law No 2/2002 states that "Members The

State Police of the Republic of Indonesia may occupy positions outside the police after withdrawing or retiring from the police status" (*Imparsial*, 2016).

The *pros* and *cons* of the bill that regulate the military and police political rights become an interesting to observe. As citizens, members of the TNI and Police also have the right to vote. At the same time, there was a concern that their political participation in elections may result in a neutrality bias. During Yudhoyono's government, commitment in his administration periods not to pass the military and police political rights can be perceived as a form of caution while ensuring military intervention in politics may be eliminated until the institutionalization of democracy in public institutions was capable of controlling the military. In fact, the case of TNI alignments in elections was observable. In Riau Province at gubernatorial election in 2015, there were indications that military actively participated in raising vote for PDI-P and Golkar. There were also facts that elements of TNI member who were placed in several places of recapitulation of voting result, especially in Batam and Tanjung Pinang. Although the Head of TNI Information Center Major General Tatang Sulaiman denied by stating that it was essential for TNI to assist the Police for security reason during the elections (*Kompas*, 22 December 2015).

The neutrality of military and police personnel from the political contestation was still required although there was evident in the 2014 election when there were retired police officers who made public speech and advised to choose a certain presidential candidate. Proximity and self-interest became the factors that gave a rise to such political support. The neutrality point of the police lies in the police function stated in Article 2 of Law No. 2/2002 as one of the state's "government functions" in the field of maintaining security and order, law enforcement, protection, shelter, and service to the public. The formulation of this police function may lead to the inclusion of police body into an agent of political stabilization of the government because of its position in the executive environment, so that neutrality in its duties was disrupted (*Kompas*, 30 June 2015). As a result of military reform, active military personnel were prohibited from entering political competition. Institutionally, the affirmation of armed forces commander General Moeldoko confirmed a commitment in keeping the TNI from practical politics for the sake of democracy and national security (*Jakarta Post*, 13 October 2013).

However, this condition is in counter with the efforts to grant political rights to military and police personnel as the fulfillment of obligations as citizens. There are at least three points to consider when giving the right to vote on members of the military and police. First, the previous presidential elections were followed by *purnawirawan* as candidates for presidential or vice presidential candidates. This sensitive issue received open support by military resulted in voter mobilization by

ex-military network that potentially led to internal conflicts within the military or police institution. Second, neutrality in the sense of abstention from being a citizen with political rights can provide assurance that the military and police were able to carry out their obligations without any political tendency or a political conflict. Third, it was crucial to prevent the rise of absolute power which had the potential to return democracy to authoritarianism when the military was given the authority to engage in political process.

Another issue was a national security including a dualism of interests between military and police duties. This dualism is part of Law No. 3/2002 on National Defense. The key points in the discussion of the law were the modernization of the main weapon system of TNI involving arms fulfillment with a minimum standard scale. In addition, there were some considerations to restrict military role in domestic security issue. The fact that the SSR was not fully satisfactory since the military still intervened civilian government as part of military responsibility to protect the state. These points required more detailed identification of the national defense coverage, for example, in the case of countering terrorism. In President Joko Widodo's administration, he attempted to restore the role of the military in domestic security issues by inviting them to discuss the revision of anti-terror policy. Dealing with this, the issue of terrorism has been handled entirely by the police while TNI also feels obliged to have an active role in maintaining national security. In addition, Widodo considers several changes to the legislation that provides supports for active military personnel to hold positions in ministries or other state bodies. Widodo's policy received critical reaction from public activists arguing that the policy will restore military aggressiveness in practical politics. They also reject TNI involvement in eradicating corruption program because it will result in new conflicts between state institutions, such as between the KPK and Police. Meanwhile, from within its internal institution, TNI is deemed to have not made any changes to the issue of budget transparency in their institutions (*Reuter*, 25 May 2015).

Several important issues such as military and police's rights to vote in election, giving political position to active military officers, and military engagement in combating terrorism are dynamics issues in the civil-military relations. Constitutionally, dealing with the involvement of the military in the handling of terrorism, there is an overlap between the role and function of TNI / Police in combating terrorists that have been regulated in Law No. 34/2004 on TNI and Law No. 3/2002 on National Defense. In the Special Committee meeting of the DPR, the revision of the anti-terrorism law has suggested that the role would be discussed in the revision of the Law on Terrorism to sort out the limits of the role of police and TNI in the fight against terrorism. However, activists and academics argue that it has

the potential to overlap handling and coordination and in a vulnerable stage to restore the dual function military doctrine (*BBC Indonesia*, 22 July 2016).

From these three issues set out above, it can be concluded that the policy changes made during the period of 1999-2014 have been manifested through legalization of the law but it required time and supporting regulations to ensure its full implementation. Nevertheless, its implementation by the government after the legislation has been passed into law also raises the debates and interests from various political forces to make revisions to encourage the acceleration of democratic consolidation. On the contrary, it shows a stagnant debate and repeated issues about political forces among those who pro-military reform and SSR as well as those who consistently want to restore military authority in politics. Finally, legislation relating to the implementation of military and SSR reforms was also widely published during the Yudhoyono administration period.

7.2.2 *Advocacy to guarantee democracy*

The discussion on civil-military relations, especially on the civil rights of military members and police personnel, opens a wider debate on how to ensure a democratic political life for all citizens. Advocacy of laws related to ensure democratic life can be seen from four main issues: 1) securing citizens from social conflicts, 2) ensuring the freedom of expression, 3) supporting civil society's freedom and easy access to public information about state institutions, and 4) investigating human rights crimes committed by the state apparatus in the past. These four aspects are the underlining rights the citizens possess regardless their status as a part of the military or civil society. The next discussion will address these issues, especially related to civil-military relations and *purnawirawan*'s involvement in politics.

The first issue of citizen's protection against social conflicts was solidified under Joko Widodo's presidency in which he ratified Law No. 7/2012 on the Management of Social Conflict, the rules in the procedures of solving domestic conflicts. Government Regulations (PP) No. 2/2015 on the rules of managing social conflicts, further, regulates the extent of military involvement in the resolution of social conflicts.

The mobilization of military forces for the cessation of conflicts can be carried out after the establishment of conflict status by local or national government. Regarding the determination of the status of the conflict, the regulation illustrates that the conflict will not be sorted out by the police force and conflict resolution procedures will not disrupt government functions. The indicator of the status is that whether the escalation of the conflict is increasing and the risk is widespread. The

task of the use and deployment of military forces will be ended if the status of the conflict has been revoked and the the status ended. Post-conflict recovery becomes the obligation of the national and local government in a planned, integrated, sustainable, and measurable manner in accordance with their authority (*Kompas*, 12 February 2015). The regulation also emphasizes the responsibility of the military and police to directly engage in social conflicts resolution with limitations on the portion of their respective duties more clearly.

After Law No. 7/2012 was issued, there was evidence in 2013 revealing eight cases of racial hostility and thirteen cases of natural resources land disputes. The explanation for these conflicts is that after reform era in Indonesia there were some civil movements that were paralyzed and turned into more excessive euphoria since the reform was not accompanied by consistent efforts in developing ideal patterns in economic, social, and cultural aspects. The weak law enforcement, combined with poverty and citizens' ignorance, triggered racial issues –thus resulting in horizontal conflicts in the society (*AntaraNews*, 11 February 2017).

In 2014 the majority of the conflicts were mainly ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural as seen in 68 cases; 1 case of racial enmity, 14 cases of natural resources and land disputes. In the mid-quarter of 2015, these conflict cases declined: ideological and political conflicts dropped to 20 cases and land disputes to 6 cases. In many cases of social conflicts, Law No.7/2012 has granted local authority the autonomy in managing social unrest in the area and strengthening the military's involvement in conflict resolution. For example, in June 2015 President Widodo asked the Governor of Papua to put an end the transmigration program in the region (Tempo, 5 June 2015). This was followed by the pledges to move from a security-driven approach to a welfare and development to encourage a dialogue between the government and Papuan society. However, plans to further boost the military presence in the region casted doubts about whether the president's reform agenda stood a chance of success in winning the 'hearts and minds' of indigenous Papuans after decades of military abuse and unaddressed human rights violations (*AntaraNews*, 22 June 2015). In addition to the continuing conflict tension in Papua, another issue that arose was the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) in other provinces. Inter-ethnic conflict in Kalimantan and Sulawesi ahead of the 1996-1998 reform had claimed the lives of 9,399 people spread across the provinces of West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku, Central Java, Jakarta, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi (Tadjoeddin, 2014: 76). The ethnic conflicts left a large number of IDPs. In the case of Muslim-Christian conflicts in Tobelo and North Sulawesi, for example, coordination between national and local governments did not succeed, especially with regard to efforts to relocate or reintegrate peoples (Duncan in Eva-Lotta Hedman, 2008, eds: 216).

The second feature in the guarantee of a democratic life is to ensure the freedom of expression. Several legal frameworks that ensure this right are described on Law No. 11/2008 on Information and Electronic Transaction and Law No. 40/2008 on the Elimination of Race and Ethnic Discrimination –both regulating the delivery and content of speech in public space. A small complementary regulation is the issued Police Handbill (*Surat Edaran*) No. 6/2015 on Hate Speech when the conflict was high. Law enforcement on the abuse and misappropriation of the freedom of speech has led to the arrest of the author of "Jokowi Undercover" –a book that presents inaccurate data and tends to be included as personal slander– and a legal settlement for the media *Obor Rakyat* for spreading hatred against one of the presidential candidates during the 2014 election. Another law related to this subject is Law No. 40/2008 that ensures that democracy in Indonesia can provide the right a freedom to speech responsibly. The implementation of this law seemed to be effective in the case of 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election during which the Police Chief, General Badrodin Haiti cracked down hate speech actors during the campaign period –social media and online platforms were tightly observed since they were where hate speech and provocation against certain parties thrived (*Tempo*, 26 March 2016).

The third feature is civil society's accessibility to access public information from state institutions. This right is guaranteed through Law No. 14/2008 on Public Information Transparency enacted during Yudhoyono's administration which aims to facilitate individual or mass media to access the information from all levels of governmental institutions. This law provides a sanction for agencies or public bodies that intentionally do not provide, or do not publish information periodically that must be available at all times. The sanction is maximum imprisonment of one year and a maximum fine of 5 million rupiahs (*Kompas*, 12 June 2008). This law is implemented maximally to the level of city/county government.

The fourth feature is the address of crimes against humanity and human rights committed by state apparatus in the past that are subject to investigation. This issue has been set forth in the law but was impeded when the Constitutional Court overturned Law No. 27/2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) aimed at ensuring the political rights of citizens who were abandoned by the New Order regime in connection with allegations of subversion and insurrection. President Joko Widodo reiterated that his administration has committed to settle past human rights cases that have so far been awaited by human rights activists. He further explained that gross human rights violations in the past can be settled through the *ad hoc* human rights court. In addition, the implementation of human rights also includes the restoration of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health services and freedom of religion. He considered the judicial

review process on Law No. 27/2004 on Reconciliation and Truth Commission as no longer having a binding legal power (*AntaraNews*, 9 December 2014).

In 2015, Widodo's government proposed the return of TRC Bill in the National Legislation Program (*Prolegnas*). In middle of the process, the new TRC Bill received a critical note from the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (*Kontras*). They argued that substantially, in terms of the fulfillment of the rights of victims –namely the right to justice, truth, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition– the new TRC Bill was considered more likely to get along with the offender. *Kontras* stated that ideally the TRC should not be placed as court substitution, but must be complementary with the human rights court. In addition, reconciliation should not abort state obligations to continue to punish perpetrators of gross human rights violations, especially for those most responsible (*Kompas*, 24 March 2015).

In addition to the TRC Law abrogated in the Yudhoyono era, there are other bills that are on pending and filed in the era of President Widodo to be passed into law. One of them is the Bill on State Secrets (*RUU Rahasia Negara*). General Secretary of Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General Ediwan Prabowo, stated that his ministerial office needs time to refine the substance of the rules, especially those related to the principles of human rights and press freedom (*CNN Indonesia*, 16 December 2015). During Yudhoyono's administration, the withdrawal of the State Secrets Bill from parliamentary discussions was motivated by the condition that the government needed more time to repatriate its substance. During that time, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono mentioned that his office also needed to examine that state secrets was related to human rights and press freedom to meet a balance between security and liberty aspects. MPs from Golkar, PDI-P, and Democrats supported the government's decision. Inspector Geneneral (ret) Sidarto Danusubroto from PDI-P thought that the bill containing the broader definition and classification of state secrets and sanctions for the press that leaked state secrets were also not in accordance with the Law on the Press (*Tempo*, 16 September 2009).

The debates on the State Secrets Bill resumed when it was re-submitted in parliament meeting during President Widodo's presidency. Some argued that the bill did not need to proceed because it was unnecessary and its proposed background was conflicting with democratic values with Law No. 14/2008, containing adequate principles of state secrets. Article 17 of the Law indirectly denotes public information to be concealed by the state. The same article mentions that disclosed public information includes information that impedes law enforcement, jeopardizes the defense and security of the state, and harms the interests of foreign relations. State Secrets Bill was tought overlapping with Law No. 14/2008 because Indonesia is a democratic country and this law will become a

limitation for both the public and the media and in turn violate human rights (*Kompas*, 12 September 2014). The overlapping role between TNI and police in the issue of national security was attempted to be solved during the era of President Widodo through this bill. Defense Minister General (ret) Ryamizard Ryaccudu again proposed the National Security Bill as a priority in National Legislative Program 2015-2019. Gerindra Party faction in DPR encouraged the House to hold a symposium on the National Security Bill and argued that there was nothing to worry about the bill potentially hampering democratization because there must be a legal rule covering TNI involvement in security operations. In this regards, PDI-P proposed to review the substance of this bill by sticking to the principles of democracy, human rights and support for press freedom (*SindoNews*, 4 May 2016). Another opinion from the PPP faction was that the bill should be regarded as an umbrella for Indonesia's defense and security law. The law should not regulate TNI involvement in handling security matters because it is already regulated in Law No. 34/2004 on TNI. Security operation has become the working area of the police so that it is necessary to regulate the working area of the Police and the TNI if both of them have to carry out the operation simultaneously (*Kompas*, 9 August 2016).

In addition to the previous bill, another bill proposed by the Widodo administration is the revision of the Bill on Terrorism. A non-governmental organization, Setara Institute, mentioned several controversial articles when the bill was passed. Article 43 B, in particular was considered concealing the authority of counter-terrorism measures since it aligns with TNI and Police Force as the parties provide a mandate for them to implement the national strategy (*Kompas*, 4 March 2016). The bill would again open the controversy of the overlapping authority between the military and police on domestic security issues. From the discussion on legislation focusing on providing guarantees to civil society, the law passed in the Yudhoyono period was canceled by the Constitutional Court or deliberated in parliament meetings. The agendas to provide guarantees against the investigation of past human rights violations by the military, for example, were unworkable. Likewise, the law on state secrets was considered to have a potential risk of restoring the authoritarian regime by providing the opportunity to use the state apparatus to intimidate and block criticism on behalf of state secrets.

7.2.3 *Commitment in Law Enforcement and Combating Corruption*

One of the indicators of the running president's commitment to follow the 1998 Reform demands is the success of his corruption eradication policies. The government's effort on war against corruption has become the next measure of success in the early period of transition, as the people were watching the government closely in hopes that corruption would finally be eradicated. Global

Corruption Survey 2009 noted that 74% of their respondents agreed that their parliament was the most corrupt institution in the country (Bubandt, 2014). This survey result supported the reason why the president figure occupies a central position in the effort to eradicate corruption instead of members of parliament or other law enforcement officers with low credibility in the public eyes.

The issue of corruption eradication is a serious concern to get public trust by the government. Law No.30/2002 on Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi,* KPK) was esablished as an answer to public demands for democratic governance to solve various cases of corruption. The law was passed during Megawati's administration in 2002 providing a legal basis for the establishment of the Commission. KPK is an independent public institution authorized to investigate and prosecute corruption cases, and it reports directly to the president. Previously, the state had two *ad hoc* institutions namely the Joint Corruption Eradication Team (TGPTPK) during Wahid's presidency and the State Supervisory Commission (KPKPN) during Megawati's administration. They were eventually disbanded because of initiatives of the institutions had disturbed the interests of the political elite. The function of both institutions was replaced by the KPK which was expected to be more rigorous in its work as it is then proved to be – the commission is careful, but sometimes quite aggressive in pursuing high-profile cases.

Megawati allowed the KPK to work independently without any invervention since she had a strong will in combating corruption cases (*Kompas*, 29 January 2015). There was a big corruption case in Megawati era involving the sale of a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) vessel owned by Pertamina. One of the suspects in the case was former PDIP chief Laksamana Sukardi who accused Megawati of being responsible for the sale. The case was brought to DPR Special Committee where PDI-P encouraged the legal settlement of all matters relating to abuse of power (*AntaraNews*, 10 November 2007). The work of the committee found the fact that Megawati did not approve the sale of tankers conducted by the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise, Laksamana Sukardi.

Despite the fact that Megawati's governance was genuinely supportive in the establishment of both judicial and anti-corruption commission, it was less supportive in their operations. In her presidency, Megawati had issued about 21 decrees of SP3 (Order of Termination of Investigation) in which 16 cases were related to corruption cases (Lindsey, 2008: 19). In addition, new institutions such as the KPK were not yet fully able to find a work rhythm without any pressure from the president's commitment to meet certain work and achievement standards.

Figure 4 shows that the cases handled by the KPK during Yudhoyono administration period from 2004-2014 fluctuated every year, both in terms of

always rising or decreasing. Prior to 2007, there were no cases of either national or regional parliamentarians. Until 2009, there had also been no judges caught by the Commission. For 10 years of the KPK's performance, the catch category was the I-III echelon bureaucracy totaling 126 individuals, followed by the head of the regent or mayor with a total of 119 people, and a corporate sector of 109 people. In general, all categories of state and government apparatus are not spared from the KPK ambush –not only from the bureaucracy that manages the government and corporate budgets involved in conspiracy with members of parliament, but there have also involved ambassadors, police, ministers, judges and commissioners. This indicates a commitment to the extension of the handling of corruption cases in all government institutions.

Figure 4: Cases held by KPK 2004-2014

Office of defendants	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	Total
Member of legislature (regional and national)				2	7	8	27	5	16	8	4	77
Head of agency/minister		1	1		1	1	2		1	4	9	20
Ambassador				2	1		1					4
Commissioner		3	2	1	1							7
Governor	1		2		2	2	1			2	2	12
Mayor/district head and deputies		4	5	5	12	11	31	5	17	14	15	119
Civil Servant Echelon I-III	2	9	15	10	22	14	12	15	8	7	2	126
Judge							1	2	2	4	2	11
Corporate sector (chief executive officer)	1	4	5	3	12	11	8	10	16	24	15	109
Others		6	1	2	4	4	9	3	3	7	8	47
Total	**4**	**27**	**31**	**25**	**62**	**51**	**92**	**40**	**63**	**70**	**57**	**522**

Source: Taken from Schutte (2016: 50)

According to the data from corruption perception index released by Transparency International, Indonesia's score in 2012 and 2013 was 32. Then it decreased to 34 (2014), 36 (2015) and 37 (2016) (www.transparency.org). In the 2012 survey, the majority of Indonesians reported that corruption had "increased a lot" in the previous year, with vast majorities involving the police (91%), legislature (89%), judiciary (86%), political parties (86 %), and public officials and civil servants (79%) as corrupt. KPK has spent the last decade investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption cases. The data since 2012 shows the Yudhoyono administration was more successful for corruption perception scores than president Widodo. His presidency proved that combating corruption is the commitment to develop a cleaner, more effective democracy.

Throughout the years the KPK has resolved several corruption cases which involved some names from different institutions and organizations. In 2012, there were 34 corruption cases handled. Some of the cases require careful attention. Some of them were solved and many still remain unresolved to the very end. Those cases have different degree of challenges, and most of the actors behind them are government officials and less likely from private sector (*Kompas*, 3 January 2013). Overall, there were at least 439 corruption cases for 12 years in period of time the KPK has been on service. The cases mostly come from the procurement department, services, bribery, illegal charges, and permissions. Due to the lack of the salary, culture and opportunity is the most likely to be the reason behind the corrupt behavior of government officials in most institutions. Some of them have an irrational accumulation of wealth. Most cases are in the procurement department of goods or services. Corruptions in Indonesia mostly have the same reason behind it (*Republika*, 29 September 2015).

Throughout his entire presidency, Yudhoyono and KPK have dealt with a number of high-profile cases that both involved general cases suspecting politicians from political parties and cases involving people surrounding him. In the first category, during the period between 2004 and 2012 Yudhoyono had signed a number of agreements of prosecution and from 2004 to 2014, some 277 regional executive and legislative officials were called by the KPK for case verification (Republika, 15 August 2015). In addition, between May 2008 and October 2009, several members of the DPR were arrested and imprisoned by KPK and even among the elite of the large-middle parties to illustrate that corruption within legislatures and parties was deeply rooted (Tomsa in Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010: 148).

The other suspects during Yudhoyono's tenure were his closest people and relatives. One of the most prominent cases involving Yudhoyono's closest relatives was the corruption case involving Bank Indonesia (BI) which ended with the punishment given to BI Deputy Governor Miranda Goeltom and Aulia Pohan who is Yudhoyono's relative. In addition, other cases involving Democratic Party cronies in the case of Bank Century and Mega Corruption Hambalang project where the closest people and administrators of the party were also faced conviction. In the case of Bank Century, two high-ranking Yudhoyono officials were also suspected. The case of Bank Century was about a small Indonesian lender bailed out by the Indonesian central bank at the cautious of the financial crisis. Allegations of misconduct were levelled at the two people in charge of handling the bailout: Indonesia's Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Vice President Boediono –two key members of President Yudhoyono's new cabinet. The president, vice president, and finance minister all denied any wrongdoing (BBC Indonesia, 9 December 2009). The KPK turned out to have taken a considerable reservoir of public support that led

Yudhoyono to renew his anti-corruption efforts in 2011. The president's daughter-in-law, Aulia Pohan, was targeted successfully by the Commission and was granted an administrative reduction of his six months of prison sentence and then released on parole in 2010 by the Minister of Law and Human Rights. Regarding the two groups of people convicted for corruption during Yudhoyono's administration, there has been no suspicion of favoritism (Horowitz, 2013: 232).

Furthermore, the cases involving the police institution also did not indicate a negative intervention from the presidential power. A side effect of the investigation was, however, an arising feud between the police corps and the KPK. For instance, the case of the driving license simulator case had encouraged Yudhoyono to confirm that KPK would complete the task of handling the case and ask the police not to intervene the case because the KPK is an independent institution (*AntaraNews*, 3 August 2012). In fact, Yudhoyono ordered the police force to stop the investigation of KPK investigator Novel Baswedan and confirmed that the case should be admitted by KPK and not the Police which resulted in the verdict against Comissioner General police Djoko Susilo (Tempo, November 2012).

The aggressiveness and level of success of the institution have put KPK in a continuing controversy. Since its inception in 2003, activists and NGO have urged the Commission to be more rigorous in its work. At the same time, it has also endured a series of attempts to delegitimize its power after its successful prosecution of corrupt officials, judges, generals, businessmen, and politicians. In September 2009, efforts to undermine the commission continued when the police declared KPK deputies Chandra M. Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto suspects for abusing their power for imposing a travel ban on Anggoro Widjojo, who had declared a suspect by the KPK for bribing legislators to secure a project with the Ministry of Forestry. This dispute between the police and KPK was later dubbed "Cicak vs. Buaya" (Gecko vs. Crocodile) with "gecko" referring to the KPK and "crocodile" to the police force, which implied a much older, larger institution.

Attacks by the police stemmed from KPK's wiretapping of the National Police detective division chief of Police Commissioner General Susno Duadji, who was at the time widely expected to become the next police chief. The tapping of Susno's cell phone revealed a conversation where he demanded 10 billion rupiahs in fees from Boedi Sampoerna to clear the businessman's savings, which were stuck in the troubled Bank Century. Yudhoyono stepped in to resolve the case by stopping the prosecutions against Bibit and Chandra. However, following the settlement, the KPK in turn was reluctant to go after the big fish or big case involving police (*Jakarta Post*, 27 February 2015).

In these cases, the Constitutional Court (MK) supported the KPK by allowing recording of conspiracy against the commissioner to be publicly aired. This allowed

KPK to gain considerable political leverage from the public support (Schutte in Bong & Scott, eds., 2016: 51). Aside from the chaotic conflict management and case resolution between the KPK and the police force, Yudhoyono seemed more assertive in completing the case. From the commitment to eradicate corruption and law enforcement, Yudhoyono's government hasshown a high commitment not to intervene various cases that the KPK is investigating. Although at the end of its reign, there were indications that as many as 309 regional heads (governors and district heads/mayors) were corrupt while data from KPK mentioned one third of the cases they handled has involved local government officials. Among them were 10 governors and 35 regents/mayors and, overall this number was higher than the 2012 period (Patunru & Rahman in Hill, eds., 2014: 161). In general, the success in maintaining such commitments is demonstrated by the assessment of international transparency where the conditions of law enforcement in the Yudhoyono period may have been better than the next administration.

In the case of law enforcement involving military personnel, Yudhoyono seemed to be avoiding intervention for military court. Other cases of law enforcement aspects that are important to be assessed are crime or any lawlessness acts committed by the military. Kontras Institute reported that there were 108 reports of torture between July 2013 and July 2014 with a high proportion of these cases allegedly involving police officers (The Jakarta Post, 27 June 2015). The case of Cebongan prison attack in Jogjakarta by Special Force Command (*Kopassus*) personnel, although resolved through military court, was considered to lack a sense of justice. Military court did not accommodate the facts as a whole and the process was less participatory –the case itself did not fall under proper investigation and resolution (www.kontras.org).

Despite Yudhoyono's firm commitment by ordering Chief of the Army General Pramono Edhi Wibowo, who is also his brother-in-law, and succeeded in dragging the perpetrators into the military court, the Army Chief successor, General Budiman, mentioned that the magnitude of the sentence received by the shooters from military tribunals was grave enough. The Panel of Judges in the Military Court of Yogyakarta sentenced Sergeant Ucok Simbolon as the 4th executor of prison in Cebongan prison with 11 years in prison while other actors who assisted the assault process were sentenced between six and eight years and all were dismissed from *Kopassus*. As many as five other defendants involved paved the attack plan with a 1 year and 9 month verdict (*Tempo*, 2 September 2015).

Public institutions such as Komnas HAM also submitted the results of investigations related to the case of Cebongan. In conclusion, Komnas HAM found that the actions of *Kopassus* Group II Kandang Menjangan were suspected to include human rights violations in the forms of violation of the right including cruel,

inhumane, and degrading acts. In this case, the victims denied the right to obtain justice. In addition, there were misuse of state-owned facilities and infrastructure by *Kopassus* members. The motive for the murder was an act of revenge for the murder of Sergeant Heru Santoso and Sergeant Sriyono. Four men executed by Sergeant Ucok were accused of being the perpetrators so this was a case of premeditated murder (*Kompas*, 19 June 2013). Nevertheless, Komnas HAM's report was not a consideration for investigation of the case.

7.2.4 *Acceptance of election results.*

The most interesting thing from election as an important instrument of democracy is the acceptance of election results by the defeated candidates. This section discusses two things: the case of election disputes resolved through the court of the Constitutional Court (MK) which involved purnawirawan in the legislative election or local head election and tension in the presidential election. Election disputes are indicator to see the extent of acceptance of constitutional mechanisms and efforts to reduce open conflict due to public discontent over election results, especially when tensions are high during presidential elections.

In 2010, Judge of the MK convened 862 times for the case of dispute resolution of local elections. The authority to settle out the dispute was based on Law No. 12/2008 on Amendment to Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, where it is explicitly explained that the dispute over the election has been transferred from the Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Agung*, MA) to the MK. In other cases, such as election disputes, the registration for the number of cases of the election disputes in 2014 increased to 767 cases. This report changed from the press release of MK which previously only mentioned 702 cases. The number of 767 cases consisted of 735 cases filed by 12 national political parties and local parties, and 32 cases filed by individual candidates for DPD members. The number of cases was higher than the 2004 and 2009 elections (MK, 2012: 10).

Compared with the dispute submitted to the MK, data from the 2009 election showed a lower number of 627 cases submitted by 38 national political parties and 6 local political parties in Aceh, and 28 cases submitted by 27 candidates for Senator (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*, DPD) members. The comparison is the average of one party participating in the 2009 General Election filed 14 cases, while in the 2014 election, the average filed 48 cases (Perludem 2014; 16). Besides, 30 candidates of the DPD members from 19 provinces also lodged protests to the MK. The number of DPD candidates who filed suits against the results of the legislative election 2014 increased from that was in 2009. In the legislative election 2009, the number of DPD candidates who filed complaints was 27, and in 2014 the number increased to 30

(AntaraNews, 14 May 2014). Since the 2004 election, the number of election disputes has risen in every legislative election.

In Figure 5, the most lawsuits were filed by Golkar with 91 cases, followed by the Democratic Party 73 cases, PKPI with a number of 71 cases, and several other parties. These cases were scattered in different parts of Indonesia. The provinces with the highest number of cases in the Court were Papua Province with 80 cases, followed by West Java with 67 cases, Aceh with 63 cases, East Java 52 cases, North Sulawesi 50 cases, and South Sumatera 49 cases (Perludem, 2014; 11). The highest number of cases filed for district level disputes reached 321 cases, followed by lawsuits filed by legislative candidates of the DPR reaching 186 cases and legislative candidate DPRD (local government) 117 cases, DPRK (Papua) 42 cases, DPRA (Aceh) 15 cases, and DPD reaching 34 cases (Perludem 2014: 12). These numbers of cases may tell us that the effort to seek legal justice over various election disputes may be well instituted to the lower level. The awareness of choosing a constitutional settlement has had an impact on the declining rate of escalation of political conflicts in the regions.

Figure 5: Political Dispute registered in Constitutional Court by Political Parties 2014

Source: Calculated by Perludem, 2014

The number of lawsuits disputes in the election was also high. From Figure 6 revealed thatcases handled by the MK related to the election had varying amounts every year where the number of lawsuits follows the exertion of each year's report. The largest number of election disputes occurred in 2010 with 230 cases reported, and in 2013 with 200 cases. The lowest number of cases occurred in 2009 was 12

cases and in 2014 there were 13 cases reported. Throughout 2015, a decrease in the number of lawsuits was reported where the MK received 147 election dispute reports from 132 regions. By the total cases, 128 or 87 percent were submitted by regent and deputy regent candidate pairs. Meanwhile, 11 lawsuits were submitted by mayor and deputy governor and governor candidate pairs (*Jakarta Post*, 30 December 2015).

Figure 6: Case Local Direct Election in Constitutional Court 2008-2017

Source: Calculation by Perludem, 2017

Of the variables of disputes over legislative elections, the MK's verdict indicated the lack of evidence presented by the plaintiffs. The tabel 22 below describes the status of reported cases throughout the 2009 elections. The MK received 699 cases for election disputes. In the process of registration until the judicial verdict, the Court received as many as 68 cases of legislative and 2 DPD elections. The MK rejected the application of 398 cases of legislative elections, 2 presidential elections and 16 DPD, and ordered recalculation of six cases and re-election for 2 cases in the legislative elections. The rest of the cases were rejected due to various reasons from incomplete files to withdrawal of lawsuits. The number of rejections made by the Court confirmed that the plaintiff's attempt to prove his allegations in court was very weak. Therefore the election of 2009 was considered an overall success since from hundreds of lawsuits that were submitted, the Court only decided a total of 8 cases that otherwise meet the element of fraud or provided a real problem in the general election.

Table 22: Cases on Election 2009 by Constitutional Court

Cases	Verdict						
	Accept	Reject	Not Accepted	Withdrawal	Interupt	Recount	Reelection
Legislative	68	398	107	27	6	6	2
Presidential	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Senat	2	16	7	0	3	0	0
Total	71	416	114	27	9	6	2

Source: Constitutional Court 2010

In the 2014 presidential election, the presidential candidate pair of Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa filed a complaint to the Court because of an alleged voting fraud in Papua. The lawsuit in the new presidential election was the first since 2004. Judge Zoelva mentioned that the Court works in accordance with facts and evidence showing the presence or absence of fraud as the plaintiff's complaint states. Only cheats can change the election results, not outside pressure against the Court (*Reuters*, 25 July 2014). At the hearing result, the Court rejected all the lawsuits Prabowo filedAccording to the Court's decision, the subject of Prabowo-Hatta's petition was unreasonable under the law. Previously, Prabowo-Hatta had asked the Court to designate them as the winner of the presidential election based on the calculation of their own vote. Based on their claim, they earned 67,139,153 votes while Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla only received 66,435,124 votes. However, the applications of both candidates were insufficient evidence for further processing (*Kompas*, 22 August 2014).

Another story on how political elites have difficulties to accept their defeat in the election was when Megawati seemed rather troubled accepting her party PDI-P's defeat in the 2004 presidential election as Yudhoyono's Democratic Party won election. She claimed her party's loss in ideological-based areas such as East Java was due to the lack of fight and campaign on their legislative candidates' side. As she put it, "They (PDI-P members of local parliament) did not want to fight in the presidential election, because they consider the presidential election is a matter of the people, not their political party" (*AntaraNews*, 1 December 2006).

When Yudhoyono was elected for two tenures in 2004 and 2009, the losing candidates did not appear to congratulate. Prabowo who advanced in the 2009 election with Megawati excused himself and later congratulated Yudhoyono (Republika, 2 June 2014). The strain of accepting the defeat in the presidential election is a problem for almost all candidates so rarely do they congratulate the winning candidates after the KPU announced its final result. Various reasons may be

put forward, but emotional and personal reasons are the main factors. When the KPU declared Yudhoyono-Boediono's victory in the 2009 presidential election, PDI-P's presidential candidate Megawati did not congratulate them. Deputy Secretary General of PDI-P Agnita Singangune who was interviewed separately did not consider there was a need for Megawati to send her regards to honor Yudhoyono's victory. But different from Megawati, Prabowo held a press conference in which he congratulated Yudhoyono as the elected president. Prabowo who is also Chairman of the Board of Trustees Gerindra Party stated that he accepted the election results (*Kompas*, 18 August 2009).

The results of 2014 presidential election became the starting point of Prabowo's new efforts. Henceforth the path of rivalry that he opted for was election disputes and constitutional channels. Prabowo and his team registered a lawsuit to the MK on the allegations of systematic, structural, and massive fraud of the election results around the nation following Jokowi's victory. However, he advised his supporters to respect the court's decisions. Prabowo also tried to appease the crowd and stated, "If you love Prabowo, you should go home now, this is a long process, I ask you to calm down and go home." (*Kompas*, 21 December 2014). Unfortunately, MK's verdict ignited a riot between Prabowo supporters and police officers. Police were forced to withdraw thousands of his supporters by water canon and fired tear gas when an orator shouted in the crowd, "A retreat is a source of betrayal" (*Tempo*, 1 December 2014). The aftermath of the protest was cleared by police with several numbers of military vehicles. General (ret.) Djoko Santoso, the former Chief of Armed Forces, declared his claim of the Unimog truck used (Kompas.com, 4 September 2014). This indicated that a network of *purnawirawan*s was suspected to be the engineer behind the protest.

The acceptance of a defeat in presidential election might have become a national issue but it does not appear to have a large organizational effect on party supporters at the lower levels. In the case of Prabowo's 2014 lawsuit, following the Court's rejection of his complaints, Prabowo finally gave recognition to the elected president Joko Widodo. In a meeting in October 2014, Prabowo and Jokowi told the media that they were committed to maintain peace and unity in Indonesia. "We agree to maintain the unity of Indonesia, the nation's ideology of Pancasila, and the Constitution". Prabowo further remarked that "competition in politics is normal, but in the end, we have to remember that the people's interests are what matters." Prabowo also called on his sympathizers to support the next administration of president-elect Joko Widodo, as long as its programs and projects are good for the public. "I have asked the party that I lead, my friends and loyalists, to support (the administration) of Joko Widodo," he stated. But, Prabowo cautioned, if the Jokowi

administration makes policies that harm the people, then his party and sympathizers will not hesitate to criticize (*AntaraNews*, 19 October 2014).

The acceptance of defeat among political elites in presidential elections reflecting political maturity only visible after the 2014 presidential election following Prabowo-Hatta's lawsuit. Previously, the protest over defeat was only manifested personally. Unfortunately, both Prabowo and Yudhoyono as *purnawirawan* gave a good example for othercivilian politician.

7.3 The *Purnawirawan*'s Contribution to the Quality of Democracy

In the assessment of *purnawirawan*'s contribution to democratization, we looking up the two democratic assessments of Freedom House and Bertellsman Transformation Index (BTI) were employed particularly in the period from 1999 to 2016 and the duration was dependent upon the institution assessed. It is a challenge to evaluate the indirect contribution of *purnawirawan* to the quality of democracy in the most visible result, yet the most plausible and verifiable contribution was evident in their roles within their political parties. As was stated at the beginning of the chapter, the variables examined are the stature of the policies that *purnawirawan* produced in public offices, the voice of their advocacy on the parties they represented in legislation, and other objective facts that are supportive to both democratic assessment identifications.

Figure 7: Indonesia's democratic status by Freedom House 1999-2016

Note: Scale of 1 the best to 7 the worst
Compiled from Freedom House Index 1999-2016

In the figure 7 above the three variables –Freedom Rating (FR), Civil Liberties (CL) and Political Right (PR)– show stagnancy scores between 1999-2005. Between 2006-2013, there was an increase of all variables, which confirmed that President Yudhoyono's performance in maintaining the consolidation of democracy demonstrating his achievement. In the following years, however, the variable remaining stable was only political rights while civil liberties and freedom rating decreased. This trend lasted until President Widodo came into governance.

There are three important things to explain from this Freedom House report. First, the rise of all assessment variables in 2005 shows a relatively successful democratic transition. Indonesia emerged as a "Free" category, occuring after the 2004 election in which Yudhoyono emerged as the first president elected by a direct presidential election system –in the transitional period up until 2004. In this regards, scholars still assessed democracy in Indonesia was deeply flawed (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Klinken, 2009b). Second, from the period of 2005-2013, Indonesia's position was very stable in all variables, confirming that the performance of President Yudhoyono in ensuring the consolidation of democracy worked well. The presidential regime had greater opportunity and power in providing guarantees for securing democratization. The presidential governance system in Indonesia, compared with other kinds of presidential system, is able to provide more space for the president as an executor. That is not to say that political negotiations are not required to obtain parliamentary approval in the ratification of the law.

Third, the second claim above is reinforced by a decrease in Freedom House report of 2013 –a year before Widodo's presidency was established. Political rights variable appeared to be more stable than the other two variables suggesting that some indicators such as political participation, fairness in elections, and the workings of government institutions have been well institutionalized. The process and outcome of the 2014 election reveals the extent of democratic conditions in Indonesia where democratization have attained considerable solidity. The sustainability, then, would depend on the viable emerging successors (Fung & Drakeley, 2013).

Figure 8: BTI assessment 2003-2016

Note: Score follows the increasing trend; higher score means better quality
Source: Compiled from BTI

The next index that complements the measure of the quality of democracy is Bertellsman Transformation Index (BTI) in Figure 8. BTI relies on six variables: political and social integration, rule of law, stateness, stability of democracy, political participation, and democratic status. The report started with a low democratic status at 3 points in 2003 that rose significantly to 6.3 points in 2006, the middle of Yudhoyono's first term. In 2010, this number rose again to 7 points and stabilized until the following years. Other variables experienced a similar improvement after 2006 and remained stagnant throughout the upcoming years albeit with slight fluctuation. The highest level of political participation was recorded in 2010 with 7.8 points, but this score decreased to only 7 points in 2016. Stability of democracy stayed stable after 2006 with a slight jump to 7.5 points in 2014. Among all observed variables during Yudhoyono's administration, only stateness aspect appeared to stay at a constant low score.

In 2006, the improvements occured for all of the variables as a result of Yudoyono's early work. The success of Indonesia's free, fair, and peaceful legislative elections for two rounds of the presidential elections were a considerably important step towards the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes in Indonesia. The space for improvement was still open in other supporting factors such as the fact about the political system which was still constrained by a high level of corruption and political patronage as the legacy of the previous administrations.

In 2010, Indonesia made a substantial progress towards the full restoration of democracy and the rule of law as well as political participation. Accessible evidence suggests a further stabilization of the political situation likely happened

after the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. Previous existing ethnic and religious conflicts declined significantly in recent years, although radical Muslim's influence in politics kept growing. Human and civil rights situation also improved to some extent despite some occasional exceptions. Widespread corruption still posed a major threat to transparency and accountability in the political and economic sphere, but recent efforts by the current administration have improved the situation slightly. In 2013, several populist party figures declared their candidates for the 2014 presidential elections and it was evident that the previously established electoral system was maintained well.

The overall parameters of Indonesian democracy continued to be relatively sound. The competitiveness of elections remained high, as the voter turnout and the wider population declared support for democracy. Moreover, the Indonesian government kept strengthening its role over remote territories by establishing more local government structures and institutions in the past through state apparatus over the period of 2014 to 2016. The remaining setback during this period was the fact that the rule of law still had insufficient power and there were few indications that the country's notoriously endemic corruption was on the decline. In addition, human rights abuse was found persisted although it was now due to a non-political nature; and violations in the province of Papua was evident resulting in the condition where the state continued to fight a separatist movement.

Referring to the BTI assessment, there are four conclusions. *First*, the increase in democratic stability in 2003 (3) to 6.3 in 2006 demonstrates the success of the transition and the early period of democratic consolidation. During this period, most of the legislation or regulation have been created to ensure citizens' freedom and institutionalization of state instituion and to strengthen the role of the government in handling corruption, constitutional justice, and guarantees of other citizens' rights. *Second*, the stability of democracy revealed a significant increase until 2014, reaching 7.5 points. During the Yudhoyono administration period, this status was stable and advances in minimizing social-political conflict and the expansion of civil liberties were key. The same increase occurred in political and social interaction variable that rose from 5.8 to 7 supported by the restoration of post-conflict horizontal community structures occuring in the early period of the democratic transition. *Third*, the decline of political variables was largely determined by the degree of public disappointment with the work of public institutions, especially the DPR where the institution's image was still closely linked to various cases and issues of corruption and low levels of public trust. This was mainly the cause of a decrease in political participation, especially in legislative elections. *Fourth*, the increase of index status from 6.5 to 7.1 confirms the journey of consolidating democracy. Indonesia was still categorized as "defective"

considering some of the problems that arose was mainly rooted from the system's dependence on dominant figures who control the government.

The assessment of both Freedom House and Bertellsman Transformation Index reports on the quality of democracy provides us three deductions. *First*, in the period between 1999 and 2016, the stability of democracy still depended on the personal factors in which the presidential figure dominated control over the government and other state institutions. The assessment of the quality of democracy should also pay attention to the variable of durability. Until 2013, democracy quality was quite diminished especially by patronage that elite pursued and the reserve domains that they tenaciously defended. In this regards, democracy quality and persistent intersect (Case, 2013: 3). *Second*, social and political condition showed a high stability although fluctuations in other variables such as law enforcement, fairness of election, and political participation were evident. *Third*, the factor of civil liberties was still vulnerable to be affected by the interests of radical groups who took advantage of the situation and nourished in public sphere and national political debate. This has hindered the government from opening up the democratic faucet on many spheres of civil liberties and freedom of speech.

From an overview of the results of the BTI and FH above, in general, democratization in Indonesia functions well, even though some improvements need to be continously made. The *purnawirawans* contribution to democratization can either directly or indirectly be seen from their impacts on the assessment of the democratization condition. In this regards, their contribution toward democratization can be at least be classified into two categories. *First*, in a period of democratic consolidation, their roles can be seen from the public positions they are in charge and the political party organizations they manage. *Second*, the role of *purnawirawan* in the arena of democracy involves their capacity in determining the rule of law, political participation and competition.

In the process of consolidating democracy, their role can be identified from their duty in public office and management of political organizations. In public office, as discussed in previous chapters, they fully support democratization. In addition, they actively involved in their positions as MPs, ministers in the cabinet and other public positions such as the governor. There are no strong indications that they support the military to get a bigger benefit or share or even against civil administration. They generally work to build public trust as civilian politicians following democratic mechanisms and procedures. In building and managing political organizations, their roles can be seen from various aspects. As discussed in previous chapters, almost not many of them are able to build modern political parties referring to the orientation of modern parties that have a well-institutionalized system. Th existing political system developed, for example,

produces leader-centric parties with a strong patron-client model. This model causes the resilience of the parties dependent upon the position of leaders. In the short term, they can build and manage parties with full authority. That was good and bad of the party become dependent on the extent of their commitment to make accountable party.

In the second category, the involvement of *purnawirawan* in the democratic arena can be identified only limited to the rule of law, participation and competition. In the rule of law arena, their position can be tested from issues that are directly related to their interests, including military tribunal and adherence to rules of the game based on democratic values. The strategic role in this context actually allows them to return the military or at least military interests to get back like in the new regime and be given greater responsibility in domestic security affairs, granting privileges to military members in criminal law cases or human rights violations as well as military resource mobilization for practical political purposes. Moreover, *purnawirawan* who hold executive power, were not evident to take steps or take policies contrary to the flow of democracy although there is a lack of records for military business completion and audits of military-run public budgets.

The second arena is political participation. From the dataset, it appears that their political participation, whether in election candidacy or active participation in other policy advocacy spaces, is determined more by personal motives for example, based on groupings of military branch or corps, ethnicity, and position levels. However, in limited recruitment of political participation by the political elite, personal proximity factors based on military education, ideological tendencies and positions when in military service are considered. In each election, their political participation fluctuates. In the political agenda, their participation can spread across all parties as to provide support to prospective retired military candidates or to support civilian candidates. From this point, it can be concluded that their political participation is based on the freedom to choose according to their political needs or interests.

In the third arena of competition, datasets show that in electoral competition, they are more likely to run for regional elections than legislative elections. This trend can be understood as part of the manifestation for their political motives as to maintain their existence as policy makers in the capacity as regional heads. Position as a member of parliament does not have a territory and is limited to making legislation that does not have territorial direct control. Their political motives are more influenced by the interests as "office seekers". Even, if their success rate or electability is low, every period of regional head election, their existence is always evident.

7.4. Summary

This chapter reviews the degree of the contribution of the *purnawirawan* to democratization in Indonesia. It highlighted four important things related to the attributive outcomes of their roles in democratization in general. First, *purnawirawan* demonstrated a stronger commitment and efforts to the military and security sector reforms, although the stability of civil-military relations need to be countinously maintained. The implementation of law enumerated through its supporting regulations can be understood as a way of ensuring the essential agendas of military reforms aiming at removing military institutions from political stage. Second, policy advocacy and efforts to continuously strengthen civil society were also evident. The various policies adopted by the government have an adequate legal umbrella to ensure the existence of public freedom.

Third, the commitment to eradicate corruption and law enforcement related to violence cases perpetrated by military personnel appeared to have an upwards trend –although there is a record that the institutionalization process in the division of tasks and authority among anti-corruption institutions was still weak. Fourth, the acceptance of election results by public has progressed. The losing candidates were able to make legal proceedings in the constitutional court regarding their complaints and it was personally difficult for them to accept the presidential election results with honor. However, fair candidates have learned to embrace and welcome the winning candidate. The latter fact is regarded as a good precedent in avoiding the partisan conflicts that could potentially split between candidate supporters in political tensions and unrest.

By and large, these cases become descriptive explanations of the results of assessments reported by Freedom House and BTI. Retired officers were actively involved as political actors in all democratization processes and there is strong evidence that their role and existence did not, therefore, bring the Indonesian democratic pendulum to serious decline and return to authoritarianism.

Conclusion

This dissertation is seeking to define the role of *purnawirawan* in political parties in post-authoritarianism Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The case study examines four political parties based on the number of *purnawirawan* members in their boards and in the parliament. This research highlights *purnawirawan* participation in political contestation, in which their role as civilian politicians –even when a high degree of heterogeneity was noticeable- was still heavily influenced by the old military doctrine of being the guardian and protector of the state. In some cases, *purnawirawan* kept holding and practicing a militaristic style of leadership to manage the discipline and course of their political party.

The explanation of this dissertation is divided into three subtopics intended to test the research hypotheses. The first is the analysis of structural-historical factors that have changed the party and electoral systems; in other words, the structural factors which had significant impacts on the behavior and political choices of *purnawirawan*. The second is *purnawirawan's* engagement in party development and how they controlled party organization through central offices. The variables compared are *purnawirawan*'s control in the party management on the national level; mobilization in the legislative and executive elections; and their performance in political parties, in the parliament, and in executive positions at both national and provincial governments. The third is the evaluation of *purnawirawan's* performance in public offices that is aimed to identify their political interests in democracy.

This dissertation has found several important findings that include the existence of structural factors that generated stress –thus renegotiating the boundaries in civil-military relations, which resulted in the weakening of the bargaining position of the military to the civilian government. The following sub-sections will follow through with detailed findings and conclusion of post-authoritarian Indonesia regarding the military retirees' involvement in politics, especially in political parties.

Purnawirawan political participation

The Indonesian transition to democracy in 1998-2004 had several vulnerabilities. During this period, there were negotiations between the civilian government and the military institution that resulted in the division of authority – the negotiations whose end was a compromise for the military institution to carry

out their internal reform agendas. The military had been under the control of several government institutions –some of them even surpassed the government's authority. It has resulted in the slow progress of democratization, and it had little success in institutionalizing democratic values. Military reform in Indonesia showed a certain level of tension –military elites often came into conflicts with civilian government. The tensions did not culminate in a major confrontation or generated resistance from the military –such as a coup– although the opportunity to do so was enormous.

The findings suggest three crucial elements that served as catalysts, thus enabling dialogue in negotiating the military reform to be successfully accommodated with military purposes. First, the civilian-controlled political parties gave no restrictions to *purnawirawan* and provided them with strategic positions instead. This can be seen, for example, in the breaking of the link between the military and Golkar followed by the inclusion of moderate *purnawirawan* in the New Golkar, as well as in the inclusion of ex-military members with nationalist leaning into PDI-P. The second element is that there was a privilege for military elites to reform their institution from within. Purnawirawan's constant persuasion in the parliamentary debates on military reform resulted in the withdrawal of the military representatives in the parliament in 2004. Moreover, the internalization of political neutrality of the military was entirely handed over to the military without any interference from civilian government. The third element is the wide opportunity for the *purnawirawan* to engage in political parties, which eventually led them to found new political parties. The new parties founded or led by *purnawirawan* drove a massive mobilization of the military retirees into politics.

Purnawirawan's political choices were affected by a certain structural pressure during the change of regulations within political parties and election system, and at the same time, military reform was underway. *Purnawirawan* were not interested in exercising power over junior officers who took the military leadership as they could still control their political organizations directly in line with their personal or ideological interests. The incentives provided by political parties included strategic positions in party management, nomination as a candidate for the legislature or a post in the cabinet, state agencies and state-owned enterprises. These issues are not frequently mentioned in studies researching the impact of political reform and its relationship with the internalization of military reform. The existence of *purnawirawan* will complement previous studies that focused on how and to what extent military reform progressed and stagnated (Mietzner, 2006; Honna, 2013).

Chapter Three has discussed *purnawirawan* political participation within political parties prior to the enactment of Law 34/2004 on Indonesian Military. It is a more personalized bill of law which restricts recruitment for motives both of

loyalty and ideological similarities with the political parties. Likewise, several parties driven by New Order loyalists had their reasons to continue the political struggle of the regime. At that time, the common interests of military officers and the military institution were channeled directly through their representatives in the TNI/Polri fraction in MPR. Massive political participation occurred after 2004, during which the involvement of *purnawirawan* in political parties expanded on the campaign team of presidential elections, local elections, and legislative elections. *These findings confirmed the first hypothesis of this dissertation that the upward trend of political participation was caused by structural changes brought by military reform and a competitive multiparty system*. In this multiparty system, notable *purnawirawan* figures and political parties that were already established had the chance to survive –that is, not only to gain significant votes in elections but also to examine the consistency of the party's political line in implementing policies through their votes in parliament.

Purnawirawan in Party Development

Purnawirawan's contributions in party development have produced a typology of successful semi-militaristic parties thriving in elections. Other individuals had contributed as political mediators in the period of democratic transition. Political parties controlled by *purnawirawan* have the same compatibility level as the civilian-controlled parties do in terms of support for democracy. The case in Indonesia is unique where democratization and military reform have produced a low-risk political conflict. The negotiations in the civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Indonesia have resulted in the exodus of *purnawirawan* to political parties, which directly affected the development of these parties.

However, empirical findings regarding Gerindra revealed that party development has proven to be relatively successful in defining organizational roles of the party elites by relying on programs and strategies to maintain its consistency. The same outcome was also found in Golkar Party during the reign of Akbar Tanjung, who was able to escape from bankruptcy as a result of the pressure from *reformasi* movement. These findings clearly indicate that the *purnawirawans* have to be elaborated as important actor in party development. As civilian politicians, they have brought political agenda which needs explanation. This can be traced to the structure of opportunities and specific conditions in which political incentives can be distributed.

Regarding *this dissertation's second hypotheses on purnawirawan contribution in party development, most of their respective parties were compatible with the democratic procedures.* The acceptance of new parties founded by

purnawirawan proves that the figure of a political leader in his capacity was strong. Their recruitment within the party, as seen in Democratic Party and Gerindra, was based on the interest to control the political organization rather than the pursuit of public office. This was evident in cases in which *purnawirawan* were nominated in electoral competitions. In addition, political incentives were visible in the process of mobilizing support during presidential elections. For Democratic Party, *purnawirawan* who provided support for Yudhoyono had the particular incentive of stewardship of the party's central board.

Another factor to consider is that political parties in Indonesia were founded on the power of political elites as the fulfillment of personal ambition of their oligarch. To generalize, at the beginning of the 1998 reform, a party was founded on an ideological basis with some overlaps. Programs and strategies were developed in the formalization stage, which was the first requirement that must be met to compete in elections. This was followed by organizational development, including elite composition, governance structure, and shaping political culture of the organization. The processes of forming social and political constituency bases were conducted during the election campaign. This pattern explains the phenomenon of the proliferation of political parties and political elites, who found it easy to set up a new political party simply to create a vehicle to participate in elections.

In fact, new parties founded by *purnawirawan* did not have a solid social base. They held a position of middle party that carries the general programs –in other words, they were parties without a specific program, strategy, or agenda and took on the rather general issues existing in the society in formulating their public policies. This model rested on the party organization aiming to form a strategic socio-political and economic base without having screened against the party's main support base. Democratic Party, for example, opted for recruiting elites from various interest groups, community organizations, professional organizations, and politicians, and thus organized them as its party elite circle. The goal was for the party to have a representation of elite in various social groups. In practice, this choice had various consequences, as some members of the elite came from different social groups and represented their backgrounds in the party and used their position as an opportunity to mobilize their organization. Still, the action to build support for the party in the social group was proven to be challenging. Cultural adjustment, elite cycle, and political investments in a certain period became the factors that affected the stability of the party's support for social groups.

Support of social groups can also be attained through party organizational wings and maximizing the control of the other party organs relating to special interest groups. For instance, Gerindra created organs intended to reach all existing social forces. In addition, these organs had direct contact with professional

associations and religious organizations. An example of this network was the co-optation of the Indonesian Farmers Association (HKTI) as the largest farmers' organizations in Indonesia, partly controlled by Gerindra. The party benefitted from the co-optation of other groups that had a large number of members in labor unions. It was carried out in several labor unions in accordance with short-term political agendas. Gerindra's strategy was more effective than that adopted by Democratic Party since their party wings or organ and network were better institutionalized. Votes gained from these social and cultural constituency bases would result in a larger quantity of support in elections.

This dissertation also argues that the stage of party development was influenced by structural-historical factors –many of which were related to the underlying pre-conditions of democratization and came from the induction of force, whether it was personal or from an institutional regime of the previous period. Pre-conditions in the form of military dual function doctrinaire, political and ex-military actors, and the lingering effects inherited from the previous regime become inevitable. *Purnawirawan* actors who became board members of a civilian-controlled party found it hard to inject the values of their military doctrine into the party organization. Nonetheless, *purnawirawan* who founded their own party could follow certain constitutional procedures and adopt democratic values in building the party, although their influence was limited and they only possessed the instrument partially.

The discussions presented thus far deduct that the model of party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia was influenced by three dominant factors: (1) the determinant factor of the bureaucracy and the military against political organizations in parliamentary structures have generated the de-bureaucratization of political parties; (2) structural factors in the form of pressure from state institutions have encouraged a high level of dependency on public resources; and (3) the weakness of civil society, professional associations, and public solidarity-based organizations have contributed to the lack of supply of credible actors in the political public space.

The 1998 Reform has not resulted in a fundamental change to the structure of state institutions. In the formation process of political institutions, especially that of political parties, a new political force with strong roots in the community appeared to emerge. Only two types of parties with the traditional power base had been formed since the Old Order in 1950s, which was followed by the parties that emerged as a reaction and political restructuring of the New Order period in the late 1960s. Parties that emerged and gained the vote in several rounds of elections included Democratic Party in the 2009 election, which took a segment of floating voters. An exception to this rule was PKS, which arose from the *Tarbiyah* movement

and represented new forces of political Islam in a manner analogous to those in Egypt and Turkey. Although it was not found in a higher degree, the homogenized type of party organization models was evident, such as that in the cases of the new democracies in Europe, where parties changed to adapt to the principles of another party of the same type (Biezen, 2005).

An important note on democratic value acceptance within political party controlled by *purnawirawan* is the emergence of militaristic party in Indonesia's democratization after 1998. It was influenced by the presence of traditional leadership in the parties that were commonly leader-centric where the parties survived by relying on the charisma of their leaders. Examples of this kind of party are PDI-P and PKB with the characteristics of possessing certain traditional constituency basis and a high degree of patron-clientelism. In the organization, party cadres or mass-based parties that relied on charismatic leaders did not have good organizational management capacity.

Another factor is the inclusion of *purnawirawan*s with their military traditions and values into the party. The combination of these two factors was implemented in various forms in each party. The use of militaristic values as a model of party organization in Gerindra was not merely symbolic but also served as the political strategy in raising the party's profile. Party structure with tiered hierarchy and chain of command has generated a high level of party discipline. They used infiltration-style intelligence as the pattern to broaden the support base of the constituency through partisan wing organizations and bodies such as HKTI and multiple labor organs at the national level.

The harsh sanctions for violations of ethical administration was able to produce "obedient" cadres and MPs. Support for the party constitution was the central role of the Board of Trustees, which was controlled by the majority of *purnawirawan* and further strengthened this party as a successful semi-military party. Unlike Gerindra, Democratic Party has preferred to mobilize *purnawirawan* only during the time of presidential election. The internal party controls involved more civilian politicians loyal to Yudhoyono. Those who chose to engage in mobilization during presidential elections did so based on their desire to gain political incentives, rather than to safeguard the interests of their tactical and strategic ideology. Some indications of this strategy were evident in the political incentives given to sit in strategic positions in the Board of Trustees after the presidential election was over. In larger numbers, they were projected to fill strategic posts within the state-owned enterprises, as well as in the ministries or as deputies in other state institutions.

There has been little indication that *purnawirawan* tried to continue or help delivering the military political agendas through their political parties. Similarly,

there is no evidence that they aimed to build special relationship with the military institution directly in their attempt to potentially hamper democratization. First, there has been no direct connection or command chain between *purnawirawan* and military institutions that could be used for repression of the political process. Second, within the national government, they were appointed to public office in the ministry and were not motivated to restore the authoritarian regime. Third, in subnational politics, those who served as governor had political orientations that were not remarkably different from that of civilian politicians who focused on the development of the economy and public welfare. Fourth, none of them would choose to act against democratic procedures. These arguments indicate that the role of the individual in democratization was very limited.

Nevertheless, several important findings may reveal the role and contribution of *purnawirawan* in democratization through political parties. They were able to ensure that party was more highly centralized and managed in a way that incorporated a number of militaristic values. This had a direct consequence on the failure of the institutionalization of political parties that aimed to become more democratic. *Purnawirawan* maintained control dominance in the management of a party through vertical control as they influenced the highest authority in the party leadership or through horizontal intervention that was able to achieve full control of the party faction in the parliament. This approach has resulted in a higher level of discipline, even if this management model has resulted in a lack of party cadres representing civilian groups which could "color" the party and its political policies broadly. The *purnawirawan* also held the position as the owners of the party. They buttressed the oligarchs retaining control of the party (although oligarchs' control was in some cases limited) and were open to negotiations with civilian groups in the party.

Purnawirawan influx into political parties has two important consequences. First, their existence has potentially reduced the possibility for a coup by military elites against the democratic government. They played the role as mediator between the interests of the political parties and the military. On the other hand, the party served to function as a platform for the development of the political career of retired military elites. This came to be one of the consequences of the uniqueness of democratization in Indonesia, where the retired military elite chose the constitutional path and became engaged in democratic procedures. Second, *purnawirawan* also played a role in the party development by integrating militaristic values to the party they founded but this is not much contributed in civilian-controlled parties. Both consequences arose because the acceptance of *purnawirawan* into politics might look contradictory to the common democratic

procedure unless an acceptance of democratic values in the party management followed suit.

Transforming Military Interest in Public Office

The success of *purnawirawan's* political parties has led to a new, unique phenomenon in that their involvement in the construction of the party has resulted in a new model of party organization. *This study disproved the third hypotheses that purnawirawan performance in public office is dominated by their interest to continue military doctrine to influence state decision-making.* Their involvement in the founding of a political party has created a new character, in which values, doctrines, and military strategy were transformed in the party development and organization. This dissertation's search for role of *purnawirawan's* understanding on military interest appeared only on the viewpoint of the discussions or legislation debates in parliament. They possessed expertise in technical discussions, lobby, and deploying patterns of support in the formulation of policies or legislation related to the military's role in the context of national defense. The *purnawirawan* strengthened civilian control over the military in discussions of legislation. Furthermore, during the presidential elections, they used military strategy, both in conventional warfare and in intelligence. In PDI-P and Golkar for example, they held positions as campaign strategists and political mobilizers of social support from constituent bases. In general, in a civilian-controlled party, they did not have the capacity to engage in the development of political parties, so that their role and function were very limited.

Despite organizational management and party discipline still retaining so-called military look, there has been no strong evidence that the *purnawirawan* directly concerned with bringing policy, voiced either through parliamentary or extra-parliamentary, to reverse the democratization process. In the case of Democratic Party, the Yudhoyono administration during the 2004-2014 coalition occupied the majority of parliamentary seats that yielded potential policies to encourage democratization. In other cases, such as Gerindra, the latter even appeared as the most transparent financial reporting party. The transformation of militaristic discipline in Gerindra has restored the pattern of the relationship between the military and political parties directly rather than emphasized the military values and doctrines that *purnawirawan* brought and actualized in non-military organizations such as political parties.

In parties like Gerindra, the *purnawirawan* control has the consequence of a soft-authoritarianism tone promoted by *purnawirawan's* hard line political actors. Military values and its basic character were not even visible in parties' policy direction and governance, most likely because the civilian politicians were also

significant as the counterweight to the aggressiveness of *purnawirawan* in controlling the party. Indonesian parties' character was leader-centric and such a characteristic was not limited to the *purnawirawan*-founded parties, since the clientelism model dominates almost all parties in Indonesia. It is argued that this model has high correlation with electoral competition (Tomsa, 2012). It has become a separate habit that parties relying on charismatic leaders were largely successful because it satisfies the constituents who wanted a strong leadership model. PDI-P, Gerindra, and Democratic Party have centralized the power and authority as embodied in the central figure and the party control. The figures have been in power for a long time and have always been reelected in each congress. Thus, we can conclude that they were the party owners.

Why did democratization fail to produce a political party that managed to be more accountable to the pattern of a democratic leadership? This dissertation has shown interesting findings that in parties, either controlled by civilian politicians or *purnawirawan*, the establishment of party structures was deliberately intended to strengthen the centralized control at the central level management. No party authority was decentralized to the local level due to the extremely domineering authority of the national elites. The institutionalization of democratic values into parties was limited to election procedures for board chairmen, as well as conventions for presidential candidates. The party owners were very interested in maintaining their authority by creating oligarchic circles in charge of ensuring support for their leadership. Of the three existing parties, only Golkar was relatively more dynamic due to the natural structure of the party organization which consists of various party factions with a significant supporting force. Thus, Golkar has a better circulation of elite cycle.

Indonesia's democratic transition regime has been supported by civilian governments, which was able to survive despite its weaknesses. This is different from the weak governance that is vulnerable to military takeover. Indeed, in general, post-authoritarian democracy tends to produce a weak civilian government due to the strength of the military organization and political interests of the still-dominant military elite, resulting in a slow transition to democracy. However, support for workers or civil society groups did not take place, thus failing to bring strong civil society groups capable of creating opposition against the government outside of parliament. Moreover, the most strategic positions in the field of defense, security, and intelligence were still occupied by military figures. In this process, it is essential to account for negotiations for military support by showing their role.

So far, *purnawirawan*'s influence in parties has not produced party de-politicization, as occurred during the reign of Suharto. This was due to the limited infrastructure support provided by them after leaving military institutions. Hence,

they could not internalize the military reform that did not allow the use of military facilities to support *purnawirawan* political agenda. This resulted in the absence of demilitarization efforts in the government, which took place within the political society instead. Uniquely, and paradoxically enough, the process was accompanied by the democratization of civil society in the region. This contrasts with the findings reported by Rouquie (1986) and Pion-Berlin (1992), who demonstrated that, in Latin America, democratization and demilitarization took place in the state and civil society, thus making the relationship between elite civilian and military leaders difficult. However, in Indonesia's case, there was no coercion by the military in achieving political objectives, or at least, in the negotiation process of military reform. The reasons behind military intervention in the politics included the need to protect the business interest and power to control the state, as well as consolidation of civilian politicians who failed to secure control over the chain of public institutions and government inviting entry of a range of hard military interventions. This may become commonplace if, later on, the military took over the reins of governance in the name of national order. Failure of civic leaders and citizens in gaining political legitimacy causes the state to experience vacuum state (Lee, 2000).

Personal relationships created in the hierarchy of military command must be examined. As is widely known, the military has strong ésprit de corps, so that even when retired, members still believe in the emotional relationships and organizational factors they learned from the military institutions. This must be examined, along with rotation and appointment of military officers in strategic positions. In the New Order era, this resulted in the decision to appoint officers in given position on the Board for the Appointment and Rank of Senior Officers. Suharto thus determined all proposals that went through a senior officer. In Habibie era, the system was not much different, as only the president could grant the right to be involved in the appointment or military positions. Analysis of the internal conditions of the military does need to take into account the factors that in many cases it was shown that the internal military promote many interests, especially if faced with a pattern of senior relationships and how officers at the lowest level could establish good relations in order to secure their interests and positions (Chandra & Kamen, 2002). In general, however, their contribution in supporting *purnawirawan* infrastructure was not sufficiently significant. The party that suffered from demilitarization and change in organizational values did not emerge from the pressures of structural or economic dynamics.

A particularly interesting factor is the cause of the power reconfiguration of the political society, especially within the parties controlled by civilian politicians and *purnawirawan* consolidation within the parties that they oversaw. This has

resulted in the mobilization of political forces at the time of the presidential elections. Elections are not attractive to *purnawirawan*, who are not motivated to garner mobilization support, except in matters of placing them as legislative candidates. Soft-authoritarianism in political institutions as appeared in most of the organizational structures of parties in Indonesia also has a considerable impact. While it did not have major impact to the state, the effect was sufficient to give a clear indication that the party characterized by hardline oligarchy would metamorphose due to the need for gaining more power. The dominance of the political elite supported by figures and organizational strength, as shown in PDI-P, Gerindra, and Democratic Party, revealed that the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia was driven by the accountability of political parties. Post-2004, political parties were more inclined to acquire the state that raises fears of partitocracy. In this case, the strength lied in the parties' resources, plus a heavy reliance on sources of funding available from the state. So the evidence is that even if the process was not straightforward, it was done officially through state subsidies for political parties. These conditions enable the parties that have gained positions of power in politics to exploit the state resources for their own electoral interests. These symptoms of a state party were not immediately apparent because there are two models of the distribution of state resources, that is, through the executive government and through the parliament.

The power fragmentation of the political elite that became part of the New Order regime supporters had significant control within the political parties, Golkar in particular. On the other hand, most of *purnawirawan* turned to Democratic Party and Gerindra. The domination of elite control in the political elite circle of the party led to the slow change in the increased accountability of the party, which had a direct impact on performance in public office. In the end, democracy was exclusively driven by actors who managed political organization under an oligarchic system, as accountability in public office could not materialize properly. It is consistent with the characteristics of exclusive democracy, if some of the criteria of the electoral regime (but not its democratic core and substance) have been violated, and delegative democracy did not work, while the principle of horizontal accountability has been reduced or abolished (Puhle, 2005; Croissant & Merkel, 2004). It is interesting to consider how parties contributed to vertical accountability. In the case of Indonesia, especially in the transitional period until 2004, delegative democracy referred to the performance of President Wahid. Such condition has put Indonesia in the category of delegative democracy or, in terms of Katz and Mair, a collusive democracy. Similarly, Slater (2004) argued that the emergence of Yudhoyono in 2004 has opened up the opportunity to strengthen representative structural politics. Accountability refers to the need to be part of the collusive system that

attempts to fix it –that is, to open up space and strengthen vertical accountability opposition. Nonetheless, there are still concerns that a large military intervention was possible.

It should be emphasized that the definition of soft authoritarianism is not the general condition of democracy in Indonesia, but rather the conditions that occurred within the major political parties. The effects of *purnawirawan's* role in the political parties they founded have produced soft-authoritarianism organizations. However, it cannot be demonstrated that soft authoritarianism has direct implications on the formulation of policy and political position of the party in legislation. Nevertheless, in the long term, this could have the potential to transform the strategic value in the policy platform and could have implications for democratization.

The theoretical framework used in this dissertation contributes to clarifying the role of *purnawirawan* in political parties and how they worked in the context of democratization in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Moreover, the methodological approach provides that analysis options are compatible in a separate categorization of *purnawirawan* in political competition and the extent of the structural and historical factors affect the dynamics of change and the behavior of actors. Evidences given through descriptive analysis in this dissertation may provide reinforcement of the findings in the discussion of various chapters on related topic. It shows the important finding that there is a structural, causation relationship between the role of the actors and party development, which includes the organization and its institutionalization with regime performance in democratization. It rejects the argument that the institutionalization of the party as a result of the party system should be analyzed separately from democracy (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2014).

Finally, this dissertation is expected to contribute to at least four studies. First is the contribution to Indonesian studies. In the study of the role of military retirees, this study contributes to a further explanation at their political participation beyond presidential elections as studies by Soesilo (2013) and Lee (2015) have shown. This study reveals their important role in the development of party organization where the main finding is that the participation of *purnawirawan* is part of efforts to safeguard their interests and existence as state guardians, not in their capacity as members of the military but as civilian politicians. This dissertation provides a clearer picture that democratization in Indonesia is imbued with transformational model of military elite that is leaning towards civilian politician, both in their capacity as the backbones of political parties and public officials. This role cannot be simply disregarded because empirical studies have proven that their important role can make democratization work.

Second, the dissertation contributes to the comparative study of democratization. In this study, an important and reinforcing finding is that the

process of democratic transition and consolidation was determined by the important actors who had belonged to the military elite of the previous authoritarian regime. In the case of Indonesia, when the military elites of the ruling group of the New Order authoritarian regime were stripped off their political authority, the military retired officers transformed into civilian politician and established a unique model of political party organization as a constitutional political force to compete in elections. This transformation model took a unique place because military retirees have combined their military paradigm into civilian politician leadership regarding the respect for the values of democratization. No similar example is found in other post-authoritarian countries, either those successful with their democratization or those returning to the electoral authoritarianism pendulum.

Third, the dissertation contributes to the study of civil-military relations. Discussions in this area have always been based on two forces: diametrically cultivated democratic civilian leaders and military actors' political interests. There has been no sufficient explanation on the role of former generals or high-ranking officers in the transition and consolidation process of democracy. It may shed some light on how to map their political power and analyze the polarization of their networks inside military institutions or within civilian groups. This study contributes to explaining the role of military retirees as intermediary actors in the formal communications between civilian government and military institution in parliamentary debate to legislation, implementing the law on the military and security sector reform. The existence of retired officers within political parties, parliament, and other state agencies has empirically made discussions, lobbying, and negotiations under the framework of military reform more manageable.

Fourth, the contribution in the study and research on political party generate findings about political party organization development model that involves a dominance of military retirees. They become the face of the parties' character and they have brought upon a particular militaristic style –but more than that, they were able to carry the demands of democratization with broad support. This unique party-building model has put the military retirees' contribution to democratization in a new contradiction. On the one hand, they hold the role of mediators in negotiations between the civilian government and military institutions. On the other hand, they were able to control the value of soft authoritarianism inside their party.

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Appendix

1. Interview questionnaire

A. For Civilian Politician

Main Question	Target Information
Can you tell about the role of retired military in the internal party organization?	1. Pattern of retired recruitment into political parties 2. Description of the situation and the needs of the party against retired military 3. The role and strategic position given to military retirees 4. Performance and contribution in the party organization.
How important are their contributions during the election?	1. Utilization of expertise and networks of military network in the winning of elections. 2. Organizational model and campaign strategy in the election. 3. The effectiveness and results achieved in the implementation of winning strategies in the election
How they perform in executive positions (whether in cabinet, province or district / city)	1. Leadership model in public office 2. Attention and network with previous military colleagues and branch/corps 3.Democratic view in the aspects of socio-political and economic development.
To what extent are their contributions in the formulation of legislation in the DPR?	1. Commitment to agendas related to military reform, changes in political institutions and national economic stability 2. Maximizing their position given by the party in the DPR commission is adjusted to the background of its expertise 3. Coordination mechanism between party and its position as member of DPR or fraction.
In your opinion, in general, what is the contribution of retired military in the democratization of Indonesia?	

B. For Purnawirawan

Main Question	Optional
Can you tell about the role of retired military in internal party organization?	1. Description of the influence of the military institution against their role in political parties 2. Description of the effect of their participation in politics. 3.The strategic role played in the party stewardship
What are the important contributions of retired military in the process of winning elections?	1. The use of military networks for organizing and mobilizing voter support. 2.Pattern of coordination and relationship with civilian politicians.
Is military doctrine still used in leading executive positions (whether in cabinet, province or district / city)	1. Military *dwifungsi* doctrine in the management of civilian government. 2. Relationship with their political party. 3. Democratic view in the aspects of socio-political and economic development.
To what extent are their contributions in the formulation of legislation in the DPR?	1. Position within the fraction and commission membership in DPR RI 2. Contribution in the formulation and debate of legislation on military reform, bureaucratic reform, and other legislation relating to socio-political affairs, economic, defense and security, human rights
In your opinion, in general, what is the contribution of retired military in the democratization of Indonesia?	

2. Indonesian Democracy Index Methods

3. Indonesian Governance Index

INDONESIA GOVERNANCE INDEX

GOVERNMENT

- PARTICIPATION
- FAIRNESS
- ACCOUNTABILITY
- TRANSPARENCY
- EFFICIENCY
- EFFECTIVENESS

INDICATOR

BUREAUCRACY

- PARTICIPATION
- FAIRNESS
- ACCOUNTABILITY
- TRANSPARENCY
- EFFICIENCY
- EFFECTIVENESS

INDICATOR

CIVIL SOCIETY

- PARTICIPATION
- FAIRNESS
- ACCOUNTABILITY
- TRANSPARENCY
- EFFICIENCY
- EFFECTIVENESS

INDICATOR

ECONOMIC SOCIETY

- PARTICIPATION
- FAIRNESS
- ACCOUNTABILITY
- TRANSPARENCY
- EFFICIENCY
- EFFECTIVENESS

INDICATOR

4. Vote and Seat in Parliament

Election 2009

	Political Parties	Vote	% Vote	Seat
1	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat	3.922.870	3,77%	17
2	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	1.461.182	1,40%	
3	Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia	745.625	0,72%	
4	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional	1.260.794	1,21%	
5	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya	4.646.406	4,46%	26
6	Partai Barisan Nasional	761.086	0,73%	
7	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	934.892	0,90%	
8	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	8.206.955	7,88%	57
9	Partai Amanat Nasional	6.254.580	6,01%	46
10	Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru	197.371	0,19%	
11	Partai Kedaulatan	437.121	0,42%	
12	Partai Persatuan Daerah	550.581	0,53%	
13	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	5.146.122	4,94%	28
14	Partai Pemuda Indonesia	414.043	0,40%	
15	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme	316.752	0,30%	
16	Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan	896.660	0,86%	
17	Partai Karya Perjuangan	351.440	0,34%	
18	Partai Matahari Bangsa	414.750	0,40%	
19	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	139.554	0,13%	
20	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan	669.417	0,64%	
21	Partai Republika Nusantara	630.780	0,61%	
22	Partai Pelopor	342.914	0,33%	
23	Partai Golongan Karya	15.037.757	14,45%	106
24	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	5.533.214	5,32%	38
25	Partai Damai Sejahtera	1.541.592	1,48%	
26	Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia	468.696	0,45%	
27	Partai Bulan Bintang	1.864.752	1,79%	
28	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	14.600.091	14,03%	94
29	Partai Bintang Reformasi	1.264.333	1,21%	
30	Partai Patriot	547.351	0,53%	
31	Partai Demokrat	21.703.137	20,85%	148
32	Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia	324.553	0,31%	
33	Partai Indonesia Sejahtera	320.665	0,31%	
34	Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama	1.527.593	1,47%	
41	Partai Merdeka	111.623	0,11%	
42	Partai Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	146.779	0,14%	
43	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	140.551	0,14%	
44	Partai Buruh	265.203	0,25%	
	Total Votes	104.099.785	100,00%	560

Parliament 1999						Parliament 2004				
No.	Political Parties	Seat	% Seat	$(s_i)^2$		No.	Political Parties	Seat	% Seat	$(s_i)^2$
1.	PDIP	153	33,12%	0,109673		1.	GOLKAR	128	23,27%	0,054149
2.	Golkar	120	25,97%	0,067465		2.	PDIP	109	19,82%	0,039283
3.	PPP	58	12,55%	0,015761		3.	PPP	58	10,55%	0,01113
4.	PKB	51	11,04%	0,012186		4.	DEMOKRAT	57	10,36%	0,010733
5.	PAN	34	7,36%	0,005416		5.	PAN	52	9,45%	0,00893
6.	PBB	13	2,81%	0,000792		6.	PKB	52	9,45%	0,00893
7.	Partai Keadilan	7	1,52%	0,00023		7.	PKS	45	8,18%	0,006691
8.	PKP	4	0,87%	0,000075		8.	PBR	13	2,36%	0,000557
9.	PNU	5	1,08%	0,000117		9.	PDS	12	2,18%	0,000475
10.	PDKB	5	1,08%	0,000117		10.	PBB	11	2,00%	0,000400
11.	PBI	1	0,22%	0,000005		11.	PDK	5	0,91%	0,000083
12.	PDI	2	0,43%	0,000019		12.	PKPB	2	0,36%	0,000013
13.	PP	1	0,22%	0,000005		13.	PELOPOR	2	0,36%	0,000013
14.	PDR	1	0,22%	0,000005		14.	PNI	1	0,18%	0,000003
15.	PSII	1	0,22%	0,000005		15.	PNBK	1	0,18%	0,000003
16.	PNI Front Marhaenis	1	0,22%	0,000005		16.	PKPI	1	0,18%	0,000003
17.	PNI Massa Marhaen	1	0,22%	0,000005		17.	PPDI	1	0,18%	0,000003
18.	IPKI	1	0,22%	0,000005						
19.	PKU	1	0,22%	0,000005						
20.	Masyumi	1	0,22%	0,000005						
21.	PKD	1	0,22%	0,000005						
22-48	Not gained seat in parliament: PNI Supeni, Krisna, Partai KAMI, PUI, PAY, Partai Republik, Partai MKGR, PIB, Partai SUNI, PCD, ÜSII 1905, Masyumi Baru, PNBI, PUDI, PBN, PKM, PND, PADI, PRD, PPI. PID, Murba, SPSI, PUMI, PSP, PARI, PILAR					18-24.	Not gained seat in parliament: PBSD, MERDEKA, PIB, PNUI, PANCASILA, PSI and PPD			
Total		462	100,00%	0,211896		Total		550	100,00%	0,141401
			ENPP	4,71929					ENPP	7,072067

Parliament 2009				
	Political Parties	Seat	% Seat	(S) ²
1	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat	17	0,0304	0,00092
2	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya	26	0,0464	0,00216
3	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	57	0,1018	0,01036
4	Partai Amanat Nasional	46	0,0821	0,00675
5	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	28	0,0500	0,00250
6	Partai Golongan Karya	106	0,1893	0,03583
7	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	38	0,0679	0,00460
8	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	94	0,1679	0,02818
9	Partai Demokrat	148	0,2643	0,06985
	Total	560	1,0000	0,16114
			ENPP	6,20572

Parliament 2014					
Political Parties	Vote	% Vote	Seat	% Seat	%(S) ²
PDI-P	23.681.471	19,41%	109	19,46%	3,79%
GOLKAR	18.432.312	15,11%	91	16,25%	2,64%
GERINDRA	14.760.371	12,10%	73	13,04%	1,70%
DEMOKRAT	12.728.913	10,43%	61	10,89%	1,19%
PAN	9.481.621	7,77%	49	8,75%	0,77%
PKB	11.298.957	9,26%	47	8,39%	0,70%
PKS	8.480.204	6,95%	40	7,14%	0,51%
PPP	8.157.488	6,69%	39	6,96%	0,49%
NASDEM	8.402.812	6,89%	35	6,25%	0,39%
HANURA	6.579.498	5,39%	16	2,86%	0,08%
TOTAL	122.003.647		560	∑	12,25%
				ENPP	8,16

5. Voting in Parliament

LocEl: Local Election 2014			*ELaw: Electoral Law 2009*				*EVList: Electoral Voter List 2009*			
Party Fraction	Yes	No	Party Fraction	Yes	No	Abstain	Party Fraction	Yes	No	Abstain
Golkar	11	73	PDIP	0	59	0	PKB	16	1	1
PDIP	88	0	BPD	4	1	1	PPP	11	0	0
PKS	0	55	PG	44	4	6	PAN	3	0	0
PAN	0	44	PPP	22	2	1	PKS	0	22	0
PPP	0	32	PD	44	0	0	PDIP	58	0	0
PKB	20	0	PAN	16	0	2	PD	0	43	0
Gerindra	0	22	PKS	19	0	0	PG	34	0	0
Hanura	10	0	PKB	24	0	0	BPD	6	0	0
Demokrat	6	0	PBR	5	0	0	PBR	0	5	0
TOTAL	135	226	PDS	8	1	0	PDS	1	2	0
			Total	186	67	10	Total	129	73 1	1

National Budget on Oil Price 2013				Century Case 2013				*Society Organization 2013*			
Party Fraction	Yes	No	Abstain	Party Fraction	Yes	No	Abstain	Party Fraction	Yes	No	Abstain
Hanura	9	0	0	Hanura	0	14	0	Hanura	0	6	0
Gerindra	15	0	0	Gerindra	0	25	0	Gerindra	0	18	0
PKB	18	0	0	PKB	23	0	0	PKB	10	0	0
PPP	0	26	0	PPP	34	0	0	PPP	22	0	0
PAN	24	0	0	PAN	40	0	0	PAN	0	26	0
PKS	38	0	0	PKS	0	51	0	PKS	35	0	0
PDIP	79	0	0	PDIP	0	91	0	PDIP	62	0	0
PG	65	0	0	PD	143	0	0	PD	107	0	0
Total	248	26	0	PG	0	98	0	PG	75	0	0
				Total	240	279	0	Total	311	50	0