Tibetan Grammar

Si tu Paṇchen and the Tibetan adoption of linguistic knowledge from India

vorgelegt von: Mag. Alexander Graf

Contents

Notes to the Reader

This dissertation investigates the classical Tibetan case model based on Si tu Paṇchen's *Great Commentary* (*Si tu'i 'grel chen*). Due to its historical and linguistic limitations (cf. chapter 1.2), this research is not intended to be a final word on all the historical and conceptual matters surrounding classical Tibetan case grammar. The main purpose of the current work is to raise awareness that this area of Tibetan intellectual history deserves closer attention with regard to both our understanding of Tibetan grammatical models in particular and Tibetan scholastic knowledge production in general. The following notes should be borne in mind by the reader to facilitate the reading and navigation of this dissertation.

Terminological notes:

A general note needs to be made on the use of the term 'academia' and its adjective 'academic' in this work. This notion exclusively refers to a certain methodological approach developed, practiced and shared in a specific institutionalized framework, typically universities and related research institutions. In the context of linguistics, chapter 5.2 provides more material on how such a conceptual and methodological approach has been conceived in this work. By and large, I tried to reduce the use of both terms and provide more specific references in terms of works and authors to avoid misleading generalizations, but certain contexts require a more general reference whenever theories or approaches cannot be reduced to only a single or few authors. It only needs to be emphasized that the distinction between academic and non-academic is by no means intended to express any sense of inferiority or superiority, nor is it meant to denounce, nor criticize academic or non-academic practices. Moreover, references to academia or academic methodologies always need to be regarded as relative and treated cautiously: first, there is no full agreement and consequently no absolute homogeneity within the academic sphere of knowledge production; second, the boundaries between academic and non-academic approaches are fluid and shaded.

Likewise, 'tradition' is intended as a general reference to entities which can be demarcated through linguistic, historical and other parameters that establish a certain continuity or contact between the participants of a tradition. In the present dissertation, the use of this notion is more a pragmatic solution rather than a strict historical theory applied to phenomena under investigation. Typically, a tradition in the sense referred to here exhibits some form of self-perception of its homogeneity (e.g. through sharing a language, through being part of the same institutional, political or other entity, or through reference to certain authoritative text corpora)

or such a perception is imposed by others. However, this means neither that a tradition is a closed off realm nor that a tradition lacks heterogeneity. In fact, both the features of extra-traditional influx and heterogeneity are at the very center of this dissertation. In case of the 'Tibetan tradition', for example, I refer to the time frame from the 7th to – in our case – the 18th century, in which a variety of scholars have shared the same written form of Tibetan language and in which specific forms and means of knowledge production have been developed and maintained, which continue to exist in Tibetan monastic education even today. In contrast, the 'Tibetan grammatical tradition' is concerned with the topic of grammar, which in certain contexts could be further distinguished. 'Sanskritic tradition' refers only very generally to those scholarly circles in which Sanskritic literature was produced and which acted as a common reference for Tibetan scholars. Thus, it needs to be emphasized that in this dissertation 'tradition' does not convey any notion of traditionalism or opposition to modernity and innovation, nor does it express the stagnation or end of a tradition.

Speaking of the 'classical Tibetan case model' or the 'classical eight Tibetan cases' in this dissertation requires two specifications. First, the term 'classical' is simply a general reference to the eightfold case scheme as presented in chapter 5 (cf. e.g. figure 4). Its main purpose is to distinguish this very model from other forms of Tibetan case grammar developed in modern academia or elsewhere. Additionally, it indicates that this model enjoyed acceptance, renown and authority in a Tibetan scholastic environment from the early times up to the present. However, this term should not obscure the fact that there are noteworthy variations in the conceptions of this scheme throughout the centuries. The term remains historically and linguistically entirely neutral regarding any preferences, superiority or inferiority compared to other forms of grammatical knowledge production. Secondly, the term 'Tibetan' does not refer primarily to the language under investigation in this model but to the scholarly sphere in which it was developed. In fact, as will be discussed in chapter 5.1 and further demonstrated throughout part II, the classical Tibetan case model was commonly understood to not be restricted to Tibetan language. However, this does not change the fact that the classical Tibetan case model has been used in grammatical sources as a valid analytical tool for the description of Tibetan language-specific structures.

In this dissertation, the attribute 'Sanskritic' indicates that a source, theory, literature, etc. has been composed in Sanskrit and goes back to the Sanskritic tradition in which Sanskrit language is the means of knowledge production. The attribute 'Sanskrit' indicates the topic under investigation. Thus, 'Sanskritic grammar' is the study of grammar as conducted in Sanskrit

language by Indian grammarians, whereas 'Sanskrit grammar' refers to the study of grammar concerned with Sanskrit language which may also be conducted by Tibetan grammarians and others. As is evident from the above definition of 'tradition', the demarcation between Sanskritic and non-Sanskritic scholars is blurry in certain contexts, since, for example, we know of Tibetan scholars such as Si tu Paṇchen who studied in South Asia and composed Sanskrit works. We also know of Indian scholars such as Smṛtijñānakīrti who lived in Tibet, translated Sanskrit sources and composed Tibetan works. In any event, the two attributes 'Sanskritic' and 'Sanskrit' are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. Therefore, it is a matter of emphasis which of these two aspects weighs more important in an argument or investigation. I have restricted the use of 'Sanskritic' to emphasize Sanskritic origins when important in the relationship between Tibetan knowledge production and Sanskritic authority. However, this is more a matter of scope and sometimes personal preference, and there remain instances where both attributes, Sanskrit or Sanskritic, can be used more or less interchangeably.

Technical notes:

To avoid confusion regarding the quotation of Si tu's works, all references are based on his collected works published by Sherab Gyaltsen in 1990. While the *Great Commentary* contained in volume 6 has been quoted only by providing the title's initials followed by the folio number and the first line (e.g. GC 450.6), all the remaining sources quoted from his collected works are without initials, but rather contain the volume number followed by the folio and first line (e.g. 6.442.5).

The two root texts *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa* which are the foundation of Si tu's commentary have been fully reproduced in the Appendix of this work. The cited versions of both texts are not those contained in Si tu's *Great Commentary* but are based on Si tu's separate edition which is also included in volume 6 of his collected works.

In the context of the translation of Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, several renditions of terms and phrases are frequently provided to offer alternative readings of passages and point out different possible nuances and emphases. They are indicated by the use of slashes (/). Since parts of the classification of Tibetan case markers remain problematic also in modern linguistic research, the use of slashes such as in INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or BENEFICIARY/DIRECTION equally indicates possible alternative categorizations whenever more detailed linguistic research was deemed to be required.

The Abbreviations and Bibliography explain and reference short forms as well as alternative names of authors and works to resolve possible confusions and avoid wrong associations of names and titles quoted in this dissertation.

<u>General note:</u>

A general note is required on the form and structure of this dissertation. The chapters of the main part II follow the traditional order of the Tibetan cases in order to provide a comprehensive and referenceable account of each of them which responds to open issues and questions in modern discourses. Following this approach, the study frequently offers a variety of historical, conceptual and linguistic options of explaining and understanding certain developments in order to avoid misinterpretation and imposition. Open questions or issues in the examination of theories are frequently indicated and delineated rather than conclusively resolved. Wherever applicable, it is made clear that the investigation is more speculative in nature than evidence-based due to the current state of research.

At times, the chosen sequence and structure of chapters interfere with a coherent and straightforward presentation of the major arguments in the dissertation, particularly in those instances where the investigation pursues the different historical, linguistic, philological and conceptual details connected to the cases. As a consequence, this dissertation may here and there give the impression of a work in progress. This was – at least in part – intended, because I see this approach as more representative of and responsive to the current state of research and the limitations outlined in chapters 1.1 and 1.2 respectively.

However, the work has the strong ambition to present a representative account of Tibetan case grammar and those dynamics which shaped its transformation in relation to Sanskritic authoritative knowledge. It introduces thus far unstudied material and opens new avenues towards ways of reading and studying Tibetan grammatical sources – rather than having the final word on it. While the unpolished, preliminary character of this study may at times cause dissatisfaction in the reader, it is my sincere hope that this feeling will equally evoke the audience's motivation to contribute further research on both sides, historical and linguistic, so that more conclusive answers will complement, refine and correct the present work wherever necessary.

Acknowledgements

Although written by a single hand, this work cannot claim to be the result of only a single mind's efforts.

I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my first supervisor, Birgit Kellner, who not only endorsed my project from the very beginning and repeatedly supported its completion, but whose critical feedback was invaluable to this work. Her historical expertise and scientific standards have been a true guidance as well as yardstick for my engagement in the historical intricacies of Tibetan grammaticography. Due to Professor Kellner's help, I was also able to get in touch with Peter Verhagen, whose work and expertise in the field of Tibetan grammatical studies contributed numerous vital insights to my thinking. The conversations with him, his continuous feedback and affirmation not only improved this dissertation substantially, but truly encouraged its progress on the long road towards completion. His kindness and humility have been a strong inspiration.

I wish to thank Markus Viehbeck, my friend and colleague. Markus encouraged me in 2012 to apply for the Graduate Programme for Transcultural Studies at Heidelberg University with this PhD project.

In the winter term of the following year, Jonathan Samuels kindly dedicated an entire course to my project in which I was offered the opportunity to present my early research and read selected textual materials together with him and Markus Viehbeck. The discussion of the highly technical materials contained in Tibetan grammatical sources and the reading of selected difficult passages together with these two expert Tibetan scholars was an important support for my work that I wish to mention here.

A year later I was granted permission to study at the Central University of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath as an affiliate, where I attended classes on Tibetan grammar for several months. Among the many helping hands that supported me during this visit, I wish to express special thanks to Venerable Lhakpa Tsering, who was my main teacher, as well as Tenzin Ghegay, who was a devoted host, knowledgeable tutor and a true friend.

To write a dissertation is often quickly decided, but never easily done. I am thus deeply indebted to my family – my wife, son, parents and sisters – for their help, especially in those times when I felt the load of this PhD most intensely. This dissertation would not have been possible without their continuous support and love.

I sincerely thank all other persons and institutions who actively supported the completion of this work, including Dennis Johnson, who accepted the painstaking task of proof-reading my work and helping me with my English, as well as Prof. Michael Radich, who agreed to step in last-minute as my second supervisor.

Finally, mention needs to be made that this work is but the collected result of all the included works, primary sources and research literature, and thus of all the dedicated minds that contributed to and participated in Tibetan grammatical studies and their investigation. Regardless of any agreement or disagreement, I wish to pay my utmost respect and express my sincere gratitude to all the past and present scholars who worked in this field. They have certainly shaped my understanding of grammatical studies in Tibet, and thus the outcome of this dissertation.

As for any remaining errors, inaccuracies or issues in this dissertation, I claim full responsibility.

Abbreviations

AK	*Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu.
AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu.
C	*Cāndravyākaraṇa* of Candragomin. See Liebich 1902 and 1918.
c.	circa.
CG	Corpus of Sanskrit Grammatical literature in Tibetan canon (numbered 1-47). This term together with its abbreviation has been adopted from HSGLT 1 and 2.
CT	*Comparative Tengyur* (= *Bstan 'gyur dpe bsdur ma*). See Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang 1994-2008. CT has been quoted with the volume (italicized), followed by a dash and the page number, e.g. CT *115* – 110.
GNT	*Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa* presumably by Lce Khyi 'brug (?). See Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang 1994-2008 (= CT), vol. 115.
GC	*Great Commentary* (= *Si tu'i 'grel chen*), i.e. *Yul gangs can pa'i brda yang dag par sbyor ba'i bstan bcos kyi bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi 'jug pa'i gzhung gi rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i mkhul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes* of Si tu Paṇchen. See Sherab Gyaltsen 1990, vol. 6 and Das 1972. In this dissertation, references to Si tu's *Great Commentary* refer to the folio of this edition, followed by the first line of the quotation in the following form: GC 450.6.
HSGLT	*A History of Sanskrit Grammatical Literature in Tibet*. 2 Vols. See Verhagen 1994 and 2001A.
JIATS	*Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies*.
K	*Kātantra* of Śarvavarman. See Liebich 1919.
KhJ	*Mkhas pa la 'jug pa'i sgo* of Sakya Paṇḍita. See Sa paṇ Kun dga' rgyal mtshan 2009.
KV	*Kāśikāvṛtti* of Jayāditya and Vāmana.
MBh	*Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. For an edition and translation of selected passages, see Joshi and Roodbergen 1974-1986.
Mchims chen	*Chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mngon pa'i rgyan* by Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs. See Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs 2004.
Mkhas 'jug	See KhJ.
MVY	*Mahāvyutpatti*, i.e. *Bye brag tu rtogs byed chen mo*. See Sakaki 1916-1925.
NG	*Gnas brgyad chen po'i rtsa ba* by Lce Khyi 'brug. See Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang 1994-2008 (= CT), vol. 115.

NGg	*Gnas brgyad 'grel pa*, also entitled Sgra'i bstan bcos and presumably by Lce Khyi 'brug (?). See Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang 1994-2008 (= CT), vol. 115.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* of Udyotakara. See Thakur 1997.
NS	*Nyāyasūtra*.
NVTT	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspatimiśra. See Thakur 1996.
no.	number.
P	Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See Joshi and Roodbergen 1991-2011 and Sharma 1987-2003.
Pāṇini	The *Pāṇinian* system of Sanskrit grammar contained in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and followed by the *Pāṇinian* school of Sanskrit grammar, in contrast to Pāṇini as the author of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See Joshi and Roodbergen 1991-2011 and Sharma 1987-2003.
r.	reigned.
SCP	*Sum cu pa*. See Appendix.
Sgra sbyor	See SSBP.
Smra ba kun	*Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* together with *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel pa*. See Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang 1994-2008 (= CT), vol. 109.
Smra sgo	*Smra ba'i sgo mtshon cha lta bu* together with the *Smra ba'i sgo mtshon cha lta bu'i 'grel pa* of Smṛtijñānakīrti. See Smṛtijñānakīrti 2002.
SSBP	*Sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa*, i.e. *Sgra sbyor*. See Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang 1994-2008 (= CT), vol. 115.
TKJ	*Rtags kyi 'jug pa*. See Appendix.
TshSS	*Tshogs gsum gsal ba* of Dpang Dpang Lotsāwa Blo gros brtan pa. See Dpang Lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa 2004.
WT	Written Tibetan, the subject of traditional Tibetan grammaticography.
Zha lu et. al.	Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub. These are the three main commentators on SCP and TKJ referred to by Si tu in his GC.

Table of Figures

1 Introduction

There is little doubt among scholars – both past and contemporary, Tibetan and non-Tibetan, trained in monastic centers or universities – that Tibetan intellectual history was and still is significantly shaped by that of the Indian subcontinent. The Indian tradition, and amongst this especially the Sanskritic, served as a major source for both the contents and methodologies of a multifaceted array of knowledge fields north of the Himalaya, such as Buddhist philosophy, linguistics, logical reasoning and others, frequently appearing as the highest authority in questions of scholarly knowledge production. In the field of grammar (*brda sprod*, *sum rtags*), for example, but also Buddhism (*nang rig*), a variety of authenticated Sanskritic authors and sources form the conceptual foundation that Tibetan monastic scholars would not only build upon but committedly adhere to, invoke, and even defend as scriptural authority.

Yet, the perception of the intellectual relationship between India and Tibet substantially diverges within time and space. While historically questionable, famous Tibetan historiographical narratives – such as minister Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa's travel to India at the beginning of Tibetan literacy as we know it or the debate in *Bsam yas* at the dawn of the appropriation of Buddhism in Tibet – testify a self-declared and sometimes overstated orientation towards the Indian subcontinent that portrays India as the only valid and established source of inspiration.[1] Thus, Tibetan monastic scholars commonly see a major task in their duty to preserve, unravel and defend such authoritative Sanskritic knowledge while avoiding, or at least often claiming to avoid, any form of deviation or self-fabrication (*rang bzo*) in their own work. From that perspective, the Indo-Tibetan cross-cultural relationship appears to be mainly one of unidirectional continuation and observance. The close proximity to Sanskritic corpora of knowledge in scholarly practices like translation and exegesis is widely acknowledged also outside the Tibetan cultural sphere, even to the extent that Tibetan Studies would frequently be degraded to a 'Hilfswissenschaft' or ancillary discipline of the field of Buddhist Studies.[2]

However, despite the fundamental role of the Indo-Tibetan knowledge transfer, Tibetan intellectual history must not be perceived from the viewpoint of a pure continuation of Indian forms of knowledge, for neither was Tibet a tabula rasa prior to the beginning of the appropriation of Indian knowledge, nor was India the only source of knowledge for Tibetan learning and scholarship. Moreover, in the methodology of Tibetan scholarly argumentation,

---

[1] For these two narratives, cf. infra 17f. and 19f.
[2] For this point and the Indo-Tibetan relation, cf. also Viehbeck, forthcoming. For a survey of the history of Buddhist Studies including Tibetan Buddhism, cf. De Jong 1997.

logical proof and factual evidence are on a par with scriptural authority, a fact that provided a most prolific matrix fostering the creativity of Tibetan intellectuals.[3] Modern Tibetologists therefore also started engaging in more nuanced depictions of Tibetan knowledge production and the role of Indo-Tibetan relationships in this process through their investigations at the interface of such notions as scholasticism, tradition and innovation, Indian vs. Indic, amongst others.[4]

A major question in the task to disentangle this relation that shaped Tibetan intellectual history at its very foundation therefore is how to understand the intricate dynamics of the transformation of adopted knowledge in a tradition that has so deeply sewn-in into its texture scriptural authority as a major principle of knowledge production. It is safe to assume that any production of knowledge involves processes of transformation in which continuities and discontinuities between traditions, authors, sources and theories operate alongside each other, and this is most certainly the case where this knowledge production is constituted by a transfer of knowledge across noteworthy cultural and linguistic boundaries. Specific forms of knowledge production or transfer and thus the intellectual relationship between India and Tibet are defined precisely through the interaction of these two forces, i.e. the individual continuities and discontinuities together with the mechanisms governing this interaction.

While grammar certainly ranks among the minor fields in Tibetan Studies, compared to the much more prominent position of Buddhist philosophy and its related subfields, the question about the transformation of knowledge is an at least equally pressing challenge in the context of the relationship between Tibetan and Sanskritic grammaticography. In fact, the cross-cultural transfer of linguistic knowledge from India to Tibet offers a setting that may be of special interest. Since the study of language and particularly that of grammar is typically concerned with the structure of concrete languages, the substantial morphological and syntactic differences between Sanskrit and Tibetan – which in modern linguistics are classed into separate language families – presumably demand an equally substantial adaptation of adopted models of linguistic analysis. In contrast to Buddhist ontology or epistemology, which are commonly regarded as being concerned with universal questions, the very object of grammatical investigation itself, namely Tibetan language, requires grammarians to deviate from Sanskritic authority and apply modifications in line with the new target language. In this sense, the recontextualization of Sanskrit grammatical knowledge into the Tibetan linguistic environment challenges the Tibetan

---

[3] For the methodology of Tibetan scholastic knowledge production in the context of grammar, cf. chapter 4.
[4] Cf. e.g. Cabezón 1994, Dreyfus 2003, Ruegg 2004.

scholastic methodology and the principle of scriptural authority very directly and concretely. To gain insight into the intricate dynamics governing the transformation of grammatical knowledge – in other words, the ways in which against the backdrop of Tibetan scholasticism grammatical theory formation was shaped in the course of de- and recontextualization of Sanskrit linguistic knowledge – can therefore only enhance our understanding of Tibetan intellectual history and its relation to Indian authority. Thus, this dissertation should be seen as a modest attempt to address this issue on the basis of one particularly controversial subject of Tibetan grammaticography.

The present study investigates the classical eightfold Tibetan case model which has been developed by Tibetan scholars in close affinity to Sanskrit case grammar and which is attested already in the earliest period of linguistic studies in Tibet (approx. 7th - 9th century). It remained authoritative as one of the major theoretical models in Tibetan traditional grammar in the education of many monastic institutions up to the present day, despite the strong critique brought forth against it from academic linguistics. The present study sheds light on the major historical (chapters 2 and 3) and methodological factors (chapter 4) that have shaped the adoption and transformation of Sanskritic case grammar. Its main part (chapters 6-14) is then concerned with a close examination of the precise continuation and discontinuation of Sanskritic technical terminology, theories and discourses on case grammar in the conceptions of Tibetan grammarians to better understand the theoretical factors involved in this cross-cultural knowledge transfer.

The transformation of the original Sanskrit case model in Tibet was an ongoing process that involved selection as well as constant negotiation and re-negotiation of adopted concepts. Thus, our understanding of the Indo-Tibetan transcultural dynamics depends on questions related to the heterogeneity of the Sanskritic and Tibetan grammatical traditions, accessed sources and established knowledge as well as the concrete agency of certain historical figures, much of which hitherto has received little or no attention in academic research. Within its possibilities, the present study nonetheless attempts to remain historically sensitive regarding these different yet interacting aspects by paying utmost attention to the continuities and discontinuities in and between source materials against the backdrop of the historical information about them available to us today. In particular, its main part (chapters 7-14) has two focal points: the celebrated Tibetan grammarian and Sanskritist Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas

(1699/1700-1774)[5] and his treatment of Tibetan case grammar in the so-called *Great Commentary* (GC)[6] as a particularly famous and insightful specimen of Tibetan grammatical theory formation. This is a commentary on two seminal treatises, *Sum cu pa* (SCP) and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa* (TKJ),[7] that in the tradition have attained the status of the very foundations of Tibetan grammar already centuries before Si tu's work.[8] In addition, Si tu's conception of the classical eight Tibetan cases is accompanied by a historical survey for each of the cases that explores their conception in selected Sanskritic literature together with the most important developments of their transformation in Tibetan grammar previous to his times. This format will avoid inaccurate generalizations that obscure the heterogeneity of Tibetan and Sanskritic grammaticography and simultaneously provide a clear account of the tradition's situation at Si tu's time, which will also facilitate an understanding of his decision-making processes in the formation of grammatical theories.

1.1 Current State of Research

In modern Tibetology and Linguistics, the Tibetan grammatical tradition received notable attention, reaching back as far as to the end 19th century. Berthold Laufer's study on Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po's (Zha lu Lotsāwa; 1441-1527/28) lexicographical work *Za ma tog* in 1898 was one of the pioneering works in this field. Yet, only two years later in a review of Laufer's work, the Leiden Sinologist Gustav Schlegel most blatantly attacked the value of Tibetan grammatical knowledge and of the entire Tibetan intellectual history:

> "It has been rightly observed that the whole literature of Tibet does not afford us a single positive result for our modern science, and that our knowledge of the tibetan language, its structure and its life would not become enriched in the least by researches in this field. Yet, Mr. Laufer remarks, the mere fact that this curious race of Central-Asia possesses a rich literature of grammatical, lexicographical and philological works would be sufficient to make it worth our study, although it may not enrich our knowledge of

---

[5] Hereafter referred to as Si tu or Si tu Paṇchen. Regarding Si tu's exact year of birth, either 1699 or 1700, there appears to be disagreement among Tibetologists. Taking as a reference JIATS 7 (cf. Germano et al. 2013), a volume which is dedicated to Si tu's oeuvre, the contributions mention both dates 1699 and 1700. For details on Si tu Paṇchen's life and works, cf. chapter 3.

[6] The full title of Si tu's Tibetan grammar reads *Yul gangs can pa'i brda yang dag par sbyor ba'i bstan bcos kyi bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi 'jug pa'i gzhung gi rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i mkhul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes*, which may be translated as 'Beautiful Pearl Necklace Adorning the Neck of Scholars: A Thorough Commentary on the Texts *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa*, Quintessence of the *Śāstra* of Correct Grammar in the Land of Snow.' The treatise is commonly known under its abbreviation *Si tu'i 'grel chen* or 'Si tu's Great Commentary.' The text is contained in volume 6 of his collected works, published by Sherab Gyaltsen in 1990 (cf. also infra 10).

[7] For the edition of the two root texts used in this dissertation, cf. Appendix.

[8] On the commented root texts *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa*, cf. infra 19f. as well as chapter 4.1.

4

languages, it yet will allow us to catch a deeper insight in the physiology and cultural history of the tibetan people.

We do not quite agree with the author's sympathy with a race which has not exercised the slightest cultural influence upon the surrounding countries, whose literature is not worth anything before the people was converted to Buddhism, and has been entirely influenced by sanskrit literature, and, according to our conviction, is hardly worth the immense labour bestowed upon its study. Like all races which only possess a religious literature, the Tibetans, like the Arabs, have become enraged grammarians or rather grammatists. As well in their religious as in their linguistic literature a barren contemplative speculation is the only fruit we can gather from its study, and we should like to throw at the head of the Tibetans Goethe's word:

> 'Ich sage Dir: 'Ein Kerl, der speculirt,
> 'Ist wie ein Thier, auf dürrer
> > Heide
> 'Von einem bösen Geist im Kreis
> > herumgeführt,
> 'Und rings umher liegt schöne,
> > grüne Weide'."[9]

The close adherence of the Tibetan tradition to Sanskritic authoritative knowledge was well-observed by Schlegel's review, yet it was also overemphasized to an extreme that does not do justice to Tibetan scholarly knowledge production and its relation to India. Fortunately, his polemical and precipitant assessment at the beginning of this emerging field of Tibetan Studies was not shared by several of the subsequent Tibetologists and linguists who continued to study the traditional grammatical literature. One of these was Johannes Schubert, who coined the notion of a 'Nationalgrammatik' especially for the two canonical root grammars SCP and TKJ together with their commentarial literature. He also produced translations of two well-known commentaries, namely that of Dbyangs can Grub pa'i rdo rje (1809-1887) in 1928-29 and that of Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786) in 1937. About the same time of Schubert's first translation, the French philologist and Tibetologist Jacques Bacot published another translation of a post-Si tu commentary on SCP and TKJ of unknown authorship in 1928, to which he also

---

[9] Schlegel 1900, 357f. In a footnote, Schlegel translates Goethe's words as follows: "I tell ye: a fellow who speculates is like an animal led about, by an evil spirit, in a circle, on a barren heath whilst all around ly beautiful, green meadows." (Schlegel 1900, 358) On Schlegel's review of Laufer's study on the Zamatog, cf. also Miller 1993, 16.f.

added the first complete edition plus translation of the two root texts themselves. His numbering of the verses remains in use up to the present day, even though it has also evoked thus far unresolved controversies among modern scholars and is sometimes substituted with alternative counting systems.[10]

Apart from these early works which have introduced Tibetan grammaticography to modern academia, there have also been noteworthy contributions to various selected topics. Among these, there are to mention for our purpose Simonsson's studies on the use of the Buddhist Abhidharmic concept *tshogs gsum* (*trikāya*, 'three collections') in Tibetan traditional grammar (1982A, 1984) as well as on the theory of the sentence and case morphemes (1982B). The American linguist Roy Andrew Miller authored numerous essays on the history and constitution of the SCP and TKJ, and by means of these he advanced to the most important protagonist of the critique against the traditional narrative of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa's authorship.[11] Remaining more on the linguistic side of modern academic research, different traditional grammatical concepts and theories have received attention for example in numerous works by Nicolas Tournadre, Bettina Zeisler or Ralf Vollmann, the latter having published – among other works – a historical survey on Tibetan ergativity in classical and modern academic accounts (2008). Zeisler's extensive article on the classical Tibetan second case in 2006 as well as Tournadre's more recent study (2010) on the case system of written Tibetan (WT) that includes an assessment of the traditional case model deserve special mention in the present study as they are directly dedicated to its core topic of case grammar. The same also applies to a more recent study of Nathan Hill (2011) on the use of the traditional Tibetan case marker '*la don*' in the *Old Tibetan Annals*.

While not directly connected to the present study, the topic perhaps most extensively explored in modern academia due to its arousal of a certain interest among linguists is Si tu's action theory, namely *tha dad min* ('differentiating [and] non-differentiating [actions]'), which is closely connected to the two technical terms *bdag* ('self') and *gzhan* ('other') in the TKJ. Among the various contributions are also some of the scholars mentioned above, however mention here will be made only to the main works of Tom Tillemans (1988, 2007, Tillemans and Herforth 1989). Especially the coauthored *Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan* from 1989 ranks among the most thorough introductions to this conception.

---

[10] For a discussion of these controversies, as well as for the edition of both root texts used in this dissertation, cf. Appendix.

[11] For a collected edition of the main essays, cf. Miller 1993.

Lastly, the work of Peter Verhagen on the Tibetan linguistic tradition in general and on Sanskrit studies in Tibet in particular deserves special mention as well. His two volumes on the *History of Sanskrit Grammatical Literature in Tibet* (1994 and 2001A)[12] contain the most detailed account available on Sanskrit grammatical knowledge in Tibet and its relation to traditional Tibetan grammar. His meticulous historical-philological examination of Sanskrit and Tibetan source materials significantly increased and refined knowledge in the field by demonstrating "that much in Tibetan indigenous grammar has been derived from Indic grammar,"[13] while he also pointed out concrete "elements that – at least at the present moment – cannot be traced to Sanskrit grammar or Buddhist literature dealing with language (in the broadest sense)."[14] Apart from these two volumes, Peter Verhagen contributed numerous articles on linguistic scholarship in Tibet, covering selected issues in grammatical treatises from the earliest to the later periods. Also important for our current purposes is the fourfold series of essays on Si tu's literary work (2004, 2008A, 2010, 2013) entitled *Notes apropos to the Oeuvre of Si-tu Paṇ-chen Chos-kyi-'byuṅ-gnas (1699?-1774)*.

A considerable amount of relevant and insightful research has been carried out in the field of traditional Tibetan grammar and linguistics. These research findings have continued to improve and refine our knowledge over more than a century. Nonetheless, a critical tone prevails up to the present day. In her article on the Tibetan traditional second case, Zeisler epitomizes western academic standpoints in the following summary:

> "For western scholars, who speak accusative languages, it has always been a matter of fact that the Sanskrit term *karman* for the 'second case' has to be understood as the 'accusative' case marker or as a case-relation corresponding to the syntactic category of Direct Object. The application of the term *karman* in its Tibetan translation as *las*, *byabaḥi yul*, or *lassu byaba* to the directional case marker *la* (and its equivalents), used for RECIPIENTS, GOALS, and LOCATIONS, thus seems to be a gross error on the part of the Tibetan grammarians, due to their blind imitation of a prestigious model that can by no means be applied to an ergative language (Tournadre 1990: 192, 195, 1996:347), except so as to create a new artificial language, which has not much to do with the 'primitive' language spoken by 'nomadic barbares' (Bacot 1928: I-IV, 11,

---

[12] Hereafter referred to as HSGLT 1 and HSGLT 2.
[13] HSGLT 2, 323.
[14] Ibid., 335.

1946: 7), in any case a futile attempt 'to make Tibetan fit the Procrustean bed of Sanskrit' (Tillemans 1991: 319)."[15]

The critiques of scholars such as Tillemans or Tournadre have certainly been more well-informed and based on more well-established historical and linguistic reasons compared to the statements of Schlegel, however the close adherence to Sanskritic authority remains a major topos. This critique commonly aims at the absent but required modifications of the original Sanskrit case grammar in view of the substantial differences between Sanskrit and Tibetan, a fact briefly alluded to by Peter Schwieger in the preface to his *Handbuch zur Grammatik der klassischen Tibetischen Schriftsprache*:

> "Vorbild für die tibetischen Beschreibungen der eigenen Schriftsprache war das früh hochentwickelte sprachwissenschaftliche Wissen der Inder, und so orientiert sich bis in die Neuzeit die einheimische tibetische Grammatik insbesondere bei der Beschreibung des Kasussystems an den in Tibet bekannten Grammatiken der Sanskrit-Sprache, wobei dieses Modell letztendlich für eine Beschreibung einer agglutinierenden Sprache wie des Schrifttibetischen schwerlich eine adäquate Grundlage bilden kann."[16]

As already indicated by this selection of quotations, the main target of this academic critique is the topic of case grammar and the eightfold Tibetan case model. However, awareness of this model's shortcomings is not only observed among foreign scholars but also among native Tibetan grammarians of the recent decades. Dor zhi Gdong drug snyems blo, for example, is quoted by Tournadre, who translates his open criticism of the traditional model as follows:

> "The analysis of Tibetan into eight cases is based on a Sanskrit model. But the model does not work in many occasions. Every scholar who pays attention to grammar knows that very well. Avoiding the bad habit of copying other languages, one should describe the Tibetan language only on the basis of its own structure and specificities."[17]

A consensus has been reached in Tibetology and Linguistics that the classical Tibetan case model cannot provide a representative account of the structures of Tibetan language. Yet, apart from isolated studies such as Zeisler's thorough article on the Tibetan second case, a

---

[15] Zeisler 2006, 57.
[16] Schwieger 2006, 5.
[17] Tournadre 2010, 94. Tournadre translated and quoted from Dor zhi Gdong drug snyems blo 1987:
bod skad la rnam dbye brgyad du phyes pa de/   rgya gar gyi skad la dpe blangs pa yin kyang/   dpe de don la mi 'byor mi nyung ba zhig yod pa ni/   sgra la gzigs rtogs gnang ba'i mkhas pa sus kyang shes/ skad rigs gzhan pa'i shan shor du ma bcug par/   bod skad rang gi grub lugs dang khyad chos mtshon thub pa zhig gi steng nas gzhi rtsa 'dzin dgos so//.

comprehensive examination of single or multiple sources that traces the precise transformations of the original Sanskrit case model in Tibetan grammatical literature remain a desideratum. To date, Peter Verhagen's pioneering translation and examination of the section on case grammar in the *Gnas brgyad rtsa 'grel* (NG(g); NG and NGg; 8th/9th century) is the only more inclusive contribution to Tibetan understandings of traditional cases.[18]

The lack of a comprehensive study of the Tibetan case model is a major reason why previous academic research has paid insufficient attention to the reasons why Tibetan grammarians developed and, over the centuries, adhered to their eightfold case system. Modern enquiries paradigmatically root the Tibetan adoption of Sanskritic case grammar only very generally in the attempt to imitate Sanskrit and its grammar based on an open adherence or faithfulness to Indian civilization and its authority. In his more recent study on Tibetan case grammar, Tournadre puts it this way:

> "For cultural and religious reasons, Tibetan grammarians of the past took as a model the Sanskrit case system, which is radically different from the Tibetan case system. They tried to match the cases of the two languages."[19]

In a similar vein, Dreyfus remarks that "although the Tibetan language is unrelated to Sanskrit, it was codified as part of an effort to adopt Indian civilization, particularly Buddhism," and that "hence, its grammar emulates Sanskrit grammar, which is viewed as normative."[20]

However, such generalized and unspecified explanations through which modern academia repeatedly characterizes the seemingly obvious inadequacy of the traditional Tibetan cases give the impression that Tibetan grammarians preferred to remain in line with Sanskritic authority due to faithfulness or related reasons although they had known better. Other than a simplification of the situation at hand, such a premise bears the risk of imposing external linguistic principles of adequate grammatical theory formation onto the Tibetan grammatical tradition. Apart from the effectively central position of Sanskritic authority, it has not been investigated thus far what methodological and theoretical principles of grammatical theory formation were operative during the early, formative period of Tibetan grammaticography, nor is it by any means self-evident how any such principles have affected grammatical taxonomies or persisted or changed throughout the centuries. For example, academic research thus far has not brought forth any evidence that the traditional concept of case (*rnam dbye*) as a progeny of

---

[18] Cf. HSGLT 2, 284ff.
[19] Tournadre 2010, 93.
[20] Dreyfus 2003, 102.

Sanskrit *vibhakti* introduced by the early grammarians equals either the traditional Sanskritic notion or the modern linguistic understandings of case grammar. Yet, without a detailed insight into the methodological and conceptual foundation of Tibetan case grammar, it is impossible to conclude in which ways any knowledge about the Tibetan language has been affected by this foundation, and consequently why Tibetan grammarians have adopted and adhered to the case model in this particular form.

The Sanskritic origin of the Tibetan eight cases is well-established and commonly pointed out in critiques of the utility of the traditional case model, yet there is a lack of detailed, comprehensive studies of the history of the Tibetan case model and its intricate, transcultural relation to Sanskrit grammatical knowledge. Thus, this dissertation is a contribution to previous work done in this "slumbering field,"[21] complementing it with a detailed study of the Tibetan case model in and before Si tu Paṇchen's work. The focus lies on the continuities and discontinuities between Si tu's case grammar, the preceding Tibetan tradition, and Sanskritic grammar. Hopefully, this approach will also refine our understanding of the mechanisms that have governed the formation of this model within the framework of Tibetan scholasticism and Sanskritic scriptural authority.

1.2 Methodological Remarks

The prospect of such a thorough and historically sensitive investigation of case grammar in Si tu's work within the conceptual and methodological framework of the Tibetan scholastic tradition deserves a few general remarks regarding its methodology and limitations.

The current dissertation is a historical study. It follows a hermeneutical-philological approach and thus primarily relies on textual material and its reception in- and outside the tradition. The main primary source is Si tu's GC, which fortunately is available in several academic and non-academic editions, although apart from a limited amount of passages on selected issues neither a critical edition nor a translation has thus far been produced. Among the *editiones principes* (Das 1915 and Sherab Gyaltsen 1990), this study relies on and quotes the latter, which was published in the form of a block print and as part of Si tu's collected works in fourteen volumes, the GC being contained in volume six.

Other primary sources include a variety of Sanskritic and Tibetan treatises from different fields of knowledge, mainly Sanskrit grammar, Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan linguistics and even sources related to the *Nyāya* tradition in the context of the Tibetan second and third case.

---

[21] A personal comment of Peter Verhagen in an e-mail conversation (September 8th, 2015).

References are given to the established standard and critical editions wherever possible. This was easily possible for most of the Sanskritic sources, however, in the field of Tibetan grammar some sources are quoted from contemporary Tibetan publications either because there is no consensus regarding standard editions or because they were unavailable.

Like any other work of academic research, the present work too has limitations which are important to keep in mind throughout. These may be summarized into two major points:

First, there is to mention the sheer volume of Sanskrit and Tibetan grammatical and linguistic literature that must be taken into account for an accurate representation of the history of Tibetan case grammar and its relation to Sanskritic authority, be it with a focus on a historical survey across sources or a single source such as Si tu's GC, the latter which is full of references to other authors and theories. Taking as a template our main author Si tu Paṇchen and confining ourselves only to Sanskrit grammar, Peter Verhagen lists a total of thirty titles which belong to four different Sanskritic grammatical schools that are mentioned by Si tu as part of his grammatical curriculum at the beginning of his massive commentary on the *Cāndravyākaraṇa*[22] – and we can suppose that this list is still incomplete. If we additionally consider the most important Sanskritic and Tibetan sources which are either directly dedicated to grammar or include relevant language-related material, this list easily adds up to fifty or more primary sources to be considered. Certainly, this is hardly manageable, particularly since much of the Tibetan grammatical material remains understudied in modern academia while many of the basic and most important Sanskritic and Buddhist sources have been extensively studied. In order to maintain a representative and historically sensitive picture of the Tibetan grammatical tradition's heterogeneity as well as of the theoretical and conceptual situation which acted as Si tu's starting point, the investigation of grammatical theories in this work has been divided into two parts: the first part will always explore the most important developments of the transformation of case grammar previous to Si tu in a more summarized fashion, whereas the second part will focus on Si tu's conception against the background of these developments. Nonetheless, a selection of primary sources had to be made:[23]

Regarding Sanskritic grammar, I have focused on the two most dominant grammatical schools on the Himalayan Plateau, i.e. *Kātantra* and *Cāndra*, as well as the most important Sanskrit grammatical school in India also known in Tibetan, i.e. the *Pāṇinian*[24] – Si tu, for example, was

---

[22] Cf. HSGLT 2, 172ff.

[23] For a complete list of Sanskrit and Tibetan primary sources, cf. the bibliography.

[24] Although Pāṇini is more accurately the author of the Sanskrit grammar entitled *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, his composition marks the beginning of the *Pāṇinian* school of Sanskrit grammar and the name *Pāṇini* also became a generic

well familiar with Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and its commentarial literature, and without the latter the two former schools are hardly understandable from a historical point of view. In addition, the comparatively late *Sārasvatavyākaraṇa* also needs to be taken into account, since it dates back to after the beginning of linguistic studies in Tibet but enjoyed noteworthy popularity and "may still reflect older undercurrents that have not breached the elevated ceiling of scriptural documentation."[25]

In addition to Sanskritic grammatical literature, selected passages of language-related philosophical texts have also been taken into account: firstly, the Buddhist *Abhidharmakośa* (AK) together with its *Bhāṣya* (AKBh), Yaśomitra's sub-commentary *Spuṭārthā* and the Tibetan sub-commentary *Chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mngon pa'i rgyan* of Mchims 'jam pa'i dbyangs (~13th century) have been investigated in the context of the so-called *tshogs gsum* (*trikāya*; 'three collections') in AK 2.47, a hierarchical model to derive the different constituents of linguistic expression in three layers, namely letters, syllables or sounds (*yi ge*, *vyañjana*), free, lexical word forms (*ming*, *nāma*) as well as syntactically complete expressions or sentences (*tshig*, *pada*); secondly, the *Nyāyasūtra* verse 2.1.16 and the subsequent Sanskritic commentarial literature has been consulted with regard to the bivalency of actions into their active and resultative part in the context of the Tibetan second and third cases.

As for the Tibetan grammatical tradition previous to Si tu, a main focus is placed on early sources in order to gain a better understanding of the early conceptions of grammatical theories and the thought processes that led to the initial adoption of case grammar in Tibet. These early sources include particularly NG and NGg, which are frequently quoted by Si tu, and the *Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa* (GNT). A second focus consists in selected grammarians which are important either to the further developments of the tradition (e.g. Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan,[26] Dpang Lotsāwa Blo gros brtan pa, etc.) or to Si tu (e.g. Smṛtijñānakīrti, Zha lu Lotsāwa, Rnam gling Paṇchen, Pra ti Rin chen don grub, etc.), although the two converge in many if not most of the cases. It is not always easy to discern the authors important to Si tu himself, since despite his extensive discussions of the former tradition he often prefers not to mention details of the referenced authors or titles.

---

reference to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the grammatical system therein. Wherever the name Pāṇini is written as such in this dissertation, it directly refers to the person, wherever it is written in italics, it refers to his grammatical composition (cf. also Abbreviations).

[25] A comment by Peter Verhagen in a personal e-mail conversation (September 1st, 2016 and September 5th, 2016).

[26] Hereafter referred to as Sakya Paṇḍita.

12

Coming to the work of Si tu himself, the main focus of the entire dissertation remains on the GC as its major source, while parts on case grammar in his *Cāndra* commentary have also been included to a limited extent, as well as selected excerpts of various works in his collected works in chapter 3.

The second limitation of this work is more of a linguistic nature: since the current topic is concerned with the study of language in Tibet, any hypothesis or conclusion about the transformation of grammatical knowledge includes and presumes our understanding of the language. We cannot adequately examine grammatical theories and the historical, conceptual or linguistic mechanisms that govern their development without accurate knowledge of the language structures under investigation in these theories. Although the analysis of Tibetan case markers in modern linguistics has brought forth important insights, there is lacking consensus regarding a standard case model and questions remain synchronically as well as diachronically.[27] One might assume that the tradition offers important material to add to our knowledge and resolve these issues, however, from a historical perspective as proposed in the present work, the main questions concerning the transformation of case grammar and its related causes must prevail. Moreover, it has been stated that in many ways the Tibetan case model is not a representative account of the language, and apparently it followed principles different than those expected from a modern linguistic perspective, a fact which will be investigated in the present study. Thus, knowledge of language structures is more a prerequisite rather than the result of this research. In the context of actual analyses of grammatical theories, this tends to be more a question of emphasis since there usually occurs a synergy of both the analysis of theories and the analysis of language. Therefore, one of the shortcomings of this work is that its author is not a trained linguist, which impacts on the assessment of the traditional case model especially in the context of those case markers whose precise function and use continue to pose challenges to modern linguistics. To counteract such shortcoming, in such instances I have relied on more recent linguistic studies of Tibetan case grammar, especially those of Tournadre (2010) and Hill (2011). On the other hand, the chapter on case grammar is filled with linguistic considerations – often more likely speculations and possibilities – in order to point to different options of explaining why Tibetan grammarians did what they did.

Due to these limitations both in the limited source materials as well as in unanswered linguistic questions regarding Tibetan language, the current study cannot claim to provide a complete or

---

[27] Cf. chapters 7-14 on the respective cases, especially the second, fourth and seventh cases and the classical case marker *la don*.

final picture. The outlined limitations and open nature of this dissertation are manifest in the structure of chapters and in those instances where I abstained from any conclusive decision on a subject matter, but rather tried to explore and assess different possibilities or options based on the available material.[28]

Following this introduction, the current study is divided into two parts: Part I will commence with a historical contextualization of Tibetan grammar in general (chapter 2) and Si tu's grammatical work in particular (chapter 3). Chapter 2 allows the reader to learn more about the historical setting that led to the esteemed status of linguistic studies as an established discipline with autochthonous contributions to both Sanskrit and Tibetan language. In this context, the question will also be addressed how *Sum rtags*, i.e. the exegesis of the two treatises **Sum cu pa** (SCP) and **Rtags kyi 'jug pa** (TKJ), became the major means of grammatical theory formation in traditional Tibetan grammaticography. Chapter 3 will then turn to Si tu's life and scholarship, particularly his occupation as a true philologist and linguist by heart, which sets the larger context of his composition of the GC.

These two chapters are followed by an introduction to Tibetan grammatical theory formation and its mechanisms within the framework of Tibetan scholastic methodology in chapter 4, with a main focus on Si tu's GC and the methodological constellation governing theory formation in *Sum rtags* in order to shed light on the principle of scriptural authority and the ways it affects GC's case grammar.

Turning to the main topic of case grammar itself, chapter 5 starts with a short overview of the Tibetan case model, its history and the related linguistic issues. This chapter introduces a selection of modern linguistic as well as traditional Sanskritic and Tibetan theories intended to provide the required theoretical and conceptual framework for the main investigation of the case model. First, an elaboration of the basic distinctions made in modern linguistic case grammar will help us understand better both classical Tibetan case grammar and its modern critique (chapter 5.2). The study then goes on to introduce two competing systems for the derivation of linguistic expressions that were both transmitted to Tibet, one from Sanskritic grammatical sources and one from the Buddhist *Abhidharma*. This subchapter demonstrates how such competing models were negotiated in Tibetan grammatical studies, how they are related to case grammar and how Si tu attempted to reconcile and bring them into a unified

---

[28] Cf. also the general note in the Notes to the Reader.

14

version adapted to the morphosyntax of WT (chapter 5.3). This is followed by a brief and preliminary note on the notion of *kāraka*, a crucial category in Sanskrit case semantics which was also used widely in other fields of knowledge and played an important part in the formation of the Tibetan cases (chapter 5.4).

After a short introduction (chapter 6), the main and by far most extensive part II consists in a detailed individual examination of each of the eight cases in two parts, i.e. a historical survey of the times before Si tu followed by his GC (chapters 7-14). Other than each case's general definition and constitution in the different sources, the investigation focuses on the relation to Sanskrit grammatical knowledge. The major historical, linguistic, philological and conceptual issues are identified for each case and discussed as far as the materials allow it.

Finally, the last two chapters, a summary of findings in part II (chapter 15) and the overall concluding observations (chapter 16), extract and assemble the bigger picture of major arguments and hypotheses from all the small pieces dispersed over the preceding investigations. These final chapters are intended to add to our knowledge about the dynamics which characterize the transformation of case grammar in the course of its de- and recontextualization from the Sanskritic to the Tibetan environment.

The dissertation also includes an appendix to discuss and clarify the issue of SCP and TKJ's verse numbering in the existent research literature, and I also introduce a new numbering based on the edition of the texts contained in volume 6 of Si tu's collected works (folios 439-446). This numbering is taken as the basis for quotations of SCP and TKJ in this dissertation.

Part I: Tibetan Grammaticography – A Scholastic Quest for the Analysis of the Literary Language

2 Grammar in the History of Tibetan Scholarship

2.1 Introduction

Tibetan intellectual history as we know it is commonly said to begin with the appropriation of Buddhism from the Indian subcontinent. This evoked an extensive transfer of knowledge to the Land of Snow, its most intensive period lasting approximately from the 7th to the 13th century, including intermissions. The earliest phase of this cross-cultural contact lasted until the mid-9th century and is known as the earlier dissemination of Buddhism (*snga dar*). It coincides with the Tibetan imperial epoch, in which larger areas of Central Asia were brought under the rule of a Tibetan central leadership.[29] According to Tibetan historiography, in which much of this time has been mystified and thus requires our cautious reading, the Tibetan king Srong btsan sgam po (c. 617-650), whose conquests usually define the beginning of the Tibetan empire,[30] took two wives: the Nepalese princess Bhrikuti Devi and the Chinese princess Wencheng of the Tang dynasty.[31] These two are credited for first having introduced Buddhism by each bringing along a Buddhist icon to Tibet. It is further said that the king ordered the construction of two temples as repositories for these gifts, which today are known as the famous monuments *Ra mo che* and *Jo khang* in Lhasa.[32] However, Srong btsan sgam po's interest in a larger propagation of Buddhism is difficult to trace. Although an inscription on the *Skar cung rdo ring* dating back to the 9th century attests the founding of temples during his reign,[33] much of the promotion of Buddhism in Tibet attributed by Tibetan historiographers to princess Wencheng probably can be traced to the deeds of the Chinese princess Jincheng, who was married to Khri Lde gtsug brtsan in the first half of the 8th century.[34]

About a hundred years after Srong btsan sgam po, it can be ascertained that Khri Lde gtsug brtsan's son and successor Khri srong lde btsan (r. 755-797) officially converted to Buddhism (c. 779)[35] and initiated its institutionalization through the construction and consecration of the

---

[29] For a brief historical survey of the Tibetan empire, cf. Dotson 2009, 16ff.

[30] Based on his study of the *Old Tibetan Annals*, Dotson connects the beginning of the imperial epoch already to events two generations earlier (mid-6th century), followed by the expansion of the former *Yar lung* kingdom by Srong btsan sgam po's father Slon mtshan (cf. Dotson 2009, 16f.).

[31] Srong btsan sgam po's marriage with the Chinese princess Wencheng is verified by independent sources, namely the Tibetan *Old Tibetan Annals* and the Chinese *Old Tang Annals*, cf. Dotson 2009, 22. These early sources appear to remain silent regarding his Nepalese marriage, although there are indications that the Licchavi king Narendradeva spent several years in Tibetan exile during the 630s (cf. van Schaik 2011, 73). On issues regarding the fatherhood of Bhrikuti Devi (Khri btsun), cf. also Sørensen 1994, 199, ft. 560.

[32] For a classical account of this narrative in the *Rgyal rab gsal ba'i me long* of the 14th century and with critical annotation, cf. Sørensen 1994, chapters XII and XIII.

[33] Cf. Richardson 1985, 75.

[34] Cf. Dotson 2009, 19.

[35] Cf. ibid., 20f.

first monastery in *Bsam yas* and the foundation of a Tibetan *saṅgha*. *Bsam yas* then became known as the site of the famous, yet mystified debate which took place between two Buddhist monks during the reign of the same Khri srong lde btsan, Kamalaśīla from India and Moheyan from China. This debate would decide which form of Buddhism the Tibetan emperor should adopt and promote.[36] The work of Matthew Kapstein and others has brought to our attention that before Buddhism started to dominate Tibetan civilization on so many of its layers, Tibetans had already been familiar with several 'foreign' cultural forms, including Chinese historiography, Greek medicine, Nestorian Christianity or Manichaeism. Thus, "to explain the success and thoroughness of Buddhism's Tibetan conquest remains a central problem for the historical study and interpretation of Tibetan civilization."[37] Kapstein offers a selection of key aspects for why Buddhism did not simply provide a set of religious beliefs, but how it represented a full package of assets for the unification, protection and organization of the centralized Tibetan imperial state that might have motivated its promotion by Tibetan royalty during these early centuries.[38] However, it should also be remarked that Buddhism did not succeed immediately and without resistance, since its royal promotion seems to have waned throughout the imperial epoch and due to ongoing rivalries between Buddhism and older forms of religion and ritual in Tibet, most notably during the empire's own demise (c. mid-9th century).

2.2 The Beginnings of Literacy and Grammar According to Tibetan Historiography

The introduction of Buddhism concurs with the emergence of Tibetan literacy itself – a historical episode of utmost importance for the entire Tibetan intellectual history. Tibetan Buddhist historiographies after the 10th century, such as the *Rgyal rab gsal ba'i me long*, report first contacts with scripture as early as during the reign of the mythologized king Lha tho tho ri snyan shal, five generations before king Srong btsan sgam po.[39] The commonly accepted version of this narrative claims that a casket containing Buddhist texts fell from the sky, either at the feet of king Lha tho tho ri or on the roof of his palace.[40] The texts supposedly contained in this casket differ in various historical sources, but usually the *Karaṇḍavyūhasūtra* and *The Pangkong Homages* are mentioned. However, Lha tho tho ri was illiterate and thus unable to

---

[36] The winner of this two-year debate was Kamalaśīla and thus Indian Buddhism.
[37] Kapstein 2000, 3.
[38] Cf. ibid., chapter 4.
[39] For a more detailed account of the following narrative, cf. van Schaik 2011, 46ff.
[40] For Nelpa Paṇḍita's (13th century) contestation of this version as well as the Fifth Dalai Lama's counter-critique against Nelpa Paṇḍita, cf. van Schaik 2011, 47.

read these texts, and so he resealed them under the label of *gnyan po gsang ba* ('secret potency').[41]

According to Tibetan traditional accounts, it was only five generations later that the wise minister Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa with an entire delegation was dispatched to India at the command of king Srong btsan sgam po to study Indian systems of writing. The extant versions of this second narrative also differ in some of the provided details.[42] At the latest from Bu ston Rin chen grub's (1290-1364) *Treasury of Priceless Scripture*[43] onwards, Tibetan sources hand down history in the form that it was Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa to whom the tradition is not only in debt for creating the Tibetan script and thus initiating Tibetan literacy as still in practice today but also for composing the first set of eight Tibetan grammatical texts.[44] Moreover, since during his studies in India minister Thon mi also became proficient in different fields of learning, he is also credited with the first translations of Buddhist sources into the newly established written form of Tibetan.[45] With the power of writing and grammar at free disposal, the heavenly casket could be reopened and the contained Buddhist texts finally translated. In this way, "it is said that the path of Shakyamuni's teaching started to spread in the north, similar to a lamp raised in the darkness."[46] While not explicitly mentioned either in *Bu ston's History*, the *Rgyal rab gsal ba'i me long* or the *Blue Annals*, it is commonly claimed that the seminal textbooks *Sum cu pa* (SCP) and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa* (TKJ), both of which are contained in the treatises section of the Tibetan Buddhist canon (*bstan 'gyur*), are the only two grammars of the eightfold set that are preserved. Consequently, these two texts have attained the status of the very foundation of Tibetan grammaticography to the extent that following the 13th/14th century, most of Tibetan

---

[41] On the translation of this term, cf. also Dotson 2006.
[42] For a more detailed and historically sensitive summary of the legend of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa, cf. van Schaik 2011, 49ff. For the version contained in the *Rgyal rab gsal ba'i me long*, cf. Sørensen 1994, chapter X.
[43] This treatise, commonly referred to as *Bu ston's History (of Buddhism)*, was first translated by E. Obermiller (1931 and 1932) and more recently by L. Stein and Ngawang Zangpo (2013).
[44] Already the *Old Tibetan Chronicle* affirms that the writing system was introduced during the reign of king Srong btsan sgam po (cf. Kapstein 2000, 55 and van Schaik 2011, 52). In contrast, the narrative of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa's creation of a Tibetan writing system is traced back by van Schaik at least to the *Pillar Testament* (*Bka' chems ka khol ma*) and the *Testament of Ba* (*Dba' bzhed*) (cf. van Schaik 2011, 49). Regarding Thon mi's authorship of grammatical literature, the *Rgyal rab gsal ba'i me long* of the 14th century lists four unknown titles of seemingly linguistic character that are attributed to him, but it makes no mention of Bu ston's version of eight grammatical texts (cf. Sørensen 1994, chapter X). Bu ston, however, did not mention the titles of the eight texts. Thon mi's composition of eight grammatical works seems to represent the most established account in the subsequent tradition and was adopted by grammarians such as Zha lu Lotsāwa or Si tu Paṇchen.
[45] For one list of titles allegedly translated by Thon mi himself, cf., e.g., Naga 2006, 13, where Naga refers to Mkhas pa lde'u and his *Rgya bod kyi chos 'byung rgyas pa* (13th century ?).
[46] […] *smag la sgron me bteg pa bzhin du shākya'i bstan pa byang phyogs su rgyas pa'i lam gyi thog ma snang bar gyur to/   zhes grags so/* (GC 450.6).
In this dissertation, I quote Si tu's *Great Commentary* from Sherab Gyaltsen's edition of Si tu's collected works 1990, vol. 6. The first number refers to the folio, the second number to the line (cf. also Abbreviations).

grammatical theory formation was conducted by means of commentaries on these two sources.[47]

The account of the authorship of both preserved grammars SCP and TKJ in their established form together with the introduction of the writing system – all done by a single hand at the very dawn of Tibetan intellectual history – is historically doubtful and was subjected to severe critique in modern academia.[48] However, the two narratives of Lha tho tho ri's first encounter with scripture and Thon mi's initiation of Tibetan literacy combine important motives in post-10th century historiography that have become constitutive for Tibetan Buddhist civilization and its identity formation. First, one can observe a strong symbolic value retrospectively attributed by Tibetan historiographers to scripture in the narrative of Lha tho tho ri, who not only received the first exemplars of writing from heaven but also regarded them as a yet mysterious source of power. Thus, a certain mystification and symbolism is connected to scripture and writing, which was perhaps already involved during the early stages of Tibetan literacy and the shift from a non-literate to a literate culture. However, the details of such an early symbolic status are difficult to trace, and we should be cautious not to exaggerate it, since earlier sources like the *Old Tibetan Chronicle* and *Old Tibetan Annals* dwell only on the bureaucratic and administrative purposes of writing.[49] Moreover, Tibetans must have been familiar with scripture already before the invention of their own script through the contact with different literate neighbors, a fact confirmed by the legend of Lha tho tho ri.

As van Schaik has sharp-wittedly noticed, another important motive that surfaces in both narratives is the connection of scripture with Buddhism.[50] While the potency of Lha tho tho ri's received scriptural exemplars certainly did not exclusively lie in their written form but also in the fact of their – yet unknown – Buddhist origin, the legend of Thon mi directly links the invention of writing with Buddhist motives such as the spread of Buddhism in Tibet and the translation of Buddhist sources. Yet, the *Old Tibetan Chronicle* and *Old Tibetan Annals* again lack any reference to the translation or composition of Buddhist texts as a major scriptural task

---

[47] The earliest dedicated commentary known at present is Dbus pa blo gsal's *Rtags 'jug kyi 'grel pa* (14th century), although some version of the root texts must have circulated earlier, at least most of their content occurs literally in Sakya Paṇḍita's *Yi ge'i sbyor ba* yet in an entirely different order of the verses. Like SCP and TKJ, Sakya Paṇḍita's text is a short grammar composed in verse form that are partially identical with those in the root texts and partially unknown from SCP or TKJ. The *Yi ge'i sbyor ba* makes reference to neither of the two. On the *Yi ge'i sbyor ba* and its relation to SCP and TKJ, cf. Miller 1993, 130ff. In addition, parts such as the old derivation of the traditional grammatical case marker *la don* in SCP hint into the direction of an early composition at least of some portions of the two texts (cf. infra 82).

[48] Cf. Miller 1993 and van Schaik 2011, 51.

[49] Cf. van Schaik 2011, 52ff.

[50] Cf. ibid.

20

during the reign of king Srong btsan sgam po, although the invention of a writing system was indubitably indispensable for a larger-scale introduction of Buddhism.[51] It is evident and without need of elaboration that literacy must have been a powerful technology to organize the administration of the state in the form of record-writing, legislation, taxation and so on. However, Buddhist scholarly tasks such as the translation of Buddhist sources do not seem to have become a dominant force before the institutionalization of Buddhism by Khri srong lde btsan (r. 755-797 AD).

Thon mi's travel to India directly connects both the quest to spread Buddhism in Tibet as well as the invention of a Tibetan writing system with India. While the written form of Tibetan was certainly developed based on Indian abugida scripts the precise templates have been heavily debated among traditional and academic linguists. Usually, these are considered to have consisted in the Indian Brahmī script or one of its derivates which had previously circulated in South and Central Asia.[52] In his recent investigation of the Tibetan writing system, van Schaik argues with strong paleographic and historical evidence that the most likely candidates for such templates are the late Gupta scripts (5th - early 7th century) in the regions of present-day Northern India and Nepal.[53] This is not the place to consider the historical and linguistic reasons involved in the Tibetan adoption of the abugida form of writing widely spread in South Asian regions, as opposed to, for example, a logographic system with which they would have been familiar with based on their contacts to their Chinese neighbors. However, it is important to note that this basic orientation in systems of writing towards the Indian model does not apply in the same way to all other appropriated writing practices during imperial times. Kapstein lists a number of non-Indian forms of knowledge the Tibetans had acquired before the dominance of Buddhism,[54] and Dotson, in his study and translation of the *Old Tibetan Annals,* points towards influential affiliations to Chinese bureaucracy during the time of Srong btsan sgam po by tracing these in the perhaps likewise exaggerated Chinese account found in the *Old Tang Annals*.[55] In the same study, among those works translated into Tibetan already by the mid-8th century, Dotson also mentions Chinese classics, Chan Buddhist teachings and apocrypha, thus corroborating the influx of non-Indian knowledge during that time.[56]

---

[51] Cf. ibid. On the issue of the beginning of translation in Tibet, cf. infra 24.
[52] For an introduction to the Tibetan script, cf. van der Kuijp 1996.
[53] Cf. van Schaik 2011. For his delineation of Northern India, cf. ibid., ft. 73.
[54] Cf. supra 18.
[55] Cf. Dotson 2009, 11.
[56] Cf. ibid., 20.

Along with the above motives of the symbolic power of scripture, the Buddhification of the foundation of Tibetan literacy and its connection to India features lastly the composition of the first Tibetan grammars in the legend of Thon mi.[57] Despite the unresolved issues surrounding the composition of SCP and TKJ and the historicity of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa as such, the basic orientation regarding the issue of grammar towards India and Sanskrit from the very beginning of Tibetan linguistic analysis remains largely uncontested. Not only does the Tibetan grammatical system indisputably exhibit such conceptual and terminological affinities, but also other possible role models such as Chinese grammatical studies only emerge much later than the Tibetan imperial epoch,[58] and in this time linguistic studies are testified through several grammatical sources in addition to the historically problematic SCP and TKJ.[59]

The legends of Lha tho tho ri and Thon mi present a picture of Tibetan history in which the adoption of scripture and grammar from the Indian subcontinent were important, even sacred vehicles for the Tibetan civilization, a civilization understood above all as the result of the appropriation of Buddhism, Buddhist scholarship and ultimately Buddhist salvation. This fundamental status of grammar for Buddhism is further supported by grammarians in a mostly pious fashion that depicts the purpose of grammatical endeavors in an intuitive causal chain: Buddhist salvation or enlightenment is nothing but a state of ultimate knowledge or omniscience, a type of knowledge for which language and scripture are ultimately insufficient yet indispensable in the process of learning, and mastery of language and scripture, in turn, means mastery of grammar.[60]

The tradition's own perception of the foundational character of grammatical studies in the Tibetan Buddhist scholarly enterprise and the propagated role of grammar in the civilization of Tibet and the Buddhist path to enlightenment – regardless of its historical accuracy – must have been an important force in the promotion of this discipline, and we have seen the most famous specimen of this perception in the present section. However, the emergence and flourishing of grammar and linguistics was most certainly the result of a complex of different theoretical, cultural, political, religious and other factors in the history of Tibetan scholarship that remain only vaguely perceptible with our current state of knowledge. Among the many efforts and

---

[57] Note that the Tibetan *Bon* tradition does not accept this narrative and relates the writing system to different origins including Central Asia or even Iran (cf. van der Kuijp 1996, 431 and van Schaik 2011, 65ff.). This claim by followers of the non-Buddhist *Bon* has to be regarded not exclusively as an important historical matter but again in the context of a power struggle regarding the cultural identity of Tibet and *Bon*'s raison d'etre against the backdrop of a strongly domineering Buddhism on the Himalayan Plateau.

[58] Cf. infra 49f.

[59] Cf. HSGLT 2, chapter 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.

[60] On Lce Khyi 'brug's parable of the boat and the ocean to emphasize the importance of grammar, cf. e.g. infra 30f.

practices in the Land of Snow which have in one way or another relied on scripture, the following section will take a closer look at the transmission of Buddhist knowledge from India and the translation of Buddhist sources. The translation enterprises of Buddhist literature are of particular interest in this context, since during the 8th/9th century they prompted an extensive standardization not only of translational practices but of the written form of Tibetan itself that stands in close relation to the emergence of grammatical studies, at least as far as we are able to trace it in the source materials other than the presented legendary accounts.

2.3 Early Linguistic Studies in Tibet and the Translation of Buddhist Sources

Amongst the most important means of the appropriation of Buddhism was the translation of a vast corpus of mostly – but not exclusively – Sanskrit sources into the newly established written Tibetan language. Any translation of more complex material requires various degrees of comparative analytical knowledge about the source and target language, and thus it is intelligible that the large-scale translation of Buddhist sources coincided also with the study of grammar. It is noteworthy in this context that many, if not most Tibetan grammarians also were active translators as well as Buddhist scholars. This holds true already during the imperial epoch and not only for the legendary account of Thon mi as an alleged grammarian and translator, but also for figures such as the Tibetan-Chinese translator Chos grub (Facheng; 9th century) or the venerated Lce Khyi ’brug (8th/9th century), both who composed grammatical texts that presently rank among the earliest dateable texts in the Tibetan tradition. The former composed a short exposé of case grammar in Tibetan (either for Tibetan, Sanskrit or both) entitled *’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa* (‘Exposition of the Eight Joining Terms/Morphemes/Forms in Verse Form’),[61] whereas Lce Khyi ’brug authored the *Gnas brgyad chen po’i rtsa ba* (NG; ‘Root Text on the Eight Great Linguistic Topics’) and presumably also the *Gnas brgyad ’grel pa* (NGg; ‘Commentary on the Eight Linguistic Topics’)[62] as well as perhaps even the *Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa* (GNT; ‘Exposition of the Linguistic Cases’), all three of which are consecutively contained in the *bstan ’gyur*.[63] Thus, the connection between translation and the study of grammar is not only intuitive, but in the Tibetan context it is also attested historically. Yet, the emergence of grammatical studies as an esteemed and separate field in which Tibetan scholars composed autochthonous works on both Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar was not per se the necessary consequence of Buddhist

---

[61] Cf. HSGLT 2, 362ff.

[62] For a discussion of these eight topics, cf. HSGLT 2, 6ff. The *Gnas brgyad ’grel pa* is alternatively referred to as *Sgra’i bstan bcos* (‘Linguistic Śāstra’). Case grammar is covered in topic 6, the topic of grammatical cases.

[63] Cf. HSGLT 2, chapter 1.1.1.1-3. Note, however, that the third of these three texts, namely the *Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa* (GNT), is missing in the Sde dge and Co ne editions of the *bstan ’gyur*.

translation. This is evident also from Buddhist translation practices in China, where the study of grammar as a dedicated and distinct field did not emerge in pre-modern times.[64] What historical traces are therefore to be found in Tibet which would explain the emergence of a grammatical science and its close connection to translation?

In contrast to Tibetan historiography, which traces the first (Buddhist) translations back to Thon mi and Srong btsan sgam po, the beginning of translational practices and related royal interest during imperial times is much more difficult to trace before Khri srong lde btsan (r. 755-797). Next to Dotson's mention of the translation of Chinese literature by the mid-8th century,[65] two imperial edicts of the 8th and 9th centuries also allude to possibly earlier translations of Buddhist texts such as the *Ratnamegha* or the *Laṅkāvātarasūtra* and even to the ratification of translational principles, yet the edicts in their preserved versions vary in the dating of these events.[66] Accounts such as Thon mi's translation of the first Buddhist texts into Tibetan during Srong btsan sgam po's reign, though not impossible, lack verification. Whichever translations may have existed in whatever form previous to the mid-8th century, at the very latest from Khri srong lde btsan's times onwards, large-scale translation efforts of (Sanskrit) Buddhist sources certainly were effected with an associated patronage by the royalty, which also included the institutionalization and standardization of translational practices.

Much more far-reaching than mere guidelines for transferring knowledge from one language into another, Tibetan scholars and translators accomplished the creation of a highly standardized classical literary language, commonly known as *chos skad* ('Dharma language') and suitable for the translation of highly technical and sophisticated textual material in various fields of knowledge.[67] The resultant accuracy and its proximity to the translated Sanskrit originals are esteemed within modern academia and even resulted in attempts to reconstruct sources where the Sanskrit original is lost.[68] Among the testimonies preserved from this period, the *Bye brag tu rtogs byed chen mo* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, MVY) and *Sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa*

---

[64] On Chinese translation techniques, cf. HSGLT 1, 47f. and Zürcher 1982, 162-164. On Chinese grammatical studies, cf. infra 49f.

[65] Cf. supra 21.

[66] On the issue of dating the two mentioned translations, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 294ff. Scherrer-Schaub argues that "the idea they might have been translated into Tibetan at an early date should not be hastily rejected" (Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 298f.; cf. also ibid., 327). Regarding the first ratification of translational principles, the edicts leave open the possibility for a date before Khri srong lde btsan, although Scherrer-Schaub proposes the year 763 during his reign (cf. ibid., 314f.). On the two royal edicts and the different versions, cf. infra 25ff.

[67] Cf. Ruegg 2004, 322f.

[68] The Central University of Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, India, for example, has installed a separate Restoration Department that published several critical editions and restorations of Sanskrit Buddhist sources from Tibetan (http://www.cuts.ac.in/GuestSection/restoration.html, accessed March 6th, 2017).

(SSBP) bear the most impressive witness to the outstanding efforts to establish a literary form of Tibetan for scholarly purposes. The *Mahāvyutpatti* represents a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary which consists of more than 9.500 entries arranged into 283 semantic categories coined by translators,[69] ranging from various areas of Buddhist thought to more general topics such as 'names of diseases' (no. 283) and others. A number of entries (4.705-4.736) of this treatise is already dedicated to Sanskrit grammatical terminology under the heading '*vyākaraṇa'i skad kyi ming la*' ('terms of the idiom of *vyākaraṇa*'),[70] followed by the standard paradigm of the eight Sanskrit cases together with their reproduction in Tibetan language based on the noun *vṛkṣa*/*shing* ('tree, wood'). The second treatise, the SSBP, includes a commentary on 413 lexical entries of the MVY.[71]

Additionally, we are in the fortunate situation to have two royal edicts pertaining to these early translation activities. The later and better known edict is contained in the first part of the SSBP and thus incorporated in the treatises section of the Tibetan Buddhist canon (*bstan 'gyur*).[72] It was decreed during the reign of Khri lde srong btsan Sad na legs (r. 799-815), probably in the year 814. The earlier edict, which is likewise accompanied by a lexical part of comparable volume,[73] goes back to Khri lde srong btsan's father and predecessor, the emperor Khri srong lde btsan (r. 755-797) mentioned above.[74]

These two decrees testify the existence of a total of three ratifications of normative principles for the translation of Buddhist sources.[75] The first ratification is mentioned in the two decrees only in a cursory and retrospective fashion, and therefore its date and involved authorities are more opaque. As for the second ratification, it is accepted that the earlier of the two edicts, i.e. the Tabo version, was issued on its occasion, whereas the third ratification of translational norms was the purpose of the edict of Khri lde srong btsan Sad na legs contained in the canonical *Sgra sbyor* (SSBP). In most general terms, the later edict accepts and confirms the principles already mentioned in the Tabo version, yet it also adds to them and provides further

---

[69] According to Sakaki's edition 1916-25; cf. HSGLT 1, 17.

[70] Transl. HSGLT 2, 19.

[71] Cf. HSGLT 1, 17f.

[72] In addition to this edition, there exists "a fragmentary Dunhuang manuscript of what appears to be a virtually identical state of the edict and the text of sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa proper […] kept in the Bibliothéque Nationale (Paris)" (Verhagen 2015, 183), i.e. Pelliot tibétain 845.

[73] Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, ft. 142.

[74] This earlier edict is usually referred to as the 'Tabo version,' since it was discovered and identified among the Tabo manuscripts by Panglung Rinpoche in 1991 (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 270 and Panglung 1994). Scherrer-Schaub proposes the year 783 as the ratification of this earlier edict (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 314f.).

[75] For a detailed discussion of the edicts, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002. Following her study, the years of the three ratifications would be tentatively 763 or a little later (i.e. approximately the time of Śāntarakṣita's arrival in Tibet), 783 or less possibly 795, and 814.

detail.[76] Peter Verhagen discusses the details of how the translational tools promulgated in the two edicts advanced in the period between them, noting that "it seems the additional instructions (of the later edict) were not 'new' in the sense of being recent new insights per se, but perhaps rather formalizations of practices that had been current were here formally endorsed by the imperial edict." [77] These two edicts and the three ratifications attested therein for the standardization of translation and the *chos skad* occur in an already initiated, ongoing process of translation in Tibet and are a reaction to perceived deficiencies that have surfaced in this process. Whatever translational practices may have already existed in and before the mid-8th century, these edicts represent important witnesses of a royally supported, institutionalized revision of these practices and the written Tibetan language as their most important means.

According to the edict contained in the canonical SSBP, a central committee referred to as the *Bcom ldan 'das kyi ring lugs kyi 'dun sa*, which was probably installed already during the reign of Khri srong lde btsan,[78] was commissioned to supervise the translation of new terminology. Upon its approval, every newly adopted term was then added to a reference catalogue (*dkar chag*), presumably some version of the MVY. The edict emphasizes that any independent action in this regard by individual translation institutes (*grwa*) was strictly prohibited, which was a way of assuring that the translation techniques and guidelines also defined in the edict were followed to the greatest extent. These instructions also convey evidence for the importance attributed at that time to grammatical analysis in efforts to improve and standardize translational activities:

> *sngon lha sras yab kyi ring la/   ā cārya bo dhi satva dang/   ye shes dbang po dang/ zhang rgyal nyen nya bzang dang/   blon khri gzher sang shi dang/   lo tsā ba dznyā na de ba ko ṣa dang/   lce khyi 'brug dang/   bram ze ā nanda la sogs pas chos kyi skad bod la ma grags pa las ming du btags pa mang dag cig mchis pa'i nang nas kha cig chos kyi gzhung dang/   byā ka ra ṇa'i lugs dang mi mthun te/   mi bcos su mi rung ba rnams kyang bcos/   skad kyi ming gces so 'tshal gyis kyang bsnan nas theg pa che chung gi gzhung las ji ltar 'byung ba dang/   gna'i mkhan po chen po nā gā rdzu na dang/   ba su bandhu la sogs pas ji ltar bshad pa dang/   byā ka ra ṇa'i sgra'i lugs las ji skad du 'dren pa dang yang bstun te/*

"Earlier, during the time of the father (i.e. Khri srong lde btsan; r. 755-797) of the divine son (i.e. Khri lde srong btsan), a great corpus of terms had been coined from the

---

[76] For a direct comparison of the two edicts, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 317ff.

[77] Verhagen 2015, 185.

[78] Already the Tabo version mentions a *bcom ldan 'das ring lugs* (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 88).

26

Dharma language [previously] unknown in Tibet by Ācāryabodhisattva, Ye shes dbang po, Zhang Rgyal nyen nya bzang, the minister Khri bzher sang shi, the translator Jñānadevakoṣa, Lce Khyi 'brug, the brahmin Ananda and others. Among these [terms], some had to be inevitably amended due to their discordance with the Dharma sources and the grammatical system (= *vyākaraṇa*). Furthermore, [this corpus of terms] was augmented by all the nomenclature that was deemed important. Then [these terms] were [coined] in accordance with the way they occur in the scriptures of the higher and lower vehicles, the way they were explained by earlier masters, such as Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and others, and the way they are derived from the linguistic system of *vyākaraṇa*."[79]

This passage describes the motives for issuing this third revision of translational practices, i.e. a discordance with authoritative knowledge during the time of Khri srong lde btsan.[80] It refers twice to Indian *vyākaraṇa* ('grammar') as an authority which must be – and apparently has not been sufficiently – taken into account in the translation of terminology. Peter Verhagen presents the various types of Sanskrit grammatical analysis which were executed in the lexical part of the SSBP for translations of Sanskrit terminology into Tibetan and which required knowledge of traditional Sanskrit grammar.[81] Thus, the royally supported efforts to issue common principles included *vyākaraṇa* as one such criteria, and in this way linguistic sciences were promoted on the Himalayan Plateau during these early times. Although the earlier edict contained in the Tabo version lacks the above passage and therefore does not explicitly mention *vyākaraṇa* as an important authority,[82] the lexical part attached to it proves the use of Sanskrit grammatical analysis – which indicates that the role of *vyākaraṇa* in the compilation and standardization of terminology was already established earlier than the third and final ratification present in the SSBP.

The fact that Indian *vyākaraṇa* became an integral part of the translators' efforts to revise existing translations and reform the practices that produced them is perhaps of little surprise in view of their close collaboration with Sanskrit *paṇḍitas*, a few of which were just named above in SSBP's edict. In Indian scholarly education, there has been a strong and long-standing

---

[79] CT *115* – 312f. For alternative translations of this passage, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 69; Kapstein 2003, 755f.
[80] This part is therefore missing in the earlier edict and represents an addition.
[81] Cf. HSGLT 1, 19ff.
[82] Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 318f.

emphasis on the study of grammar,[83] as attested, for example, in the prelude (*kathāmukha*) to the world-famous *Pañcatantra*:

> "'Gentlemen, it is known to you that these sons of mine, being hostile to education, are lacking in discernment. So when I behold them, my kingdom brings me no happiness, though all external thorns are drawn. For there is wisdom in the proverb:
>
>> Of sons unborn, or dead, or fools,
>>
>> Unborn or dead will do:
>>
>> They cause a little grief, no doubt;
>>
>> But fools, a long life through.
>
> And again:
>
>> To what good purpose can a cow
>>
>> That brings no calf nor milk, be bent?
>>
>> Or why beget a son who proves
>>
>> A dunce and disobedient?
>
> Some means must therefore be devised to awaken their intelligence.'
>
> And they, one after another, replied: 'O King, first one learns grammar, in twelve years. If this subject has somehow been mastered, then one masters the books on religion and practical life. Then the intelligence awakens.'"[84]

In his study of education in ancient India, Hartmut Scharfe states that "what is almost totally absent is the concept of a science or an art for its own sake, since even the seemingly most theoretical science has a goal - not the detached search for truth as we would have it, but deliverance through assimilation of the truth that has been revealed."[85] This holds equally true for the science of grammar. Patañjali, for example, refers to grammar as the most important among the six ancillaries to the study of the Veda, for such purposes as to preserve the sacred Veda, assure correct understanding, correctly perform ritual and more generally to eradicate defective use of words among brahmins.[86] When Patañjali's emphasis on Sanskrit grammar is regarded in its socio-political context, what was most likely at stake was the Sanskritic and Brahmanical dominion which was threatened by the Prakrit languages spoken by the common

---

[83] Cf. Scharfe 2002, 60f. In this context, cf. also Takakusu's translation of the Chinese Buddhist monk I-tsing's travel records (671-695) to India and the Malay Archipelago, where the latter devoted a section on education, including a grammatical curriculum in western (?) India (cf. I-tsing 1896, chapter XXXIV, 167ff.).

[84] Transl. Ryder 1925, 13f.

[85] Scharfe 2002, 59.

[86] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen (1986, 26ff.) on *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh), *Paspaśāhnika*, *Bhāṣya* 16ff., particularly *Bhāṣya* 19. The six ancillary disciplines are *śikṣā* ('phonetics'), *kalpa* ('ritual'), *vyākaraṇa* ('grammar'), *nirukta* ('etymology'), *chandas* ('prosody') and *jyotiṣa* ('astrology').

people.[87] Yet, the importance and prestige of Sanskrit grammatical studies remained throughout the course of time, even after different forms of Prakrit languages evolved in literary arts and philosophy.[88] Sanskrit is the language that is 'properly constructed' (*saṃskṛta*) and the correct use of Sanskrit words continued to be highly esteemed, prestigious and even necessary to many of the scholarly and religious practices in India.

Returning to the Himalayan plateau, the above passage from the SSBP ranks among the earliest dateable testimonies to the fact that grammatical studies had been practiced and esteemed, and it is perhaps the only one of that time which provides a concrete historical context and describes the promotion of this practice as a royally supported, centralized revision and standardization of translation. Apart from these fractured bits, it is difficult to trace whether grammatical analysis already existed before the royally supported revision enterprises. We can assume that grammatical studies must have been involved from the very time the first translations were made from Sanskrit, simply for the acquisition of necessary language skills. May these have been initiated already during the time of Srong btsan sgam po or only shortly before the first revision, it was most likely through the centralized revision of translational practices that the Tibetan tradition first gave increasing and lasting attention to grammar.

The shape and form of possible grammatical studies previous to the revisions remains unknown – perhaps these were confined to translators who conducted a merely passive study of Sanskrit grammar, perhaps there were first compositions of study materials or perhaps even real linguistic treatises such as proto-versions of SCP and TKJ. As already noted above, with the 8th/9th century we have evidence for the existence of Tibetan linguistic works in relation to the translation of Buddhist sources by figures such as Lce Khyi 'brug and Facheng (Chos grub), and thus in- and outside the context of royally supported translation revision. The following section will take a closer look at such traces and how the composition of linguistic texts emerged within the revision and standardization of Sanskrit Buddhist translations.

2.3.1 On the Beginnings of Tibetan Autochthonous Grammatical Compositions

The extent and depth of Sanskrit grammatical analysis in the lexical part of the SSBP and its Tabo version certainly required an extensive occupation with the Sanskritic grammatical system (*vyākaraṇa'i lugs*). Yet, the ways in which this focus on Indian *vyākaraṇa* led further to the composition of autochthonous grammars is an intricate issue with a general lack of more extensive evidence. One helpful point of reference may be the Tibetan translator and

---

[87] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1991, 8f.
[88] Cf. also Scharfe 2002, 61f.

grammarian Lce Khyi 'brug, who flourished already shortly before the issuing of the second edict quoted above and who presumably is the author of up to three grammatical works preserved in the *bstan 'gyur*. He is also listed among the active translators during the time of Khri srong lde btsan and was thus involved in the contemporaneous terminological standardization and compilation.[89] As testified by the existence of sources such as Lce Khyi 'brug's NG, his efforts as a translator of Sanskrit sources in terminological standardization and compilation went hand in hand with the translation of and probably also the commentary on grammatical terminology in a dedicated work.[90] At the end of his NG, Lce Khyi 'brug mentions the following parable:

> *dbul ba 'joms byed rnyed dka' rin po che/   bgrod dka' rgya mtsho che la gnas pa dag legs par gru btsugs dar phyar rlung gis bskyod/   rin chen thob byed gzhan du thabs med bzhin/   sdug bsngal 'joms byed dam chos rin po che/   rtogs dka' gsung rab rgya mtsho dag la gnas/   yi ge ming dang tshig gi 'bru btsugs te/   sgra yi dar phyar shes rab rlung gis bskyod/   dam chos thob byed gzhan du thabs med do/*

> "The poverty's conqueror, the jewels difficult to find dwell in the great ocean difficult to traverse. Having built a proper boat [and] hoisted the sail, moved by the wind [one] attains the jewel. Other than that, there is no way. Likewise, the jewel [which is] the suffering's conqueror, the noble Dharma, dwells in the ocean of Buddha's word (*gsung rab*) difficult to realize. Having built the boat of letters (*yi ge*), free, lexical word forms (*ming*) and syntactic forms (*tshig*) and hoisted the sail of linguistics, moved by the wind of wisdom [one] attains the noble Dharma. Other than that, there is no way."[91]

This commitment to scripture for the realization of the Buddhist doctrine tells us that the attainment of the Dharma can only be achieved by skillfully navigating through the vast ocean of the Buddha's words (*gsung rab*) as presented in the authentic scriptures. The sole expedient

---

[89] Cf. supra 26f.

[90] Of the three texts that could be attributed to him, only one bears his name in the colophon, namely the *Gnas brgyad chen po'i rtsa ba* (NG; 'Root text on the eight great linguistic topics'):

> "The translation/compiling (*bsgyur ba* ?) of some *vyākaraṇa*-terminology (*byā ka ra ṇa'i skad mdo tsam zhig*) by Ce khyi 'brug, the *Gnas brgyad (chen) po'i rtsa ba* is finished."
> *ce khyi 'brug gis byā ka ra ṇa'i skad mdo tsam zhig bsgyur ba gnas brgyad (chen) po'i rtsa ba rdzogs so* (CT *115* – 413)

The Tibetan tradition usually mentions Lce/Ce khyi 'brug as the author and not translator of the NG, although the nominal form *bsgyur ba* ('translation') rather indicates that he did not compose the text himself. Both options cannot be ruled out, but it seems to be more plausible that he translated *and* commented *vyākaraṇa*-terminology. The unusual and in Sanskritic sources thus far unattested material contained in NG and its commentary (NGg) suggests that a straightforward translation of a Sanskritic source is rather unlikely in my view, although an ultimate decision would require a thorough philological scrutiny of the text. Related to this issue, the text also raises the question whether it deals with Sanskrit, Tibetan, both languages or languages in general (cf. infra 31f.).

[91] CT *115* – 413.

means thus is literacy – the boat of letters (*yi ge*), syntactically free, lexical word forms (*ming*) and syntactic forms (*tshig*) – guided by the wind of wisdom to progress into the right direction. Yet, it is only through the study of linguistics and grammar (*sgra*) that wisdom leads to the Dharma, for the boat does not travel when its sails are not hoisted, despite the strong breeze of wisdom. Although a direct comparison of Patañjali's assessment of the importance of grammar and the views expressed by Lce Khyi 'brug is only partially reasonable and reveals more differences than similarities, the above quotation still strongly resonates with general ideas that widely permeated Indian scholarship with which he was most probably familiar through his Indian colleagues – first and foremost the mainly pious motive of grammatical knowledge as indispensable for the study of sacred texts and ultimately for the realization of soteriological goals. Besides any practical use of autochthonous grammars in the revision of translations, such motives together with the prestige that grammatical studies occupied in India must have certainly left a strong impression on figures such as Lce Khyi 'brug and perhaps even the royalty itself, situated in an emerging intellectual tradition that was only about to develop its own forms of knowledge production and literature in close collaboration with Indian scholars. Different scenarios may be envisaged as to the ways in which a translator such as Lce Khyi 'brug might have initiated such an endeavor: perhaps it was conceived as part of the formalization of translation, maybe it even carried an official status as some form of theoretical textbook in addition to SSBP and MVY, or perhaps it was composed based on personal interest.

Another question that arises in this context is how and to which extent the focus on Sanskrit grammatical analysis expanded on the study of Tibetan grammar already at that time. Although SCP and TKJ are historically problematic in their present form, passages such as SCP 9.3-11.2 attest that portions of them, and thus Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis as well, must go back to the early stages of Tibetan literacy.[92] However, it remains open whether the origins of these portions are to be sought before, during or still after the revisions of translations. Apart from SCP and TKJ, the above-mentioned early sources NG and NGg as well as Chos grub's *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa* ('Exposition of the Eight Joining Terms/Morphemes/Forms in Verse Form') all share the feature that they are difficult to attribute to a specific language. Without doubt, in one way or another they all draw upon Sanskrit grammatical knowledge, and NG and NGg even contain portions specifically dedicated to Sanskrit morphology together with its Tibetan equivalents. However, the texts themselves do not explicate whether the promulgated theories and analytical models pertain to one, both or

---

[92] SCP 9.3-11.2 provides an old derivation of the morphological category *la don* that is known from pillar inscriptions and Dunhuang manuscripts (cf. infra 82).

languages in general. Overall, these sources do not give the impression of being dedicated to Sanskrit per se, since their main contents appear to be focused on linguistic, grammatical and language-related topics in a broader sense, which are not dedicated to a specific language but to forms of linguistic analysis that are generally or perhaps even universally applicable.[93] In the case of later grammarians such as Si tu, we will see in part II that he did regard the contents of NG(g) as applicable to Tibetan language. A more general and perhaps indeed universal approach to grammar in NG(g) is further corroborated by the GNT, possibly authored by the same Lce khyi 'brug but composed no later than during the early period of the second dissemination of Buddhism (10th/early 11th century).[94] This text makes clear reference to the universality of its case model and contains several portions dedicated to the discussion of language-specific morphologies of both Sanskrit and Tibetan.[95] Another noteworthy source in this regard is the historically problematic *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* (*Sarvabhāṣāpravartanavyākaraṇaśāstra*, 'Linguistic *Śāstra* Pertaining to All Speech') together with its autocommentary (*-vṛtti*), both of which allegedly represent Sanskritic compositions and are contained in the *bstan 'gyur*.[96] Although the colophons of both CG 16 and 17 mention Subhāṣākīrti as their author, the texts themselves are rather opaque regarding their Sanskritic origin, authorship and content. In any case, their titles and contents do suggest the universal applicability of their propounded theories. Interestingly, these texts do not only contain a section on the fundamentals of Sanskrit case functions, i.e. the *kāraka* theory, in close affinity to typical Tibetan conceptions of the case model, they also list many if not most of the non-case functions of SCP that have been hardly traceable in any Sanskritic sources so far.[97]

Presuming that the hypothesis regarding a universal approach to grammar in these early sources proves consistent, the linguistic analysis of Tibetan language structures may have arisen as a natural byproduct of the presentation and exemplification of cross-linguistic theories in sources such as NG(g), GNT, and others. Part II will detail how this more 'universal' validity of linguistic models not only facilitated the expansion of Sanskrit grammatical studies on the

---

[93] For a concrete instance of this issue on the language under investigation, cf. also infra 198ff. on NGg's presentation of the first two *kāraka*s of the eightfold *kāraka*-scheme.

[94] Cf. HSGLT 2, 15.

[95] Cf. e.g. infra 95f., 173 and 291.

[96] Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 16 and 17. The two texts together will be referred to as *Smra ba kun*.

[97] Leaving alone the historical problems and assuming their Indian origin, texts like CG 16 and 17 might have likely been direct sources of inspiration already in early Tibetan grammaticography. If not of Sanskritic origin, the fairly unusual grammatical taxonomies presented therein might have still been an important theoretical basis for Tibetan grammarians, somehow transmitted in their contact with Indian *paṇḍita*s and grammatical knowledge. As a personal remark, Peter Verhagen asked whether we can even look upon them as 'class notes' of a lecture (personal e-mail conversation dated September 1st, 2016). On *kāraka*, cf. infra 88f. and chapter 5.4.

Tibetan *chos skad*, but also how it was instrumental as a major mechanism in shaping the adaptation and non-adaptation of the Tibetan case model.

Another question that begs to be raised at this point is the extent to which the purpose of early autochthonous works composed by translators that do apply to Tibetan-specific grammar – either exclusively or in the form of general or universal linguistics – lies in the practical use to either produce or refine concrete translations and resolve translational problems. In fact, they often appear to lack any practicable nature in this regard. Although this issue needs to be separately addressed for each individual grammatical source and topic, chapter 5.1 features a discussion of the shortcomings of the traditional Tibetan case model with regard to the morphosyntactic distribution of the *chos skad*.[98] The substantial divergence between the case model and WT's language structures alone suffice to conclude that Tibetan grammarians of that time did not develop the cases through monitoring and revising Sanskrit-Tibetan syntactic equivalents to produce concrete translational manuals or grammars, and even where this might have been the case they could have done so only on a very generalized and simplified basis that easily leads to significant errors in Tibetan if not accompanied by the language proficiency of a native-speaking translator.

If any version of SCP and TKJ was composed during that time, we might nonetheless imagine that they served practical purposes such as teaching correct morphological derivations of Tibetan grammatical markers and word forms, a central topic in both texts. On the other hand, if works such as that of Lce Khyi 'brug did not simply serve the general scholarly purposes of introducing selected topics of Indian linguistic studies to the newly emerging Tibetan scholarship, the practical translational purpose of topics such as the case grammar in NG(g) may have been at most that of a metalinguistic-semantic analytical tool which clarifies basic problems of understanding on a rather gross level more hermeneutical than strictly grammatical in nature. Moreover, NG(g) comprises a selection of eight linguistic topics in the broadest sense, some of which come with a strong philosophical character that grants only limited utility in translational work.[99] We may therefore come to the conclusion that some of the earliest autochthonous compositions, despite the fact that they were produced within the context of

---

[98] Cf. infra 92ff., as well as the respective investigations of the classical eight Tibetan cases in chapters 7-14.
[99] On the eight selected topics in NG and NGg, cf. HSGLT 2, 6ff. Cf. for example topic 5, i.e. the topic of the domains pertaining to letters/sounds/phonemes (*yi ge 'jug pa'i gnas*; lit 'the topic of [where] letters/sounds/phonemes engage'), which defines the nature of eight linguistic technical terms such as *sgra* ('sound'), *skad* ('language'), *brda* ('linguistic sign, signifier'), *don* ('meaning, semantics') and their relation. In comparison, topic 4 (*drang ba'i gnas*) seems to be related more to logical reasoning.

translation and its revision, were probably not primarily intended for the purpose of any translational practices.[100]

In general, the elaboration, prestige and proclaimed importance of Sanskrit grammatical knowledge for soteriological goals provided favorable circumstances that apparently encouraged Tibetan scholars to compose the above-mentioned texts, which was even further supported by the context of translational revisions where grammar received special attention. Furthermore, the preserved source materials suggest that the cross-lingual validity of originally Sanskrit grammatical models have naturally facilitated Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis in early Tibetan compositions, yet with neither Tibetan nor Sanskrit as the actual topic, instead the languages perhaps served only as templates to introduce and illustrate general linguistic topics and theories. Other than that, the actual causes for the expansion of grammatical analysis to Tibetan language are difficult to extract, and these may have varied in view of the different grammatical genres – those pertaining specifically to Tibetan (SCP and TKJ) and the more general grammars (NG, NGg, GNT, etc.) – as well as in- and outside the context of the revision of translation.

Thus far, the current investigation has not only revealed some traces of how linguistic studies emerged in the course of translation, particularly that of a royally patronized revision of translation, and how Tibetan scholars have developed forms of linguistic studies that included autochthonous works applicable to Sanskrit and Tibetan language. It has also become clear that grammatical studies in Tibet were concerned with syntactic knowledge and more specifically with case grammar from the very beginning. Yet, what are the reasons of Tibetan translators and grammarians for devoting their attention to case grammar? And are there any traces that the centralized revision and standardization of translation helped to promote case grammar as a prominent Tibetan grammatical topic?

2.3.2 Tracing the Role of Syntactic Knowledge in the Revision of Translation

Any translation from a source into a target language naturally requires comparative knowledge of the syntactic features of both languages, including case grammar, so that linguistic expressions of a higher grammatical hierarchy than lexical words (i.e. phrases, clauses, and sentences) may be accurately rendered. Although Peter Verhagen lists the various types of Sanskrit grammatical analysis in the lexical part of the SSBP,[101] unfortunately I have not been

---

[100] It is to be kept in mind that Lce Khyi 'brug was explicitly mentioned as part of the revision efforts during Khri srong lde btsan.

[101] Cf. HSGLT 1, 19ff.

able to identify a particular occurrence of the utilization of grammatical knowledge other than for the purpose of the derivation of syntactically unbound, lexical terminology; that is to say, more 'syntactic' knowledge such as the derivation of case suffixes, case grammar in general and so on seems to have played no or only a minor role in the SSBP. This becomes apparent from the fact that the SSBP is a compilation of lexical entries rather than a grammar in the common modern sense. Yet, this does not mean that the ratified standardization of translation and explicitly related importance of Indian *vyākaraṇa* did not include the consideration of case grammar or other syntax. It is important to note at this point that Sanskritic grammatical schools usually do not strictly distinguish between syntactic and other aspects of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), a discipline which is ultimately concerned exclusively with the single maxim to form complete and syntactically functioning word forms (*pada*, *tshig*) through the affixation, substitution or elision of inflectional morphemes.[102] Consequently, if Tibetan translators were able to master the derivation of Sanskrit lexical entries in the SSBP, they certainly were also well acquainted with the elaborate and eminent Sanskritic system of case grammar.

If we can assume that the entire revision was not exclusive to terminological conventions, it would be only natural, if the standardization of translation has been an impulse for translators also to seek a more standardized and accurate translation of syntactic structures that conforms with the standards of *vyākaraṇa*. Evidence for the consideration of linguistic expressions of a higher order than independent terminology as well as syntactic structures of such expressions in the standardization of translation is articulated in SSBP's edict dated 814, although not without philological issues:

> *dam pa'i chos bsgyur ba'i lugs ni don dang yang mi 'khal la bod skad la yang gar bde bar gyis shig   dharmma bsgyur ba la rgya gar gyi skad kyi go rims las mi bsnor ba bod kyi skad du bsgyur na don dang tshig tu 'grel zhing bde na ma bsnor bar sgyur cig bsnor na bde zhing go ba bskyed pa cig yod na/   tshigs bcad la ni rtsa ba bzhi pa'am/ drug pa'ang rung ste/   tshigs su bcad pa gcig gi nang na gang bde ba bsnor zhing sgyur cig   rkyang pa la ni don gang snyegs pa yan chad kyi tshig dang don gnyis ka la gar bde bar bsnor zhing sgyur cig*

> "As for the manner of translating the sublime Dharma: It must not contradict the meaning (*don dang* [...] *mi 'khal ba*), but it must also be done in a way that is accessible (~ easy [to read/understand]; *bde ba*) in Tibetan language. When translating Dharma, if

---

[102] Cf. e.g. Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, particularly P 1.4.14 *suptiṅantaṃ padam* "[A] *pada* [is that which either] ends [in a] nominal suffix (*sup*) [or a] verbal suffix (*tiṅ*)."

translated into the Tibetan language without deviating from the Sanskrit structure (*go rims*), then under the condition that it is coherent and accessible in content as well as syntax (*don dang tshig tu 'brel zhing bde*). If [one] deviates [from the Sanskrit structure], then under the condition that it is accessible and comprehensible: As for verses, four or also six lines are suitable, and within one single verse line one may deviate and translate whatever is accessible/easy [for the reader]. As for prose, one may deviate and translate whatever is accessible in terms of both syntax and content (*tshig dang don gnyis ka la gar bde*), [as long as the syntax/phrasing (*tshig*) and content/meaning (*don*) remain] within the boundaries of the meaning pursued [by the translated text]."[103]

In this passage, the edict offers basic principles for translating portions of Sanskrit language that surpass single, independent word forms. A translation is required to fulfill two main criteria: it must not contradict the meaning of the translated original (*mi 'khal ba*) and it must be accessible or easy to the readership (*bde ba*). I am not fully content with my translation of *bde ba* as 'accessible' or 'easy', yet the term usually refers to a state of mind or affection – happiness, felicity, content, pleasure – and in the current context it indicates that a translation should not be strenuous to the reader in terms of meaning/content (*don*) and phrasing/syntax (*tshig*). The accessibility is thus derived from the pleasant (*bde ba*) state of mind the reader maintains during reading, presumably as a result of effortlessness. This is readily comprehensible to every student or scholar who has studied difficult works that can cause a headache both metaphorically and literally.[104] Moreover, the translation of the term *tshig* in the sense of 'syntax' is based on its two main technical uses familiar to Tibetan grammarians and translators as the Tibetan pendant of Sanskrit *pada*, one based in Sanskrit grammar and the other based on the Buddhist *Abhidharma*. The term *pada* (*tshig*) refers either to syntactically bound word forms (grammar) or to free, lexical word forms combined into connected phrases and sentences (*Abhidharma*), however, in both cases it refers to syntactic entities that express information in addition to a word's unbound lexical value.[105] Alternatively, a more general and less accentuated translation of *tshig* would be 'phrasing,' of which syntax is only one aspect.

The two basic types of translation distinguished in the edict are those not deviating (*mi bsnor ba*) and those deviating (*bsnor ba*) from the original Sanskrit structure of the phrase, sentence or perhaps even paragraph. Obviously, both types need to fulfill the criteria of *mi 'khal ba* and

---

[103] CT *115* – 313. For alternative translations, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 72; Kapstein 2003, 756.

[104] On the notion of *bde ba* in this context, cf. also Sakya Paṇḍita's notes on how to write a synopsis (*bsdus don*) in the third chapter of his *Mkhas 'jug*, where he elaborates in more detail notions such as *brjod bde ba* ('easy to express/pronounce/read') and others (cf. KhJ 2009, 96f.).

[105] For more details, cf. chapter 5.3.

bde ba, but whenever the Sanskrit structure is transferred into Tibetan language without deviation, the translation also has to fulfill the criterion of syntactic and contentual or semantic coherency (*'brel ba*), which is missing for the deviating type and was apparently presupposed. It is important to note that the Tabo version only provides guidelines for the non-deviating type of translation and omits mention of the deviating type. Although both edicts remained silent as to which of the two strategies (non-deviating and deviating) is to be preferred or perhaps even used as the default method, it is safe to assume that the non-deviating type of translation was the preferred ideal in view of the larger context of the standardization of translation at greatest possible accuracy. Moreover, if the principles of coherence (*'brel ba*) and accessibility (*bde ba*) are fulfilled in a non-deviating translation, it does not according to this theory fall behind the deviating type and the proximity to the source language is but an additional improvement.

Since the Tibetan text above poses certain difficulties and since there are alternative and deviating translations,[106] this passage requires closer philological scrutiny especially of the two notions *go rims (las bsnor ba)* and *don dang tshig tu 'brel zhing bde ba*:

The phrase *go rims las bsnor ba* ('to deviate from the structure') bears the ambiguity of either including syntactic modifications such as the change of case markers and so on or only referring in a narrower sense to a switch (*bsnor ba*) of the original order (*go rims*) of words or phrases in a translated sentence. In case of the latter, there arises the additional question as to whether the author(s) of the edict included the possibility of syntactic deviation from Sanskrit structures, or whether this statement prohibits deviation from the syntactic structure of a Sanskrit sentence. As for the latter, it is unlikely in my view that the edict would dictate such a restrictive methodology hardly ever to be executed in practice, since there is no direct one-to-one correspondence between Sanskrit and Tibetan vocabulary or syntax and thus no single way of rendering the syntactic structures from one language into the other. In contrast, the option that syntactic restructuring was not included in *go rims* but simply left open in the decree is more difficult to rule out at this point. Nonetheless, it is most likely that we are faced with a rather general statement which defines two strategies of translating Sanskrit phrases, etc. into Tibetan (deviating vs. non-deviating), pertaining to structural features of the languages in a very broad, unspecified way and thus including possible syntactic deviations as well. This is corroborated

---

[106] Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 72; Kapstein 2003, 756.

also by Scherrer-Schaub's translation of this passage as well as by Matthew Kapstein's assessment of the same quotation.[107]

The perhaps most intricate issue in the above quotation regards the phrase *don dang tshig tu 'brel zhing bde* (*ba*). Scherrer-Schaub and Kapstein offer different renditions of the final passage while agreeing to read *don dang tshig tu 'brel* as one syntagma with the meaning of 'the relation/connection between meaning and word/phrase/expression.'[108] As alluded to by Scherrer-Schaub in a footnote, such a relation between *don* and *tshig* refers to the relation between signifier (*brjod byed*, *sgra*) and signified (*brjod bya*, *don*),[109] a topic that figures prominently in Indian and Tibetan philosophical literature as well as in topic five of NG and NGg. In that sense, *don dang tshig tu 'brel* clarifies that a non-deviating translation needs to remain meaningful in written Tibetan, and the item *bde ba* is treated as an additional attribute syntactically unrelated to *don dang tshig tu*. This understanding of *don dang tshig tu 'brel zhing bde* (*ba*) intuitively appears more correct especially against the background of the Tabo version, which only reads *don dang tshig tu 'breld pa* without the additional attribute *bde ba*.[110]

In contrast, my translation offers the tentative and rather unusual alternative 'coherent and accessible in content as well as syntax,' in which the phrase *don dang tshig tu* does not indicate the connected entities but represents a verbal attribute to both *'brel ba* and *bde ba*. One of the main reasons for this alternative translation is that the author(s) of the edict of SSBP repeat this attribute in the same quotation in the form of *tshig dang don gnyis ka la gar bde bar bsnor zhing bsgyur cig* ('translate and deviate whatever is accessible/easy with regard to both syntax and content'), this time omitting *'brel ba*.[111] Despite the Tabo version that might be more supportive of the understanding of the first phrase *don dang tshig tu 'brel zhing bde* along the lines of Scherrer-Schaub and Kapstein, it may therefore be argued for the possibility that Tibetan authors of the second edict understood this first phrase in the sense of *don dang tshig tu* being

---

[107] Cf. Scherrer-Schaub (1999, 72) who renders the phrase *rgya gar gyi skad kyi go rims las mi bsnor ba* as "without deviating from the arrangement of the Sanskrit [that is to say without deviating from the Sanskrit syntax]." Kapstein (2003, 756) also speaks of syntax and word order in this context.

[108] Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 72:

 '[…] [making] the connexion between expression and meaning well-adapted [to Tibetan], […].'
Kapstein 2003, 756:

 '[…] the ease of relationships between meaning and word.'

[109] Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 77.

[110] Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 319.

[111] Note that the phrase *tshig dang don gnyis ka la gar bde bar bsnor zhing bsgyur cig* ('translate and deviate whatever is both, syntactically and contentwise accessible/easy') is omitted in the Tabo version, since it belongs to the non-deviating type of translation that has not been mentioned in the earlier edict (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 320).

a single syntagma equal to *tshig dang don gnyis ka la* in the second phrase. Consequently, *don dang tshig tu* then represents an attribute to both *'brel ba* and *bde* (*ba*).

The entire section on the translation of phrases, sentences and so on in the edict of SSBP would then amount to the following: Every translation is required to be in line with the original meaning of the translated text (*mi 'khal ba*) and accessible to the Tibetan readership (*bde ba*). Among the two types of deviating (*bsnor ba*) and non-deviating (*mi bsnor ba*) translation, it is to be assumed that both must fulfill the criteria of coherency/connectedness (*'brel ba*) and accessibility (*bde ba*), although coherency/connectedness only arises as an issue in non-deviating translations to ensure the correctness of the sentence in Tibetan and thus has been omitted for the deviating type. Lastly, both criteria of *'brel ba* and *bde ba* are measured by means of two additional parameters, namely *tshig* ('phrasing, syntax') and *don* ('meaning, content, semantics'). Among the possible shortcomings of this reading, it has to be noted that while the proposed, tentative translation of *'brel ba* in the sense of 'coherency' would certainly make sense and allow for a simpler and more straightforward rendition of the full Tibetan sentence, it also requires a more abstract, intransitive understanding of the term *'brel ba* that perhaps did not exist in this form.

Unfortunately, we cannot go deeper into the issues related to this passage without undertaking a separate study. The main tasks for such future research would be a detailed assessment of existing translations and their shortcomings as well as an examination of the four parameters *tshig*, *don*, *'brel ba* and *bde ba* together with their precise relation. However, even without resolving these textual issues, it still holds true that linguistic expressions of a higher order than independent lexical terminology were considered in standardization and revision, and that a few simple principles for the translation of phrases, sentences and so on were already defined in the Tabo version and in more detail in the edict of SSBP. If syntax was indeed included as one feature in the deviation and non-deviation of Tibetan translations from Sanskrit structures (*go rims*) – either in the form of the phrasing (*tshig*), including syntax, that has to remain connected to meaning (*don*) (i.e. remaining meaningful), or in the form of syntactic coherency and accessibility (*tshig tu 'brel zhing bde ba*) – then the importance of syntax and case grammar in the standardization of translation is historically attested in the edict of SSBP. Although this may not explain the concrete decision making of an author like Lce Khyi 'brug and his reasons for featuring case grammar as a separate topic (topic number 6) in his *Gnad brgyad*, at least we have one important testimony for the ways in which syntactic topics such as case grammar received prominent status in Tibetan grammaticography from its very beginning.

The current section has shed light on the question how the study of grammar was initially promoted and perhaps even emerged for the first time during the early stages of Tibetan intellectual history in the course of the translation of Sanskrit sources and its royally supported revision, standardization and centralization in which Sanskrit and Tibetan scholars collaborated closely. Related questions were addressed, such as the ways in which Indian *vyākaraṇa* became an important focus in this revision due to the shortcomings of previous translations and the need for translational standards, as well as the ways in which the study of grammar started to involve the composition of autochthonous texts that dealt with both Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar, including case grammar, already in this earliest traceable period of Tibetan grammaticography. It was noted that prestige as well as the general and often soteriologically argued importance that Indian scholars attributed to the study of grammar must have strongly supported the role of *vyākaraṇa* in the revision and among Tibetan translators. Additionally, it was proposed that the 'universal' validity of certain grammatical topics was most likely an important factor that facilitated the expansion of grammatical analysis on the *chos skad*, a point which will be further developed in the investigation of the Tibetan case model as one particularly illuminating instance.[112]

During the first dissemination of Buddhism, it is moreover too early to associate the preserved grammatical testimonies of that time with a full-fledged distinct discipline. The reference to Indian systems of *vyākaraṇa* in the edict of SSBP is evidence for the prevalence among Tibetan grammarians of an idea of grammar as a distinct field of knowledge in India, but the number, extent and form of the preserved Tibetan testimonies make it rather dubious that grammatical studies claimed the status of a full-fledged discipline north of the Himalaya at this early date. At the current state of research, there are preserved no more than six dedicated linguistic compositions which may in some version date back to this period: SCP (?), TKJ (?), NG, NGg (?), GNT (?) and *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa*. Furthermore, MVY lists a short selection of grammatical terms and SSBP refers to grammar in its edict. The composition of grammatical sources was likely restricted to a few scholars, some of which claim traceable authority in the subsequent tradition, and it remains open to which extent their compositions circulated in Tibet outside the authorities of the official translation committee at that time. Grammatical studies appear to have been more like an ancillary endeavor in the course of translation and its standardization that then transitioned into the composition of linguistic works on Sanskrit, Tibetan and linguistic expressions in general, yet without clearly defined status or

---

[112] Cf. part II.

40

institutionalization. However, it may be certainly concluded that the commitment to linguistic studies as an integral part of the Tibetan Buddhist scholarly enterprise surfaced no later than the 8th/9th century and under the circumstances described above. The following section will demonstrate how this commitment will have intensified in the centuries ahead and, carried by one of the most illustrious figures in Tibetan intellectual history, led to the formalization and, to varying degrees, the institutionalization of linguistics and grammar.

2.4 Linguistics and the Emergence of Tibetan Scholasticism

After the demise of the Tibetan empire in the middle of the 9th century, followed by a period of political and religious instability until the end of the 10th or beginning of the 11th century about which still very little is known, the Indo-Tibetan knowledge transfer and the spread of Buddhism in Tibet was revitalized. This period up to roughly the end of the 13th century is commonly referred to as the later dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet (*phyi dar*) and was also accompanied by a new surge in translations (*gsar 'gyur*). Its beginning is usually associated in Tibetan historiography with the activities that took place in North-East and West Tibet. In the western kingdom of *Gu ge,* the activities of the translator Rin chen bzang po (958-1055) flourished under the sponsorship of king Ye shes 'od, who also invited the Indian scholar Atiśa (982-1054) to Tibet (arrived in 1042) and later founded the Kadampa order of Tibetan Buddhism. In Amdo in North-East Tibet, the transmission of a codex of Buddhist monastic discipline (*'dul ba*, *vinaya*) in the form of the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* as well as other parts of the royal dynastic curriculum supposedly survived, and a handful of people subsequently reintroduced these to Central Tibet. [113] Davidson argues that the renewed flourishing of Buddhism and the integral changes of Tibetan civilization during this period are indeed closely connected to these events, but nonetheless the Tibetan Buddhist renaissance and reformation need to be seen in the larger context of Inner and East Asian developments which are more complex than the rather formulaic rendition outlined above. [114]

Of special interest for our purposes is the fact that this second dissemination of Indian Buddhism in Tibet (*phyi dar*, 'later dissemination') was stimulated to a large extent by the decline of Buddhist spiritual and intellectual practices in temples and schools, both in number and quality, together with growing doubts about their authenticity. Davidson, for example, states that "according to the Tibetan documents, Lha lama Yéshé-Ö was aghast at the forms of Buddhism on display in the kingdom of Gugé."[115] This was not only a religious or theoretical

---

[113] Cf. Davidson 2005, 85.
[114] Cf. ibid., chapter 3.
[115] Ibid., 108.

issue among intellectuals and practitioners, but it manifested as an institutional clash between old and new religious interests and thus must have also involved power struggles.[116] As indicated by the term *gsar 'gyur* ('new translation'), one of the main protagonists of that time were again the translators, however the mode of translation had changed substantially compared to that of the imperial period. Without a central political or translational authority, those Tibetans who were ready to take on the hardships travelled to the South of the Himalaya in order to access Buddhist knowledge through Indian masters and sources as well as to acquire the skill of translation.[117] At the same time, Indian scholars were also invited to teach and translate in Tibet. While this created an entirely new influx of knowledge and sources to Tibet which also included novel esoteric teachings, it could not resolve the issue of authenticity but rather intensified it. Davidson discusses how illustrious figures such as Mar pa (1012-1097) attained new supremacy in monastic as well as worldly affairs through their occupation as translators and their resulting authority.[118] The translators of this time may be regarded from the perspective of powerful gatekeepers of the reinvigorated Buddhist doctrine, empowered through their skills and capable of consulting sources of knowledge (texts, masters, teachings and so on) inaccessible to the untrained. The lack of other, more transparent criteria apart from the authority of the translator to assess the reliability of teachings, translations, etc., naturally bears a certain arbitrariness, and thus it is "little wonder that the introduction of the great volume of esoteric materials during this period called for a response on many fronts."[119] In contrast to the contents of the imperial edicts of the earlier dissemination of Buddhism, the main concern in this period was not just the accuracy and standardization of translations, which likely remained an important issue even during the second dissemination, but rather even the authenticity of sources and teachings as such. These times further featured the circulation of a vast amount of texts with uncertain or unattested Indian origin, including apocrypha of unknown authorship, and especially the authenticity of esoteric sources usually restricted to a small circle of initiates was discredited or doubted.

Davidson has labelled the reaction to this uncontrolled spread of teachings of old and new translations under the banner of Buddhism together with the resulting disputes about the Sanskritic origins of teachings, transmission lineages, etc. as 'neoconservative orthodoxy.'[120] Tibetan scholasticism in the form it became established and institutionalized during the second

---

[116] Cf. Davidson 2005, 120.
[117] Even though some translators seem to never have left their home (cf. Davidson 2005, 119).
[118] Cf. ibid., chapter 4.
[119] Cf. ibid., 151.
[120] Cf. ibid., 151ff.

42

dissemination of Buddhism and the centuries thereafter is perhaps only the most formalized and technical manifestation of this movement to authenticate transmitted knowledge and to distinguish between the true and false Dharma.[121] A main proponent of new scholarly principles during this new translation period was the venerated Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251).[122] We can get a taste of Sakya Paṇḍita's 'neoconservativism' at the beginning of his *Mkhas pa la 'jug pa'i sgo* (*Mkhas 'jug*, 'Gateway to Scholarship'; KhJ):[123]

> *mkhas par khas 'che ba 'ga' zhig sgra tsam gyi rnam gzhag dang/ ming sgrub pa la rnams* [sic!][124] *par dbye ba'i rkyen ster ba dang/ khams sgrub pa la ti ngan ta'i rkyen ster ba dang/ byed pa'i tshig la bzhi dang drug la sogs pa'i sbyor ba dang/ dpe la dngos dang bzlog pa la sogs pa'i khyad par dang/ tshig gi rgyan la rang bzhin dang/ rdzas dang yon tan brjod pa la sogs pa'i dbye ba dang/ dbye ba sgo tha dad pa'i tshul dang/ bsdu ba la spyi bye brag gis sgo nas ji ltar sdud pa dang/ grangs nges pa la dngos 'gal rnam par gcod pa dang/ log rtog bzlog pa dang/ dgos pa'i sgo nas ji ltar nges pa dang/ go rims la tshig dang don gyi rim pas brjod bde zhing rtogs sla ba'i sbyor ba la gangs can gyi khrod 'di na legs par ma sbyangs pa'i skye bo phal cher 'khrul par mthong nas/ de la phan pa'i don du mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo 'di bshad do/*

"Some here in the snowy mountain ranges [of Tibet] who claim to be learned are not well trained in the analysis of sound itself, in providing the grammatical affixes for nominal inflection of a formed word, in providing the grammatical affixes (*ti ngan ta*) in verbal formation, in applying the four, six, etc. *kāraka*s, in distinguishing such things as the object (*dngos*, *vastu*) and the reversal (*bzlog pa*, *viparyāsa*) in an analogy, in the nature of verbal ornamentation, in distinguishing among such things as expressions of substance and quality, in the different methods for divisions and headings, in how to summarize based on the general and subheadings in a summary, in deciding among opposing [positions] in reckoning and ascertainment (*grangs nges pa*), in eliminating wrong views, in how to get a definitive ascertainment by way of the purpose, and in joining the order of words and meanings in a structure that is pleasant

---

[121] In the current work, I see the major difference between the Tibetan scholastic tradition and non-scholastic knowledge traditions in the principle of scriptural authority and the preservation of authoritative knowledge that comes along with it. In most general terms, this includes the organization, canonization and exegesis of such knowledge as well as its defense that is strongly based on formalized argumentation practices. For more information on Tibetan scholastic methodology, cf. chapter 4. For a more detailed examination of the notion scholasticism in the (Indo-)Tibetan context, cf. Cabezón 1994, 11ff.; Dreyfus 2003, 10ff.

[122] Hereafter referred to as Sakya Paṇḍita.

[123] The text is also known under the title *Mkhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo* ('Gateway for Scholars').

[124] I read *rnam*.

to say and easy to understand, and so [they] are, for the most part, mistaken. This Gateway of Learning is related for their benefit."[125]

Sakya Paṇḍita's critique represents a frontal attack on many levels of scholarly practice, starting from a lack of linguistic competency to the ignorance about the application of commentarial techniques and the stylistic requirements for the composition of treatises. His response to these deficits is condensed in the same text in a quotation from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* shortly after the above quotation:

> *rig pa'i gnas lnga dag la mkhas par ma byas par//*
> *'phags mchog gis kyang thams cad mkhyen nyid mi 'gyur te//*
> *gzhan dag tshar gcad rjes su gzung bar bya phyir dang//*
> *rang nyid kun shes bya phyir de la de brtson byed//*

> "Without becoming a scholar in the five sciences
> Not even the supreme sage can become omniscient.
> For the sake of refuting and supporting others,
> And for the sake of knowing everything himself, he makes an effort in
> these [five sciences]."[126]

Among the many achievements attributed to Sakya Paṇḍita, he was credited with strengthening Indian models of learning in Tibet by introducing and propagating a classical Indian Buddhist curriculum that defines Sanskritic *pāṇḍityam* ('scholarship'), formalized as the five sciences (*rig gnas*, *vidyāsthāna*): linguistics (*sgra rig*, *śabdavidyā*),[127] logic or reasoning (*gtan tshigs rigs pa*, *hetuvidyā*), medical science (*gso rig*, *cikitsāvidyā*), craftsmanship (*bzo rig*, *śilpakarmasthānavidyā*) and spiritual or inner science (*nang rig*, *adhyātmavidyā*), i.e. the Buddhist Dharma. Together, these are referred to in Tibetan sources as the five major sciences, which are accompanied by another set of five minor sciences: poetry/poetics (*kāvya*, *snyan ngag*), lexicography/synonymy/metonymy (*mngon brjod*), metrics or compositional style (*sdeb sbyor*), opera (*zlos gar*) and astrology (*skar rtsis*).[128] The five major and five minor sciences together do not form an exhaustive list of scientific branches, since areas such as politics or erotic arts are not even mentioned,[129] however the minor sciences do complement the five major ones and within the latter mainly *śabdavidyā*, which reflects "the centrality of language in the

---

[125] KhJ 2009, 2f.; transl. Gold 2008, 9.
[126] KhJ 2009, 5; transl. Gold 2008, 14.
[127] Which pertains to both Sanskrit and Tibetan linguistic studies.
[128] For an introduction to the five major and minor sciences, cf. Ruegg 1995.
[129] Cf. Dreyfus 2003, 102.

curriculum."[130] Among the five major sciences, Sakya Paṇḍita's KhJ strongly focuses on the study of linguistics in a broader sense (*śabdavidyā*), including grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) and poetics (*kāvya*), as well as logical reasoning (*hetuvidyā*). His text represents one of the few Tibetan testimonies directly dedicated to scholarship, and it proposes a threefold model of inclusive learning based on Indian ideals: *rtsom* ('composition'), which includes *śabdavidyā* (linguistics) as well as *kāvya* ('poetry/poetics'), *'chad* ('exposition'), which is concerned with interpretation and commentary and was developed in apparent relation to Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* (4th-5th century), as well as *rtsod* ('debate'), much of which deals with logic and reasoning (*hetuvidyā*).[131]

For Sakya Paṇḍita, the five major sciences did form a whole of complementary areas assisting the preservation and protection of the true Dharma as well as the attainment of the ultimate goal of omniscience.[132] However, as authors like Gold and Dreyfus noted, the actual influence of Sakya Paṇḍita's vision of the ideal scholar should not be overemphasized, since his "unified curriculum was never practiced as he articulates it in the *Gateway*, and never had exactly the effect he had hoped. Yet, Sa-paṇ is rightly credited with having consolidated the study of the 'five sciences' across Tibet, and with having made the linguistic sciences – poetry (*kāvya*) in particular – the crown jewel in a great scholar's intellectual repertoire."[133]

Since it is difficult to assess the real impact of the five major and minor sciences as an inclusive curriculum in Tibetan education and knowledge production, the same also holds true for grammar or linguistics (*sgra rig*) as one of them. Georges Dreyfus' gives a general description of education and the monastic and secular curricula in pre-modern Tibet (= pre-1950) without distinguishing different historical periods but with many interesting details nevertheless.[134] If we follow his account, which Dreyfus himself, being aware of the limitations of the source materials, characterizes as tentative,[135] literacy – at least in the form of basic recognition and pronunciation of letters and combinations of letters – appears to have been surprisingly widespread among Tibetan people, although regional differences seem to have been considerable, for example between Central and Eastern Tibet as well as between more urban and more rural areas.[136] Reading was utilized mainly for religious purposes such as ritual and

---

[130] Ibid.
[131] On scholarship and hermeneutics in the KhJ as well as *Vyākhyāyukti*, cf. Verhagen's series of articles *Studies in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Hermeneutics*, more specifically article numbers 4-7, published in the years 2005A, 2005B, 2008B, 2017.
[132] Cf. Gold 2008, 14ff.
[133] Ibid., 14. Cf. also Dreyfus 2003, 105.
[134] The following observations are based on Dreyfus 2003, chapters 4 and 5.
[135] Cf. ibid., 80.
[136] Cf. ibid., 81.

devotional practices, and by comparison writing skills were much more restricted. While the acquisition of such basic literacy was mostly an informal, private matter within the household or monastery, Dreyfus also reports of formal, state-supported schools in urban centers such as Lhasa or Shigatse (Gzhis ka rtse), in which branches such as administration, medicine, astrology or literature were taught,[137] and there were also a small number of private schools that provided a solid education especially in literacy and linguistic skills such as writing, spelling, grammar and composition.

As part of a closer look at the curricula in Tibetan education, Dreyfus outlines the significant differences between secular and monastic curricula as well as between the normative curriculum proposed in the five sciences and the actual curricula as they were practiced.[138] Lay students were often trained predominantly in the literary sciences such as grammar and poetics in particular, and they focused less on the inner science of Buddhism or logic. In an article on monastic education in Tibet, Dungkar Lobzang Tinley mentions a government school during the times of the Seventh Dalai Lama (1708-1757), the Rtse rig gnas slob grwa, in which monks were trained in the secular sciences, including grammar, with the prospect of later joining the government administration. In contrast, the monastic curricula focused primarily on Buddhist philosophy and logic, sometimes to the full neglect of literary studies and other secular sciences, which also marginalized the role of grammar in monastic education.[139] Tinley notes that "in some of the large monasteries, it was sufficient for the disciples to just understand how to read. […] If the strength of the school was between forty to fifty, there were hardly more than two or three who could write. The number of students who knew grammar and had knowledge in lexicography was extremely few."[140] During the rule of the fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682), the secular sciences were even officially banned from the three monastic seats (*gdan sa gsum*) of the Dge lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism, 'Bras spungs, Se ra and Dga' ldan.[141] Scholars of the three seats who upon graduation were interested in literary studies would therefore attend the Snying ma monastery Smin grol gling to study grammar or poetry. Another question that arises in this regard is to which extent the literary education related to *śabdavidyā* focused either on Sanskrit or Tibetan language, and Dreyfus' study only remarks that the curriculum featured an

---

[137] Cf. ibid., 82.
[138] Cf. ibid., 101ff.
[139] Cf. ibid., 102 and 105.
[140] Tinley 1993, 12.
[141] Cf. Dreyfus 2003, 121; Tinley 1993, 11. Note, however, that the 'Great Fifth', as he is commonly known, was a friend and promoter of the secular sciences and had composed Sanskrit verses, although his expertise in Sanskrit composition seems to have been only mediocre. According to Dreyfus (2003, 121), the prohibition of literary arts in the three seats was a means to protect students from any involvement in political matters, a danger that might come from the proximity of these powerful institutions to the political centre Lhasa.

emphasis on Sanskrit and that "the study of Tibetan grammar culminates in the study of Sanskrit grammar as analyzed in Tibetan sources."[142]

In total, the emerging picture reveals that secular and monastic education seemed to have had their respective focal points, but that they mostly did not implement the full scope of the formal curriculum proposed in the five major and minor sciences. Grammar and other literary arts were taught in a limited number of private and official schools as well as in a few monastic centers that offered *sgra rig* and related topics. Against the backdrop of these general observations, it is safe to assume that the mastery of Sakya Paṇḍita's scholarly ideal probably remained reserved for a handful of illustrious figures in the history of Tibetan intellectual history, such as Bu ston Rin chen grub or Rje Tsong kha pa who studied at Sa skya monastery. The main value of Sakya Paṇḍita's propagation of *rig gnas* for grammatical studies lies in the formalization of a normative curriculum that attributes great importance to linguistic and language-related studies. Sakya Paṇḍita's efforts were pivotal in the sense that they have rendered linguistic studies including grammar a distinct discipline in Tibetan scholarship and consequently an integral and esteemed part of Tibetan intellectual history.

2.5 Résumé on Grammar and Linguistics in the History of Tibetan Scholarship

At this point, we may conclude this historical excursion and underline some of the central historical mechanisms that led to the high status of linguistics and grammar in the Tibetan tradition. As initially argued, the introduction of Buddhism and Tibetan literacy during the Tibetan empire mainly from Indian and Sanskritic role models involved the contact with the latter's elaborate grammatical knowledge. This must have left a big impression on the Tibetans, particularly since grammar was a highly esteemed field of study at the beginning of any scholarly career in India, and Tibetan scholarly knowledge production which only started to begin followed the Sanskritic model. The vast extent of translation of Buddhist sources from Sanskrit into Tibetan naturally necessitated the study of Sanskrit grammar, and the preserved imperial decree in the SSBP attests that the supervision of translation by a royally supported central authority emphasized the importance of grammar in order to revise and standardize translational practices and their output.

Around that time, authors like Lce Khyi 'brug or Facheng made important contributions to grammatical studies that seem to be primarily concerned with the introduction of grammatical terminology and concepts of cross-lingual validity, and only secondarily with an analysis of any specific language, but without any noticeable restriction to either Sanskrit or Tibetan.

---

[142] Dreyfus 2003, 102.

Although we cannot say more about the concrete motivation and purpose of these early contributions, we have seen in the work of Lce Khyi 'brug that he drew on Indian soteriological motives that connect the study of language to the realization of the true Dharma. Regardless of the actual status of a work like Lce Khyi 'brug's NG as a possible official document – perhaps requested by some authority and perhaps even in addition to SSBP and MVY – or merely as a private endeavor alone or in collaboration with Indian colleagues, it was argued that the usefulness of their contents in actual translational work appears to be higly limited, a fact that points more towards the direction that their main purpose was indeed more the introduction of linguistic studies to the establishing Tibetan scholarship. In any case, this focus on general rather than language-specific linguistics almost naturally facilitated the expansion from Sanskrit grammatical studies to that of the written Tibetan language, since the presentation of linguistic topics in NG or that of case grammar in Facheng's exposition of the cases required exemplification either in Sanskrit, Tibetan or both. In addition to these sources, also some parts of SCP and TKJ were likely composed during or even before this period. Although part II will demonstrate that their terminological-conceptual framework clearly resonates with that of 'general' linguistics, those parts that deal with old Tibetan morphology not only prove that they date back to early times of Tibetan grammaticography, but also suggest that Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis existed at that time as well.

During post-imperial times and the second dissemination of Buddhism, the decline of Buddhist scholarly and religious practices and the quest to distinguish authentic from misguided teachings brought forth new standards of scholarship with a strong focus on commentary and argumentation. The study of language received an important role in this quest and became further formalized as one of the five classical sciences, thus attaining a fixed position in Tibetan scholarship. Sakya Paṇḍita as well as the earlier Indian scholar and translator Smṛtijñānakīrti (10th/11th century)[143] contributed important works as grammarians of that time, and some versions of the seminal treatises SCP and TKJ must have circulated as well.[144] While direct cross-cultural contacts with India substantially decreased latest from the 14th century onwards, the narrative of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa, his creation of the literary language as well as his composition of the first Tibetan grammatical treatises surfaced prominently in important and esteemed historiographical sources such as the *Rgyal rab gsal ba'i me long* or Bu ston's *chos 'byung*, thus uniting several motives such as the beginnings of literacy, the beginnings of Buddhism and grammar as well as a direct link to the Indian Buddhist tradition, and in effect

---

[143] Hereafter also referred to as Smṛti.
[144] Cf. ft. 47.

connecting all these to the very beginnings of Tibetan (Buddhist) civilization. Along with the acceptance and promotion of this narrative, numerous important figures in Tibetan intellectual history produced a considerable corpus of commentarial literature on SCP and TKJ, consolidating the study of grammar in general and Tibetan grammar in particular, the latter now widely understood from the perspective of this narrative as *Sum rtags* ('Tibetan grammar as correctly propounded in SCP and TKJ')[145] and not only as an integral discipline in Tibetan scholarship but also an important part of Tibetan Buddhist identity.

At the current state of research, we are still far from any accurate assessment of the extent of linguistic studies in Tibet, either in terms of contributing authors or in terms of works associated with Tibetan-specific *sgra rig*. Different selections of mostly grammatical works or authors dealing with Tibetan grammar were provided by Tshe tan zhabs drung and Dmu dge bsam gtan, however without claiming to be exhaustive.[146] After a preliminary and tentative assessment, it is safe to say that at least more than thirty identifiable authors contributed either one or several works to Tibetan-specific or general, Sanskrit-unspecific *sgra rig* in the period from the 8th/9th century up to the 1850s. These works are spread amongst genres such as *bklag thabs* ('reading, pronunciation'), *dag yig* ('orthography'), *brda sprod* ('grammar') or *sum rtags* ('grammar,' more specifically 'Tibetan grammar as correctly propounded in SCP and TKJ'), and if areas such as *snyan ngag* ('poetry') or *mngon brjod* ('lexicography/synonymy/metonymy') and others were included, this number would certainly increase. The majority of these authors flourished subsequent to Sakya Paṇḍita, and previous to him there was only a handful of known authors during the Tibetan empire and the early period of the second dissemination.

It is most interesting to note at this point that the situation differs significantly in the context of the growth and spread of Chinese Buddhism, in terms of the three factors (1) beginnings and early stages of literacy, (2) the prevailing translation policies and (3) a generally more scholastic approach to Buddhism with a strong emphasis on scripture and argumentation. Even before the appropriation of Buddhism, the Chinese tradition already looked back at a longstanding and esteemed intellectual history of their own literature as well as a logographic writing system. Furthermore, the translation of Buddhist sources into Chinese was initially a more private enterprise and centralized only during its later stages (c. 400).[147] The fact that Chinese translators apparently did not value Sanskrit grammatical expertise in their translational

---

[145] The technical term *Sum rtags* that is frequently used in the meaning of grammar as a discipline or field of knowledge is derived from the respective first syllables of *Sum cu pa* (SCP) and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa* (TKJ).
[146] Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 190ff.; Dmu dge bsam gtan 2006B, 222ff.
[147] Cf. HSGLT 1, 47f.; Zürcher 1982.

practices as much as it is pronounced in the Tibetan imperial edicts has already been noted by the Chinese traveler and monk I-tsing in the records of his travels (671-695):

> "But the old translators have seldom told us the rules of the Sanskrit language. Those who lately introduced the Sūtras to our notice spoke only of the first seven cases. This is not because of ignorance (*of grammar*), but they have kept silence thinking it is useless (*to teach the eighth*), (i.e. the vocative). I trust that now a thorough study of Sanskrit grammar may clear up many difficulties we encounter whilst engaged in translation."[148]

Finally, although much of Chan Buddhism's claim regarding its nonlinguistic transmission of realization from master to disciple should not be taken too literally,[149] this rhetoric as such does stand opposed to the more intellectual and scholastic approach to Buddhism as promulgated in the Land of Snow as well as to literary curricula such as that of Sakya Paṇḍita. Interestingly – and we might be tempted to say consequently – grammatical studies have never been introduced to pre-modern China and without European influence.[150] This may be seen as corroborating that these represent crucial factors for the flourishing of grammatical studies in Tibet, while the substantial linguistic and scriptural gap between the Chinese and Sanskrit languages in the Chinese context needs to be taken into account as well.[151]

---

[148] Transl. by Takakusu in I-tsing 1896, 168. On the minor role of Sanskrit grammatical studies in Chinese translational practices compared to Tibet, cf. also HSGLT 1, 48.

[149] Cf. Gold (2008, 2) with reference to Faure 1991. Also note that in his travel records I-tsing complained about the lack of more extensive Sanskrit grammatical studies in China, proposing that it would clarify many difficulties encountered during translation (cf. I-tsing 1896, 168).

[150] Cf. Branner 2003, 192; Wang and Asher 1994, 524. Both point towards the 19th century for the beginning of systematic grammatical studies in a modern linguistic sense.

[151] Branner's and Wang and Asher's summary of Chinese grammaticography mention as reasons both language-typology and the logographic writing system (cf. Branner 2003, 192; Wang and Asher 1994, 524).

3 Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi ’byung gnas – His Life and Scholarship

3.1 Introduction

Si tu Paṇchen (1699/1700-1774) was born into a family of old nobility near the city of Sde dge in East Tibet.[152] At the age of three, he was recognized as the eighth incarnation in the lineage of *Si tu sprul sku*s[153] and received the name Chos kyi ’byung gnas. From his childhood onwards, he maintained close relationships with the House of Sde dge, at that time an independent kingdom which showed political interest in taking Bka’ brgyud lamas as court chaplains.[154] This relationship would turn out to be a strong influence on Si tu’s career, since his loyalty to the royal family not only enabled him to establish a new monastic seat in Dpal spungs but also made him the editor of the renowned Sde dge edition of the *Bka’ ’gyur* (1731-1733).[155] Even though many illustrious figures in Tibetan history had achieved mastery over multiple fields of knowledge, only few of these have reached a comparable level of proficiency and lasting influence in several of these. Based on the *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7[156] and its contributions, we are in the fortunate position to have a full volume of articles dedicated to his work, the table of contents of which alone provides an impressive image of Si tu Paṇchen’s vita.

As an abbot of Dpal spungs and a court chaplain, in the course of his life Si tu ordained more than four thousand monks. Next to his monastic obligations, Si tu also was a respected doctor and painter, and from his autobiography we learn about his appreciation for various Chinese, Newar and even Kashmiri painting styles he had encountered on his visits to Central Tibet and Nepal,[157] and especially the former two impacted on the development of his own style. As a physician, Si tu incorporated a number of different medical sources and techniques, and he practiced not only classical Tibetan but also Chinese medicine.[158] Si tu’s literary production becomes evident from a look at his collected works,[159] which features a broad array of literary genres, such as the already mentioned field of medicine or historical works on Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (volume 9) as well as the Tibetan Karma bka’ brgyud lineage (volumes 11-12). Especially the latter received attention in recent academic research as an important

---

[152] Today’s Sde dge County is located in Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, China’s Sichuan province.
[153] The *Si tu sprul sku*s are among the high-ranking incarnations in the Karma bka’ brgyud order of Tibetan Buddhism. The title ‘Si tu’ was originally granted by the Yuan dynasty in the 14th century (cf. Chaix 2013, 19).
[154] Cf. Chaix 2013, 22.
[155] Cf. Smith 2001, 91.
[156] Cf. Germano et al. 2013.
[157] Cf. Tashi Tsering 2013, 128f.
[158] Cf. Garrett 2013, 280.
[159] Published by Sherab Gyaltsen 1990 (cf. supra 10). For an overview of the volumes, cf. Schaeffer 2013, 304f.

complementary perspective to the more established Dge lugs *pa* tradition and its version of Tibetan monastic history.[160] Si tu also composed a variety of poems which cover religious and worldly topics both in Tibetan and Sanskrit, and these bear witness to his mastery of and passion for the literary arts. Regarding the inner science of Buddhism, he translated, revised and commented upon numerous short tantric treatises and prayers most of which are rather short in volume. His major contribution to Buddhist philosophy is a word-by-word commentary (*tshig 'grel*) on the first four books of the *Abhidharmakośa* which covers nearly 700 folios in his collected works (volume 13). As Schaeffer noticed, the classical topics of *Madhyamaka*, *Yogācāra* or *Pramāṇa* are, however, entirely missing.[161] It is also noteworthy in this context that his oeuvre contains at least one contribution to non-Buddhist philosophy in the form of a translation of a treatise attributed to the non-dualist Vedāntika Śaṅkara.[162]

The largest part of Si tu's writing is related to linguistic science, and the first six volumes of his collected works are exclusively dedicated to Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar as well as linguistics, with some additional minor works in the remaining volumes. The most outstanding works of Sanskrit scholarship are certainly his revisions of the Tibetan translations of the *Kātantra* and *Cāndravyākaraṇa* (volume 1) as well as his extensive commentary on *Cāndra* (volumes 1-3), which Verhagen aptly characterized as "a survey of all major Indian indigenous traditions of Sanskrit linguistics."[163] Si tu also revised the Tibetan version of the Sanskrit-lexicon *Amarakośa* along with a translation of the commentary *Kāmadhenu* by Subhūticandra (volumes 4-5). His collected works further feature a bilingual version of Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* on poetical theory as well as minor works which include additional contributions to Sanskrit lexicography, pronunciation and grammatical voice. Regarding Tibetan language, his most important contribution certainly is his *Great Commentary* (GC; volume 6), an extensive Tibetan grammar which covers 170 folios and comments on the two seminal texts SCP and TKJ, a separate edition of which directly precede this commentary. Additionally, volume 10 includes two shorter grammatical works on Tibetan lexicography and orthography.

Prevailing throughout Si tu's entire literary production is the fact that conspicuously much of it is not his own composition, but it rather consists in either translated Sanskrit works – some in bilingual versions – or edited and revised translations. Schaeffer illustrates the scope of Si tu's

---

[160] Cf. Sperling 2013.
[161] Cf. Schaeffer 2013, 306.
[162] Cf. ibid.
[163] Verhagen 2013, 317.

meticulous detail and accuracy in which he conducted the edition and translation of sources.[164] Si tu's translation of the *Nag po chen po'i bstod pa brgyad pa* ('Eight Verses of Praise to *Mahākāla*'; volume 7) includes not only a bilingual version of the eight verses but is also replete with annotations. These range from comparisons of numerous textual witnesses of the prayer in Sanskrit and Tibetan for the sake of a reliable edition of the Sanskrit text to translational-hermeneutical issues relevant for a reliable Tibetan translation, drawing the reader's attention to alternative readings, homonymies of Sanskrit terminology and other issues. Si tu's main concern in this context is a bilingual edition of the prayer that provides the reader with all the necessary text-critical and translational background for a refined understanding of the verses, thus regarding the prayer primarily as a textual item with the concerns of a true philologist. The direct involvement and importance of grammar in general and case grammar in particular as part of his philological scrutiny is directly revealed, for example, when he states that "after I had carefully considered the structure and appropriate meaning of the words and case endings in the verse, which expounds the benefits of the recitation of this hymn, I translated it thus [as above]."[165] It is clear that an exegetical approach that focuses on translation and textual critique is not far from the study of grammar, for grammatical expertise in theory and practice is the most fundamental armament of the translator and philologist, especially in a Sanskritic-inspired environment in which this was highly esteemed. While the connection to translation and the importance of grammatical studies in India have already been highlighted as major factors for the successful proliferation of grammatical studies in Tibet from the earliest times onwards, Si tu's radical execution of philology was certainly exceptional among earlier and later Tibetan scholars. Thus, what are the roots of this meticulous philological approach in the eighteenth century that apparently, in Schaeffer's words, "for Si tu philology trumps philosophy"?[166]

3.2 Tracing the Emphasis of Philology in Si tu's Scholarship

Si tu shares the same stance with Sakya Paṇḍita, Lce Khyi 'brug's NG as well as the opening declaration of SCP,[167] namely the Sanskritic-inspired ideal that expertise in linguistic studies is at the very root of (Buddhist) learning:

> *gang dag thar mchog bde chen dbyig thob phyir/*
> *des don snying po'i rgya mtshor 'jug 'dod na/*

---

[164] Cf. Schaeffer 2013, 307f. For a more detailed account of Si tu's text-critical methodology in the same text, cf. Verhagen 2001B, 77-82; Verhagen 2010, 474-476.
[165] *bstod pa bklag pa'i phan yon bstan pa'i tshigs bcad 'di rnam dbye dang tshig gi 'gros dang don thob la legs par brtags nas 'di ltar bsgyur ba yin* […] (Si tu 7.437.6, transl. Verhagen 2010, 476).
[166] Schaeffer 2013, 306.
[167] For the importance of grammar in SCP's opening declaration, cf. infra 111f.

> *ming tshig brjod gzhi yi ge'i sbyor ba'i gru/*
>
> *blo ldan ded dbon tshogs kyis bsten bya yin/*

> "For attaining the treasure of liberation and highest joy,
>
> if one wishes to enter the seas of quintessence and definitive meaning,
>
> the basis of free, lexical words (*ming*), syntactic forms (*tshig*) and sentences (*brjod pa*),
>
> the boat of applying letters,
>
> is to be relied on by those helmsmen gifted with acumen."[168]

Even though this quotation marks the end of the GC, the application of letters (*yi ge'i sbyor ba*) draws upon the opening declaration of SCP and needs to be understood as that very operation which defines all of linguistic studies and grammar, including topics such as lexicography, orthography, syntax, etc.[169] Along with this approach which sees the purpose of grammar in the Buddhist path to realization, we have seen that philology and grammar have had a long history in Tibet already before Si tu, since they were instrumental to the transfer, revision and authentication of authoritative knowledge, first and foremost the Buddhist doctrine. Si tu was certainly not unaffected by these issues, since the preservation and validation of knowledge are at the very core of Tibetan scholastic knowledge production with its strong focus on exegesis and commentary. Si tu does not stint polemics throughout his writings against misguided scholarly practices during his time, and illustrative examples of these are beautifully rendered by Schaeffer in the following:

> *dbul po'i rigs skyes mu to ba rnams kyis//*
>
> *nor bu 'ching bu'i*[170] *bye brag mi shes shing//*
>
> *brgya lam dbyig mchog rin chen thob gyur kyang//*
>
> *don ldan byi dor cho ga shes mi srid//*
>
> *de bzhin sgra rig mi shes mkhas rloms kyis//*
>
> *legs bshad nyes bshad dbye ba mi shes shing//*
>
> *dam pa'i gzhung bzang 'chad par rloms pa yang//*
>
> *phal cher tshig don log par 'phyan pa mang//*

> "Beggars, people destitute and poor,
>
> Do not know the arts of formal dress.
>
> And if they chance to gain a precious jewel,

---

[168] GC 615.6. For an alternative translation, cf. Schaeffer 2013, 303.

[169] Cf. also infra 111f.

[170] Schaeffer (2013, 10) reads *'ching bya'i*.

54

They know not how to don it to impress.

Just so fake scholars know not language arts,

And don't distinguish eloquence from chatter.

They vainly teach the good and holy scriptures,

Yet mostly stray from words that actually matter."[171]

ci phyir deng dus skye bo phal mo che//

blun po 'khor mang stobs 'byor ldan pa'am//

rmongs pa mkhas snyems zol zob gyon can la//

mkhas par bstod cing ri bong cal rjes 'jug//

"Why do the masses around today,

Chase fools like rabbits, chattering praise?

These fools with power, wealth, and command,

Are idiots posing as scholars – a scam!"[172]

The danger of fraudulence and the lack of linguistic skills reflect motives encountered also during the later dissemination of Buddhism, when scholars like Sakya Paṇḍita promoted new, higher standards for Buddhist scholarly practices, and thus it seems that Si tu's scholarship resounded this position hundreds of years later in a time when the vast translation enterprises of the two disseminations of Buddhism and the most intensive period of the Indo-Tibetan knowledge transfer had already passed.

3.2.1 The Intellectual Environment of Si tu's Era

It seems that the decrease of political turmoil in India that had been caused by the Muslim invasions and stimulated the emigration of Indian scholars to Tibet as well as the vast accumulation of Sanskritic knowledge by Tibetans up to the 13th century was followed by a period in which the Tibetan tradition engaged more in an internal processing of the collected knowledge rather than the pursuit of additional Sanskritic materials.[173] At the latest by the 14th century, the accumulation of new Sanskritic materials decreased substantially and the Tibetans increasingly attended to the study of Tibetan or bilingual translations. Despite the long history of philology in the form of translated Sanskritic knowledge and the established position of Sanskrit-Tibetan linguistics (*sgra rig pa*, *śabdavidyā*) in the scholastic curriculum, the primary practical purpose of these two disciplines, i.e. translation, had naturally lost importance. An

---

[171] Si tu 3.678.5; transl. Schaeffer 2013, 309f.
[172] Si tu 3.679.1; transl. Schaeffer 2013, 309.
[173] Cf. Smith 2001, 87f.

emerging and increasing state centralization, such as the establishment of the Central Tibetan government, the foundation of the Qing empire and the kingdom of Bhutan, took place from the mid-17th century onwards, with the effect of again invigorating Buddhist patronage and scholarly learning on the Himalayan plateau. The Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) together with his regent Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653-1705) played important roles in this flourishing of intellectual practices after a period of conflict between rivaling political and religious parties, as the former had established a central leadership over Central Tibet with the help of the Mongol ruler Gushri Khan. In the words of Kurtis R. Schaeffer, the Great Fifth and his regent "embarked on a massive literary, architectural, and institutional campaign to create a cultural hegemony for Gelukpa influence over the entire Tibetan Plateau, reforming religious and secular practices and especially the Lhasa landscape in the process. Aside from their literary output and the building of the Potala Palace, they made Lhasa a lively center of international exchange, with resident Armenians, Mongols, Newars, and Indians, not to mention Tibetans from all over the plateau who brought elements of this cultural renaissance back to their own home regions, helping shape the current vision of Tibetan nationalism."[174] Between 1654 and 1681, nearly forty Indian scholars resided at the Fifth's court according to his own autobiographical account, the majority of which were renowned for their knowledge of medicine and languages. About ten of these reportedly came from Varanasi, such as a Brahmin named Gokula, who remained in Lhasa for an entire decade (1654-1664).[175] Si tu's lifetimes and the decades before him witnessed a sprawling development of new monastic institutions throughout the Himalayan plateau due to the recent political changes.[176] In Amdo province, for example, the patronage of Buddhism by the newly established Qing dynasty evoked a significant growth of the monastic population. Lastly, Si tu's role as the chief editor of Sde dge's royally sponsored *bka' 'gyur* print certainly is of special relevance to philological scholarship, together with the fact that by the early eighteenth century printing had become a major means to textual reproduction and a technological advance that substantially increased the output of published texts.

These developments resulted in "a vibrant period of Tibetan intellectual life," referred to by Schaeffer as "the long eighteenth century",[177] in which Si tu was part of "a new generation of eastern Tibetan 'renaissance scholars'."[178] Among Si tu's contemporaries with which he maintained close personal relationships were also such figures as Mdo mkhar ba Tshe ring

---

[174] Cf. Schaeffer 2014, 348.
[175] Cf. ibid., 352f.
[176] Cf. Schaeffer 2013, 303f.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Schaeffer 2009, 94.

56

dbang rgyal, the author of the celebrated novel *Gzhon nu zla med kyi gtam rgyud* ('Tale of the Unrivaled Youngling'), as well as the editor of the *Sde dge bstan 'gyur*, Zhu chen Tshul khrims rin chen. Even without detailed knowledge of the latter's linguistic expertise, Zhu chen's editorial standards certainly equaled those of Si tu.[179] Such was the prolific environment across the Himalyan plateau which was caused by the invigorated promotion of Buddhism and literary as well as other arts and in which Si tu developed his ideal of scholarship while simultaneously causing awareness and voicing criticism of the deficiencies of that tradition.

3.2.2 Tracing Si tu's Critique against the Lack of Linguistic Skills

It was stated above that particularly pre-modern Tibetan monastic education neglected literary arts to the extent that many students were incapable of proper writing, since the studies were predominantly centered around the development of expertise in Buddhism and logical reasoning.[180] Judging from events such as the ban of secular sciences from the Dge lugs's monastic seats during the Fifth Dalai Lama, Si tu probably faced a similar situation in his own times. In the scholastic view of Si tu, it must have seemed contradictory if not ironic to see so-called experts in Buddhist philosophy and logical debate without a proper literary education, for in his views this was the very foundation of becoming an expert in the true Dharma. We might therefore speculate whether Si tu's critique quoted above may have also aimed at this lack of literary skills he observed in the prevalent forms of monastic scholarly training during his times.

Si tu's polemics against those unskilled in linguistics was certainly not simply an eloquent exercise for the amusements of readers, but he probably considered the lack of literary skills in both Sanskrit and Tibetan as a real danger to the exegesis of authoritative Buddhist knowledge, and throughout his career he had plenty opportunity to witness that a correct and accurate (textual) understanding requires linguistic, philological and translational expertise. To give one particularly illuminating example, Si tu travelled to the Kathmandu valley twice to visit dignitaries from the three kingdoms Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Patan. On his first visit, at the age of 23 (1723-24), he was in the company of the Black and Red Hat hierarchs of the Karmapa branch, and for his second visit, in the year 1748, he travelled with his own entourage.[181] During both visits, he was eager to meet local *paṇḍita*s and access or collect Sanskrit manuscripts wherever possible, and Si tu's autobiography notes that he was able to study numerous texts in different areas of knowledge. Verhagen remarks that Si tu was well aware of the different

---

[179] Cf. Schaeffer 2009, chapter 5.
[180] Cf. supra 46.
[181] Cf. Verhagen 2013, 1.

qualities of manuscripts obtained from Nepal,[182] for example for his Tibetan translation of the *Svayaṃbhūpurāṇa* (volume 7 of his collected works), he was able to acquire two editions in 1723 and in 1748 and observed that the first one was corrupt and thus inferior compared to the second one. We can assume that such comparisons of Sanskrit manuscripts and likewise of Tibetan translations, such as the *Eight Verses of Praise to Mahākāla* mentioned by Schaeffer,[183] clearly called Si tu's attention to the dangers of misinterpretation due to textual corruption or translational errors.

Si tu encountered this lack of language proficiency also during his stays abroad, and Verhagen gives a vivid account of Si tu's first travel to Nepal and his struggles in communicating with local scholars in his quest for knowledge, two episodes of which seem especially noteworthy. First, even though much of the communication with locals was facilitated by interpreters, Si tu learned to speak Sanskrit in order to directly converse with the *paṇḍita* Bacchur Ojā, an acknowledged Sanskrit grammarian. While the details of the earlier stages of Si tu's education are yet to be investigated in more detail, he must have already achieved a certain proficiency in Sanskrit grammar from a young age and before travelling to Nepal, which is evident from a list of tutors (*yongs 'dzin*) at the end of his autobiography (volume 14), where at least three names are associated with Sanskrit studies.[184] In his autobiography, Si tu's recount of his first trip shows that his Sanskrit expertise was recognized by local scholars,[185] however, Si tu also had to realize that his mostly theoretical and passive reading competency of Sanskrit acquired in Tibet was insufficient to speak the language and, to his embarrassment, his mistakes were corrected by the Brahmin *paṇḍita*.

As for the second episode, the Tibetan delegation had relied on interpreters for discussing the Buddhist doctrine with local scholars and dignitaries, and during one such occasion Si tu complained that the interpreters' translational skills severely impeded the exchange:

> gang ci'i gsung 'phros smar [sic!][186] bar byung song yang lo tsā ba mi mkhas pa dag bar du bcug dgos pa'i stabs kyis chos phyogs kyi gsung 'phros 'dra ni cher byung ma song/

---

[182] Cf. ibid., 4f.
[183] Cf. supra 52f.
[184] Slob dpon Mkhas pa dpal grub apparently introduced him to the *Kalāpa* system of Sanskrit grammar (cf. Si tu 14.736.4), a scholar named Viṣṇupati taught him *Pāṇini* as well as *Sārasvata*, and the name Pradhumna is mentioned as Si tu's tutor of the *Amarakośa* (cf. Si tu 14.736.7f.). I owe this important piece of information to Peter Verhagen in an e-mail conversation dated January 6th, 2017.
[185] Cf. Verhagen 2013, 318f.
[186] I read *smra*.

"Whatever conversation came up, it was necessary to bring in the unlearned translators, for which reason a real conversation on Dharma could not take place for the bigger part."[187]

Such frustration caused by language barriers during his first visit in Nepal must have left an impression on him, formative for his position on scholarship and the related role of linguistic competency. On the other hand, direct contact with local *paṇḍita*s must have also provided him with firsthand experience of Indian scholarly ideals in theory and practice.

Yet, Si tu's philological career was only about to begin. Considering perhaps the most important event for the purpose of this study, it is unsurprising that his position as the court chaplain of the House of Sde dge together with his philological-linguistic expertise led to being commissioned by the royal family as the editor of the *bka' 'gyur* section of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon, which work he commenced in 1729 at the age of thirty.[188] As part of the catalogue that he compiled following completion of the canonical project in 1733 (volume 9), Si tu also attached not only the above-mentioned history of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism but also detailed information on the materials, workforce, methodology etc. for the production of the *bka' 'gyur*.[189] As editor-in-chief, Si tu was responsible for the edition of more than 1.000 works considered as the word of the Buddha, compiled into more than 100 volumes, and he oversaw more than 500 men or 6 types of workers, i.e. more than 60 calligraphers and scribes, a group of 10 proofreaders and several hundred block carvers, woodworkers as well as paper and ink workers.[190] These numbers already reveal the enormous size of this royally sponsored project and the prestigious and – from a Buddhist perspective – auspicious task of the chief editor only rendered the need for philological accuracy all the more urgent. According to his own accounts, Si tu himself made the decisions regarding the compilation and editing methodologies for the *bka' 'gyur* and he had the final word on difficult passages. His editorial work was mainly based on two earlier versions of the *bka' 'gyur*, the *'Jang sa tham* block-print (1609-11) and the Lho dzong manuscript.[191] Apart from these two sources he also had access to earlier editions, and he also used several Sanskrit manuscripts for the edition of *tantra*s. Schaeffer mentions the recension, examination and emendation of the canonical sources as the three main tasks in the editorial practice of both the editors of the Sde dge Canon, Si tu and Zhu chen Tshul khrims rin

---

[187] Si tu 14.119.4. Cf. also Verhagen 2013, 322.
[188] On the history of the Sde dge canon, Si tu's editing of the *bka 'gyur* section as well as the general "explosion" of printing the Tibetan Buddhist Canon on the Himalayan Plateau during the 18th century, cf. Schaeffer 2009, chapter 5.
[189] Cf. Schaeffer 2009, 94; Verhagen 2010, 471f.; Chaix 2010, 91f.
[190] Cf. Schaeffer 2009, 104f.
[191] Cf. ibid., 95.

chen, the latter being responsible for the *bstan 'gyur* section of the Canon from 1737 until 1744.[192] While recension is concerned with the appraisal and arrangement of sources, their examination has to distinguish between authentic and corrupt readings, the latter then being possibly emended as the third of the three branches. Schaeffer further notes that "the foundations for such reasoned examination and impartiality," as they were practiced by the two editors, "were definitely laid down in the grammatical treatises of the early translators."[193] Editors working in the project groups were required to be familiar with works such as the SCP and TKJ, the SSBP and MVY or even Smṛtijñānakīrti's Tibetan grammar *Smra sgo*.[194] Indeed, Schaeffer's detailed and informative account of the production of the Sde dge Canon reminds us to some extent of the centralized translation enterprises during the imperial period, at that time also a massive, royally patronized project with a high degree of standardization based on decreed principles. The honorific duty assigned to Si tu further fostered his philological-linguistic vocation and required him to further practice, cultivate and promote these disciplines among his editors. Latest at this stage of his career Si tu must have had detailed insights into the philological, editorial and further constitution of translated Buddhist Sanskritic sources on the Himalayan plateau, thus empowering him to critically assess the observed shortcomings among the scholars of his time.

Si tu's direct access to new textual material already during his first visit to Nepal, his contacts with Sanskrit *paṇḍita*s, the editorship of the *Sde dge bka' 'gyur* as well as some of his personal experiences all point towards the importance of linguistic competency and philology and only confirm what SCP, Lce Khyi 'brug or Sakya Paṇḍita already had pronounced long before him: recourse to the Sanskritic tradition and its sources as well as linguistic, translational, text-critical and philological practices are indispensable for an accurate understanding of authoritative (Buddhist) teachings.[195] However, to this point, the question as to how the composition of the *Great Commentary* is situated within Si tu's philological and linguistic work has remained unaddressed in our investigations.

3.3 Si tu's Project of Tibetan Grammar, the *Great Commentary*

Si tu's philological work as an editor and translator was closely intertwined with his grammatical work, a fact which is most directly testified by his revision of Tibetan translations

---

[192] Cf. ibid.
[193] Schaeffer 2009, 101.
[194] Smṛtijñānakīrti's composition on Tibetan grammar referred to here as *Smra sgo* more accurately consists of a root text entitled *Smra ba'i sgo mtshon cha lta bu* ('Weapon-like Speech door (= mouth)' or 'Weapon-like Entrance to Speech') and an autocommentary (cf. also *Smra sgo* in the Abbreviations).
[195] On reasons for Si tu's emphatic revision of already translated textual materials, cf. also Schaeffer 2013, 305.

of the Sanskrit grammars *Kātantra* and *Cāndra*[196] as well as his editorial work on the *bka' 'gyur* in which he demanded grammatical knowledge from his editors.

It was mentioned above that many of the well-known Tibetan translators also made contributions to the field of Sanskrit or Tibetan linguistics. During the imperial epoch, a few autochthonous linguistic texts on Sanskrit language and the *chos skad* emerged in- and outside the context of the revision and standardization of translation that directly emphasized Indian *vyākaraṇa*, however it remains challenging to evaluate whether these compositions arose out of mere personal efforts by figures like Lce Khyi 'brug or whether they had an official status or purpose in the royally supported commission.

Si tu makes available more detailed material on the background of his grammatical composition, for example at the end of the *Great Commentary* he states that several interested, yet unnamed persons had repeatedly encouraged him before he commenced the composition of the part on the *Sum cu pa* at the age of thirty, the same year he was assigned to the editor-in-chief for the *bka' 'gyur* and several years after his first trip to Nepal.[197] It is difficult to discern the true value of this statement, since it is a typical rhetoric of Tibetan scholarly modesty to deny the composition of an important work merely on one's own behalf. On the other hand, this claim may further corroborate the fact that his expertise in linguistics and grammar was already widely acknowledged at that time, which is confirmed also by his assignment to the editor of the *bka' 'gyur*. SCP and TKJ had already achieved their status as the unquestionable authorities of Tibetan grammar some centuries before Si tu and the related narrative about their origin was widely accepted by the tradition. The composition of a commentary on these two texts thus was an established practice among grammarians and even the most important means of grammatical theory formation for WT, therefore also an esteemed endeavor for an expert like Si tu.

Si tu further explains that he put down the work and postponed its completion several times, distracted by different "duties related to the Dharma as well as mostly not declinable obligations outside of [his] control,"[198] until he finished the work only at the age of forty-five in his monastic seat in Dpal spungs. In this context, he mentions the venerated Mdo mkhar ba Tshe ring dbang rgyal as a high-ranking literate who kindly and repeatedly beseeched him to finish his work after having deferred it the first time, which also demonstrates the value ascribed to Si tu's composition of the *Great Commentary* amongst Tibetan intellectuals. Even though Si tu had already started composing the treatise slightly before or at the beginning of his editorial

---

[196] Cf. volume 1 in his collected works, Sherab Gyaltsen 1990.
[197] Cf. GC 617.1.
[198] […] *chos ldan gyi bya ba dang phal cher bzlog tu med pa'i gzhan dbang gi khol po* […] (GC 617.4).

work on the Sde dge Canon – probably one of those duties which distracted him – the fifteen years required to complete it also assured that his experience and expertise gathered during this time found its way into his grammar.

Si tu comments upon his own motivation to compose the *Great Commentary* at its very beginning:

> *de las sum cu pa dang rtags kyi 'jug pa gnyis kho na deng sang gi bar du yod cing/ mkhas blun mang pos 'grel bshad kyi khur blangs pas don gzhan dang gzhan du 'don pa'i glegs bam gyi phreng bar gyur mod/ 'on tang rnam dpyod dang ldan pa kha cig gis rigs pa'i mda' rnon gyis phug pas gzhung don mang po zhig dpyis pyin par gyur cing/ phal cher ni byang pyhogs 'dir gtsug lag gnyis ka bar du nyams pa'i dbang las bshad rgyun dang bstan bcos kyi yan lag gzhan ma tshang ba'i phyir mi gsal ba rnams kha khral 'jal ba tsam las don du gnas par ma mngon pas/ bdag lta bus mtha' gcig tu bshad par sla ba ma yin kyang blo gros kyi nor dang ldan pa gzhan dag gis kyang ched du bskul ba dang/ rang nyid gzhung khyad par du 'phags pa 'di dag la 'jug par 'dod pa'i spro ba brtas pas rjes dpag gsum gyis ji ltar dpag pa dgrol bar bya'o/*

"Of these [eight treatises originally composed by master Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa], only the two, *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa*, are preserved up to the present day. Since many learned ones as well as fools have taken on the burden of a commentary, a series of works expounding this and that interpretation (~ *don*) has emerged. Yet, while some with the gift of thorough analysis have pierced the treatises' meaning with the sharp arrow of reasoning, thus clarifying much of it, the majority [of explanations] lacks clarity, because the transmission as well as the remaining branches of the [eight] treatises are incomplete due to their downfall between the two disseminations (*gtsug lag gnyis ka bar du* ?) here in the north (i.e. Tibet). Apart from paying tribute [to master Thon mi], they appear to miss the [texts'] meaning (*don du gnas par mi mngon*). Consequently, even though a definitive explanation (*mtha' gcig tu bshad pa*) is not easy for someone like me (*bdag lta bus*), after others gifted with the jewel of intellect also requested it and, as for myself, being full of enthusiasm, wishing to engage in these two sublime treatises, [I] will elaborate how to measure [them] by means of the three inferences (*rjes dpag gsum*)."[199]

---

[199] GC 451.1.

Here, Si tu expresses a strong and direct critique against most of the existing commentarial literature on the *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa* and reveals his main opponents. The notion of *kha khral 'jal ba* ('to pay tribute/respect [to the master]') is not merely directed against previous commentators in general, it is a subtle but unmistakable attack against Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po (Zha lu Lotsāwa; 1441-1527/28) together with Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dgon mchog chos grags (Rnam gling Paṇchen; 1646-1718) as well as Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub (Pra ti; 17/18th century).[200] All of them mention *drin du gzo ba* ('to show gratitude') as one of the reasons why "writing on [the two root texts], reading and explaining [them], listening to [teachings on them] as well as [their] full clarification is nothing but appropriate for scholars."[201] Si tu therefore acknowledges that their respective compositions fulfill the purpose of paying respect to the root texts and their author, but he also shares his devastating judgement of their actual understanding of SCP and TKJ. However, his polemical assessment of the tradition is not restricted to these three since his knowledge of *Sum rtags* commentaries and Tibetan grammatical literature in general went far beyond these works.

Si tu observes the diversity of existing interpretations of the two root texts, both by true scholars as well as fools, and consequently he sees the primary purpose of his commentary to arrive at a definitive explanation (*mtha' gcig tu bshad pa*). Thus, it was the exegetical state of the art of *Sum rtags* that prompted Si tu to add abundant assessments – for the larger part refutations – of the former grammatical tradition throughout the entire *Great Commentary*. This common Tibetan scholastic-commentarial practice bears the name *mtha' dpyad* ('final analysis') and is usually contained at the end of a textual section in order to clarify uncertainties, possible inconsistencies and to refute or reconcile competing interpretations and theories. Since Si tu attributed such great importance to the language arts in which he had become an acknowledged expert and since he already had direct contact with Sanskritic scholarship during his first trip to Nepal, it seems natural if not necessary in view of his assessment of the exegetical state of the art to turn to the most important Tibetan grammatical texts – either by himself or upon request – and take upon him the duty of correcting misleading faults of former commentators as well as to elaborate on the 'definitive' meaning of SCP and TKJ. According to Si tu's own account, standing out against commentators that only achieve to show their gratitude, he intends to pursue the courageous project of *mtha' gcig tu bshad pa* by means of *rjes dpag gsum* ('threefold

---

[200] Note that Zha lu Lotsāwa represents a frequent target of Si tu's critique also in the context of other works, e.g. the translation of the *Eight Verses of Praise to Mahākāla* (cf. Verhagen 2010, 476) or the commentary on *Cāndravyākaraṇa* (cf. HSGLT 2, 177f.).

[201] […] *mkhas pa rnams kyi 'bri zhing klog pa dang 'chad pa dang nyan pa dang rab tu gsal bar byed rigs pa nyid do/* (Zha lu 2013A, 2).

inference'), that is to say, reasoning. This well-established triad in Tibetan scholastic knowledge production sets out the methodological framework within which Si tu's grammatical theory formation operated.

The present chapter had demonstrated that Si tu was a philologist by heart who was fully committed to the prominent view that grammar should be studied as part of the Buddhist path, and thus his *Great Commentary* was not only an exegetical exercise but also serves an important soteriological purpose. The foundations of Si tu's project in the *Great Commentary* were the diversity of competing commentarial literature, the need for a definitive explanation of SCP and TKJ as well as the open commitment to a critical approach based on reasoning.

After having discussed at some length the historical background of Tibetan grammar as well as that of Si tu and his *Great Commentary*, the following chapter will turn to the methodological framework of Si tu's grammatical theory formation in order to provide insights into why and how a definitive explanation of SCP and TKJ may improve the understanding of WT, an investigation that will further reveal some important methodological mechanisms governing his conception of case grammar.

4 Tibetan Scholastic Methodology and the Formation of Grammatical Theories in the *Great Commentary*

The perhaps most important characteristic of grammatical theory formation in the *Great Commentary* is the fact that it is a commentary on SCP and TKJ, ultimately the exclusive scriptural authorities regarding the grammar of the written Tibetan language in Si tu's time. This further implies that any analysis of the structures of WT, including any attempt to further develop the understanding of these structures, takes place within the framework of interpreting the word of SCP and TKJ – and the same holds true for the entire *Sum rtags* tradition, i.e. the commentarial literature on SCP and TKJ that understands the grammar of WT through the exegesis of these two seminal texts. In order to gain insight into Si tu's methodology and his quest towards a definitive explanation, this chapter will commence with a closer look at his understanding of the authority of SCP and TKJ against the background of the general Tibetan scholastic principal of scriptural authority.

4.1 On the authority of *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa*

In his study of Indo-Tibetan scholasticism, Cabezón notes that "when it comes to the actual practice of philosophical discourse, we find that scripture plays an extremely important role."[202] This importance of scriptural authority in Tibetan scholarship is rooted in the Indian tradition and is theoretically founded in the field of *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*, 'means of valid cognition') that is primarily concerned with logic, epistemology and the question of valid cognition. In Indian philosophical schools such as *Nyāya*, for example, authoritative speech (*śabda*) is considered one such *pramāṇa*, next to *pratyakṣa* ('direct perception'), *anumāna* ('inference') and *upamāna* ('comparison, analogy'), through which one arrives at correct and reliable knowledge.[203] The epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti commonly referred to as the tradition of Buddhist epistemology accepts only the two *pramāṇa*s of *pratyakṣa* ('direct perception') and *anumāna* ('inference'), *śabda* being included as a form of the latter.[204] In the context of the validation of authoritative speech or scripture, exegetical analysis and argumentation are further formalized in the Tibetan scholastic tradition by means of the *dbyad pa gsum* ('threefold analysis'), comprising direct perception (*mngon gsum*), logical inference (*rjes dpag*) and scriptural authority (~ *yid ches rjes dpag*; lit. 'inference [based on] trust or belief').[205] Any

---

[202] Cabezón 1994, 91. On scriptural authority in so-called "Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism", cf. ibid., chapter 5.

[203] Cf. *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.3.

[204] Cf. Tillemans 1986. For a reprint of this article, cf. Tillemans 1999, chapter 1.

[205] As already evident from the term *yid ches rjes dpag*, Buddhist epistemology has subsumed authoritative speech under the category of logical reasoning. On the *dpyad pa gsum* as well as the question of authority and truth in (Tibetan) Buddhist scripture, cf. also Cabezón 1981. Note that Tillemans (1993, 9ff.) speaks of a

authoritative source and its content must not contradict factual evidence, must be logically consistent and conform with other authoritative knowledge in and outside itself. These are the three pillars that support the authority and authenticity of a source and its content.

In most general terms, the authority of a source that occupies the status of a *dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i lung* ('scripture/teaching that is pure by means of the threefold analysis') in the Tibetan scholastic tradition is tied to the idea of its completeness and inerrancy.[206] That is to say, such authoritative texts and corpora of texts contain at least all necessary knowledge with regard to their topic and without fault. This also comes with the task for the exegetical tradition to defend these against any violation in terms of the three types of analysis brought forth by either real or anticipated opponents. Despite the tradition's rhetoric that emphasizes the *dpyad pa gsum* as the method of authentication, it must be noted that the actual authentication of scriptures can be a more intricate dynamic than a mere theoretical validation through the threefold analysis, a fact confirmed by the authority of SCP and TKJ that has been largely promoted by Tibetan traditional historiography and the narrative of Thon mi. Nonetheless, this triad makes clear that Tibetan scholastic knowledge production is based not simply on blind adherence to any scriptural authority but on a critical encounter with it, revealing that factual evidence and logical reasoning represent important parameters next to to authoritative knowledge in the validation of scriptural authority.

The fact that Si tu directly confirms this authority of SCP and TKJ based on the threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*) is of utmost importance for an understanding of Si tu's grammatical theory formation within a Tibetan scholastic methodology:

> […] *zhes smos te bstan bcos 'da* [sic!][207] *dpyad pa gsum gyis rnam par dag pas rjes 'jug rnams kyis 'phags yul nas bsgyur pa'i bstan bcos khyad par 'phags pa rnams dang mtshungs par lta zhing don du gnyer rigs so zhes 'doms pa'i don du thu mi nyid kyis bsgyur pa'i mdo rgyud rnams kyi 'gyur phyag dang mthun par 'phags pa 'jam dpal la phyag mdzad pa'o/*

> "[The root text SCP] says the following [through the translator's homage]: For the sake of expounding that, due to [its] full purity (*rnam par dag pa*) by means of the threefold analysis, it is reasonable to aspire towards this *śāstra* (= SCP and TKJ) and regard it as equivalent to those noble *śāstra*s translated from the Noble Land by [his] successors,

seemingly "Tibetan contribution" with regard to the *dpyad pa gsum*, whereas Verhagen (2008B, 244ff.) notes a possible connection to Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*.
[206] On the characteristics of completeness and inerrancy, cf. also Cabezón 1994, 91.
[207] I read *'di*.

Thu mi payed homage to Mañjughoṣa in accordance with the translator's homage of the *sūtra*s and *tantra*s he himself translated."[208]

Si tu's exposition of the initial homage of SCP is concerned with the issue of why master Thu mi (= Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa) had included a translator's homage (*'gyur phyag*) at the very beginning of the text, if it is a Tibetan source and thus not a translation. Si tu's solution to this issue is that the master added it in the same fashion as he added it to his actual translations and as to indicate that SCP and TKJ are to be treated in the same way as translated Sanskritic texts, since they are all equally pure/authenticated/correct (*rnam par dag pa*) by means of the threefold analysis.

Their purity involves that the texts contain a correct representation of WT's grammar, and consequently a correct understanding of the language amounts to the correct interpretation of the root texts. For an accurate understanding of Si tu's intricate grammatical theory formation which involves the reconciliation of several authorities,[209] it would be far too narrow to reduce the topic of his commentary to a mere exposition of the root texts that tries to overcome misinterpretations of the former tradition and to defend its authority, since he has equally attempted to further develop and refine the representation of the language.

Due to their inerrancy, a correct interpretation of SCP and TKJ falls together with the correct understanding of the language, which is assumed to be the intention or intended meaning (*dgongs pa*) of the author of the commented texts, i.e. master Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa. When Si tu thus aims at a definitive explanation of the SCP and TKJ, he simultaneously aims at the master's intended meaning (*mkhan po'i dgongs pa*) as well as the correct understanding of WT:

mtha' gcig tu bshad pa = mkhan po'i dgongs pa = correct understanding of language structures

This very relationship is always presupposed and represents the starting point of Si tu's grammatical theory formation in the GC. It amounts to the simple point that every single part of the root texts' content is treated as a significant and adequate representation of Tibetan grammar.

In the GC, the unquestioned authority is mostly based on the constellation that any taxonomy, any inquiry and reply as well as the entire scope of grammatical theory formation takes place within the conceptual framework of the root texts and that they are de facto never refuted, not even in part. To a large extent, their unrefuted character is simply due to the reason that the two

---

[208] GC 453.1.
[209] Cf. chapter 4.4.

texts are highly condensed and leave much space for interpretation, but is their authority really such that Si tu was not allowed to violate it and needed to preserve the infallible status? Firstly and independent of any concrete answer, it should be kept in mind that the commentarial task is not simply to defend the root texts but to describe and explain Tibetan language. Since the two coincide, a commentary such as the GC is more about describing the language through explaining and defending the root texts, and their strong authority is already implied by this fact alone. However, the question remains whether they are simply unquestioned or really unquestionable? This is a matter of why they are unquestioned, because they have proven to remain consistent or because the status they occupy in the tradition does not allow for any serious questioning?

Most cases of Tibetan scholastic reasoning and argumentation are far too intricate for either of these two dimensions to surface straightforwardly and on their own. Any defense of the root texts' content is typically based on reasoning, thus giving at least the impression that the author followed them not due to their status but because examination demonstrated that they are consistent. Moreover, many if not most of such defenses do not simply defend the root texts themselves, but they equally and often primarily defend a commentator's own interpretation of the root texts. Presuming that no scriptural source is fully consistent and without problems, ultimately it is the overall attitude of a commentator to constantly take side with the root texts in and throughout argumentation that renders them not only unquestioned but through this attitude also unquestionable. In a text like the GC, only very few instances of this unquestionability surface more directly. In his argument against the literal reading of SCP 9.4-11.1 that would prescribe the morphemes *su*, *ru* and *du* to the final letter of the marked syllable itself (*nyamsu* vs. *nyams su*), Si tu launches a multilayered attack that evokes empirical reasons and others, including the following:[210]

> *de la 'dod pa snga ma de ni shin tu 'khrul te/ rjes 'jug sa ra da gsum gyi mthar su ru du rnams 'jug zer ba nyi tshe zhig gzhung 'dis bstan par song bas ru dang du gnyis kyi 'jug yul da dung gzhan yang yod na gzhung 'dis mi ston pa'i rgyu mtshan 'thad ldan smra dgos shing/ rgyu mtshan med na ni gzhung gi bstan bya ma tshang ba'i skyon du 'gyur ba* […]

> "As regards that first assumption, it is strongly deluded for the following reason: if this text (SCP) should have taught such a half-finished statement (*zer ba nyi tshe zhig*) that

[210] On the issue of how to read SCP 9.4-11.1 and how Si tu's reading was based on his limited knowledge, cf. infra 81f.

su, *ru* [and] *du* join at the end of the three postscript letters *sa*, *ra* [and] *du*, one has to give a plausible reason (*rgyu mtshan 'thad ldan*), [why], given there are still also other letters (~ *yul*) which the two *ru* and *du* join to, this text did not teach [these]. If there is no reason, the error follows that the content of the text is incomplete. […]"[211]

Si tu argues that in a literal reading of the root texts, it would follow that *su*, *ru* and *du* were only mentioned to mark postscript letters *sa*, *ra* and *du*. However, since the Tibetan language uses at least also *ru* and *du* after other postscript letters, SCP would have missed to provide the full morphological derivation of the three morphemes. If that was the case, there must be a plausible reason, otherwise SCP would be incomplete. This consequence, however, was not accepted by Si tu, who took it as a reason for dismissing a literal reading. Such passages reveal that Si tu's understanding was indeed based on the inerrancy and completeness of the root texts as an adequate representation of Tibetan language.

However, despite the proclaimed purity of SCP and TKJ, there are different factors that obscure or complicate their definitive interpretation and the relation between *mkhan po'i dgongs pa* and the correct understanding of the language, for example terse and cryptic passages, conflicts between the texts' content and the language, diachronic variations of the language, conflicts with other authoritative knowledge and others. Thus, the project of Si tu or any other commentator is anything but an easy task. As we have seen, to Si tu it is the *rjes dpag gsum* that meet the methodological standards to achieve the commentator's task, and he explicitly declares them as the major means of his GC.[212]

4.2 The *rjes dpag gsum* in the Great Commentary

The *rjes dpag gsum* ('three inferences, threefold inference') represent a common typology of logical inferences in formal Tibetan scholastic reasoning. It distinguishes inferences into inferences based on facts (*dngos stobs rjes dpag*), inferences based on renown or convention (*grags pa'i rjes dpag*) and the inference based on faith or authority (*yid ches rjed dpag*).[213] Each of these three inferences has its own type of inferential proof or reason (*rtags*; lit. 'sign, mark') for the validity of a certain proposition. In most simple terms, a *dngos stobs rjes dpag* is an inference based on a *dngos stobs kyi rtags* ('factual reason'), the typical example being the proposition that sound is impermanent, where the fact that sound is produced and disintegrates is an inherent feature of sound that directly and factually evidences its impermanence. In

---

[211] GC 478.3.
[212] Cf. supra 62.
[213] For a general introduction to these three inferences, cf. Lati Rinbochay 1986, 77ff.; Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé 2012, 153.

contrast, an inference based on renown or convention (*grags pa'i rjes dpag*) has renown or convention as its reason (*grags pa'i rtags*). The proposition 'the rabbit-bearer is properly called 'moon'' (*ri bong can zla ba zhes pa'i sgras brjod du rung*) is only based on the (inherent ?) fact that the signified object is an object of thought (*rtog yul*) that can be designated at free will. Yet, there is no inherent fact that directly connects the sound sequence 'moon' with the designated object, for which reason the name's appropriateness is established through renown or convention in English. If that were not the case, the same object would not be properly called *candra* in Sanskrit. Lastly, the *yid ches rjed dpag* ('inference based on faith or authority') is based on the authority of an authenticated, typically textual source by the power of which certain propositions become valid.[214] As evident from the above examples, the application of each type of inference is dependent on the nature of the topic or proposition under investigation.[215]

Si tu's general organization of his GC quotes SCP and TKJ part by part according to his topical division (*sa bcad*) of the root texts. Following (1) a gloss that either concisely or more elaborately paraphrases the quoted passages to elucidate their direct meaning as understood by him, he optionally supplements (2) a more detailed discussion of his understanding of the topic at hand, (3) and a final analysis (*mtha' dpyad*) to discuss positions of earlier commentators and possible objections to his interpretation. A closer look at Si tu's execution of his abundant final analyses (*mtha' dpyad*) reveals that in the majority of cases he indeed strictly follows the basic structure of formal reasoning:[216]

> […] *'grel byed kha cig gis/   lhag bcas kyi sgra ste kho nar 'dod pa **ni** mi 'thad **de**/ gong smos ltar rjes 'jug 'ga' zhig la ste sbyar ba klog dka' ba'i skyon dang/   de yig lhag bcas kyi don can 'jug pa'i skabs mi 'byung ba'i skyon dang/   sngon gyi glegs bam dag pa rnams la yongs su grags pa dang 'gal ba'i skyon yang yod pa'i **phyir** ro/*

> "[…] Regarding some commentators' assumption that *ste* is the only morpheme [in the function] of *lhag bcas*, it is not apt, because there is the fault, as stated above, that the application of *ste* with some postscript letters is difficult to read, and the fault that there would be no possibility for letter *de* to join in the meaning of *lhag bcas* as well as

---

[214] The classical example for this third type of inference is that the proposition 'generosity brings pleasure/possessions/resources and moral conduct happiness' (*sbyin pas longs spyod khrims kyis bde*) is confirmed through the authority of a scripture authenticated by the three types of analysis (*dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i lung*).

[215] Cf. Horváth 1989, 393 and 396f.

[216] For a comparison with common examples in Tibetan Buddhist formal reasoning, cf. e.g. Tillemans 1999, 121ff.

the fault that it contradicts the common convention in the pure books of earlier [times]."[217]

This argument consists of the topic under investigation – frequently an opponent's view marked by the topical marker *ni* – in combination with a proposition that frequently expresses the unacceptability of this view ending with the grammatical marker *lhag bcas*, followed by Si tu's statement of the reason or a sequence of reasons. Throughout the GC, there are minor variants of this basic structure as well as expanded forms with subordinate reasons, since many of the arguments are considerably more extensive and intricate than the one quoted above. Although Si tu's argumentation does not consistently follow this or similar structures, it remains a frequently recurring pattern and Si tu generally does follow Tibetan scholastic formal reasoning. Yet, a full categorization of each argument in his GC according to the typology of three inferences would be to overextend this point, since the multifaceted reasons provided by Si tu would certainly evade a fully coherent categorization of them, considering also that single arguments often contain several reasons of different kinds. In general, to support and confirm his interpretation of the root texts SCP and TKJ and consequently of WT, Si tu mentions, among others, linguistic conventions (*grags pa*) used among speakers of the language, textual testimonies, the quotation of authoritative sources, factual arguments that are directly perceived and thus independent of further reasoning (*mngon gsum gyis grub pa*), reasons that aim at the logical consistency of an argument or the root texts, as well as others.

Si tu's mention of the *rjes dpag gsum* in the opening passages of his *Great Commentary* should thus not be taken too literally, since he simply refers to this typology in the form quoted above and without providing a detailed theoretical account of them. In this sense, their mentioning should be understood first and foremost as a strong commitment to the generally critical approach which investigates and explores the correct interpretation of SCP/TKJ based on reasoning as understood in Tibetan scholastic methodology. Thus, although Si tu takes for granted the authority of SCP/TKJ and their content, a critical encounter with them was a major objective that defined his own project. The following two subchapters will now investigate in more detail the ways in which he executed this approach in practice.

4.3 Authorities in Si tu's Grammatical Theory Formation

As pointed out in chapter 4.1, the root texts as authoritative textual sources that correctly represent the structures of WT together with these structures themselves are the very pivot of

---

[217] GC 491.2; my emphasis.

Tibetan scholastic grammatical theory formation in the context of GC and we can safely assume in a number of earlier and later *Sum rtags* commentaries as well. The two constitute the double value of a commentary and represent the two principal authorities which provide input to the grammarian or commentator, a relationship that from the perspective of a commentary like the GC may be represented as follows:

Figure 1: Principal authorities in the Great Commentary

While the unidirectional arrows in this figure represent the aspect of input in the GC, they take into account neither the ways in which Si tu negotiated this input,[218] nor the possible relations between the structures of WT and the root texts or any possible normative dimension of grammatical texts that may have affected the language. For the GC, it may also be noted that Si tu himself considers the relation between SCP, TKJ and WT such that the root texts represent WT during the time of their author Thon mi (dashed arrow), as evident in comments such as the following:

> *gzhan yang bod yig gi sdeb ji ltar sbyor ba'i tshul ni sngon gyi bod skad dag pa nyid la brjod pa'i sgra ji ltar 'byung ba de ltar mkhan po 'dis sbyar ba yin* […]

> "Furthermore, regarding the mode of how to combine Tibetan letters (*bod yig gi sdeb ji ltar sbyor ba'i tshul*), this master [Thon mi] applied the sounds/morphemes (*sgra*) as [they] occurred [in] the pronunciation of the pure Tibetan language itself of the past (*sngon gyi bod skad dag pa nyid la brjod pa*)."[219]

The principality of the two authorities, the root texts of *Sum rtags* and WT, is mainly constituted by the fact that both are simultaneously the actual topic of classical *Sum rtags* commentarial literature. In addition, the root texts are unquestionable insofar as any direct or open and unresolved contradiction even with their parts is unacceptable and regarded as a commentarial

---

[218] Cf. chapter 4.4.

[219] GC 520.4. Preceeding this quotation, we read that the undefiled pronunciation (*klog tshul ma nyams pa*) is commonly known as the one from ancient Central Tibet (*bod yul dbus*) (cf. GC 520.2).

lapse in the form of either a lack of understanding or commentarial skill. While Si tu did not explicitly declare the unquestionability of WT in the same way as he did for the root texts, the fact that the written Tibetan language in use represents a principal authority for grammatical analysis and the assessment of grammatical theories in the GC surfaces when, in the context of the syntactic link (*tshig phrad*) *slar bsdu*,[220] he argues that ultimately the application of any dependent grammatical marker at the end of a marked entity has to follow the criteria of easy pronunciation and worldly convention:

> *da drag can gyi mthar to la sogs pa 'thob pa'i don ni/* […] *spyir btang rjes 'jug la ltos pa'i rnam dbye dang phrad rnams la/   sbyor yul ming tshig gi mtha' de dang sbyar bas brjod pa bde zhing sgra mthun pa yod na rtags mthsungs nyid sbyar bar bya zhing/ de lta bu med na'am yod kyang brjod mi bde na brjod bde ba gang yin sbyar bar bya ba yin pa dang/   de dag kyang 'jig rten gyi grags pa'i rjes su 'brang dgos pas rjes 'jug gzhan rnams rang rang la rna ru sogs sbyar bar rtags mthsungs min ci rigs yod kyang brjod bde ba dang drags zhing grub pa'i phyir 'od pa yin* […]

"As for the point that the ending of [a word] with *da drag* (= secondary postscript *da*) takes *to*, etc.: […] In general, regarding the cases and [syntactic] links that are dependent on the postscript letter (*rjes 'jug la ltos pa'i rnam dbye dang phrad rnams*), if there is an easy pronunciation and morphological/phonological agreement (*brjod bde zhing sgra mthun pa*), [then] the concordant sign (*rtags mthsungs*) is to be applied directly (~ *nyid*). Yet, regardless of whether or not there is such a [concordant sign that is easy pronounceable and morphological/phonological agreeing], if not easy to pronounce, whatever is easier to pronounce is to be applied. And since the [other postscript letters] also must follow worldly convention (*'jig rten gyi grags pa*), it is apt to apply *rna ru* (= vowel 'o') at the end of the other postscript letters as such, no matter if it is the concordant sign or not, because it is easier to pronounce (*brjod bde*), commonly known/used (*grags pa*) and established (*grub pa*) [in that way]. […]"[221]

Although this passage discusses the syntactic link *slar bsdu* in SCP 8.3-9.2, it also refers to the idea of morphological/phonological agreement of letters (*sgra mthun pa*, lit. 'agreeing phonemes/morphemes'), a term mentioned in TKJ 22.2.[222] The major topic of TKJ (*rtags kyi*

---

[220] The syntactic link *slar bsdu* is used to mark the end of a Tibetan sentence. On the technical term *tshig phrad* ('syntactic link'), cf. infra 90f.
[221] GC 468.5.
[222] TKJ 22.1-23.1:

"By these very word endings (*ming mtha'*),   *ming mtha' de dag nyid kyis ni//*

73

'jug pa, 'joining of [gender] signs') is concerned with the classification of letters (*yi ge*), prescripts (*sngon 'jug*) and postscripts (*rjes 'jug*) based on predefined genders (male, female, neutral, very female, etc.) in order to establish rules that govern the morphophonological derivation of word forms. Depending on the position in the word (prescript, root letter, postscript), each letter represents a specific gender sign (*rtags*) that is in concordance with the sign of the neighboring letter, if they agree with one another according to the defined gender rules in TKJ. In Si tu's terminology, such gender signs are concordant signs (*rtags mthsungs*). A simple example would be the word form *dpyid ka* ('spring'), where the ending letter *ka* is the concordant sign (*rtags mthsungs*) of the postscript letter *da*, since in their respective position both are defined as male gender (*pho*) and TKJ 21.2 defines that male postscript letters trigger male word endings. On the basis of this gender model, TKJ presents some fundamental principles for the correct morphophonological derivation of word forms.

Si tu's main argument in this passage is that if these concordant signs (*rtags mtshungs*) which are defined by the rules of TKJ interfere with the criteria of easy pronunciation and common usage/convention, then in the derivation of any grammatical marker preference is to be given to those forms of the markers that fulfill these last criteria. In this way, Si tu clearly states that grammatical analysis must follow the common conventions of the users of a language, even if this overrules the gender rules as defined in TKJ.[223] Such passages bear direct witness to the

---

in morphological agreement with themselves,	*de nyid rang gi sgra mthun pa'i//*
[the syntactic links] *chos dngos*, *las, byed pa*	*chos dngos las dang byed pa dang//*
sbyin,*'byung khungs*, *'brel ba*, *gnas*	*sbyin dang 'byung khungs 'brel pa dang//*
and also the morpheme for *bod pa* are triggered."	*gnas dang bod pa'i sgra yang drang//*

This passage states that the word endings discussed previously to this quotation trigger the grammatical markers in morphophonological agreement with these very word endings. The eight listed syntactic links are the eight case markers. This passage is directly followed by a list of non-case syntactic links in TKJ 23.2-23.4, a section which is equally governed by TKJ 22.1-2.

[223] From the perspective of the root texts, this would be an obvious violation of their authority, since the existing language conventions prove that important parts of TKJ's content are not always applicable, and if they are, then only as long as the other criteria (easy pronunciation, worldly convention) apply. Si tu resolves the problem by defining mainly two criteria for the term *sgra mthun* in TKJ 22.2. Although SCP/TKJ mention no other term than *sgra mthun pa* once in TKJ 22.2, Si tu labels any agreement in terms of the gender scheme with the term *rtags mtshungs* ('concordant sign') during his exposition of TKJ 22.2. He goes on to argue that this is only one criterion of morphophonological agreement (*sgra mthun*) along with the even more important criterion easy pronunciation (*brjod bde*) (cf. GC 591.2). When Si tu therefore argues in the last quotation that not *rtags mtshungs* alone but even more importantly *brjod bde* (and in this passage also *grags pa*, i.e. convention, and *grub pa*, i.e. being established) govern the derivation of grammatical markers, this is also his proposed interpretation of the term *sgra mthun pa* in TKJ 22.2. Thus, even if TKJ's gender rules are overruled by *brjod bde*, this is still in line with TKJ, since *brjod bde* is included in *sgra mthun pa* in TKJ 22.2 according to Si tu's understanding.

Whether Si tu's strategy to explain the term *sgra mthun* in TKJ and reconcile it with existing language use is indeed in line with the root texts or rather an intentional attempt to avoid a violation of their purity is difficult to assess. On the one hand, the single, not further explicated use of the term *sgra mthun pa* in TKJ 22.2 within the overarching topic of gender rules suggests that *sgra mthun pa* refers precisely and exclusively to these rules but not to any other criteria such as *brjod bde* that are entirely missing in both texts.

importance he attributed to the language as a principal authority in arguing for or against linguistic taxonomies, and they also reveal his efforts at improving the understanding of the language and not simply the root texts. However, another question altogether is whether or not the indubitable and categorical significance presupposed for the commented root texts and their entire content also in the same way applies to the language and all its parts, or if there are cases in which Si tu openly diminished the significance of the language in favor of the root texts' content.[224]

In addition to the two principal authorities that represent the actual topic of the GC, Si tu also consulted and quoted from Sanskritic grammatical texts, Buddhist philosophy and several Tibetan linguistic sources that are either commentaries on SCP and TKJ or not directly associated with *Sum rtags*. The main schools of Sanskrit grammar studied in Tibet, i.e. *Kātantra* and *Cāndra*, both figure occasionally in the GC[225] and they claim full authority when it comes to Sanskrit grammar, and from what may be estimated from the numerous references in his voluminous *Cāndra* commentary, he presumably also in the same way acknowledged the highest recognized system in India, i.e. the *Pāṇinian*. However, when it comes to the highest authority regarding the true state of reality, including linguistic matters such as the nature of language in the context of the so-called *tshogs gsum* model, authenticated Buddhist philosophical sources such as the *Abhidharmakośa* occupy center stage.[226] In *Sum rtags*, neither Sanskritic grammatical nor Buddhist philosophical sources are the actual commentarial topic, which to a limited extent allows for a diminishing of their significance with regard to Tibetan grammar, although we can assume that any critique undermining their validity within their own province has to be seen as a commentarial lapse rather than an actual inconsistency of the authoritative source.[227] Lastly, there are a number of Tibetan grammatical texts of different

---

On the other hand, the gender rules are strictly speaking only defined in the context of word-internal formation, i.e. the derivation of prescripts (*sngon 'jug*), postscripts (*rjes 'jug*) and word endings (*ming mtha'*) of a single word form. In contrast, the once occurring term *sgra mthun* ('agreeing phoneme/morpheme') in TKJ 22.2 refers in very general and unspecified terms to the agreement of word endings with the syntactic links, and thus it might be possible that TKJ indeed understood it as a general reference to morphological agreement and not specifically to the defined gender rules. As Si tu correctly noted, this is corroborated by the fact that not all the morphological forms of the syntactic links presented in SCP follow the gender rules of TKJ (cf. GC 592.1).

[224] On Si tu's rejection of the Tibetan interjections *ka ye* and *kwa*, two proper forms to express or emphasize vocative meaning, cf. e.g. GC 498.3 and infra 80.

[225] For an exemplary list of quotations from Sanskrit grammars, cf. Verhagen 1996, 431.

[226] On the *tshogs gsum* (*trīkāya*; 'three groups/collections') in Sanskrit and Tibetan scholarship, cf. chapter 5.3.

[227] I am unaware of any passage in the GC where Si tu would openly refute the mentioned Sanskritic grammatical or Buddhist philosophical sources with regard to their own respective fields. The instance that comes closest to an open critique is in the context of the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum* model, where Si tu states that it is "merely general and rough, therefore not applicable from the perspective of a more detailed investigation here" (*spyir btang rags pa tsam yin pas 'dir phra ba'i dbang du byas na mi 'byor ba*) (GC 608.5). However, this statement does not declare that the *Abhidharmic* model is wrong by any means, it is only too general for a detailed examination as required in GC's context concerned with Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis, rather

kinds that have found their way into the GC. These include texts like the NG(g) that presumably deals with linguistic theories of multilingual validity such as the Tibetan eightfold case model, Tibetan-specific grammars such as the *Smra sgo* which remain outside the context of *Sum rtags* as well as numerous *Sum rtags* commentaries. These sources did not attain the same status of authority in the Tibetan tradition that sources like SCP, TKJ, *Cāndra*, *Kātantra*, *Pāṇini* or the *Abhidharmakośa* occupy in their respective fields. Consequently, their general authority as well as their significance for a certain topic were openly contested by Si tu who subjected this last type of sources to his full critique. This is clearly evident from statements about NG(g), for example, in which he notes that "there is some content (*don*) of the *Eight Linguistic Topics'* root and commentary which cannot be reasoned/proven (*bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi 'gro ba*)."[228] However, regardless of their incompletely authenticated status, in Si tu's view such sources claim significance in the context of grammar and linguistics, but they need to be investigated more critically:

> *smra sgo rtsa 'grel dang smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos rtsa 'grel 'di rnams la'ang mi 'thad pa shin tu mang zhing mkhas pa gzhan gyis gnad* [sic!][229] *byed brjod pa gnad du song ba'ang mang bar snang bas 'phags yul mkhas pa'i legs bshad ni min par nges mod/   'on kyang sum cu pa'i skabs su 'ga' zhig drangs pa sogs gzhung 'di'i don dang skabs 'gar mthun pa'i legs bshad mang dag kyang 'dug pas rnam pa kun tu 'dor bya ni ma yin no/*

> "Root text and commentary of the *Speech Door* (*Smra sgo*) as well as root text and commentary of the *Linguistic Śāstra Pertaining to all Speech* (*Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*) not only convey plenty of inadequacies (*mi 'thad pa*), but there also seem to [be] many trenchant refutations expressed by other scholars (*mkhas   pa gzhan gyi gnod byed brjod pa gnas du song ba*). Therefore, [these texts] are not the lucid exposition of scholars [of] the Noble Land. However, since [they] also contain numerous lucid explanations which on several occasions agree with the content of these texts (= SCP and TKJ), e.g. some derivations (*'ga' zhig drangs pa* ?) in the SCP, they are not to be rejected in all respect."[230]

---

[228] *gnas brgyad rtsa 'grel gyi don 'ga' zhig bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi 'gro ba yod* […] (GC 455.2). On the context of this statement, cf. infra 312f.

[229] I read *gnod*.

[230] GC 607.5.

In total, the different authorities consulted by Si tu as important input sources in the formation of grammatical theories may be summarized as follows:

Figure 2: Overview and hierarchy of sources of input in the Great Commentary

This figure is not intended as a comprehensive and exhaustive presentation of authorities, and each of the mentioned authorities may be further divided to arrive at a more accurate picture. However, the main point of this figure is to illustrate that a variety of different sources prominent in the Tibetan scholastic tradition, each with a variety of different theories, occupied a certain authoritative status which was ascribed by Si tu based on his knowledge of grammar and the tradition, either as fully authenticated and thus indubitable within their own province or generally acknowledged by Si tu or others as significant yet not un-erroneous contributions – all of which provided important input to the GC and thus contributed to the formation of grammatical theories.

The precise status and use of any of these authorities varies across grammarians due to differences in the importance attached to them. For example, a more or less direct adherence to both Sanskrit grammatical and Buddhist derivational models is encountered – despite their limited compatibility with each other – in sources such as Dpang Lotsāwa's *Tshogs gsum gsal*

ba (TshSS), an important grammar outside of the *Sum rtags* genre, without any noteworthy efforts towards reconciliation. By contrast, Si tu Paṇchen emancipated himself from these two authorities to develop a model more fit to the peculiarities of the written Tibetan language.[231] On different occasions, he makes the point clear that what works in the context of Sanskrit language does not necessarily apply to Tibetan language in the same way, and thus Sanskrit models of description may not always be directly applied.[232] In the GC, regarding the Buddhist doctrine he even openly criticizes that "without explaining the mode of application of the syntactic link [called *de sgra* ('morpheme *de*') as it would have been] important in the current context, the extensive verbiage [of previous commentators] on *Madhyamaka* or the *Pāramitā*s ends nowhere."[233] Although Si tu does not directly refute any Buddhist theory, this comment clearly restricts the authority of Buddhism in the domain of (Tibetan) grammar.

4.4 The Disequilibrium of Authorities and their Reconciliation

Even those authorities which are pure by means of the threefold analysis and thus inerrant and complete according to the tradition do exhibit inconsistencies, either within themselves or compared to other authorities. The partial overlap of authorities in figure 2 attempts to illustrate schematically that any two of these may converge or diverge regarding theories, concepts and terminology. Naturally, any inconsistencies within and between authorities can result in a variety of theoretical conflicts that cause a 'disequilibrium' in the constitution of a grammatical theory. This term has been introduced by Seyfort Ruegg to specify Tibetan knowledge production and its relation to Indian scholarship:

> "A challenging and very significant task before us is to attempt to clarify the ways in which Tibetans have absorbed and integrated into their civilization the various component parts of the originally Indian culture that they imported starting at the latest in the seventh/eighth century. In the study of such a transcultural relation, and of the enculturation of Indo-Buddhist civilization in Tibet, the identification and analysis of continuities and discontinuities – of homeostasis (dynamic stability) and internal, systemic disequilibrium leading to restoration/renewal/innovation – will naturally play a major part. This should then assist us in overcoming the familiar opposition of stagnant

---

[231] Cf. chapter 5.3.3.

[232] E.g. in the context of case marking in connection with verbs of prostration (cf. infra 310ff.) or in the context of the morphology of the first case (cf. infra 132f.). Note that such a stance towards Sanskrit grammar is not restricted to Si tu. Sakya Paṇḍita, for example, elaborates in some detail in his KhJ how Sanskrit models of nominal inflexion do not apply to Tibetan language, and therefore he restricts their validity for WT mainly to the eight prototypical case functions in the form they were adopted already long before him (cf. KhJ 2009, 24).

[233] [...] *'di skabs su gal che ba'i phrad kyi 'jug tshul 'chad du med par dbu phar sogs kyi bshad yam rgyas pas ni gang du'ang mi 'gyur ro/* (GC 505.5)

stasis vs. dynamic change, a somewhat superficial and jejune dichotomy which has so
frequently, and unproductively, been invoked in such matters."[234]

In the current study, the term disequilibrium is applied to the theoretical imbalance within or between established authorities or sources that take part in the formation of – in this context – grammatical theories. It is manifested in the form of a partial or full disregard, underestimation or neglect of an authority. From the perspective of such a theoretical disequilibrium, the main task of Si tu and other traditional grammarians of *Sum rtags* in order to arrive at a valid grammatical theory involves neither simply finding forms of conceptualization appropriate to the language nor a straightforward reading of the commented root texts, but more an estimation in each and every single case of the precise significance and validity of each authority and an identification of possible contradictions, incompatibilities, etc. within and between these authorities. Finally, the grammarian's use of reasoning and argumentation has the task of resolving conflicts and reconciling the different authorities while avoiding any violation of their respective authoritative status.[235]

In order to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies and reconcile authorities, each authority offers a variety of hermeneutical techniques for the argumentation of Si tu and other commentators. SCP and TKJ give much freedom for different readings but also allow for supplementation of missing information or even textual interventions. [236] In case of supplementation, a commentator like Si tu tends to provide a reason for why the root texts lack the supplemented information.[237] Sanskrit grammatical concepts, in contrast, can be adopted, adapted or rejected in the context of the Tibetan language for the reason that they do not always directly apply due to significant language differences. Already the grammarians before Si tu have acknowledged, for example, that the Tibetan first case is more a stem form and does not fit into the Sanskritic derivational scheme of stem plus suffix.[238] Likewise, Si tu repeatedly distinguishes between generic and exceptional case marking patterns in Sanskrit grammar to decide which of them are in line with Tibetan case marking patterns and which of them are not.[239] The language and its

---

[234] Ruegg 2004, 321.

[235] On the resolution of scriptural inconsistencies in the context of Buddhist philosophy, cf. Cabezón 1994, 62ff.

[236] One such textual intervention in SCP 10.3 by former commentators is attested and refuted in the GC (cf. GC 479.4).

[237] Such a completeness can be argued, for example, through stylistic requirements to be fulfilled by the root texts, e.g. conciseness that necessitated the selection of noteworthy information, or through the requirement of text-internal consistency. For example, the missing derivation of syntactic links such as *to*, *tu*, etc., in SCP, all which take the root letter *ta*, has been explained by Si tu – correctly or not – insofar as that the derivation of syntactic links is based on the ten so-called postscript letters (*rjes 'jug*) in the SCP. Letter *ta*, however, is none of these ten (cf. GC 468.1).

[238] Cf. infra 141f.

[239] Cf. e.g. infra 310f. and 354ff., as well as chapter 16.

structures, in turn, allow for the manipulation of their representation in a grammatical source, for example, through the selection of examples that might approve or disapprove taxonomies.[240] Another possibility are decisions as to a certain standard of the language, e.g. the exclusion of local and colloquial peculiarities as well as the distinguishing between pure and impure or exquisite and ordinary language. On different occasions, Si tu mentions a pure language (*skad dag pa*) not further specified by him or purified corpora of texts (*glegs bam dag pa*)[241] as reference points of his argumentation. He also argued, for example, that the missing forms *ka ye* and *kwa*, both which express the function of address (*bod pa*) similarly to the form *kye* mentioned in SCP 17.3, appear to be a little vulgar (*cung zhig mi mdzes pa*).[242] All of the above and beyond are important techniques for the commentator which allow him to modify the authorities or stretch and narrow their boundaries in order to maintain their respective authoritative status in the reconciliation attempts and to arrive at valid grammatical theories.

It is important for an understanding of the scholastic methodology in GC to keep in mind that the authoritative statuses of input sources outlined in the previous section connects to the significance Si tu attributed to a source and its content with regard to a certain grammatical topic (e.g. case grammar), since this has a strong impact on the strategies how to reconcile conflicts within and between authorities. A conflict between a source like NG(g) and WT may but not necessarily must be directly designated as an error of the linguistic text, since it is not a fully authenticated source and thus the significance of its content may be freely questioned. Yet, a conflict between language and SCP or TKJ does not offer this possibility due to the root texts' authority which is fully accepted by Si tu. In the latter case, Si tu needed to find other strategies and apply hermeneutical techniques that maintained the significance of the root texts despite a conflict with language. There is, for example, at least one interpretation of the root texts' content in the GC that matches Si tu's understanding of the language yet also goes against a straightforward reading and might even result in a misrepresentation of the root texts.[243] Additionally, it was mentioned above that he had, on the basis of text-internal reasons, i.e. the root text's focus on the postscript letters, correctly or incorrectly argued for SCP's completeness despite the missing forms *to*, *tu*, etc.[244] Perhaps even more problematic from a modern linguistic perspective is the fact that the root texts' authority has also allowed for the strategy of leaving

---

[240] In part II, this will be a major point during the investigation of the cases and their exemplification by different grammarians.
[241] Cf. supra 70f. and 72.
[242] Cf. GC 498.3.
[243] For an instance, where Si tu deviated from a direct reading of the root texts and reinterpreted their content to accommodate it for a more accurate understanding of WT, cf. infra 82.
[244] Cf. ft. 237.

the conflict unresolved by their reinterpretation while at the same time accepting their content and adapting the understanding of WT's structures. This seemingly happened frequently in *Sum rtags* commentaries when case examples are selected that are more in line with the root texts' taxonomy than the actual distribution of case markers in the language.[245] However, it remains difficult to assess to which extent a commentator has intentionally adjusted his understanding of the language to preserve the root texts' authority, since the commentaries feature only limited material about their authors' precise knowledge of the distribution of grammatical markers in the language, and part II will demonstrate that strong theoretical reasons impeded such knowledge and consequently supported this strategy.

On a theoretical level, the quality and success of a commentary in terms of an agreement or disagreement by the subsequent tradition depends on the grammarian's ability as a commentator to account for not just one but all the authorities (language, etc.) and to estimate their relative significance with regard to a certain grammatical subject matter. This results in most interesting reconciliation strategies that differ from author to author and can range from a simple negligence of one authority to the formation of a consensus, yet significant divergences frequently do not allow more than uneasy compromises. These may manifest as a cumbersome and unlikely explanation of a passage in the root texts or other textual sources or as an inaccurate or even inadequate representation of the language. It is about the extent to which a commentator was able to reach a consensus and how few compromises were necessary or how few conflicts have remained unresolved in the process. The prevailing compromises, the various evaluations of authorities and the fact that different authors have a different perception of their convergence or divergences constantly requires additional reconciliation strategies in the tradition, thus resulting in a continuous process of renegotiation, restoral, renewal or reformation of established theories, including the introduction of new theories or postulates. This entire dynamic constitutes the lifeline which over the centuries has nurtured grammatical theory formation in the *Sum rtags* tradition as well as in Si tu's *Great Commentary*.

It is important to note at this point that the reconciliation of authorities and resolution of conflicts through the application of techniques in the argumentation of a *Sum rtags* commentator is not simply governed by free and active decision-making. Any agency of the commentator in his formation of grammatical theories depends on his knowledge and

---

[245] Cf. chapters 7-14 on the respective cases, where several lists of examples are provided from sources previous to Si tu as well as the GC. A particularly illustrative example would be Rnam gling's *'tshang rgya 'dod na chos gyis* ('If [you] want to become enlightened, practice Dharma!') as an instance of *na* expressing the meaning of the fourth case (cf. infra 271).

experience which are naturally limited by factors such as the accessibility of and interaction with sources, teachers, colleagues, etc. It may therefore be argued that in the resolution of conflicts the limits of a commentator's knowledge and expertise are as determining as his knowledge itself. A simple example is Si tu's interpretation of SCP 9.4-11.1 and the morpheme *du* with its allomorphs *su* and *ru*: in contrast to other authors, Si tu goes against a literal reading of the root text and claims that the passage needs to be interpreted so that these morphemes are added *after* the last syllable (~ *tsheg bar*) of a lexical word form rather than being attached within that syllable. The difference would be, for example, *nyams su* (Si tu's reading of SCP) vs. *nyamsu* (literal reading of SCP). The obvious reason is that Si tu's version is the one that has been long used in WT. However, old Tibetan inscriptions and Dunhuang manuscripts also bear witness to the fact that the alternative version was in use during the early period of the current writing system. It required quite some effort on behalf of Si tu to demonstrate how the phrasing of SCP should be understood despite the much more straightforward literal reading, and one of his arguments was that such morphological forms are unattested in the ancient textual testimonies listed by him which also included ancient inscriptions.[246] This is somehow surprising in so far as at least Lhasa's *Zhol rdo rings* inscription dating back to the reign of King Khri Srong lde btsan features such forms.[247] Without knowledge of Si tu's reasons for denying their existence – he might not have come across this particular instance or perhaps these forms featured too infrequently in the available material to be accepted as proper – access to additional material as contained in the Dunhuang manuscripts would have probably lead Si tu to another conclusion altogether. Consequently, we might speculate, whether he would have changed his reconciliation strategy from matching the root texts' meaning with the current use of the language to arguing that there are diachronic variations in the latter, something he indeed acknowledged in other contexts.

4.5 Résumé on Grammatical Theory Formation in the *Great Commentary*

This chapter has demonstrated that Si tu introduces his commentary on *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa* with basic methodological principles common to Tibetan scholastic knowledge production. He presupposes the unquestioned authority and thus significance of the commented texts regarding the topic at hand, i.e. Tibetan grammar, and attempts their definitive explanation by means of argumentation and formal reasoning, more precisely the *rjes dpag gsum* ('three inferences'). In practice, this involved the consideration and negotiation of a variety of different

---

input sources such as Sanskritic grammatical sources, Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan linguistic sources and of course the written Tibetan language as the root texts' object under investigation. The pivotal point in this constellation is the relation between the root texts and language, which forms the major topic of the commentary. Thus, a further refinement of existing interpretations of the root texts goes hand in hand with a further refining of existing grammatical models and vice versa. The remaining sources mainly serve to support this project. They represent important authorities that offer Si tu additional material to improve and defend his understanding of SCP, TKJ and WT through either adherence or refutation. Each authority occupies a certain status accepted by Si tu, (1) fully authenticated and thus unquestionable within its province, (2) only generally accepted as an important source, (3) or in case of WT the topic under investigation. Inconsistencies between and within authorities result in a disequilibrium that requires renegotiation and reconciliation, therefore the major task of Si tu and any other *Sum rtags* grammarian is to detect possible conflicts and to resolve them in order to arrive at sound grammatical theories. This results in various creative strategies of grammatical theory formation that often are unable to achieve more than a compromise between authorities.

What may be learned from this methodological constellation about the mechanisms that have shaped Tibetan case grammar? And what does this mean for the role of Sanskritic authority in scholastic Tibetan linguistic knowledge production?

The principle of scriptural authority is a major mechanism how Si tu features the cases in his GC, and the investigation in this chapter has revealed that the unquestionable authority of the commented sources SCP and TKJ sets the framework for Si tu's grammatical theory formation. This implies that the unquestioned authority of adopted forms of originally Sanskritic case grammar relies primarily on SCP and TKJ and the fact that the eight case functions of the classical Tibetan case model are listed in connection with their respective morphological realization.[248] Additionally, the case model has been an all-pervasive and widely acknowledged concept that figures in many of the renowned and accepted Tibetan grammatical sources and is also closely connected – historically and conceptually – to Sanskrit case grammar. This entire constellation establishes and strengthens the undoubted authority of the Tibetan eightfold case scheme, and Si tu drew information from all these sources and the language. The presentation of these eight cases in SCP and TKJ also sets the framework for Si tu to acknowledge different

---

[248] Yet, it should be noted that neither SCP nor TKJ make use of the category 'case' (*vibhakti*, *rnam dbye*) and list these eight functions *on a par* with the remaining syntactic links and their meanings (cf. infra 138f.).

parts of case grammar as well possibilities for adaptation. The basic scheme of the eight functions together with their respective morphology as presented in SCP and TKJ sets the minimum framework Si tu needs to adhere to, and therefore it also governs the possibilities for adaptation. This methodology undeniably constrained the possibilities of transforming the existing case model into a more accurate description of the written Tibetan language because it needed to account for scriptural authorities especially of the root texts.

However, the investigation has made it equally clear that in the concrete practice of grammatical theory formation the adherence to scriptural authority is neither primarily based on Sanskritic authority nor is it uncritical, but instead it is far more intricate, creative and versatile than is typically acknowledged by the topos of faithfulness to or imitation of Sanskritic grammatical authority. Part II will occasionally give evidence for the fact that Sanskritic grammatical knowledge remained a strong and authoritative argument and that references to the notion of Indian civilization in general (*'phags yul*, etc.) had noticeable power in a grammarian's reasoning, however, this chapter has also provided noteworthy methodological restrictions to the 'normativity'[249] of Sanskritic knowledge. In *Sum rtags* that is specific to the Tibetan language, the main scriptural authorities are SCP and TKJ but not Sanskritic grammatical sources. Consequently, the adherence to the case model is based on the cases' appearance and form in SCP and TKJ, and thus not directly but only indirectly on Sanskritic grammatical knowledge. Moreover, although Si tu never directly refuted the validity of any Sanskritic theory, he openly restricted their applicability to Tibetan language. We have also seen that Si tu's use of Tibetan scholastic formal argumentation that combines principles such as factual evidence, linguistic conventions, logical consistency and scriptural authority, together with the application of a variety of hermeneutical-argumentative techniques, allowed him a critical encounter with the root texts in which there was space for negotiation, adaptation and refinement of the existing understandings of the case model.

A natural question remains, which will occasionally be reencountered also in the examination of Si tu's case model, namely the extent to which *Sum rtags* commentators were aware of producing compromises that not always adequately represented either the language or an authoritative source. In other words, did commentators intentionally argue for a certain taxonomy in spite of knowing that it leads to a misconstruction of sources or language, with the principle of scriptural authority not allowing them otherwise? Although this will have to be decided separately for each instance, strongly cumbersome and seemingly artificial solutions

---

[249] Cf. supra 9.

by commentators including Si tu sometimes cannot but give the impression that they did know better than admitted in their commentaries, even more so in view of the fact that most of them were native speakers. However, the issue at hand is more difficult. It was noted above that the formation of theories through the reconciliation of authorities is not a simple act of a commentator's free will but strongly limited by his own knowledge. This also includes the fact that any language proficiency of Tibetan grammarians does not directly translate into an awareness of the gap between language and linguistic models, no matter how immense this gap might be. Linguists will agree that language is an utterly complex phenomenon which offers innumerable strategies as to how to describe it. How to distinguish, therefore, between an adequate and an inadequate description of language, a valid or invalid grammatical theory? The answer to this question depends on the specific state of the art in a tradition, of approved modes to conceptualize language, available knowledge about linguistic theories and methods to describe the language and form theories. Lastly, it is also a matter of awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of these methods and theories. Such knowledge of adequacies or inadequacies is not given simply with language competency, but it is limited by the peculiar approach followed by a grammarian and it needs to be developed by detecting and, in the process, focusing on shortcomings or inconsistencies in prevailing forms of grammatical analysis through a constant rubbing of concepts against each other and the language in use. Methodology, perceptions of adequacy, awareness of strengths and weaknesses and consequently the refinement of theories are all intertwined and develop alongside in time and space. As a word of caution rather than an answer to the above question, it is utterly difficult to discern and therefore will remain open in this thesis, whether a grammarian such as Si tu had all the prerequisites at his disposal to becoming aware of the linguistic shortcomings in some of his conceptions of the case model. The next chapter will detail, for example, how any possible awareness was severely impeded by the theoretical foundation of case grammar with its roots already in the Sanskritic tradition. In any case, it is safe to conclude that Si tu's case grammar in the GC is the thorough and honest attempt to develop an adequate representation of WT, not just to defend the scriptural authority of SCP and TKJ or any other source.

Before going on to the main topic of this dissertation, i.e. the close examination of the classical Tibetan eightfold case model in and before Si tu, it is necessary to repeat that the grammatical methodology investigated in this chapter focused only on *Sum rtags* and thus on a literary genre and tradition that cannot be traced back further than the 14th century at the current state of research. The numerous linguistic sources in the Tibetan tradition outside of the *Sum rtags* genre and before and after this time have a different constellation of their respective input

sources and their authorities. This might be of special interest for early conceptions of the case model in sources like NG(g), GNT or the *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa*, in which Sanskritic authority presumably played a more direct role. Yet, it is a different question whether Sanskritic sources occupied any similar status like SCP and TKJ. It may also be assumed that especially for the earliest period it was only natural and even reasonable to rely on the accumulated linguistic knowledge and experience of the Indian tradition in the cross-cultural knowledge transfer, and it would be counterintuitive for grammarians of that early time to have been fully aware of the intricacies of grammar and the weaknesses of their approach to the analysis of the Tibetan language.

5 Introduction to Tibetan Case Grammar

5.1 Introduction to the Tibetan Case Model

Since there is no morphological structure in written Tibetan that directly corresponds to the Sanskrit nominal inflexion, the introduction of case grammar must have posed a great challenge to Tibetan grammarians. In Sanskrit as a fusional language, suffixes join to base forms (verbal roots and nominal stems) in order to form complete, syntactically functioning and bound word forms (*pada*).[250] These suffixes are clearly defined by Sanskrit grammarians in terms of two unmistakably separated sets of suffixes for nominal and verbal inflexion.[251] Written Tibetan, in contrast, allows the application of one and the same grammatical marker following nouns and verb forms, indicating either identical, related or occasionally even unrelated syntactic, semantic or pragmatic information. Next to this morphological difference, there is also a significant morphosyntactic disagreement between Sanskrit and WT, regarding both the number of distinguishable morphological case forms as well as the different syntactic, semantic and pragmatic categories (= case functions) distributed onto them. Despite multiple serious obstacles, the Tibetan tradition has nonetheless adopted nonetheless Sanskrit case grammar and eventually made it an integral part of its grammatical system.

A specific procedure for the derivation of syntactically bound word forms (*pada*) was developed in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and continued in a simplified manner by grammars such as *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*, enabling grammarians to execute a distinction between morphological forms and their functions in the context of case grammar very consistently.[252] The grammatical term *vibhakti* ('case suffix'), of which the Tibetan term *rnam dbye* is a direct translation, is restricted to a fixed set of 21 suffixes listed in grammatical treatises, which are triggered by clearly defined semantic and syntactic conditions to indicate the respective semantic or syntactic information conveyed in these conditions.

> P 2.3.2 *karmaṇi dvitīyā* "If there is a *karman*, a second [*vibhakti* occurs]."

> P 2.3.4 *antarāntareṇa yukte* "In connection with *antarā* ('in between') and *antareṇa* ('without'), [a second *vibhakti* occurs]."

While both these rules establish specific conditions which require an affixation of a second case suffix, they constitute different types. The grammatical tradition usually distinguishes these two

---

[250] The notion of syntactically bound word forms to render *pada* is derived from the idea of "bound syntactic word forms" in HSGLT 2, 220 and 240.
[251] Cf. infra 114.
[252] On the distinction between case forms and case functions in case grammar, cf. also chapter 5.2.

in terms of *kārakavibhakti* ('case suffix [triggered by] a *kāraka*') and *upapadavibhakti* ('case suffix [triggered by] another word [in the sentence]'). In simple terms, the first type of condition (P 2.3.2) expresses a direct participation of the marked argument in the accomplishment of the action expressed by the verb of the sentence, whereas the second type establishes merely an intrasentential relation between two arguments, for example the marked argument and the two word forms *antarā* and *antareṇa* according to P 2.3.4. Therefore, these two types may be distinguished in terms of semantic vs. syntactic conditions, where the first condition is directly related to the semantic structure of the sentence, whereas the latter is not.[253] These two main conditions are supplemented by a set of additional ones that address specific situations, for example Vedic conventions, and others.[254] The precise and distinct separation of the morphological and functional level in the derivation of cases provides an economical way of representing the highly complex morphosyntax of Sanskrit nominal inflexion, and it also allows the grammarian to account for features of Sanskrit language such as the different morphological manifestations of each *vibhakti*[255] or the fact that each *vibhakti* can have several distinct uses. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini list a total number of 32 *kāraka*-definitions (1.4.24-55) and 72 conditions that can trigger the Sanskrit case suffixes (2.3.2-73). *Kātantra* has 8 *kāraka*-definitions (2.4.8-15) and 22 triggers of the suffixes and *Cāndra* provides 56 triggers without separate definitions for the *kāraka*s (2.1.43-98).[256] Furthermore, the Sanskritic linguistic literature across the centuries includes extensive investigations of the semantic-syntactic constitution of the defined case functions, especially of the *kāraka*s.[257]

The Tibetan grammarians have basically retained the number of eight cases by simplifying the Sanskritic model and focusing on a selection of prototypical case functions of each Sanskrit case suffix.[258] These functions consist of the six eminent *kāraka*s ('doers, causes'), of which *karaṇa* ('instrument') and *kartṛ* ('agent') prototypically belong both to the Sanskrit third case

---

[253] However, the *kāraka*s have been an all-pervasive analytical tool in Indian scientific knowledge production that has been used in different ways in various fields of knowledge and moreover, there exist also significant divergences in academic research, how to classify them in terms of syntactic, semantic, or other categories. On the term *kāraka*, cf. chapter 5.4. On the distinction between syntactic and semantic case marking in academic approaches to case grammar, cf. also infra 102f.

[254] For one such example of Vedic grammatical operations, cf. e.g. P 2.3.3.

[255] I.e. the different paradigms of nominal inflexion.

[256] *Cāndra* did not provide any definition of the *kāraka*s, since the text does not supply *saṃjñā-sūtra*s for the definition of technical terms and relies more on self-explanatory terminology (cf. HSGLT 2, 292).

[257] Cf. chapter 5.4 and the historical surveys of the respective cases.

[258] Sanskritic grammatical schools such as *Pāṇini*, *Kātantra* or *Cāndra* usually distinguish only seven cases based on seven distinct case forms, while the eighth case form that expresses vocative meaning is not distinguished due to its morphological proximity to the first case form. For a more details, cf. chapter 14.

suffix, plus the prototypical first (*prātipadikārtha*) and sixth case function (*sambandha*), as well as *sambodhana* as another typical first, or alternatively eighth case function:

#	*Pāṇini*	*Kātantra*	*Cāndra*
1.1/ 1	***prātipadikārtha*** ('meaning of the nominal stem') (2.3.46)	***liṅgārtha*** ('meaning of the nominal stem') (2.4.17)	***arthamātra*** ('the mere meaning') (2.1.93)
2.	***karman*** (~ direct object) (1.4.49-53, 2.3.2)	***karman*** (~ direct object) (2.4.13, 2.4.19)	***kriyāpya*** ('to be reached through the action') (2.1.43)
3.1	***kartr̥*** ('agent') (1.4.54-55, 2.3.18)	***kartṛ*** ('agent') (2.4.14, 2.4.33)	***kartṛ*** ('agent') (2.1.62)
3.2	***karaṇa*** ('instrument') (1.4.42, 2.3.18)	***karaṇa*** ('instrument') (2.4.12, 2.1.19)	***karaṇa*** ('instrument') (2.1.63)
4.	***sampradāna*** (~ recipient, goal) (1.4.32-41, 2.3.13)	***sampradāna*** (~ recipient, goal) (2.4.10, 2.4.19)	***sampradāna*** (~ recipient, goal) (2.1.73)
5.	***apādāna*** ('fixed point of departure') (1.4.24-31, 2.3.28)	***apādāna*** ('fixed point of departure') (2.4.8-9, 2.4.19)	***avadhi*** ('limit' ?) (2.1.81)
6.	***śeṣa*** ('remainder') (2.3.50)	***svāmyādi*** ('owner, etc.') (2.4.19)	***sambandha*** ('connection') (2.1.95)
7.	***adhikaraṇa*** ('location') (1.4.45, 2.3.36)	***adhikaraṇa*** ('location') (2.4.11, 2.4.19)	***ādhāra*** ('support') (2.1.88)
1.2/ 8.	***sambodhana*** ('address') (2.3.47), ***āmantrita*** ('address') (2.3.48)	***āmantraṇa*** ('address') (2.4.18)	***sambodhana*** ('address') (2.1.94)

Figure 3: Overview of the Sanskritic conceptual framework adopted in the Tibetan case model

After a fusion of agent and instrument under a single agentive function, each of these functions was directly associated with a single morphological category in WT as its respective morphological realization, resulting in the following standard Tibetan model:

#	Case name (*rnam dbye'i ming*)	Morphology + example
1st	*ngo bo tsam, ming tsam* ('the mere essence [of a word meaning],' 'the mere nominal stem')	**unmarked** form: *shing* ('wood')
2nd	*las, las su bya ba* (~ direct object, 'to be done as the *karman*' ?)	base form + *la don* *shing la* ('upon the wood')
3rd	*byed pa po* ('agent')	base form + *byed sgra* *shing gis* ('by the wood')
4th	*ched du bya ba, dgos ched* ('beneficiary, purpose')	base form + *la don* *shing la* ('for the wood')
5th	*'byung khungs* ('origin')	base form + *las/nas* *shing las* ('from the wood')
6th	*'brel ba* ('connection')	base form + *'brel sgra* *shing gi* ('of the wood')
7th	*gnas gzhi, rten gnas* ('base, support')	base form + *la don* *shing la* ('on/in the wood')
8th	*bod pa* ('address')	*kye* + base form: *kye shing* ('oh wood!')

Figure 4: Overview of the Tibetan case model

The Tibetan case model may be described in most general terms as a bivalent system of case forms and their meanings or functions. While the total number of cases follows from their meaning, namely from the eight functional categories also represented by the cases' names, the model distinguishes only six different case forms, since the second, fourth and seventh cases have identical markers. In Tibetan grammatical nomenclature, the case morphemes which are added to indicate cases two to eight are referred to as 'syntactic link' (*tshig phrad*). 'Syntactic link' (*tshig phrad*) is also the technical term for all other grammatical markers that modify the meaning of lexical word forms to govern – mainly but not exclusively – the relations between arguments, subclauses, and other parts of a sentence. The autocommentary of Smr̥tijñānakīrti's *Smra sgo* gives the following definition of *tshig phrad*:

tshig gang zhig rang la bstan par bya ba'i don med cing gzhan la phan 'dogs shing gsal bar byed pa de ni tshig gi phrad ces bya ste/   dper na lcags gnyis sbyor bar byed pa'i tsha la lta bu'o/

"Any word form (*tshig gang zhig*) that has no meaning on its own to be indicated and benefits as well as clarifies [the meaning of] another [word form] is called syntactic link (*tshig gi phrad*, lit. 'connection of syntactically functioning word forms, phrases, subclauses, or other syntactic forms'), for example like the solder that attaches two iron pieces."[259]

Si tu's definition of the term resonates with that of Smṛtijñānakīrti:

[…] *tshig gi phrad ces bya ba ni spyir ming tsam gnyis sam du ma sbrel ba'i tshe bar du mtshams sbyor ba'am don gsal ba la phan 'dogs par byed* […]

"[…] Regarding 'syntactic link' (*tshig gi phrad*), in general, whenever two or more mere lexical word forms (*ming tsam*) are combined together (*sbrel ba*), [a syntactic link] connects between [them] (*bar du mtshams sbyor ba*) and benefits the clarification of the meaning (*don gsal ba la phan 'dogs par byed*) […]."[260]

However, not all grammarians have accepted the subsumption of case markers under *tshig phrad*. Dpang Lotsāwa, for example, in his *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* (TshSS) explicitly separates the two notions of *rnam dbye* and *tshig phrad* on the basis of Sanskrit grammar, where the translational equivalent of *phrad* (i.e. *nipāta*) refers to indeclinable particles that are separate from the case suffixes.[261]

While the Tibetan case model follows the most basic and general interpretation of Sanskritic case grammar, it is certainly not a direct reproduction of any Sanskritic grammatical school. The Tibetan model exhibits noteworthy modifications and reinterpretations of the Sanskritic conceptions contained in *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*, although a strong emphasis remained on Sanskritic authority in general.[262] In addition to these three classical schools of the Sanskritic grammatical tradition, there are indications that the transmission of grammatical knowledge

---

[259] Smṛti 2002, 74.
[260] GC 603.5. It is to be noted, however, that Si tu deviates from Smṛti when he following to this quotation distinguishes between those syntactic links that cannot indicate clear meaning on their own and those that can (cf. GC 603.5 and 604.5).
[261] Cf. Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 260. One reason might be that his TshSS is dedicated to general linguistics that considers both, Sanskrit and Tibetan language, and thus he attempted a more universally applicable taxonomy in which he adhered closer to Sanskritic models. In contrast, Smṛti's and Si tu's works are Tibetan-specific grammars.
[262] For more information, please refer to the respective chapters of the cases.

was also mediated through other scriptural or oral sources, although historical challenges remain to be resolved as to the exact details.[263]

Due to the Tibetan grammarians' strategy to retain selected basics of the Sanskritic scheme and its prototypical functions, a variety of morphosyntactic differences between Sanskrit and Tibetan language remained for the most part unreflected in the adaptation processes. In fact, neither the classification of Tibetan case morphology into six categories nor the list of eight case labels as the actual case functions distributed onto these morphological categories is able to provide an exhaustive and representative template of the grammar of WT. The following discrepancies, among others, arise in research literature:

1. An unmarked word form as a mere expression of a word's lexical meaning (*ngo bo tsam*, *ming tsam*; = first case) in Tibetan is not incorrect as such, but it has no syntactic significance whatsoever, since Tibetan does not follow any agreement patterns of noun phrases with verbs that are comparable to Sanskrit.[264] Consequently, usual exemplifications of the first case in Tibetan grammatical treatises do not exceed mere lists of words without any implementation in phrases or sentences.

Within a Tibetan sentence, however, the unmarked argument represents the most affected participant of the action, being either the PATIENT of a verb where AGENT and PATIENT are differentiated (*tha dad pa*) or the single participant of verbs where AGENT and PATIENT are instantiated within the same entity (*tha mi da pa*, 'non-differentiated').[265] In modern linguistics, the unmarked participant in a Tibetan sentence is normally identified with the ABSOLUTIVE. This much more important use of an unmarked word form – at least in the context of grammar and syntax – has never been considered by Tibetan grammarians in the context of the first case.[266]

---

[263] One possible candidate is the *Smra ba kun* (root text and autocommentary; cf. supra 32). Additionally, we know only little about the oral transmission of grammatical knowledge to Tibet, but we know that the close collaboration between Tibetan and Indian scholars for the translation of Buddhist sources also involved grammatical studies and therefore some of the adaptations in the Tibetan model might have been mediated through oral transmission.

[264] For an early Tibetan theory that may be against such a view, cf. infra 198ff.

[265] Cf. e.g.:
> (a) *shing mkhan gyis **shing** gcod* 'the carpenter is cutting the tree/wood' (*tha dad pa*)
> (b) ***'khor lo** 'khor* 'the wheel turns' (*tha mi dad*)

There are numerous debates about the conceptual affinity of the traditional classification of verbs into *tha dad pa* and *tha mi dad pa* ('differentiated' and 'non-differentiated') which was originally introduced by Si tu in the Tibetan context, and the academic notion of transitivity (cf. Tournadre 1992, Tillemans 2007, Müller-Witte 2009). I will not engage in these debates in this chapter and use the Tibetan nomenclature, as this is mainly a historical work.

[266] Cf. also point 3 in the current list of discrepancies. Equations of the traditional first case *ngo bo tsam* with the ABSOLUTIVE of WT as an ergative language, which appear in research literature (cf. Tournadre 2010, 94f.;

2. The morphological category *la don* ('[having] the meaning of *la*' or '[having the same] meaning [as] *la*') consists not only of the morpheme *la* but includes the seven morphemes *tu*, *du*, *ru*, *-r*, *su*, *la* and *na*, all of which may equally take on the meaning of a second (*las*), fourth (*dgos ched*) or seventh case (*gnas gzhi*) according to the tradition. This is contrary to various academic studies of the Tibetan case morphemes,[267] which demonstrate that *la don* consists at least of three different morphological categories (*la*, *na*, *du*). The latter three differ significantly in their usage in Tibetan sentences and in the syntactic-semantic information they can express, even though their precise constitution remains a subject of debate both synchronically and diachronically.

3. Closely related to both above points is the specific morphosyntactic distinction in WT between the grammatical categories PATIENT and DIRECTION/INDIRECT OBJECT, which would have required an adaptation of the second case called *las* as a direct translation of the Sanskrit prototypical second case function *karman*.

	Phrase 1	Phrase 2	Syntax of phrase 1 and 2
Sanskrit:	*odanaṃ pacati* rice-**ACC** cook-3SG.PRS	*grāmaṃ gacchati* village-**ACC** go-3SG.PRS	1: *karman* 2: *karman*
Tibetan:	*'bras chan 'tshed* rice-Ø cook.PRS	*grong la 'gro* village-**ALL** go.PRS	1: PATIENT 2: DIRECTION
(English:)	'(s/he) cooks rice'	'(s/he) walks to the village'	

Figure 5: Comparison between Sanskrit and Tibetan case marking patterns in the context of the second case function karman

Both Sanskrit clauses are morphosyntactically identical and treat the arguments marked by the second case suffix as the same type of category, which traditional Sanskrit grammarians have rendered as *karman*. WT, in contrast, clearly distinguishes these two instances in the form of different grammatical constructions: the *'bras chan* ('rice') represents the PATIENT role as the unmarked argument in phrase 1, whereas *grong* ('village') of phrase 2 is marked by the morpheme *la* expressing the information of DIRECTION, INDIRECT OBJECT or more

---

Müller-Witte 2009, 28), are therefore misleading from a historical perspective. I am not aware of any classical Tibetan grammar, which identifies the ABSOLUTIVE-argument in a Tibetan sentence with the first case *ngo bo tsam*. The only exception might be NGg in its presentation of an eightfold *kāraka*-scheme (cf. infra 198ff.), however, the passage in question is open to interpretation and assuming that my reading of it is correct, this theory has not been adopted by any other Tibetan grammarian to my knowledge.

[267] Cf. e.g. Hill 2011; DeLancey 2003; Tournadre 2010.

generally perhaps SECONDARY OBJECT.[268] In other words, Tibetan language distinguishes on its morphosyntactic level between two grammatical categories that are not separated in the same way in Sanskrit. This most significant, language-specific feature of WT, especially the zero-marking of the PATIENT, has never been openly problematized in a systematic theorization in the Tibetan tradition, which has rather simply adopted the Sanskrit second case as a single category representing the meaning of *karman* and marked by *la don*.[269] Consequently, the question arises whether the traditional conceptions of the Tibetan second case qua *karman* are only restricted to the directional/indirect objective function of morpheme *la* as the second case's prototypical marker (cf. e.g. phrase 2 above)? Or does the Tibetan second case perhaps cover any other function of the three morphemes *la*, *na* and *du* subsumed under *la don*? How does any such function of one of the *la don*-morphemes connect to Sanskritic *karman* that typically – yet not exclusively – refers to that PATIENT role which is prototypically indicated by the unmarked argument in Tibetan? And lastly, how does the PATIENT role and its zero-marking in written Tibetan fit into this model?

4. The fifth case in the standard model (*'byung khungs*, 'origin') once again comprises two different morphemes (*las* and *nas*). These, however, may be distinguished more accurately, and recent studies render their difference in terms of an ABLATIVE function for *las* and an ELATIVE function for *nas*:[270]

> (1) *rta las/nas babs* '[Someone] has fallen off/dismounted the horse.'

> (2) *ba las 'o ma byung* 'The milk originated from the cow.'

According to Tournadre, the first sample phrase indicates a mere spatiotemporal origin in which the morphemes *las* and *nas* may be applied interchangeably. The second phrase, however, expresses not only a mere spatiotemporal relation but an "origin of a *transformation*" in

---

[268] I use the term SECONDARY OBJECT as a more neutral, thus far less loaded category in modern linguistics compared to INDIRECT OBJECT. In the current thesis, SECONDARY OBJECT only emphasizes the aspect of less affection relatively to the 'primary' DIRECT OBJECT.
Although there is a clear consensus in modern Tibetan linguistics that there is a linguistically significant difference between the unmarked PATIENT and arguments marked by *la*, the question about the grammatical information encoded by the morpheme *la* in terms of how many distinct functions it expresses, as well as what these functions precisely express, has not been conclusively resolved thus far. On this issue, cf. the *la don*-cases in chapters 8, 10 and 13, especially 8.1.1 and 8.1.2.7.
[269] Some awareness of the difference between the traditional second case marker *la don* and the unmarked morphology in Tibetan language, yet not any open problematization, is traceable already before Si tu, who himself seems to be the first addressing it directly, yet without acknowledging any significant difference that would result in separate case functions. Only during the 20th century we can find more systematic approaches in Tibetan grammatical treatises to investigate the difference of *la don* and unmarked morphology in the context of the traditional second case, although a distinction between the different *la don*-morphemes is entirely missing to my knowledge. For more details, cf. chapter 8.2.4.
[270] C.f. e.g. DeLancey 2003; Tournadre 2010; Hill 2012.

Tournadre's nomenclature, i.e. "the object (or the being) from which, [sic!] something is extracted, generated or produced."[271] In such cases, only *las* must be used. Additionally, only the morpheme *nas* may be used to indicate the agent:

> (5) *bod dmag nas rgya nag gi yul mang po bcoms* 'The Tibetan army conquered many Chinese territories.'[272]

In this clause, the morpheme *nas* may be substituted by the agentive marker *gis*, but I am unaware of any study which would specify semantic, syntactic or pragmatic nuances between these two types of agentive marking. In any case, the morpheme *las* may certainly not be applied in such instances.

5. Finally, in addition to the morphological categories provided in the classical eightfold case model, there is at least also the morpheme *dang* ('and,' 'with') with its usage as a morphological marker to indicate intrasentential relations either between nouns or between nouns and verbs:

> (6) *ri dang chu* 'mountains and water'

> (7) *bla ma dang mjal* 'to meet with the Lama'[273]

These two uses of *dang* have been rendered in Tournadre's study as coordinative (6) and associative case functions (7) respectively, while traditional grammarians have not categorized these as case functions but instead commonly classify *dang* as a non-case syntactic link.[274]

As demonstrated in this exemplary list, the close adherence of Tibetan grammarians to the Sanskritic fundamentals of case grammar has created a substantial gap between the structures of WT and their conceptualization, giving rise to the question why Tibetan grammarians unequivocally followed the Indian tradition in this particular way – a question which has startled modern academia for a long time.[275] The answer provided by Tibetan grammarians is most striking in view of the outlined inconsistencies:

> *de ltar na 'khor 'das kyi dngos po'i don brjod par bya ba rnams brjod par byed pa'i tha snyad thams cad ni brgyad po 'di las ma 'das shing/   'dir ma 'dus pa'ang gcig kyang med pa kho na'o/*

---

[271] Tournadre 2010, 111.
[272] Example and translation from Tournadre 2010, 112.
[273] Examples and translation from Tournadre 2010, 113.
[274] Note that Tournadre proposes a tenfold case system in total, which I did not fully discuss in this presentation. Hill (2011, 5) proposes 9 case morphemes for Old Tibetan, whereas Schwieger (2006) does not seem to distinguish between case and non-case morphemes or functions.
[275] Cf. chapter 1.1.

"Accordingly, regarding all terms (*tha snyad thams cad*) which express the meanings to be expressed of a real phenomenon in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa* (*'khor 'das kyi dngos po*), they do not exceed these eight [cases], nor are there any [such terms] which are not included in them."[276]

Even hundreds of years later and despite his demonstration of a considerably increased awareness of the language-specific structures of WT, Si tu Paṇchen will still argue for the validity of these cases along similar lines, although perhaps in a more careful voice:

> *rnam dbye zhes pa ni legs sbyar gyi skad la ming gi mthar sbyar bas tshig tu 'grub par byed pa'i rkyen si sogs bdun gsum nyi shu rtsa gcig po rnams te/ don thob kyi dbang gis don rjod par byed pa'i skad rigs thams cad la rnam dbye de rnams med pa mi srid pas mkhan po 'dis bod kyi skad la'ang legs sbyar dang bstun nas rnam dbye de rnams kyi 'jug pa gsal bar mdzad pa yin no/*

"'Case' [refers] to 21 – seven times three – suffixes in Sanskrit, such as *si*, etc., which complete/accomplish (*'grub par byed pa*) a word through their application at the end of a nominal stem. However, actually for all languages that express meaning it is impossible that these cases do not exist, and therefore this teacher here has elucidated the application of these cases in accordance with Sanskrit also for the Tibetan language."[277]

Taking the proclaimed and recurrent idea of the cross-lingual validity of the cases as its starting point, this chapter examines how Si tu received and – in the process – transformed an analytical inventory from both the Sanskritic and Tibetan tradition, how he conceptualized and categorized the morphosyntactic surface structure of WT within the theoretical framework of case grammar, and how he modified, reconfirmed and illustrated the case categories, with the aim to gain further insight into the underlying, explicit and implicit rationales that have led him to his assertion of the cross-lingual explanatory value of the cases.

The remaining chapter will start with a brief sketch of some of the key elements of case grammar from a modern linguistic perspective in order to develop the necessary analytical-hermeneutical equipment for a refined awareness of the issues regarding Tibetan case grammar and a more precise assessment of the mechanisms involved in Tibetan grammatical theory formation (chapter 5.2). This is followed by a short introduction to Sanskritic as well as Tibetan

---

[276] GNT CT *115* – 444.
[277] GC 597.2.

derivational systems for the formation of lexical words, syntactic entities, etc., that constitute the theoretical framework in which case grammar has been embedded (chapter 5.3). A brief, yet important preliminary consideration of the notion of *kāraka* in Sanskritic scholarly literature will be given in chapter 5.4, which is required for a more accurate understanding of the adoption of case grammar by Tibetan scholars.

5.2 Introduction to Modern Case Grammar

Without a proper background in linguistic training, the study of modern case grammar to me often seemed like the opening of Pandora's box, exposing myself to an unsurmountable and continuously growing amount of highly technical and difficult theories as well as competing nomenclatures and taxonomies, all aimed at explaining the utterly complex phenomenon called language. More than once, all I was left with was the hope to understand it one day. This introduction will therefore only provide a rough template of a basic conceptual framework useful to our current purposes, and the reader should bear in mind that any of the presented terms and models can and probably have been contested or even criticized by alternative accounts of case grammar.

In its most basic sense, case grammar is part of syntactic theory and thus aims at a representative explanation and description of the morphosyntactic surface structure of languages. [278] Moreover, syntax and its adjective 'syntactic' generally take the sentence and thus intrasentential structures as their reference. As will become evident in this chapter, case relations on the surface may be more syntactic, more semantic or even pragmatic in nature, yet as intrasentential entities they remain part of syntax. Speaking of languages in this context implies a whole variety of different languages, each with their own specific structures. One central characteristic of languages is that they offer a relatively fixed inventory of grammatical categories to express a relatively unfixed amount of content intimately related to our world of experience.[279] The ways in which this is achieved by the speakers of a certain language – or more technically speaking how this content becomes represented and encoded in linguistic expressions – is at the very core of syntactic theory including case grammar. In his well-known introduction to grammatical cases, Blake gives the definition that "**case** is a system of marking dependent nouns for the type of relationship they bear to their heads."[280] Grammatical cases are typically regarded as a property of nominal forms and traditionally refer to a system of

---

[278] On the term syntax, cf. e.g. Wackernagel 2009, 1f. On the history of Anglo-European syntactic analysis, cf. Graffi 2001.
[279] Cf. DeLancey 1991, 338.
[280] Blake 2004, 1. For another important introduction to case grammar and the issues related to it, cf. Fillmore 1968.

inflectional marking in a specific language. Grammatical treatises usually organize these systems into the different paradigms, which constitute the set of case forms in which lexical items may appear.[281] Latin and Turkish, for example, distinguish six cases, whereas Ancient Greek distinguishes only five and Sanskrit even eight. In sum, grammatical cases are a linguistic device that governs and indicates intrasentential relations of a nominal form to other arguments in the sentence, and thus the sentence and its meaning are its major reference levels.

Cases and their various morphological manifestations need to be separated from the relations they may express,[282] and thus one of the most fundamental distinctions in case grammar is that between the morphological case forms and the case functions,[283] i.e. the specific information communicated in the use of a certain case form. This distinction has not always been consistently pursued in academic linguistics, as noted by Anderson:

> "The grammatical terminology of most languages which incorporate the European tradition in such matters displays a systematic ambiguity in the use of the term 'case'. Usually, it is employed to refer both to a certain inflexional category (and the forms that manifest it) and to the set of semantic distinctions carried by the forms of that category. We can differentiate these as case-forms and case-relations or case-functions respectively. Thus in *Lutetiam veni*, [284] it might be said that the noun is in ACCUSATIVE form and that in this instance it indicates, or functions as, the 'goal'. Much controversy has depended simply on the confusion of the two senses."[285]

As we have seen above, Sanskritic grammatical sources avoid this issue through the derivational procedure of *pada*s (syntactically bound word forms), which consistently distinguishes these two levels so that *vibhakti* is unambiguously restricted to the morphological case suffixes only.[286] The Tibetan tradition, however, did not follow the Sanskritic terminological framework as strictly, and thus the ambiguity described by Anderson above is once more encountered. The Tibetan notion of *rnam dbye*, which is translated as 'case' in this work, was modelled along the lines of the eight prototypical functions rather than morphology, and therefore it often focuses

---

[281] Cf. Blake, 1f.
[282] Cf. ibid., 3.
[283] Note that Blake (2004) uses both terms in a slightly more specific way, which is, however, not further relevant for our current discussion and the questions followed in the investigation of the Tibetan case model.
[284] 'I came to Lutetia (a pre-Roman and Roman town at the place of present day's Paris).' (transl. Graf)
[285] Anderson 1977, 9. It is rather confusing that the case forms as morphological entities are often referred to in terms of ACCUSATIVE etc., which are clearly semantic notions originally introduced to indicate the prototypical function of a specific case form. In modern linguistic treatises, however, these labels often do not imply any indication about the use of the case form.
[286] Cf. supra 87f. and infra 113f.

on the functional side of the cases. However, in the context of the morphological derivation of case forms, the Tibetan term may still also refer to the morphological categories outlined in figure 4. Thus, depending on the context, the term allows for both meanings of case form as well case function, an imprecision that may strongly impede our understanding of a grammarian's argumentation for or against certain taxonomies.

On the morphological side, there are different types of manifestations of cases. The most familiar way to indicate case forms in the European grammatical tradition would be that of case suffixes of fusional languages like Latin, Ancient Greek, etc., where one case form encodes not only the information of an intrasentential relation but also number and gender, such as in the following Sanskrit paradigm for masculine a-stems:

	Singular	*Dual*	*Plural*
1st case	*vṛkṣaḥ*	*vṛkṣau*	*vṛkṣāḥ*
2nd case	*vṛkṣam*	*vṛkṣau*	*vṛkṣān*
3rd case	*vṛkṣeṇa*	*vṛkṣābhyām*	*vṛkṣaiḥ*
4th case	*vṛkṣāya*	*vṛkṣābhyām*	*vṛkṣebhyaḥ*
5th case	*vṛkṣāt*	*vṛkṣābhyām*	*vṛkṣebhyaḥ*
6th case	*vṛkṣasya*	*vṛkṣayoḥ*	*vṛkṣāṇām*
7th case	*vṛkṣe*	*vṛkṣayoḥ*	*vṛkṣeṣu*
8th case	*vṛkṣa*	*vṛkṣau*	*vṛkṣāḥ*

Figure 6: Example of case suffixes in fusional languages

The eightfold case model of Sanskrit has a number of case forms which are morphologically identical. For masculine a-stems, the dual is identical in the 1st, 2nd and 8th case and in the 3rd, 4th and 5th as well as in the 6th and 7th case. Accordingly, the plural is identical in the 4th and 5th case. This phenomenon is termed syncretism,[287] a common feature of case systems across languages. Next to synthetic case suffixes as a mechanism for expressing grammatical relations, there are also 'analytic' means such as adpositions. The Sanskrit case system clearly belongs to the synthetic type, but Tibetan is a more problematic case. Even though Tibetan is in principle an agglutinative language which encodes grammatical information in the form of analytic

---

[287] Cf. Blake 2004, 19.

morphemes,[288] there are grammatical markers (*byed sgra*, *'brel sgra*, *du sgra*) that exhibit morpho-phonetic agreement patterns with the final sound of the marked base form. These variants are usually termed allomorphs, and the grammatical morphemes in general are thus often referred to as enclitics rather than mere adpositions or particles. Many, if not most, synthetic languages have the two means of inflexional affixes as well as adpositions to indicate relations to other arguments in a sentence. To which extent these different means of expressing grammatical information are accepted as forms of case marking is a matter of the theoretical foundation of the cases and thus varies from theory to theory.[289]

On the functional side, it is a common feature across languages that case markers have several functions. This feature is observed in WT as well and may be referred to as the multifunctionality of cases.[290] However, as already demonstrated above, one and the same function may also be shared by several case markers, as in the case of *la* (*bod la 'gro* 'to go to Tibet') and *du* (*bod du 'gro* 'id.'), both of which in WT may mark the destination of verbs of motion.[291] The same feature also applies to Sanskrit, where sentences like *grāmaṃ gacchati* ('s/he goes to the village') and *grāmāya gacchati* ('id.') are equivalent in the sense that they both encode the *karman*-function according to P 2.3.12.

It was stated at the beginning of this subchapter that the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language and the content expressed by it is at the very core of case grammar. This does not, however, necessarily require a *direct* correspondence between the two. Modern case grammar commonly follows a more multilayered approach of understanding the meaning or content of sentences and its relation to the surface structure as directly present in the sentence. First, we observe various kinds of case functions, i.e. the information directly encoded by the case forms. If we compare two simple German phrases like *Ich liebe dich* ('I love you') and *Ich töte dich* ('I kill you'), the morphosyntactic surface structure is identical insofar as both verbs are bivalent, governing one argument in the NOMINATIVE form and one in the ACCUSATIVE. On the semantic level, however, we are faced with two quite different types of events in which the actants' participation varies significantly: while the argument marked by the

---

[288] Analytic in the sense that one morpheme only encodes one type of information (grammatical relation, number, gender) at a time, as well as that these morphemes are morphologically independent from the word stem and are thus no suffixes in the strict sense.

[289] Cf. Heine 2009, 458: "Where this boundary [between affixes and adpositions] is to be located is an issue that is notoriously controversial in both typological works and grammatical description; what is described by one author as an affix is described by another author as a clitic or an adposition, and what is expressed by case suffixes may correspond to adpositions in another language or dialect of the same language."

[290] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 99.

[291] At least in classical Tibetan. Nathan Hill (2011, 35) observes that in the Old Tibetan Annals, only *du* and its allomorphs mark the DIRECTION of motion verbs.

ACCUSATIVE in the action of killing may be interpreted as a genuine PATIENT, which is directly affected by the action done by a genuine AGENT characterized by intentionality, volitionality and other parameters, the loved one in the first phrase cannot be said to be directly affected by the action of loving, nor is the argument in the NOMINATIVE a genuine agent in the sense that s/he is doing something. In a semantic analysis, the NOMINATIVE form governed by the verb *lieben* ('to love') may be more likely termed the EXPERIENCER of the action.[292] If we change the grammatical voice to a passive construction (*Du wirst von mir geliebt*; *Du wirst von mir getötet*), then the arguments marked by the NOMINATIVE even correspond to those marked by the accusative of the active clause. These case forms therefore do not directly encode information about the semantic structure at hand, but only syntactic information that governs their relation to other arguments in the sentence. In our two examples, these **syntactic relations** would be called SUBJECT and DIRECT OBJECT for the NOMINATIVE and ACCUSATIVE respectively. Other common syntactic categories in modern linguistics are the INDIRECT OBJECT as well as the ABSOLUTIVE and ERGATIVE in ergative languages. AGENT, PATIENT and EXPERIENCER are normally labelled **semantic roles**, sometimes also thematic roles or theta roles, depending on the linguistic theory.

As for the syntactic information conveyed in the SUBJECT relation in languages like Latin or Sanskrit, this is the agreement with the verb. Another type of an exclusively syntactic information would be that of the Tibetan syntactic link *slar bsdu*,[293] which is used to mark the end of a Tibetan sentence in the literary language, although this link is not classified as a case either in the Tibetan tradition or in modern linguistics. Yet, both categories, grammatical subject and *slar bsdu*, add only structural information for the organization of the sentence and no information about the semantic structure of the sentence. Other than such mere information about the organization of the sentence, the German examples have demonstrated that syntactic relations such as the DIRECT OBJECT, for example, are more syntactic in nature rather than semantic, because they often cover a heterogeneous array of different semantic roles. Another important parameter to measure the 'syntacticity' of a case relation is thus also its degree of standardization or abstraction, that is to say to which extent intrasentential case marking patterns follow prototypes and persist across different semantic contexts. In case of semantic relations, we may measure their 'semanticity' in terms of the sensitivity of case marking regarding semantic variations of the verbs or in the extent to which case marking forms patterns

---

[292] Cf. e.g. Blake 2004, 32 and 68.
[293] *nga bod la phyin **no*** 'I went to Tibet.' This link consists of eleven allomorphs, which correspond to the ten postscript letters in WT plus the form *to*.

of homogeneous semantic categories (= semantic roles) that directly convey information about the sentence's construal of the actual phenomenal scenario it refers to. In this sense, we may distinguish between more syntactic and more semantic case relations which are directly manifest in the sentence's surface.

In his study on linguistic ergativity, Dixon introduces a distinction between syntactically based and semantically based patterns of grammatical marking along similar lines:

> "Before venturing into a detailed examination of kinds of ergative and accusative grammatical patterning, we must distinguish between two different kinds of strategy that languages employ for marking 'who is doing what to who'. These can be called (1) the syntactically based (or prototypical') alternative, and (2) the semantically based (or 'direct') alternative. We shall see that labels such as nominative, accusative, absolutive and ergative are only properly applicable to languages of the first type.
>
> For languages of the first type, each verb has a prototypical meaning, and grammatical marking is applied to the verb's arguments on the basis of their function in the prototypical instance. English basically follows this approach. The prototypical meaning of *hit* is that in *He hit me* (implied: with his hand) or *He hit me with a stick*. The agent (who propels the implement) is marked as transitive subject (A), being placed before the verb (and being in nominative case if a pronoun). The target, which the implement comes into contact with, is marked as transitive object (O), and placed after the verb (being in oblique form if a pronoun).
>
> When the verb is used with a non-prototypical meaning the same grammatical marking of arguments applies. *Hit* is categorized as a transitive verb and so there must be a transitive subject stated. In *The falling branch hit me*, the noun phrase *the falling branch* is treated as being in A function, although it is not an agent propelling an implement (nor an implement propelled by an agent). […]
>
> Turning now to languages of the second type, we find that in any instance of use of a verb its arguments are marked not by a syntactic rule relating to any prototypical scheme, but so as to directly describe its meaning in that instance. […] In 'John hit Bill accidentally' and 'The falling branch hit Bill' 'Bill' would again be marked as patient but 'John' and 'the falling branch' would not be marked as agent, since they do not exert volitional control over the activity."[294]

---

[294] Dixon 1998, 23f.

Since languages are highly complex systems, case marking systems usually exploit both types of relations, more syntactic and more semantic ones, sometimes even within one and the same case form. The Latin ablative case form, for example, is often categorized as encoding the information of a semantic case relation, since its prototypical function is to directly encode the distinctive semantic information of SOURCE in a sentence. At the same time, it can also mark the 'agent' of a passive clause, but this agent indifferently subsumes a variety of distinguishable semantic roles in clauses like *occisus a consule* ('killed by the consul') vs. *amata a consule* ('loved by the consul'), since it corresponds to the SUBJECT of the active clause.[295]

A third type of information apart from the syntactic and semantic that may be encoded by case markers is of pragmatic or discursive character. Tournadre gives the examples of emphasis, topicalization or contrastive function as possible information expressed by such morphemes as *gyis* (together with its allomorphs) or *la*.[296] Compare the following example from a Tibetan translation of the sixth chapter of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (verse 54):

> *gzhan dag bdag la mi dga' ba/   des ni tshe 'di 'am tshe gzhan la/*
> *bdag **la** za bar mi byed na/   bdag ni ci phyir de mi 'dod/*

> "If the repugnance/disfavour [of] others towards me does not consume me in this life or another, why do I dislike it?"[297]

The *bdag* ('I') in the third line of the verse is marked by *la* to indicate the information that 'I' is PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT of the action of eating.[298] The verb *za ba* ('to eat'), however, usually governs two arguments, one in the ergative representing the eater and an absolutive form (zero-marking) rather than a *la*-form to mark that which is eaten. We might interpret the addition of *la*, a marker of the INDIRECT/SECONDARY (i.e. less affected) OBJECT and DIRECTION, to have a semantic function in terms of a partitive meaning ('to eat into me' > 'to consume me partially' > 'gnaw upon me'), but this is not suggested by the Sanskrit original, which remains indifferent regarding the degree of the consumption.[299] It seems more likely to

---

[295] Cf. Blake 2004, 32.
[296] Tournadre 2010, 99.
[297] *mayy aprasādo yo 'nyeṣāṃ sa māṃ kiṃ bhakṣayiṣyati | iha janmāntare vāpi yenāsau me 'nabhīpsitaḥ || 6.54 ||* (Tibetan and Sanskrit quoted from Zeisler 2006, 76f.)
Cf. alternative translations either from Sanskrit (Steinkellner 1997, 69), or from Tibetan (Hangartner 2005, 125). The English translation above focuses on the Tibetan version. The varying interpretations in the quoted sources is of rather minor importance for the current grammatical analysis, which only focuses on the unproblematic morpheme *la* in verse line 3.
[298] In the current analysis of this example it is not important, whether *la* is typically a syntactic or semantic case marker, since it focuses on the pragmatic value. I cannot answer the question in this dissertation, whether *la* is a syntactic or semantic case marker.
[299] For this type of interpretation and the resulting translation of *la* in verse line 3, cf. Zeisler 2006, 75ff.

me that the translator first of all felt the need to specify or emphasize the PATIENT role of 'I' due to the semantic constitution of the verb 'to eat.' The semantics of the action of eating highly suggests that the agent is a sentient being that eats something else. From a lexical-semantic perspective, the 'I' (*bdag*) in the third line of the verse therefore qualifies as a prototypical agent for the verb *za ba* ('to eat'). In *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 54, we are faced with a very abstract use of the verb with a somewhat reverse situation in which a sentient being as the PATIENT is eaten by an abstract affection as the AGENT marked by the ergative (*mi dga' ba* 'repugnance, disfavour'). If *la* had been omitted, *bdag* as a sentient being could have been easily misunderstood as an agent without ergative marking, a common practice in poetry if the agent-patient distribution is self-evident. In this sentence, the agency of *bdag* would have been further corroborated by the fact that the analytic verb form *za bar* (*mi*) *byed* emphasizes the active part of the action. The resulting and incorrect understanding of *pāda*s 1-3 would then be that 'I am eating due to the repugnance of others towards me.' This would make little sense and raise the question what the 'I' is eating. In a poetic context, the translator probably wanted to clarify the precise participation of the two actants ('repugnance' and 'I') in the action, in order to maintain the reading flow. Secondly, the meter of the verse counts seven syllables, and the first, third, fifth and seventh (i.e. the uneven ones) are stressed. Usually the primary items of a sentence, i.e. the lexical items, tend to be distributed onto the stressed syllables, whereas additional information such as case relations, etc. often takes on the remaining slots. By way of the addition of *la* between *bdag* and the verb *za*, the translator found a convenient solution to complete the verse meter and simultaneously allocate *za* to a stressed position in the verse line. Thus, we are faced with the pragmatic function of a verse filler. Thirdly, the word *bdag* is repeated immediately at the beginning of the following line of verse, marked here with the topical marker *ni*, indicating that *bdag* switches from the patient role of *za ba* to the subject of *'dod pa* ('to want, desire'). The *bdag la*/*bdag ni* contrast therefore also adds a contrastive function of *la* to *bdag la*. In sum, the morphosyntactic surface structure of the Tibetan sentence may be explained as the result of a combination of three pragmatic functions of the morpheme *la*. Of course, all three mentioned functions – emphasis, verse filler and contrastive function – must not interfere with the syntactic and semantic structures of the sentence, and thus the grammatical marker which comes closest to the role of a PATIENT or DIRECT OBJECT has been utilized. Yet, the pragmatic functioning is based on the fact that, even though the morpheme *la* encodes syntactic or semantic information in this sentence, the marking of *bdag* was not triggered by any syntactic or semantic condition but due to the pragmatic reasons outlined above.

Thus far, we discussed a small selection of basic distinctions in academic case grammar, i.e. the difference of case forms vs. case functions as well as the three different types of grammatical functions, namely the encoding of syntactic, semantic or pragmatic information. Although these types of functions are connected to different types of information in a sentence structure, all three are interrelated and their boundaries are not always easily determined.

From what was said so far on the differences between syntactic and semantic case relations, it is clear that semantic roles such as AGENT or PATIENT are not always directly encoded in the morphosyntactic surface structure of the sentence and only directly surface if a grammatical case relation coincides with such a role. Nonetheless, it may be assumed that any kind of surface structure consisting of different types of grammatical relations between arguments of a sentence connects to an underlying semantic structure. To speak with Blake, "all modern theories allow for some kind of semantic relations that are not always reflected directly in the morphosyntax."[300] As already mentioned in the case of the German examples (1) 'Ich liebe dich' and (2) 'Ich töte dich,' while both share the same morphosyntactic surface, their semantic structures differ and they prescribe the semantic role of EXPERIENCER to the 'Ich' in (1) and that of the AGENT to the 'Ich' in (2). Such semantic roles are frequently also called deep-cases.[301] Naturally, it is the semantics of the verb that governs much of the underlying semantic structure of a sentence.

Another crucial distinction in this context comes from the fact that neither the surface structure of a sentence nor any underlying semantic structure cover the entire range of semantic information that can be said about the actual phenomenon referred to by that sentence. In fact, any one phenomenon may be semantically structured into several events. For example, in the incident of throwing a ball through the window, the window may be conceived in one semantic representation as the LOCATION (pathway of the ball) or as the PATIENT (smashed window) in another. However, one sentence only encodes one such semantic representation or event at a time. In the phrase 'to throw the ball through the window,' the situation at hand is semantically structured with the window as the location no matter whether or not it was smashed, whereas 'to smash the window with the ball' would be an event construal of the same phenomenal incident in which the window is the PATIENT. Not keeping these two levels apart from each other, the specific event expressed in a sentence and the underlying, semantically open

---

[300] Blake 2004, 62.
[301] Cf. ibid., 63.

phenomenon,[302] easily leads to the imposition of wrong event construals onto the sentence based on the wrong assumption that "to say that case roles are semantic means that it should be possible to read them algorithmically off of an objective description of an incident."[303] DeLancey calls such wrong imposition the "objectivist error," for example to classify the window as the PATIENT and the ball as the INSTRUMENT in 'to throw a ball through the window,' because the window was conceived as being closed and thus smashed in the situation as such.[304]

In sum, what was said thus far about the different types and layers of case functions amounts to the fact that the grammatical information directly encoded by grammatical case markers in a sentence does not necessarily correspond directly to the underlying semantic structure of the same sentence, nor does this sentence's semantic structure directly correspond to the phenomenal scenario referred to in the sentence.

Based on the distinction of case forms vs. case functions and what was said about them so far, two fundamental and intertwined problems of linguistic analysis regarding case grammar may be formulated that also permeate linguistic methodology. How to distinguish the case forms? And how to describe their meaning and use?[305]

Without having space in this introduction to even scratch the surface of the methodology of case analysis and its related issues, modern as well as traditional linguistics have known multiple strategies for the derivation of the different forms and functions of the cases in their

---

[302] One may argue that phenomena as such are not semantically open, but determined to various degrees. This would bring us deep into questions about the existence of semantic universals, the ontological status of phenomena and universals, etc. Some aspects of Si tu's stance and that of other Tibetan grammarians regarding these questions are touched upon in part II and are summarized in chapters 15 and 16. However, these issues are related to entire sets of philosophical discourses in Western as much as (Tibetan) Buddhist thinking which have to remain outside the scope of the present work. It will also become clear that apart from general references to notions such as phenomenon or the actual meaning of actions, Tibetan grammarians remained largely unconcerned with any deeper linguistic-philosophical foundation of them. In the current context, the focus should therefore remain on the fact that phenomena as such allow for several semantic construals and can be semantically structured in different ways within and across languages.
It should be also noted that the use of the term phenomenon has been chosen in this work for two reasons: (1) it is a common translation of the Tibetan terms *chos* as well as *dngos po* (2) and in contrast to notions such as reality, object, etc., it remains more neutral with regard to the ontological status of phenomena. In most general and simplistic terms, 'phenomenon', 'real phenomenon', 'scenario' as well as the attribute 'phenomenal' all refer to the bottom basis of linguistic expressions in this dissertation, regardless how this basis may be interpreted in terms of an extra-linguistic, sensory, cognitive, 'real', or other nature by different scholars. They are used interchangeably in the present study, if not expressed otherwise.
[303] DeLancey 1991, 339.
[304] Cf. ibid. Note that DeLancey introduces more technical terms in his article to work out the presented difference and I am also not fully sure, whether my use of the term 'event' fully corresponds to his. However, for our investigation of the history of Tibetan case grammar, I would argue that these nuances are not further required.
[305] Cf. Blake 2004, 19.

specific languages – often with competing results. While traditional approaches were sometimes based on more intuitive grounds,[306] a rigorous analysis of the distribution of linguistic elements throughout a language has become an integral part of methodological inventories at least in the context of modern descriptive grammars, with the major advantage of a comparatively high verifiability.[307]

In theory, distributional analysis may be described as dealing with the "distribution of features of speech relatively to the other features within the utterance."[308] Historically, this approach belongs to the heritage of structuralist linguistics. In more detail, it means that "in both the phonologic and the morphologic analyses the linguist first faces the problem of setting up relevant elements. To be relevant, these elements must be set up on a distributional basis: x and y are included in the same element A if the distribution of x relative to the other elements B, C, etc., is in some sense the same as the distribution of y. Since this assumes that the other elements B, C, etc., are recognized at the time when the definition of A is being determined, this operation can be carried out without some arbitrary point of departure only if it is carried out for all the elements simultaneously. The elements are thus determined relatively to each other, and on the basis of the distributional relations among them."[309]

In practice, the distribution of case forms and functions may be tracked by monitoring and comparing the behavior of morphemes on the surface structure throughout different syntactic and semantic environments within a language. This involves different tests, such as the replacement of one element with another within the same clause or the application of one and the same element to different clauses, etc. For example, if we were to assess whether or not the seven morphemes subsumed under *la don* in traditional Tibetan grammar indeed form a single category, we might trace their distribution through a comparison of different sets of clauses:

> 1) *lcags gser **du** sgyur* ('to transform iron into gold'), **lcags gser **ru** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags gser**r** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags gser **tu** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags gser **su** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags gser **na** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags gser **la** sgyur* ('id.')

---

[306] Cf. ibid., 48.

[307] In the Tibetan context, Hill (2011, 4) notes in his study of *la don* in the Old Tibetan Annals that "distributional considerations are the correct criteria on which to describe linguistic phenomena." Note, however, that especially case semantics and semantic roles can require different forms of semantic and syntactic testings, as they are not always directly manifest in the morphosyntax. In the following, I will, however, focus on the distributional methodology.

[308] Harris 1963, 6.

[309] Ibid. 1963, 7.

2) *lcags 'bras **su** sgyur* ('to transform iron into rice'), **lcags 'bras **ru** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags 'bras**r** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags 'bras **tu** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags 'bras **du** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags 'bras **na** sgyur* ('id.'), **lcags gser **la** sgyur* ('id.')

3) *nga **la** dpe cha gcig dgos* ('I need a pecha'), *nga**r** dpe cha gcig dgos* ('id.') *?nga **ru** dpe cha gcig dgos* ('id.'), **nga **na** dpe cha gcig dgos* ('id.'), *nga**r** dpe cha gcig dgos* ('id.'), **nga **du** dpe cha gcig dgos* ('id.'), etc.

4) *bod **na** 'dug* ('to reside in Tibet'), *bod **la** 'dug* ('id.'), *bod **du** 'dug* ('id.'), **bod **ru** 'dug* ('id'), **bod**r** 'dug* etc.

Based on this very limited amount of data and assuming it is correct, we are able to infer certain statements about the distribution of the seven *la don* morphemes.[310] First, only one of the three morphemes *du*, *su* and *tu* may be applied at a time, never two of them. Secondly, one of the same three morphemes is applicable in sets one, two and four, yet not in three. Thirdly, the morpheme *na* is only applicable in the fourth set, whereas its application in the first three sets is ungrammatical. Fourthly, *la* may be applied in sets three and four, but it appears to be ungrammatical in the first two. Fifthly, if *la* may be applied, then also *-r* may be applied in set three but not in set four. The amount of data above is simply too small to arrive at large-scaled generalizations and to abstract reliable regularities. However, if the corpus of phrases attested in texts would be continuously extended, we would sooner or later arrive at a distributional map demonstrating that *du*, *su*, *tu* and *ru* are allomorphs, *la* and *na* are separate categories, *-r* is an allomorph of *la* as well as a free variant of *ru* in vocalic environment[311] and that the use of the resulting three morphological categories (*la*, *na*, *du*) overlaps only with a restricted number of verbs.

Another, more technical example of distributional analysis is presented by Blake in the extinct (?) Australian ergative language Kalkatungu.[312] By way of "paradigmatic oppositions,"[313] he demonstrates that the language distinguishes between transitive subjects ('A') and the instrumental function, although both are identically marked with the ergative marker:

---

[310] The data presented here is not the result of a real distributional analysis of any Tibetan text corpora, but only based on my – perhaps insufficient – language proficiency. Moreover, also the very limited volume of the data might lead to wrong or at least only temporary conclusions regarding the ultimate distribution of the morphemes and should therefore not be mistreated as a representative picture of Tibetan morphosyntax. These sets of phrases are only a hypothetical example to illustrate linguistic methodology, for which such shortcomings even improve our understanding of this approach's mechanisms and the related problems.

[311] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97.

[312] Cf. Blake 2004, 48f.

[313] Ibid.

a. *Marapai-thu*   *rumpa-mi*   *ithirr*   *matyamirla-thu*

  woman-ERG   grind-FUT   seed.NOM   grindstone-ERG

'The woman will grind the seed with the grindstone.'

b. *Marapai*   *rumpa-yi-mi*   *ithirr-ku*   *matyamirla-thu*

  woman-NOM   grind-AP-FUT   seed-DAT   grindstone-ERG

'The woman will grind seed with the grindstone.'

The difference of the two sentences lies in their grammatical construction, with *a.* being a typical ergative construction with two tokens of the ergative, whereas *b.* represents the corresponding antipassive. In most simple (though inaccurate terms), the antipassive-construction of ergative languages is the equivalent to the passive voice of accusative languages. Consequently, the case marking of the woman as the agent changes from ERGATIVE to NOMINATIVE. However, the grindstone as the instrument remains unaffected by the derivation of either *a.* or *b.* Through monitoring the distribution of the ergative-marker throughout different syntactic environments, INSTRUMENT can be demarcated as a distinct and relevant grammatical category in Kalkatungu.

Of course, distributional analysis is often easier said than done. What may be fruitful in one context may not be so in another, or perhaps it will even lead to wrong conclusions. Since languages vary significantly, there is no universal set of testings which can produce an adequate description of the morphosyntactic surface structure of all languages, and thus what Harris articulates at the beginning of his *Structural Linguistics* is a most important insight:

> "The only preliminary step that is essential to this science is the restriction to distribution as determining the relevance of inquiry. The particular methods described in this book are not essential. They are offered as general procedures of distributional analysis applicable to linguistic material. The specific choice of procedures selected for detailed treatment here is, however, in part determined by the particular languages from which the examples are drawn. The analysis of other languages would undoubtedly lead to the discussion and elaboration of additional techniques. Even the methods discussed in detail here could be made to yield many additional results over and above those brought out in this survey. Furthermore, the whole framework of basic procedures presented below could be supplanted by some other schedule of operations without loss of descriptive linguistic relevance. This would be true as long as the new operations dealt

essentially with the distribution of features of speech relatively to the other features within the utterance, and as long as they did so explicitly and rigorously. Any such alternative operations could always be compared with the procedures presented here, and the results of one could always be put into correspondence with the results of the other."[314]

Since there is no perfectly consistent model to explain the distribution of case forms and case functions without producing incoherencies, there is neither a single taxonomy defined by academic linguistics for specific languages, nor are distributional considerations the only technique in linguistic analysis. The high distributional complexity of languages, which reflects the speakers' or writers' usage of the language's lexical, grammatical, stylistic, etc. inventory, naturally provokes competing results in linguistic analysis. There is often dissent about the types of use of a certain grammatical case morpheme, whether to capture them in terms of syntactic or semantic relations and whether to accept a case's multifunctionality or to abstract a *Gesamtbedeutung*, etc. Also the boundaries of the different case functions are often difficult to define, which allows for competing taxonomies. What in one theory is classified as a syntactic relation due to its high standardization across semantically heterogeneous environments might perhaps be traced back to a homogeneous semantic category in another model through the abstraction of different semantic parameters. Also the language in use itself impedes a fully conclusive distributional mapping of syntactic elements, since their distribution in a language is not always consistent, as is evident in WT, where *la* and *du* may be identified as two separate morphemes, but the allomorph *-r* still belongs to both of them.[315] Moroever, local variations and peculiar uses by certain authors or speakers increase the difficulties to arrive at a definitive representation of a language's syntax – and attempts at tracing regularities across languages makes the whole story even more shambolic.

It was stated above that case grammar, especially in the context of descriptive grammar, is concerned with a representative explanation or description of a language's morphosyntactic surface structure. This excursus has demonstrated a few important distinctions, such as the distinction of case forms and case functions as well as different types of case functions dependent on the behavior of the morphemes and the information expressed by them. This reasoning has also touched upon the intricate yet crucial difference between morphosyntactic surface structure, underlying semantic structure and the actual situation or phenomenon referred

---

[314] Harris 1963, 6.
[315] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97.

110

to. Finally, it has also engaged in the issue of distributional methodology and the task of arriving at an accurate representation of a language's morphosyntax. There exists a variety of competing models that offer different ways of distinguishing between surface and underlying deep structure, as much as there are different theories on the relation of case forms, case functions and semantic roles. Consequently, also the boundaries of syntax, semantics, etc. may differ significantly in grammatical analysis. Without going into their respective details, the terms and techniques outlined above are intended here for a refined awareness of the general problems involved in linguistic analysis against the backdrop of its general purpose in modern research and the resulting methodologies. What has been revealed in the process is that any adequate and accurate representation of a language's syntax cannot contradict or go against *the language-specific morphosyntactic structures on the surface level as it is directly manifest in the sentence*; and even if other methodologies are applied which focus more on the underlying structures, the outcome must not contradict the morphosyntactic surface structure of the language.

5.3 The Derivation of Linguistic Expressions in Tibetan Grammar

"The fundament of all [Buddhist] teachings,

the cause of the proclamation of the *Veda*s,

the basis for expressing all lexical word forms and syntactic forms,

the application of letters will be taught."[316]

This opening declaration (*dam bca'*) of the *Sum cu pa* articulates in most basic terms the very essence of linguistic studies (*sgra rig*, *śabdavidyā*), including grammar (*sum rtags*, *brda sprod*, *lung du ston pa*, *vyākaraṇa*), as it was widely understood in the Tibetan tradition: the mastery of language amounts to the knowledge of the single operation of applying letters or phonemes (*yi ge*, *vyañjana*) to each other. This highly analytical approach to grammar and linguistics is rooted in the *trikāya* model ('three groups/collections') of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*,

---

[316] *bslab pa kun gyi gzhi 'dzin cing// rig byed smra ba rnams kyi rgyu// ming tshig brjod pa kun gyi gzhi// yi ge'i sbyor ba bshad par bya//* (SCP 3.1-4)
The term *brjod pa*, which I translated as a nominalized verb attributed to *ming* and *tshig* in the meaning of 'expressing', could be alternatively interpreted as 'sentence' as a reference to Sanskrit *vākya*. The application of letters would then be "the basis of all lexical word forms (*ming*), syntactic forms (*tshig*) and sentences (*brjod pa*)." Although this second version would make totally sense from a linguistic perspective, it is, in my view, historically problematic. This verse makes reference to the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum* model that only consists of the three constituents *yi ge*, *ming* and *tshig*. While authors such as Si tu modified this triad and added *brjod pa* as another layer of syntactic expression that represents a combination of *tshig* (cf. chapter 5.3.3), in the more common Tibetan interpretation of the *tshogs gsum* model that is already attested in the NG *tshig* is defined as *ming 'dus pa* ('collection of *ming*') and thus covers sentences as well (cf. infra 125f.). Under the condition that presentations of *tshig* like that in NG are representative, *brjod pa* cannot refer to sentences and thus must express its normal lexical value 'to express', in which way it also fits well with the term *smra ba* in the preceding verse line.

which was adopted and absorbed by the Tibetan linguistic tradition far beyond the quoted *Sum cu pa* to an extent that one cannot but think of it as almost all-pervasive. The analysis of linguistic expressions into letters or phonemes (*yi ge*, *vyañjana*), names – or more precisely denotative-lexical words (*ming*, *nāma*) – and syntactic forms (*tshig*, *pada*) constitutes the most basic framework in Tibetan grammatical analysis and also served as an important organizational principle in grammatical works such as Dpang Lotsāwa's *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* (TshSS; '*Elucidation of the Three Collections*').

The above opening declaration of the SCP already alludes to a very specific understanding of the three collections and their relation, namely that ultimately any kind of linguistic expression may be split into its component parts until we arrive at the level of letters or phonemes which cannot be further subdivided. From this perspective, all linguistic expressions, either syntactically free and unbound word forms (*ming*) of merely lexical-denotative value or any syntactic form (*tshig*) that expresses information in addition to a word's lexical meaning (e.g. marked word forms other than a first case, phrases, subclauses or entire sentences), are nothing but the combination of letters. Their alteration, for example through addition, elision or substitution, is what governs the meaning and the structure of linguistic utterances. While this hierarchical taxonomy for the derivation of linguistic expressions presents itself in a rather straightforward and intuitive fashion, a closer look at its details nevertheless raises a few pertinent questions of historical and linguistic character that will be addressed in this subchapter. First, it will be shown that Sanskritic grammar includes a competing derivational system that can be traced back as early as to Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The most pressing issue seems to be the terminological overlap of the term *pada* (*tshig*) that has been used in both models, the *Abhidharmic* and the Sanskrit grammatical. Although both versions of *pada* in one way or another refer to 'syntactic forms' of linguistic expression, they also represent almost entirely different interpretations of the term. This fact is of particular interest for the current chapter, since case grammar in the Sanskritic tradition was originally based in the *Pāṇinian* mode of grammatical analysis rather than the *Abhidharmic* theories of language.

The following questions therefore arise from the above: how did Sanskritic and Tibetan scholars negotiate these two models in view of the substantial discrepancies between them? To which extent were the Tibetan grammarians aware of the differences between the two models? What are the ramifications of the Tibetan grammatical conversion from Sanskrit grammatical to *Abhidharmic* derivational models for Tibetan case grammar? And how should references to *pada* (*tshig*) in quotations such as SCP 3.1-4 be understood? Finally, the presentation of

derivational models in Sanskritic and Tibetan grammaticography will also serve as a prerequisite for an investigation of the first case, where it will be proposed that some of the terminological framework prevalent in the Tibetan interpretation of the *tshogs gsum* entered the conceptualization of the first case.

5.3.1 Two Competing Sanskritic Systems for the Derivation of Linguistic Expressions

In Indian *vyākaraṇa*, case grammar is intimately related to the derivation of word forms or, more accurately, of complete, syntactically functioning and bound word forms that are known under the term *pada*. Technically, case grammar is one half of the derivation of *pada*s in Sanskrit grammar, and if this is explained based on Pāṇini's system, the following three rules of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are of particular interest:

> P 1.4.14 *suptiṅantaṃ padam* "[A] *pada* [is that which either] ends [in a] nominal suffix (*sup*) [or a] verbal suffix (*tiṅ*)."

> P 1.2.45 *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam* "[A] *prātipadika* [is that which is] meaningful, neither a verbal root (*dhātu*) nor a suffix (*pratyaya*)."

> P 1.3.1 *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* "[A] *dhātu* [is] *bhū* ('to be') etc."

This set of rules dispersed in the first book defines three key terms that govern the derivation of *pada*s in Pāṇini's derivational system. Confining this examination to the very basics required for the current context, the most important rule is P 1.4.14, which defines *pada* as that which either ends in nominal (*sup*) or verbal suffixes (*tiṅ*). In other words, only those word forms that are marked by either of these two mutually exclusive sets of suffixes qualify as a *pada*. The class of *sup*-suffixes consist of 21 prototypical case suffixes which are listed in P 4.1.2. Although P 1.4.104 assigns the term *vibhakti* to both sets of suffixes, nominal (*sup*) and verbal (*tiṅ*) suffixes, it has become the generic term for the set of *sup*-suffixes in the subsequent Indian grammatical tradition and throughout the different schools, and thus *vibhakti* is usually rendered with the term 'case' or 'case suffix' as its closest English equivalent. Without ending in either a *sup*- or a *tiṅ*-suffix, a word form is incomplete and unable to participate in a sentence. According to the *Pāṇinian* system, even indeclinables and particles that do not take any separable suffix are considered *pada*s, since Pāṇini treated them as suffixed and thus complete *pada*s that subsequently undergo the grammatical operation of suffix elision.[317]

---

[317] Cf. Abhyankar 1986, 233. For an example of such an elision, cf. P 2.4.82.

An important feature of this definition of *pada* is that it distinguishes two basic types of word classes, namely nominal forms and verbal forms which may be distinguished through the two sets of suffixes. Accordingly, there are two separate types of word forms to which these two sets may be joined, i.e. *prātipadika* and *dhātu*. While *prātipadika* is defined in negative terms as a meaningful entity (*arthavat*) that is neither a *dhātu* nor a suffix (*pratyaya*) (P 1.2.45),[318] *dhātu* is defined through reference to a list of base forms that starts with *bhū* ('to be,' 'become') and is entitled *Dhātupāṭha*.[319] In simple terms, both refer to incomplete, free or syntactically unbound base forms that convey a word's lexical value, with *prātipadika* referring to nominal stems that may be affixed with the case suffixes (*sup* or *vibhakti*) and *dhātu* referring to verbal roots that take *tiṅ*-endings. The distinction into nominal and verbal forms as well as the distinction into base forms and suffixes for each of the two word classes constitutes the very foundation of the Sanskrit derivational model in the field of grammar and thus of the entire grammatical system. Regarding case grammar, the basic derivation is as follows:

$$prātipadika + sup = pada$$

Example:

$$brāhmaṇa + as = brāhmaṇāḥ \text{ 'the brahmins' (NOM.PL)}$$

The exact *Pāṇinian* derivation of the form *brāhmaṇāḥ* is more complex than presented above and involves additional morphological as well as text-internal technical operations,[320] yet the basic procedure to apply a case suffix to a stem form remains the foundation. The precise nomenclature as well as the precise derivational procedure may vary throughout the grammatical schools,[321] but the basic scheme above has been retained within the entire field of Sanskrit grammar.

Turning now to Buddhist philosophy, the prominent *Abhidharmakośa* (AK) and its *Bhāṣya* (AKBh), both attributed to Vasubandhu (4th-5th century), have proposed a threefold

---

[318] Note that *pratyaya* ('suffix') includes more than *sup* and *tiṅ*, since there exist a variety of other morphemes that are subsumed under the category of suffixes in classical Sanskrit grammar (cf. Abhyankar 1986, 265). This does not change the fact, however, that any intra-sentential word form requires to end in either an actual or elided *sup* or *tiṅ*-suffix in Pāṇini's grammar.

[319] Note that grammatical schools such *Pāṇini* or *Cāndra* usually have their own *Dhātupāṭha*s. On the definition of *dhātu* in P 1.3.1, its discussion in Sanskritic commentarial literature, as well as issues related to it, cf. Ogawa 2005.

[320] Cf. Sharma 1990, 512f.

[321] Cf. e.g. *Kātantra* 2.1.1, which substituted the term *prātipadika* with *liṅga*.

114

classification of linguistic expressions that stands in contrast to the grammarians' understanding of the technical term *pada*:[322]

AK 2.47 a-b:

> *nāmakāyādayaḥ saṃjñāvākyākṣarasamuktayaḥ*
> "*nāmakāya*, etc., are the groups of *saṃjñā*, *vākya*, and *akṣara*."[323]

AKBh on AK 2.47 a-b:

> *ādigrahaṇena padavyañjanakāyagrahaṇam/ tatra saṃjñākaraṇaṃ nāma, tad yathā rūpaṃ śabda ity evam ādi/ 'vākyaṃ padam', yāvatā 'rthaparisamāptiḥ/ tad yathā anityā bata saṃskārā ity evam ādi/ yena kriyā-guṇa-kāla-sambandha-viśeṣā gamyante/*

> "The word 'etc.' denotes *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya*. Among these [groups which are mentioned in the *kārikā*], *nāman* is the same as *saṃjñākaraṇa*, as when we say 'colour', 'sound', etc. [By] '*vākya*' [mentioned in the *kārikā*,] [we mean] *pada* [by which term we do not mean a 'word', but a set of words, used] in so far as a meaning (idea?) is brought to complete expression. For instance: 'impermanent are the *saṃskāras*', etc. [A *pada* is defined as that] by which the specific relations of action, quality, and time are known."[324]

In most simple terms, Vasubandhu distinguishes three groups or collections (*kāya*) fundamental to human linguistic utterances, namely *vyañjana* ('letter,' 'phoneme'), *nāma* ('name') and *pada* (lit. 'word;' i.e. 'linguistic expression higher than single, unspecified word forms'). In order to clarify their meaning, AK and AKBh provide alternative and less technical terms for each of these three groups: the group of *vyañjana* is also referred to as *akṣara* ('alphabetical letter'), *nāma* is identified with *saṃjñā* ('term,' 'definition,' 'name,' 'idea') and *pada* with *vākya* (lit. 'speech;' i.e. 'sentence').

Of particular interest for the current topic of Tibetan case grammar are *nāma* and *pada*. AKBh defines *nāma* as *saṃjñākaraṇa*, which, following Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā* commentary on

---

[322] The following quotations of the AK and AKBh have been already discussed by Simonsson (1982A) in his investigation into the Tibetan grammatical tradition and its use of the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum* (*trīkāya*) model. Although his argumentation follows a different direction than the present dissertation, I draw from his approach to contrast *Abhidharmic* and Sanskrit grammatical derivational models as well as theories of the sentence (*vākya*, *ngag/brjod pa*). Therefore, the following quotations are for the bigger part quoted from and transl. by Simonsson (1982A). For a comparison of Sanskrit grammatical and *Abhidharmic* derivational models in the context of Tibetan grammaticography, cf. also HSGLT 2, 240ff.
[323] AK 2.47 a-b, quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 538.
[324] AKBh on AK 2.47 a-b, quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 538 and 540.

AKBh, should be understood as everyday language and thus a synonym (*paryāya*) for *nāmadheya* ('name,' 'appellation,' 'designation'), just like a person may be called Devadatta.[325] Consequently, designations such as 'colour,' 'sound,' etc. constitute the group of *nāma*. We can assume that Vasubandhu's concise definition aimed at the rather direct, intuitively comprehensible idea that words such as 'colour' or 'sound' as such have a denotative power through which phenomena can be referred to. In this sense, they stand in proximity to the expression of lexical information similar to Sanskrit grammatical stem forms. However, AK(Bh) does not add further considerations about the precise morphosyntactic nature of *nāma*, and the two examples (*rupam* and *śabdaḥ*) are fully inflected nouns in the first case singular. From the perspective of the mere denotative-semantic value of *nāma*, these examples nonetheless fall together with the Sanskrit grammatical *prātipadika* ('nominal stem'), since grammars like that of *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* or *Kātantra* define the first case as that which expresses the mere meaning of the nominal stem.[326] Vasubandhu's choice to use fully inflected word forms (= grammatical *pada*) rather than stem forms may be due to the fact that the latter are incomplete word forms, i.e. theoretical abstractions in grammatical analysis that do not exist in the actual language.[327] Against the backdrop of Sanskrit grammatical definitions of the first case function, it seems most likely that *nāma* is indeed restricted to nominal word forms (noun substantives, nominalizations, etc.) in the nominative case form, since in Sanskrit syntax only this word form is confined to the denotative function assigned by Vasubandhu to *nāma* as *saṃjñākaraṇa*. However, the following questions should still be kept in mind for the subsequent investigation: Do base forms qualify as *nāma*? And do only nominal word forms in the nominative qualify as *nāma*, or also other word forms such as verbs?

In contrast, a *pada* is defined as a sentence (*vākya*), more particularly a linguistic expression with complete meaning (*arthaparisamāpti*) and through which relations of action, qualities and time are specified (*kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣā*). The single example 'impermanent are the *saṃskāras*' (*anityā bata saṃskārāḥ*) is apparently a specification of the type *guṇa* ('quality'), assuming that *saṃskārāḥ* as a nominative plural form is that which is specified. Although Vasubandhu remains silent on this point, the implication seems to be that this nominative plural

---

[325] Cf. ibid., 539.

[326] The difference between nominal stem and word form in the nominative is thus not the expressed semantic information, but their respective syntactic value. While stem forms are incomplete, syntactically non-functioning word forms, first case forms are in congruence with the finite verb. This latter value was presumably not in the focus of Vasubandhu's definition. For more information on the syntactic value of the Sanskrit first case suffix as well as Sanskritic conceptions of the first case function, cf. infra 142f. and 150f.

[327] In contrast, c.f. e.g. infra 145 on the examples of the Tibetan scholar Dpang Lotsāwa for *nāma* that include Sanskrit nominal stem forms.

is a *nāma* that may then take certain additional word forms (nominal, verbal, etc. with different nominal and verbal inflections) as specifiers to form a *pada* (= *vākya*). Already the Indian commentator Yaśomitra, in his commentary on AK 2.47 a-b and AKBh, has sharply observed that this definition of *pada* is substantially different from *pada* as understood by Sanskrit grammarians:

> *padaṃ tu suptiṅantaṃ padaṃ gṛhyate/ tenātha 'yāvatārthaparisamāptis tad yathā anityā bata saṃskārāḥ ity evam ādi' iti/ ādiśabdena utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ, utpadya hi nirudhyante, teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukham ity evam ādi/*

> "*Pada* is [usually, by the grammarians,] taken [in the meaning of] that which has a nominal or verbal ending. Therefore [i.e. in order to preclude this interpretation] the author says: 'in so far as a meaning (idea?) is brought to complete expression. For instance: impermanent are the *saṃskāra*s, etc.' By 'etc.' [the rest of Śakra's words are meant]: having as attributes birth and decay, for having been born they die; their cessation is happiness. And so on."[328]

A *pada* here is no longer a stem form that ends in *sup* or *tiṅ* and represents a syntactically functioning word form, but that which brings about complete meaning through specifying relationships of action, etc. in sentences such as 'impermanent are the *saṃskāra*s, etc.' (*anityā bata saṃskārā ity evam ādi*). Yaśomitra was well aware that Vasubandhu's illustration of *pada* was a partial quotation of the first verse (following two verses of homage) from the *Udānavarga*, which he did not hesitate to complete:

> *anityā bata saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ,*
>
> *utpadya hi nirudhyante, teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukham.*

We can thus assume that this is one example for a *pada* in its fullest sense of *vākya* as defined in AK(Bh), and there is no need to spend more time on the question what is involved in the condition of *arthaparisamāpti* ('completeness of meaning'),[329] an intricate issue that may be discussed elsewhere. Of more interest in our case is that Yaśomitra not only contrasts the two different notions of *pada* in Sanskritic grammar and AK(Bh), but he also goes on to compare the AKBh's definition of *pada* as *vākya* ('sentence') with the definition of a sentence in the grammarian Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* 9 on P 2.1.1:

---

[328] Quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 541.
[329] Cf. ibid., 540.

sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam iti vākyavido vadanti/ tad yathā pacati paṭhati gacchatīti, kṛṣṇo gauro raktaḥ iti, pacati pakṣyaty apākṣīd iti kriyā-guṇa-kālānāṃ sambandhaviśeṣā gamyante tat padam/

"The [*Pāṇinian*] experts on *vākya* say that *vākya* [sentence] is what has indeclinable words and *kāraka* as qualifiers. [But according to Vasubandhu,] that is *pada*, whereby are known specific relations connected with action: e.g., is cooking, is reading, is going – with quality: e.g., black, white, red – and with time: e.g. is cooking, will be cooking, has cooked."[330]

As we can read in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the explicit definition of a sentence appears to be a novelty of Kātyāyana's work, since Pāṇini did not include any such definition.[331] Yaśomitra does not quote Kātyāyana's full definition, and he omitted perhaps its most important part, namely the term *ākhyāta* ('verbal form,' 'finite verb'):

ākhyātaṃ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam "A sentence is a finite verb qualified by *avyaya*s (indeclinables) and *kāraka*s."[332]

Due to this omission, Yaśomitra's quotation of Kātyāyana's definition may not be wrong, but it is certainly somewhat misleading. A sentence is indeed that which has qualifiers (Yaśomitra), namely indeclinables and *kāraka*s, yet it is the verb which is qualified in Kātyāyana's definition. In *Vārttika* 10 on P 2.1.1, Kātyāyana also gives a well-known second definition of a sentence that emphasizes the importance of the verb:

ekatiṅ "[A sentence is that which has] one [word form ending in] *tiṅ*."

In other words, a sentence is that which has a finite verb; and according to the first definition not only a finite verb, but one that is or may be further qualified by *kāraka*s. In contrast, AKBh states that a sentence is that through which specifications such as action or qualities are to be understood, and it seems to be a central *nāma* in the nominative case form that is specified. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the grammarians and Vasubandhu concerning the point whether a verb, i.e. that argument of the sentence that typically expresses the action, is

---

[330] Quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 541f.
[331] Cf. Deshpande 2009, 113. This is reasonable due to the fact that Pāṇini's grammar is entirely confined to a perspective that focuses on the individual derivation of *pada*s. Although it seems to be surprising, how syntactic topics such as case grammar can be adequately treated without any clear notion of a sentence, it has been argued in modern academia that he could dispense with any explicit concept of the sentence due to the requirement of *sāmarthya* ('semantic-syntactic fitness') that governs the derivation of word forms (cf. Roodbergen 1974, iv). On the notion of *sāmarthya*, cf. also Deshpande 1991, esp. 32f.; Deshpande 2009, 111ff.; Cardona 2004, 194.
[332] Cf. Deshpande 2009, 113.

viśeṣya ('qualificand,' for the grammarians) or *viśeṣa* ('qualification,' for Vasubandhu) in a sentence.[333]

Yet, Yaśomitra does not stop here and continues with his comparison of AK(Bh) and grammatical theories of the sentence, next quoting Patañjali on Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* 4 in the context of P 1.2.45:

> *tathā hi sāmānye vartamānānāṃ padānāṃ yad viśeṣe 'vasthānam sa vākyārtha ity āhuḥ/ tad evaṃ svalakṣaṇābhidyotakaṃ nāma kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhiyotakaṃ padam ity uktaṃ bhavati/*

> "Thus, it is said [by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P 1.2.45 that] 'the sentence meaning represents the particularization (= contextualization) of [the meanings of] these words which otherwise have generic [= uncontextualized, lexical] meanings.' Likewise, it is said [by Vasubandhu] that that which indicates a *svalakṣaṇa* is *nāma* [and] that which indicates a specification of relations of action, etc. is *pada*."[334]

Patañjali's statement on the particularization of word forms with otherwise generic meaning is part of his exposition of P 1.2.45 and its definition of *prātipadika* ('nominal stem'), more particularly its feature of being *arthavat* ('meaningful').[335] If *arthavat* specifies *prātipadika*, there is the definitory problem that also linguistic expressions of a higher hierarchy, such as the collection of words into meaningful sentences, would likewise qualify as *prātipadika*. This issue sets the starting point for a more voluminous and excessive discussion of the attribute *arthavat* in different contexts such as stem forms, other word forms, sentences and even letters, in order to clarify their respective meaningfulness or meaninglessness and consequently to distinguish them from *prātipadika* and its *arthavat*. This discussion has also included the question, whether the meaning of sentences as collections of words (*samudāya*) is exhaustively constituted through the meaning of the individual words in a sentence, or whether its meaning goes beyond that of the individual words. As hinted at in the part quoted by Yaśomitra, Patañjali

---

[333] Cf. also Simonsson 1982A, 542, although his argument goes into a different direction. If I understand Simonsson correctly, this difference of the verb's status in the sentence amounts for him to the difference between a verb-centered theory of the sentence vs. a noun-centered system – the latter which he also attributes to Tibetan *Sum rtags* (cf. ibid., 531):

grammarians:	*viśeṣya* = *ākhyāta*	*viśeṣa* = *kāraka*s, etc.
AK(Bh):	*viśeṣya* = *nāma*	*viśeṣa* = *kriyā*, etc.

[334] Sanskrit quoted from Simonsson 1982A, 542; transl. of Patañjali's portion by Deshpande 2009, 115.
[335] For P 1.2.45, cf. supra 113. For Patañjali's exposition of P 1.2.45, cf. the translation of MBh in Subrahmanya 1956, 80ff.

accepts that a sentence's meaning not only includes the meaning of its individual parts but also the interrelation between them covered by their particularization.

Yaśomitra apparently used this quotation for the attempt to at least partially reconcile the two competing models of the grammarians and Vasubandhu. He seems to mediate between Vasubandhu's *nāma* and Patañjali's *sāmānye vartamāna pada* through the *svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka* ('clarification/indication of the self-characteristic [of a real phenomenon]') as well as between Vasubandhu's *pada* and Patañjali's *viśeṣe 'vasthāni padāni* through *kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhiyotaka* ('clarification/indication of a specification of relations of action etc.'):

nāma (Vasubandhu) = *svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka* (Yaśomitra) ~ *sāmānye vartamāna pada*
(Patañjali)

pada (Vasubandhu) = *kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhiyotaka* (Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra) ~
viśeṣe 'vasthāni padāni (Patañjali)

Nāma as that which denotes a self-characteristic ('*svalakṣaṇa*') does not figure in the AK or AKBh and is thus an addition, possibly by Yaśomitra himself. The idea of an unspecified self-characteristic indicated by *nāma* comes close to Patañjali's idea of an unspecified, generic meaning of a *pada* (*sāmānye vartamāna pada*). Furthermore, it is clear from the basic grammatical derivational maxim – namely nominal/verbal stem + *sup/tiṅ = pada* – that Patañjali's word forms that express generic, lexical meanings (*sāmānye vartamāna pada*) must refer to *prātipadika* and *dhātu*, whereas their particularized form (*viśeṣe 'vasthāni padāni*) represents grammatical *pada*, i.e. suffixed, completed, syntactically fitting and functioning word forms. Yaśomitra's comparison thus brings grammatical base forms (*prātipadika* and *dhātu*) in close proximity to Vasubandhu's *nāma*, a strategy which is indeed reasonable from the point of view that both represent word forms with pure denotative-lexical value from a semantic perspective. However, a direct association of *nāma* and base forms is not necessarily suggested by AK(Bh), which illustrates *nāma* by means of fully inflected word forms.[336] The congruence of *nāma* and base forms therefore remains on a semantic level, yet not with regard to intrasentential morphosyntactic operations of any kind. Moreover, the inconsistency remains that Patañjali's *sāmānye vartamāna pada* must refer to both base forms, nominal (*prātipadika*) and verbal (*dhātu*), whereas Vasubandhu did not explicate the inclusion of verbs in *nāma*, the latter being more likely confined to nominative nominal forms.

---

[336] Cf. supra 115.

In contrast, the connection between Vasubandhu's and Patañjali's notions of a sentence is even less intuitive. While the idea of a sentence as that which contains specifications (*viśeṣa*) resonates with both conceptions, the respective natures of these specifications diverge significantly. In the context of grammar, Patañjali's specification/particularization must refer to *suptiṅantaṃ padam* (P 1.4.14), in the sense that nominal and verbal base forms with generic meanings are specified in a sentence through the application of suffixes that particularize this very meaning. In the *Abhidharmic* context, only one *nāma* in the sentence is specified through quality, action and time. This specification does not refer to any grammatical markers but to the remaining parts of the sentence apart from the central *nāma*. Moreover, the term *pada* in MBh only refers separately to each particularized word which then form a sentence (*vākya*) together consisting of these several *pada*s, whereas Vasubandhu refers to the entirety of the sentence (*vākya*) as one *pada*.

The *Abhidharmic* notion of *pada* as a sentence that specifies a central argument by means of action, etc. raises the question of the relationship of case grammar to the *trīkāya* model. Obviously, the cases cannot be part of either *vyañjana* or *nāma*, since they require linguistic expressions of a higher order than either meaningless letters or single, free and unbound designations (= lexical word forms). Although the case model must therefore belong to the domain of *Abhidharmic pada*, the presentations of *pada* in AK(Bh) and the *Sphuṭārthā* focus on the criteria *arthaparisamāpti* and *kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣā* that have only limited explanatory power with regard to the grammatical operation of the affixation of case suffixes in Sanskrit. It may be expected that the completeness of meaning (*arthaparisamāpti*) as well as the reference to connections (*sambandha*) somehow relates to the idea of intrasentential syntax, but nowhere was this further elaborated and put into a more systematic and consistent model for the derivation of word forms and grammatical structures as it was done in grammatical sources. In the form it was formulated in the Sanskrit *Abhidharmic* sources quoted above, it should therefore be concluded that the *trīkāya*-model has only limited utility in the context of a more thorough analysis of case grammar. In that sense, the two competing notions of *pada* are both syntactic entities or forms, yet of very different natures.

Although much more could be said about the definition of *pada* and the theory of the sentence in the works of Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Vasubandhu as well as about the possible implications, problems and ramifications of Yaśomitra's comparison, we have now already arrived at a basic terminological-conceptual framework which includes a certain tension between grammatical and *Abhidharmic* models of linguistic derivation. This background is sufficient for our current

purpose of investigating derivational models in Tibetan grammaticography and their relation to the eight classical Tibetan cases. Therefore, we may now turn directly to the question how Tibetan scholars north of the Himalaya revisited and renegotiated this framework in the context of the fields of Buddhist philosophy and linguistics, and where in this process the Tibetan grammarians have located case grammar.

5.3.2 Renditions of the two Models in Tibetan Scholarship

In the Tibetan tradition in general, the *trīkāya* model proposed in AK 2.47 is known as the notion of *tshogs gsum* ('three collections,' 'three groups'), a direct translation of the Sanskrit term. The respective groups of *vyañjana*, *nāma* and *pada* have also been adopted and rendered through the Tibetan terms *yi ge* ('letter'), *ming* ('name,' 'designation') and *tshig* ('word,' 'phrase'). Although the triad *yi ge*, *ming* and *tshig* is certainly the most well-known version, *vākya* ('sentence') as AK's interpretation of *pada* is typically translated with *ngag* ('speech,' 'sentence') in Tibetan Buddhist as well as linguistic literature.

The Tibetan commentarial literature on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* is very elaborate, and thus we should not assume full consensus in the presentation of AK 2.47. One relatively early commentary that has attained general authority across the different branches of Tibetan Buddhism is Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs's (~ 13th century) famous work *Chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mngon pa'i rgyan*, also known under the epithet *Mchims chen*. On the two collections *ming* ('name, designation') and *ngag* or *tshig* we can read the following:

> *de la ming ni don gyi ngo bo brjod par byed pa ste gzugs zhes pa lta bu'o/   ngag ni tshig ste don gyi khyad par ston pa kye ma 'dus byas rnams mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs ba'am/   bstan du med la thogs pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs zhes bya ba lta bu ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa (ra ston pa bstan bcos la sogs pa) ste/   tshig gang gis lhas byin (dkar sham) 'gro zhes ba la sogs pa'i bya ba dang/   kha dog dkar sham la sogs pa'i yon tan dang/   btsos so 'tshed do 'tshed par 'gyur ro zhes pa la sogs pa (ngo bo dang yon tan dang bya ba dang) dus kyi 'brel ba'i khyad par rtogs par 'gyur ro/*

> "As regards *ming*, it expresses the essence of a meaning (*don gyi ngo bo*) as in 'form' (*gzugs*). As regards a sentence (*ngag*) it is *tshig*. [This] is the indication of a qualification/specification of [that] meaning (*don gyi khyad par*), a full completion of the meaning to the extent [of that qualification] as in 'Oh, impermanent are the *saṃskāra*s (*'dus byas*)' or 'the form which cannot be indicated and is endowed with resistance' [A sentence is] any *tshig*, by which [the meaning's] qualification [in terms]

of connections of action, such as 'Devadatta goes' (*lhas byin 'gro*), qualities, such as 'pure colour' (*kha dog bkar sham*), or time, such as 'having cooked,' 'cooking,' 'will be cooking' (*btsos so, 'tsed do, 'tsed par 'gyur ro*), is comprehended."[337]

The basic definition of *ming* is *don gyi ngo bo brjod par byed pa* ('expressing the essence of a meaning', 'expressing the essential meaning,' or 'expressing the semantic essence' ?) and that of *ngag* or *tshig* is *don gyi khyad par ston pa* ('indicating the qualification/specification of a meaning' or 'indicating a semantic specification' ?):

> *ming = don gyi ngo bo brjod par byed pa*
>
> *tshig = don gyi khyad par ston pa*

This directly resonates with Yaśomitra's terminology of *svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka* and *viśeṣābhiyotaka* that he used to characterize *nāma* and *pada* respectively, although at least the notion of *viśeṣa* equally figures in AKBh and Yaśomitra's quotation of Patañjali.[338] Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs provides one example for *ming*, namely *gzugs* ('form'), to illustrate the form of such an expression of a meaning's essence. A *ming* and thus expression of the essence of a meaning (*don gyi ngo bo*) appears to be a direct reference to the designated object or phenomenon without any indication of further information (e.g. syntactic). Judging from Sanskrit *svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka*, this reference is intimately related to the designated object's self-characteristc. In the definition of *tshig* as the qualification of a meaning (*don gyi khyad par*), the *Mchims chen* also adopts the feature of *arthaparisamāpti* ('completeness of meaning,' *don yongs su rdzogs pa*) and interprets the notion of a qualification (*viśeṣa, khyad par*) – naturally following from AKBh – in terms of action, quality and time. The original quotation of AKBh from the *Udānavarga* to illustrate *pada* qua *vākya*, i.e. 'impermanent are the *saṃskāra*s, etc.' (*kye ma 'dus byas rnams mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs ba*), was retained in the Tibetan commentary and accompanied by the second example 'that form which cannot be indicated and is endowed with resistance' (*bstan du med la thogs pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs*). This second example emphasizes that *gzugs*, *Mchims chen*'s example for *ming*, is that which is further qualified through qualities, etc. The *Mchims chen* therefore fully adheres to the

---

[337] Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs 2004, 156.
Note that the three brackets in the Tibetan text are annotations inserted by the author (or scribe/editor?) into the main commentary. This practice was followed throughout the entire commentary. In the quoted passage, I omitted them in the translation. For a digital block print version, cf. "*chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi rnam par bshad pa'i mngon pa'i rgyan zhes bya ba stod cha'i dkar chag.*" In *bka' gdams gsung 'bum phyogs bsgrigs thengs gsum pa/*. TBRC W1PD153536. 23: 7 - 8. khreng tu'u/: si khron dpe skrun tshogs pa/ si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang/, 2009. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1PD153536|O1PD153536C2O0217$W1PD153536 (accessed March 21st, 2017)
[338] Cf. supra 115 and 119.

Abhidharmic version of a syntactic form (*tshig*) that is a synthetic expression consisting of more than one word form.

Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs does not seem to have added substantial new aspects to the materials in the Sanskritic sources discussed above, and he adhered mostly to Yaśomitra's rendition of *nāma* and *pada* without further comparison to grammatical theories as found in the *Sphuṭārthā*. Related questions have not been further addressed, such as whether *nāma* is restricted only to genuine nouns as indicated by the examples in the Sanskritic and Tibetan sources, or whether *vākya*'s parameter of completeness refers to some notion of complete sentences – e.g. the requirement of an explicit or implicit verb – or more generally only to complete meaningful syntactic entities such as in *Mchims chen*'s second example.

Although in the field of grammar and linguistics we might expect that Sanskrit grammatical models of word formation and derivation as well as notions of the sentence should have become more important than the very general conception of linguistic expressions in terms of individual phonemes/letters, denotative lexical words and sentences of Buddhist *Abhidharmic* literature, quite the opposite is true: it is the latter that figures much more prominently in Tibetan autochthonous grammatical literature. [339] One reason for this must have been the general importance of Buddhist *Abhidharma* in Tibetan Buddhist scholarship, some of which may be assumed also to have permeated into the field of grammar, since the *tshogs gsum* model represents a linguistic theory that applies to linguistic expressions in general and thus also in the case of Tibetan. In addition, in his *Mkhas 'jug*, Sakya Pāṇḍita alludes to the possibility that there may have also been linguistic reasons for the Tibetan grammarians to abstain from any direct application of the Sanskrit grammatical *pada* model:

> *su banta'i rkyen gyis sgra sgrub pa'i tshul 'di saṃ skrīta la shin tu dgos mod/ bod kyi skad la mi dgos pa'i phyir re zhig gzhag go*

> "This system of accomplishing a word form (~ *sgra sgrub pa*) by means of the *subanta*-suffixes is very much required for Sanskrit, yet [I] ignore [it] for the time being, since it has no need in Tibetan language."[340]

Sakya Pāṇḍita makes this comment in the context of case grammar in general and the Sanskrit case suffixes in particular. If we are to speculate why he concludes that the *subanta* system, i.e. the system of nominal *pada*s which end in one of the *sup*-suffixes, is not required in Tibetan, a

---

[339] Without having looked deeper into it, one exception might be Tibetan contributions to Sanskrit-specific grammar, in which derivational models of the Sanskrit grammarians are usually adopted and applied.
[340] KhJ 2009, 24.

major reason is the fact that complete word forms in Tibetan do not require the application of case suffixes to stem forms. Unmarked words such as *gzugs* ('form') already represent complete and meaningful word forms that are not theoretical abstractions but can be either used on their own, in sentences as DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT/ABSOLUTIVE or also in sentences with copula.[341] In the context of case grammar, the demarcation line between nominal stem forms and *pada*s is therefore shifted in the Tibetan context. Apart from this, the fact that Tibetan language also does not contain a system of verbal suffixes comparable either to Sanskrit verbal inflection or the Tibetan system of case markers marks another major gap between the uniform and straightforward maxim *suptiṅantaṃ padam* (P 1.4.14) and Tibetan morphosyntax that would have required a more substantial adaption of Sanskritic grammatical models.

It was therefore maybe not completely without linguistic reasons that Tibetan grammarians have rather followed the threefold distinction of linguistic expressions proposed in *Abhidharmic* literature. The perhaps earliest definition of the *tshogs gsum* preserved in Tibetan linguistic literature is contained in NG as part of its fifth topic number five (*yi ge 'jug pa'i gnas*, lit. 'the topic of [where] letters/sounds/phonemes engage,' i.e. 'the topic of the domains pertaining to letters/sounds/phonemes'). Under the premise that letters or sounds form the smallest analytical component of any form of linguistic expression, this topic defines eight linguistic key terms for which the notion of *yi ge* is constitutive in one way or another.[342] Although *yi ge*, *ming* and *tshig* have not been presented in topic five as the unified concept they represent in the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum* (*trīkāya*) model, Lce Khyi 'brug had a clear idea of their unity, which is evident from his reference to the triad at the end of NG.[343] In topic five, he defines *ming* and *tshig* in very brief terms:

> *ming ni chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dwags te yi ge 'dus pa'i bdag nyid do/*
>
> "Regarding *ming*, it is a designation (*tshig bla dwags*) of the essence of phenomena (*chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid*), an entity of collected letters (*yi ge 'dus pa'i bdag nyid*)."[344]
>
> *tshig ni chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dwags yin te ming 'dus pa'i bdag nyid can no/*

---

[341] Although Tibetan grammarians did not associate unmarked word forms with any kind of intrasentential argument. The unmarked argument has been identified with the first case of the Tibetan case model, its syntactic value remaining mostly open in grammatical treatises (cf. chapter 7).

[342] These eight are as *sgra* ('sound'), *skad* ('language'), *ming* ('name, free lexical word form'), *mtshan ma* ('characteristic'), *brda* ('linguistic sign, signifier'), *tha snyad* ('term, definition'), *tshig* ('phrase', 'sentence' ?) and *don* ('meaning, semantics')

[343] Cf. supra 30.

[344] CT *115 – 410*.

"Regarding *tshig*, it is a designation (*tshig bla dwags*) of the specification/qualification of phenomena (*chos rnams kyi khyad par*), an entity of collected *ming* (*ming 'dus pa'i bdag nyid can*)."[345]

Lce Khyi 'brug adhered to the basic *Abhidharmic* distinction of *ming* (*nāma*) and *tshig* (*pada*) as presented in Yaśomitra's commentary based on *svalakṣaṇa* and *viśeṣa*. Comparing the account of Lce Khyi 'brug with the later *Mchims chen*, the former explicitly speaks of the 'essence of phenomena' (*chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid*) and 'specification of phenomena' while the latter refers to *don gyi ngo bo* ('essence of a meaning') and *don gyi khyad par* ('specification/qualification of a meaning').[346] Lce Khyi 'brug is therefore unmistakably clear on the point that the term 'essence' (*ngo bo*) refers to the essence of the designated object and that any designation in terms of *ming* is a reference to the essence of the designated phenomenon; and likewise it is the phenomena that are specified in *tshig*. In his definition of *tshig* (*pada*), he mentions neither *arthaparisamāpti* (*don yongs su rdzogs pa* 'completeness of meaning') nor *kriyāguṇakālasambandha* (*bya ba dang yon tan dang dus kyi 'brel ba* 'connections of action, quality and time'). Instead, he adds another characterization of *ming* and *tshig* that is found neither in the quoted sections of AK(Bh) and Yaśomitra, nor in the *Mchims chen*, namely *yi ge 'dus pa* ('collection/combination of letters/phonemes/sounds') and *ming 'dus pa* ('collection/combination of names/designations').[347] This allows him to directly interrelate the three, *yi ge*, *ming* and *tshig*:

yi ge ➔ *yi ge 'dus pa = ming = chos kyi ngo bo* ➔ *ming 'dus pa = tshig = chos kyi khyad par*

A collection or combination of letters forms a *ming* that expresses the essence of a phenomenon, whereas a collection or combination of *ming* results in *tshig* that expresses a specification of a phenomenon. This is the basic derivational scheme found in Tibetan grammatical sources such as the *Smra sgo*, *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* and others, with the already mentioned variation of *don*

---

[345] Ibid., 410f.

[346] Cf. supra 122f.

[347] Note that also some Tibetan commentaries on AK(Bh) adopted this addition, e.g. Rgyal dbang 'phrin las rnam rgyal's *Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa'i legs bshad nyin byed dbang po'i snang ba* from the 19th century.

I cannot answer, whether this or any similar idea can be found in the remaining parts of Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā* on AK 2.47. Interestingly, the idea of a single word that is the collection of letters, as well as of a single sentence that is the collection of words can be found in the same section of Patañjali's MBh on P 1.2.45, from where Yaśomitra quoted his theory of the sentence. Perhaps less systematically, but still in the same terms, Patañjali refers to the sentence during *Vārttika* 2 on P 1.2.45 as a collection of words (*samudāya*) (cf. Deshpande 2009, 114; Subrahmanya 1956, 82), and later on he asks about the meaning of letters, either on their own or as a collection of letters (*varṇānāṃ samudāya*) (cf. Subrahmanya 1956, 92f.).

gyi ngo bo/khyad par vs. *chos kyi ngo bo/khyad par*. In the *Smra sgo*, which adopts the triad's interrelation in terms of *'dus pa*, this is also rendered in terms of a causal chain:

> *de la rgyu ni dper na rdul 'dus pa las gong bu grub pa na de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa bzhin yi ge 'dus pa las ming 'grub ste/*

> "Regarding the cause for this [*ming*], for example like a lump that results from a gathering (= collection) of dust particles cannot be said to be separate from these very [dust particles], a *ming* results from a gathering (= collection) of letters/phonemes."[348]

> *de la rgyu ni ming ngo/   rang gi ngo bo ni de 'dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa'o/*

> "Regarding the cause for this [*tshig*], it is *ming*. [*Tshig*'s] essential characteristic (~ *rang gi ngo bo*) is that it expresses the specification of a meaning through the collection of that [*ming*]."[349]

This relation of *ming* and *tshig* in terms of *ming 'dus pa* reveals a different understanding of *nāma* (*ming*) compared to Vasubhandu. It was argued above that common illustrations by means of word forms such as *śabdaḥ* or *rupam* suggest that the concept of *nāma* (*ming*) aims at genuine nominative nominal forms which are then to be specified by the remaining part of the sentence to form a *pada* (*tshig*). By means of the notion of *ming 'dus pa*, it becomes clear that any word form that is a specifier on the level of *tshig* is itself also *ming*, and this point has been expressed clearly in Smṛtijñānakīrti's *Smra sgo*:

> […] *tshig ces bya ba ni ming 'dus pa la bya ste/   ji ltar don gyi khyad par ston na ming gnyis sam/   ming mang po 'dus kyang rung ste tshig ces bya'o/   'di ltar ka ba ring po zhes brjod na ka ba'i khyad par rjod par byed do/   de bzhin du ka ba ring po 'di ni dkar po'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa'ang tshig ces bya'o/*

> "[…] So-called '*tshig*' is to be regarded as a collection/combination of *ming*. If [it is asked] how a specification of meaning (*don gyi khyad par*) is indicated, either two *ming* or multiple *ming* are suitable and are called *tshig*. Likewise, if one says 'long pillar' (*ka ba ring po*), a specification of the pillar is being expressed. Similarly, also 'Regarding this long pillar, [it is] white.' (*ka ba ring po 'di ni dkar po'o*) and the like are called *tshig*."[350]

---

[348] Smṛti 2002, 49.
[349] Ibid., 58.
[350] Ibid., 58f.

Smṛtijñānakīrti asserts that two or more *ming* may form a *tshig*. His two examples, namely *ka ba ring po* and *ka ba ring po 'di ni dkar po'o*, make clear that the terms *ring po* ('long') as well as *dkar po* ('white') are equally considered *ming*. 'Essence' (*ngo bo*) thus refers to the essential nature of any kind of phenomenon, and consequently *ngo bo* must refer to the essence of a phenomenon regardless of the type of word (nouns, adjectives, verbs) or lexical information (things, qualities, action). However, it is important to note that the typical illustrations of *ming* nonetheless abstain from mentioning other word forms than genuine nouns, a fact we might interpret as a remnant of the *Abhidharmic* commentarial literature in which this type of illustration prevails.

In any case, already in the NG(g) we can observe a shift of focus in Tibetan linguistic sources away from *pada* as *arthaparisamāpti* ('completeness of meaning', *don yongs su rdzogs pa*) and *kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣā* towards *pada* as a collection of *ming* that specifies either a meaning or a phenomenon (*don* or *chos*). This does not necessarily mean that the criteria of AKBh were regarded as obsolete or even mistaken, rather they have receded into the background and sometimes were even fully omitted in the presentation of the *tshogs gsum*.[351] This shift possibly reflects a more analytical approach typical to (Sanskrit) grammatical analysis, namely to divide a linguistic utterance into its parts and focus on each of them individually and in relation to each other, a perspective towards which the *Abhidharmic* model with its focus on a central *nāma* remains fairly insensitive. However, also the Tibetan renditions of *tshig* in terms of *ming 'dus pa* have remained far from Sanskrit grammatical *pada*, since the specification of a meaning or phenomenon (*chos/don gyi khyad par*) is that of adding more lexical items and connecting them into sentences and phrases, yet not the particularization of an otherwise lexical word form through the affixation of suffixes.

Before we will next turn to the views of Si tu, it should also be mentioned that despite the dominance of the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum* in Tibetan grammatical treatises, Tibetan grammarians were not only well aware of the Sanskrit grammatical understanding of *pada*, but they in fact even fully acknowledged the difference between *pada* in Sanskrit grammar and *Abhidharma*:[352]

---

[351] However, it is interesting to note that common presentations of the Tibetan syntactic link *slar bsdu* that marks the end of a Tibetan sentence resonate with the idea of *arthaparisamāpti*, not the least in the link's alternative label *rdzogs tshig* (cf. e.g. GC 467.6; Zha lu 2013A, 6). Yet, even if this connection proofs to be consistent, at least *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* and its autocommentary should be equally taken into account with its category of *zla sdud* that became another established label for *slar bsdu*, cf. CT *109* – 1714f.
[352] Cf. also HSGLT 2, 245.

ming gnyis 'dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa sangs rgyas ni skyabs so zhes pa lta bu dang/   ming mang po 'dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa chos thams cad bdag med pa'o zhes pa lta bu'o/   de bzhin du 'du byas mi rtag pa'o zhes ming gnyis pa dang/ mya ngan las 'das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba'o/   zhes pa ming mang po 'dus pa yin te/   de ni chos mngon par gsungs pa'i tshig yin no/   brda sprod pa po la grags pa'i tshig ni/

> *ming la rnam dbye brgyad phye ba/*
>
> *nyi shu rtsa bzhi sbyar ba dang/*
>
> *byings la ti sogs sbyar ba yis/*
>
> *rang rang don rnams 'byed pa'i tshig/*

"[*Tshig* is] the expression of a meaning's specification through the combination of two *ming*, such as 'The Buddha is the refuge.' (*sangs rgyas ni skyabs so*), and the expression of a meaning's specification through multiple *ming*, as in 'All phenomena are selfless.' (*chos thams cad bdag med pa'o*). Likewise, 'The *saṃskāras* are impermanent.' (*'du byas mi rtag pa'o*) [is the] combination of two *ming* and 'Nirvāṇa [is the] pacification of all suffering' (*mya ngan las 'das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba'o*) is the combination of multiple *ming*. This is *pada* [as] propounded in the *Abhidharma*. *Pada* [as] it is known to the grammarian (*brda sprod pa po*) is as follows:

> To a nominal stem (*ming*), eight cases distinguished
>
> [into] 24 suffixes are to be applied, and
>
> to the verbal roots (*byings*) *ti*, etc. are to be applied by which
>
> the individual meanings are distinguished. [That is the grammarian's] *pada*."[353]

Dpang Lotsāwa in his *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* repeats the foundations of *pada* in *Abhidharma* and Sanskrit grammar as they are commonly known in the Tibetan tradition: *pada* is either the specification of a meaning (*don gyi khyad par*) through the collection of otherwise unbound lexical word forms (*ming 'dus pa*), or it is a stem form to be affixed with nominal or verbal suffixes.

The two following points in the above passage are important to note. First, the terminological issue of *ming*: Dpang Lotsāwa not only uses *ming* as a translation of *Abhidharmic nāma* in the notion of *ming 'dus pa*, it is also the Tibetan translation of Sanskrit grammatical *prātipadika* ('nominal stem'). Despite the clear separation of the two derivational models in the TshSS,

---

[353] Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 249.

Abhidharmic nāma and grammatical *prātipadika* were equated, at least implicitly. Also his list of examples for *ming* qua *nāma* contain among Tibetan unmarked word forms also two Sanskrit nominal stem forms (*ku* and *sugata*), which suggest a direct relation between *nāma* and *prātipadika* in Dpang Lotsāwa's conception.[354] Neither this association nor any other form of relation between the two was elaborated by Dpang Lotsāwa, yet the terminological congruence was not at all regarded as problematic. Thus, should we read this as the silent acceptance of a direct relation between *nāma* and *prātipadika*? But then how does this fit with his clear separation of *Abhidharmic* and grammatical *tshig*? Does this mean that *ming* in *tshig* qua *ming 'dus pa* (*Abhidharma*) and *tshig* qua *ming* plus case suffix (grammar) both refers to stem forms that either form *tshig* through a collection of several such stem forms (*Abhidharma*) or through the affixation of a case suffix to a single stem form (grammar)? And what about Sanskrit first case forms that are the prototypical examples for *nāma* in AK(Bh)? Do they equally qualify as *nāma* in his model? These questions are only speculative attempts to reflect further upon issues which Dpang Lotsāwa has never clearly explicated in his work, and a similar situation is given in many if not most Tibetan grammatical sources previous to Si tu – at least as part of my research, I have not encountered a source that actively attempts to reconcile or problematize *ming* qua *nāma* and *ming* qua *prātipadika*.

As stated above, these two notions are only semantically identical, and a comparison of Vasubandhu's derivational model with that of the grammarians has demonstrated that they are not necessarily the same morphologically or syntactically and that they have their roots in different Indian fields of knowledge. After the investigation into Yaśomitra's exposition of AK 2.47 and its notion of *pada*,[355] I tentatively propose that it may have been his mediation between Patañjali's *sāmānye vartamāna pada* (a reference to the stem forms) and Vasubandhu's *nāma* that has facilitated the Tibetan strategy to translate both Sanskrit terms with *ming*. In addition, the fact that the morphosyntactic difference between *nāma* in the nominative case and *prātipadika* as an unmarked stem form is blurred in WT perhaps has also suggested a Tibetan translation of the two with the same term *ming*. Although the implicit equation of *nāma* and *prātipadika* by means of their common translation as *ming* is thus a rather comprehensible choice, it should be noted that the category *dhātu* (verbal root) that must also belong to *sāmānye*

[354] Cf. infra 145.
[355] Cf. supra 117ff.

vartamāna pada in Patañjali's theory has been translated in Tibetan with *byings* and thus is not translationally equated with *nāma*.[356]

The second important point in Dpang Lotsāwa's confrontation of *Abhidharmic* and Sanskrit grammatical *pada* is that there has been no attempt to further compare and reconcile the two. Both versions of *pada*, the *Abhidharmic* and the Sanskrit grammatical, refer to syntactic forms or entities in general, yet of very different natures. Nonetheless, Dpang Lotsāwa did not reflect upon whether these two authoritative models agree with or complement each other, and his presentation does not go beyond an acceptance of their coexistence. It is difficult to assess whether this silence was a scholastically-driven strategy to avoid possible conflicts of two important authoritative models which are difficult to attack, or whether Dpang Lotsāwa simply did not see any need to specify their relation. In any case, this lack again leaves unaddressed the the question how to relate the cases to the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum* model. As will be shown in the following discussion of the first case, Dpang Lotsāwa's strategy to resolve this issue was to switch from the *Abhidharmic* notion of *pada* to Sanskrit grammatical *pada* and to remain silent on questions of their relation or the location of the case model within the *tshogs gsum*. His silence is representative for the Tibetan grammatical tradition in general, since most of its authors refrained from clarifying this issue in their use of either notion of *pada*.

This strategy of leaving unclarified the interpretation of *pada* and its two related derivational models may severely impede our understanding of *tshig* in grammatical sources. Quotations such as SCP 3.1-4 that lack any further elaboration not only leave open whether *tshig* ('syntactic form') is a marked and thus syntactically functioning stem form or a collection of *nāma*. If it is suitable to apply the early linguistic interpretation of *ming* and *tshig* in NG to SCP's opening declaration, an *Abhidharmic* interpretation of *tshig* in terms of a collection of several word forms is more likely, independently of whether or not they are *nāma* on their own. Moreover, the missing attempt to reconcile the *Abhidharmic* and Sanskrit grammatical versions of *pada* limits the explanatory value of the *tshogs gsum*, particularly that of *Abhidharmic pada* as *ming 'dus pa*, for the case model, to the extent that it may even become irrelevant. This was certainly not the intention of Dpang Lotsāwa or other Tibetan grammarians, but it is a direct ramification

---

[356] One rationale for the Tibetan translation strategy might be that early translators understood *nāma* in the sense of genuine nouns as suggested by Vasubandhu's examples. However, this would be against *tshig* as that which is *ming 'dus pa*, a definition already attested in NG (cf. supra 125f.).

To complicate things even further, also note that Dpang Lotsāwa gives Sanskrit *namaḥ* ('to bow, pay homage') as a further example of *nāma*, defining it as "being an identical verbal root like *phyag 'tshal ba*" (*phyag 'tshal ba dang byings gcig pa*; Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 246). Does this suggest that he regarded the form *namaḥ* that is an indeclinable (*avyaya*) in Sanskritic grammar (cf. Sharma 1995, 124) as a verbal form and consequently also allowed for verbal forms being included under *Abhidharmic nāma* (*ming*)?

of their silence. Therefore, we will turn next to Si tu and investigate the strategy in his GC for treating the derivation of linguistic expressions and its relation to case grammar.

5.3.3 Si tu's Approach to the Derivation of Word Forms in a Tibetan-specific Context

Si tu's discussion of the *tshogs gsum* as well as of the Sanskritic grammatical model for the derivation of case suffixes is contained in the last parts of his GC and in the context of an exposition of TKJ 28.4-29.3 which featured the *tshogs gsum*:[357]

> *bya* [sic!][358] *ka ra ṇa'i lugs la rnamd dbye'i mtha' can ni tshig go   rnam dbye med pa ni ming ngo/   zhes 'byung yang/   bod skad la rnam dbye dang po'i gcig tshig ming tsam las logs su dbyer med cing/   dag dang rnams kyi phrad kyis gnyis tshig dang mang tshig mtshon yang da dung de dag gi mthar rnam dbye gzhan 'jug pa sogs kyis rnam gzhag de lta bu sbyar du mi rung ba dang/   chos mngon pa'i lugs kyi yi ge du ma 'dus pa las ming/   ming du ma 'dus pa las tshig ces gsungs pa'ang spyir btang rags pa tsam yin pas 'dir phra ba'i dbang du byas na mi 'byor* […]

"It occurs in the system of *vyākaraṇa* that a syntactic form (*pada*, *tshig*) is that which has a case ending (*rnam dbye'i mtha' can*), and a nominal stem (*prātipadika*, *ming*) is that without a case (*rnam dbye med pa*). However, in Tibetan language the mere nominal stem (*ming tsam*) is not distinguishable from the singular of the first case, and although the dual and plural is indicated (*mtshon*) by the [syntactic] links *dag* and *rnams*, there is still another case joining (*'jug*) at their end. Due to this and other [reasons], this [Sanskrit grammatical] model (*rnam gzhag de lta bu*) is inapplicable. Furthermore, the teaching of the *Abhidharmic* system that from many letters [results] a lexical word form (*ming*) [and] from many lexical word forms [results] a syntactic form (*pada*) is merely general and rough, therefore not applicable from the perspective of a more detailed investigation here […]."[359]

---

[357] TKJ 28.4-29.3:
ci phyir 'jug par byed ce na/
yi ge'i khongs nas ming dbyung ste/
ming gi khongs nas tshig phyung nas/
tshig gis don rnams ston par byed/
"Why are [letters] joined?
Out of letters, lexical word forms are to be brought forth,
Out of lexical word forms, syntactic forms are brought forth and
Through syntactic forms, meanings are indicated."
[358] I read *byā*.
[359] GC 608.4.
132

Si tu is not only aware of the different models proposed in *Abhidharma* and Sanskrit grammar, but he even openly rejects them. For his rejection of the grammatical derivation stem plus suffix, he takes recourse to Tibetan-specific linguistic reasons, one of which he illustrates. As mentioned above, Tibetan unmarked stem forms already are complete word forms that do not require any further application of case suffixes, and such word forms are the first case in Tibetan grammatical taxonomy. This holds equally true for dual and plural forms, since the syntactic links for dual and plural are no case markers and yet their application alone results equally in complete word forms that consequently represent the first case. That is proven by the fact that like singular forms, dual and plural forms can take a case marker to form one of the remaining cases. In contrast, the *Abhidharmic* model is briefly rejected by Si tu with the reason that although it is not per se inapplicable to the Tibetan context, it remains too general for the detailed grammatical analysis attempted by him. Following this assessment, Si tu goes on to propose his own derivational model specified for the Tibetan context:

> […] *skabs 'dir ni bod skad gzhir gzhag gis gang zhig yi ge gnyis sam mang po 'dus pa'ang rung don gyi ngo bo tsam ston pa'i sgra ni ming yin zhing/ ming de nyid rnam dbye'am phrad gang rung dang ldan pas don gyi khyad par ston par byed pa rnams ni tshig dang/ tshig mang po sprel nas don dang ldan pa'i ngag gi phreng bar grub pa ni brjod pa zhes bya'o/*

> "[…] For our current context, therefore, taking Tibetan language as the basis, any indication of a mere essence of a meaning, regardless of whether two or more letters are combined, is a lexical word form/word stem (*ming*). And the indication of a specification of the meaning by that very lexical word form/word stem endowed with any case or [syntactic] link is a syntactic form (*tshig*). And after connecting many syntactic forms, the resulting speech sequence (*ngag gi phreng bar grub pa*) endowed with meaning is called 'a sentence' (*brjod pa* ?)."[360]

Put in simple terms, Si tu combines the basic conceptual blocks of the *Abhidharmic* and Sanskrit grammatical models. He adopts the basic distinction of *Abhidharmic ming* and *tshig* in terms of *don gyi ngo bo* and *khyad par* that were already encountered in Yaśomitra's exposition of AK 2.47, and he directly applies it to the derivational scheme of stem form + syntactic link/case, the latter which was most likely Si tu's adaptation of Sanskrit grammatical *subanta* as one half of *pada*. Si tu clearly states what the former grammarians have not further specified: *ming* is

---

[360] GC 608.5.

both *prātipadika* as a stem form to be affixed as well as *nāma* as a mere denotative, lexical word form. However, only in his exposition of the first case it will be understood that his version of *ming* not only refers to nominal stem forms (*prātipadika*) in opposition to verbal roots (*dhātu*, *byings*), but it comprises unmarked nominal and verbal forms, thus referring to word stems or base forms in general that may be affixed with case markers or other syntactic links.[361] In sum, Si tu proposes a single derivational procedure for any kind of morphosyntactic operation in WT:

> *yi ge 'dus pa = ming* → *ming + rnam dbye/tshig phrad = tshig* → *tshig sprel = brjod pa*

One can see that Si tu completely discards the notion of *ming 'dus pa* in the context of *tshig*, probably because it was incompatible with the derivational model of stem + syntactic link. Instead, he substitutes it with the notion of *tshig mang po sprel* ('connecting many syntactic forms') that results in the next level of linguistic expression, presumably sentences (*brjod pa*), although he did not provide an example to clarify this point.

Since Si tu takes a clear stance and forms a single, homogeneous and straightforward Tibetan-specific derivational model from the former two competing systems, its relation to case grammar is specified without ambiguity. Any application of the cases (*rnam dbye*) to a *ming* results in *tshig* that specifies this very *ming* by means of the grammatical information contained in the case.[362] What remains to be investigated in chapter 7.2, is the question how the first case as *ming tsam* ('mere word stem,' 'mere lexical and syntactically free word form') fits into Si tu's model.

5.4 A Preliminary Note on the Notion of *kāraka*

The introduction of this chapter has already mentioned that the *kāraka*s represent a group of six fundamental case functions in Sanskrit grammar. Although case grammar in either Sanskrit or Tibetan linguistic studies cannot be reduced to this group, it is no exaggeration that they are at the very center of the case functions. The *kāraka*s have been extensively studied in modern academia and thus a detailed study is unwarranted in this dissertation.[363] Moreover, part II will feature a detailed discussion of each of the six categories of *kāraka* in the context of the respective cases they belong to. However, as the perhaps most central part of Tibetan case

---

[361] Cf. chapter 7.2.2.

[362] Note that in this quotation, Si tu clearly uses *rnam dbye* in the sense of case suffixes and thus morphological categories. However, during the examination of the cases we will frequently encounter this term as a reference to the case functions rather than their forms. On the ambiguity between case forms and case functions in modern linguistics, cf. supra 98.

[363] Cf. e.g. Kiparsky and Staal 1969; Cardona 1974; Cardona 1997, 215ff.

grammar, one important observation about the nature of this category is required, which will allow for a more accurate understanding of the historical developments of Tibetan case grammar from Sanskritic grammatical knowledge.

In Pāṇini's grammar, which is one of the earliest and perhaps the most prominent Sanskritic account, the six *kāraka*s are defined in the section P 1.4.23-54 that starts with the so-called *adhikāra*-rule "*kārake*" ('in [the domain of] *kāraka*'; P 1.4.23). In Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* 5 ad P 1.4.23, the term *kāraka* is explained in terms of *sādhaka* ('accomplisher') and *nirvartaka* ('producer') as respective glosses.[364] Jayāditya and Vāmana's *Kāśikāvṛtti* (KV) ad P 1.4.23 also gives a similar explanation, providing the terms *nimitta* and *hetu* ('cause') as synonyms, adding that the *kāraka*s are the cause of the action.[365] The *kāraka*s as participants in an action contribute to the accomplishment of that very action based on the specific functions they perform. As such, agent, object, instrument, etc. all represent constitutive parts for bringing about the phenomenal action denoted by a verb.

Mahābhāṣya 15ff. on P 1.4.23 explains this accomplishment in more detail. Based on the literal meaning of *kāraka* as 'that which does' and 'that which brings about' (*karotīti kārakam*), each of the *kāraka*s somehow works as an agent which contributes a specific type of action to the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verb. In a sentence like 'Devadatta cooks rice in a pot with fire wood' (*devadattaḥ sthālyām odanaṃ kāṣṭhaiḥ pacati*), each of the participants performs its respective action that then results in the main action of cooking: Devadatta needs to put the pot on the fire and the rice into the pot, etc., the pot needs to hold the rice and the fire wood has to burn. Patañjali himself as well as the later tradition have painstakingly discussed the details and various ramifications of this theory. What we can see is that this theorization and use of *kāraka* goes beyond mere linguistic-syntactic considerations about relationships between arguments in a Sanskrit sentence, such investigations into the nature of actions additionally involves a strong semantic and even metalinguistic-philosophical component. However, this does not mean that these metalinguistic conceptualizations automatically go against Sanskritic morphosyntax. In fact, imbedded in and developed out of the semantic-syntactic environment of Sanskrit, these grammarians have nonetheless achieved a highly accurate description of Sanskrit language.

Moreover, the six categories of *kāraka* were not only utilized in the context of case grammar or grammatical analysis in general, they also figure, for example, in the literature of the *Nyāya*

---

[364] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 13.
[365] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 79.

school, where the categories of 'agent' and 'instrument' serve as analytical tools for conceptualizing the process of cognition.[366] Likewise, modern characterizations of the *kāraka*s in Pāṇini's grammar range from purely "semantic categories" [367] and "extra-linguistic or psychological, rather than linguistic and formal in nature"[368] to Cardona's "semantico-syntactic categories"[369] and even to Houben's "ontological-logical classifications."[370]

While the precise nature of the *kāraka*s as well as their location somewhere at the intersection of logic, semantics, syntax and perhaps even psychology and ontology is not of further concern for our topic, all these different competing notions do bring to light that the *kāraka*s in Sanskritic scholarly literature reached far beyond mere grammatical categories in a modern linguistic sense. This status of the *kāraka*s should be kept in mind when in the following we will have a close look at how it has affected the conception of the classical Tibetan case model.

Following part I on the history of Tibetan grammaticography and Si tu's work, the methodology of his theory formation, and the theoretical background of Tibetan case grammar, part II will now scrutinize in detail the continuities and discontinuities between Sanskrit and Tibetan case grammar, including those between Si tu and former Sanskrit and Tibetan grammarians in particular. This part will bring several reconciliation strategies to the surface and reveal the extensive processes of transformation and negotiation in Tibetan conceptions of the cases. Furthermore, it will point out how theoretical-linguistic reasons have shaped the Tibetan case model as fundamentally as the methodological framework discussed in part I.

---

[366] Cf. e.g. infra 250f.
[367] Sinha 1973, 35.
[368] M.D. Pandit 1963, 22.
[369] Cardona 1975, 138.
[370] Houben 1999, 28. On some more information about the discourse on the precise status of the *kāraka*s that can be traced back to the later parts of the 19th century, cf. Cardona 1997, 216ff.

Part II: The *rnam dbye brgyad* – Historical Survey and their Conception in the *Great Commentary*

6 Introduction

Si tu received the eight Tibetan cases as an integral part of Tibetan grammar that had already been established and reconfirmed in the entire grammatical tradition over many centuries, thus claiming unquestionable authority. In the *Sum rtags* commentarial literature, presentations of the case model follow a rigid standardization that is often confined to the very essentials to comprehend SCP and TKJ. Specifications of the cases' morphology and semantics (*sgra* and *don*) are usually confined to a sometimes more, sometimes less elaborate glossing of the information contained in the root texts, accompanied by varying amounts of minimalistic sample phrases in the form of verb plus the argument marked by the case form. Any further examination of the case model, such as detailed conceptions of the case functions, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic or any other parameters to characterize the use of the cases, problematic instances which allow for more than one classification or the comparison with competing conceptions are more the exception and were often completely omitted. The condensed presentation of the cases with a restriction to a few illustrations in most of the *Sum rtags* commentaries reflects the cases' self-evident status assumed by commentators, at least for native speakers who are proficient in the use of the language. Although this status may hold true for some of the cases, this restraint is rather surprising, especially in the context of the three *la don*-cases in which the morphosyntactic variety of the examples in and between grammatical sources is not readily comprehensible to infer the precise meaning of the case category intended by the grammarian or commentator.

It is crucial to note that neither SCP nor TKJ make use of the term *rnam dbye* in its technical sense. TKJ 22.3-23.1 lists the eight case functions in their usual order, which suggests that the author or editor(s) of the treatise must have been familiar with the concept. However, the fact that the concept of case plays no systematic role in the root texts is obvious not only from the fact that SCP omits the first case and does not follow the cases' order for the remaining case functions, but also since the only verse line which refers to *rnam par dbye ba* (TKJ 28.3) alludes to its lexical meaning of 'dividing' or 'distinguishing' and pertains equally to all functions of the syntactic links listed in TKJ 24.4-28.2, not just the cases. The omission of the technical term *rnam dbye* could be due to different reasons, and one likely was that the economical character of texts was highly valued in Indian and Tibetan scholarship. The authors or redactors of SCP and TKJ may have also followed role models such as *Cāndra*, whose works feature a strong

tendency to avoid technical terminology and its definition.[371] In any case, Si tu acknowledges that the use of the technical term *rnam dbye* in the context of *Sum rtags* is actually an imposition by commentators:

> […] *byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba ston pas na gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye gsum pa zhes 'byung ba byed pa po'i sa re shes par bya'o/*

> "[…] [The morphemes *gis*, *kyis*, *'is*, *yis* and *gyis*], since they indicate the engagement of an agent in an action, are known as the semantic domain of the agent, which in other texts occurs as third case."[372]

The same observation is made in the contexts of the sixth case *'brel sgra* in SCP 12.3-13.3 and the fifth case *'byung khungs* in 16.2-4. Nonetheless, Si tu does not hesitate to follow the common convention in *Sum rtags'*s commentarial literature to identify the classical Tibetan case functions given in SCP with their respective case numbers of the Tibetan model.

The GC discusses Tibetan case grammar mainly in two sections, first in SCP's presentation of syntactic links in SCP 8.3-23.2, the cases being covered in 9.3-14.1 and 16.2-17.3, as well as at the end of TKJ in the context of the root text's own recapitulation of the main functions of syntactic links in 24.4-28.2.[373] In many ways, Si tu's exposition resonates with his predecessors: definitions are kept short and concise, often leaving space for interpretation, while the main focus is on the selection of sample phrases to determine the precise interpretation of the case function. The established and self-evident character of the cases strongly figures in his work as well. Nonetheless, he has also developed an astute awareness of the peculiarities of WT as well as its differences to Sanskrit, which has frequently animated him to address those pressing questions less self-evident in the context of Tibetan language in order to refine the cases and revalidate them also for the Tibetan context. This most important material in the GC, which is

---

[371] In addition, we might also speculate, whether the omission of *rnam dbye* reflects a shifted understanding of the categories case and non-case due to the agglutinative character of WT that has no fully distinct nominal inflexion compared to Sanskrit. The notion of *rnam par dbye ba* in TKJ 28.3 might have even been a technical use as a generic category applicable to all functions listed in TKJ 24.4-28.2, similarly to Pāṇini's use of *vibhakti* that is used for both, nominal and verbal endings (cf. P 1.4.104). Also a linguistic philosophical influx cannot be ruled out at this point, e.g. the common distinction of linguistic signs (*brda*) into sound and meaning (*sgra* and *don*) Tibetan scholars have been well familiar with from Buddhist epistemology might have become the general model in grammatical analysis, for which reason any further classification into case/non-case forms and functions might have become obsolete.

[372] GC 485.5.

[373] More accurately, Si tu's *sa bcad* distinguishes between TKJ 24.4-25.3 (case functions) and TKJ 25.4-28.3 (remaining functions until 28.2), but he provides his discussion of case grammar in form of a summary of cases 1-7 only after the discussion of both passages, so technically under 25.4-28.3.

mainly contained in the part of TKJ on case grammar, includes a number of ideas new to classical Tibetan case grammar.

After this brief introduction, each of the cases will be treated separately in their traditional order from one to eight. Every case will be treated twofold, starting with a historical survey of the developments up to Si tu, followed by Si tu's strategies for developing his case model and tackling perceived problems of previous conceptions.

7 *Rnam dbye dang po ngo bo tsam*

7.1 Historical Survey

The first case, best known in the tradition under its name of *ngo ba tsam* ('the mere essence'), is an unmarked word form.[374] Even though there are significant differences between the sources, the most dominant basic conception became that the first case only expresses a word's lexical information, which is closely connected to the essence (*ngo bo*) of a real phenomenon (*chos*, *dngos po*) as its reference point. Sakya Paṇḍita succinctly demonstrates this idea by the help of the time-honored example 'tree' or 'wood' (*shing*):

> [...] *shing zhes bya ba yal ga lo 'dab dang ldan pa tsam go bar byed pa lta bu ngo bo'i tshig* [...]

> "[…] [A word form such as] 'wood,' which merely causes the comprehension (*go bar byed pa*) of a branch endowed with leaves, is the syntactic form of essence (*ngo bo'i tshig*). […]"[375]

Illustrations of the first case often do not exceed mere listings of syntactically unbound single nouns, such as in Zha lu Lotsāwa's TKJ-commentary:

> [...] *rnam dbye dang po chos dngos te ngo bo tsam brjod pa/   sangs rgyas/   sems can/ ka ba/   bum pa/   snam bu/   re lde zhes pa la sogs pa ming rkyang pa rnams* [...]

> "The first case is an actual phenomenon (*chos dngos*), i.e. the expression of a mere essence. These are bare nouns, as in 'Buddha' (*sangs rgyas*), 'sentient being' (*sems can*), 'pillar' (*ka ba*), 'pot' (*bum pa*), 'woolen cloth' (*snam bu*), 'bast' (*re lde*)."[376]

At least since Dpang Lotsāwa Blo gros brtan pa's *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* (TshSS) onwards, there has been the awareness that the morphological word form which encodes this type of

---

[374] The precise nomenclature varies significantly: *chos dngos* (TKJ 22.3), *spyi(r) 'jug* (TKJ 24.4), *don tsam gyi tshig* (NGg *kāraka*-topic CT *115 – 417*), *ngo bo tsam ston pa'i tshig* (NGg *kāraka*-topic CT *115 – 419*), (*don gyi*) *dngos po gang yang rung ba* (NGg *vibhakti*-topic *CT 115 – 432*), *rang gi ngo bo tsam ston pa* (GNT CT *115 – 444*), (*dngos po*) *gang yang rung ba'i sa* (GNT CT *115 – 444*), *khyab pa* (?) *spyi'i don* (GNT *115 – 444*), *ngo bo'i tshig* (KhJ 2009, 24f.), *ngo bo tsam ston pa/brjod pa* (Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250; Zha lu 2013B, 34 on TKJ 22.3), *gang yang rung ba* (Dbus pa Blo gsal 20.1), *chos kyi dngos po* (Dbus pa Blo gsal, 20.1) *dngos po tsam brjod pa* (Zha lu 2013A, 7 on SCP 8.3-9.2), *ming don gyi ngo bo tsam zhig ston pa* (GC 598.2), etc. Many of the terms are obviously related, some of them being specifications of others, some only mere paraphrases. To which extend the terminological variations reflect conceptual differences, is a question which cannot be pursued any further here. However, it can be affirmed that there are noteworthy dissimilarities between the sources.
[375] KhJ 2009, 24f. For a translation of the entire section on the cases in Sakya Paṇḍita's *Mkhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo* (KhJ), cf. also Gold 2008, 168.
[376] Zha lu 2013B, 34. The first case's designation/characterization as *chos dngos* ('actual/real phenomenon') is a quotation from TKJ 22.3, of which Zha lu's passage is a gloss. Dbus pa blo gsal in his TKJ-commentary paraphrases the term as *chos kyi dngos po* (~ 'dharmic phenomenon').

information does not follow the Sanskrit morphology of the first case and thus cannot be analyzed into stem and suffix like its Sanskrit counterpart:

> *de la rnam dbye dang po ngo bo tsam ston pa/   shing/   me/   bum pa zhes pa lta bu ste/   saṃskrīta'i phal che ba la rkyen gyi rdzas*[377] *yod pas/   'di dang po gcig tshig sbyar ba'o/   zhes bshad mod kyang/   bod skad la dang po'i gcig tshig la de med pas/ de dang ming la khyad med do/*

> "The first case, the indication of a mere essence, is for example 'wood' (*shing*), 'fire' (*me*), 'pot' (*bum pa*). Since the majority of Sanskrit [word forms] have suffix-endings (*rkyen gyi rjes*), it is explained that 'this is the application of the first [case suffix] singular.'[378] Yet, since in Tibetan the singular of the first [case] does not have such a [suffix], there is no difference to the nominal stem (*ming*)."[379]

Dpang Lotsāwa explained the zero-marking of the Tibetan first case form in Sanskrit grammatical terms as a nominal stem (*ming*, *prātipadika*). This explanation was well received by later grammarians like Rnam gling Paṇchen and also Si tu. However, to my knowledge, none of these classical authors have taken into account also the morphological identity with the ABSOLUTIVE argument in Tibetan sentences.

Despite a clear connection to the prototypical function of the Sanskritic first case, the terminological variations of the Tibetan version[380] immediately reveal that, with the exception of the very general *don tsam* ('the mere meaning'),[381] none of them was a direct translation of the corresponding Sanskritic grammatical nomenclature. In the grammars of *Pāṇini*, *Kātantra* and *Cāndra*, the first case form is a suffix applied to nominal stems, and its prototypical function has been rendered along the following lines:

> P 2.3.46 *prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā* "A *prathamā* 'first triplet of *sUP*' occurs when only *prātipadikārtha* 'meaning of the stem, stem notion'; *liṅga* 'gender'; *parimāṇa* 'measure'; or *vacana* 'number' is to be expressed."[382]

---

[377] I read *rkyen gyi rdzas* as *rkyen gyi rjes* in accordance with Rnam gling (2013, 66), who quotes this passage in his *Sum rtags* commentary.

[378] or "this [suffix] is to be applied as the first [case] singular"? Even though this appears to be a quotation, I have not been able to identify the origin.

[379] Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250.

[380] Cf. ft. 374.

[381] NGg *kāraka*-topic, CT *115* – 417.

[382] Transl. Sharma 1995, 149.

142

K 2.4.17 *prathamā vibhaktir liṅgārthavacane* "The first case suffix [occurs] if the meaning of the nominal stem [is to be expressed]."

C 2.1.93 *arthamātre prathamā* "The first [case suffix occurs] if the mere meaning [is to be expressed]."

The precise meaning of the nominal stem (*prātipadikārtha*) and the semantic features it includes in P 2.3.46 was subject to extensive contentions in the Sanskritic tradition.[383] This study will not address to which extent these discussions have influenced especially the early interpretations of the Tibetan first case and perhaps even the dominating label *ngo bo (tsam)* itself. Nonetheless, it may be assumed that the terminological divergence between the quoted Sanskritic grammars and the Tibetan tradition reflects modifications regarding the conception of the case, which raise questions of historical and linguistic character. Since their adequate assessment requires preliminary investigations far beyond the scope of this introduction, they will be outlined in the following only regarding Si tu's grammar, and the answers will remain to the largest extent tentative and deserve further research in the future.

First, there is the simple matter of the historical origin of the different Tibetan terminologies for the first case function, especially that of *ngo bo tsam*. While this is a simple question, its answer appears to be more intricate. According to our current knowledge concerning the timeline of Tibetan grammatical sources, the early tradition seems to have centered its interpretation of the first case's meaning more on the notions of a real thing or phenomenon (*dngos po*, *chos dngos*) and a word's generic meaning (*spyi'i don*, *spyir 'jug*).[384] In addition, NGg and GNT have already mentioned the concept of *ngo bo* ('essence'). While NGg only uses it as an alternative label for *don tsam* (*arthamātra*, 'mere meaning') in the section on *kāraka* and not as a case label, the GNT mentions it in its conception of the first case:

> *de la dang po gang zhes pa ni dngos po gang yang rung ba'i sa ste/ khyab pa spyi'i don yin la las ni gang la yang mi sbyor ba kho na te/ mdor na rang gi ngo bo tsam ston pa de'i khyad par dang bcas te ston pa dang/ khyad par gyi bye brag du ma ston pa'ang ste/ dngos po'i don gang yang rung ba zhig ni go* […] *de yang phyogs gcig la mtshon na/ ka ba nyid brjod par 'dod pa'i bsam pas ka ba zhes brjod pas bdag nyid dang/ gzhan rnams kyis ka ba'i shes pa nges par 'dren par 'dren nus de nyid dang*

---

[383] For a comprised summary, cf. Sharma 1995, 150f. According to Sharma, Patañjali, for example, lists five meanings: *dravya* ('concrete thing'), *svārtha* ('stem-notion'), *liṅga* ('gender'), *saṃkhyā* ('number') and *kāraka*. Cf. also the entry on *prātipadikārtha* in Abhyankar 1986, 276.
[384] For the precise references, cf. ft. 374.

po'i sgra yin la/   byed pa'i tshig gzhan ni gang yang ma sbyar ba'o/   de yang ka ba

zhes brjod par ka ba'i ngo bo tsam go ba dang/   ka ba ring po zhes brjod na ngo bo

de nyid khyad par dang bcas nas go ba dang/   ka ba sbom zhing ring ba mang po 'dug

ces brjod na ngo bo'i khyad par de nyid khyad par du ma dang bcas nas go nus pa ste/

"The first [case], 'what' (*gang*), is the semantic domain of whatever real thing (*dngos po*) is at hand. It is a generic meaning (*khyab pa spyi'i don*) and an action is never applied. In short, [the first case] is the indication of the mere self-essence (*rang gi ngo bo tsam*), [its] indication including a quality (*khyad par*) and also the indication of many specific qualities. The comprehension of whatever meaning is at hand of a real phenomenon [...] [is a first case]. If we illustrate [these] together, that which is capable (*nus pa*) of inducing a cognition (*shes pa*) of a pillar in oneself and others, because one says 'pillar' due to the wish of expressing pillarhood (*ka ba nyid*), is the first case form (*dang po'i sgra*). The *kāraka* forms (~ *byed pa'i tshig*) are not to be applied at all. Furthermore, in expressing 'pillar,' only the mere essence of the pillar is understood, and if one expresses 'long pillar' (*ka ba ring po*), then this very essence is understood after including a qualification, and if one expresses 'there are many thick and long pillars' (*ka ba sbom zhing ring ba mong po 'dug*), one can understand that very qualification [of the essence] after including many qualifications."[385]

According to GNT, the first case as an indication of any real thing or phenomenon (*dngos po gang yang rung ba*) is confined to generic meanings (*spyi'i don*) without the application of an action (*las sbyor ba*), which is reserved for the *kāraka*-relations. Such generic indications of real phenomena then include any type of linguistic expression (single word forms, phrases, sentences), as long as this remains restricted to information about a real thing's self-essence (*rang gi ngo bo*) and its specification through attributes or qualities (*khyad par*). The remaining tradition did not follow the same strategy, since the specification of additional qualities has not been considered a first case anymore. In contrast to GNT's understanding of *tsam* ('mere,' 'only') in *ngo bo tsam*, which excludes *las sbyor ba* ('application of action') together with the *kāraka*s from the first case that is *ngo bo* plus optionally *khyad par*, in most Tibetan grammatical sources *tsam* excludes also any other kind of information indicated by a linguistic expression other than *ngo bo*.[386]

---

[385] GNT CT *115 – 444*.

[386] However, I do not know to which extent the tradition before Si tu was merely focused on any other semantic information regarding *tsam* in the first case's definition as *ngo bo tsam ston pa* ('indicating the *mere* essence'),

144

It is most likely that the Tibetan reinterpretation of *prātipadikārthamātra* ('mere meaning of the nominal stem') in terms of *ngo bo tsam* was developed in connection with the *Abhidharmic tshogs gsum*. As shown in chapter 5.3.2, the Tibetan commentarial literature on the *Abhidharmakośa* defines *ming* ('syntactically unbound, lexical word form') as *don gyi ngo bo brjod pa*/*ston pa* ('expressing/indicating the essence of a meaning') and distinguishes it from *tshig* ('syntactic form') as *don gyi khyad par brjod pa/ston pa* ('expressing/indicating a specification of [that] meaning'), the terminology of which directly corresponds to that of the Tibetan first case. In both notions, *Abhidharmic ming* and the Tibetan first case, *ngo bo* functions as the denotatum and is intimately connected to the essential nature or own-being of a phenomenon.[387] Also morphology and the selection of the examples corroborate a relation: syntactically unbound nominal forms without grammatical marker are the expression of *ngo bo* in both models, *tshogs gsum* and case grammar, and GNT's example for the first case as either *ka ba* ('pillar') or *ka ba ring po* ('long pillar') is the example for *Abhidharmic ming* and *tshig* respectively in such Tibetan grammatical sources as the *Smra sgo*, KhJ or TshSS. Lastly, Yaśomitra's comparison of *Abhidharmic nāma* (*ming*) as *svalakṣaṇa* with Patañjali's *sāmānya* ('generic [meaning]')[388] resonates with the Tibetan first case's meaning as (*rang gi*) *ngo bo* and *spyi'i don/spyir 'jug* respectively, suggesting that perhaps both notions have been adopted from the same *Abhidharmic* context.

Although the historical connection between the terminology of the first case as *ngo bo tsam* and *Abhidharmic ming* is highly conspicuous, the Tibetan tradition normally avoided an open reflection of this relation. In the *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* (TshSS) of Dpang Lotsāwa (14th century), for example, the connection between *Abhidharmic ming* qua *don gyi ngo bo ston pa* and the Tibetan first case qua *ngo bo tsam ston pa* becomes clearly visible: he lists two unmarked Sanskrit nominal stem forms (*ku* 'earth,' 'ground' and *sugata* 'Sugata') and a few unmarked Tibetan proper nouns as examples for *Abhidharmic ming* and its definition *don gyi ngo bo brjod pa*.[389] Since Tibetan translators have rendered *nāma* and *prātipadika* with the single term

---

or whether this also excluded syntactic information. It will become evident below, at least for Zha lu Lotsāwa and his followers, that *tsam* apparently mainly referred to additional semantic information (cf. chapter 5.5.1.2.1).

[387] Compare Sakya Paṇḍita's and GNT's definition of the first case as *ngo bo* (*tsam*) with *Smra sgo*'s definition of *Abhidharmic ming*:

> *mdor na chos kyi ngo bo nyid tsam ston nus la khyad par mi ston pa'i yi ge 'dus pa'i gnas skabs la ming zhes bya'o/*
> "In short, a spatio-temporal entity (*gnas skabs*), which is the combination of letters and is capable of indicating the mere essential nature of a phenomenon (*chos kyi ngo bo nyid tsam*) without indicating a specification (*khyad par*), is termed *ming*." (Smṛti 2002, 50)

[388] Cf. supra 119f.

[389] *yi ge gnyis 'dus nas brjod bya'i don gyi ngo bo rjod par byed pa/   saṃskṛta la **ku** zhes pa ka dang u 'dus pas sa gzhi'i ming dang/   bod la'ang **kha** dang a 'dus pas kha'i bu ga'i ming dang/ **nya** zhes pa nya yig dang a 'dus pas sems can gyi bye brag gi ming yin pa lta bu'o/   yi ge mang po 'dus pas don gyi ngo bo brjod pa **su ga**

ming,[390] which is further supported by Dpang Lotsāwa's classification of Sanskrit nominal stem forms as *nāma*, and also since the Tibetan first case as *ngo bo tsam* was defined as nothing but a nominal stem (*prātipadika*),[391] both the *Abhidharmic ming* and the first case are constituted by *prātipadika* and express the meaning of *ngo bo*. Likewise, the morphology of the Tibetan examples, i.e. unmarked noun forms, remains identical in both concepts. Thus, it may be inferred that *Abhidharmic ming* and the Tibetan first case meaning are equivalent in Dpang Lotsāwa's work and that *ngo bo* must refer to the same idea. However, no matter how convincing this inference strikes us, Dpang Lotsāwa did not articulate a direct relation between the two. Instead, in his topical outline (*sa bcad*), he subsumes the discussion of the first as well as the other cases under *Abhidharmic tshig*, and then he also switches from the *Abhidharmic* to the Sanskrit grammatical understanding of *ming* and *tshig*:

> *ming gnyis 'dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa sangs rgyas ni skyabs so zhes pa lta bu dang/   ming mang po 'dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa chos thams cad bdag med pa'o zhes pa lta bu'o/   de bzhin du 'du byas mi rtag pa'o zhes ming gnyis pa dang/ mya ngan las 'das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba'o/   zhes pa ming mang po 'dus pa yin te/   de ni chos mngon par gsungs pa'i tshig yin no/   brda sprod pa po la grags pa'i tshig ni/*

>> *ming la rnam dbye brgyad phye ba/*

>> *nyi shu rtsa bzhi sbyar ba dang/*

>> *byings la ti sogs sbyar ba yis/*

>> *rang rang don rnams 'byed pa'i tshig*

> […] *'dir bod la nyer mkho ba'i ming la sbyar ba'i rnam dbye'i rnam pa tsam bshad par bya ste/   ngo bo las dang byed pa ched/   'byung khungs 'brel ba gnas gzhi dang/ bod ('bod) pa'i don la rnam dbye brgyad/   re re'ang gcig gnyis mang tshig can/   de la rnam dbye dang po* […]

> "[*Tshig* is] the expression of a meaning's specification through the combination of two *ming* such as 'The Buddha is the refuge.' (*sangs rgyas ni skyabs so*) and the expression of a meaning's specification through multiple *ming* as in 'All phenomena are selfless.'

*ta dang/ **de bzhin gshegs pa** zhes pa la sogs pa shin tu mang ngo/* (Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 246; my emphasis).

[390] Cf. e.g. supra 129ff.
[391] Cf. supra 142.

(*chos thams cad bdag med pa'o*). Likewise, 'The *saṃskāras* are impermanent.' (*'du byas mi rtag pa'o*) [is the] combination of two *ming* and 'Nirvāṇa [is the] pacification of all suffering' (*mya ngan las 'das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba'o*) is the combination of multiple *ming*. This is *pada* [as] propounded in the *Abhidharma*. *Pada* [as] it is known to the grammarian (*brda sprod pa po*) is as follows:

> To a nominal stem (*ming*) eight cases distinguished
>
> [into] 24 suffixes are to be applied, and
>
> to the verbal roots (*byings*), *ti*, etc. are to be applied, whereby
>
> the individual meanings are distinguished. [That is the grammarian's] *pada*.

> […] Here, only those aspects of the cases applied to nominal stems which are required in Tibet will be explained: the meanings of essence, *karman*, agency, benefit, origin, connection, locus and address [are termed] the eight cases, each of which has a singular, dual and plural form. As for the first case, […]"[392]

By applying to case grammar the grammatical derivational model stem plus suffix, instead of the *Abhidharmic* essential meaning and its specification, the question remains open whether the Tibetan first case belongs to the domain of *ming* in the *Abhidharmic* sense according to Dpang Lotsāwa. We are left with interpreting the reasons for this, but a direct identification would have gone beyond the morphological (nominal stem) as well as semantic (essence) congruence between the two, since it would have also attributed the syntactic status of *Abhidharmic ming* to the first case.

This status has not been fully clarified in the Tibetan grammatical reception of the *tshogs gsum* to my understanding, since *ming* may either refer to the main argument of the sentence to be specified by quality, etc., or to the basic building blocks of a sentence in the sense of *ming 'dus pa* ('combination of *ming*').[393] As for the first option, the first case would attain a syntactic status close to the topical subject of a Sanskrit sentence marked by the first case suffix. As for the second option, the first case would not only share morphology and meaning with the nominal stem (*prātipadika*), but it would actually have become nothing but that very nominal stem itself as a syntactically non-functioning building block for sentences, without representing

---

[392] Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 249f. The first part of this passage up until the end of the verse has already been quoted and discussed supra 129f.

[393] These two options correspond to the two different definitions of the sentence which belong to Vasubandhu and Patañjali and which are brought together by Yaśomitra in his *Sputārthā* on AK 2.47. For more details, cf. also Simonsson 1982A, 542; chapter 5.3.1.

any syntactic, i.e. intrasentential, item whatsoever. Dpang Lotsāwa does not follow any of these directions, but confines himself to a separate presentation of the two concepts *Abhidharmic ming* and first case within the *Abhidharmic* and grammatical derivational models respectively without relating them further:

	Abhidharmic ming (nāma)		***rnam dbye dang po***
Morphology:	*ming* qua *prātipadika* (indicated by Sanskrit and unmarked Tibetan examples)	=	*ming tsam* qua *prātipadika* (only in Tibetan)
Semantics:	*don gyi ngo bo ston pa*	=	*ngo bo tsam ston pa*
Syntax:	*ming* qua *nāma* (main argument of the sentence to be specified or syntactically unbound building block, i.e. *prātipadika*)	≠	?

Figure 7: Comparison between Abhidharmic ming *and the Tibetan first case*

The resulting model successfully avoids any possible ramifications of the complete fusion of *Abhidharmic ming* and first case, but it does so at the price of systematicity, since the author does not further explicate why according to his model the first case in Tibetan semantically and morphologically equals *Abhidharmic ming* but is still treated under the section of *tshig* or *pada*. Since the author does not specify any syntactic equivalence between the first case and *ming*, does this imply that the first case still belongs to the domain of syntactically bound and functioning word forms? This would be most certainly correct in the Sanskritic context, where the first case suffix establishes a syntactically bound word form despite its semantic identity with the nominal stem. However, its explanatory value for Tibetan is very limited, since the semantic value of the first case does not figure in most Tibetan sentences. Alternatively, did his silence imply that the morpho-semantic congruence between *Abhidharmic ming* and first case results in their syntactic equivalence as well? Depending on the precise understanding of *Abhidharmic ming*, this would either assign a rather insignificant status to the first case in Tibetan (main argument of the sentence), or it would result in a substantial divergence compared to the Sanskrit first case (syntactically unbound building blocks). Moreover, despite Dpang Lotsāwa's clear switch to grammatical *tshig* (*pada*) (stem plus suffix) in his treatment not only of the first case but of the entire case model, the precise interrelation of the two derivational models has not been specified by Dpang Lotsāwa.

In my opinion, it is most likely that in his conception of the cases he deliberately remained close to the Sanskrit grammatical model, and that apart from morphological observations he did not go into further detail about the differences between the incongruent models or the syntactic status of the first case in Tibetan – the latter which remains of course the biggest question mark in our current context – because his work deals with a presentation of the *tshogs gsum* as a general, cross-lingual concept that he applies to Sanskrit and Tibetan language in his exemplifications. The strategy to remain within the established and authoritative conceptual framework of the Sanskritic grammatical and *Abhidharmic* derivation of linguistic expressions without clarifying their mutual relation or adapting them to Tibetan was an easy solution in this regard.

In summary, the understanding of Tibetan conceptions of the first case lies in the interrelation of the triad *nāma* (*ming*), *prātipadika* (*ming*) and *prathamā vibhakti* (*rnam dbye dang po*). The three demonstrate clear conceptual affinities and even borrowings with regard to terminology, morphology and semantics, but they also pose questions regarding their relation on the syntactic and derivational level. As for the historical relation of the first case as *ngo bo* (*tsam*) to *Abhidharmic ming* qua *ngo bo tsam ston pa*, presentations like that of Dpang Lotsāwa are a strong indication that the adoption of the latter for the former was apparently mainly based on the close semantic value of the first case and *nāma* without deeper syntactical considerations or comparisons of the two competing derivational models.

The precise usage of the first case as an intrasentential and syntactic category in Tibetan language remains a major lacuna. In fact, whether an argument in the first case is or even can be part of any sentence is a most salient question in the Tibetan context – a question which was completely outside the grammarians' attention. The standard definition of a first case as the indication of a mere essence, together with its illustration as syntactically unbound noun lists, emphasizes that the first case is restricted to the expression (*brjod pa*) or indication (*ston pa*) of mere lexical information, just like its Sanskrit counterpart *prātipadikārtha*. Any additional information about the sentence or its content is no longer covered by the meaning of the first case. If at all, then the first case's use was only indirectly decided by Tibetan authors through varying scopes of linguistic expressions that were deemed to be confined to the semantic information of *dngos po*, *spyi'i don* or *ngo bo*, etc.

For example, GNT classifies a clause with the existential copula *'dug* as an instance of a first case, namely *ka ba sbom zhing ring ba mang po 'dug* ('There are many thick and long

pillars').[394] Based on the treatise's examples, any linguistic expression about the mere essence of a real phenomenon (*dngos po*) including its attributes or qualifications (*khyad par dang bcas*) qualifies as a first case. Zha lu Lotsāwa was the first in a succession of grammarians, who in contrast argued that also the syntactic link *slar bsdu*, which marks the end of a Tibetan sentence, is closely related to the first case.[395] The precise rationale of his argument is not made explicit in his grammatical work, but according to Pra ti's interpretation, this refers to elliptical expressions like *bum pa'o* ('pot.'), etc., which do not go beyond the semantic information of lexical word meanings and thus qualify as first cases. Thus, Pra ti's theory allows for at least one type of intrasentential use of the first case.

In sum, the mere lexical-semantic definition of the first case did not establish sufficient parameters regarding its precise usage in Tibetan language. Since the focus of this definition lies only on the reference between a word and its lexical meaning, issues like the case's function in a sentence and its relation to other intrasentential arguments apparently were secondary for most grammarians and thus frequently omitted.

The roots of the unresolved intrasentential status of the Tibetan first may be traced back not only to the *Abhidharma* and possible conflicts with the grammatical derivational models, but go back even further to the first case's origin in Sanskritic grammar. Like its Tibetan progeny, the Sanskrit first case form is introduced by the three quoted grammatical schools in purely semantic terms as the indication of a mere lexical function without any syntactic value.[396] The syntactic information of the first case suffix, i.e. its congruency with the finite verb, is only indirectly contained in the derivational procedure of the treatises, and in the *Pāṇinian* system first of all in the famous rule of *anabhihite* in P 2.3.1.[397] Compare the two interpretations of the following Sanskrit clause:

> *Devadattaḥ odanaṃ pacati*
> Devadatta cooks rice.
> *Devadatta; someone cooks rice.

---

[394] GNT CT *115* – 444f.; cf. supra 143f.
[395] Cf. infra 156ff.
[396] Cf. Raster 2015, 93; Deshpande 1991, 36.
[397] P 2.3.1:
> *anabhihite*
> "[A case suffix is only to be applied] if [the information contained in the condition which triggers the case suffix is] not [already] expressed otherwise."
For the exact scope of this rule and related issues, cf. the rules P 2.3.1 and 2.3.46 in Joshi and Roodbergen 1998. *Cāndra* explicates this syntactic condition for triggering a first case suffix only in its *Vṛtti* ad C 2.1.43.

Obviously, only the first interpretation represents the correct understanding of the Sanskrit clause. Devadatta is the agent of the action, even though his agency is not expressed by the first case suffix, since this type of information is already encoded by the verbal ending *-ti*. Nonetheless, there must be a relation in the sentence between noun phrase and verb phrase, otherwise Devadatta cannot be understood as the agent but remains an unrelated, mere articulation of a word as in the second interpretation. It is precisely the addition of the syntactic condition of *anabhihite* which covers this relation by triggering the first case suffix in the meaning of *prātipadikārtha* only if Devadatta's agency is already expressed through the verb. In other words, Sanskritic grammars ascertain the use and status of the first case suffix as an intrasentential, syntactically connected category not in direct terms in their definitions of the first case function, but only indirectly through a condition that must be fulfilled by other arguments in the sentence for the assignment of a first case suffix. Of course, this syntactic condition that triggers a first case suffix covers a language-specific feature of Sanskrit sentences. Conversely, the quoted semantic definitions of the prototypical first case function in *Pāṇini*, *Kātantra* or *Cāndra* do not account for the relation between first case and verb-ending.[398]

The Tibetan tradition designed its case model along the lines of the Sanskritic prototypical case functions and adopted the lexical-semantic character of the first case directly from the Sanskritic tradition. It stands to reason, however, that grammarians north of the Himalaya did not pay much attention to its syntactic function as the default case form for already expressed agents or *karman*s, for WT does not follow any consistent agreement patterns between noun arguments and the verb, nor does the verb in the same way already encode the information of agent or *karman*. Once the Tibetan tradition dispensed with the outlined implementation of the first case's prototypical function into the Sanskrit-specific derivation, the language-specific syntactic value of the Sanskrit first case suffix was lost and the lexical definition stood on its own, leaving open the question of the case's usage in Tibetan language. From this perspective, it may even be speculated whether the Sanskritic strategy to explain the meaning and usage of the first case suffix evoked the impression in Tibetan grammarians that its semantic value constitutes the main function and that the grammatically more important syntactic value is only secondary; and even more so in a linguistic comparative approach with WT, since at least the

---

[398] It is only the Sanskritic commentarial literature which explicates this. Kātyāyana, for example, adds the following definition for the first case ending:

> *tiṅ samānādhikaraṇe prathamā*
> "The nominative case is used after a word if it is coreferential with the finite verb ending" (transl. by Deshpande 1991, 38).

expression of unconnected single words carries comparable semantic information in WT so that the prototypical definition of the first case function might have been regarded as having linguistic validity across languages, whereas the precise usage of mere denotative lexical word forms (= first case) varies from language to language.

In sum, the standard interpretation of the Tibetan first case (*ngo bo tsam* 'mere essence') in pre-Si tu times is most likely a combination of Sanskritic grammatical definitions and *Abhidharmic* definitions of *ming*. Its morphology as an unmarked word form was explained by the tradition in Sanskritic terminology as a mere nominal stem (*prātipadika*, *ming*) without the affixation of separate suffixes (*pratyaya*, *rkyen*) for its completion. Among the different conceptions and terminological variations, the most dominant first case function agrees with Sanskritic grammatical theories inasmuch as it expresses only a word's lexical meaning, which has been rendered in terms of *ngo bo* ('essence') and is closely related to the own-being of phenomena. It has been argued in this historical survey that this particular interpretation of a nominal stem's meaning (*prātipadikārtha*) is an influx of *Abhidharmic* conceptions of *ming* (*nāma*) as *don gyi ngo bo ston pa* ('indicating the essence of a meaning'), which however requires further approval in separate studies due to the grammarians' reservation to articulate this connection. As we have seen, Dpang Lotsāwa and his influential TshSS separate between *Abhidharmic ming* and the first case insofar as the latter is treated as part of case grammar that belongs to the different derivational model of Sanskritic grammar, the latter in which it is *tshig*. Additionally, the status of the first case as an intrasentential argument in Tibetan sentences lies almost completely outside the focus of classical treatises. The Tibetan first case has never been clearly conceived as part of sentences, and if it was so conceived, then only as long as its actual function as the expression of a mere lexical meaning remains preserved. It is the lexical-semantic value of the first case which ultimately determines its range of application in the sources. The main issue is the fact that the Tibetan traditional version of the first case is not a relevant category for the morphosyntactic surface structure of Tibetan sentences. Nonetheless, the semantic information of *ngo bo tsam* remained an important linguistic category for the grammarians. Therefore, the Tibetan first case is characterized by a strong semantic focus, whereas the case's validity as a grammatical category does not seem to have been grounded on its significance as an intrasentential relation nor any language-specific usage in WT – a most important fact for our understanding of the case model as a whole.

We are not required to have the final word in this survey on the conception of the first case in the tradition before Si tu, since the outlined theories and the related issues primarily serve the

purpose to arrive at the historical and theoretical context which will facilitate an adequate and accurate assessment of Si tu's agency. They already give a strong impression, which issues have been driving his specific theory formation.

7.2 The First Case in the *Great Commentary*

The SCP does not mention any function related to the first case, since the treatise's actual topic is morphology and the meaning of a selection of syntactic links, and the first case does not take any link due to its zero-marking. Si tu's exposition of the first case form is thus only located in his summary of case grammar at the end of the TKJ commentary:

> *de la rnam dbye dang po'i gcig tshig gi ming don gyi ngo bo tsam zhig ston pa ni/ bum pa/ rtag pa/ bstand pa/ byas pa/ bsgrubs/ bsgrub/ sgrub/ lta bu ste/ bod skad la rnam dbye'i rjes logs med pas ming tsam de nyid yin zhing ming la ni bdag gzhan dang dus gsum gyi dbye ba can rnams dang ming rkyang yang rung ste khyad par med do/*

> "Regarding the indication of a mere essence of a word stem's meaning (*ming don*) by the singular of the first case, this is e.g. 'pot' (*bum pa*), 'permanent' (*rtag pa*), 'having taught' (*bstand pa*), 'having done' (*byas pa*), 'has been established' (*bsgrubs*), 'is to be established' (*bsgrub*), 'establish' (*sgrub*). Since there are no separate endings of [this] case in Tibetan language, it is precisely the mere word stem (*ming tsam*); and for a word stem, it may be [items] that have a distinction into self and other or into the three time aspects as well as proper nouns (*ming rkyang*), so this makes no difference."[399]

Si tu starts with a short definition of the first case as indicating the mere essence of a word stem's meaning (*ming don gyi ngo bo tsam ston pa*). Like his predecessors, Si tu accepts the morphological identity between the first case and *prātipadika* (*ming*, 'nominal stem') due to the lack of a separate case ending (*rnam dbye'i rjes*). The listed examples of the first case qua *ming* resemble common illustrations in that they represent free lexical word forms without their implementation into sentences. However, his list includes not only proper nouns but also attributes as well as nominalized verbs and verbs proper. It is for the latter that *ming* no longer only refers to the nominal stem in the context of GC and was translated as 'word stem.'

Following his elaboration of the first and previous to the remaining cases, Si tu introduces an important distinction for all cases:

---

[399] GC 598.2.

rnam dbye gnyis pa la sogs pas ni don gyi ldog pa kho na ston gyi ngo bo ni nam yang
mi ston te/   dper na/ […] *bum pas zhes pas de'i byed pa'i don ston pas tshig de dag*
gis bum pa rang gi ngo bo tsam ma yin par de'i ldog pa ston pa lta bu'o/

"Regarding the second case, etc., only variations (*ltog pa*) of the meaning are indicated by them, whereas they never indicate the essence. For example, […] by means of 'by the pot' (*bum pas*), [the pot's] agency (*de'i byed pa*) is indicated. Therefore, these syntactic forms indicate a [semantic-syntactic] variation of the pot, but they are not the mere self-essence."[400]

This passage divides the cases into those which express only essential meaning and those which indicate a semantic-syntactic variation of this essential meaning, the latter being all the cases except for the first. The distinction into essential word meanings of the first and their variations (*don gyi ldog pa*) by means of the remaining cases directly resonates with his version of the *tshogs gsum* and the related pair *ngo bo*/*khyad par*.[401] While cases number two to seven are therefore classified as *tshig*, the first case falls together with *ming* qua word stem. In Si tu's model, the first case thus has a clearly defined derivational status, namely precisely that of *ming* qua extrasentential stem form that is then to be joined by a syntactic link to form an intrasentential, syntactically functioning *tshig*.

However, Si tu's taxonomy requires further clarification. His introduction of an overarching derivational scheme requires any kind of grammatical operation or category including the cases to be consistently subsumed under it. For Si tu, the option no longer exists to treat the derivation of the cases separately from the *tshogs gsum* and only vaguely subsume it under *tshig* without any considerations about the precise relation of the cases and the *Abhidharmic* theory. Whereas the classification of cases two to seven in a straightforward fashion is that of being a *tshig* as syntactically functioning and bound word form which take a link to express a semantic-syntactic specification (*don gyi khyad par*), the derivational status of the first case as *ming* qua word stem is more intricate. On the one hand, it may be argued that the morphological (zero-marking) as well as semantic (indication of a mere essence) identity is sufficient reason for a correlation between the first case and *ming*: since the first case neither expresses a semantic-syntactic specification nor is it marked by any link, its classification as *tshig* would be contradictory. On the other hand, the question arises whether the morphological and semantic identity necessitates that they have the same grammatical-derivational status as well. Does zero-

---

[400] GC 599.1.
[401] Cf. chapter 5.3.3.

marking and the indication of *ngo bo tsam* automatically result in syntactically unbound, free word forms which constitute the derivational basis for the formation of syntactic word forms through affixation? Yes, if we assume that an unmarked word form that is absolutely restricted to the expression of lexical meaning cannot be in any relation to other arguments of the sentence; no, however, if we take into account Sanskrit grammar, in which the first case has been equally established as a mere lexical category without indicating any information about its relation to other arguments in the sentence. Si tu was of course very well aware that despite the exclusion of any other meaning than lexical, the Sanskrit first case form is not only affixed and therefore not a stem form to be affixed, but it is also a syntactically bound form in a sentence, a genuine *pada* (*tshig*) in the grammatical sense. The classification of the first case as *ming* in WT, which attributes the derivational status of extrasentential stem-forms to the case, was therefore not only the result of the morpho-semantic agreement of the two concepts, but it also resulted from the fact that the first case as *ngo bo tsam ston pa* has no other value in WT.[402] This is important insofar as Si tu claims that the cases have linguistic validity throughout all languages, but the full classification of the first case as *ming* remains language-specific. It was said above in the historical part of the current case that Tibetan grammarians may have looked upon the actual syntactic value of the Sanskrit first case suffix as secondary, since it only determines its use in the language and was covered by the manner in which it is triggered through certain grammatical conditions. It may therefore be concluded that Si tu's Tibetan first case as a word stem on all levels of grammatical analysis likewise defines its use in WT.

It might go against our linguistic intuition that a case is not part of a sentence and thus no syntactic entity, and even more so since this feature applies to only one of the cases, but it substantiates an important issue in the Tibetan case model: since there is no homogeneous syntactic criterion like that of dependent nouns which bear a relationship to their heads[403] in order to define the grammatical category 'case' (*rnam dbye*) in the GC, it may be suspected that Si tu's case model was developed along different lines and thus that its postulated validity must be sought elsewhere, namely its fundamental semantic value.

---

[402] A form of Tibetan language may be imagined with a similar syntactic alignment like in Sanskrit (accusative language with diathesis), in which the Tibetan first case could still be unmarked for economical reasons. Then the morphological-semantic status between *ming* and the first case would remain identical, even though their grammatical-syntactic value diverges most significantly.
[403] Cf. supra 97f.; Blake 2004, 1.

The integration of the first case into the *tshogs gsum* together with its full identification with *ming* prompted two important modifications in Si tu's conception compared to other grammarians, which will be further investigated in the following two sections.

7.2.1 The Exclusion of any Syntactic Dimension from *ngo bo tsam* in the *Great Commentary*

First, there is a modification of the case's precise understanding as *ngo bo tsam ston pa* that arises most clearly in a critique against Zha lu Lotsāwa and his followers Rnam gling Paṇchen and Pra ti Rin chen don grub. They all relate the syntactic link *slar bsdu*, the first link discussed in the SCP, to the first case. *Slar bsdu*, also termed *rdzogs tshig* ('syntactic form of termination'), is the technical term for the ten morphemes *go*, *ngo*, *bo*, *mo*, *do*, *no*, *'o*, *ro*, *lo* and *so*, including also the eleventh form *to* that is not mentioned in SCP, which mark the end of a Tibetan sentence. The underlying reason for Zha lu et al. to demonstrate a relationship between the two grammatical categories of the first case and the terminating link seems to lie more in the structural features of the SCP and less in the theoretical considerations of their syntactic or semantic value. Since the *rnam dbye brgyad* represent an integral part of Tibetan traditional grammar, Tibetan grammarians such as Zha lu have apparently struggled with the fact that Thon mi did not include a presentation of the first case function in the SCP, whilst at the same time listing all others.[404] It may be speculated that the commentators wished to defend him against the incompleteness of the treatise, a common deficiency to undermine the authority of a treatise in the Tibetan scholastic tradition.

However, the relation between the first case form and *slar bsdu* has been based on theoretical reasons. In Zha lu's commentary on SCP, this reasoning is unfortunately confined to a minimalistic and thus rather ambiguous statement on the connection between the two:

> […] *'di yin no/* […] *'byung bar 'gyur ro/* *'od gsal lo/* *mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so/* *zhes pa lta bu rnams ni slar bsdu rdzogs tshig can dngos yin la/* *bya'o snyam nas yod do zhes/* *zhes sogs slar bsdu ma yin pa yang yod de/* *de dag ni gtso bor rnam dbye dang po dngos po tsam brjod pa dang 'brel ba shas che'o/*

---

[404] None of the three commentators states this fact in their argumentation, but its importance clearly arises in Zha lu's *sa bcad* ('topical outline'). He organizes the main part of SCP, i.e. the exposition of syntactic links, exclusively along the lines of the eight cases, an indeed forceful act, since the root text applies different criteria for its rule ordering. In Zha lu's commentary, the non-case links are all subsumed under the header of one of the cases, thus appearing only as secondary grammatical categories. The association of *slar bsdu* with the first case was a convenient solution to implement the latter, particularly as the syntactic link is the first grammatical morpheme discussed in SCP. Although Pra ti as the latest one of the three authors already demonstrates more awareness for SCP's structure, he still adopts Zha lu's theory, perhaps because it was already more established during his time due to Rnam gling's reception.

"[…] '*'di yin no*' ('[…] this is.'), […], '*'byung bar 'gyur ro*' ('[…] will originate.'), '*'od gsal lo*' ('[…] clear light.'), '*mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so*' ('[…] the fully enlightened Buddha./has become fully enlightened.'), etc. are [examples of the] actual *slar bsdu* as a terminating syntactic form, whereas there are also [examples like] '*bya'o snyam nas yod do*' ('[…] having thought [it is] to be done, [it] existed.'), etc., which are not *slar bsdu*. These are mostly connected to the first case, the expression of a mere thing."[405]

The precise argument above remains unclear to me. Without discussing the two types of *slar bsdu*, first the question arises whether Tibetan *de dag ni* ('these') refers to both of them or only the second, *slar bsdu ma yin pa* ('non-*slar bsdu*' ~ non-actual or secondary *slar bsdu*). Secondly, in the sample phrases nouns and verbs are equally marked by the link in question, leaving open the question which of them qualify as an expression of the first case. The only definite point in the argument seems to be that *'brel ba* ('connection') indicates that *slar bsdu* is not the first case as such but only connected to it. In the following, Rnam gling Paṇchen provides a more detailed account of the argument at hand:

'di dag rnam dbye dang po'i don yin pa'i rgyu mtshan ni/ […] *rnam dbye dang po'i gcig tshig brjod pa dang/   ming phal che ba bod skad la khyad par med mod kyang/ slar bsdu 'di dag dang 'brel ba ni rnam dbye dang po'i don du shin tu gsal ba'i phyir ro/*

"Now to the reason why these [syntactic links of *slar bsdu*] have the meaning of the first case form: [...] Even though the expression of the first case's singular is identical with most nominal stems in Tibetan, it is very clear that *slar bsdu* connected to these [nominal stems] has the meaning of the first case."[406]

The argument follows the intuition that *slar bsdu* does not interfere with the semantics of the first case, since it has no semantic meaning but only the syntactic value of indicating the end of a sentence. As such, a noun which is marked only with this link indicates but the mere essence of the expressed phenomenon:

(1) *me* ('fire')   (2) *me'o* ('fire**.**')
(3) *shing* ('wood')   (4) *shing go* ('wood**.**')[407]

---

[405] Zha lu 2013A, 7.
[406] Rnam gling 2013, 66.
[407] Note that samples (2) and (4) may alternatively be translated as 'There/This is fire' and 'There/This is wood'. However, commentators do not specify whether the expression of mere existence ('there is') or the use of the

157

Rnam gling Paṇchen very carefully distinguishes between the first case and its meaning. This suggests that while examples (2) and (4) are to him equivalent to the first case regarding the expressed semantic information, they are perhaps not fully identical in his view, since the first case remains morphologically distinct as the unmarked argument. Pra ti, however, establishes the relation of first case and *slar bsdu* much more directly:

> *bod 'dir ming tsam kho na la rnam dbye dang po zhes bya zhing/   rdzogs tshig sbyar yang ming tsam las tshig tu mi 'grub bo/   de'i phyir bum pa'o zhes bya ba yang rnam dbye dang po'i gcig tshig kho na'o/*

> "Here in Tibet, only the mere nominal stem is called 'first case,' and even though a terminating link has been applied, no syntactic form has been established other than the mere nominal stem (*ming tsam*). Therefore, also '*bum pa'o*' ('pot.') is exactly the singular of the first case."[408]

Pra ti ignores the morphological inconsistency that a *ming* marked with *slar bsdu* no longer remains an unmarked stem form and thus is no longer a first case form. He seems to define the first case exclusively through its semantic value. The fact that *slar bsdu* in phrases like 'pot.' adds no information about the semantic constitution of the sentence or its content leads him to the conclusion that the two are not just semantically equal but also identical due to their semantic agreement. Turning finally to Si tu, his response to all three authors is very clear:

> *yang 'grel byed phal cher gyis/   slar bsdu'i sgra 'di rnam dbye dang po'i don du bshad kyang shin tu 'thad par ma* [sic!][409] *mthong ste/   rnam dbye dang po'i gcig tshig gis ni don gyi ngo bo tsam las gzhan mi ston la/   'di ni sdud pa'i sgra yin pa'i phyir don gyi ldog pa ston byed du 'gyur bas kyang khyad par che zhing/   khyod la'o/   'di yis so/   slongs mo par ro/   'byung khungs nas so/   bdag gi'o/   shing la'o/   rtag tu'o/   lta bu gnyis pa la sogs pa'i rnam dbye thams cad kyi mthar yang slar bsdu sbyar ba yod pas/   khyed ltar na de rnams kyang rnam dbye dang po'i don can du 'dod dgos pa'i phyir ro/*

> "Furthermore, most commentators explained that this *slar bsdu* term has the meaning of the first case, but [this] seems to be very unreasonable. The singular of the first case

---

copula fall under the category of *ming*. Strictly speaking, both add meaning (existence and identity respectively), for which reason it is more likely that the focus was on *slar bsdu* as a merely syntactic marker to indicate the end of a sentence.

[408] Pra ti 2013A, 194.

[409] I read *mi*.

does not indicate anything other than the mere essence of a [word stem's] meaning, whereas this [*slar bsdu* here] becomes the indication of a semantic/syntactic variation, because it is a collective term. For this reason, there is a great difference [between first case and *slar bsdu*]. And since it occurs that [*slar bsdu*] is also applied at the end of all cases, the second and so forth, e.g. in 'to you.' (*khyod la'o*), 'by this.' (*'di yis so*), 'for the beggar.' (*slong mo par ro*), 'from the source.' (*'byung khungs nas so*), 'of mine.' (*bdag gi'o*), 'on the tree.' (*shing la'o*), 'forever.' (*rtag tu'o*), it follows that according to them, also these [examples] have to be assumed as having the meaning of the first case."[410]

Si tu's critique is directed against all the mentioned commentators, but it appears to draw mostly on Rnam gling's exposition with its focus on the semantic equivalence of the first case and *slar bsdu* without postulating their full identity. It basically consists of two arguments, the second of which results from an immoderately exceeded equation of the two categories in question, which actually does not correspond to the outlined arguments in the criticized sources.

To start with the first argument, Si tu denies that *slar bsdu* may have the meaning of the first case, because it indicates a variation in meaning (*don gyi ldog pa*) by encoding the additional information of collection (*sdud pa*),[411] which, so Si tu, is outside the scope of the first case as *ngo bo tsam ston pa*. In contrast to Rnam gling, in his assessment of *slar bsdu* he treats the respective semantic and syntactic value of the two categories on the same level, and the exclusively syntactic value of the terminating link therefore interferes with the first case's meaning according to his argument:

Rnam gling: *ngo bo* (semantic) + *sdud pa* (syntactic) = *ngo bo tsam*

Si tu: *ngo bo* (semantic) + *sdud pa* (syntactic) ≠ *ngo bo tsam*

Even though semantically Rnam gling's understanding remains valid and expressions like *bum pa'o* are mere statements of an entity or an entity's essence without any further semantic specification, they do not qualify as an indication of the mere essence in a more inclusive analysis, in which all encoded information is taken into account. In other words, the difference of Si tu's interpretation of the meaning of the first case compared to Rnam gling is that *tsam*

---

[410] GC 470.6.

[411] Based on the etymology of the syntactic link *slar bsdu*, Si tu (GC 467.6) defines it as that through which "a current content's meaning or syntactic expression becomes collected (*bsdu ba*) to the extent [of] that very [meaning or syntactic expression] (*skabs bab kyi brjod bya'i don nam tshig de nyid gyis bsdu bar song ba* [...])." In freer terms, this link gathers a certain portion of expressed information on a topic at hand into a collected and connected whole or unit, i.e. a sentence. Compare this definition also with *Abhidharmic* conceptions of *pada* as *vākya*, chapter 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.

ston pa ('mere indication') in *ngo bo tsam ston pa* has the entire grammatical structure of linguistic expressions as its reference point, in which both semantic and syntactic information is encoded. Thus, although in the GC it has lost any syntactic status as an intrasentential bound argument, Si tu's conception of the first case involves more syntactic considerations than that of Rnam gling. This was also required by Si tu's systematization of the *tshogs gsum* in Tibetan. Since in Si tu's derivation phrases like *bum pa'o* consist of *ming* plus *tshig phrad*, they also belong to *don gyi kyhad par* and thus no longer are stem forms in the meaning of *don gyi ngo bo*.

Conversely, it may be speculated whether Rnam gling as well as Zha lu and Pra ti arrived at their merely semantic interpretation of *ngo bo tsam ston pa* simply because they have not developed any comparable consistent scheme for the derivation of grammatical categories – a trace perhaps that they followed Dpang Lotsāwa and the standard *tshogs gsum* interpretation without implementing the cases in a consistent derivational scheme. The eight cases remain a closed set of semantic categories, while their status within the whole grammatical system remains open and undecided, especially in the context of cases like the first, for which the syntactic applicability is not self-evident. In view of what was stated in the introduction to modern case grammar, namely that languages usually do not represent the semantic structure of sentences in a direct one-to-one correspondence and also involve syntactic information, it may be concluded that Si tu's strategy is preferable from a linguistic perspective and the demand of an adequate description of the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language.[412] Obviously, Zha lu et al.'s semantically based equation of forms like *bum pa* and *bum pa'o* lack explanatory power in this context. However, also to Si tu the cases remain first of all a set of semantic categories. This semantic importance holds true for the first case, since we should not forget that, after all, this case encodes the crucial semantic information of a word stem's lexical meaning also for Si tu.

Si tu's second argument to oppose the relation between *ngo bo tsam* and *slar bsdu* attempts to reduce Zha lu et al.'s point to absurdity and is based on a number of examples in which a case particle is followed by *slar bsdu*.[413] These relate primarily to elliptic sentences in which the verb needs to be inferred from the context.[414] Si tu's point appears to be that if *slar bsdu* is interpreted in the meaning of *ngo bo tsam bston pa*, then it directly interferes with the semantic

---

[412] Cf. supra 100f. and 105.

[413] 'To you.' (*khyod la'o*), 'by this.' (*'di yis so*), 'for the beggar.' (*slong mo bar ro*), 'from the source.' (*'byung khungs nas so*), 'of mine.' (*bdag gi'o*), 'on the tree.' (*shing la'o*), 'forever.' (*rtag tu'o*) (cf. supra 158f.).

[414] Another option perhaps are stylistic requirements in poetry in which the verb may indeed precede the noun phrase?

value of the other cases in the examples and consequently overrules them. However, in this case Si tu ignored the fact that neither Zha lu nor his followers have ever generally identified the first case with *slar bsdu*. It is clear from the argumentation of Rnam gling and Pra ti as well as their examples that *slar bsdu* may only take the meaning of a first case form in connection with unmarked word forms which are already first cases on their own. Their argument is not that *slar bsdu* as such is a first case marker which expresses the information of *ngo bo tsam*, but that this link simply does not add any semantic information which would change the meaning of the first case. However, Si tu's counterexamples reveal the arbitrary character of their argument, since the very same applies to all the other cases as well. No matter which type of semantic information (agency, source, etc.) is expressed, the terminating link does not interfere with its semantic level, and thus this link equally relates to the remaining cases as to the first. This corroborates the hypothesis that Zha lu et al. were required to find a theoretical basis for why *slar bsdu* may be regarded as Thon mi's indirect presentation of the first case in the SCP. As for Si tu, his critique as a whole confirms and substantiates that any intrasentential use of a first case as *ming* is prohibited and falls under the domain of *don gyi khyad par/ldog pa* as a part of *tshig*.

7.2.2 The First Case and Verbs in the *Great Commentary*

Apart from the syntactic blank value of the first case due to Si tu's strict understanding of *ngo bo **tsam** ston pa*, Si tu's second important modification of the first case due to its direct identification with *ming* is the subsumption of syntactically unbound, morphologically unmarked verb phrases. Si tu lists two nominalized verb forms (*byas pa* 'that which is done' and *bstand pa* 'that which has been taught') plus the proper verb *sgrub* ('establish,' 'accomplish') in all three tenses.[415] The derivational status of the nominalized forms in Si tu's system is somewhat bivalent. The Tibetan nominalizer *pa*, referred to by the tradition as *bdag sgra* ('possessive morpheme/term'), is included in the SCP and normally classified as a syntactic link.[416] As such, Si tu's model actually subsumes forms like *byas pa* or *bstand pa*

---

[415] Additionally, Si tu lists *rtag pa* ('permanent'), which is more difficult to classify. Although technically, *rtag pa* is a nominalized verb, the verbal form *rtag* ('be permanent') is very rare. One might therefore argue that it more likely attained the status of an attribute in WT, i.e. a proper nominal form on its own. I am not qualified to decide whether the scarcity of the verbal form may even be an argument for that *rtag pa* was the original form and the verb only a denominalization. Therefore, this sample will be excluded from my analysis, in order to avoid its misinterpretation.

[416] Cf. SCP 20.2-21.1. According to this conception, a form like *byas pa* indicates through *pa* that the marked stem form *byas* ('has been done') belongs to something else. Compare the following two examples:
      (1) *las ka byas pa* 'the work that has been done'
      (2) *rta pa* 'horseman'
In the first clause, the nominalized *byas pa* is an attribute that belongs to (~ is owned by) *las ka* ('work,' 'labor'), whereas in (2), the marker *pa* indicates that *rta* ('horse') belongs to (~ is owned by) someone, i.e. the horseman.

under *tshig* and thus outside the domain of the first case, since they are affixed words indicating the semantic/syntactic specification of ownership (*bdag po*, lit. 'lord,' 'owner,' 'possessor') and not only the essential meaning of the stem. On the contrary, they qualify as the basis for the affixation of an additional case marker, rendering them proper first cases according to Si tu's model:

(1) *byas* (essence of a word stem's meaning) + *pa* (syntactic link, ownership) = *byas pa*

(2) *byas pa* (essence of a word stem's meaning) + *s* (case link, agency) = *byas pas*

Si tu classifies the two nominalized examples in his list in accordance with (2), apparently regarding them as independent word forms expressing essential word meanings, which are then to be specified by additional links to form a *tshig*. As for the three verbal forms *sgrub*, *bsgrubs* and *bsgrub*, the rationale proposed by Si tu is apparently that in their syntactically unbound form they fulfill the necessary meaning condition (*ngo bo tsam*) and also correspond to the derivational behavior (stem form to be affixed) that defines Si tu's first case. He justifies his classification for all five forms, nominalized or not, by claiming that a nominal stem (*ming* qua *prātipadika*) may be differentiated regarding *bdag*/*gzhan* ('active/passive')[417] as well as the three temporal forms, as much as it can be a noun proper (*ming rkyang*). The explicit focus on *ming* in his argumentation already reveals that Si tu must have been aware of the bizarre character that verbs fall under the first case, for which reason he does not hesitate to immediately support his taxonomy by the help of his Sanskrit expertise:

> *dper na legs sbyar gyi skad du/   krī ṭa/   ka ra ṇa/   kāryya/   lta bu dus gsum dang bdag gzhan gyi dbye ba yod pa'i sgra rnams kyang ming tsam nyid du mtshungs pa la rnam dbyes tshig tu bsgrub dgos pa bzhin no/*

> "[The fact that proper nouns, items distinguishable into *bdag*/*gzhan* as well as the three temporal forms are *ming*] corresponds (*bzhin*), for example, with Sanskrit, where also the terms which have a distinction into the three time aspects and self/other – e.g. *kr̥ta* ('having done'), *karaṇa* ('means,' 'doing'), *kārya* ('what is to be done') – are equivalent to the very mere nominal stem (*ming tsam*), which [then] has to be completed

---

[417] This is a very inaccurate rendering of the two terms *bdag* ('self') and *gzhan* ('other') that would need further explanation. Yet, his comparison with Sanskrit reveals that in this context he indeed had the active/passive pattern of Sanskrit language in mind (cf. also HSGLT 2, 298f.). On the grammatical concept of *bdag* and *gzhan*, cf. Tillemans and Herforth 1989.

as a complete, syntactically functioning word form (*tshig*, *pada*) through a case[-suffix].”[418]

The classification of genuine verbs as a first case clearly goes against all of Sanskritic grammatical theory, since it violates the very basis of the Sanskrit derivation of *pada*s, i.e. the distinction into nominal and verbal forms.[419] However, Si tu provides the reader with three Sanskrit derivations that are classified as *prātipadika*, but nonetheless indicate time and diathesis.[420] The first term, *kṛta*, is derived from the verbal root *ḌUkṛÑ* (‘to make’), after which the suffix *Kta* (P 3.2.102 + P 1.1.25) is added in the meaning of past (P 3.2.84) and *karman* (P 3.4.70). The second example, *karaṇa*, is derived from the same verbal root *ḌUkṛÑ* in combination with suffix *LyuṬ* to express instrumentality (P 3.3.117). The third term, *kārya*, is once more derived from *ḌUkṛÑ*, this time in combination with suffix *ṆyaT* to express *karman* (P 3.4.70) and future.[421] According to the *Pāṇinian* system, all three suffixes belong to the *kṛt*-class, which has the main function to nominalize verbal roots, which P 3.1.93 together with P 1.2.46 then classifies as *prātipadika* (nominal stem), in order to qualify them for the affixation of case suffixes (P 4.1.1). Si tu shows full awareness of the *Pāṇinian* system and the fact that it indeed does treat these three examples as nominal stems regardless the different temporal information and grammatical voices they express. Si tu also demonstrates that the Sanskrit derivational system is fully in line with his argument that *prātipadika* (*ming*) is not only restricted to nouns but may also include word forms which express time and diathesis. In Tibetan, once words with these semantic values qualify as nominal stems, they simultaneously qualify as first cases as long as they are syntactically free or unbound and no marker or syntactic link has been added. Thus, so Si tu, the five Tibetan examples above are correct first cases.

On the surface, Si tu’s argument is clearly flawed. His whole argumentation that verbs can be first cases is based on their derivational classification as a nominal stem, for which verbs fully qualify as long as they are unmarked (*rjes logs pa med*). Yet, the fact that nominal stems *can* encode the semantic information of tense and diathesis does not directly translate into the point that all word forms which encode this type of information are automatically nominal stems. In

---

[418] GC 598.3.
[419] P 1.4.14 *suptiṅantaṃ padam* ‘[A] *pada* [is that which either] ends [in a] nominal suffix (*sup*) [or a] verbal suffix (*tiṅ*).’
[420] The following analysis of the Sanskrit derivations is mainly based on HSGLT 2 (299), with a few minor additions necessary for our current purpose.
[421] Cf. HSGLT 2, 299. Therein, Verhagen mentions that *ṆyaT* indicates future. P 3.3.169, 171 and 172 attribute the meanings of ‘deserving’ (*arha*), ‘necessity’ (*āvaśyaka*), ‘being indebted’ (*ādharmaṇya*) and ‘possibility/ability’ (*śakti*) to all *kṛtya*-suffixes, under which *ṆyaT* is to be subsumed. Accordingly, European grammars usually classify it as a gerund from which perspective a future aspect in terms of ‘that which should be done’ is implied.

Sanskrit, even though there are nominalized verbs which are affixed by case suffixes, there still also remain verbs with the same type of information (time and diathesis) which cannot take any case suffixes, since they participate in a different derivational procedure with a different set of suffixes (*tiṅ*). The status of a nominal stem is determined through different criteria than the semantic information it conveys (e.g. time or diathesis), namely the manner in which the different word forms behave morphosyntactically as well as derivationally. From this perspective, Si tu's argument to classify verbs as nominal stems because nominal stems can express time and diathesis is invalid. If they are not necessarily nominal stems, they also no longer necessarily qualify as first cases in the Tibetan context. Only the two nominalized examples make the exception and in fact directly correspond to the Sanskrit examples, thus being proper first cases in Si tu's model. As for the three verbal forms *sgrub* ('accomplish,' 'establish'), etc., the Sanskrit examples cannot prove that verbs need to be first cases in Tibetan, since the parameters of grammatical voice and time do not provide sufficient criteria to include verbs into the nominal stems.

However, what the Sanskrit examples can prove is that the semantic parameters of time and diathesis also do not *exclude* verbs per se, since the semantic information of time and grammatical voice can be encoded through both forms, nouns as well as verbs. If that were not be the case, then Sanskrit words like *kṛta* ('having done,' ~ past participle), *karaṇa* ('means,' 'doing') and *kārya* ('what is to be done' ~ gerund) could not become complete *pada*s through the addition of case suffixes. In other words, the semantic parameters in question are only of minor relevance regarding the distinction of nouns and verbs as well as nominal stems and verbal roots. In contrast, the relevant morphosyntactic and derivational behavior of the word forms is language-specific. Si tu's whole point thus aims at the fact that verbs in Tibetan behave like genuine nouns and vice versa, both morphologically (unmarked) as well as from the perspective of the derivation (to be affixed with syntactic links), for which reason in his model a distinction between the two cannot be maintained. The foundational distinction of *sup* and *tiṅ* in Sanskrit is simply the result of Sanskrit morphosyntax, but since WT does not in the same way distinguish between two sets of suffixes for nouns and verbs, both word classes undergo the same derivational operation of the application of a syntactic link. As such, verbs qualify as *ming* as much as as any other word. This results in the already mentioned modification of *ming* in the sense that once the dichotomy of nominal stem (*prātipadika*) and verbal root (*dhātu*) has been nullified, *ming* is no longer fully equivalent to *prātipadika* (nominal stem) but rather refers

to a word stem in general.[422] *Ming* is any unmarked, syntactically unbound word form (= *prātipadika* and *dhātu*) that expresses only the essence of a word stem's meaning (~ *nāma*) and may be further specified (semantically and syntactically, ~ *Abhidharmic* and Patañjali's *pada*) through adding syntactic links (~ Sanskrit grammatical *pada*), first of all the case markers. Any such *ming* then is identical with the first case on all levels, not only morphologically and semantically as in Dpang Lotsāwa and perhaps most of the preceding tradition. The first case is regarded as *ming*, and this modification again was inspired by Si tu's systematic application of his derivational model to WT, this time in the issue of the subsumption of free lexical verb forms under the first case due to the morphosyntax specific to Tibetan.

The distinction into nouns and verbs in Tibetan certainly is a more complex distributional issue than the way it is presented in Si tu's treatment. Features like the verbal inflexion in WT into four forms traditionally referred to as *ma 'ongs pa* ('future'), *'das pa* ('past'), *da lta ba* ('present') and *skul tshig* ('imperative') clearly sets verbs apart from nouns. Si tu apparently favored the option of including the information of tense in the essence of a word meaning (*ming don gyi ngo bo*), however the different tenses of a verb still raise the question whether they qualify as genuine stem forms which indicate the essence of a meaning, since they may equally be classified as a semantic/syntactic specification (*khyad par*, *viśeṣa*) of an actual root form.[423] Moreover, the precise distribution of the syntactic links demonstrates significant variations after nouns and verbs, in the sense that not all of them follow proper verbs and some of them encode different meanings when applied to nouns or verbs. Si tu did not consider these factors and was more concerned with the homogenization of the established concepts first case and *ming*. Even though Si tu's conception was most definitely not only a theoretical exercise to reconcile and

---

[422] This complicates the translation of Si tu's commentary on the first case, since the same term, namely *ming*, refers to word stems in the Tibetan context, while in the Sanskrit context it of course remains confined to nominal stems. This is a paramount example for a shift in the meaning of a concept due to its de- and recontextualization from Sanskrit into the Tibetan linguistic environment, within one single treatise, even within one single passage.

[423] Otherwise, the classification of the different tense forms as a specification of a meaning (*don gyi khyad par*), and thus *tshig* would lead on to the question what kind of form could be the semantic and derivational basis, i.e. the actual essential meaning (*don gyi ngo bo*) of the different verbal forms. The options are then reduced (1) to ontological-semantic debates about the principal of the four forms, or (2) to introduce the concept of abstract, hypothetical verbal roots.

Also note that in the *Pāṇinian* conception of *dhātu*, causative, desiderative or also intensive derivations of verbal roots are themselves classified as *dhātu* (cf. Abhyankar 1986, 207). As such, these deverbal forms are the derivational basis for further grammatical operations such as the affixation of suffixes in the formation of the optative, etc. Si tu may have looked upon the different tense forms of a Tibetan verb in a similar fashion, namely that they are derived from the same derivational basis, yet each on their own also represent separate derivational bases for the affixation of syntactic links. This multilayered derivation of verbal forms that always assigns the derivational basis (= stem form) depending on the current grammatical operation also resonates with Si tu's classification of nominalized verbs as first cases and thus stem forms despite the fact that they are synthetic forms marked by *bdag sgra* (cf. supra 153 and the current chapter 7.2.2).

systematize hitherto incoherent Tibetan grammars but indeed aimed at a representative description of WT, the question whether or not his strategy has the highest explanatory value and was the most economical with regard to the language itself will be left to modern linguistics.

7.2.3 Résumé on Si tu's Conception of the First Case

The task to reconcile all the established authorities, i.e. WT, Sanskritic and Tibetan grammatical sources as well as Buddhism, required a great effort. The Tibetan tradition from the earliest time onwards had contact with a variety of linguistic notions such as *prātipadika*, *nāma*, *pada*, *prātipadikārtha*, *prathamā vibhakti*, etc., which were originally developed against the backdrop of Sanskrit language and which already in the Sanskritic tradition had belonged at least to two different schools of thought. As shown above, all these notions are involved in the conception of the Tibetan first case. The decontextualization of these partially competing notions matches even less against the backdrop of the new linguistic environment of WT and thus required adaptation. In the TshSS, for example, there at least was an awareness about the morphological incongruence of the first case form in Sanskrit and Tibetan, but other than that the author adhered to the Sanskritic syntactic status of the cases as a *pada*. The competing authoritative theorems regarding *pada* (*tshig*) in *Abhidharma* and grammar were likewise adopted, but only reproduced next to each other without the courage of relating them to each other. Si tu's strategy shifted focus away from these diverging authoritative conceptions and towards the language, in order to bring the different strands of the conceptual heritage back together into a consistent device that is operable in the Tibetan context. The ramifications of this daring homogenization were the syntactic blank value of the first case plus the inclusion of verbs, both significant deviations from Sanskritic taxonomies but at the same time never unreasoned. These are clear traces of Si tu's self-proclaimed rational approach to the commentary of SCP and TKJ.[424] His Sanskrit expertise enabled him to deviate from Sanskritic grammar mainly based on the extraction of the differences between the languages, so that the Sanskritic authority was not undermined but only recontextualized; and since TKJ only mentions the first case without further information and SCP fully omits the case due to the lack of a syntactic link, Si tu also had all hermeneutical freedom from the side of the Tibetan root texts.

In any event, Si tu's adaptations explicitly excluded the first case from *pada* and included verbs into case grammar, which corroborates that for him the cases did not have a predefined grammatical status, since their application may differ across languages in the sense that they are restricted to nominal inflexion in Sanskrit but cover verb phrases (VPs) in Tibetan.

---

[424] Cf. chapters 3.3 and 4.2.

Accordingly, depending on the language, they may be syntactically functioning arguments or have the syntactic blank value of stem forms. As for the first case, it may be a marked argument in Sanskrit and still remain unmarked in Tibetan language. The validity of the first case rests therefore first and foremost on the semantic core value, the indication of the essence of a word stem's meaning. The historical survey has demonstrated how the semantic focus of the case can be traced back to Sanskrit grammar, and the case's implementation into Si tu's modified derivational model was then only the result of his recontextualization and systematization of adopted models against the backdrop of the linguistic environment of WT.

8 *Rnam dbye gnyis pa las* or *las su bya ba*

8.1 Historical Survey

The Tibetan second case is commonly referred to as *las* (*karman*, lit. 'action,' 'deed') or the rather opaque *las su bya ba* ('to be done as the *karman*' ?) and is marked by *la don* ('[having the same] meaning [as the morpheme] *la*').[425] *La don*, referred to as *la sgra* ('*la*-morpheme') in SCP 11.4, represents a morphological category that consists of the seven manifestations *su*, *-r*, *ru*, *du*, *na*, *la* plus *tu*, the latter not listed in the SCP but added by commentators already before Si tu.[426] Illustrations of the second case vary strongly throughout the sources and comprise a variety of distinguishable grammatical constructions which reflect significant variations regarding the conception of the case and its meaning. The precise rationale has often not been made explicit, but common phrases come with a strong directional aspect, such as *nam mkha' la 'gro* ('[s/he] goes to heaven') or *shar phyogs su 'gro* ('[s/he] walks to the east') in Rnam gling's work.[427] The diversity of the examples becomes manifest as soon as these phrases are compared with other types of clauses that have been equally classified as *las* by grammarians in and outside the context of *Sum rtags*:

> *shing gi rtse mo **na** gcod* ('to cut the tree **at** the top') (Smṛtijñānakīrti), *shing de **la** lta ba'am 'jog pa* ('to look **at** or chop **into** the wood/tree') (Sakya Paṇḍita, KhJ), *bsam **du** med* (lit. 'not to be thought,' meaning 'unthinkable,' 'beyond our mind') (Zha lu and Rnam gling), *phyi rol **tu** bsdad* ('[s/he] dwelled **outside**'), *se ra **na** chos ston* ('[s/he] teaches the Dharma **at** Se ra') (Pra ti)[428]

This morphosyntactic diversity is not only attested between the sources, but it can be also observed within one and the same source. The collection of morphologically and semantically distinguishable categories such as DIRECTION, LOCATION, etc. in sample lists of grammatical treatises reveals that the classification of second cases did not follow the precise

---

[425] Common glosses of *la don* are *la'i don* ('meaning of *la*') or in Zha lu's commentary to SCP also *la('i sgra) dang don mthun pa* ('agreeing with the *la*-morpheme regarding the meaning,' cf. ft. 426), which goes back to his quotation of *Smra sgo* and the verse '*du*, etc. agree with *la*' (*du la sogs pa la dang mthun*, Smṛti 2002, 92). I have not further investigated the origins of *la don*, however, a similar notion compared to the *Smra sgo* is found already in the GNT under the second case, namely *la dang cha mthun pa* ('partially agreeing with *la*'), where it only refers to the specific function of *du* and its allomorphs as *de nyid* (cf. infra 190f.). Additionally, the autocommentary on *Smra sgo* uses the term *la'i don* to refer exclusively to the functions of *la*.

[426] Cf. e.g. Zha lu 2013A, 9 on SCP 9.3-11.4:
   de ltar su dang/   ru dang/   du dang/   na dang/   la dang 'di nas shugs kyis bstan pa'i tu yig rnams ni/ […] *la'i sgra dang don mthun pa yin te/*
   "Likewise, regarding *su*, *ru*, *du*, *na*, *la* and the letter *tu* taught only implicitly here (in the SCP), […] [they] agree with the morpheme *la* regarding the meaning."

[427] For more examples of the second case in Rnam gling's S*um rtags* commentary, cf. infra 207.

[428] My emphasis.

168

functioning of the *la don* morphemes in the different semantic and syntactic environments of Tibetan sentences, but it was based on other criteria that established the second case *las* or *karman* to be investigated in this chapter 8.

8.1.1 Conceptions of the Second Case in *Pāṇini*, *Kātantra* and *Cāndra* and the Problem of the Tibetan Adoption of *karman*

The second case's prototypical function in Sanskritic grammar is that of *karman*. The principal Sanskritic conception of *karman* in the context of grammar goes back to Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.49-51:[429]

> P 1.4.49 *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* "*Karman* is that which is most desired by the agent."

> P 1.4.50 *tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam* "That which is undesired [but] connected in the same way is also [*karman*]."

> P 1.4.51 *akathitaṃ ca* 'Also that which has not been mentioned [is *karman*].'

These three rules define the core notion of *karman* in *Pāṇini*, which belongs to the *kāraka*s and represents the prototypical function of the second case suffix (*vibhakti*). The first rule is its basic definition and refers to most conventional instances of a PATIENT role in modern linguistic terminology,[430] whereas the second rule covers those instances where the object of the action is undesired and thus not covered by the preceding rule.[431] According to the commentarial tradition, the third rule finally refers mainly to double accusative constructions and sentences with more than one argument in the second case.[432] In sum, the notion of *karman* is mainly defined in semantic terms based on the parameter of an agent's desire for some item, and if the additional conditions of P 1.4.52 and 53 are included, generally speaking it covers a similar range of application compared to the grammatical category DIRECT OBJECT.[433] By

---

[429] P 1.4.52-53 also define additional, syntactic values of *karman* in connection with certain verbs. Since these do not add any noteworthy information to the constitution of the Tibetan second case, their quotation has been omitted.

[430] Cf. two common examples quoted from Sharma 1990, 257: *kaṭaṃ karoti* 'he makes a mat,' *grāmaṃ gacchati* 'he goes to the village.'

[431] Sharma 1990, 261: *odanaṃ bhuñjāno viṣaṃ bhuṅkte* 'while eating rice he is consuming poison.'

[432] Ibid., 262: *pāṇinā kāṃsyapātryāṃ gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* 'he milks the cow by hand into a copper vessel.'

[433] This comparison should not be misunderstood as an assumption of their identity. It should only help to gain a first orientation and should not hide the fact that there are noteworthy differences. Despite the clear semantic focus in its prototypical definition, it will not be decided whether *karman* in its entirety is best compared with the semantic role PATIENT or with the syntactic relation DIRECT OBJECT. For the traditional *Pāṇinian* interpretation of *karman* and its reception in the commentarial literature, cf. Sharma (1990) as well as Joshi and Roodbergen (1995) on the quoted rules.

comparison, *Kātantra*'s illustration of the meaning of *karman* only makes use of the Sanskrit morphosyntactic feature of diathesis:

> K 2.4.13 *yat kriyate tat karma* "That which is done is *karma*."[434]

Finally, the *Cāndravyākaraṇa*, which does not provide any definition of *kāraka* and also omits the term *karman*, defines the prototypical of the second case function as follows:

> C 2.1.43 *kriyāpye dvitīyā* "If to be reached by the action, a second [case suffix]."
> *Cāndravṛtti*: *kriyayā vyāpye dvitīyā vibhaktir bhavati. kaṭaṃ karoti.* "If to be reached by the action, a second case suffix occurs. S/he makes a mat."

Cāndra's designation of the second case label as *āpya* ('reachable,' 'obtainable,' 'to be reached,' etc.) instead of *karman* is closely connected to P 1.4.49, since it is etymologically related to *īpsita*, which in turn is the desiderative of the same verbal root *āp* of which *āpya* is the gerundive form.[435] Candragomin's *Vṛtti* further clarifies that his definition encompasses the *Pāṇinian* rules under a single and more homogeneous parameter than an agent's desire (*īpsita*):

> *īpsite 'pi vyāpyatvād dvitīyā siddhā: gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ. [...] evam anīpsite 'pi: ahiṃ laṅghayati. viṣaṃ bhakṣayati. yan naivepsitaṃ nāpy anīpsitaṃ tatrāpi bhavati: grāmaṃ gacchan vṛkṣamūlāny upasarpatīti.*

> "Also if desired, the second case suffix is established because of the reachability (*vyāpyatva*) [of the desired, as in] 's/he milks the cow's milk' (*gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ*) [...]. Likewise, also if undesired [as in] [...], 's/he eats poison' (*viṣaṃ bhakṣayati*). Also in case of that (*tatrāpi*) which is neither desired nor undesired, [the second case suffix] occurs [because of its reachability], as in 'whilst going to the village, s/he comes close to the roots of a tree' (*grāmaṃ gacchan vṛkṣamūlāny upasarpati*)."[436]

Candragomin's *kriyāpya* or *āpya* is the direct terminological equivalent for the term *karman* in his grammar not only in the context of the second case function, but he systematically

---

[434] In contrast to K 2.4.12 *yena kriyate tat karaṇam*, "by which [something] is done is the instrument" and K 2.1.14 *yaḥ karoti sa kartā*, "that which does is the agent."

[435] Cf. the entry on *īps* in Monier-Williams 1981, 170. The KV gives an etymological interpretation of Pāṇini's *īpsitatama* under P 1.4.49 that resonates with the *Cāndravṛtti*:
> *kartuḥ kriyayā yad āptum iṣṭatamaṃ tat kārakaṃ karmasaṃjñaṃ bhavati*
> "A *kāraka* which the agent most wishes to reach through his action is termed *karman*." (transl. Sharma 1990, 257)

[436] *Cāndravṛtti* on C 2.1.43. Sanskrit quoted from Liebich 1918, 103.

170

substitutes the former for the latter throughout his entire work, for example also *anāpya* (C 1.2.97) for *Pāṇinian akarmaka* ('without object,' i.e. intransitive, P 3.2.148).[437]

As for the Tibetan grammatical tradition, the problematic character of the second case starts with the fact that, although the category *karman* (*las*) was directly adopted and adhered to as the only function of the second case in the classical Tibetan case model, none of the quoted Sanskritic definitions exactly covers the Tibetan-specific functioning of the three morphosyntactically distinct morphemes *na*, *la* and *du* that are traditionally subsumed under the morphological category *la don* as the second case marker. From a descriptive-distributional perspective, the category *la don* needs to be distinguished in accordance with Tibetan morphosyntax at least into the three distinctive morphemes *la*, *na* and *du* together with *tu*, *su* and *ru* as allomorphs of the latter as well as *-r* as a variant of *la* and *ru*.[438]

Following a more recent account of the morphemes, *la* as the main marker of *la don* principally indicates information of the type BENEFICIARY, POSSESSOR, ALLATIVE as well as different forms of LOCATIVE.[439] Since *la* is governed by a fairly heterogeneous array of verbs with different semantic fields, the morpheme's uses could be also subsumed under a more syntactic label such as "what would normally be called a dative, or an indirect object in a European language."[440] Hill's study on the traditional *la don* category is restricted to the *Old Tibetan Annals*, listing the following examples for the regular uses of *la*: *bab* 'fall on,' *phul* 'give to,' *spos* 'transfer to,' *rdugs* 'reduce to' and *chags* 'be attached to.'[441] In contrast, Tournadre uses the term INDIRECT OBJECT only as alternative for his BENEFICIARY function of *la*.[442] If my understanding of this function in his article is correct, this category covers rather diverse uses that are specific to *la* and *-r* and not shared by *du* nor *na*. Generally speaking, a spatio-directional interpretation of *la* in terms of an ALLATIVE or DIRECTION seems to prevail in linguistic research regarding the morpheme's prototypical function.

The morpheme *du* appears to be more straightforward in its uses and shares with *la* the ALLATIVE/DIRECTION as well as LOCATIVE function, while according to Tournadre it additionally also encodes the information of PURPOSE and TRANSFORMATION.[443]

---

[437] Note that this was also part of his strategy to avoid technical terms that are not self-explanatory and require separate definitions (cf. ft. 256).

[438] Cf. supra 93.

[439] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 106f.

[440] Hill 2011, 15.

[441] Cf. ibid.

[442] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97.

[443] Cf. ibid., 108f. On the category of TRANSFORMATION and Tibetan conceptualizations of this particular use of *du*, cf. also chapter 8.2.5.

Finally, the marker *na* is restricted to mere static spatio-temporal information,[444] in most basic terms a static LOCATIVE.[445]

Even though at least DIRECTION constitutes a semantic field that can be covered by *karman* as well, as demonstrated by the classic example *grāmaṃ gacchati* ('s/he goes to the village'),[446] the generic meaning of *karman* refers to those DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT-arguments of transitive Sanskrit sentences that remain unmarked in Tibetan sentences. Only exceptional uses of the morpheme *la* for emphatic case marking and other reasons may mark the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT, and this feature is referred to as optional or floating case marking[447] and cannot be maintained as the morphemes' generic use. As for the morphemes *du* and *na* that are equally considered second case markers, they do not even exceptionally encode the category DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT. Other than that, functions of the seven *la don* morphemes in Tibetan sentences such as POSSESSOR, PURPOSE, LOCATIVE, etc. are even further away from Sanskritic conceptions of *karman* than ALLATIVE/DIRECTION.

So how did Tibetan grammarians regard this substantial divergence that none of the Tibetan *la don* morphemes directly correspond to the Sanskrit second case suffix in its function as *karman*? Why did they nonetheless associate the second case's Sanskritic prototypical function of *karman* with the directional marker *la* and its traditional equivalents? And what is the resulting status of the unmarked argument that encodes the DIRECT OBJECT or PATIENT in Tibetan sentences? Finally, how did Tibetan grammarians argue for the homogeneity of *la don* in view of the seven morpheme's morphosyntactic diversity? It is for questions such as these that the second case *las* is by far the most intricate of all, both linguistically and historically, and has been addressed in an important article by Bettina Zeisler.[448] For the sake of clarity, the following presentation of the history of the second case pre-Si tu will be separated into the early tradition with a focus on NGg as well as GNT and then the remaining tradition before the GC.

---

[444] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 110; Hill 2011, 19.

[445] This is by no means a comprehensive analysis of the morphemes. Each of the three comprises a range of functions, and the taxonomies significantly differ in the modern academic literature as well. For a more recent presentation, cf. Tournadre 2010. Also note that the presentation provided above is diachronically insensitive. Unfortunately, apart from Hill's study on the *Old Tibetan Annals*, the diachronic, geographical as well as other variations between literary genres, etc. are only beginning to be understood in modern academia. An increase in knowledge about the precise constitution of these case markers would certainly also enhance the historical analysis of this dissertation.

[446] Cf. ft. 430.

[447] Cf. Zeisler 2006, 87ff. For an example of *la*'s use as a marker for the DIRECT OBJECT due to pragmatic reasons, cf. also supra 103ff.

[448] Cf. Zeisler 2006.

8.1.2 Early Conceptions of the Second Case

Whereas SCP and GNT already group together the three morphemes *la*, *na* and *du* and attribute to them the second case function *las*, other early sources such as NG, NGg, MVY and Chos grub's *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa* only mention *la* as the marker for the second case.[449] The fact that early sources unanimously adhered to this position that all three morphemes qualify as second cases is difficult to evaluate due to the relative absence of information the sources provide on this issue. Most importantly, *la sgra* is not only the morphological marker for the second case function in the SCP, but it may express up to five different meanings:

> *las dang ched dang rten gnas dang/*
> *de nyid tshe skabs la sgra yin/*
>
> "*karman*, beneficiary, support,
> identity [and] time [are] the *la*-morpheme (*la sgra*)."[450]

Even though the root text does not mention the term 'case,' this passage still demonstrates that the morpheme *la* together with its equivalents comprises amongst its meanings three case functions, i.e. the second (*las*, '*karman*'), fourth (*ched*, 'beneficiary') and seventh (*rten gnas* 'support'). The same fact has been recognized and noted in the GNT:

> *de yang gnyis pa'i sgra 'di gang la zhes pa'i la yis ston te/   bod kyi sgra la ni bzhi pa*
> *yang la yis ston pa yod la/   bdun pa yang la yis ston te/   gnyis pa dang/   bzhi pa*
> *dang/   bdun pa'i bye brag rnams kyi don ma nor bar shes pa ni gal che ba kho na'o/*
>
> "Likewise, this second [case] form is indicated through *la*, i.e. 'upon which' (*gang la*). In Tibetan morphology (*bod kyi sgra la*), also the fourth [case] is indicated through *la*, and the seventh [case] is expressed through *la* as well, but a knowledge of the meaning of the specific second, fourth and seventh [cases] (*gnyis pa dang bzhi pa dang bdun pa'i bye brag rnams kyi don*) without confusing [them] (*ma nor bar*) is of utmost importance."[451]

GNT's highlighting of the importance of the three cases despite their morphological identity in Tibetan ranks among the clearest textual evidence that the Tibetan case scheme was not based

---

[449] NG: cf. CT *115* – 407 and 411f.; NGg: cf. CT *115* – 417ff. and 432; MVY: cf. HSGLT 2, 26; Chos grub: cf. HSGLT 2, 361f.
[450] SCP 11.3-11.4.
[451] CT *115* – 447.

on the same theoretical foundation as the Sanskritic tradition. Whereas Sanskritic grammars had based the number of cases on the language's morphology and the distribution of morphemes, the Tibetan grammarians distinguished the cases merely on a functional basis. This fact alone is a strong indicator that the notion of 'case' in general refers more to the case functions and less to the morphemes. While the precise reasons for this remain to be investigated, in the meantime we may examine the very meaning of the Tibetan second case referred to as *las* or *karman*, which constitutes its proclaimed importance.

Similar to the findings encountered in the investigation of the first case, the Tibetan conception of the second case is not a direct reproduction of any of the presented Sanskritic grammatical conceptions, although in this case its label *las* (*karman*) corresponds directly to *Pāṇini* and *Kātantra*.[452] Apart from merging *la*, *na* and *du* together under *la sgra* and attributing to it the function of *las*, SCP is rather parsimonious when it comes to the conceptual foundation of the second case's meaning. However, NGg and GNT focus on the two notions *yul* ('place,' 'locus,' 'domain') and *gzhi* ('base,' 'substratum') respectively. Additionally, both these sources mention the alternative label of the second case *las su bya ba* ('to be done as the *karman*')[453] and thus fully prepare the key terminological framework prominent in Si tu's GC and most other grammatical works. Especially this pair of *yul* and *gzhi* deserves a more detailed preliminary investigation as part of this study, not only because they convey crucial information about the Tibetan understanding of *las*, but also since the historical and conceptual origins of this focal Tibetan terminology so far has not yet received sufficient attention in modern academia.

---

[452] As for *Cāndra*, Tibetan scholars may have seen *āpya* as synonymous in the grammatical context, and therefore they may have focused on *karman* as the more common term due to the resulting advantage of avoiding confusion caused by two competing terminological conventions. In fact, this is manifest in the Tibetan translation of the term. From HSGLT 2 (Appendix C, 356), we know of three Tibetan translations of *kriyāpya*, i.e. *bya ba'i las* ('the *karman* of the action'), *bya ba dang las* ('action and *karman*') and *bya ba* (action). It might also be imagined that Tibetan translators apparently struggled with the Sanskrit compound form, perhaps lacking any reliable commentary regarding its precise interpretation. Interestingly, Peter Verhagen (HSGLT 1, 54) remarks that no Tibetan translation of a *Cāndra* commentary is known. As we have seen, the *Vṛtti* clearly resolves the compound as a *tṛtīyā-tatpuruṣa* and thus clarifies the precise meaning of the compound, something Tibetan translators could have hardly missed, if they would have known it.
It may also be interesting to note that in Si tu's *Cāndra* commentary the term is generally translated with *bya ba'i las* as well, even though Si tu quotes the definition of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* inlcuding the verbal root *āp* which he translates literally with Tibetan *khyab pa* (cf. infra 230f.).
[453] GNT: CT *115 – 449*, NGg: CT *115 – 419*.

8.1.2.1 The Second Case *las* as *yul* in the *Gnas brgyad 'grel pa*

NGg offers two definitions of *las* that attract our interest: one in the context of the sixfold scheme of *kāraka* of topic one, the other in the definition of the second case under topic six (*vibhakti*, *rnam dbye*):

Kāraka-definition of *las*:

> *gang la byed ces pa ni gnyis pa las kyi tshig ste/   las su bya ba gang zhig las byed pa gzhan zhig yul du byas pa yin te/   shing la byed ces pa lta bu'o/*

> "So-called '*gang la byed*' ('to act upon something') is the second, the syntactic form *karman* (*las kyi tshig*). It says that something to be done as the *karman* (*las su bya ba*) has been made into the domain (*yul du byas pa*) [by] something distinct that performs an activity (*las byed pa gzhan zhig*), for example 'to act upon the tree'."[454]

Vibhakti-definition of *las*:

> *gzhan gyis byas pa las su ston pa dang/   las lta bur byed pa ston pa'i phyir gnyis pa las kyis*[455] *yin no/*

> "Since it indicates that which has been done by something distinct (*gzhan gyis*) as the *karman* and that which is being done as if [it would be] the *karman*, it is the second [case], the semantic domain (*sa*) of *karman*."[456]

The basic idea is that an activity (*las*) is performed (*las byed pa*) on or upon the *karman* as *las su bya ba*, the latter which takes on the part of the place or domain (*yul*) where the activity is being performed (*kāraka*-definition). Alternatively, *las* is simply that which is done by something distinct, presumably the agent (*vibhakti*-definition). These definitions exhibit two salient features of NGg's conception of *karman*.[457] First, both emphasize the feature of distinctiveness or separateness through the addition of *gzhan* ('other,' 'distinct'), which suggests a basic bivalency or bipolarity of an action in terms of the active performance of an activity (*las byed pa*), presumably that of an agent, and *karman* as *las su bya ba*. Secondly, the *kāraka*-definition further specifies *karman* as the *yul du byas pa*, indicating that the *karman*

---

[454] CT *115 – 419*.
[455] I read *kyi sa*.
[456] CT *115 – 432*.
[457] A third one regards the temporal status of the *karman* as that which has been made (*byas pa*) or has been made into the domain (*yul du byas pa*). The past tense seems to be indicatory, otherwise the *vibhakti*-definition would not have added the "quasi-status" of *karman*s in the present (*las lta bur byed pa*). I was unable to make further sense of this, and since to my knowledge the later tradition refrained from drawing on this particular feature, it will not be further considered.

becomes the locus of the agent's doing. Maybe more trenchantly, *karman* may be interpreted as the 'domain' or 'focus' of the agent's performance, for example a piece of wood in the focus of a carpenter who cuts the wood, in a sentence such as 'the carpenter cuts wood.' The Tibetan term *yul du byed pa* (lit. 'making into the place/domain/object) is a translation of Sanskrit *viṣayī karoti* in non-grammatical literature.[458] I am not qualified to decide on the affinity of the semantic fields of Sanskrit *viṣayī karoti* ('make an object') and *Cāndra*'s *(vy)āpya* ('to be reached'), but the idea of *āpya* according to which the patient of the sentence is to be reached or obtained through the action certainly resonates with the patient as a locus, domain or focus of the agent's activity. In addition to this general conceptual propinquity or at least compatibility with C 2.1.43, NGg's conception of the second case *karman*, especially its two major characteristics of distinctiveness of agent and *karman* as well as the specification of *karman* in terms of *yul* (*viṣaya*), already figures very directly in the Sanskritic tradition.

8.1.2.2 On the Notion of *viṣaya* (*yul*) in Sanskritic Conceptions of *karman*

Without attempting to determine the actual inspirational sources for the Tibetan accounts quoted above and below, it may be stated that the only Sanskritic sources where I encountered the direct explication of the idea that the *kāraka karman* is *viṣaya* are found in the *Nyāya* literature, i.e. non-Buddhist philosophical sources.[459] The *Nyāyavārttika* (NV)[460] introduces the term *kriyāviṣaya* (*bya ba'i yul*, 'domain of the action') in a discussion of the famous six *kāraka*s in the context of *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) 2.1.16:

> *darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatvād vṛkṣaḥ karma, karmaṇi kaḥ kārakārthaḥ? kriyāviṣayatvam. yat khalu kriyāyā viṣayabhāvena vyavatiṣṭhate tat karma. anena karmalakṣaṇena tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam iti (= P 1.4.50) saṃgṛhītam.*

> "[In 's/he looks at the tree' (*vṛkṣaṃ paśyati*),] the tree is *karman,* because it is that which is desired to be reached through the [action of] looking (*darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatva*). What is the meaning of the *kāraka* in the case of *karman*? To be the domain of the action (*kriyāviṣayatva*). Now that which is definitive/stands out (*vyavatiṣṭhate*) (?) as the

---

[458] Cf. Negi 2003, 5860.

[459] The following investigation is mainly confined to only two of the earlier *Nyāya* sources in which are found simple and straightforward accounts of *karman* qua *viṣaya* and which precede the NGg or are at least positioned within the same early time frame. This serves the purpose of presenting the necessary textual evidence that such a conception of *karman* has already circulated in a very direct form in the Sanskritic tradition at the time of NG and NGg's composition, yet it is not intended to establish any relation between Sanskritic *Nyāya* and Tibetan grammaticography which would amount to an astonishing twist in Tibetan intellectual history, but which is too early to be assumed and likely much more complex.

[460] Composed by Udyotakara (~ 6th/7th century).

domain of the action is the *karman*. Through this definition of *karman* [also] '[that which is] connected in the same way [but] undesired' (= P 1.4.50) is included."[461]

Without a direct reference, NV's *darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatva* is the application of *Pāṇinian kartur īpsitatamaṃ*, even more literally that of KV's *kartuḥ kriyayā (yad) āptum iṣṭatamaṃ*, and it stresses the idea of *āp* ('to reach') for *karman*.[462] That which is desired to be reached, i.e. the *karman*, is simultaneously qualified by *kriyāviṣaya*. This Sanskrit term does not seem to be a common technical term in classical Sanskritic grammatical schools, at least I did not identify it in *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* or *Kātantra* nor in commentaries like Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* or the later *Kāśikāvṛtti*. Also Abhyankar did not include it in his Sanskrit grammatical dictionary.[463]

If *āptum* ('reached') is determined as the main qualificand of *karman* in NV's *darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatva* and the *iṣyamāṇa* is neglected as a secondary specification reproducing the original desiderative information of the *Pāṇinian* maxim of *īpsitatama*, a direct relation becomes evident in this source between Sanskrit *āp* ('to reach') and *viṣaya* ('domain'). To further develop my interpretation of NV, that item which is desired to be reached (*āptum iṣyamāṇa*) by means of the action, which of course is in closest proximity to that which is to be reached (*āpya*) by means of the action (C 2.1.43), lies in the focus of the reaching and thus becomes the focus or domain of the action (*kriyāviṣaya*). As clarified in NV, the reason for the shift of focus from a *Pāṇinian* definition that focuses on the parameter of desire to the more neutral *kriyāviṣaya* is that it provides a simple and pragmatic solution to summarize the different meanings of *karman* as defined in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.49-50. This is precisely the same rationale also encountered in *Cāndra*'s *Vṛtti* and its substitution of *kriyāpya* for *karman*.[464]

Vācaspati's (~ 9th/10th century) subcommentary on the *Nyāyavārttika*, the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (NVTT), provides a much more theoretical and philosophical interpretation of *kriyaviṣaya* in the context of its commentary on the passage of NV quoted above:

> *uttaram – kriyāviṣayatvamiti. anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ kriyāviṣayatvaṃ*
> *karmatvam. devadattasamavetayā hi kriyayā darśanalakṣaṇayā vṛkṣaviṣayo 'nubhavo*

---

[461] Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1997, 189.1-4.

[462] Cf. supra 170 and ft. 435. The two sources are both dated to around the 6th/7th century. I am not able to answer, whether there is any textual evidence which could prove that Udyotakara knew about the KV.

[463] Cf. Abhyankar 1986. Note that Abhyankar (1986, 363) provides the notion *viṣayaviṣayibhāva* ('relation between the object and the subject') with a reference to Kaiyaṭa (11th century ?) on P 6.4.104. I have been unable to address how this notion may be related to the idea of *kriyāviṣaya* as presented in the following, but I could not identify any direct connection.

[464] Cf. supra 170.

janyate. [...] *etena ca karmalakṣaṇenāhiṃ laṅghayati grāmaṃ gacchan vṛkṣamūlānyupasarpatītyādayo 'pi saṃgṛhītā veditavyāḥ.*

"Next [is] 'being the domain of the action (*kriyāviṣayatva*).' To be endowed with the result of an action which is inherent in [something] distinct (*anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva*) is being the domain of the action, which is being *karman*. [In 'Devadatta looks at the tree,'] a direct cognition (*anubhāva*) of the tree as the domain is produced by an action (*kriyayā* [...] *janyate*) inherent in (*samaveta*) Devadatta and characterized by looking. [...] And through this definition of the *karman*, also 'walking to the village,' 's/he steps over a snake,' [or] '(s)he comes near the roots of a tree'[465] should be understood to be included. [...]"[466]

In short, that very entity which is connected or endowed (*śālitva*) with the result of the action – that is to say, where the result manifests itself – that entity is the *kriyāviṣaya* ('place/domain of the action'), which once again is intended to comprise at least two types of *karman* listed in Pāṇini's grammar 1.4.49 and 50.

Vācaspati's elaboration of *kriyāviṣaya* adds important features compared to the account in NV. Although he adheres to the general idea that *karman* is the entity reached or to be reached by the action,[467] in Vācaspati's commentary *viṣaya* primarily refers to the experiencer or locus of the result of the action. The second important addition is his idea of the distinctiveness of agent and *karman*, which is made explicit by means of the *anātmasamavetakriyā* ('action inherent in something distinct'). This notion deserves closer attention with regard to Si tu's typology of actions, in which it corresponds to his definition of differentiated and non-differentiated actions (*tha dad min*) in terms of *byed pa po gzhan dang dngos su (mi) 'brel ba'i bya ba* ('an action which is (or is not) directly related to a distinct agent'). As to the current context of case grammar, it suffices to say that this notion was introduced by Vācaspati to account for instances

---

[465] These two examples are taken from *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh), *Bhāṣya* 6 and 7 respectively ad P 1.4.50.

[466] Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 322.7-17.

[467] This becomes evident in the NVTT prior to the last quotation:

> *prcchati 'karmaṇikaḥ kārakārthaḥ'. kārakaśabdārthaḥ kriyānimittaṃ hi kārakam. yat punaḥ kriyāyā eva vyāpyaṃ na tat kriyānimittamiti na kārakam?*
>
> "[The NV] asks: 'What is the meaning of the *kāraka* [in the context of] *karman*?' The meaning of the term *kāraka* is that *kāraka* [is] certainly the cause of the action. Conversely, is *karman* not a *kāraka* in the sense that not that which is to be reached by actions (*kriyāyā vyāpya*) is a cause of the action?"
>
> (Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 322.5-7)

The issue at hand is of little interest for the current investigation, and its solution is connected to the preexistence of *karman*/*kriyāviṣaya* prior to the action, for which reason it ultimately qualifies as a cause of the action and thus a *kāraka* despite being that entity which is to be reached. The *karman* as *kriyāviṣaya* is only endowed with the result, but not the result itself according to NVTT's theory. What is of more interest here is that Vācaspati's phrasing of *kriyāyā vyāpya*, which completely omits the idea of desire (*īpsita*, *iṣṭatamaṃ*, etc.), comes very close to Candragomin's *kriyayā vyāpya* ('that which is to be reached by the action').

such as *nagaraṃ gacchati caitraḥ* ('Caitra goes to town'). This phrase conveys the problem for his definition of *kriyāphalaśālitva* ('being endowed with the result of the action') that the result of the action of going, which he renders in accordance with the tradition as 'reaching somewhere' or 'meeting with something' (*prāpti*),[468] qualifies both Caitra as well as the town, since the result of reaching or meeting can only take place between two entities.[469] Therefore, Caitra, despite being the agent of the sentence, qualifies as *karman* in the same way as *nagara* does. The addition that the action is inherent in an agent which is distinct from the experiencer of the result then solves this issue by clarifying that Caitra, since the action is inherent in him as the goer, becomes the agent and thus can no longer experience the result.

The importance of Vācaspati's conception of *karman* in the Sanskritic tradition can be best seen from its appearance in the much later *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāraḥ* of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa (17th century), who was a grammarian and thus in opposition to the Naiyāyikas:

> *tathā hi 'karmaṇi dvitīyā'* [*pā sū* 2-3-2] *tacca karturīpsitamaṃ* [*pā sū* 1-4-49] *kriyājanyaphalāśraya ityarthaḥ.* [...] *'tathā yuktaṃ cānīpsitam'* [*pā sū* 1-4-50] *ityādisaṃgrahāccaivameva yuktaṃ.*

> "Therefore, 'a second [case suffix] if there is a *karman*' (= P 2.3.2). That is 'that which is most desired by the agent' (= P 1.4.49) [and is] 'the substratum of the result produced by the action' (*kriyājanyaphalāśraya*). [...] It is also suitable in this manner, because it includes '[That which is] connected in the same way [but] undesired' (= P 1.4.50), etc."[470]

This resonates directly with Vācaspati's *anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva*, with the variation that the *karman* is the substratum (*āśraya*) of the result and not endowed with it (*śālin*) as well as the omission of the *anātmasamaveta*, which is subsequently refuted by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa.

The entire conception of *karman* as *kriyāviṣaya* is closely connected to attempts towards a simplification and homogenization of the *Pāṇinian* approach which distinguishes between desired and undesired *karman*s. This approach occurs already in the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* and thus before the quoted *Nyāya* sources, however both feature a shift away from *Pāṇinian īpsita* ('desired') towards a more inclusive reinterpretation of *karman* in terms of either *kriyāviṣaya* ('domain of action') or *āptum* and *āpya* ('reached' and 'to be reached').

---

[468] Cf. Thakur 1996, 322.17-21.
[469] Cf. also Joshi (1990, 268) for a discussion of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's critique of the *anātmasamaveta* as the solution of this issue, as well as Bhatta (2001, 720ff.) for the view of the Navya-Naiyāyika Gadādhara.
[470] Sanskrit transliterated from Penna 2013, 266.

Returning to the Himalayan plateau and NGg's definition of *karman*, there are noteworthy differences compared to the Sanskritic sources. The Tibetan treatise does not employ the notion of *kriyāviṣaya* (*bya ba'i yul*) as such, but it only speaks of *karman* in terms of *yul du byas pa* (*viṣayīkṛta*, 'being made (into) the domain'), which however is only a minor terminological-conceptual variation. It is most important to note that the subsequent Tibetan grammatical tradition has discarded NGg's *yul du byas pa* and frequently speaks instead of *bya ba'i yul*, a terminological convergence with Sanskritic *kriyāviṣaya* too striking to be a mere coincidence. Secondly, NGg employs the characteristic of distinctiveness between the agent and *karman* only in very general terms, and the related issues that prompted its implementation in the NVTT are completely lacking in the Tibetan source. Finally, NVTT's notion of result (*phala*) is not found NGg at all.[471]

NGg is at most a free and general rendition of the quoted conceptions of *karman* qua *kriyāviṣaya* with a focus on the very basics: a *karman* is that which is the domain (*viṣaya*, ~*yul du byas pa*) of an action done by a distinct agent (*anātmasamavetakriyā*, ~ *las byed pa gzhan zhig*), its domainhood being perhaps related to and developed in connection with *karman* as that which functions as the object of reaching (verbal root *āp*).

Regardless the precise relation between NGg and NV(TT), the quoted sources above sufficiently reveal that detailed conceptions and discourses of the notion of the *kāraka karman* qua *viṣaya* had already occurred in the Sanskritic tradition and featured both major aspects of NGg's definition of *las*, namely the ideas of domain and distinctiveness. It may therefore be concluded that the technical term *yul* in Tibetan grammaticography was likely adopted from the context of Sanskritic conceptions of *karman* as part of the *kāraka* theory – although questions as to the form and the medium through which these conceptions were transmitted to Tibet must still remain open. It could be imagined that Tibetan scholars were introduced to this conceptual framework through various scriptural sources already in the early stages of Tibetan linguistic studies, or perhaps also through an oral transmission of Indian scholars who had been familiar with these concepts in one way or another. This study will not address the question whether the technical term *kriyāviṣaya* for *karman* was a development specific to *Nyāya* and known as such in the Sanskritic tradition, or whether it circulated more freely and diffusely in different fields

---

[471] However, an indirect indication of the importance of the resultative aspect of *karman* in NGg's conception might perhaps be the use of *byas pa* in the perfect tense of both, the *kāraka-* and *vibhakti*-definition, in the sense that *karman* is that which has been made into the domain (*kāraka*) or that which has been made (*vibhakti*). In contrast, NGg explicitly distinguished these instances from the 'quasi-*karman*' that is being made (*las lta bur byed pa*) during the *vibhakti*-definition.

of knowledge with or without existing terminological and conceptual variations.[472] However, it is clear that at least the general attempt to homogenize the originally *Pāṇinian* conception of *karman* was a common theme in and outside the field of grammar which also motivated solutions such as *Cāndra*'s *kriyāpya*.

8.1.2.3 The Second Case *las* as (*bya ba'i*) *gzhi* in the *Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa*

A similar idea to NGg's *yul du byas pa* is also pronounced in the GNT in the form of *gzhir byas pa* ('making into the substratum') and implemented in another theory of equal importance for the following tradition and Si tu. The *Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa* starts its discussion of the second case *las* with a most intriguing investigation into the nature of action:

> *de yang gnyis pa'i sgra ni las kyis*[473] *kho na yin te/   las te yang rnam pa gnyis su 'gyur te/   byed pa po la yod pa'i las dang bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa'i las gnyis so/   las de gnyis kyang phyogs gcig la mtshon na sta res shing gcod pa lta bu la/   sta re steng du 'gro ba dang/   'og tu 'jug pa lta bu'i bya ba byed pa rnams ni byed pa po la yod pa'i las yin la/   de'i dus su shing dum bu gnyis lta bur gyur pa ni bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa'i las so/   de lta bu la sogs pa dngos po thams cad kyis las gnyis su she par bya ste/   de la byed pa po la yod pa'i las ni gsum pa kho na yin gyi/   gnyis par mi lta'o/   gnas gnyis pa 'dir ni bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa'i las kho na ston pa yin pas/   de'i bye brag ma 'dzol ba yang kal te ba nyid to/   de yang shing la gcod ces pa'am/   shing la rko 'jog 'brud 'dar ba la sogs pa shing bzhir* [sic!][474] *byas nas shing gi steng du las byed pa rnams lta bu ste shing la chu chus zhes pa'am chu thong zhes pa lta bu shing gi dgos pa rgyu mtshan du byas nas byed pa ni bzhi pa nyid yin gyi gnyis yin pa ma yin no/*

"Furthermore, regarding the second [case-]term (*gnyis pa'i sgra*), it is only *karman* (*las*). This *karman*, in turn, has two aspects, the *karman* existent in the agent (*byed pa po la yod pa'i las*) and the *karman* existent in the substratum of action (*bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa'i las*). If [we] illustrate these two *karman*s together, for example 'to cut a tree with an axe,' (*sta res shing* [!] *gcod pa*) the doing of actions (*bya ba byed pa*) like the axe's movement upwards and penetration downwards is the *karman* existent in the agent. At that time, the having-turned-into-something-like-two-pieces of the tree is the *karman* existent in the substratum of the action. In this manner, *karman* is to be

---

[472] Only with regard to the specification of *anātmasamavetakriyā* ('action inherent in something distinct'), it can be said with some more certainty that this must have circulated as a theory specific to the *Nyāya* in the Sanskritic tradition, since it was criticized by grammarians (cf. supra 179).

[473] I read *las kyi sa*.

[474] I read *gzhir*.

181

understood as twofold throughout all things (*dngos po*). Now, regarding the *karman* existent in the agent, this is only the third [case], whereas it is not to be regarded as the second [case]. Regarding this second semantic domain (*gnas gnyis pa* = second case), it only expresses the *karman* existent in the substratum of action, [and] therefore it is of particular importance to not confuse their specifics. Additionally, 'cutting into the tree' (*shing la* [!] *gcod*) or 'carving into, putting onto, digging into, rubbing on (?) the tree' (*shing la* [!] *rko 'jog 'brud 'dar ba*), etc. are something like doings of *karman*s on top of (*steng du*) the tree, after having made the tree into the substratum (*gzhir byas nas*), whereas e.g. 'irrigating the tree [with] water' or 'send water!' (?) are an acting after having taken the need of the tree as a reason. This [last instance] is precisely the fourth [case], but not the second."[475]

The use of *las* in this quotation is polysemous, since it first refers to the case function or *kāraka*, then to the two types of activities which constitute the main action, and finally to the main action itself. The GNT divides any kind of action in very clear and simple terms into two constitutive parts or aspects (*rnam pa*), one belonging to the agent (*byed pa po*) and the other to the substratum of action (*bya ba'i gzhi*), the latter part being then identified with the second case *las*. The dichotomy of an action's active and passive part[476] distributed onto the agent and *karman* respectively remains a prominent theory in later Tibetan grammar, with the major difference that in *Sum rtags* literature, it was converted from a description of the second case into the interpretation of the opaque, if not to say mysterious dichotomy of *bdag* and *gzhan* in TKJ 11.4-12.3. In the GC, where it is used likewise for *bdag/gzhan*, it constitutes the very basis of Si tu's typology of action together with the mentioned idea of *byed pa po gzhan dang dngos su (mi) 'brel ba*.[477] It suffices to note that the distinction itself together with the example of a moving axe splitting the tree into two parts was once more adopted from the Sanskritic tradition, where it has been rendered in terms of the dichotomy of *vyāpāra* ('activity') and *phala* ('result'), a common distinction in later linguistic theories of the three schools of *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā*. Its historical origin remains unclear, but the most likely candidate are perhaps the Naiyāyikas, who focus on the example of cutting wood in their illustrations in sources like the NVTT,[478] and a focus on *phala* ('result') was already encountered above in

---

[475] CT *115 – 447*.

[476] Not to be confused with grammatical voice.

[477] Cf. supra 178. For a detailed discussion of this bipolarity of actions in Si tu's GC, cf. Tillemans and Herforth 1989.

[478] For NVTT's rendition of *vyāpāra* and *phala*, cf. infra 250f. On the possible beginning of this dichotomy by the school of Naiyāyikas, the following is stated in Joshi and Roodbergen 1994, 126:

NVTT's rendition of *karman* qua *kriyāviṣaya* that is *anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva*. Due to the relation of the example of cutting wood to the *vyāpāra/phala* concept, the connection of the second case qua *las* (*karman*) to the resultative part of the action (*phala*) is more prominent in the GNT compared to NGg, even though the Sanskitic terminology has not been directly adopted (*phala* = Tibetan *'bras bu*).[479]

In GNT, this resultative part of the action explicitly belongs to *bya ba'i gzhi*, the substratum of the action, which is further specified as the tree made (into) the substratum so that the action is done literally 'on top' (*steng du*) of it. The addition of Tibetan *steng du* thus further emphasizes a spatial-locative interpretation of *bya ba'i gzhi* and *gzhir byas pa*.

The relation of GNT to the NGg on the one hand and Sanskritic *kriyāviṣaya* on the other requires interpretation, because GNT's second case is not a simple reproduction of any of them. The following will be confined to a short remark, but a more detailed future study of this issue is a desideratum.

First, there is the simple terminological divergence between *yul*/*viṣaya* ('domain,' 'focus,' 'object,' etc.) and *gzhi* ('substratum'). This may be a minor issue, since both are valid translations for Sanskrit *viṣaya*,[480] and the substitution of *āśraya* (*gzhi*, 'substratum') for *śālin* ('endowed with, possessing') in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāraḥ* shows that this notion has been used within the context of *karman* in the Sanskritic tradition as well.[481] The change from *yul* to *gzhi* may have moreover been motivated in connection with the common seventh case label

---

"Traditionally – but where this tradition starts is not clear, maybe from later Naiyāyikas – the meaning of a transitive verb is analyzed into an activity (*vyāpāra*) and a result or effect (*phala*). As explained by the *Bālamanoramā* on the *SK* (=*Siddhāntakaumudī*) here, the time-honoured example is *pac-* 'to cook'. The verbal base meaning is defined as *viklittyanukūlavyāpāra* 'an activity leading to the softening (of the rice-grains)'. Here *viklitti* 'the softening (of the rice-grains)' is the *phala*. The substratum (*āśraya*) of the activity (really a conglomerate of activities, see Vt. VIII on P 1.4.23 and VP 3.8.4) is the agent (*kartr̥*). The substratum of the result/effect is the direct object (*karman*). It is further assumed that in the case of a transitive verb the word representing the *vyāpāra* and the word representing the *phala* must not be coreferential. In fact, they must refer to different items."

In contrast, Diaconescu (2012, 215 and 225) traces the dichotomy at least back to Helārāja (10th century) and the example of rice-cooking in the context of the grammarians:

"It must be noticed however, that historically, the double meaning of verbal roots as action and result (i.e. *vikledana* and *viklitti* for *pac*) has been asserted before Kaiyaṭa by Helārāja in his commentary on Bhartr̥hari. [...] Moreover, with respect to the meaning of the root in the equation *pacati pākaṃ karoti*, the meaning cognized from the word *pac*, i.e., *vikledana* 'making soft (by cooking or boiling),' is to be distinguished from viklitti 'becoming soft,' related to the object in the real process. The meaning can be put as *viklidyatas taṇḍulān vikledayati* 'He softens the rice grains that are becoming soft.' Therefore, there is difference in cognition between 'they become soft' (*viklidyanti*) and 'they cook' (*pacanti*), on account of the operations pertaining to the object and to the agent."

[479] Note, however, that especially GNT's use of *gyur pa* ('has turned [into]'), a *tha mi dad pa* verb in the perfect tense that covers the semantic field of 'becoming,' strongly emphasizes the resultative aspect in the action of splitting the wood.

[480] Cf. Negi 2003, 5280.

[481] Cf. supra 179.

gnas gzhi ('substratum of abiding,' 'abode') that is equally marked by *la don* in order to establish a direct terminological contrast between *bya gzhi* and *gnas gzhi*.[482] If it is correct to assume that in this context *gzhi* is equivalent to *yul*, GNT's *bya ba'i gzhi* – in contrast to NGg's *yul du byas pa* – directly corresponds to Sanskritic *kriyāviṣaya*.

Secondly, *yul du byas pa* and *gzhir byas pa* definitely refer to identical or similar ideas, however GNT features a strong spatial-locative conception (*steng du*) in combination with the resultative part of the bipartite action model, whereas NGg only stresses the distinctiveness of an active part and *karman*. Certainly, this distinctiveness smoothly translates into GNT's two parts of the action and perhaps it is nothing but another rendition of it, but it has also been demonstrated that the two concepts can also be traced back to different theories in the Sanskritic tradition, *anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva* and *vyāpāra/phala* respectively. This issue may be resolved through a closer investigation into the relation of these two concepts in the Sanskritic tradition, since both figure prominently already in NVTT and they could not have been totally unrelated, a point corroborated also by their shared notion of *phala*. Nonetheless, there remains GNT's addition of *steng du*, which is either a more interpretative account of Sanskritic *kriyāviṣaya*, which does not exhibit the spatial focus in the above quotations, or it was adopted from another source or context or represents an adaptation specific to Tibetan grammaticography.

Despite the strong conceptual and terminological correspondences between Sanskritic and Tibetan sources, their precise relation cannot be determined at this point. As a working hypothesis, both presentations of the second case in NGg and GNT appear to be basic, condensed accounts of theories on *kriyaviṣaya* and *vyāpāra/phala* as they have evidently existed in Sanskritic sources. As for *vyāpāra/phala*, it is even ascertained that different forms and variations of this theory circulated in India on a broader basis.[483]

Without resolving all the details in this survey, it nevertheless provides us with a basic and clear picture of the history of the Tibetan second case *las/las su bya ba* as *yul/gzhi* together with its conception in the early Tibetan tradition. In summary, it represents an entity that is the location, focal point or domain of the action and which is closely connected to the result of an agent's doing. Historically, the cited *Nyāya* sources are a strong indication that the term was introduced in the Sanskritic tradition as *kriyāviṣaya* in order to combine and homogenize the different meanings of *karman* originally listed in *Pāṇini* and that it is perhaps related to *Cāndra*'s understanding of *karman* as *kriyāpya*. For the Tibetan tradition, this terminological-conceptual

---

[482] Cf. chapter 13.1.

[483] The perhaps most fruitful approach would be to investigate the discourse on *śābdabodha* that received increased attention especially in the later Indian tradition (main period approx. 15th to 17th century.). Material regarding these theories are mainly available in the works especially of *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā*.

framework then would have been the obvious choice, since north of the Himalaya the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* was much more dominant than *Pāṇini* and its commentators.[484]

8.1.2.4 A First Résumé on the Early Conception of the Second Case

The presentation so far provides an utterly clear picture of the early approach to the Tibetan-specific morphosyntactic differences between the four morphemes *la*, *na*, *du* and the unmarked argument of Tibetan sentences. Neither the Sanskritic nor the Tibetan sources have designed the basic conception of *karman* in such a way that it corresponds with the morphosyntactic distribution of the four Tibetan morphologies. As it was demonstrated, the whole conception of *viṣaya* was originally motivated by the rather opposite intention to unify subcategorizations. If we are to compare the presented theories on *karman*/*las* qua *viṣaya*/*yul*/*gzhi* with academic linguistic notions, they come closest to a genuine PATIENT role as the most affected entity. Regarding the functional difference between an ALLATIVE/DIRECTION function encoded by the second case's prototypical marker *la* as well as *du* versus the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT of the unmarked argument, the NVTT even makes unmistakably clear that *karman* as *kriyāviṣaya* comprises both:

> *tena kriyāviṣayasya kriyātaḥ prāgbhāvād yuktaṃ kārakatvam. evaṃ ca vikāryaprāpyayorupapannaḥ karmabhāvaḥ, nirvartyasya tu paṭāderyadyapi kriyāyāḥ prāgbhāvo nāsti, tathāpi tadavayavānāṃ tantūnāṃ prāgbhāvaḥ, teṣāṃ ca tādarthyena paṭatve upacārāt paṭaṃ karotīti yuktaḥ prayogaḥ.*

> "Thus, because of the preexistence of the domain of the action compared to the action, [it] is a proper (*yuktaṃ* ?) *kāraka*. Accordingly, the *vikārya-* and *prāpya-*[*karman*s] are established *karman*s. Yet, even if the garments, etc. as *nirvartya*[-*karman*s] (*nirvartyasya paṭādeḥ* ?) are not prior to the action, there is the preexistence of the threads [as the garments'] parts, and since their purpose [lies] in the garmentness (*teṣāṃ ca tādarthyena paṭatve* ?), 's/he makes a garment' is a proper use due to figurative application (*upacāra*)."[485]

The subcategorization of *karman* into the three main types of *nirvartya* (~ produced), *vikārya* (~ transformed) and *prāpya* (~ to be reached/destination), the first two of which are already discussed in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh) ad P 1.4.49, goes back to Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP 3.7.45). Of these three, the *prāpya* type comprises all those objects visibly unaffected by the action,[486] which includes semantic fields such as looking somewhere, studying something as well as approaching a town ('*nagaram upasarpati*').[487] The semantic information of DIRECTION, which falls under the category of *prāpya*, is thus joined together with the other two forms of *karman* (*nirvartya* and *vikārya*) and equally qualifies as the domain of the action endowed with the result. From a Sanskrit grammatical perspective, such investigations into the nature of action and *karman*, no matter how metalinguistically or philosophically they may be coloured, remain in line with the language-specific morphosyntax and the distribution of the second case suffix and its function *karman*. The debates and resulting classifications remain within the grammatical framework offered by Sanskrit language as well as the semantic-syntactic conditions defined in the grammars. But how was it possible for the early Tibetan grammarians to adhere to these investigations, if they do not correspond to the surface structure of their own language? And why did they not attempt any adaptation of the conception of *karman*? Did they not see the incompatibility of typical Sanskritic conceptions of *karman* with Tibetan language in general and the *la don* morphemes in particular? In fact, most of the early sources remain silent on this issue, but at least one source, namely the GNT, provides sufficient material for an answer.

8.1.2.5 On the Semantic Nature of the Second Case in the *Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa*

It comes as no surprise that a source such as the GNT does not deviate from the Sanskritic conception of the second case and lacks any attempts at an adaptation according to the requirements of WT, since the treatise is dedicated to the cases in general and claims that they cover any type of term (*tha snyad*) concerning real phenomena in *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* ('*khor 'das kyi dngos po*').[488] Since this text shows clear evidence of the cases as valid both in the Sanskrit and Tibetan context, GNT's claim should be understood as stating that any *existing term regardless of the language* is covered by these eight cases. GNT attributes a strong and categorical validity to the cases. However, how is the treatise able to establish such a status for the second case in view of the fact that it directly faces counterevidence of this assumption in the morphosyntax of WT, even more so if *las* is associated with *la don*?

---

[486] Cf. VP 3.7.51; Subramania 1992, 301f.
[487] Cf. Subramania 1992, 302.
[488] Cf. supra 95f.

186

Even though the *Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa* identifies the *la*-morpheme as the morphological realization of the second case, the examples in the treatise show significant morphosyntactic variations. First, the treatise provides two versions for the prototypical example of wood cutting (*sta res shing gcod pa* and *shing la gcod*), one in which the wood as the *karman* remains unmarked and is thus represented as the DIRECT OBJECT or PATIENT according to Tibetan-specific syntax, as well as a second one in which the wood is represented as either the DIRECTION or INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT depending on the precise function of *la* in this clause.[489] If we follow the common academic interpretation of *la* as an ALLATIVE/DIRECTION marker, the difference in meaning would then approximately be that of 'to cut the wood' vs. 'to cut **into** the wood.' In this instance, *la* as an indirect or secondary objective marker seems to be less intuitive, unless the morpheme was primarily used for emphatic reasons or perhaps to indicate some form of partitive meaning.[490] In any case, the author apparently did not really bother with the morphosyntactic variation between *la* and unmarked; but the treatise does not only alternate between the precise grammatical construction in the prototypical example of wood cutting, it also explicitly mentions and elaborates on the use of the two remaining morphological categories *na* and *du* as second cases. Immediately following the above quotation, the author gives his exposition of the morpheme *na*:

> *gnyis pa'i la'i sgra 'di nyid ni na yis kyang ston nus te/   shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing 'dug ces pa'am/   rked na 'jog ces pa'am/   rtsa ba nas rko zhes pa la sogs pa'ang de las mi 'da' 'o/   de bzhin du zhing gi zhabs na rmod cing 'dug ces pa la sogs pa'ang shes par bya'o/*

> "This very *la* term (*la'i sgra*) [as] the second [case] can also be indicated by [the morpheme] *na*: [the examples of] 'residing at the top of the tree and cut [it]' (*shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing 'dug*), 'split [it] at the trunk' (*rked na 'jog*) or 'dig [it] out from the root' (*rtsa ba nas rko*), etc. do not go beyond *karman*. In the same way are to be understood 'to reside at the bottom (?) of the field and plow [it]' (*zhing gi zhabs na rmod cing 'dug*), etc."[491]

GNT provides two examples, one which employs the word 'tree/wood' (*shing*) and the other uses the word 'field' (*zhing*). The example of the tree can be further divided into three different

[489] On the term SECONDARY OBJECT in this dissertation, cf. ft. 268. On the question of the functioning of *la* as either DIRECTION or INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT, cf. infra 201f.
[490] On *la* as an emphatic marker of the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT, cf. supra 103f. and infra 200f.
[491] CT *115 – 447*.

clauses, but the Tibetan phrasing makes clear that the *cing 'dug* of *shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing 'dug* belongs to all three and its omission in the remaining two represents a simple ellipse:

> (1) (1.1) *shing gi rtse mo **na** gcod cing **'dug** ces pa'am/*   (1.2) *rked **na** 'jog ces pa'am/*
> (1.3) *rtsa ba **nas** rko zhes pa/*
> ''**residing at** the top of the tree and cut [it],' 'split [it] **at** the trunk,' or 'dig [it] out **from** the root''[492]
> (2) *zhing gi zhabs **na** rmod cing **'dug**/*
> 'to **reside at** the bottom of the field and plow [it]' (or 'to reside down at the field and plow it' ?)

The illustrations are difficult to analyze and may be interpreted in different ways, but it is clear that the examples differ significantly from the previous *zhing (la) gcod*. The author added spatial specifications (*rtse mo* 'top,' *rked* 'trunk,' 'stem,' *rtsa ba* 'root,' *zhabs* 'bottom') of the entity representing the *karman* and then he added a second verb *'dug* (lit. 'to reside,' 'to sit,' 'to exist somewhere') after the main actions.

The construction of a verb followed by *cing 'dug* offers two interpretations. First, the addition of *'dug* may be a separate verb on the same hierarchical level as *gcod*, etc. in the examples and translated as 'to reside [and cut, split, etc.].' Alternatively, the construction verb plus *cing 'dug* may be an auxiliary construction to indicate the durative aspect of the main verb. In contrast to the translation offered above, a phrase like *shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing 'dug* could then be translated as '[someone] is cutting at the top of the tree,' or perhaps more trenchantly '[someone] dwells in cutting […]' or 'spends time cutting […],' instead of the simple *gcod* that would be more factual in the sense of 'cut'. It is obvious that the durative auxiliary use of *'dug* is derived from its lexical value, and the demarcation line between the two readings of the examples is fluid and a matter of emphasis depending on the context. The durative construction implies the residence or dwelling of the agent at that place, in the same way as the use of *'dug* as a separate verb implies that the action expressed in the first verb is the mode of how the agent dwells. Whatever reading is preferable, the addition of *'dug* brings in a noticeable locative connotation, either as a durative auxiliary construction or as a separate verb, which is then further supported by the use of spatial specifications of where the agent needs to reside for the performance of cutting, etc. Yet, in both readings of the sample phrases the implication remains that the top, trunk, etc. of the tree are not just the locations of where an agent resides or is

---

[492] A less literal but more accurate translation according to my interpretation would be: ''residing at the top of the tree and cut [it],' '[residing] at the trunk [and] split [it],' or '[residing at] the root [and] dig [it] out from there.''

cutting, etc. something, but that the tree is that which is being cut, etc. In other words, it is indeed an important information e.g. in *shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing 'dug* that the tree is cut at the top.

The modifications of sample phrases of the morpheme *na* compared to *zhing* (*la*) *gcod* resonate with Tournadre's presentation of *na* as a mere locative[493] as well as with the findings in Nathan Hill's study on the *Old Tibetan Annals*, according to which *na* expresses mainly a mere static, locative meaning with locations but not with physical objects or beings.[494] It is therefore clear in my view that the author made these additions to emphasize the locative aspect in these sample phrases and to provide a suitable syntactic-semantic environment for the use of *na* that is a clear locative marker in WT. The tree (*shing*) and field (*zhing*) as the *karman*s of cutting and plowing respectively, although an important information contained in these samples, are not directly encoded through grammatical marking but indirectly derived from the the lack of an unmarked argument and the consequent event-construal of the underlying situation at hand. From a morphosyntactic perspective, the arguments marked by *na* are clearly not instances of *karman*. Yet, it must be admitted that such constructions pose a challenge to grammatical analysis, since they are elliptic and encode the semantic double value of *shing gi rtse mo gcod* ('to cut the top of the tree') and *shing gi rtse mo na 'dug*/*gcod* ('to reside/cut at the top of the tree'). One might therefore argue that the underlying semantic structure is more complex than its morphosyntactic representation on the surface of the sentence. The modern linguistic classification of this elliptic use of *na* is based on a distributional approach to extract the generic uses of the morpheme throughout the language, however one can hardly expect an early Tibetan tradition to have such a methodology readily at hand, especially in view of the metalinguistic-semantic character of the adopted grammatical terminology already in the Sanskritic tradition. GNT's classification of *na* as a second rather than a seventh case was perhaps established due to the fact that in grammatical constructions in the form of a verb plus *cing 'dug*, indeed *'dug* is often secondary to the action expressed in the main verb. The dominance of the main verb apparently facilitated the semantic interpretation of these phrases in terms of *karman* against the generic meaning of the case marker itself.[495]

---

[493] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 110.
[494] Hill 2011, 19.
[495] Note that *Smra sgo*'s autocommentary provides GNT's *shing gi rtse mo na gcod* ('[s/he] cuts at the top of the tree' → '[s/he] cuts the tree at the top') without *cing 'dug* as the only illustration of *na* in the meaning of *las*. Such instances are perhaps even more challenging, assuming that they are not ungrammatical (cf. Smṛti 2002, 79).

In any event, it is most striking that the author felt the need to significantly adjust the grammatical construction of the sample clauses compared to the more straightforward *zhing (la) gcod*. This move to adjust the grammatical construction of the samples to WT reveals the author's sensitivity to the morphosyntactic, i.e. language-specific differences between *la* and *na*. Even more interesting in this context is the use of the morpheme *nas* in *rtsa ba **nas** rko* ('dig out **from** the roots'), which may be just a corrupt passage, but in fact it is a correct grammatical construction in Tibetan and thus might have been intended by the author.

Subsequent to the previous quotation, GNT addresses the morpheme *du*:

> *gzhan yang gnyis pa la'i sgra 'di nyis su 'gyur te/   la dngos gzhi sgra dang la dang cha dang 'thun pa'i sgra'i/   de la dngos kyi sgra ni sngar bstan par zad do/   /la dang cha 'thun pa'i sgra ni du dang ru dang su rnams kyis kyang ston te/   dper na khang bzang gi bye brag 'ga'zhig thog dgu phar du phug   /dbyibs gru bzhi ru brtsigs shing mig mangs ris sub dang zhes pa lta bu'o/   de rnam kyang las kho na ston par lta'o/*

> "Furthermore, this second [case], the *la*-term, is twofold: the actual *la*-term (*la dngos gzhi sgra*) and the term partially accordant with *la* (*la dang cha dang 'thun pa'i sgra*). Now, as for the actual term (*dngos kyi sgra*), it has already been taught. As for the term partially accordant with *la*, [it] is also indicated by [the morphemes] *du*, *ru* and *su*, for example as in 'some specifically well-made palaces are carved out (?) **into** more than nine stories (*thog dgu phar **du** phug*), built **in** square form (*dbyibs gru bzhi **ru** brtsigs*) and set **into** a checkered square design (*mig mangs ris **su** btang*).' Also these [instances] are to be regarded as indicating only *karman*."[496]

The author introduces a subcategory of *la'i sgra* (lit. '*la*-morpheme' or '*la*-term'), the so-called *la dang cha 'thun pa'i sgra* ('term partially accordant with *la*'), which is contrasted with the actual *la*-term. The specific function of the morpheme *du* in this example is also known in the tradition as *de nyid* ('identity'), and Tournadre labels it "the transformative function,"[497] a genuine meaning of *du* and only rarely of *la*. It will have to be decided elsewhere whether the subsumption of such instances under *karman* is based on a Sanskritic model, for example the double accusative constructions traditionally associated with P 1.4.51, or more on a consideration of Tibetan-specific syntax.

---

[496] CT *115* – 447f.; my emphasis.
[497] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f.

Furthermore, unfortunately the phrasing of this passage is highly ambiguous regarding the proposed subcategorization. On the one hand, *gnyis pa* ('the second') suggests that the topic is that of the second case, i.e. *karman*, and thus we are facing a semantic-functional subcategorization into actual and partially accordant *karman*s. However, the *la'i sgra* appears to refer to morphology as the general term for all three of the morphemes *la*, *na* and *du*, if we read it against the backdrop of SCP's *la sgra*.[498] *La dang cha 'thun pa* ('partially accordant with *la*') may therefore also refer to the entire morpheme *du* rather than the transformative function, meaning that *du* is only partially accordant with *la*, because it indicates the second case *las* in the same way as *la* and *na* but additionally also the transformative function, which is normally not expressed by *la*. Although the employed terminology is perhaps more in favor of a morphological interpretation, the structure of the sentence as well as of the entire passage seem to corroborate the semantic-functional focus. For the time being, therefore the notion of *la'i sgra* – as ambiguous as it might be – will be read as a direct reference to the second case *las* as its alternative label and translated as '*la*-term' instead of '*la*-morpheme.'[499] *La dang cha mthun* then only establishes the distinction between transformative function and actual *karman*. It is not further explicated how this functional difference should be perceived, and various possibilities may be imagined.

If my reading should turn out to be inconsistent, then the translation in the last two quotations of *la'i sgra* as '*la*-term' should be replaced with '*la*-morpheme' to emphasize the morphological reading outlined above. In any case, the author's association of *du* with this function together with his use of this morpheme in the illustrations once again remain in line with the Tibetan-specific morphosyntax and reveal his proficiency in the correct application of *du*.

Finally, GNT gives a detailed specification of the morphological difference between the allomorphs *du*, *ru* and *su* and the ways in which they are triggered by the different final sounds of the preceding syllable:

> *gzhan yang ming gang yang rung ba'i mtha' na/   ga dang nga la sogs pa'i rjes 'jug bcus brten pa yod la/   de rnams kyang gnyis pa las su sbyor na/   du dang ru dang su gsum kho na las su 'gyur te/*

---

[498] SCP 9.3-11.4.

[499] Note that the term *sgra* ('morpheme,' 'term') generally refers to morphology in the grammatical context, especially within the pair *sgra* ('sound, morpheme') and *don* ('meaning'), and often bears a bivalency in the sense that it is not just a morpheme but also a meaningful one, thus comprising both. This allows for a variety of different uses with different meanings, such as 'term,' 'notion,' etc. Cf. also GNT's initial exposition of the second case, which speaks of *gnyis pa'i sgra* ('the second [case-]term'), an unmistakable reference to the case function, supra 181.

"Moreover, at the end of whatever word that is affixed (~ *brten pa*) by the ten postscripts *ga* and *nga*, etc., if [it] is also applied as the second [case] *karman*, the very (*kho na* ?) three, *du* and *ru* and *su* respectively (*kho na* ?)[500] function as *karman* (~ *las su 'gyur*)."[501]

GNT then lists the following examples as *karman* for the three allomorphs:[502]

> *du*: (1) *rgya nag tu 'gro*, (2) *rgya nag tu rgyug cig*, (3) *rgya nag tu phyin*, (4) *byang du 'gro ba*, (5) *bod du 'gro ba*, (6) *o rgyan du 'gro ba*, (7) *mtha' khob tu 'gro ba*, (8) *sum cu rtsa gsum du 'gro ba*, (9) *rgyal bu rgyal byed kyi tshal du 'gro*, (10) *rgya gar du 'gro*
> *ru:* (11) *ma ga dha ru 'gro*
> *su:* (12) *dbus su 'gro*

Interestingly, only the verbs *'gro ba* ('to go,' 'walk') (10 examples), *rgyug pa* ('to run,' 'to ride') (1 example, #2) and *phyin pa* ('has gone,' 'has come') (1 example, #3) are used in the examples. Once again, the grammatical construction of the sample phrases used by the author resonates with the observations made by Hill, according to which the primary function of the morpheme *du* in the *Old Tibetan Annals* is the LOCATION of actions and the DESTINATION of motion verbs.[503] Regrettably, the treatise does not specify whether these examples are to be classified as actual or partially accordant *la*-terms. Although their classification as only partially accordant *karman*s seems much more unlikely, from the structure of the passage as well as the fact that the treatise focuses on Sanskritic-based semantic theories of *karman* with a validity across languages, this question will deliberately remain unaddressed, since their status as second cases and thus *karman* – either actual or only partially accordant – remains undisputed in the source.

The overall presentation of the distribution of the three morphemes *la*, *na* and *du* in GNT is most intriguing and telling. The author accurately utilizes the three distinct grammatical morphemes *la*, *na* and *du* according to their generic uses in the written Tibetan language while even separating the three in his structured presentation. Thus, he demonstrates a palpable sensitivity for their difference, either deliberately or at least intuitively as a native speaker. Yet, the author also classifies all these different syntactic constructions as second cases, which

---

[500] *kho na* (lit. 'only') as well as *kyang* ('also') and its allomorphs are excessively used in this treatise, raising the question whether in fact they add any noteworthy information to the meaning of the sentence.
My translation attempts to make sense of *kho na* in this context in that the author emphasizes that he now focuses on these three particular morphemes. Or should *kho na* be understood in the sense of 'respectively,' meaning that only (*kho na*) one of the allomorphs *du*, *su* and *ru* may be used with one of the postscripts respectively?
[501] CT *115* – 448.
[502] Cf. ibid.
[503] Cf. Hill 2011, 35.

means that, according to him, they all qualify as *karman* in the sense of the substratum or domain, the locus where the resultative part of the action is located and upon which an action is performed. In other words, the language-specific categories of PATIENT, DIRECTION, LOCATION, and so forth, which in Tibetan are distributed across the different morphologies, are only secondary in the analysis of these examples. There is a disregard of the morphosyntactic surface structure, and apparently the ways in which the marked arguments can fit the definition of the second case matter much more. How should this be understood? I think that there are two important features which operate simultaneously in GNT's approach to grammatical theory formation:

1) First, the definition of the second case *las* and the bivalent action scheme do not describe any language-specific morphosyntactic surface structures, they describe the underlying phenomena or scenarios as such referred to in the different sample phrases.[504] I argue that GNT regards the quoted sample phrases more from the perspective of the instances they represent, in other words, from the perspective of the underlying scenarios or phenomena. On that level, there is no difference between, for example, *grāmaṃ gacchati* and *grong la 'gro*, since both samples refer to the same scenario. The question which case is at hand then is no longer the matter of any language-specific morphosyntactic surface structures nor their underlying semantic structures, but of a semantic construal which is deemed representative for the scenario as such. If the investigation into the scenario of a sentence suggests that a participant is the locus of the resultative part of the action, it can be regarded as an instance of the second case *karman*. If a participant is *karman* in such a construal of the scenario, then the corresponding referent in the sentence together with its marker are classified as that *karman*. I therefore argue that there is a strong and direct amalgamation of morphosyntactic and semantic structures of linguistic expressions with the level of scenarios, resulting in DeLancey's so-called "objectivist error."[505] This also instantly explains how, outside these cases, there can be no single linguistic term which expresses a real phenomenon in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa* (*'khor 'das kyi dngos po*), simply because the scenarios or phenomena as such are representatively covered by these categories and linguistic expressions as representations of these phenomena can therefore equally be subsumed under the same categories. Treating linguistic expressions from the perspective of the underlying scenarios, the apparent implication is that since linguistic expressions are about

---

[504] Note that I borrowed the notion of scenario from DeLancey (1991) and use it as another more general reference to phenomena as the ultimate basis of linguistic expressions (cf. also chapter 5.2). However, DeLancey seems to use it in a more nuanced way in his article as that what the verb describes, which may then be represented through different semantic construals or events (cf. DeLancey 1991, 345) expressed in a sentence.

[505] Cf. supra 105f. including ft. 302 on the use of the terms phenomenon and scenario in this dissertation.

the phenomenal world, a semantic construal deemed representative for a particular phenomenal scenario applies equally to those linguistic expressions expressing that scenario regardless the language. In other words, concrete linguistic expressions are regarded as more or less direct representations of phenomena.

This approach to case grammar strongly resonates with the idea of linguistic universals in some form and the direct reference to the phenomenal world further prompts the question about the ontological basis of the cases' universality.[506] Unfortunately, GNT does not elaborate these issues other than through scattered comments like the quoted ones. The text did not develop any coherent theory on the universal character of the cases in all its linguistic-philosophical implications no matter how strong it is claimed by the text. What we can see are perhaps remnants and influxes, may they come from Sanskritic *kāraka*-theories, discourses in the larger context of *śābdabodha* ('verbal cognition'), or Buddhist linguistic-philosophical discourses on matters such as linguistic signs (*brda*), etc.[507] In any event, this has to remain speculation at this point.

However, due to the systematicity in which sources like the GNT derived the meanings of case morphemes from an analysis of the phenomenal world and its various manifestations, as well as the open question about this approach's foundation in theories on linguistic universals, etc., this feature will not be referred to as an 'error', but as an **objectivist approach** to case grammar and an **objectivist focus** in more general terms.

It has to be noted that if this approach is characterized as problematic or even erroneous in certain contexts, then not due to the general claim of the cases' universality, but because of the ways in which these cases, as linguistic universals or not, have been directly applied to Tibetan morphosyntax without any further mediation between phenomenal world and its representation in a particular language. This led to misclassifications of sample phrases and grammatical markers, since the language-specific functioning of Tibetan grammatical structures was neglected and 'objectified' based on the assumption that it directly rests on the constitution of our shared phenomenal world. The precise nature of the presupposed 'objectivity' of a phenomenon's construal is intimately related to the cases' universality and would probably need to be decided for each source separately. Again, texts such as the GNT mostly omit any

---

[506] On the notion of universals in modern linguistic theory, cf. e.g. Bach and Harms 1968.

[507] Cf. e.g. chapters 5.4 and 8.1.2.2 as well as infra 250f. on *kāraka*s and *śābdabodha*. For more information regarding the linguistic-philosophical foundation of the universal character of the cases and the objectivist focus in Tibetan grammar, cf. also point 5 of chapter 15, in particular infra 427ff.

elaboration of these issues. Consequently, we can only define 'objective' in the sense of 'deemed representative for the phenomenal world as such' in this dissertation.[508]

2) Secondly, an important feature of the definition of *karman* in terms of the resultative part of the action or the substratum upon which an action is performed is its sufficient generality, so that it may be applied to all various grammatical constructions subsumed under the second case. The directional functioning of *du* in *rgya gar du 'gro* can be rendered in terms of marking that entity which experiences the result of the action, or that upon which an agent performs the action. In fact, this is how in Sanskrit Indian grammarians have already rendered the instance of going to account for its second case marking. Likewise, any function of *la* in terms of DIRECTION or INDIRECT OBJECT may be explained in these terms as much as the PATIENT of the unmarked argument. Perhaps even the locative *shing gi rtse mo na* may be included in this definition as the substratum of the action that experiences the resultative part.[509] From this perspective, GNT does not necessarily impose an incorrect semantic construal of the underlying scenarios that directly contradict Tibetan morphosyntax. The point is that the category *karman* and its definition are deemed as covering Tibetan-specific morphosyntax. It follows from the above that this is how the treatise retains the cases' validity across all linguistic terms and regardless of the language, since they cover all possible semantic categories and subcategories that may be thought about in languages and thus make any others unnecessary. If the author of GNT had an accurate knowledge of the syntax of different constructions classified as second case, it may be argued that he saw it as covered by his definition. This feature of GNT's second case definition is less objectivist in the sense of neglecting morphosyntax in favor of one's understanding of the underlying scenario, but it still considers and acknowledges Tibetan-specific morphosyntax. Therefore, this feature, which is particularly important for the second case, will be referred to as **interpretative** or **semantic-interpretative**.

The combination of these two points above (objectivist and semantic-interpretative) in GNT's case grammar completely blurs the morphosyntactic surface structure in instances such as the second case, and moreover it is highly arbitrary. How can it be decided, for example in phrases with locative *la*, *na* or *du*, if the morphemes are to be classified as *karman* or as a seventh case

---

[508] The terms 'objectivist' and 'objectify' would require further elaboration, particularly against the background of various philosophical and Buddhological discourses one may think of in the Tibetan context. However, these notions are used in a technical sense as defined here and by DeLancey, and Tibetan grammatical sources provide little to no reference to such discourses.

[509] Although I find it more likely in this case that the author did not see the locative value of *na* included in the definition, but that he rather focused on the genuine PATIENT role that becomes visible only in the scenario as such or in the underlying semantic double value of *shing gi rtse mo* in the Tibetan sentence. Whichever of these two levels the author of GNT had in mind, he then directly applied it to the marker *na* (cf. supra 187ff.).

location? And when is a certain semantic construal deemed more representative for the underlying scenario and thus for a sentence representing this scenario? Or in which instances is the Tibetan-specific use of case morphemes meant to be covered by a definition? Here the classification of morphemes as *karman* or not-*karman* becomes mostly a matter of weighing in Sanskritic role models (Sanskrit case marking patterns and their conceptualizations), metalinguistic investigations into the nature of scenarios, Tibetan case marking patterns and perhaps other factors. It remains that any clear-cut methodology of how to arrive at the classification of case morphemes is absent. However, in this kind of grammatical analysis, it is comprehensible that the eight basic case functions adopted from the Sanskritic tradition, especially the *kāraka*-functions, are deemed to be a representative analytical framework. These are proven and tested categories for the description of Sanskrit semantic structures, and if there is no manifest distinction between language-specific semantic structures in sentences and their underlying scenarios, the language-specific semantic structures – and together with them the semantic case categories – are accepted to be shared by all languages.

In the remaining part II, it will become evident that such a direct form of the objectivist-interpretative approach was not common to all Tibetan grammaticography. However, numerous instances will be encountered that demonstrate how grammatical theory formation throughout the Tibetan tradition is deeply permeated by different variants of the objectivist approach as well as the interpretative approach.

A decisive point remains that already the Sanskritic tradition, embodied by the grammarians, Naiyāyikas, or others, had exhibited a strong metalinguistic focus in the *kāraka* theory or the conception of *vyāpāra*/*phala*.[510] However, within their natural environment of Sanskrit language, these theories on the constitution of actions and the definition of *karman* do not go against the morphosyntactic surface structure and are even nourished by it. However, in the Land of Snow and a dramatically altered linguistic environment, the decontextualization of metalinguistically-informed concepts such as *kriyāviṣaya* (*bya ba'i yul*/*gzhi*) results in discourses on these grammatical categories that are objectivist, interpretative and ultimately unrelated to and thus unrepresentative for Tibetan-specific language structures. And even in case the Sanskritic investigations into the nature of actions, etc. was not already objectivist per se, it could have easily been misinterpreted as objectivist. Thus, an author like the one of the

---

[510] Cf. chapter 5.4, as well as supra 176ff. and infra 250f.

GNT did not develop this form of grammatical analysis by himself, but he was surely inspired in some form by Sanskritic modes of linguistic analysis.

8.1.2.6 Second Résumé on the Early Conception of the Second Case

With the GNT there is at least one fairly clear account of the reasons why the second case comprises the three distinct Tibetan morphological categories *la*, *na* and *du* – or even four if we also include the unmarked argument like in this source. Since the remaining sources of the early period provide much less material regarding this matter, there remains a certain doubt regarding the representative character of GNT within this period. The similarities to the definition of *karman* in NGg as well as the almost identical example of *na* for the second case in the *Smra sgo* commentary[511] speak in favor of a broader acceptance of GNT's approach in some form.

Apart from this, there may have also been disagreement regarding the number of morphemes qualifying as second case marker. NGg and MVY mention only *la*, whereas SCP does not explicitly mention whether the unmarked morphology may also express *las* of SCP 11.3. In NGg and MVY, the omission of the other morphemes may be explained by their exclusive focus on the prototypical markers for each case, whereas SCP's omission of zero-marking could simply be caused by its focus on a presentation of syntactic links, which is missing in the unmarked PATIENT. It is also possible that alternative approaches coexisted during this formative period of Tibetan grammar, and that these established different morphologies as well as parameters for which grammatical construction represents the second case *las*. The issue of the case status of the Tibetan unmarked argument as the PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT in Tibetan grammatical sources – whether it is a second case or a case at all – remains decisive, but it cannot be addressed here.

Of most importance for the later tradition in general and Si tu in particular are the notions of *yul*/*gzhi* as well as the bipartite action-model of GNT and NGg. Moreover, the merging of up to four distinct morphologies as second-case markers with *la* as the prototypical marker, for which we encountered at least one attestable explanation in the GNT, represents precisely this conceptual heritage which is at the core of the issues surrounding the second case and which has dominated every later conception of the subsequent tradition. Finally, GNT's approach of conceiving the second case *las* from an objectivist-interpretative perspective – although this takes on different manifestations and/or degrees throughout the centuries – constitutes a

---

[511] Cf. ft. 495. Note that the examples for the case markers in the *Smra sgo* frequently resonate with those in GNT.

recurrent feature in the entire tradition. Even Si tu, who in his conception of grammatical categories in general and his derivational model in particular attempts to account more for the Tibetan-specific structures, will frequently return to this very same approach in his examination of the cases.

The missing piece in the puzzle of the early conception of the second case is certainly represented by the question why all early sources unequivocally name *la* as the prototypical marker and not the unmarked argument, while at least the presented theories on *karman*, although they cover all the different uses of *la* and its traditional allomorphs, appear to be conceptually dominated by the grammatical PATIENT role and thus closest to the unmarked morphology. There are several possibilities here, three of which will now be discussed as a final addendum to the early tradition.

8.1.2.7 Three Hypotheses on the Prototypicality of *la*

(1) Assuming that the prototypical function of the morpheme *la* is that of a directional-locative marker, a first option might be the locative conception of *las* as *yul/gzhi* and *yul du/gzhir byas pa*, which allows to conceive basically any object-related grammatical construction in the prototypical form of *gang la byed* ('to act upon'), even in the most PATIENT-dominant instances:

> *dgra gsod pa* 'to kill a foe' → **dgra la gsod par byed pa* 'to perform the killing upon a foe'

The zero-marking of the Tibetan prototypical *karman* is then simply another language-specific, morphological variation on the surface structure, like *na* or *du*, whereas the focus was more on the concept-specific prototypical marker *la*.

(2) Another option might manifest itself in the *kāraka*-topic of NGg. The eightfold *kāraka*-scheme, so far to my knowledge unattested in any Sanskritic source, strongly resonates with the classical eightfold case scheme, however it does so not in a direct one-for-one correspondence. The most prominent difference compared to the case model are represented by the first two *kāraka*s in this scheme, which presumably should refer to the first two cases:

> *de la tshig brgyad ni gang byed ces pa la sogs pa ste de la gang byed ces pa ni dang po'i byed pa'i dngos po'am don tsam gyi tshig yin te/   'di ltar 'bras chan 'tshed pa'i byed pa po lha sbyin yin pa dang 'dra bar nyon mongs skyed pa'i byed pa po tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa yin pa dang/   lam skye ba'i byed pa po chos rgyu 'bras la yid*

ches lta ba [sic!]⁵¹² *dang/   rnam par shes pa skye ba'i byed pa po 'du byed sems pa yin pa lta bu ni dngos po ngo bo'i tshig ces bya'o/   yang na gang 'tshed par byed na 'bras chan 'tshed par byed pa dang 'dra bar gang skyed par byed na nyon mongs pa dang lam rnam par shes pa skyed par byed ces don gyi ngo bo tsam ston par byed pa ni dang po'i tshig ces bya'o/   gang gi sa zhes bya ba ni dper na lha sbyin ni 'bras chan 'tshed par byed pa po dmigs 'dzin pa'am/   yang na gang zhig la 'tsed par byed na 'bras chan la 'tshed par byed ces las kyi dmigs 'dzin par byed pa bzhin du tshul bzhin ma yin pa ni nyon mongs pa skyed par byed pa la sogs pa'am/   nyon mongs la byed ces pa la sogs pa ni gnyis pa dmigs 'dzin pa'i tshig ces bya'o/*

"As regards the eight syntactic forms [that are the *kāraka*s-], [these] are 'to act/do something' (*gang byed*) and so forth. As for 'to act/do something' (*gang byed*), this is the first, the syntactic form of the active entity (*byed pa'i dngos po*) or of the mere meaning (*don tsam*, *arthamātra*). Thus, similar to (1) 'The agent of cooking the rice is Devadatta.' (*'bras chan 'tshed pa'i byed pa po lha sbyin yin pa*) are for example (2) 'The agent of producing mental afflictions are the incorrect thoughts.' (*nyon mongs skyed pa'i byed pa po tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa yin pa*), (3) 'The agent of producing the path [is] the faith in Dharma, cause and effect.' (*lam skye ba'i byed pa po chos rgyu 'bras la yid ches*)⁵¹³ and (4) 'The agent of producing consciousness are the mental (?) formations.' (*rnam par shes pa skye ba'i byed pa po 'du byed sems pa yin pa*).⁵¹⁴ [These are] called the syntactic form of the entity [or] essence (*dngos po ngo bo'i tshig*).

Alternatively, if [one asks] what is cooked, rice is cooked (*'bras chan 'tshed par byed pa*). Similarly, if [one asks] what is produced (*gang skyed par byed*), [the answer] 'the mental afflictions, the path [and] consciousness are produced' (*nyon mongs pa dang lam rnam par shes pa skyed par byed*) indicates the mere essence of a meaning, which is called the syntactic form of the first [*kāraka* of the eightfold scheme].

As for [the second *kāraka*, called] 'the semantic position of something' (?) (*gang gi sa*), this is the emphasis of the agent (*byed pa po dmigs 'dzin pa*), for example 'As regards

---

⁵¹² I read *bu*.

⁵¹³ Lit. 'the agent of the arising path' (*lam skye ba'i byed pa po*), since the verb *skye* is *tha mi dad pa* and thus has intransitive meaning ('to come forth,' 'be born,' 'arise'). However, the construction *skye ba'i byed pa* ('the making of the arising') is very close if not equivalent to *skye bar byed* ('to make arise') that is a periphrastic construction with the same meaning as *skye ba*'s *tha dad pa* pendant *skyed pa* ('to bring forth,' 'produce'). Moreover, in the next sentence of this quotation it is seen that he repeats all examples and used *skyed pa* ('to produce') also in the context of *lam* ('path').

⁵¹⁴ Cf. ft. 513 that equally applies to example (4).

Devadatta, [he] cooks rice.' (*lha sbyin ni 'bras chan 'tshed par byed*). Or alternatively, if [one asks] what is cooked (*gang zhig la 'tshed par byed*), [it is] the emphasis of the *karman* (*las kyi dmigs 'dzin pa*) [as in] 'The rice is cooked.' (*'bras chan la 'tshed par byed*). Likewise, 'As regards the incorrect thoughts, [they] produce mental afflictions.' (*tshul bzhin ma yin pa ni nyon mongs pa skyed par byed pa*), etc., or 'Mental afflictions are [produced].' (*nyon mongs la byed*) are called the second, the syntactic form of emphasis (*dmigs 'dzin pa'i tshig*)."[515]

The meaning of the second *kāraka*, namely *gang gi sa*, remains elusive, however the quotation makes very clear why the author did not choose the expected *gang la byed* ('to act upon something'). For our current purpose, it suffices to note that Lce Khyi 'brug apparently attempted to explain the phenomenon of grammatical voice and the basic active/passive pattern of Sanskrit sentences by reproducing it in Tibetan. That this was not an easy task can be best seen from the first *kāraka* in the active meaning. The author obviously wanted to avoid ergative marking in order to maintain the zero-marking plus the meaning of *don tsam* (*arthamātra*), just like the Sanskritic analysis of agents in active sentences, therefore in WT he was left only with a copula-construction plus genitive attribute. The passive pattern is then reproduced by means of default construction in WT of an unmarked argument plus verb, apparently interpreting the former as having only lexical value in this construction, just like the Sanskritic interpretation of *karman*s in passive sentences. The second *kāraka* is thus turned into something like a complementary to the first *kāraka*, representing the marked patterns of agent and *karman*. This is then labelled 'the emphatic syntactic form' (*dmigs 'dzin pa'i tshig*) and distinguished into the emphasis of the agent (*byed pa po dmigs 'dzin pa*) and the emphasis of the *karman* (*las kyi dmigs 'dzin pa*), indicated through *ni* and *la* respectively.

Since the treatise's status is not fully evident, it is difficult to say whether this was meant as a mere illustration of Sanskrit syntax or indeed an attempt to apply this theory to Tibetan. If it was deemed relevant in the Tibetan context as well, there may have been the idea due to the Sanskritic role model that the unmarked argument of a Tibetan sentence equals a first case indicating only mere lexical information, whereas ultimately only *la* indicates – or emphasizes, as demonstrated by the second *kāraka dmigs 'dzin pa* 'emphasis' – the second case *las*. Yet, apart from the eightfold *kāraka*-scheme in NGg, no other sources or theories where an unmarked argument of the sentence represents a first case were encountered in this research.

---

[515] CT *115 – 417*.

Alternatively, the emphatic case marking of a PATIENT with *la*, explicit also in the above quotation, may have even had a specific linguistic significance in the old Tibetan context, perhaps inherited from Proto-Tibetan.[516] In contrast to the initial interpretation of GNT's *shing gcod* vs. *shing la gcod* as 'to cut wood' vs. 'to cut into the wood,'[517] the second phrase may in fact be an example of emphatic case marking, which would also explain why the author did not bother to consider the morphosyntactic variation between the two employed phrases. The morpheme *la* was perhaps regarded as the prototypical marker, since the emphatic case marking, which stresses the information of the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT, represents a grammatical operation similar to the affixation of a Sanskrit second case suffix to mark the DIRECT OBJECT. Both indicate *karman*, but Tibetan zero-marking, despite being the default construction, does not indicate any function due to the lack of a marker. The PATIENT-role manifests only through the word's implementation into a grammatical construction and not through the affixation of a case marker. The equalization of the pragmatic-emphatic function of *la* to stress *las* with the syntactic function of the Sanskrit second case suffix to mark *karman* is understandable, since their difference is an important but difficult nuance.

However, given the emphatic function of *la* for the PATIENT as attested in NGg, the preference of *la* as the second case over zero-marking may also have resulted from the fact that *la* as the most versatile marker, including emphatic PATIENT, ALLATIVE, and a variety of other functions, simply covers most instances of *las*/*karman* in the early objectivist, semantic-interpretative conceptions and was thus perceived as the most inclusive morphology in the Tibetan tradition.

(3) The third and final option in this discussion is connected to the precise understanding of the distribution of the morpheme *la*, which continues to pose a challenge to modern linguistics. Despite the general consensus that *la* is a strong directional-locative marker, such as in *skyed tshal la 'gro* ('to go **to** the park')[518] or *khri la bla ma bzhugs* ('the lama resides **on** the throne'),[519] it remains unclear which of the morpheme's diverse uses may be regarded as prototypical and how its various functions may be connected. So far, in modern research no sufficient evidence has been adduced regarding the diachronic distribution of this morpheme, but based on Hill's findings in the *Old Tibetan Annals*, it is possible that the use of *la* was more

---

[516] Cf. Zeisler 2006, 79.
[517] Cf. supra 187.
[518] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 69f.
[519] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 106.

restricted and that the "allative (= *la*) does not appear to imply any spatial movement."[520] Hill states that "in those instances in which movement is involved, it is always made explicit in a verb of motion and the destination themselves are marked in the terminative (= *du*)." While this is no occasion for linguistic investigations, the following question still begs to be asked: if indeed the use of *la* was more restricted, and if its perception by Tibetan speakers as well as grammarians of the early period did not exhibit any noticeable or noteworthy directional connotation, how should the main function of *la* be conceptualized? An answer is challenging also since it is perhaps the most diverse of all case markers and governed by a whole array of verbs with different semantics. Yet, from a linguistic perspective it may be said that an interpretation in terms of *karman* – more as a general object-category and less as a narrow DIRECT OBJECT in the strict sense – might have been indeed the closest option to a Tibetan grammarian's comprehension of *la*'s generic meaning and use. Of particular interest are those constructions in which the morpheme *la* cannot be substituted by *du* or *na*, such as for example *ngas gzugs la lta* ('I look at the form') or *nga bu mo la dga'* ('I love the girl'). Both verbs are bivalent, *lta ba* ('to look at') usually governs an ergative for the agent of looking and *la* for the object, and *dga' ba* ('to like,' 'to love,' 'to be fond of') also triggers *la* for the object of loving, while the one affected by love remains unmarked. If the bivalency model of GNT – and probably also NGg – is applied in terms of agentive and resultative parts of the action, the object of *lta ba* qualifies more as the *karman* than the agent. As for *dga' ba*, if we are to determine the use of *la* based on the object's participation within the same bivalency-scheme, it is without agency and thus definitely more on the resultative side, although the 'I' as the experiencer of the affection remains unmarked and thus appears even more strongly affected by the result of loving. In fact, under the hypothesis that *la* is not a directional marker per se, both examples allow for an understanding of *la* as an INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT that is unaffected or less affected, similar to the *prāpya*-type *karman* in Sanskritic conceptions. The ways in which such a function of *la* may possibly retain its explanatory power throughout other verb frames is a much more intricate question and will need to be investigated elsewhere.

Facing the limited possibilities for evaluating the rationale of Tibetan grammarians without a more detailed knowledge of the precise diachronic distribution of *la*, it may only tentatively be concluded for this third option that – if among the many uses of *la* its prototypical function was not necessarily locative-directional – the morpheme's conceptualization in terms of *karman* as a broader object-marker may have been the most accurate choice among the available options

---

[520] Hill 2011, 15. Cf. also supra 187ff., in particular 192f., on the distribution of morphemes in GNT's presentation of the second case, which corroborates this statement.

in the case model. In this case, the early Tibetan grammarians' strategy could have had at least a limited Tibetan-specific, linguistic basis that renders the identification of *la* with the second case much more comprehensible also from a linguistic perspective. The prototypicality of *la* is then derived from the fact that, among the three *la*, *na* and *du*, its generic functioning comes closest to *karman*, whereas the unmarked argument's prototypicality was ruled out due to the reasons outlined in option (2) above.

8.1.3 The Development of the Second Case up to Si tu

After the terminological history of the second case and the issues related to its 'missing' adaptation in the early Tibetan context, the following will give a shorter summary of the remaining developments leading up to Si tu. Although the prototypicality of the morpheme *la* remained unquestionable, the conception of the second case as *yul/gzhi* and the active/resultative distinction was neither the only one, nor did the objectivist-interpretative focus prevent further language-specific reinterpretations of the second case.

Regarding first the works outside the *Sum rtags* genre, Sakya Paṇḍita labelled the second case as *bya ba'i tshig* and defines it as *bya ba la sbyor ba* ('application to an action'),[521] a phrase we will reencounter in Si tu's definition of the third case, although with an important addition.[522] Dpang Lotsāwa gives *bya ba'i las* ('the *karman* of the action') as his definition in the TshSS, obviously a direct reference to his translation of *Cāndra*'s *kriyāpya* in C 2.1.43, for which he uses the same Tibetan term.[523] It may further be speculated whether *bya ba'i las* reflects the same idea as *bya ba'i yul*, an issue for which some material is provided in the TshSS,[524] but which will be followed any further, since it was of no particular importance in Si tu's work.

Then, within the *Sum rtags* commentarial literature, there is an important reinterpretation of the second case compared to the Sanskritic and Tibetan conceptions presented thus far. Whereas the second case *las* – in *Sum rtags* commentaries predominantly *las su bya ba* – is identified with the term *las* in SCP 11.3 as one of the five functions of *la'i sgra* (= *la don*), the distinction of GNT into an active and resultative part of the action has been outsourced by many commentators to TKJ 11.4-12.3 as an explanation for the opaque *bdag* ('self') and *gzhan* ('other').[525] Omitting the bipartite action theory in the context of the second case, the common practice was to explain the term *las* in SCP by paraphrasing it as *las su bya ba* ('to be done as

---

[521] Cf. KhJ 2009, 25.
[522] Cf. chapter 9.2.
[523] Cf. HSGLT 1, CG24; HSGLT 2, 356.
[524] Cf. Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250.
[525] For more details on the separate meanings of *las* in SCP and TKJ respectively, cf. also Zeisler 2006, 58ff.

the *karman*'), while supplementing examples and presuming their comprehensibility, at least for natives. The strategy was to clarify the terminology via illustrations rather than to specify clear-cut semantic or syntactic criteria to explain the cases' use in the examples. Illustrations are restricted to the *la don* morphemes listed in SCP. This left open the possibility of interpreting the second case along the lines of *la don* and narrow it down to a function specific to *la don*, whereas the genuine resultative function, identified with *dngos po gzhan* ('other-thing'), was more closely related to the unmarked PATIENT in Tibetan sentences. [526] The prevalent terminological overlap of both categories, second case and *gzhan*, with the concepts of *las* as well as *yul/gzhi* was resolved partially by using *las su bya ba* for the second case and *las* for *gzhan*, and partially by remaining silent about any possible relation or separation between the two categories which belong to two different passages in the root texts and thus letting the examples speak for themselves.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether already the author(s) or editor(s) of SCP and TKJ themselves had intended any relation or separation between TKJ's *gzhan* and SCP's *las* along the lines of unmarked PATIENT versus *la don*, first of all because the *bdag/gzhan* terminology is too cryptic for a decision regarding its original meaning. It is likewise challenging to determine the time when the outlined interpretation first started appearing in the commentarial literature. In the *Sum rtags* commentary of Rnam gling, the active/resultative scheme already features in his exposition of TKJ's *bdag/gzhan* but not in his presentation of the second case on SCP 11.3.[527] His numerous references to other sources further suggests that the interpretation *bdag/gzhan* qua active/resultative had proven popular already before his times. On the other hand, interpretations of *bdag* and *gzhan* such as the one of his direct predecessor Zha lu Lotsāwa, who does not note any relation between *bdag/gzhan* and the active/resultative dichotomy in his TKJ commentary, demonstrate that this strategy to outsource the resultative function from the second case to *gzhan* was not as simple and straightforward within the tradition.[528]

Moreover, it should be noted that the sources are not fully clear on whether the outsourcing of the resultative meaning of *las* from the second case was really intended to distinguish between the second case marked by *la don* and the unmarked PATIENT, or whether authors adhered to the idea that both are identical, related or at least to be subsumed under an overarching

---

[526] Unfortunately, commentaries vary significantly regarding the extent to which they provide clear illustrations to clarify such details.
[527] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 69f. and 117f.
[528] Cf. Zha lu 2013B, 25ff.

conception of *las*. The decisive issue concerns not only whether the resultative part of the action expressed by the unmarked argument is a second case, but also whether its general status qua case is lost in a complete separation of the two. Although Pra ti, for example, follows the strategy of introducing the active/resultative pair in the context of TKJ's *bdag*/*gzhan* without mentioning it in relation to *la don*, his definition of the second case as *gzhi gzhan la bya ba byed pa* ('to perform an action upon a distinct substratum') resonates with the old definitions in NGg or GNT, and thus it could easily subsume genuine PATIENTs and *dngos po gzhan* as well.[529] The commentary of Rnam gling likewise exhibits inconsistencies that complicate the question of whether or not he fully separates SCP's *las* qua second case from TKJ's *gzhan* qua resultative part of the action. Most interestingly, in his explanation of *gzhan* and *bdag*, he quotes *Kātantra*'s definition of *karman* and agent in K 2.4.13 and 14. This makes unmistakably clear that he associates TKJ's *gzhan* with the prototypical Sanskritic second case function, but he does not explicate any connection to his *la don*-specific second case which belongs to SCP 11.3.[530] His numerous sample phrases for *gzhan* suggest that this category in principle includes the unmarked PATIENT, yet they are morphosyntactically too diverse to decide without a separate study whether he excluded *la don* from *gzhan*, without a separate study.[531]

The common strategy to reconcile the different notions of second case, that is *las*, *las su bya ba*, *gzhan* and the resultative part of the action, was a certain silence presumably to avoid obvious conflicts of the traditional Sanskritic and Tibetan case models with the structures of written Tibetan. This silence, unfortunately, lacks clarity regarding the details of this terminology. Different (preliminary ?) forms of separating second case from *gzhan* evidently emerged before Si tu through the commentarial practice of associating the grammatical notions with two different sections in SCP and TKJ, and the precise status of this separation prior to Si tu's work would require another future study.[532]

Despite all inconsistencies and the lack of clarifications, this separation definitely was an important step towards a more accurate analysis of Tibetan language, and it reflects an increased awareness of and/or attention to the language-specific structures compared to what is encountered in GNT. The unmarked morphology of the actual PATIENT role and the non-PATIENT character of the case markers *la*, *na* and *du* must have been too strongly compelling to later grammarians for them to remain fully neglected in grammatical analysis. However, it

---

[529] Cf. supra 175 and 181f.; Pra ti 2013A, 204; Pra ti 2013B, 241.
[530] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 117.
[531] Cf. ibid., 118f.
[532] For a Tibetan account post-Si tu that is based on the traditional terminological-conceptual framework and yet elaborates this difference more explicitly, cf. ft. 594.

could have been only a step within the framework of the authoritative tradition, in particular SCP and TKJ. The analytical framework offered and established by the early tradition obscured the precise distribution of the three case morphemes and restricted options for developing a more accurate representation of Tibetan syntax. The equivalence of *na*, *la* and *du*, inherited from SCP and also attested in GNT and the *Smra sgo*, remained to be reconciled with the structures of Tibetan language up to and after Si tu. Commentators, who would often omit an elaborated exposition of the second case's meaning, were still faced with the task to classify these three morphemes against their actual distribution as one morphological category within the case model, while simultaneously also maintaining the distinction of second, fourth and seventh case. In the context of the second case, this refers to the issue of consistent parameters that allow all three morphemes *na*, *la* and *du* to encode a homogeneous function which represents the second case *las su bya ba*. From the degrees of variation in the sources' selected sample phrases, it may be assumed that the precise criteria to establish the second case's meaning varied as well.[533] The following examples for the second case are provided by Zha lu and Rnam gling under SCP 9.3-11.4:

Zha lu Lotsāwa:

> *shar phyogs su 'gro* ('to go to the east'), *sangs rgyas la skyabs su mchi* ('to go to the Buddha as the refuge,' in the meaning 'to take refuge to the Buddha'),[534] *'di ru mgon po rtag bzhugs nas* ('after the protector resided perpetually here'),[535] *'dir ni rgyal ba dgra rgyal* ('As regards this [life], the victorious [truth] conquers the enemy [...]'),[536] *der ni khyad rnams phyin par 'gyur* ('you reached there'), *dbugs dbyung du gsol* ('to pray/ask/request for relief'), *bshad du gsol* ('to ask/request to explain'), *mdun du bkug* ('to bend forwards'), *bsam du med* (lit. 'not to be thought,' in the meaning of 'unthinkable,' 'beyond our mind'), *shing la rlung gis bskyod pa* ('the wind moving/shaking the tree')[537]

---

[533] This selection of sample phrases most definitely bears invaluable information about a grammarian's understanding of the case. Future research on these sample lists will hopefully bring more clarity and refine our understanding about the grammarians' precise conception of the second case before Si tu.

[534] *la* and *su* are both considered to be a second case in Zha lu's grammar.

[535] Apparently, this is a quotation from another source, which I have been unable to identify.

[536] This quotation appears in several Tibetan sources (cf. TBRC). I assume it goes back to the canonical source *Rig sngags kyi rgyal mo rma bya chen mo las gsungs pa'i smon lam dang bden tshig*:
"*Rig sngags kyi rgyal mo rma bya chen mo las gsungs pa'i smon lam dang bden tshig.*" In *bka' 'gyur* (*Sde dge par phud*). TBRC W22084. 101: 540 - 541. Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1976-1979. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS12980|O1GS1298001JW14656$W22084 (accessed May 5th, 2017)
The whole sentence reads:
> *'dir ni rgyal ba dgra rgyal bden gang gis/   shin tu bden pa gsung zhing brdzun med pa/   bden pa de yis 'dir ni dge bar shog/*

[537] Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 7f.

Rnam gling Paṇchen:

> *shar phyogs su 'gro* ('to go to the east'), *zhing gi gyas su 'gro* ('to go right of the tree' or 'to go to the right [side] of the tree'?), *rgya gar du 'gro* ('to go to India'), *mnyan yod du 'gro* ('to go to Śravasti'), *mdun du bkug* ('to bend forwards'), *bsam du med* (lit. 'not to be thought,' in the meaning of 'unthinkable,' 'beyond our mind'), *gsal du btang* ('[s/he] made clearer, clarified'), *nang du bcug* ('[s/he] put inside, inserted'), *dga' ldan na chos ston* ('to teach Dharma at Dga' ldan'), *nam mkha' la 'gro* ('to go to the heaven'), *skyed tshal la 'gro* ('to go to the park'), *mngon dga' ru 'gro* ('to go to Abhirati'),[538] *phor pa ru chu bcus* ('[s/he] poured water into the pot'),[539] *rgyab tu gos gyon* ('to wear/put on cloths at the back'), *mig tu sman blug* ('to apply medicine to the eyes'), *pha rol tu bsgral* (lit. '[s/he] has got free to the other side' ?), *dbang bskur du gsol* ('to request for an initiation/empowerment')[540]

The examples in each of these two lists differ regarding the employed verb frames, morphological markers and the syntactic/semantic information encoded by them. Thus, their classification as one and the same case cannot provide an accurate representation of Tibetan syntax. An explanation regarding the rationale of their selections is lacking, which perhaps suggests that they followed an intuitive approach, or perhaps also that they struggled to provide clear-cut definitions maintaining the traditional taxonomy, while simultaneously remaining in line with the peculiarities of the language.

In contrast to his two predecessors, Pra ti attempts to explicate a homogeneous parameter to define the second case and distinguish it from the fourth and seventh in his presentation of SCP 11.3-4:

> *des na 'di dag gi khyad par ni/   thab la med btang zhes pa lta bu/   gzhi gzhan la bya ba byas pa dang/   byed pa sogs ston pa'i la sgra rnams rnam dbye gnyis pa dang/ mgron po la me btang lta bu bya ba byed pa'i gzhi dngos ma yin par/   de la me bdang ba ni/   de'i ched du me btang ba yin la/   de ltar dgos pa la/   la sgra sbyar te/   bya ba me btang bar ston pa'i la'i sgra ni rnam dbye gzhi pa'o/   thab la me yod lta bu/ gzhi thab la me btang ba sogs kyi bya ba byas pa mi brjod par/   me'i ngo bo tsam yod par brjod pa'i la'i sgra ni rnam dbye btun pa'o [...]*

---

[538] Abhirati is the Buddhafield associated with Buddha Akṣobhya.
[539] Note that according to the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (2006, 866), the standard grammatical construction of the verb *'chu ba* (to take/bring water') normally marks the container by means of which the water is taken with *byed sgra* rather than with *la don*: *zangs skyogs kyis chu 'chu* ('to take water with a copper ladle').
[540] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 69f.

"Therefore, as regards the difference between these [five functions in SCP 11.3-4], a *la*-morpheme indicating that an action has been performed or is being performed, etc. upon some distinct substratum (*gzhi gzhan la bya ba byas pa dang byed pa sogs*), is the second case, as in 'to light a fire on the stove' ('*thab la me btang*'). In 'having lit a fire for the guest' (*mgron po la me btang*), without being the actual substratum where the action is performed, 'having lit a fire for him' (*de la me btang ba*) [means that] the fire is lit for the sake of him (*de'i ched du*). Accordingly, a *la*-morpheme indicating the action of fire-lighting for a purpose (*dgos pa*) to which the la-morpheme has been applied, is a fourth case. In 'there is fire on the stove' (*thab la med yod*), not saying that an action of lighting a fire on the stove, etc., has been performed, a *la*-morpheme expressing that the mere essence of fire exists (*me'i ngo bo tsam yod pa*) is the seventh case."[541]

The definition of Pra ti's second case amounts to a distinction of active vs. existential verbs or verbs of abiding, meaning that any *la don* with an action verb results in a second case, whereas *la don* plus verb of existence or abidance qualifies as a seventh case.[542] However, a *la don* with action verb where the marked argument figures as the purpose or beneficiary is a fourth case. Interestingly, his illustrations of the second case are mostly restricted to indications of locative meanings, such as *gyas la nyal* ('to sleep on the right'), *se ra na chos nyan* ('to listen to the Dharma in Se ra'), *khog ma ru sha 'tshos* ('to digest meat in the stomach').[543] If he would have followed the traditional practice to add also phrases with a directional meaning, like *shar phyogs su/la 'gro* ('to go to the east'), which equally fall under his definition of the second case, the arbitrariness of his definition with regard to Tibetan syntax and the distribution of the morphemes would have been more evident. In fact, the case markers in sentences like *se ra na chos nyan* and *shar phyogs su 'gro* do not encode the same type of information and thus cannot be the same case from the perspective of the morphemes' function. Pra ti focuses merely on the verbs and a single, very general semantic parameter of actions in general, instead of analyzing the meaning and function of the different case morphemes as present in the language.[544]

In any case, he achieved to establish a homogeneous criterion for all three morphemes to function as genuine second cases, without one of them prevailing over the others and with a

---

[541] Pra ti 2013A, 203f.
[542] On this distinction, cf. also chapter 13.
[543] Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 197.
[544] It may also be noted that this criterion leaves room for competing interpretations as to which verbs are active and which are only verbs of existence/abiding. Compare his examples of *phyi rol tu bsdad* ('to stay outside') or *gyas la nyal* ('to sleep on the right') for the second case with his seventh case example *rab gsal du dpon po bzhugs* ('the chief resided in *Rab gsal*') (cf. ibid.).

clear separation of the second case from the fourth and seventh despite their identical morphology. Therefore, Pra ti's definition was a systematic solution in view of the early tradition's heritage, and it continued to remain even after Si tu. The source of this distinction, however, may be even more ancient, as demonstrated by Rnam gling's example for the second case, *dga' ldan na chos ston* ('[s/he] teaches the Dharma at Dga' ldan'), as well as Zha lu's list with comparable instances. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that it goes back to the earliest stages of Tibetan grammaticography.[545]

8.1.4 A Note on the Notion of *las su bya ba* ('to be done as the *karman'*)

A final remark in this survey of the times leading up to Si tu is in place concerning the term *las su bya ba* ('to be done as *karman*'), which gradually evolved into a more prominent label for the second case than *las* in *Sum rtags*. Admittedly, my current translation of this term is but a tentative rendition, since the transition in meaning from *las* to *las su bya ba* remains unclear. Bettina Zeisler, for example, has translated the term as 'action towards/for a deed,' thus emphasizing the directional meaning of the second case due to its prototypical marker *la*.[546] Yet, it has already been demonstrated in the survey above that many classical commentators such as Zha lu et. al did not develop a clear directional conception of the second case, nor was it the original meaning of the term in the Tibetan tradition. The nomenclature *las su bya ba* is attested as early as in the NGg and GNT, where it refers to the *kāraka karman* without any difference regarding PATIENT, DIRECTION, etc.

Furthermore, *su* in *las su bya ba* should be interpreted as a classical instance of *de nyid* ('identity'), which is supported also by Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab 'od gsal's commentary to SCP, entitled *Sum cu pa'i rnam bshad gsal ba'i sgron me*.[547] Yet, the term's

---

[545] Further research is highly suggested, but possible antecedents may be as early as Sakya Paṇḍita's definition of *bya ba la sbyor ba* ('that which is applied to an action') or it may even be related to Tibetan translations of the original *Cāndrian kriyāpya* as *bya ba'i las* (CG 24) or *bya ba* (CG 6, CG 37) (cf. HSGLT 2, 356). They all leave enough room to reinterpret the second case as a general action case.

Despite GNT's *bya ba'i gzhi* (second case) vs. *gnas gzhi* (seventh case) dichotomy, which also resonates with Pra ti's definition, it is questionable whether such instances would have qualified as a second case in the works of NGg, GNT or *Smra sgo*. Compare GNT's *shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing 'dug* (cf. supra 187f.) and *Smra sgo*'s *shing gi rtse mo na gcod* (cf. ft. 495) with Pra ti's *se ra na chos nyan* (cf. supra 208): in the former two examples, both arguments marked by *na* are second cases, because they qualify in a non-Tibetan-specific general construal of the scenario as genuine PATIENTs in terms of *karman*. The resultative part is already occupied by *chos* in Pra ti's example, for which reason *se ra na* must have been a seventh case in the earlier sources. Unfortunately, Pra ti's type of example is missing therein, thus leaving open the question about GNT's and *Smra sgo*'s standpoint regarding such constructions.

[546] Cf. Zeisler 2006, 59.

[547]   *spyir 'di skabs kyi las su bya ba zhes pa'i su sgra ni rnam dbye gnyis pa'i nang gses de nyid kyi don yin zhing su sgra bsdus na las bya ba zhes pa ste don du bya ba byed pa'am phal skad du las ka byed pa zhes pa dang 'dra/*
     "In general, the morpheme *su* of the current '*las su bya ba*' has the meaning of *de nyid*, the subcategory of the second case. If the *su*-morpheme is contracted, [it results in] '*las bya ba*,' the meaning being

origins as well as its meaning still remain unclear. It is even unclear whether the version *las su bya ba* in fact reflects any additional meaning compared to the simpler *las*. In his Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary, Negi mentions both *las* and *las su bya ba* as a translation for *vyāpāra*.[548] Perhaps the Tibetan term was also developed as part of the complementary pair *las su bya ba*/*las byed pa* in the bivalent action model of NGg. Alternatively, there may also be a relation to the fourth case *ched du bya ba* (lit. 'to be done as the purpose,' i.e. the beneficiary or purpose of the action), the two perhaps being connected to *Cāndra*'s *kriyāpya* (prototypical second case function, C 2.1.43) and *tādarthya* (secondary fourth case function, C 2.1.79) respectively.[549] Since at this point these are but speculations groping in the dark, this dissertation will adhere to my tentative translation of 'to be done as the *karman*.'

8.1.5 Résumé of the Second Case pre-Si tu

In sum, the classical *Sum rtags* conception of the second case before Si tu represents the paragon of Tibetan grammatical theory formation within the Tibetan scholastic environment and its methodology. Early conceptions of the Tibetan second case drew upon Sanskritic theories of *karman* and established a taxonomy that was apparently (if GNT's account is representative) strongly based on general considerations of *karman* and the semantic construal of scenarios referred to in sample phrases largely disconnected from Tibetan-specific morphosyntax. This taxonomical framework became authoritative in the later *Sum rtags* tradition as preserved in SCP and TKJ. The disequilibrium between early taxonomies in SCP, NGg, GNT (perhaps also *Smra sgo* ?) and Tibetan language evoked a process of reconciliation to account for authoritative conceptions of the second case and simultaneously develop it as a homogeneous category in Tibetan language marked by *la don*. Naturally, due to the gap between the authoritative conceptual framework and the language, this resulted less in a nice and neat consensus and more in uneasy compromises in which often silence prevailed. However, the obscured distribution of the *la don* morphemes in the context of the second case probably did only a little harm to students of Tibetan grammar, since as native speakers they were proficient regarding the precise use of the language's grammatical inventory.

---

somewhat like '*bya ba byed pa*' (to do an action') or in colloquial language '*las ka byed pa*' ('to do the work')." (Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab 'od gsal 2009, 20)
Note that Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab 'od gsal explicitly separates the two types of *las* under SCP and TKJ respectively, but of course he is positioned much later than Si tu.
[548] Cf. Negi 2004, 6625 and 6646.
[549] Cf. also the entry on *ched*, *dgos ched* and *sbyin* in HSGLT 2, 217.

In the case of Si tu, the outlined terminological apparatus as well as the issues surrounding the established conceptions of the second case and the actual distribution of *la don* would have great impact on his theory formation and classification of sample phrases.

8.2 The Second Case in the *Great Commentary*

With the second case, we are entering the domain of *tshig* (*pada*, 'syntactic form,' 'syntactically bound word form') in Si tu's derivational model, that is to say, all remaining cases including the second are intrasentential arguments marked by a syntactic link in order to express a semantic-syntactic variation (*don gyi khyad par/ldog pa*) of the lexical word meaning specifying its participation in the meaning of the sentence.

In the GC, the association of the second case with SCP and the identification of the resultative part of the action with *gzhan* in TKJ has been accepted in accordance with the preceding *Sum rtags* tradition. Si tu's extensive illustration of *dngos po gzhan* makes it evident that the resultative part has been identified with the unmarked argument of differentiated actions (*tha dad pa*) and thus corresponds more or less to the function of DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT.[550] Likewise, the *la don* morphemes stated in SCP 9.3-11.2 form a single category in Si tu's work, which expresses the five meanings of SCP 11.3-4, including *las* (*karman*) which is identified in accordance with Si tu's predecessors as the second case (*rnam dbye gnyis pa*). In view of the basic setup of the preceding tradition, what was Si tu's strategy to retain the second case *las* as a single, homogeneous category marked by the three distinct morphemes *la*, *na* and *du*, which also mark the seventh and fourth case? And how did Si tu perceive this separation of *la don gyi las* and *dngos po gzhan*?

8.2.1 Two Definitions of the Second Case

8.2.1.1 First Definition

Following the commentarial tradition before him, Si tu's exposition of the second case starts under SCP 9.3-11.4. In his paraphrase of the root text, subsequent to the morphological derivation of the *la don* morphemes, Si tu provides the first, uncommented example of *skyabs su mchi'o* (lit. '[s/he] goes to the refuge,' in the meaning of 'to take refuge'), classifying it as *las kyi sgra* ('*karman* morpheme') in the meaning of the second case *las su bya ba*[551] and implying that this is the same function as referred to by the root text. As part of his commentary

---

[550] Cf. e.g. GC 547.2.
[551] *'di dag kyang skyabs su mchi'o lta bu rnam dbye gnyis pa las su bya ba'i don can du sbyar na las kyi sgra* […]
"If these [*la don*-morphemes] are applied in the meaning of the second case 'to-be-done-as-the-*karman*,' as in 'to go to the refuge,' [they are] the *karman*-morpheme […]" (GC 472.1)

on SCP 9.3-11.4, he also provides a first concise definition in the section on the functional mode of application (*don gyi sbyor tshul*) of the *la don* morphemes:

> *la na gnyis de nyid kyi don du mi 'jug cing gzhan la 'jug pa dang/   su ra ru du tu lnga po de rnams las sogs don lnga la mtshungs par 'jug pa yin pas de rnams ji ltar sbyor na/   byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las kyi don can du 'gyur ba rnam dbye gnyis pa ni/   shar phyogs su 'gro/   rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed/   mtha' ru 'khyol/   rgya gar du 'gro/   rgyab tu phyogs/   pha rold tu phyin/   gzugs la lta/   mdun na rgyu/ zhes sogs mtha' yas par bsgres nas sbyar bar bya'o/*

"The two [morphemes] *la* and *na* are not applied in the meaning of *de nyid* but take on the other [four meanings defined in SCP 11.3-4]. The five [morphemes] *su*, *-r*, *ru*, *du*, *tu* take on equally [all] five meanings *karman*, etc. If [someone] therefore [asks] how these [seven morphemes] are applied, becoming endowed with the meaning of a *karman*, upon which an agent performs an action (*byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las*), [they result in] the second case. As for [this second case], it is to be applied by indefinitely extrapolating from [examples] such as (1) 'going to the east' (*shar phyogs su 'gro*), (2) 'making/carving a picture onto/on/to the stone' (*rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed*), (3) 'getting to an end/to become finished' (*mtha' ru 'khyol*), (4) 'going to India' (*rgya gar du 'gro*), (5) 'turn to the back' (*rgyab tu phyogs*), (6) 'gone to the other side' (*pha rold tu phyin*), (7) 'to look at the form' (*gzugs la lta*), (8) 'to move in front of/to move forward (?)' (*mdun na rgyu*)."[552]

Regarding the morphology, Si tu does not add anything new and adheres to the established category of *la don* consisting of seven morphemes. The exclusion of *la* and *na* from *de nyid* varies throughout the commentaries, since not all have identified *de nyid* with the transformative function of the morpheme *du*. Si tu's version probably followed *Smra sgo* and perhaps he also knew about it from GNT, but he does not refer to this latter source in the GC. It is interesting to note that Si tu starts the entire section on the meaning of *la don* by recognizing that *la* and *na* share the same four meanings while *du* has an additional one, taking this distribution as the reason for inquiring into the precise application of the morphemes and the meaning of their functions. Thus, may this be read as his awareness that the traditional taxonomy is not necessarily self-evident from a Tibetan point of view?

---

[552] GC 473.4.

The brief definition Si tu places before the examples is rather dissatisfying, since he implemented only one of the oldest labels of the second case, *gang la* ('upon which'), in one of the most general phrases imaginable, namely *byed pa pos bya ba byed pa* ('an agent performs an action'). Given the presented conceptual background of *karman* in the history of Tibetan grammaticography, the resulting *byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las* ('the *karman* upon which an agent performs the action') remains rather indifferent regarding any of the linguistic issues surrounding the three morphemes and the second case. Paradigmatic for the *Sum rtags* tradition, this definition has to be read against the backdrop of the examples to understand its meaning.

8.2.1.2 Discussion of Examples in the First Definition

Si tu provided eight examples, one for each morpheme plus an additional one for *tu*. A similar pattern will be encountered in the context of the other cases, which reveals that Si tu attempted to prove that all seven morphemes indeed qualify as indicating a second case. The grammatical constructions of the samples exhibit a total of six different verb frames, *'gro ba* ('to go'), *byed pa* ('to make'), *'khyol ba* ('to come to an end,' 'to become finished/completed'), *phyogs pa* ('to turn oneself towards'), *lta ba* ('to look at') and *rgyu ba* ('to move'), with *'gro ba* being repeated twice, once in the perfect tense *phyin pa* ('has gone'). Both types of verbs, *tha dad pa* as well as *tha mi dad pa*, are listed indifferently. The majority consists of bivalent verb frames which govern one unmarked plus one *la don* argument (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8) as their most common value in a default construction, however there is also one bivalent verb frame with one agentive plus one *la don* argument (7) as well as one bivalent verb frame that governs one agentive plus one unmarked argument in which the entity marked by *la don* constitutes the third value of the verb (2).

In a semantic construal of the scenarios expressed by all eight examples, a directional value of the argument marked by *la don* is conceivable to varying degrees, and this may thus be regarded as the overarching information encoded by *la don* that prevails throughout the examples. According to this reading of the examples, Si tu's strategy to demarcate the second case would be the formation of the homogeneous parameter DIRECTION/ALLATIVE. This would then lead to an altered reading of his definition *byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las* as 'the *karman towards* which the action is performed by the agent,' instead of the older understanding (GNT, NGg) in terms of 'the *karman upon* which the action is performed by the agent.' Yet, both suppositions, namely that the actual information encoded by *la don* in all examples is indeed DIRECTION as well as that Si tu's strategy of focusing on such a directional value of *la don*, require closer scrutinization since the situation at hand is much more complex in view

213

of the heterogeneous distribution of the three morphemes (especially *la*) and the many other issues involved in the second case already outlined in the historical survey above.

From a linguistic perspective, only the five examples (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) can be more easily identified with DIRECTION/ALLATIVE, as they all exhibit either a verb of spatial (1, 4, 5, 6) or metaphorical movement (3) and are marked by *du* or its allomorphs, of which the ALLATIVE function appears to be more distinctive compared to the other markers and also established in modern research. Example (3) may be alternatively classified as an instance of the transformative function, since the 'end' (*mtha'*) in question is that of the object to be finished itself, but this is but a minor issue in the current investigation. Although semantic construals of the scenarios expressed by examples (2), (7) and (8) allow for a directional value in one way or another, they are more problematic.

In example (8) (*mdun na rgyu* 'to move in front of' or 'to move forward' ?), the directional meaning is somehow compromised due to the morpheme *na* as static locative marker. Hahn's textbook on Classical Tibetan mentions a "very rare" directional function of *na* in phrases such as *gyas na phyag 'tshal lo* ('S/he prostrates to the right [side].'), although he also adds that such examples may be restricted to grammatical sources.[553] The phrase is very close to the English 'to move/go in front of [the house, etc.],' which bears the same ambiguity of whether 'in front of' has mere locative or directional meaning. The two different resulting scenarios amount to the question whether the goer is going to the house from another place, or whether the goer is already located in front of the house and performs the action of going at that very place. Whether the directional or locative meaning prevails in such phrases is a matter of linguistic analysis for which I lack qualification as either linguist or native speaker.[554] Phrase (8) may therefore be a rare and exceptional use of *na* – perhaps also a fixed expression – but it still represents a genuine indication of DIRECTION, or alternatively a counterexample with no directional but only a locative value. However, since this is the only phrase for the morpheme *na* in this list, it is obvious that Si tu was looking for the most representative instance of this morpheme in the meaning of the second case. Whatever his general interpretation of the second case *las* and thus also of the marker *na* in (8), a locative preposition (*mdun* 'before') with a verb of strong directional movement was perhaps the best option to withdraw from the actual locative function

---

[553] Cf. Hahn 2005, 92. This information is important insofar as it bears the issue that such phrases could have been introduced to support the specific taxonomical decisions of grammarians rather than being representative for the language.

[554] On a personal remark, note that during an informal consultation with Tibetan native speakers, I was given the feedback that the phrase may in fact have both meanings.

of *na*, which in Si tu's model would be a seventh case, and to approximate the morpheme to the remaining examples.

The verb *byed pa* ('to do') in phrase number (2) (*rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* 'making/carving a picture onto/on/to the stone') does not have any directional meaning per se, and in a hierarchy of the verb's valency *la don* follows as the third only after the agentive und unmarked arguments. The default construction is thus that of an agent who is doing something, and thus the question arises how the information encoded by *la don* in this phrase should be understood. The *la don* morpheme at hand is that of -*r*, which raises the further question of whether to read the morpheme as an allomorph of *la* or a variant of *ru*.[555] Based on modern understandings of *la* and *du*, the precise meaning of the *rdo bar gzugs snyan byed* might range from 'to make a picture onto the stone' (= DIRECTION/ALLATIVE) to 'to make a picture on the stone' (= LOCATIVE), and in view of the statements on the marker *la* in the historical survey of the current case, the option 'to make a picture ~ to the stone' (= SECONDARY or INDIRECT OBJECT') also beeds to be taken into account.[556] In the case of a variant of *ru* and thus *du*, the directional reading seems to be the most probable candidate, with the alternative of a locative reading.[557]

In case we have to read the phrase as an instance of *la*, the same basic problem is encountered as for (7) (*gzugs la lta* 'to look at the form'), namely whether the indeed possible directional – and for (2) also locative – interpretation of the morpheme *la* is representative for the information actually encoded within the sentence. Similar to what was stated in the context of the precise functioning of *la* in the historical survey,[558] if *la* in these two phrases does not primarily have a

---

[555] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97.

[556] The 'to' in the last translation is not a grammatically correct construction in English, however it is intended to emphasize the indirect objecthood or secondary affectedness in contrast to the two other versions.

[557] Tshe tan zhabs drung (2005, 121 and 124f.) correctly remarks Si tu's inconsistency to classify (2) as an instance of the second case but *lcags la gser 'byug* ('to apply gold to the iron' or 'to spread gold on the iron' ?) as a seventh case. He therefore concludes that Si tu should have chosen the same classification for both, arguing that the option of a seventh case can cover (2) as well by making reference to one of Si tu's renditions of the seventh case (*bya ba'i rten* 'support of the action'). For more details, cf. infra 391ff.

Such contradictive classifications which figure prominently in Tibetan grammatical sources are probably challenging for every taxonomy. In this particular instance, Si tu's seemingly inconsistent classification of the two converging examples together with Tshe tan zhabs drung's alternative classification as a seventh case are a sign that the lexical semantics of the verb apparently remain indifferent regarding the precise participation of the actants and thus allows for different readings. There may therefore be the possibility that each of the two phrases indeed allows for both values, directional and locative, depending on the mental construal of the expressed scenarios by the speaker or hearer. This construal may be further influenced by the context and regional variations or in the context of grammar of course also by Sanskrit role models, which might have had an impact on the precise interpretation and classification of an example.

Apart from the historical constitution of the case model, challenging examples like (2) are probably another reason why grammarians like Pra ti took resort to the rather insignificant distinction of action vs. residential verb to define the second and seventh cases, since this criterion has no difficulties with these phrases, for they employ action-verbs and can thus only be second cases.

[558] Cf. supra 201f.

directional-locative meaning, what are the other options? And may its function indeed be that of an objective marker in terms of the INDIRECT/SECONDARY as the less affected OBJECT?

This entire issue is of utmost importance, since *la* unquestionably is the traditional prototypical marker of the second case and the question arises why Si tu chose not to further specify his first definition of the second case as an ALLATIVE function, but leave it in such general terms close to earlier conceptions?

If, after all, *la* indeed encodes directional meaning in (2) and (7), and thus all eight examples are a fairly homogeneous set of ALLATIVES, a **first option** would be that he simply presumed that the definition as an ALLATIVE is more or less self-explanatory against the backdrop of the examples. Yet, I find this option unlikely in view of the heterogeneous definitions of the second case throughout the tradition on the one hand, and his adoption of old renderings of the second case as *gang la* that were clearly not intended as ALLATIVE definitions on the other. While I do not qualify as a native speaker of 18th century Tibetan, I argue that Si tu's first definition does not appear as self-evident.

A **second option** under the condition that *la* encodes ALLATIVE information is that his version of the second case is that of an ALLATIVE, but that he desisted from a direct explication in order to remain closer to conceptions of the former tradition and avoid possible conflicts which might have revealed inconsistencies of the traditional case model.

Alternatively, although all eight illustrations are instances of ALLATIVE – with or without his awareness of this fact –, he might have nonetheless adhered to older accounts like in NG(g) or GNT according to which the second case is a genuine *karman*.

If *la* does not necessarily encode directional-locative meaning in its only examples (2) and (7), then the **first option** is that this first definition of the second case (*byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las*) may have been based more on its morphosyntactic significance with regard to the case's prototypical marker *la* as having some form of objective function.

A **second option** regarding *la* as a non-directional marker is that Si tu regarded them as having directional value, and thus he construed an ALLATIVE function through the selection of examples by choosing mainly clear instances of direction and interpreting the semantics of the remaining (2, 7, 8) against their backdrop. Presumably, he also refrained from further specifying his ALLATIVE in the first definition to remain in line with the tradition and avoid possible conflicts.

The intricacies surrounding the entire issue of the second case are evident from the multiple options and speculations resulting from the initial question which variant *-r* is in (2), the
216

meaning of *la* in (2) and (7) from a linguistic perspective, and finally the historical question about Si tu's strategy to establish the second case within the basic framework offered by SCP and the preceding tradition. In sum, five (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) of the eight examples are unambiguous instances of DIRECTION marked by either *du* or one of its allomorphs, whereas (8) bears a certain ambiguity but was intended to fit the set of examples as well as Si tu's definition of the second case as the only instance of *na*, which is a clear static locative marker and thus requires a compromise in any event. The two remaining samples for *-r* and *la*, however, offered multiple options that are left open at this point.

Based on the majority of samples, the resulting picture suggests that in this first definition Si tu focused mainly on a DIRECTION/ALLATIVE-function. Yet, as pointed out at the beginning of this subsection, this majority has little significance in the sense that the rationale for the selection of examples was not exclusively aiming at the most representative phrases for the second case function, but priority was rather given to finding representative instances of the second case for all seven *la don* morphemes. That the directional value therefore prevails is more the result of the fact that four of the seven markers represent *du* and its allomorphs, with *-r* perhaps even representing a fifth. The criterion of the majority of samples is thus not sufficiently indicative. Moreover, if the prototypical marker *la* is taken into account, the picture is immediately more complicated in view of the heterogeneity of the morpheme and the different options outlined above.

With this analysis of Si tu's first definition in mind, this chapter will now turn to his second definition which will teach us more about his conception of the second case *las*.

8.2.1.3 Si tu's Second Definition of the Second Case

In his summary of Tibetan case grammar following his commentary on TKJ 25.4-28.3, Si tu provided an additional definition of the second case:

> *de la la don rnams rnam dbye gnyis pa las la 'jug pa'i tshul ni/   dper na/   lha la phyag 'tshal/   gzugs la lta/   shar du 'gro/   lta bu'i lha/   gzugs/   shar rnams ni phyag 'tshal ba dang/   lta ba dang 'gro ba rnams kyi bya ba 'jug pa'i yul yin pas de dag la las kyi   rnam dbye 'jug pa yin no/*

> "Now as to the mode in which [the syntactic link] *la don* takes on the second case, *karman*: For example, 'god,' 'form' and 'east' of [the sentences] (1) 'to prostrate to the god/deity' (*lha la phyag 'tshal*),[559] (2) 'to look at the form' (*gzugs la lta*), (3) 'to go to

---

[559] Lit. 'to perform the prostration to/towards the deity.'

the east' (*shar phyogs su 'gro*) are the domain (*yul*) in wich the actions of 'to prostrate,' 'to look at' and 'to go' engage (*'jug pa*). Therefore, the case *karman* joins to them."[560]

Two of the three examples (2, 3) are already known from the first definition, with the only new illustration being (1). The default construction of (1) requires three participants, the agent who performs the prostration marked by *byed sgra*, the object of prostration marked by *la* and the prostration (*phyag*) as the unmarked argument. Alternatively, the entire phrase *phyag 'tshal ba* may be classified as a synthetic verb form, which would require only two other arguments. Depending on which option is to be preferred, we are thus facing a construction equivalent to (2) in the first definition[561] or (2) in the second definition, but it should be mentioned that – to my knowledge – the expression *phyag 'tshal ba* ('to prostrate, to perform a prostration'), like the verb *lta ba,* governs only *la* or its allomorph which cannot be substituted by *du*. Thus, once again we are confronted with the issue of the precise information *la* expresses within this phrase and the question of Si tu's interpretation of it.

In contrast to Si tu, commentators such as Zha lu et. al. classified the grammatical construction of *la don* plus *phyag 'tshal ba* ('to pay homage,' 'to prostrate') as a fourth case. Si tu criticizes this classification, since according to him it is nothing but an exaggerated application of Sanskrit-specific case grammar to Tibetan language.[562] Si tu's critique is probably correct, insofar as the Sanskritic role model was certainly an important factor in the decision process of his opponents. This classification may further be connected to the heterogeneous distribution of the morpheme *la* and questions about its generic uses, with BENEFICIARY/RECIPIENT as another possible candidate.[563] Therefore, while one may or may not agree with Si tu's analysis, both questions remain. Does *la* encodes the information of DIRECTION, BENEFICIARY or INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT within the surface structure of the sentence? And which conception of the second case led Si tu to his classification of (1) as a second case while ruling out the fourth case?

In sum, the three illustrations of the second definition provide a more heterogeneous distribution compared to those of the first definition, with only one clear instance of an ALLATIVE marker (3), one repetition of an example for *la* (2) in which the precise function of the marker remains

---

[560] GC 599.2.
[561] *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* 'making/carving a picture onto/on/to the stone'
[562] Cf. chapter 10.2.2.
[563] Cf. Tourndre 2010, 106.

unclear, and finally the even more problematic clause (1) in which *la* allows for up to three readings (ALLATIVE, BENEFICIARY, INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT).

Apart from the examples, Si tu further specifies the second case with the old notion of (*bya ba'i*) *yul* ('domain (of the action)'), which he renders as *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* ('the domain in which the action engages'). The verb *'jug pa*, here apparently in its *tha mi dad pa* meaning 'to enter,' 'engage', has a strong directional connotation which may be read as Si tu's theoretical reflection of a directional understanding of the second case. Again, *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* is sufficiently general to be interpreted along the lines of older definitions such as NGg's *yul du byas pa* ('having been made into the domain') or even the parameter of active vs. residential (= static and inactive abiding) explicated in Pra ti's grammar, thus leaving the possibility for a broader understanding of the second case than merely DIRECTION/ALLATIVE.

Since the GC offers a number of additional examples for the second case beyond these two definitions, it is imperative to examine the distribution of all the selected examples to arrive at a more representative picture of Si tu's version of the second case.

8.2.2 On the Morphosyntactic Distribution of the Examples Classified as Second Cases

I have identified 22 phrases in the GC which are classified as second cases, two of which are listed twice and may thus be omitted, while others are equivalent or differ only insignificantly from a grammatical perspective.[564] The following provides a full list of the examples:[565]

1) *dkon cog de la phyag 'tshal lo* '[I] prostrate to these jewels' (SCP 1.2, Rnam gling, Pra ti: 4th case)

2) *skyabs su mchi'o* lit. 'to go to the refuge' (Zha lu: *sangs rgyas la skyabs su mchi*) (~3)

3) *shar phyogs su 'gro* 'to go to the east' (Zha lu, Rnam gling)

4) *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* 'to make/carve a picture onto/on the stone'

5) *mtha' ru 'khyol* 'to get to an end' i.e. 'to become finished/completed'

6) *rgya gar du 'gro* 'to go to India' (Rnam gling) (~3)

7) *rgyab tu phyogs* 'to turn backwards'

8) *pha rold tu phyin* 'gone to the other side' (Zha lu: *pha rol tu*) (~3)

---

[564] Note that Tshe tan zhabs drung (2005, 120) identifies 18 phrases for the second case in the GC, however, it is not fully clear to me, whether this refers to the total number of examples or only those that are correct in his view.

[565] The translations are intended to be as literal as possible, even though some of them may appear awkward in English. They also need to be regarded only as tentative. I have added possible antecedents in the grammars of Zha lu, Rnam gling and Pra ti, the three main sources of inspiration for Si tu as well as his main opponents. The treatises' resemblances are more numerous than mentioned in the list, and I have only provided information about identical examples or those in which Si tu has added or omitted parts.

9) *gzugs la lta* 'to look at the form' (listed twice)

10) *mdun na rgyu* 'to move in front of'

11) *mchog gsum **la** skyabs su shes* 'to know/recognize the three jewels as the refuge'

12) *gzugs la mi lta* 'to not look at the form' (~3)

13) *gun la dga'* 'to like/love all', alternatively 'to like/love totally'? (Rnam gling: *de nyid*)

14) *de ru skyid* 'to be delighted about it' (Rnam gling: *de nyid*)

15) *rgyab tu spro* 'to emanate/spread/radiate backwards' (Rnam gling: *de nyid*)

16) *lha la phyag 'tshal* 'to prostrate to the god' (~1)

17) *shar du 'gro* 'to go to the east' (~3)

18) *gzugs **la** lta bar byed* 'to perform the looking at the form' (~9)

19) *bum par chu blugs* 'to pour water into the pot' (listed twice)

20) *mgo bor dbyug pas bsnun* 'to hit at the head with a stick'

If we exclude the redundant grammatical constructions[566] from this list based on the employed verbs, Si tu provides 13 different verb frames for the second case.[567] Among these, the prototypical marker *la* is used four times (1, 9, 11, 13), *du* and its allomorphs *tu*, *su* and *ru* five times (3, 5, 7, 14, 15), *-r* three times (4, 19, 20) and *na* only once (10). Supplementing the thirteen distinctive verb frames with the missing participants of their default construction, they exhibit the following syntactic patterns, summarized into five types according to traditional morphology:[568]

(1):	[*byed sgra*] + unmarked + *la*	
(4), (19):	[*byed sgra*] + unmarked + *-r* (=*la* or *du*?)	*byed sgra* + unmarked + *la don*
(20):	[*byed sgra*] + *byed sgra* + *-r* (=*la* or *du*?)	*byed sgra* + *byed sgra* + *la don*
(9):	[*byed sgra*] + *la*	*byed sgra* + *la don*
(13):	[unmarked] + *la*	
(3), (5), (7), (14), (15):	[unmarked] + *du*	unmarked + *la don*
(10):	[unmarked] + *na*	
(11):	[*byed sgra*] + *la* + *du*	unmarked + *la don* + *la don*

With the exception of the morpheme *du* in (14) and the morpheme *la* in (11), which both raise questions, all the remaining constructions may safely assumed to be grammatical.

---

[566] 2, 6, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18.
[567] These are the highlighted examples.
[568] Supplemented arguments which are missing in the examples have been put into brackets.

In view of the above examinations, only four of these thirteen (3, 5, 7, 15) are clear candidates for DIRECTION, insofar as they employ the morpheme *du* and a verb with a perceptible directional value. As already elaborated in Si tu's two definitions of the second case, the grammatical function of *la* and *-r* in the grammatical constructions of (1), (4) and (9) are difficult to assess without a better understanding of the morphemes' general distribution and their meaning, leaving the possibility for the three candidates ALLATIVE, INDIRECT OBJECT and – in the case of (1) – also BENEFICIARY. Furthermore, (10) as the only instance of *na* in the entire list has a special status, and thus the morpheme's precise morphosyntactic functioning is little help in determining Si tu's understanding of the second case and the rationale of his selection. However, the remaining five phrases (11), (13), (14), (19) and (20) deserve a closer examination as they contain new material for the present analysis.

(11) (*mchog gsum **la** skyabs su shes* 'to know/recognize the three jewels as the refuge') resembles (4) insofar as the verb *shes pa* ('to know') on its own does not exhibit any clear directional meaning and normally governs two nominal arguments, an unmarked PATIENT as the object of knowing and the knower marked by *byed sgra*. In contrast to (4), the directional meaning is much less apparent from the semantic construal of the phrase's content, since *mchog gsum* ('three jewels') is the direct object of knowing, unlike the *rdo ba* in (11), which is either a LOCATION, DIRECTION or INDIRECT OBJECT. Tshe tan zhabs drung notes that the addition of *la* in this phrase is unnecessary or even "uneasy/awkward to say" (*brjod mi bde ba*).[569] He compares it with phrases such as *don drub dbang rgyal pha ru shes* ('to recognize Don drub Dbang rgyal as the father') and dismisses *don drub dbang rgyal **la** pha ru shes* as equally awkward. However, Si tu's classification is intelligible from the context and the fact that he uses this particular phrase to explain the difference between the second case and *de nyid*.[570] Thus, Si tu required a representative example which employs both these functions within a single clause. It is not visible to me, why he did not simply refer to the much more common and unproblematic *mchog gsum la skyabs su mchi* ('to take refuge to the Buddha'). The exact semantic or syntactic value of *la* in this clause as well as Si tu's perception of this value remains open. However, it should be kept in mind that the object of knowing remains unaffected through the process of knowing, which may have prompted Si tu (incorrectly) to

---

[569] Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 124. In his Tibetan verb lexicon, Hacket also classifies *shes pa* as a type V verb according to his scheme, a so-called 'agentive-nominative verb' which is differentiated (*tha dad pa*) (cf. Hackett 2003, 169f.).
[570] Cf. infra 239f.

apply the morpheme *la*, in case the latter is a marker for SECONDARY OBJECTS in the sense of little or no affectedness.

(13) (*gun la dga'* 'to like/love all') and **(14)** (*de ru skyid* 'to be delighted about it') are equally problematic. Both belong to the type of verbs in Tibetan which express affection or states of emotion, with other common instances being, for example, *'jigs pa* ('to fear'), *skrag pa* ('to be frightened'), *khro ba* ('to hate') and *sdang ba* ('id.'). They form a group insofar as all follow the same syntactic pattern in which the experiencer of the affection remains unmarked whereas the object of the affection is marked by *la* and cannot take *du* or its allomorphs. Apparently, Si tu either missed or neglected this important language-specific feature of these verbs forming a homogeneous pattern, which Tshe tan zhabs drung criticizes by stating that Si tu classifies instances like *sdig pa la 'jigs* ('to fear misdeeds') or *seng ge la skrag pa* ('to fear the lion') not as second but as seventh cases.[571] As will be seen below, an instance such as *dman par brtse ba* ('to feel loving kindness for the inferior beings') was even classified as a fourth case, i.e. beneficiary. On the one hand, this obvious inconsistency may be explained through an objectivist approach by switching from an analysis of the sentence structures to the interpretation of the underlying scenarios, for example in the classification of *rtse ba*.[572] However, it still remains unclear why Si tu would distinguish between the instances of being happy and having fear, and how this relates to his conception of the second case. More material will be found in the context of the seventh case on this issue of his classification of verbs of fear as seventh case in relation to Sanskrit case marking patterns as well as his understanding of the underlying scenario of fear.[573]

Linguistically, the group of affective verbs may support arguments in favor of the hypothesis that *la* can have indirect/secondary objective meaning – in its prototypical function or not – for without additional information on their etymology, the directional value of these verbs, while not impossible, is much less intuitive compared to other uses of *la*.[574] Furthermore, *la* with these verbs may usually not be substituted by the directional marker *du*, just like the verb *lta ba*.[575]

---

[571] Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 120.

[572] If we suppose that loving kindness towards beings results in some benefit for them.

[573] For more information on the issue of Si tu's classification of affection verbs and the reasons why he classified verbs of fear as a seventh case, cf. infra 302ff.

[574] Note that Tournadre (2010, 106), for example, subsumes this use of *la* under BENEFICIARY, not its ALLATIVE-function.

[575] Note, however, that this is contradicted by (14) *de ru skyid* ('to be delighted about it'), where Si tu adopted a phrase from Rnam gling who used *du*'s allomorph *ru*. One option to explain this use may be *ru*'s morphological affinity to *-r*, thus the two interpreting *de ru* as the substitute for *der* in a vocalic environment where an additional syllable is required.

Unfortunately, a comparison to other authors in this issue is lacking since no further representative passages dealing with this type of verbs could be identified in other classical sources. While the exact function of *la* in these examples deserves further investigations, for the time being the hypothesis will be assumed that the very distinct use of *la* with verbs of affection has no directional value but rather that of an INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT. From the perspective of the functioning of *la* in (13) and (14), these two sample phrases are therefore in favor of an objective interpretation of Si tu's second case as opposed to a directional one, although the possibility cannot be ruled out that Si tu interpreted (13) and (14) as examples of DIRECTION despite their objective value.

In the case of **(19)** (*bum par chu blugs* 'to pour water into the pot'), even though its grammatical construction equals that of (4) as well as – given that *-r* here is an allomorph of *la* – that of (1), which raises similar problems regarding the case marker's precise functioning on the level of the surface structure of the sentence, a directional value would be an intuitively comprehensible semantic construal of the scenario at hand.[576]

Finally, **(20)** (*mgo bor dbyug pas bsnun* 'to hit with a stick at/on the head') is an interesting case. If we abstain from all acrobatic interpretations of this phrase and its underlying semantic structure, this is a clear instance where *-r* is substituted for the directional marker *ru* or where *-r* as an allomorph of *la* has clear directional-locative meaning in the sense of the phrase's translation. It must only be noted that *snun pa* ('to press,' 'to hit') may also be used in grammatical constructions such as *dgra bo la mtshon cha snun pa* ('to push the weapon into the enemy,' i.e. 'to stab the enemy'),[577] which again corresponds to (1), (4) and (19).

If this investigation now moves from the discussion of Si tu's selection of examples for the second case on to a comparison with those provided by Zha lu et al.,[578] it is observed that there are two major homogenizations of the selected corpus in GC. In contrast to Zha lu and Rnam gling, Si tu omitted any example of the type *bzhad du gsol* ('to ask to explain'), *bsam du med* (lit. 'not to be thought,' in the meaning of 'unthinkable,' 'beyond our mind') or *drag tu brgyal* ('to fall/faint violently') which he would classify as *de nyid* ('identity') in accordance with *Smra sgo*, Pra ti and GNT.[579] Despite the fact that Si tu never classifies such examples as an actual

---

[576] For more details on this example, cf. infra 232ff. On example (4), *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed*, cf. supra 215.
[577] Cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* 2006, 1596.
[578] Cf. supra 206ff.
[579] Although he did not list these particular examples. Also note that Pra ti would disagree with my classification of phrases with the verb *gsol ba* ('to ask,' 'request') as *de nyid*, since he interprets them as fourth cases in the sense of 'to ask for an explanation' (*bzhad du gsol*), *bzhad pa* being the purpose of the request. It is definitely a challenging question whether the morpheme *du* in such instances should be seen in its purposive function, in which case Pra ti's classification is preferable, or alternatively as the indication of a verbal attribute similar to Si

second case *las su bya ba* but rather as *de nyid*, he nonetheless subsumes the latter as a subcategory under the former. The exclusion of these examples from the actual second case is therefore more a refinement within the second case itself.[580]

Si tu's second deviation from his predecessors regards the already mentioned examples of the type *'di **ru** mgon po rtag bzhugs nas* ('after the protector resided perpetually here;' Zha lu)[581] or *dga' ldan **na** chos ston* ('to teach Dharma at Dga' ldan;' Rnam gling) apparent in Zha lu, Rnam gling as well as Pra ti. Si tu omits these examples here as well, and instead they are encountered under the seventh case. He thus broke with the action vs. existential/residential distinction between the second and seventh case, which was directly explicated in Pra ti. Consequently, the GC allows for seventh cases with proper action verbs but not proper locatives under the second case.

8.2.3 Résumé on Si tu's Two Definitions and his Selection of Illustrations

The overall picture of Si tu's presentation of the second case is anything but simple or clear. There are two general definitions in terms of *byed pa pos bya ba gang las byed pa's las* and *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*, both of which may be independently interpreted as either an ALLATIVE definition or that of a general objective case function, the latter either exclusively for *la don* in the sense of a INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or including also the unmarked PATIENT. In sources such as the GNT or NGg, the second case was defined in terms of a genuine PATIENT, whereas Pra ti proposed his 'action case.' At least it is clear that Si tu distanced himself from the latter option by classifying locative uses of *la don* with action verbs as a seventh case. The directional meaning in terms of an ALLATIVE, which is frequently attributed to the morpheme *la* in modern linguistics and would smoothly match with the morpheme *du* as another second case marker, has not been explicated as the meaning of the second case previous to Si tu, yet it remains a possible interpretation of Si tu's second case. In order to resolve the issue of the remaining possibility of either ALLATIVE or OBJECT (either INDIRECT OBJECT, DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT or both) in his conception, examples of the second case throughout the entire GC were collected and analyzed. Unfortunately, these sample phrases

---

tu's understanding of *de nyid* (cf. chapter 8.2.5). The difference in translation would then be that of 'to ask/request for (the sake of) an explanation' (purposive) or 'to ask/request that (something) will be explained.' The morpheme *du* is used in instances where they correspond to adverbs (cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f.), but the question remains as to the precise parameters to demarcate the purposive from the adverbial function of this morpheme, perhaps a good example for the intricacies of distributional analysis.

[580] Cf. chapter 8.2.5.

[581] Apparently, Zha lu quoted this example from another source.

pose further questions surrounding the same issue, which amount to the following two interrelated points:

From a linguistic perspective, what is the precise syntactic or semantic information encoded by the seven *la don* morphemes on the level of the sentence in these examples?

From a historical perspective, how did Si tu interpret the function of the seven *la don* morphemes in these examples?

These two questions together also carry with them important insights into the linguistic significance of and the strategies behind Si tu's conceptions. It was argued that the main difficulty here is the exact functioning of the second case's prototypical marker *la*, which covers a heterogeneous array of semantic-syntactic environments in which it can be used. A precise classification in terms of directional-locative vs. objective in many instances is more a matter of interpretation, which bears the danger of DeLancey's objectivist error.[582] The two remaining morphemes of the second case, i.e. *du* and *na*, are less problematic, mostly because their use appears to be more homogenous and their generic functioning as directional-locative and static locative markers respectively are more established in modern linguistics. Based on a cursory analysis of the examples, I offer the following summary of the sample phrases:

From the thirteen distinct grammatical constructions, only four (3, 5, 7, 15; 30,8%) can be classified as more or less unproblematic, unequivocal instances of DIRECTION/ALLATIVE, since they employ a verb with a strong directional value and the morpheme *du*. One more example (10; 7,7%) has an exceptional status but would still rather unproblematically fit the directional option, since it is the only instance of *na* in this list which illustrate its use as the second case despite being the most distinct and specialized marker.

Seven additional examples (1, 4, 9, 11, 13, 14, 19; 53,8%) remain problematic insofar as they employ *la* or *-r*, thus raising the question of the exact intrasentential information encoded by these morphemes. From a syntactic perspective, they cover five different grammatical constructions (construction 1: 1; constr. 2: 9; constr. 3: 11; constr. 4: 13; constr. 5: 14), with examples 4 and 19 either belonging to construction 1 or forming a separate group, depending on the status of *-r* as either a variant of *la* or *du*. From a semantic perspective, they either allow for a directional as well as non-directional interpretation (1, 4, 9, 19) or their directional value is not directly obvious (11, 13, 14) although not impossible. The degrees to which either the directional or non-directional value prevails in the four semantically bivalent examples is a

---

[582] Cf. e.g. the discussion of sample phrases in chapter 8.2.1.2, especially supra 215f. As for the objectivist error, cf. supra 105f.

matter of semantic interpretation. Example 14 is problematic in two ways, since its use of *ru* instead of *la* remains unclear.

A final example (20; 7,7%), although also marked by *-r*, can hardly be interpreted as a secondary, indirect or less affected object and thus must be an instance of DIRECTION.

From a semantic-interpretational perspective, most if not all examples in the list may be read as having a directional value in one way or another. Yet, since I am not a linguist, I will refrain from deciding on the question of the meaning of *la*. With the heterogeneity as well as possible semantic ambiguities of the examples of *la* in mind, let us instead trace Si tu's version of the second case further. It is most insightful in this context to contrast Si tu's second case *las* or *las su bya ba* with *las* as *dngos po gzhan*, the latter covering the genuine DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT function prototypically encoded by the unmarked argument in Tibetan sentences.

8.2.4 On the Relation between *la don gyi las* and *dngos pos gzhan gyi las*[583]

It was stated in the historical part on this case that the separation of *la don* and its function from the genuine resultative part of the action (*bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa'i las*), which was used in the context of *Sum rtags* as the explanation for *dngos po gzhan*, enabled Tibetan grammarians to distinguish at least between *la don* vs. unmarked morphology.[584] However, the terminological heritage from the original Sanskritic conception that *las* and *yul/gzhi* are used in both contexts was also still prevalent. Whether this overlap was regarded as indicative for some functional connection between the two remained mostly unaddressed in the grammatical works before the times of Si tu. But the question remains of high importance for its intimate relation to the understanding of the second case as well as for the status of the unmarked argument within the traditional case model. If *dngos po gzhan* together with *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul* ('*karman*/domain of the other thing') are unconnected to *la don* and *la don gyi las/yul* ('the *karman*/domain of the *la don*-morphemes') as the second case, what may this most central grammatical function represent apart from the second case? Is it part of another case or no case at all? And what does this mean for the second case? The GC follows former *Sum rtags* commentators and identifies the resultative part of the action with *dngos po gzhan* and without mentioning it as a meaning of *la don*. Thus, Si tu's taxonomy bears the same issues, and Si tu needed to find a strategy to resolve them.

---

[583] While these two Tibetan terms are not used in Tibetan grammars, I introduce them here for the sake of clarity regarding the two functions of the second case, which is marked by *la don*, and the PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT expressed through zero-marking, which is referred to as *dngos po gzhan* in the GC.
[584] Cf. chapter 8.1.3.

In GC, the notion of *yul* is not only utilized in the second definition of the second case, but it figures almost more prominently during the exposition of *dngos po gzhan*, in which it refers to the unmarked PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT and is rendered as [*byed pa po*] *des bsgrub par bya ba'i yul* ('the domain which is to be accomplished by that [agent]'). Likewise, at least one example is found, namely *bum par chu blugs* ('to pour water into the pot'),[585] in which Si tu rendered *chu* – obviously an instantiation of *dngos po gzhan* – as the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* ('*karman* to be poured').[586] Therefore, in the GC, *la don gyi las/yul* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul* may be contrasted as follows:

la don gyi las/las su bya ba	dngos po gzhan gyi las
byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las	[bya bar] (~blugs par) bya rgyu'i las[587]
bya ba 'jug pa'i yul	byed pa pos bsgrub par bya ba'i yul

Figure 8: Comparison between la don gyi las *(=* las su bya ba*) and* dngos po gzhan gyi las *in the* Great Commentary I[588]

The following general observations may be made here: first, *yul* and *las* equally qualify both of them. In a direct confrontation, the ALLATIVE hypothesis regarding Si tu's conception of the second case appears to be the most straightforward choice. The difference between the two *las* would then be that one *karman* is the directional object towards which (*gang la*) the action is performed, whereas the other *karman* would be the direct object which is to be done (*bya par bya rgyu'i las*). The difference regarding *yul* likewise would be that in the case of *la don*, *yul* is that domain in which the action engages (*'jug pa*), whereas for *gzhan* the domain is that which is to be accomplished by the agent (*bsgrub pa*). In total, this would be Si tu's theoretical reflection of the difference between *la don* marking and zero-marking, which basically amounts to the functional difference of ALLATIVE/DIRECTION and DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT.

This interpretation of the terminology should be kept in mind, since it represents a plausible possibility that Si tu not only recognized and acknowledged a difference between the *la don* and unmarked argument, but even directly accounted for it in his definitions in terms of DIRECTION and PATIENT. Yet, some precaution is suggested, for the respective passages in which *bsgrub par bya ba'i yul* and *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* are discussed are unrelated in the GC and Si tu omitted any theoretical encounter of the two. The same holds true for the respective

---

[585] Number 19 in the overall list of examples.

[586] Cf. infra 232f.

[587] Note that Si tu did not make use of the term *bya bar bya rgyu'i las* ('*karman* to be done') himself, but I have derived and abstracted it from his *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* ('*karman* to be poured').

[588] The respective translations are:
la don: 'the karman upon/towards which the action is performed by the agent,' 'the domain in which the action engages.'
dngos po gzhan: 'the karman which is to be done,' 'the domain which is to be accomplished by the agent.'

versions of *las*. Since on their own, both definitions of the second case in GC as either *byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'las* or *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* are not sufficiently specific to exclude other functions previously subsumed under the second case, it cannot be precluded that Si tu wanted to leave space for *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul* to remain part of the two definitions of the *la don* case.

A further distinguishing criterion between the two might become manifest if Si tu's varying paraphrasings of *tha dad pa/tha mi dad pa* ('differentiated/non-differentiated') in the context of his verb typology are read against the backdrop of Si tu's distinction of the second case into principal and subordinate *karman*.[589] Si tu distinguishes actions in terms of being differentiated (*tha da pa*) or non-differentiated (*tha mi dad pa*), first of all in order to account for the syntactic and semantic difference of verbs like *skor ba* ('[some distinct agent actively] turns [a wheel, etc.]') and *'khor ba* ('[a wheel, etc.] is turning [by itself]').[590] In his introduction to this terminology under TKJ 11.3, Si tu glosses the technical term *tha (mi) dad pa* ('differentiated/not differentiated') as *byed po dang **bya ba** tha (mi) dad pa'i las kyi tshig* ('verbs in which agent and action are (in)different'), and he also alternatively renders *tha mi da dpa* verbs at least once as *byed po dang **bya yul** ngo bo gcig pa'i las kyi tshig* ('verbs in which agent and domain of action are identical').[591] The *bya yul* ('domain of action') in this context refers exclusively to *dngos po gzhan* and thus the unmarked PATIENT of Tibetan sentences. If the two renditions of *tha dad min* are in fact equivalent, which they must be, it may be inferred that in case the agent is indifferent (*tha mi dad pa* = identical, *ngo bo gcig*) with the action, it is also identical with the domain of the action. Conversely, if it is different from the action, it must also be different from the domain of the action. Si tu did not explicate the resulting relation between action and *karman*, however from his presentation it may be inferred that the action (*bya ba*) and the domain of action (*bya yul*), i.e. *dngos po gzhan*, are conceived as a general relationship of identity (*ngo bo gcig*).

This is especially noteworthy in the present context, insofar as Si tu introduces an analogous subdivision of the second case marked by *la don* in order to distinguish between instances such as *shar phyogs **su** 'gro* ('to go **to** the east') and *sgrol ma tshe'i lha **ru** bsten* ('to rely on Tara **as** the deity of longevity'). The latter phrase represents an instance of the transformative function of the morpheme *du* that Tibetan grammaticography refers to as *de nyid*.[592] In the GC, the basic

---

[589] Cf. chapter 8.2.5.
[590] In English, this would be mainly distinguished by the transitive/intransitive use of a single verb.
[591] Cf. GC 541.1 and 541.2.
[592] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f.

distinguishing criterion between the two is the identity with or separation from the action (*bya ba dang thad dad mi dad*): *shar phyogs* in *shar phyogs su 'gro* would then be a principal (*gtso bo*) *karman*, because it is a domain of the action different from the action itself (*bya ba dang tha dad pa*), whereas *tshe'i lhar* in *tshe'i lha ru bsten* only qualifies as a secondary or subordinate (*phal pa*) *karman* due to its identity (*ngo bo gcig*) with the action:[593]

la don gyi las	vs.	*dngos po gzhan gyi las*
las dang bya ba tha dad pa = las tso bo: ***shar phyogs su*** *'gro* ('to go **to the east**') ***gzugs la*** *lta* ('to look **at the form**')	**vs.**	inferred from Si tu's two renditions of *tha dad min*: *las dang bya ba tha mi dad pa/ngo bo gcig pa*: ***chu*** *blugs* ('to pour **water**')
las dang bya ba ngo bo gcig pa = las phal pa: *sgrol ma* ***tshe'i lha ru*** *bsten* ('to rely on Tara **as the deity of longevity**')	**?**	

Figure 9: Comparison between la don gyi las *(=* las su bya ba*) and* dngos po gzhan gyi las *in the* Great Commentary *2*

The whole argument amounts to the point that another distinguishing criterion in the GC between *la don gyi las/yul* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul* may be that of **the difference from the action** for the principal *la don gyi las* vs. **the identity with the action** for *dngos po gzhan*. In other words, if this argument is valid, Si tu conceptualized the unmarked PATIENT as the resultative part of the action (*bya ba'i yul la yod pa'i las*) identical with the action but arguments marked by *la don* as separate from the action.[594] The obvious resulting question, of course, then

---

[593] Cf. chapter 8.2.5.

[594] That such a line of thought was relevant in the Tibetan tradition is evident at least after Si tu's times from Dmu dge bsam tan, who has established the distinction between second case marked by *la don* and unmarked argument precisely through the very identity with the action, which only qualifies the latter of the two:

> *de bzhin du la don sbyar tshul la'ang khyad par yod de/ mig gis gzugs la lta zhes pa'i skabs/ gzugs yul du byas nas de la blta ba'i bya ba byas pas/ gzugs dang blta ba'i bya ba gnyis tha dad pa'i tshul du yod de/ gzugs yul dang lta ba bya ba byas te brjod pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis/ la don sbyor dgos/ mig gis gzugs mthong zhes pa'i skabs/ brjod tshul gyi dbang gis/ mig byed pa dang gzugs mthong ba bya ba yin pas/ gzugs dang mthong ba gnyis bya ba'i ngo bor gcig tu 'brel nas yod pas la don mi 'thob bo/*

> "Likewise, there is also a difference in *la don*'s mode of application: For instance, 'to look at the form with the eyes' (*mig gis gzugs la lta*), after having made the form into the domain (*yul du byas nas*), the action of looking at it is performed, for which reason the two, form and action of looking, exist in separate form (*tha dad pa'i tshul du yod*), namely the form is the domain (*yul*) and looking the performed action. Because [it] is expressed [in this way], *la don* must be applied. In the instance 'to see the form with the eyes' (*mig gis gzugs mthong*), due to the way [it] is expressed, the eyes are that which performs [the action] (*byed pa*) and the seeing-the-form (*gzugs mthong ba*) is the action (*bya ba*). Thus, the two, form and seeing, exist connected in the single identity of the action (*bya ba'i ngo bor gcig tu 'brel nas yod pa*), for which reason no *la don* follows (~ *mi 'thob*)." (Dmu dge bsam tan 2006B, 59)

Dmu dge bsam tan also goes on to explain the same difference between *la don*, i.e. the second case *las su bya ba*, and the unmarked argument, i.e. *dngos po gzhan*, by means of the sample pair 'to contest a foe' (*dgra la rgol*) and 'to conquer/beat/overcome a foe' (*dgra 'joms*) as well as other examples. He did not use the term *las* for the second case, which in his work he labels *las su bya ba* and associates with the category *yul* ('domain'), whereas simple *las* is the category associated with *dngos po gzhan* (cf. also Dmu dge bsam gtan 2006A, 18ff. and 77f.).

concerns the difference between unmarked *dngos po gzhan* as *bya ba dang ngo bo gcig pa* and the subsidiary *karman* marked by *la don*, which is equally *bya ba dang ngo bo gcig pa*.

It is difficult to evaluate how the parameter of separation vs. identity would have to be translated into concrete grammatical categories, and without Si tu having confronted all the different conceptions surrounding the two types of *las/yul* in the GC, we are left to our own interpretation. No real difference in terms of ALLATIVE and PATIENT manifests in these theories on the identity and separation with the action, yet, this has also not been fully excluded, especially if separation and identity are interpreted in terms of spatial proximity to the action.

To make things even more intricate than they already are, a distinction of *bya ba'i yul* in terms of spatial proximity is precisely what Si tu articulated in his *Cāndra* commentary on C 2.1.43:

> *kri yā pye dwi tī yā/ bya ba'i las la gnyis pa'o/ byed pa pos bya ba byed pa'i tshe bya ba'i yul gyi dngos po de la byed pa can gyi las zhes brjod pas de la rnam dbye gnyis pa 'gyur te/ ka ṭa dang/ o da na dang/ ā di tya rnams las gnyis pa'i gcig tshig am/ am la sngon ma 'os/ am'i a dang/ rtags mtha'i a dag gcig tu gyur/ byed tshig dang sbyar/ hal la ma'i nga ro byas pas/ ka ṭaṃ ka ro ti de ba dattaḥ/ lhas byin gyis rtswa lhas byed/ o da naṃ pa ca ti ya dznya dattaḥ/ mchod byin gyis zas 'tshed/ ā di tyaṃ pa shya ti bi praḥ/ bram ze nyi ma la lta bar byed lta bu'o/ 'dir rgya 'grel rnams su byed pa po'i bya bas gang zhig shin tu khyab par 'dod pa de ni byed pa can gyi las kyi ming can du 'gyur ro/ zhes bshad pas bya ba'i yul la'ang nye ba dang ring ba gnyis las de ma thag bar ma chad par bya ba 'jug pa'i yul de la byed pa can gyi las zhes bya bas de ni rnam dbye gnyis pa 'jug pa'i yul yin no/*

> "*kriyāpye dvitīyā* (C 2.1.43), 'the second [case suffix] when the *karman* of action (*bya ba'las*).' During the performance of an action by the agent, that entity [which is] the domain of the action (*bya ba'i yul gyi dngos po*) is called the *karma-kāraka* (*byed pa can gyi las*), for which reason a second case suffix is [added] to it. After [the nominal stems] *kaṭa* ('mat'), *odana* ('rice') and *āditya* ('sun'), the singular of the second [case suffix] *am* [is added]. By [the rule C 5.1.113] 'the former (= the nominal stem's final vowel) if *am*' (*am la sngon ma 'o*), the *a* of *am* is fused with the stem's final *a*. If applied with a verb, since [in front of] a *hal*[-sound] (= consonant) an *anusvara* is applied to *m*, [these word forms would become], for example, *kaṭaṃ karoti devadattaḥ*

'Devadatta makes a mat' (*lhas byin gyis rtswa lhas byed* ?), *odanaṃ pacati yajñadattaḥ* 'Yajñadatta cooks rice,' *ādityaṃ paśyati vipraḥ* 'the Brahmin looks at the sun.' In this context, it is explained in the Sanskrit commentaries that 'that which is desired to be thoroughly obtained by the agent's action is termed the *karma-kāraka*.' Therefore, among the two [types] for the domain of action (*bya ba'i yul*), the more proximate (*nye ba*) and more distant (*ring ba*), that domain in which the action engages (*bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*) immediately (*de ma thag par*) [and] without discontinuation (*ma chad par*), is called *karma-kāraka*, for which reason it is the place where the second case suffix adjoins."[595]

The Sanskrit second case suffix marks the *kriyāpya* (*bya ba'i las*), i.e. the *kāraka*-function *karman* according to Si tu, which is equally identified with the *bya ba'i yul* ('domain of action'). The examples make clear that the morphosyntactic entity in question is that of the DIRECT OBJECT or PATIENT in Sanskrit sentences. Since Si tu further quotes the widespread *karman* definition of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on P 1.4.49,[596] it is safe to assume that he refers to the prototypical function of the Sanskrit second case suffix as it was traditionally conceived, the *karma-kāraka* in its most genuine sense. He then introduces a distinction of the *bya ba'i yul* into more proximate (*nye ba*) and more distant (*ring ba*), specifying the current function of C 2.1.43 as that domain which is immediately (*de ma thag par*) or without discontinuation (*ma chad par*) engaged by the action. Si tu argues for the identification with the proximate domain based on the definition from the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, and thus the immediate engagement of the action must conceptually relate to the Sanskritic definition in his view. It may therefore be inferred that there must consequently be a non-immediate, gradual, mediated, indirect, etc. engagement of the action with the domain, which results in the distant type. This concept is a suitable foundation for distinguishing between the Tibetan-specific *la don gyi las/yul* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul*, yet, the background of the distinction into proximate and distant domains of an action remains completely in the dark. No other sources or further passage in Si tu's collected works were encountered in this research which would further elaborate on this concept, nor any other Sanskritic or Tibetan source that would utilize it. While the proximate type clearly refers to the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT in Sanskrit sentences, it remains completely open what kind of grammatical entity the distant domain supposedly represents. Furthermore, there is also

---

[595] Si tu 2.26.2.
[596] Cf. in the last quotation: *byed pa po'i bya bas gang zhig shin tu khyab par 'dod pa de ni byed pa can gyi las kyi ming can du 'gyur ro/* For a comparison with the Sanskrit version, cf. ft. 435.

no clarification of the concept's linguistic status, whether it was specific to Sanskrit or also applicable to Tibetan.

Therefore, for the time being, this quotation may only be regarded as a third possibility in Si tu's grammatical repertoire to distinguish between the Tibetan second case marked by *la don* (~ distant domain) and *dngos pa gzhan* as the unmarked argument (~ proximate domain). However, the use of the *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* for the Sanskrit DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT has utmost importance in this passage, since it is precisely the phrase of Si tu's second definition of the Tibetan second case. This makes clear that whatever was Si tu's exact understanding of the examples for the second case in the GC, the definition of *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* is not meant to provide any specification in terms of ALLATIVE, INDIRECT OBJECT, etc. This strongly corroborates the option that both definitions in the GC, namely *byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa's las* and *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*, refer simply to a general objective function which remains indifferent regarding further specifications.

This rather technical cross-reading of passages either related to Si tu's conception of the second case, *dngos po gzhan* or the Sanskritic second case suffix makes evident that the relation of *la don gyi las/gzhi* and *dngos po gzhan* consists mostly of fragments, like pieces of a puzzle dispersed throughout the GC and even outside of it, without ever fully developing or rendering them into a complete and systematic picture. Accordingly, I am not aware of any passage in the GC which would unequivocally decide on the relation between the two types of *las/yul*. Possible resolutions may be speculated, some of which have been touched upon in this chapter, however, especially in view of Si tu's own restraint, any such attempts must be regarded as later interpretations. It was demonstrated that although there are clear traces of such a distinction in his work, there also was a limited readiness to directly articulate and theorize it, which fact leaves space for a possible reconciliation of the two. This point is particularly interesting, since in the final statement on the second case in his case summary at the end of TKJ, Si tu finally drops the bomb:

> *de bzhin du bum par chu blugs zhes pa lta bu bum pa la bya ba blugs pa'i yul yin pas gnyis pa'am chu brten pa'i cha nas gnas gzhi ste rnam dbye gnyis gang rung 'jug cing/   chu ni blugs par bya rgyu'i las nyid yin pas de nyid kyi don la gnyis pa kho na 'jug mod/   phyi ma 'di rigs kyi rnam dbye bod skad la med pa mang ngo/*

> "Likewise, for example in 'having poured water into a pot' (*bum par chu blugs*), since the pot is the domain of the action of 'having poured' (*bya ba blugs pa'i yul*), the second

[case], or from the perspective of the water being supported, the abode (*gnas gzhi*)[597] – whichever of the two cases – join to ['the pot']. Regarding the water, since it is the very *karman* which is to be poured (*blugs par bya rgyu'i las*), only the second case joins [to the water] in that very meaning. However, cases of this latter type are often absent in Tibetan."[598]

This statement is the only direct confrontation in Si tu's work of an argument marked by *la don* with an unmarked argument,[599] and unfortunately he does not elaborate any conceptual details. Si tu chose a very representative example, namely *bum par chu blugs*, in which both arguments in question appear within one single phrase. Despite possible ambiguities in this example regarding the information encoded by *-r*, the fact that there is a significant functional difference between *la don* and the unmarked morphology is unmistakably clear. The pot represents the location where the water is poured, and the water is the entity to be poured.[600] Regarding *bum par*, Si tu offers a seemingly strange double-classification as either a second or seventh case depending on whether the pot is the domain in which the pouring engages (= second case) or whether the pot is that which supports the water (= seventh case). The underlying rationale of this double classification remains unclear, although it may have been inspired by Sanskrit case marking patterns in which the pot is indeed marked by a seventh case,[601] Si tu perhaps attempting to account for both language-specific constructions. Yet, Si tu's argument seems to go beyond the fact that these two constructions exist in both Tibetan and Sanskrit, but that *bum par* in the Tibetan phrase may carry both meanings depending which perspective is taken on. If he was not just indecisive in this statement which of the two semantic construals is the one encoded in the Tibetan phrase, but if he indeed accepted both as valid classifications of *bum par*, this seems like the recourse to an objectivist investigation that explores the instance of pouring water into a pot as such, with the resulting semantic construals deciding that two case

---

[597] I.e. the seventh case.

[598] GC 599.4.

[599] Nor have I thus far encountered any direct comparison of the two intrasentential arguments of Tibetan sentences in any other grammatical source pre-Si tu.

[600] In the current context, the precise functioning of *-r* and related questions in this phrase are only of secondary importance. For more information cf. supra 223.

[601] Cf. for example the following entry on *blugs* in Negi (2002, 3915):

> *phyed ni dge slong rnams kyi lhung bzed du blugs*
> *upārdhaṃ bhikṣuṇāṃ pātre pātayanti*
> 'They put one half into the alms bowl of the monks.'

Which rule in the Sanskrit grammars covers this use of the seventh case suffix remains unclear. Is it simply part of the *kāraka*-function *adhikaraṇa/ādhāra* despite the directional connotation? Concerning the second case, it will have to be left open whether Sanskrit grammar would allow the pot (*kumbha*, *ghaṭa*) to be alternatively classified as *karman* by P 1.4.51, in order to form a double-accusative construction in which the pot would then be marked by a second case suffix. In any case, from a Tibetan perspective it may be safely assumed that the non-locative meaning in the example prevails despite Si tu's double-classification.

functions of *du* are at hand. If this represents Si tu's intended line of argumentation, and it is asked why both classifications are a representative construal of the scenario of pouring, we are left with mere speculations. Perhaps Si tu conceived the entire situation of pouring water into a pot as a temporally extended process in which parts of the water are still to be poured into the pot, whereas the already poured part is located in the pot. From that perspective, the scenario as such allows for both semantic construals, second and seventh case, which then explains the Sanskrit case marking pattern and allows for the double value of *-r* in the Tibetan clause. As further instances will be encountered in which Si tu more obviously follows a strategy to compare Sanskrit and Tibetan case marking patterns based on an interpretation of the underlying scenario as such, it is not unlikely that Si tu followed an objectivist approach also in this instance.

The most interesting part of this quotation regards *chu* ('water') as the DIRECT OBJECT. According to Si tu, since it is the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* ('the *karman* to be poured'), only (*kho na*) a second case can be applied, in contrast to the double-classification of *bum pa*. The *kho na* refers to the two options for *bum par* and indicates that *chu* allows for only one classification, i.e. the second case. However, Si tu also acknowledges that this type of second case is often lacking in Tibetan. The reason of being the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* that causes the affixation of a second case form thus applies only to other languages, presumably Sanskrit, but generally not to Tibetan. The decisive question – and a detail Si tu unfortunately did not further explicate – remains the reason for Tibetan language so "often" lacking a second case marking, i.e. the application of *la don*, for the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las*. Consequently, what is the status of the unmarked argument within the case model? Are we supposed to see the reason in the fact that

1) in Tibetan, the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* is a distinct category, and thus there are two morphologically distinguished functions (*la don kyi las* and *dngos po gzhan*) which form a single category and are marked identically in other languages such as Sanskrit?

Tibetan	**Sanskrit (and other languages?)**
2 morphologies = 2 functions	1 morphology = 1 function

In this case, Si tu accepts a language-specific difference between Sanskrit and Tibetan. His Tibetan version of the second case must then be restricted to the function of *la don* without including unmarked DIRECT OBJECTS/PATIENTS, leaving open the question why the second case *las* (*karman*) is identified with the *la don* function but not with the much more prototypical function of *dngos po gzhan*. A further ramification is that *dngos po gzhan* would
234

no longer belong to the case model, an option which conveys a clear conflict with traditional Sanskritic and Tibetan taxonomies.

2) the zero-marking of the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* is nothing but a morphological variation without any difference in meaning compared to the second case marked by *la don*? While Tibetan and Sanskrit share the same grammatical function of *karman*, its morphological marking differs only in Tibetan:

Tibetan	Sanskrit (and other languages?)
2 morphologies = 1 function	1 morphology = 1 function

This type of argument would allow Si tu to maintain the relation between Tibetan and Sanskrit as well as the case status of the unmarked PATIENT. Yet, the establishment of a single function for both Tibetan morphologies (unmarked and *la don*) results in a complete arbitrariness of morphological case marking, which not only neglects the actual case marking patterns of Tibetan language and the semantic/syntactic parameters which govern them, but also raises the question why Si tu chose not to include any unmarked PATIENTs in his numerous examples of the second case. Thus, this option opposes the factual language and is further not corroborated by Si tu's list of examples.

3) the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* is indeed a separate functional category which is marked (inaccurately) with the same case suffix only in Sanskrit (and perhaps other languages)?

Tibetan	Sanskrit (and other languages?)
2 morphologies = 2 functions	1 morphology = 2 functions

In this case, Si tu would fully account for Tibetan-specific syntax. However, this option contradicts the basic conceptions of *karman* as encountered in the historical survey above, especially the attempts of *Cāndra* and the Naiyāyikas to homogenize this category. Si tu may have circumvented this issue by taking recourse to Sanskritic subcategorizations such as *nirvartya*, *vikārya*, *prāpya* and the like, but this option is rather unlikely. From the perspective of the basic, i.e. generic morphosyntactic distribution of the Sanskrit second case, the Tibetan pair of *la don gyi las* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las* is one grammatical category, and we can safely assume that Si tu was well aware of this fact.[602]

---

[602] The fourth and final logical option is that of two distinct Tibetan morphologies which express a single function of *karman*, whereas Sanskrit exploits only a single morphology expressing two distinct functions:

Tibetan	Sanskrit (and other languages?)
2 morphologies = 1 function	1 morphology = 2 functions

Since this makes only little sense linguistically as well as historically, this option will be excluded. Any other version in which the Tibetan morphology is reduced from two to one or the Sanskrit morphology extended from one to two is impossible from Si tu's quotation.

This may be regarded as a true scholastic-commentarial dilemma, which also makes Si tu's reticence much more comprehensible. The main issue concerns the already elaborated tension between the language-specific difference of *la don* versus unmarked morphology and the traditional Sanskritic conception of the second case, which comprises functions of both. Splitting the second case into two Tibetan-specific functions (option 1) would only disprove the authoritative status of the second case and raise the question why *la don gyi las* qualifies more as second case than *dngos po gzhan*. The alternative avenue to maintain the linguistic validity of the case by claiming a single category of *karman* (option 2), however, is blocked by Tibetan language and Si tu's more Tibetan-sensitive conception of the second case. Thus, what may Si tu's standpoints have been in view of these options?

Again, we are left to our own interpretation. However, at least we can read additions like *de nyid gyi don la* ('in that very meaning') and *phyi ma 'di rigs kyi rnams dbye* ('this latter type of case') in the quoted passage as indications or hints that Si tu indeed saw a noticeable functional difference between the two. Moreover, the clear separation of *la don gyi las/yul* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul* into two unrelated sections of the root texts and the lack of any direct association of the resultative part of the action with *la don* are further strong suggestions of a separation between the function specific to *la don* and the function of the unmarked argument in the GC. Yet, a different question altogether is how far Si tu was ready to follow this direction and – apart from the mere morphological fact that the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* in Tibetan is no longer a second case due to the lack of *la don* – whether he fully accepted a functional separation in the language between *la don gyi las* and *blugs par bya rgyu'i las*.

Apart from the selection of examples in which he left out instances for unmarked arguments, Si tu never openly considered a separation in his conception of the second case. In the above investigation, the two definitions and especially the second proved to be more inclusive and remain indifferent regarding any functional difference between the two types of *las/yul*. The reason for this inclusive approach to the definition of the second case despite the exclusion of sample phrases for unmarked arguments is probably contained in Si tu's statement that the second case marking as the only option for the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* is often absent in Tibetan. This means that the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* apparently takes a second case form outside the Tibetan context, with the implication that the Tibetan unmarked pattern seems like a more a language-specific variation of the generic pattern. Even more so, if it is marked, then only (*kho na*) by a second case and not by any other, according to Si tu's statement. Si tu justifies this by stating that only the second case marker joins to the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las*, simply

because it is the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* (*blugs par bya rgyu'i las yin pas*), which also makes it clear that the second case form remains intimately connected to the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las*. If marked by the second case form and only by that, then it must be part of the second case function *karman* as the only second case function in the Tibetan case model. The peculiarity in WT of the unmarked *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* therefore remains of minor significance compared to the general use of the case that follows more closely the Sanskritic version, in which the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* represents *karman* marked by the second case suffix. In this sense, the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* remains part of the second case even in Si tu's conception, and I would argue that he needed to account for this type of *karman* in his definitions of the second case. I therefore argue that Si tu's two definitions of the second case intend to also cover the resultative part of an action, even though this type of *karman* is not marked in Tibetan. After all, it must be bared in mind that Si tu claims linguistic validity for the traditional Tibetan case model across all meaning-expressing languages. A full separation of the *blugs par bya rgyu'i las* from the second case would go against Sanskritic morphosyntax and Sanskritic conceptions of *karman*, thus revealing that the validity of the traditional second case does not persist across languages.

The conclusion of this entire analysis therefore is that Si tu's conception of the second case is more likely that of a general objective case that subsumes all instances of a domain in which the action engages in (*bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*) or that *karman* upon which an action is performed by an agent (*byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa'i las*). Any further specification in terms of ALLATIVE, PATIENT, etc. was presumably left open deliberately. The coherency of the second case across the different morphologies is then established only by the fact that the two definitions are sufficiently general and versatile to cover the different functions of the *la don* morphemes as well as the unmarked PATIENT. While in one instance the action engages in the DIRECTION, it might engage in an INDIRECT OBJECT in the context of affections or equally engage in the PATIENT, thus all instances of the second case. In similarity to what was stated above on the approach of GNT, it is evident that Si tu's general definition does not go directly against any function encoded by the case markers. Nonetheless, his definition totally blurs the morphosyntactic surface structure of Tibetan sentences without much explanatory power for the meaning of the case markers. While the two definitions as such are not manifest in the Tibetan surface structure, they are general enough for being reinterpreted in terms of the morpheme-specific functions and vice versa. The only more apparent distinction in the GC is that of *la don gyis las/yul* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul*, at least in the form that *la don* no longer is a case marker for the resultative part of the action. Apart from the general definitions

of the second case and the differentiation between non-PATIENT *la don* and unmarked PATIENT, the exact understanding of particular second case markers in particular sentences has been left to the reader, for native speakers anyway a minor issue.

It is argued that a definition sufficiently general to cover all uses of *la don* and unmarked morphology was Si tu's strategy to retain the traditional taxonomy while simultaneously avoiding any conflict with Tibetan language, no matter how much awareness he may have had about the precise functioning of the different morphologies subsumed under the second case. If this strategy was not based on an objectivist approach, it was at least very interpretative.[603]

I sincerely hope that this presentation will provoke further research on Si tu's second case in general and the final quotation in particular, as to enhance our understanding of the intricacies of this most notorious Tibetan traditional second case. Regardless of its terse and vague character, this passage is the earliest testimony I thus far encountered in the tradition which openly addresses the difference between unmarked argument and argument marked by *la don* in WT.

A final important point, which is closely connected to the morpheme *du* and its adverbial as well as transformative functioning, regards Si tu's distinction into principal (*gtso bo*) and subordinate/secondary (*phal pa*) *karman*s. Important as it is for the historical constitution of Si tu's second case, this does not add much new information about the main conception of *las*, apart from the already outlined distinction into *las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad* ('*karman* and action differentiated [or] identical'). Therefore, its presentation will be restricted to the basic conception and its historical background.

8.2.5 The Secondary or Subordinate *karman*

Si tu's subordinate or secondary *karman* is the *de nyid* function of SCP 11.4, which he subsumes under the second case. This technical term *de nyid* ('identity') evoked several interpretations in the commentarial tradition. While Zha lu and Rnam gling offer *dngos po'i de kho na nyid* ('a phenomenon's real nature')[604] and *nges bzung ba* ('determination/emphasis')[605] respectively, Si tu basically adhered to *Smra sgo*, where *de nyid* has been used unrelated to SCP and refers to the transformative function exclusive to the morpheme *du* with nearly the same example as in GNT.[606] Based on the given examples, although Pra ti renders *de nyid* as *'den pa* ('truth'),

---

[603] Conclusive material on the systematic character of Si tu's objectivist approach to case grammar in general and thus also regarding his definitions of the second case is presented especially infra 314ff. and in chapter 16.
[604] Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 9.
[605] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 68f.
[606] Cf. Smṛti 2002, 92; supra 190.

his understanding of the term covers the same type of use of morpheme *du* as in Si tu.[607] A look at Zha lu's and Rnam gling's examples for the second case reveals that, even though they did not associate *de nyid* with the morpheme *du*'s extra-function, they already subsumed this type of use under the second case. Si tu's association of the transformative function with *de nyid* and the consequent supsumption under the second case is therefore less an innovation, but rather a refinement that accounts for the semantic/syntactic differences between genuine second cases marked by the various *la don* morphemes and morpheme *du* in its additional function.

Si tu dedicates a relatively large passage to his conception of *de nyid* in GC's section on *la don*'s functional mode of application (*don gyi sbyor tshul*), subsequent to his exposition of the three cases. He starts as follows:

> *rnam dbye gnyis pa'i bye brag yul gang zhig la bya ba gang zhig byed pa'i tshe/   las de kho na nyid kyi ngo bor gyur pas las dang bya ba ngo bo gcig pa yin pa de lta bu'i las kyi don la 'jug pa ni/   mchog gsum la skyabs su shes/   lhar gsal/   sra bar byed/ brtan par gyur/   sgrol ma tshe'i lha ru bsten/   'od du 'tsher/   gcig tu gyur/   sogs su shes par bya ste/*

> "A specific [instance] of the second case is the essential identity of *karman* and action during the performance of some action towards some domain, because [the action] has become the essence of that very *karman* itself (*las de kho na nyid kyi ngo bo*). As regards the application [of the morphemes *su*, *ru*, *-r*, *du* and *tu*] in the meaning of such *karman*s, it is to be understood as in (1) 'to know/recognize the three jewels as the refuge' (*mchog gsum la skyabs su shes*), (2) 'to visualize as the deity' (*lhar gsal*), (3) 'to make solid/to solidify' (*sra bar byed*), (4) 'having turned/being stable' (*brtan par gyur*), (5) 'to rely on Tara as the deity of longevity' (*sgrol ma tshe'i lha ru bsten*), (6) 'to shine brightly' (*'od du gsal*), (7) 'having turned into one/being united' (*gcig tu gyur*), etc."[608]

Si tu provides a very specific theory of this term, according to which he establishes an identity (*de nyid*) between the action and the argument marked by *du*. After noting the difficult character of this point, he goes on to elaborate it in more detail:

> *mchog gsum la skyabs su shes zhes pa lta bu la/   spyir btang/   skyabs su shes pa ni bya ba/   mchog gsum ni bya ba de'i yul yin pas de la las kyi rnam dbye sbyor ba yin*

[607] Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 198.
[608] GC 474.3.

mod/   bye brag phye na las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad kyi dbang gis las kyi rnam dbye 'jug pa'i yul gtso phal gnyis las gtso bo ni de nyid dang/   phal pa'am 'dir bstan de nyid kyi don can ni bya ba nyid la las dang bya ba gnyis su dbye ba'i/   shes pa ni bya ba/   skyabs ni shes par bya rgyu'i las yin pas der la don gyi rnam dbye 'jug pa de nyid de/   skyabs dang shes pa gnyis spyir tha dad yin yang bya ba gcig la sbyor ba 'di 'dra'i skabs su shes pa nyid skyabs yin no snyam pa'i ngo bor skyes pa brjod pa yin pas/ shes pa yul can dang skyabs yul du mi gzung bar/   mchog gsum yul dang/   skyabs dang shes pa bsdams pa'i tshig nus yul can gyi ngo bo gcig ston pa yin no/   des na bya las ngo bo gcig pa'i phyir la don 'di rigs la gzhung 'dir de nyid kyi sgras bstan cing/ ngo bo gcig la bya ba dngos mi 'byung bas/   'phags yul pa'i brda sprod pa dag gis las kyi don gtso bo ma yin pa'am phal pa zhes ser ro/

"Generally speaking, in 'to know the three jewels as the refuge' (*mchog gsum la skyabs su shes*), 'to know as the refuge' (*skyabs su shes*) is the action and the three jewels are that action's domain (*bya ba de'i yul*), for which reason the *karman* case is applied to the [three jewels]. But more specifically, from the perspective of the separation and identity of *karman* and action (*las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad*), the argument to which the *karman* case joins [is divided into] principal (*gtso bo*) and secondary (*phal pa*) [*karman*]. Among these two, the main [*karman*] is these very [three jewels]. [After] dividing the action itself into the two, *karman* and action, 'to know' is the action and 'refuge' [is] the *karman* to be known, which has the meaning of the secondary [*karman*] and is taught here [in the SCP] as 'identity' (*de nyid*). Therefore, [if] a *la don* case joins to that [entity which is the refuge], it is *de nyid*.

In general, both 'refuge' and 'to know' are different, but in such applications within one action, [*de nyid*] expresses the formation of an essence (*ngo bor skyes pa*) in the sense of 'the knowing itself is the refuge.' Therefore, instead of apprehending 'to know' as the located (*yul can*) and the 'refuge' as the locus (= domain, *yul*), 'three jewels' are the locus (= domain, *yul*), whereas the syntactically fit form (*tshig nus*) that combines 'refuge' and 'to know' is the indication of a single essence as that which is located (*yul can*). Thus, since action and *karman* are identical, in this treatise this type of *la don* is taught by the term '*de nyid*' ('identity'). Since within a single essence no real action arises, the grammarians of the Noble Land called it the non-principal (*gtso bo ma yin pa*, *apradhāna*) or secondary (*phal pa*, *guṇa*) meaning of *karman*."[609]

---

[609] GC 474.4.

Si tu establishes a subcategorization for the second case *las/las su bya ba* into principal and secondary and illustrates it through the phrase *mchog gsum la skyabs su shes* ('to know the three jewels as the refuge'), which employs one verb and two arguments marked by *la don*. The first argument, *mchog gsum* ('three jewels'), is classified as the main or principal second case, whereas in this example *skyabs* ('refuge') only qualifies as a secondary *karman*. The distinguishing criterion is their identity or distinctiveness with the action (*las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad*), according to which *skyabs* becomes identical with the action to form a single, syntactically fit form (*tshig nus*) that represents the action and takes *mchog gsum* as its object or domain (*yul*).

Thus, Si tu treats arguments classified as *de nyid* basically like verbal attributes. Instead of establishing the identity between the noun phrases in the sense of 'to know the three jewels *as* the refuge' – perhaps the more intuitive interpretation from a translational point of view – his understanding comes closer to 'to *refuge-know* the three jewels.' Likewise, his example (2) (*lhar gsal* 'to visualize [someone/-thing] *as* the deity') would in Si tu's theory be more accurately given as 'to *deity-visualize* [someone/-thing]'. Whether this is in fact the linguistically most satisfying representation of WT cannot be addressed here, however it certainly allowed Si tu to group together instances like *mchog gsum la skyabs su shes*, in which *skyabs* as *de nyid* specifies the noun phrase *mchog gsum*, and *rab tu gsal* ('very clear'), where *de nyid* appears as a clear adverb in English translations.[610]

Si tu's reference to Sanskrit grammar in this context bears its historical problems. The distinction into principal (*pradhāna*) and secondary (*apradhāna/guṇa*) *karman* indeed is a prominent subcategorization in the *Pāṇinian* commentarial literature, but I could not find any traces that in the Sanskritic tradition the *guṇakarman* was derived from the fact that no action can take place within one essence. The *locus classicus* for the two *karman*s in the commentarial literature is P 1.4.51 which relates to double-accusative constructions. According to Joshi and Roodbergen, the classification as either principal or secondary follows first of all the parameter which of the two second cases is the *īpsitatama* ('the most desired').[611] Additionally, Patañjali's quotation of *Ślokavārttika* 1 under P 1.4.51 evoked hermeneutical "acrobatics"[612] to explain why, for example, in *māṇavakaṃ dharmaṃ brūte* ('he tells the boy duty'), *dharma* becomes

---

the *guṇakarman* despite being the most desired (*īpsitatama*) item. The answers vary from *dharma* being subordinate (*guṇa*) to the action due to its status as *kāraka*, i.e. a means ('*sādhana*') for the action, to *dharma* being that entity which does not undergo a change of case marking in the passivization of the sentence; and Si tu's identity of action and secondary *karman* does not intuitively fit into any of these ideas from my understanding.

I can only offer my own "acrobatic" attempt at the origin of Si tu's theory, i.e. the observation that the entire phrase in his explanations, *shes pa nyid skyabs yin no snyam pa'i ngo bor skyes pa brjod pa yin pas* […] *skyabs dang shes pa bsdams pa'i tshig nus yul can gyi ngo bo gcig ston pa yin no*,[613] is reminiscent of compound formations.[614] In fact, if we substitute Tibetan *bsdams pa* ('bound,' 'combined,' etc.) with its cognate *bsdus pa* ('collected,' 'compounded,' etc.), the result is the proper technical term for 'compound' (*samāsa*) in Tibetan. Perhaps only a coincidence, the term *nus* ('syntactically fit') in Si tu's quotation corresponds to the Sanskrit *samartha*, which is the heading condition that governs the entire compound section in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.[615] Unfortunately, apart from such speculations, the precise conceptual background for Si tu's theory has to remain in the dark for the time being.

A further line of inquiry concerns the reason of Si tu's subsumption of the *de nyid* function under the second case. On the one hand, it may simply be regarded as related to both the Tibetan

---

[613] '[*De nyid*] expresses the formation of an essence (*ngo bor skyes pa*) in the sense of 'the knowing itself is the refuge.' Therefore, […] the syntactically fit form (*tshig nus*) that combines 'refuge' and 'to know' is the indication of a single essence as that which is located (*yul can*).'

[614] One option could be Tibetan descriptions of *karmadhāraya* compounds. Cf. e.g. NGg's topic number two on compounds:

> *khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa ni sngon po yang de nyid utpa la yang de nyid yin pa ni utpa la sngon po gzhan spong ba'i tshig mdor bsdus pa'o/*
> "As for the compounding by [means of] a specification (*khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa*), [since it says that] the blue is that very same [entity] as well as the lotus is also that very same [entity], 'blue-lotus' (*utpa la sngon po*) is a compounded syntactic form which excludes other [instances of the item, in this case other lotuses]." (CT *115 – 421*)

Note that *khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa* is this treatise's name for the *karmadhāraya*. More common names in Tibetan would be *las 'dzin* (*pa*) or *khyad par can*. Also note that the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit *karmadhāraya* compound *nīlotpala* ('blue lotus') as *utpala sngon po* is no equivalent compound form, since Tibetan language simply does not offer such a grammatical construction. The Tibetan form is that of noun plus adjective.

From the perspective of a *karmadhāraya*, Si tu treats *karman* and action as essentially identical (*ngo bo gcig*), because they both refer to one and the same referent (the action) and are thus coreferential (*samānādhikaraṇa*). This is not only the idea expressed in NGg's example, but the actual definition of the *karmadhāraya* in P 1.2.42. Furthermore, the *skyabs* in *skyabs su shes* would then be a specification (*khyad par*) of *shes pa*, while being essentially the same.

Cf. also Tubb and Boose's definition of the *karmadhāraya*:

> "*Karmadhāraya*s (Pāṇini 2.1.49-2.1.72; 'descriptive compounds,' Whitney 1279-1291) are *tatpuruṣa* compounds in which the two members appear in grammatical apposition in the analysis. Although some important types of *karmadhāraya* involve the additional notion of comparison and thus require special formulas of analysis (Section 1.55), in most *karmadhāraya*s the first member simply adds a specification of the thing expressed by the second member." (Tubb and Boose 2007, 102)

[615] P 2.1.1 *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ* 'An operation concerning fully inflected words is to be syntactically related' (transl. Sharma 1995, 1).

242

and Sanskritic tradition. Sources such as GNT but also Zha lu and Rnam gling have already subsumed the same function of the morpheme *du* that Si tu identified with *de nyid* under the second case. Since he also saw a relation to the double-accusative constructions in Sanskrit, his strategy then was the obvious choice.

8.2.6 Conclusory Remark on Si tu's Second Case

Si tu clearly set himself apart from Pra ti's conception of the second case as a mere action case that perhaps was also at the core of Zha lu and Rnam gling's understanding. While Pra ti achieved a very clear-cut and straightforward definition of the second case, his parameter of action verbs vs. non-action verbs could not account for most significant functional differences, such as *gzugs la lta* ('to look at the form') vs. *se ra na chos ston* ('to teach Dharma at Se ra'). Si tu's theory of the second case, which outsources latter instances to the seventh case, seems more sensitive in this regard. Nonetheless, his two definitions of *las* and *bya ba'i yul* refer to a very general and inclusive objective case to cover a variety of Tibetan-specific syntactic-semantic functions which need to be distinguished more accurately. The second case is that of the *karman* upon which an action is performed, or the domain in which the action engages, without further specifications of any precise function encoded by the *la don* morphemes. Despite the indication in his work that *la don gyi las/yul* and *dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul* are not one and the same category in Tibetan, it was proposed that both fall under his two definitions of the second case. The GC has not clarified the ways in which a relation or difference between the two may be conceived. Thus, it can only be said that both fall under the notion of the two definitions and that *yul/las* marked by *la don* is no longer connected to the resultative part of the action.

Si tu's entire conception reveals that he adhered to a strong interpretative approach to this case. The status as general object over three distinct morphemes together with their relation to *dngos po gzhan* are mainly carried by the fact that the definition is sufficiently general to cover all the morphemes' respective functions. It remains difficult to assess whether his definitions of the second case consisted not only in his coarse and interpretative account that merges Tibetan-specific morphosyntactic categories such as ALLATIVE, etc., but was additionally based on a semantic interpretation of phenomena that he directly imposed on the case markers while neglecting their morphosyntactic functioning. The remaining cases, however, will reveal that he frequently followed an objectivist approach in his work and thus his conception was very likely also in this case influenced by it.[616]

---

[616] Cf. especially infra 314ff., as well as chapter 16.

9 *Rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po*

9.1 Historical Survey

The standard designation for the traditional Tibetan third case is *byed pa po* (*kartṛ*, 'doer,' 'agent') or *byed pa* (lit. 'doing,' 'agency;' *karaṇa*, 'instrument'), and is expressed by the morphological category *byed sgra* ('the agentive morpheme') with its five manifestations *gis*, *kyis*, *'is*, *yis*, *gyis*. The presentation of these allomorphs is incomplete in SCP which omits *yis*.[617] In contrast to the morphological category *la don* and its seven morphemes, the homogeneity of *byed sgra* remains established in modern linguistics, as does the agent as its prototypical function.

As regards *Sum rtags*, reference is made three times in the root texts to either *byed pa po* or *byed pa*. SCP 13.4-14.1 encapsulates the morphology as well as the semantics of the grammatical category 'agent' (*byed pa po*) without any reference to case grammar:

> *de nyid la ni bcu pa sbyar/   byed pa po ru shes par bya/*

> "[If] a tenth [postscript] is affixed to that very [morphemes *gi*, *kyi*, *'i* and *gyi*, this] is to be known as the agent."[618]

SCP derives these four *byed sgra* morphemes that express agency from the preceding presentation of the morphological category *'brel sgra* ('connection-morpheme'),[619] since the only difference between them is the addition of the postscript *sa*. TKJ 22.3 and 24.4 both refer to the third case with its alternative label *byed pa* (lit. 'doing' or 'instrument').

Pra ti demonstrates the third case in simple terms in his commentary on SCP 13.4-14.1:

> […] *gis kyis 'is gyis/   zhes grub pa ni/   rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa zhes bya ba/ byed pa po gtso bor ston pa'i rnam dbye'o/* […] *dper na bdag gis thos/   rang gis byas/ khyod kyis bshad/   shes rab kyis dpyad/   sras kyis nyan/   sems dpa'is bslabs/ gzhan gyis go/   dgra bcom gyis spangs/   gser gyis nyos/   zhal gyis bzhes lta bu'o/*

> "[…] '*gis*, *kyis*, *'is* [and] *gyis*' are the third case called 'doing/agency' (*byed pa*), which is the case indicating primarily the agent. […] For example, 'I heard (*bdag gis thos*), 'oneself did' (*rang gis byas*), 'you explained' (*khyod kyis bshad*), 'analyzed with wisdom' (*shes rab kyis dpyad*), 'the Bodhisattva taught' (*sems dpa'is bslabs*),

---

[617] Cf. SCP 12.3-13.3.
[618] SCP 13.4-14.1
[619] Cf. SCP 12.3-13.3 and chapter 12.

244

'someone else understood/heard (*gzhan gyis go*), 'the Arhat abandoned' (*dgra bcom gyis spangs*), 'bought with gold' (*gser gyis nyos*), 'accepted with the mouth' (= to assert, accept; *zhal gyis bzhes*)."[620]

In general, these examples exhibit two basic functions, namely the agent in phrases such as *bdag gis thos* ('I heard') as well as the instrument in phrases such as *gser gyis nyos* ('bought with gold'). That this functional difference is indeed operational on the surface level of WT despite the use of the same case marker can be easily demonstrated by a simple distributional feature. In sentences with both, agent and instrument, each argument needs to be marked separately with *byed sgra*, whereas several agents or instruments within a single sentence may only take one *byed sgra* after the final agent or instrument:

(a) *bdag gis gser gyis nyos* 'I bought with gold' (1 agent + 1 instrument)

(b) *bdag dang khyod kyis nyos* 'I and you bought' (2 agents)

(c) *dngul dang gser gyis nyos* 'bought with silver and gold' (2 instruments)

However, these two functions are often not distinguished in pre-Si tu Tibetan grammatical sources before Si tu and instead were fused together within the single category of the third case.

This fact complicates the understanding of the third case's label *byed pa*, which in a single source may appear as the only designation but frequently also together with *byed pa po*, the latter option being more common to *Sum rtags* commentaries due to both labels' occurance in SCP and TKJ. Although Tibetan *byed pa po* and *byed pa* appear to be direct translations of their Sanskrit equivalents *kartṛ* ('agent') and *karaṇa* ('instrument'), which are the two *kāraka*s and the prototypical functions of the third case suffix in Sanskrit grammar, *byed pa* bears the ambiguity whether it alternatively refers more literally to the agent's 'doing' as a nominalization of the verb *byed* ('do').[621] While this issue needs to be addressed separately for each Tibetan grammatical source, the passage from Pra ti's grammar quoted above is a good illustration of an instance in which *byed pa* more likely has the meaning of 'the doing' or

---

[620] Pra ti 2013A, 206f.
[621] Cf. also Sakya Paṇḍita's *Mkhas 'jug* on the third case:
    […] *shing gi khang pa byed ces bya ba lta bu gsum pa byed pa* […]
    "[…] 'to make a wooden house' is the third [case called] 'doing/agency' […]" (KhJ 2009, 25)
Here, the third case's label *byed pa* has to draw on the verb *byed* ('to do, make') from the sample phrase, since neither an agent nor instrument are added in the example.

perhaps even 'agency,' since 'instrument' would contradict the case's definition as that which indicates the agent.[622]

The relation of the Tibetan version of the third case to Sanskritic grammar is obvious from all the major grammatical schools of the latter, where the third case suffix (*vibhakti*) is associated with the very same two functions:

> P 2.3.18 *kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā* "A third [case suffix occurs], if there is an agent or instrument."

> C 2.1.62 *kartari tṛtīyā* "A third [case suffix occurs], if there is an agent."
> C 2.1.63 *karaṇe* "[And] if there is an instrument."

> K 2.4.33 *kartari ca* "[A third case suffix occurs] also, if there is an agent."[623]

The general relation between the Sanskritic and Tibetan third case is indubitable. However, the question remains why the two functions of agent and instrument were already fully developed in the Sanskritic tradition, yet this distinction was not followed by the Tibetan authors of most grammatical texts previous to Si tu, despite its significance for WT. One simple answer probably lies in the fact that despite the clear-cut conceptual distinction of the two *kāraka*s agent and instrument, the Tibetan case model is based on the principle of a single function per case, and thus the two categories had to be combined in one way or another. In WT, the agentive function is certainly the more dominant than *byed sgra*'s instrumental use, thus this choice seems to be fairly comprehensible.

While *Cāndra* did not provide any definition of *kartṛ* due to the strategy to omit separate *saṃjñāsūtra*s, *Pāṇini* and *Kātantra* offer the following:

> P 1.4.54 *svatantraḥ karttā* "The agent is the independent [one]."

> K 2.4.14 *yaḥ karoti sa kartā* "That which does is the agent."

However, it is ascertained that the *Pāṇinian svatantra*-maxim of the agent did not play any significant role north of the Himalaya, and it may be speculated whether this was related to the influx of Buddhist thought or rather the caveat that an independent agent is in contradiction

---

[622] But note that Pra ti used *byed pa* as the third case's function in this quotation based on his version of SCP 14.1:
> *byed pa'i sar ni shes par bya* "is to be known as the semantic domain of doing/instrument (?)"
In contrast, the majority of commentaries including that of Si tu read: *byed pa po ru shes par bya* 'is to be known as the agent.'
[623] In *Kātantra*, the affixation of a third case suffix in the meaning of *karaṇa* ('instrument') is already covered by K 2.4.19, which attributes one prototypical case function to each of the case suffixes except for the first.

with basic Buddhist doctrines of causality and selflessness. *Kātantra*'s minimalistic definition of the agent as the doer[624] as well as *Cāndra*'s strategy to fully abstain from any further explanation of the term, thus assuming its self-explanatory power, resonate much more with Tibetan grammatical sources. Moreover, *Kātantra*'s rendering of *kartṛ* in terms of *karoti* might have been an inspiration for the alternative Tibetan third case label *byed pa* in the sense of 'doing/agency,' even though it does not explain the lack of the distinction between agent and instrument, which is fully adhered to in *Kātantra*.

In general, Tibetan sources for the most part focused neither on explanations of the agent's agency nor on syntactic conditions or semantic parameters that trigger agentive marking, etc.[625] What prevails is a concise presentational style similar to the one of Pra ti, if not even more concise in many cases. This fact impedes a precise understanding of the terminology at hand, namely that of the term *byed pa*, and obscures the question about the fusion of agent and instrument into one category. A rare exception in this regard again is the GNT, which not only identifies the third case with the active part of the action (= *vyāpāra*) in the already presented bivalent action scheme,[626] but it also provides numerous subcategories to demonstrate the significance of the category agent:

> *da ni gnas gsum pa ste/   de yang gsum pa gang gis shes pa ni byed pa po'i sa bstan pa nyid yin la/   'di ni byed pa po yod pa'i bya ba kho na ston gyi bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa ni cung zad kyang ston pa ma yin no/   byed pa po de yang ldog pa mi 'dra ba du mar 'gyur te/   'phral gyi bya ba byed pa'i byed pa po dang mi 'thun pa'i phyogs spong bar byed pa'i byed pa po dang/   rgyud la yon tan skyed cing thob par byed pa'i byed pa po dang/   phan tshun du stobs 'gran zhing 'thab mo'i byed pa'i byed pa po dang/ rgyu rnams kyi 'bras bu skyed par byed pa'i byed pa po la sogs pa chos can dang ldog pa so so'i bye brag gis byed pa po mang du yod la/   de yang 'phral gyis* [sic!][627] *bya ba byed pa'i byed pa po ni mda' yis brgyab ces pa'am/   gri yis bcad ces pa'am/   sta res gcod ces pa la sogs pa 'phral gyi bya ba byed pa po'i bye brag du mar lta'o/*

---

[624] From a semantic perspective, this definition does not seem to add any noteworthy insights into what the term *kartṛ* itself already contains, but it has a certain explanatory power in the context of Kātantra's remaining definitions of *kāraka*, especially that of *karman*:
K 2.4.13 *yat kriyate tat karma* "That which is done is the *karman*."
The change of diathesis is significant in these definitions, which seem to make use of syntactic features of Sanskrit instead of semantic or philosophical conceptions to explain the term.
[625] Although it should be noted that syntactic conditions for the use of any of the *kāraka*s, e.g. verb frames, etc., are not provided in Sanskrit grammar either.
[626] Cf. supra 181f.
[627] I read *'phral gyi*.

"As for now, the third semantic domain: the third [case is] called 'by which' (*gang gis*) [and] is only the indication of the semantic domain 'agent.' This indicates only the activity existent in the agent, whereas it does not whatsoever indicate [that activity which is] possessed by the substratum of the action (*bya ba'i gzhi*). This agent also has many different variations: the agent that performs the action of separation (*'phral gyi bya ba byed pa'i byed pa po*), the agent that abandons the discordant aspects (*mi 'thun pa'i phyogs spongs bar byed pa'i byed pa po*), the agent that brings forth and attains virtues in the [mental] continuum (*rgyud la yon tan skyed cing thob par byed pa'i byed pa po*), the agent[s] that perform competitions and fight with each other (*phan tshun du stobs 'gran zhing 'thab mo'i byed pa'i byed pa po*), the agent that brings forth the result of the causes (*rgyu rnams kyi 'bras bu skyed par byed pa'i byed pa po*), etc. Due to the specifics of the respective manifestations (~ *chos can*) and variants (*ldog pa*), the agent exists in manifold ways. Furthermore, regarding the agent who performs the action of separation, it should be regarded as many instances of the agent of separating actions like 'is to be shot by an arrow' (*mda' yis brgyab*) or 'was cut by a knife' (*gri yis bcad*) or 'cut by an axe' (*sta res gcod*)."[628]

Although neither these subcategories nor the general strategy to form such subcategories for the third case were followed by the later grammarians, GNT may offer additional insights into the issue of the functional fusion of agent and instrument in the Tibetan context.

9.1.1 On the Fusion of Agent and Instrument under the Third Case

The general definition of the third case in the GNT is *byed pa po* (*la*) *yod pa'i las/bya ba* (activity existent in the agent), which is identified as the complementary part of *karman*'s activity.[629] In the exposition of the second case, the activity existent in the agent (*byed pa po la yod pa*) is demonstrated by help of an axe moving up and down, and it may therefore be assumed that it is the agent who instigates and controls this movement. In the bilateral action model presented in the GNT, agent and instrument are therefore both constitutive for the *byed pa po la yod pa'i las* and form a single unit that brings about the result of the action.

It is interesting that already the historically problematic *Smra ba kun*[630] demonstrates clear signs of a fusion of agent and instrument. The latter parts of the root text contain a short enumeration of grammatical functions under the somewhat opaque header of *byed pa'i dus* (lit. 'the time of

---

[628] CT *115 – 450*.
[629] Cf. supra 181f. and 247f.
[630] Cf. supra 32 and HSGLT 1, CG 16 and 17.

kāraka/doing/[grammatical] functioning' ?) that lists not *byed pa po* but only *byed pa* as a function:

> *byed pa'i dus ni de nyid la/   the tshom gcod byed 'dus byas yin/   de yang las dang byed pa dang/   ched dang 'byung khungs 'brel pa dang/   gzhi dang zla bsdu lhag bcas dang/   dgag sgrub brnan dang bdag po dang/   rgyan dang kha skong dus la 'jug* [631]

The commentary then gives the following concise definition of *byed pa*:

> *byed pa ni byed pa po dang bcas pa ste/*

> "Regarding the instrument/agency (*byed pa*), it is [that which is] endowed with the agent."[632]

That this understanding of *byed pa* comprises both, the agent and the instrument of classical Sanskritic accounts, is evident from the commentary's subsequent demonstration of the *catuṣkoṭi* (*mu bzhi*, 'four alternatives') on the ways in which single and multiple *byed pa*s may perform single and multiple actions. An example of the four alternatives in which multiple *byed pa*s perform a single action is the following:

> *rnam par 'jog byed ni lhas byin dang lag chu'i* [sic!][633] *tshogs lta bu du mas shing lta bu bya ba gcig la byed pa* […].

> "As for performing the cutting, multiple [instruments/agencies] such as the combination of Devadatta and the tool (*lhas byin dang lag cha'i tshogs*) perform a single action such as upon the tree (*shing lta bu bya ba gcig la byed pa*)."[634]

In classical Sanskritic grammatical accounts, Devadatta is the agent, and the tool, presumably the axe, is the instrument to perform the action of cutting a tree. Although the precise meaning

---

[631] Due to the difficult character of this passage, a tentative translation is only offered in this footnote:
"As for the section/time of [grammatical] functioning, it is the composite formation (*'dus byas*) that eradicates doubts regarding these very [compound forms that have been discussed right before]. Furthermore, *las*, *byed pa*, *'byung khungs*, *'brel pa*, *gzhi*, *zla bsdu*, *lhag bcas*, *dgag sgrub*, *brnan*, *bdag po*, *rgyan* and *kha skong* belong to this section/time (*dus la 'jug* ?)." (CT *109* – 1701)
The list does not stop here but goes on to enumerate a total of 35 grammatical categories, including, for example, the pair *ātmanepada* and *parasmaipada* (*bdag*/*gzhan gyi tshig*). Note that the quoted parts of the list are especially interesting since they clearly resonate with the non-case functions listed in SCP, the history of which still remains unstudied. For our current context, it suffices to note that the term *byed pa po* has been omitted and only *byed pa* was included.
[632] CT *109* – 1711.
[633] In accordance with the Peking and Narthang edition of the *bstan 'gyur*, I read *lag cha'i* (cf. CT *109* – 1712, ft. 9).
[634] CT *109* – 1712. Or "perform [the cutting] upon a single [entity] to be done such as the tree" (*shing lta bu bya ba gcig la byed pa*)?

of *byed pa* requires future scrutiny, in *Smra ba kun* both entities are equally classified as *byed pa* that combined (*tshogs*) constitute multiple *byed pa*s performing a single action.[635] Since both the root text and the commentary are contained in the Tibetan *bstan 'gyur*, it is likely that this source played a part in the Tibetan development of the third case and the fusion of agent and instrument. However, the Sanskritic origin of the two texts, although claimed in the colophon of the Tibetan texts CG 16 and 17, remains unattested and at least an authoritative Sanskritic origin has been denied by Si tu.[636]

If the fusion of agent and instrument is traced further back in the Sanskritic tradition, the notion of *vyāpāra* is an important direction to follow. In the Tibetan second case, it was argued that the conception of *byed pa po* in terms of the *byed pa po la yod pa'i las* together with its counterpart *bya ba'i gzhi la yod pa'i las* was derived from the Sanskritic *vyāpāra/phala* dichotomy. The *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* provides an early definition of Sanskritic *vyāpāra* in its commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1:

> *sarvaḥ kartā karaṇagocaravyāpāro na tu sākṣāt phale vyāpriyate. karaṇaṃ ca dvidhā siddhasasiddhaṃ ca. tatra siddhaṃ paraśvādi dārudvaidhībhāvāyodyamyodyamya dāruṇi nipātayan dāru cchinattītyucyate, na tu sākṣāt kartṛvyāpāragocaro dārudvaidhībhāvaḥ, kiṃ tu sparśavadvegavataḥ karaṇībhūtasya paraśoḥ saṃyogasyodyamananipātanalakṣaṇastu kartṛvyāpāraḥ parśugocara eva. evaṃ svargakāmo 'pi kartā na sākṣāt svarge vyāpriyate, kiṃ tu tatkaraṇam yāgamasiddhaṃ sādhayati.*

"Each agent has an activity (*vyāpāra*) which has the instrument as its domain/sphere [and] does not directly engage in (*vyāpriyate*) the result (*phala*). And the instrument is twofold, accomplished or unaccomplished. Accomplished means (*ucyate*, lit. 'is explained') that an axe, etc., having raised and raised and letting it down for the being-split-into-two of the wood, cuts the wood. But the being-split-into-two of the wood is not directly the domain/sphere of the activity of the agent. [The being-split-into-two of the wood is directly the domain] of the connection of the axe, which is the contacting and fast instrument, [with the wood], whereas the activity of the agent, characterized by lifting up and letting down, has only the axe as its domain/sphere. Likewise, also the

---

[635] Perhaps because either Devadatta as the agent and the tool as the instrument are two instantiations of agency/activity (*byed pa*), or perhaps because both are instrumental (*byed pa*) to bring about the action?
[636] Cf. HSGLT 1 CG 16 and 17; GC 607.5.

agent, who desires heaven, does not directly engage in heaven, but accomplishes the instrument for it, the unaccomplished sacrifice."[637]

The context of this statement is neither grammatical nor linguistic. As a commentary on NS 1.1.1, it is concerned with introducing a selection of key notions for the attainment of valid knowledge or cognition, with the means that lead to valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) representing a major part in the process. This passage attempts to explain the basic constitution of an action less to develop a linguistic action theory than to analyze the action process by help of simple examples as an analogy to the process of cognition. Thus, the quoted passage first of all follows an epistemological purpose. The most important terminology for our current context, i.e. *vyāpāra* and *phala*, together with the already familiar example of splitting wood into two pieces are all used in this passage. The quotation utilizes an etymological explanation of *vyāpāra* ('activity') in terms of an agent who engages (*vyāpriyate*) not directly in the result of the action, but is only occupied with the instrument that ultimately brings about the result. In the Naiyāyika's context, this point is pivotal, since the result of the process of valid cognition is analogically based on the idea that only by means of a valid instrument, i.e. one of the *pramāṇa*s, such a cognition may be brought forth.

The instrument, be it an axe or a *pramāṇa*, works as a necessary intermediary without which the agent is unable to generate the result of the action. Thus, *vyāpāra* is constituted by the agent and his handling of the instrument in order to indirectly bring about the result. The leap from this model to the agent's and instrument's unit with the result of the action ('*phala*') as its counterpart is not too far anymore, perhaps only a matter of interpretation of such passages.

The precise history of this entire model in the Sanskritic as well as Tibetan tradition is yet to be investigated, but in the following centuries the conception of an action in terms of *vyāpāra* and *phala* surfaced in different fields of knowledge and figured prominently in the works of Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians, particularly in the context of *śābdabodha* ('verbal cognition').[638]

9.1.2 Résumé on the Third Case before Si tu

In sum, despite a few minor issues surrounding its conception, the third case *byed pa po* or *byed pa* is much less problematic compared to the first two cases. This is probably due to the fact

---

[637] Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 18.20-19.6. Note that the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* on NS 1.1.1 discusses the same example of woodcutting and its constituent parts (the moving up and down of the axe and the being split in two parts of the wood) in the context of the general theory of *kāraka* (cf. Thakur 1996, 18.20-19.1). This passage was briefly discussed in Cardona 2008, 107.
[638] Cf. also supra 182.

that the category of the agent (*byed pa po*, *kartṛ*) is much more homogeneous and distinctive in WT compared to the notion of *karman* (*las*). The only noteworthy modification compared to classical Sanskritic grammars is the fusion of agent and instrument into one category, however the historical survey revealed that this is not necessarily a Tibetan invention.

9.2 The Third Case in the *Great Commentary*

After his quote of SCP 13.4-14.1,[639] Si tu paraphrases and supplements the root text as follows:

> *sngar bshad pa'i rnam dbye drug pa'i sgra gi la sogs pa de dag nyid la rjes 'jug bcu pa sa yig sbyar bas/ gis/ kyis/ 'is/ yis/ gyis rnams su grub pa ni byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba ston pas na gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye gsum pa zhes 'byung ba byed pa po'i sa ru shes par bya'o/*

> "If the tenth postscript, the letter *sa*, is affixed to exactly the morphemes of the just explained sixth case, [i.e.] *gi* etc., [this] results in *gis*, *kyis*, *'is*, *yis* [and] *gyis*. Since it indicates the application to an action by an agent (*byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba*), it is to be known as the semantic domain of the agent, which in other treatises occurs as the third case."[640]

Si tu's paraphrase of SCP 13.4-14.1 is inspired by Zha lu's commentary but includes additions.[641] For both morphological categories, *'brel sgra* as well as *byed sgra*, Si tu's commentary adds the allomorphs *yi* and *yis* respectively, which were omitted in the SCP and usually serve the purpose of filling an additional syllable in metric treatises as substitutes for *'i* and *'is* respectively. In this approach, Si tu has probably followed Zha lu and Rnam gling Paṇchen, both who have used similar paraphrases and have included the derivation of *yis* from *yi* in their commentary. In his commentary on SCP 12.3-13.3, Si tu reasons that the morpheme *yi* "does not occur explicitly, since here (= SCP) is taught mainly the functioning of the postscript."[642] The commentarial tradition including Si tu usually declares the main topic of SCP as the functioning of the postscript, in contrast to TKJ which is said to focus more on the prescript. This is derived from the fact that SCP's main part is dedicated to a presentation of the syntactic links (*tshig phrad*) that the root text consistently derives from the ten postscript letters throughout the entire text. Si tu therefore correctly observes that *ya*, the root letter (*ming gzhi*) of the morphemes *yi* and *yis*, is not a postscript, and he thus concluded that they are outside

---

[639] Cf. supra 244.
[640] GC 485.5.
[641] Cf. Zha lu on SCP 13.4-14.1 (Zha lu 2013A, 10): *sngar bshad ma thag pa'i gi kyi gyi 'i yi zhes pa'i sgra lnga po de dag nyid la ni rjes 'jug bcu pa sa yig sbyar ba ni/ rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po ru shes par bya'o/*
[642] […] *'dir rjes 'jug gi yi ge'i bya ba gtso bor bstan pas dngos su mi 'byung* […] (GC 484.5).

the scope of SCP's standard derivational procedure, an argument which has true appeal and successfully defends the root text against its incompleteness.

One of Si tu's additions to the paraphrase of the root text is the short definition of the third case in terms of *byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba* (lit. 'the application to an action by the agent'). This phrase leaves open what exactly is applied to the action by the agent. Si tu uses the phrase *bya ba la sbyor ba* without the addition of *byed pa pos* in his commentary on *Cāndra* in 2.1.68, where it is probably derived from Sanskrit *kriyāyoga* of the *Cāndravṛtti* on the same rule.[643] Pāṇini used the Sanskrit term in P 1.4.59, where it refers to the connection of *upasarga*s (~ verbal prefixes) with the verb, thus expressing a morphological connection which cannot be the meaning in the current context. Additionally, Sakya Paṇḍita in the *Mkhas 'jug* uses the same phrase *bya ba la sbyor ba* without *byed pa pos* in his definition of the second case:

> *shing de la lta ba'am 'jog pa lta bu bya ba la sbyor ba shing la zhes bya ba lta bu gnyis pa bya ba'i tshig/*

> "The application [of that tree] to an action, e.g. 'to look at or cut into that tree', is the second [case], the syntactic form 'to be done', as in 'upon the tree'."[644]

Although my understanding of the passage differs from the one of Gold, I agree that it must be the object that is connected with or applied to the action (*bya ba la sbyor ba*; Gold translates 'associates with'). No further elaboration on the expression's conceptual foundation were encountered as part of this research in the grammatical treatises, nor have I been able to directly relate it to any Sanskritic technical term. Although the underlying conception of the term may reach much deeper, the phrase seems to be a rather general characterization of the second case in Sakya Paṇḍita's KhJ, which is understood here as highlighting the requirement for *karman* that an action must be applied to that entity which is to become the *karman* or second case.

---

[643] Compare *Cāndravṛtti* with Si tu:
> C 2.1.68 *hetau* "If a cause."
> *Vṛtti: tatkriyāyogye tṛtīyā syāt*
> "If this [cause] is connected/used with an action, a third [case suffix] results." (Sanskrit quoted from Liebich 1918, 108).
> *he tau/ rgyu la'o/* (C 2.1.68) *rgyu ste bya ba la sbyor ba'i rgyu mtshan la gsum pa 'gyur te/*
> "'*Hetau*,' 'If a cause.' (C 2.1.68) For a cause, i.e. (*ste*) the reason an action is applied for (*bya ba la sbyor ba*), a third [case suffix] occurs." (Si tu 2.39.6)
Note that – granted my reading of the respective passages is correct – Si tu's understanding of *kriyāyoga*/*bya ba la sbyor ba* deviates from *Cāndra*. While the latter seems to refer to the simple point that a cause (*hetu*) and a verb or action (*kriyā*) are used together in a sentence (*tatkriyāyoga*; *tat = hetu*), Si tu seems to aim at the idea that cause (*hetu, rgyu*) refers to the reason causing the application/performance of an action (*bya ba la sbyor ba'i rgyu mtshan*).

[644] KhJ 2009, 25. Compare also the different translation of Gold 2008, 168:
> "As in looking at or cutting down that tree, the expression 'with respect to a tree' associates [the tree] with an action. Thus, the second is an action[-related, or object] inflection."

Likewise, Si tu's use of *bya ba la sbyor ba* in C 2.1.68 as well as in the GC does not seem to amount to more than the fact that an action is taking place. Si tu's definition of the third case in SCP 13.4-14.1 then only states that a third case, the agentive, indicates that such an application to or of an action is performed by an agent. This does not provide any deeper insights into the underlying concept of agency. The correct understanding of the agentive link and its use rather needs to be inferred from the list of examples:

> *byed pa po'i sgra de rnams tshig grogs dang ji ltar sbyor ba'ang/   bdag gis bstan/ gang gis bsgrubs/   thams cad kyis 'dud/   rab kyis bkur/   phyogs kyis dbye/   de'is mtshon/   zhes sam/   skad gsar bcad ltar na/   des mtshon/   de yis thams cad dbang du byed/   gzhan gyis gsos/   lam gyis 'tsho/   gser gyis byug   dpal gyis brgyan/ kund kyis skyong/   rab 'byord kyis gsol/   zild kyis mnan/   ces sogs rgya cher sbyar nas shes par bya'o/*

> "Furthermore, how these agentive morphemes are applied to an accompanying phrase (*tshigs grogs*) is to be known from extensive application such as (1) 'I taught' (*bdag gis bstan*), (2) 'somebody/-thing accomplished' (*gang gis bsgrubs*), (3) 'all bowed' (*thams cad kyis 'dud*), (4) 'to serve excellently' (*rab kyis bkur*), (5) 'divided through directions/extremes/sides' (~ divided into directions/extremes/sides) (*phyogs kyis dbye*), (6) 'this/that illustrates' (*de'is mtshon*) or according to the revision of the script (7) 'this/that illustrates' (*des mtshon*), (8) 's/he/it conquers everything' (*de yis thams cad dbang du byed*), (9) 'nourished/taken care of by someone/-thing else' (*gzhan gyis gsos*), (10) 'to live by means of the path' (~ to live according to the path) (*lam gyis 'tsho*), (11) 'to coat with gold' (*gser gyis byug*), (12) 'to ornament with glory' (*dpal gyis brgyan*), (13) 'everyone protects' (or 'totally protected,' *kund kyis skyong*), (14) 'Subhūti asks' (*rab 'byord kyis gsol*), (15) 'to overwhelm with splendor' (*zild kyis mnan*)."[645]

The examples are regarded as sufficient representations of the correct meaning and use of the third case, and the GC lacks any analysis of their syntactic-semantic patterns to abstract rules or restrictions. This fact may perhaps be interpreted as a sign of Si tu's metalinguistic-semantic focus that is less concerned with language-specific syntactic patterns and more with the general constitution of the category agent that is fairly self-explanatory. Taking over the task of an analysis, they all consist of a verb and an additional argument marked by *byed sgra*. The selection of the 15 sample phrases first of all aims at a representative illustration of the different

---

[645] GC 486.2.

254

morphological derivations of the allomorphs. One phrase is dedicated to each of the ten postscript letters and the respective agentive allomorph triggered by it (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12), with the exception of the postscript letter *sa*. The latter is nonetheless covered by (5), which together with the phrases (13), (14) and (15) demonstrates the use of *byed sgra* when triggered by the letters *sa* and *da* in secondary postscript position. (7) and (8) are both morphological variations for the postscript *'a* (covered in (6)), with (7) being the much more common version compared to (6) after the language revisions, whereas (8) illustrates the use of the allomorph *yis* after *'a* in instances where an additional syllable is required due to metrics, etc.

The illustration of *da drag* (secondary postscript *da*) by means of three instead of simply one phrase may be explained by the fact that its use has become less common and thus more difficult in current orthographic conventions. *Da drag* is usually no longer put into writing, yet it remains operational in grammar since it has an impact on the morphology of the following syntactic link, in this case triggering the allomorph *kyis*. Compare the application of *byed sgra* after the future and past tense of the verb *ston pa* ('teach') respectively:

Future: *bstan **gyis*** ('because to be taught' or 'will be taught')

Past: *bstan **kyis*** ('because it was taught')

As demonstrated in these examples, the past tense of *ston pa* does take a *da drag* and thus triggers a different allomorph compared to the future tense, however the letter *da* is no longer spelled out. Thus, it is likely that Si tu wanted to provide more than one example in order to illustrate the tricky usage of *da drag*.

All the employed verb frames are differentiated (*tha dad pa*), with the exception of (9), which I interpret as a non-differentiated use of the verb *'tsho ba* ('to live'). The selected arguments marked by *byed sgra* differ significantly from each other regarding their word class, ranging from proper nouns to pronouns as well as adjectives. The different word classes as well as lexical meanings of the marked arguments impact the syntactic-semantic information expressed by the third case markers. There are unproblematic agents in (1), (3) and (14) as well as instruments in (5), (10), (11), (12) and (15). (2), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are more ambiguous and could refer to either an agent or an instrument due to the use of pronouns or the term *gzhan* ('other'). Finally, (4) and (13) appear more as adverbial specifications of the verb rather than separate arguments, although (13) could be a genuine agent in the sense of 'protected by all.' It would require closer linguistic scrutiny to assess whether *byed sgra* in WT has a distinctive

adverbial function or rather a broader instrumental usage.[646] The feature that additions such as *rab kyis* or *kund kyis* directly precede the verb and cannot be removed from it may serve as a strong argument for their separate grammatical status in terms of adverbs, although the etymological relation to the instrumental function remains apparent.[647] In total, the phrases therefore exhibit up to three functions, with agent and instrument being clearly distinguishable and adverb probably forming a third significant category. In Si tu's commentary on SCP, all phrases are equally treated as instantiations of the third case and its definition *byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba*, regardless any semantic or syntactic variations. The outlined fusion in the Tibetan tradition of agent and instrument under the category of the agent has therefore been consistently retained in the GC, with a few examples in SCP-GC stretching the agent category to rather abstract uses.

However, Si tu's second presentation of the third case in the summary of cases following his commentary on TKJ 25.4-28.3 then remarks on this difference between agent and instrument:

> *rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po la 'jug pa ni/ lhas bstan/ rdo rjes phug/ khyod kyis skyong/ bdag gis brjod lta bu ste/ bstan/ phug skyong/ brjod rnams bya ba yin pas de byed mkhan gyi don du rim par/ lha/ rdo rje/ khyod/ bdag rnams la rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po'i tshig 'jug pa yin no/ de'ang zhib mor dpyad na/ bdag gis rig sngags kyis tshe sgrub lta bur bdag dang rig sngags gnyi ga spyir byed pa po yin pas gnyis ka la rnam dbye gsum pa 'jug kyang/ bdag byed po gtso bo dang rig sngags byed po phal pa yin pa'i dbye ba yod cing/ yang na bdag byed pa po dang rig sngags ni byed pa tsam yin pa'i bye brag shes par bya dgos so/ rgyu mtshan gyi don la gsum pa 'jug pa'ang rgyu mtshan des de ltar 'grub par byed pas byed pa po dang mtshungs pa'i phyir ro/*

> "Regarding [how] the third case takes on [the meaning of] the agent, it is like in 'the deity taught' (*lhas bstan*), 'pierced by the Vajra' (*rdo rjes phug*), 'you protect' (*khyod kyis skyong*), 'I expressed' (*bdag gis brjod*). Since 'taught,' 'pierced,' 'protect' [and] 'expressed' are actions, a third case, the syntactic form of the agent, joins to the 'deity,' 'Vajra,' 'you' and 'I' respectively in the meaning of the one who does these [actions] (*byed mkhan*). If [we] examine this [third case] in detail, then e.g. in 'I perform the long life practice with mantra,' the 'I' and the 'mantra' generally are both agents [and] therefore a third case joins to both. Yet, it should be known that there is the distinction

---

[646] (4): lit. 'by means of excellence' → excellently; (13): lit. 'by means of everything/by all means' → totally.
[647] Tournadre, for example, attributes an adverbial function to *byed sgra* (cf. Tournadre 2010, 102ff.).

that the 'I' is the main agent and the 'mantra' is the secondary agent (*byed po phal pa*), or alternatively that the 'I' is the agent and the 'mantra' the instrument (*byed pa*). Additionally, the third [case] also takes on the meaning of reason (*rgyu mtshan*), because [it] is equivalent to an agent, for [it means that] a particular reason accomplishes (*'grub par byed pa*) [something] in a particular way."[648]

Si tu acknowledges the difference between agent and instrument, although their unity remains equally established, since *byed pa* ('instrument') becomes only the secondary or subordinate type (*phal pa*) of the third case's main function agent (*byed pa po*). Any further detailed conceptions of the third case or the notions of agent and instrument are missing.

At the very end of the third case's presentation under TKJ 25.4-28.3, Si tu briefly mentions a third meaning of this case, namely that of reason or cause (*rgyu mtshan*). He has already introduced this category in SCP 13.4-14.1 in the context of a short refutation of *Smra sgo*. According to this latter source, the *byed sgra* morphemes may take on the meaning of a so-called 'discordant ornament' (*mi mthun pa'i rgyan*), i.e. a concessive and adversative meaning.[649] Without here going into the details of this critique, Si tu relates one of *Smra sgo*'s examples for *byed sgra*'s discordant function, namely *de lda mod kyis* ('though indeed it is like that'), to constructions such as *rtag par yod gyis mi rtag par ma yin no* ('since it exists permanently, it is not impermanent'). Si tu's reasons for connecting these two examples remain unclear, since they are rather unrelated grammatical constructions, however he concludes that "such *kyis* morphemes, etc. are agentive cases in the meaning of reason (*rgyu mtshan*)."[650]

Si tu's sample phrase allows for both proposed logical structures, i.e. *Smra sgo*'s adversative relation in the sense of 'it exists permanently, whereas/but it is not impermanent' as well as Si tu's causal relation in the sense of 'because it exists permanently, it is not impermanent.' The issue of which of the two relations is ultimately expressed by *byed sgra* in the sentence cannot be pursued in this work. Tournadre does attribute a rare adversative function to *byed sgra*,[651] and although it is frequently associated with the instrumental function, the causal function of the morpheme following proper and nominalized verbs is so prominent in WT that it can hardly be neglected by any modern linguistic taxonomy.[652] That *rgyu mtshan* is indeed a syntactically

---

[648] GC 599.5.
[649] Cf. Smṛti 2002, 90f.
[650] […] *de 'dra'i kyis sogs kyi sgra de rgyu mtshan gyi don gyi byed pa po'i rnam dbye yin* […] (GC 486.5)
[651] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 104.
[652] Cf. e.g. ibid., 102ff. and Schwieger 2006, 242ff.

distinctive function of *byed sgra* and thus significant in the context of WT may again be demonstrated by *byed sgra*'s distribution in sentences with marked agents or instruments:

dngul med pas bdag gis zas mi nyos so 'Because [I] had no money, I did not buy food.'

The clause *dngul med* (*pa*) ('[I] had no money') requires separate marking by *byed sgra* to indicate its relation to the other parts of the sentence – in this case a causal relation with the second clause *bdag gis zas mi nyos* – and thus it represents a distinct grammatical entity in the sentence. Apart from the linguistic significance of the function *rgyu mtshan*, the introduction of this subcategory was also in line with Sanskritic grammar, at least insofar as reason or cause (*hetu*) already figured as a secondary condition for the third case suffix in *Pāṇini* (P 2.3.23) and *Cāndra* (C 2.1.68) to cover instances such as *annena vasati* ('(s)he lives due to food') or *vidyayā yaśaḥ* ('famous due to knowledge').[653]

Si tu explicitly classifies the *rtag par yod gyis mi rtag par ma yin no* as an instance of the agentive case. This fact reveals the degree to which the demarcation between cases is based on semantic conformity of the case functions. Comparing the verbal use of *byed sgra* with that of *la don*, it is striking that Si tu lists functions of the morpheme *na* such as reason (*rgyu mtshan*) or the connective function (*mtshams sbyor ba*) of *la* under the category of 'other (i.e. non-case) modes, how [*la* and *na*] join semantically [to a lexical word form]' (*don gyi 'jugs tshul gzhan*).[654] The same applies to *'brel sgra*'s adversative use after verbs, which Si tu characterizes as "also taking on a different, [i.e.] non-case meaning."[655] If the number of cases would have been based on morphemes like in Sanskritic grammar, such uses would need to be classified as case uses as well. The subsumption of reason under the third case, in turn, is obviously related to the intuitive proximity of the categories agent, instrument and reason.[656]

What still remains open is the relation of reason (*rgyu mtshan*) to the other two third case functions developed by Si tu, namely agent (*byed pa po*) and instrument (*byed pa*). Fortunately, Si tu's grammatical work contains additional material to be considered in this context.

---

[653] Cf. Sharma 1995, 129 and Liebich 1918, 108.
[654] Cf. GC 475.5.
[655] […] *rnam dbye'i don ma yin pa gzhan la'ang 'jug pa* […] (GC 485.4)
[656] Note, however, also the inconsistency in Si tu's taxonomy of classifying the category *rgyu mtshan* indicated by *byed sgra* as a third case, yet the related *rgyu mtshan* function of *na* as a non-case function and not a third case (cf. GC 475.6). This reveals that the morphological parameter to conform with the agent's morphology also plays a role in this taxonomy (cf. also infra 299 and 420f.).

9.2.1 Addendum on the Relation between Agent, Instrument and Reason

It may be argued that the semantic conformity of all three categories is fairly intuitive and probably even has a linguistic-historical basis in WT due to their identical morphological realization. Given the fact that they are moreover attested as third case functions in Sanskritic grammar,[657] it is intelligible that Si tu omitted any detailed discussion of this point in his GC, restricting himself to the already quoted statement at the very end of the third case's summary under TKJ 25.4-28.3:

> *rgyu mtshan gyi don la gsum pa 'jug pa'ang rgyu mtshan des de ltar 'grub par byed pas byed pa po dang mtshungs pa'i phyir ro/*

> "Additionally, the third [case] also takes on the meaning of reason (*rgyu mtshan*), because [it] is equivalent to an agent, for [it means that] a particular reason accomplishes (*'grub par byed pa*) [something] in a particular way."[658]

Si tu argues that the semantic fields of reason and agent are equivalent insofar as a reason accomplishes something. 'Accomplishment' (*'grub par byed pa*) therefore appears to be the common ground of the two categories, and consequently Si tu's argument seems to amount to the point that this notion constitutes the main characteristic of the entire agentive case together with its three subcategories. If we ask what is to be accomplished (*bsgrub par bya ba*) by the argument marked with *byed sgra*, we are left in the dark, however it must either be the *karman* (*las*) together with the resultative part of the action (*bya ba'i yul la yod pa'i las*) or the action (*bya ba*) in general; and both these options are corroborated by Si tu's theoretical exposition of *dngos po bdag/gzhan* in TKJ 11.3:

> 1) *bsgrub par bya ba = karman* and the resultative part of the action (*bya las*): in his first definition of *dngos po bdag/gzhan*, Si tu renders *dngos po gzhan* as "that entitiy which is the domain to be accomplished by that [agent and his doing] together with what is to be done (= the resultative part of the action)."[659]

> 2) *bsgrub par bya ba* = action in general (*bya ba*): still in TKJ 11.3, Si tu also defines those actions which are directly connected with a distinct agent (*byed pa po gzhan dang*

---

[657] It should be noted, however, that in Sanskritic grammars the status as a third case function of all three is primarily based on their morphological rather than a functional-conceptual conformity.

[658] GC 600.1.

[659] […] *des bsgrub par bya ba'i yul gyi dngos po bya ba dang bcas pa* […] (GC 535.4).

dngos su 'brel ba'i las = bya byed thad dad pa) as "that action which is directly accomplished (*sgrub par byed pa*) by a distinct agent."[660]

Whichever of the two options Si tu may have preferred in our current context, the third case in the GC appears constituted mainly by a causal relation in terms of an accomplisher (either the agent, the instrument or the reason) and that which is accomplished by this very accomplisher. Without further textual evidence at hand, it is assumed that it is this causal relation Si tu was trying to highlight through his use of the demonstrative pronouns in the definition of the *rgyu mtshan* function of the third case:

> *rgyu mtshan **des de ltar** 'grub par byed*

A *particular* reason or cause accomplishes something in a *particular* way (*rgyu mtshan des de ltar 'grub par byed*) to refer to the fact that, for example, a seer (= agent) accomplishes the action of seeing form (and not that of hearing sound), and a particular reason accomplishes only the matching result or consequence.

While the notion of *'grub par byed pa* establishes a homogeneity of the third case with its three subcategories, the conceptual distinctiveness as well as relation between them remains open. Si tu's *Cāndra* commentary may be of help in this context, since it contains most interesting additions to his standpoint regarding the relation of agent, instrument and reason, although it should also be kept in mind that his composition of the *Cāndra* commentary dates to the years 1750-1756 and is therefore subsequent to the completion of the GC.

In his commentary on C 2.1.68, which introduces *hetu* (*rgyu*, *rgyu mtshan*; 'cause,' 'reason') as a trigger of the third case suffix, Si tu discusses a possible objection against the need for a separate rule for this case trigger:

> *he tau/   /rgyu la'o/   /rgyu ste bya ba la sbyor ba'i rgyu mtshan la gsum pa 'gyur te/* […] *'dir gong du byed pa la gsum pa 'jug par bshad na rgyu'ang byed pa yin pas ched du smos mi dgos so snyam na/   rgyu dang byed pa gnyis la dbye ba yod de/   rgyu la rag lus pa ni byed pa po yin zhing byed pa po la rag lus pa ni byed pa yin pas so/   des na zas kyi rgyu mtshan gyis gnas pa ni rgyu mtshan nges pa can yin la/   zor bas gcod pa sogs ni de lta ma yin no/*

"'*Hetau*', 'If a cause.' (C 2.1.68) In case of a cause, i.e. (*ste*) a reason for the application to an action (*bya ba la sbyor ba*), a third [case suffix] occurs. […] One might think here that since it was explained above that the third [case suffix] takes on the meaning of instrument (*byed pa*), there is no need to mention cause (*rgyu*) purposely (*ched du smos*), since it is also an instrument. [Yet,] there is a difference between the two, cause and instrument, because that which is dependent (*rag lus pa*) on the cause is the agent and that which is dependent on the agent is the instrument. Thus, 'to live due to food' (*zas kyi rgyu mtshan gyis gnas pa*) is certainly a reason, whereas 'to cut with a sickle' (*zor bas gcod pa*), etc. are not like that."[661]

To argue for the status of *hetu* as a separate category, Si tu offers a model of unidirectional dependency consisting of the three layers instrument, agent and cause/reason. Starting from the bottom, the instrument relies on the agent during the performance of the action and the agent relies on the cause or reason to act. The comparison of the two examples *zas kyis gnas pa* ('to live due to food') and *zor bas gcod pa* ('to cut with a sickle') illustrates the difference between instrument and reason, despite the fact that the phrase *zas kyis gnas pa*, which Si tu obviously chose because the *Cāndravṛtti* cites it as one of the examples for *hetu*,[662] is a somewhat unfortunate choice, since without context it is rather ambiguous as to the difference between instrument and reason. Si tu's understanding seems to be that the one who lives does not make use of food as an instrument in order to live, but that food enables or instigates the one who lives to perform the action of living. As such, in Si tu's interpretation of this example, the one who lives (~ the agent) relies on food, while the food does not rely on the agent's handling of it. In any case, at least the phrase *zor bas gcod pa* makes unmistakably clear that there is a significant semantic difference between the two grammatical categories, since the sickle as the reason or cause for the cutting would result in an entirely different, rather counterintuitive meaning of the sentence.

Returning to GC's conception of the Tibetan third case, the relation of unidirectional dependency between the three functions is compatible with the idea of *'grub par byed pa*, in the sense that all three remain involved in the act of accomplishment, each having its own sphere of influence (cause/reason → agent → instrument). Yet, it remains unanswered to which extent Si tu already had any such model in mind during the composition of his GC.

---

[661] Si tu 2.39.6.
[662] *annena vasati* 's/he lives due to food' (cf. Liebich 1918, 108).

9.2.2 Résumé on Si tu's Third Case

As already stated in the historical survey of this case, the third case of *byed pa po* ('agent') or *byed pa* ('doing,' 'agency,' 'instrument') poses much fewer historical and linguistic problems compared to the first two cases. Its conceptual and terminological framework was adopted much more directly from Sanskritic grammar, due to the fact that the use of a single morphological category (*byed sgra*) corresponds much more directly to the adopted terminology. Therefore, also Si tu's conception stayed in line with the preceding tradition.

Si tu developed three subcategories of the agent, namely the main or primary agent (*byed pa po gtso bo*), the secondary agent (*byed pa po phal pa*) or instrument (*byed pa*) and the reason (*rgyu mtshan*) – a taxonomy which in this research was not encountered in other Tibetan grammatical sources. However, the sample phrases of several grammatical works before Si tu's times approve that at least the category of instrument was commonly subsumed under the agentive case, even though an explicit mention of this category is usually lacking. Furthermore, all three functions of Si tu's conception were already featured as distinct categories of the third case suffix in Sanskritic grammar. Although Sanskrit and Tibetan have important differences in the use of agentive, instrumental and causal marking, the significance of these three functions remains established in the latter, which is also corroborated by modern linguistic taxonomies.

The three functions' coherence as part of a single agentive function was only briefly touched upon by Si tu, to whom this was apparently connected with the idea that all three presumably accomplish (*'grub par byed*) the action or alternatively only the resultative part of the action together with the *karman*. In contrast, their distinctiveness as three subcategories of the agent is problematized not in the GC but only in his commentary to *Cāndra*, which he composed several years after the completion of the GC and in which he provides his views on this issue in the Sanskrit context.

Apart from generic instances of both the agent and instrument, Si tu's list of examples includes also grammatical constructions such as *rab kyis bkur* ('to serve excellently'), and he chose not to introduce a separate non-case function for this type of use, a solution which would not have severely interfered with authoritative taxonomies and which he favored for a variety of uses of *la don*. It must remain open at this point why Si tu decided to include such constructions in the third case, whether he saw a semantic relation to the categories of agent, instrument and reason, and whether this was in fact the best possible solution. The same questions arise with regard to Si tu's treatment of the phrase *rtag par yod gyis mi rtag par ma yin no* ('Since it exists

permanently, it is not impermanent.' or 'It exists permanently, whereas it is not impermanent.') and a possible adversative use of *byed sgra* in such constructions.

However, the recent account of *byed sgra* in Tournadre provides not only a more diverse variety of sample phrases but also more functional distinctions, including an adverbial and adversative function.[663] How Si tu would have classified such additional examples and whether he omitted them intentionally or simply chose not to go into the further details of the use of *byed sgra* – lacking awareness of a possibly more diverse distribution – are thought-provoking impulses which should be considered in Si tu's decision making. Although these questions and their answer will hopefully refine the presented picture, we can for now conclude that the conception of the third case in and before the GC required much less acrobatic efforts and reconciliation than compared to the first and especially the second case.

---

[663] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 102ff.

10 *Rnam dbye bzhi pa dgos ched*

10.1 Historical Survey

The classical Tibetan fourth case is labelled as *dgos ched* (*dgos pa* 'to need,' 'purpose,' *ched* 'purpose,' 'sake') as well as *ched du bya ba* (lit. 'for the sake of which [the action is done]). Apart from minor variants, such as *dgos pa'i tshig*,[664] sources also refer to the fourth case as either *sbyin pa* ('giving') or the related *yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa* (*sampradāna*, 'proper giving').[665] While *dgos ched*/*ched du bya ba* and (*yang dag par rab tu*) *sbyin pa* have become fossilized nomenclatures that are used interchangeably in *Sum rtags* commentaries, their relation in the early Tibetan sources NGg and GNT is less categorical.[666] Moreover, these two notions can be traced back to different categories in Sanskritic grammar.[667] The fourth case is the second case after *las/las su bya ba* which is marked by the morphological category *la don*, although the precise morphological realization of the fourth case varies significantly throughout the sources.

Based on SCP 9.3-11.4, *Sum rtags* commentators have usually associated the entire set of morphemes subsumed under the category *la don* or *la sgra* with all three case functions listed in SCP 11.3-4 (*las*, *ched*, *rten gnas*), and therefore *la don* in its entirety is typically classified as a marker for the fourth case. Although the integration of all morphemes and functions into the single category *la sgra* in the final statement of SCP 11.4 easily prompts such a conclusion, the passage itself does not directly explicate this. The section only states that the listed morphemes carry these five meanings and are grouped together under the label of *la sgra*, presumably due to their functional conformity. Yet, the precise distribution of the morphemes – whether we have to understand SCP that they can all equally take on the listed functions or whether they are grouped together due to a more general functional accordance that can have exceptions – remains questionable; and this latter option is indeed what Si tu proposes in the context of the function *de nyid*, by arguing that the seven manifestations of *la don* concur only regarding a majority of their functions, since *la* and *na* are exempt from indicating the information of *de nyid*.[668] Although Si tu adhered to the common interpretation of *na* as a marker of the fourth case, his proviso regarding *de nyid* also corroborates the fact that the

---

[664] Cf. KhJ 2009, 25.
[665] Cf. e.g. TKJ 22.4.
[666] Cf. chapter 10.1.2.
[667] Cf. chapter 10.1.1.1.
[668] GC 473f. and 483.3ff. Note that he therefore comes to the daring conclusion that the term *la sgra* was less based on the prototypicality of *la* throughout the five functions mentioned in SCP, but since it is the last letter in the alphabetical order of the seven *la don* morphemes (cf. GC 483.4f.)

passage does not necessarily exclude restrictions or exceptions of the morphemes' agreement. Thus, despite the general agreement of *na* with *la*, *du*, etc., the root text's author or authors have perhaps not associated every *la don* morpheme with the purposive function, i.e. the fourth case.

Additionally, there was the common practice the tradition to associate constructions such as *'brel sgra + phyir du*, *ched du* or *don du*, all of which exhibit purposive meaning in the broader sense, with the fourth case. Already the earliest sources have identified the construction *'brel sgra + phyir* (e.g. *thob pa'i spyir*, 'for the sake of attaining') with the fourth case, either exclusively or additionally to *la don*. Only *phyir* is listed in MVY 4741[669] as well as in Chos grub's *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa*.[670] NGg and GNT use both morphological realizations in their presentations of the fourth case, although the form *'brel sgra + phyir* seems to be regarded as the more generic form.[671] As for the category *la don*, many of the grammatical texts which are not directly dedicated to *Sum rtags* and include *la* as a fourth case marker focus exclusively on the morpheme *la* and fail to explicitly mention the three distinguishable *la don* morphemes *la*, *na* and *du*. Particularly the early sources lack *na* and *du*, although *du* does already appear at least in auxiliary constructions such as *ched du* in the GNT. In early Tibetan grammaticography, SCP would perhaps be the exception regarding the mentioning of *na* and *du*, depending on the precise understanding of SCP 9.3-11.4. It will have to be addressed elsewhere whether any of these morphological variations is connected to a diachronic or synchronic disagreement concerning which of the morphemes may mark the fourth case. This may be an interesting line of inquiry particularly in the context of *na*, since it will be demonstrated below that this is most clearly not a purposive marker in WT. The earliest source identified in this research to unmistakably classify *na* as a marker for the fourth case is the *Smra sgo*;[672] and concerning *du*, the *Smra sgo* states that it shares all its functions with *la*, however no explicit examples of the three case functions are given.[673]

Regardless of all morphological and conceptual variations, the basic function associated with the Tibetan fourth case in all grammatical sources is the purpose of the action, which grammarians usually refer to under the nomenclature of *dgos ched*, *ched du bya ba*, etc. If the terminology is allowed to speak for itself, the two main notions *dgos pa* and *ched* emphasize different facets of what in this dissertation is rendered as the purposive meaning. The more literal meaning of *dgos pa* as a verb is 'to need' or 'to require,' with its derived nominal meaning

---

[669] Cf. HSGLT 2, 26.
[670] Cf. ibid., 362.
[671] Cf. CT *115* – 432f. and 454f.
[672] Cf. Smṛti 2002,79.
[673] Cf. ibid., 92.

of 'objective,' 'intent,' purpose' (*dmigs yul*)[674] often also used as a translation for Sanskrit *prayojana*.[675] In the context of the fourth case, *dgos pa* therefore emphasizes that the action serves a certain need of the marked argument or that the action fulfills a certain requirement for the attainment of the marked argument, in which senses the marked argument is then the objective or purpose. The term *ched*, in contrast, directly indicates the sake or purpose for which an action is performed, implying that the action is done or not done in favor of *ched*'s reference point or the attainment of this reference point. Other important notions in this context that add further characteristics surrounding the purposive meaning expressed by the Tibetan fourth case are, for example, *don* (lit. 'meaning') or *phyir* (a causal connector that indicates final clauses in the context of the fourth case, 'for the purpose of'), which are used in auxiliary constructions in the form *'brel sgra + don du/phyir du* ('for the sake of') and are typically classified in grammatical sources as fourth cases.

These different etymological nuances of the purposive terminology, although certainly conducive to a general understanding, should however not be overemphasized, since they seem to have had little importance to the grammarians, who used the terms interchangeably or even as paraphrases for each other.[676] Also from a grammatical point of view, constructions such as *de'i ched du* ('for the sake of that'), *de'i phyir du* ('id.') or *de'i don du* ('id.') may for the most part be used interchangeably in purposive instances.

Dpang Lotsāwa encapsulated the fourth case in short terms as follows:

> *bzhi pa dgos ched kyi rnam dbye'i tshig gsum sbyar ba/   shing gi ched du/   shing dag gi ched du/   shing rnams kyis ched du chu drongs zhes pa lta bu'o/*

> "The three syntactic fourth case forms of purpose (*dgos ched*) are to be applied as in 'Pull/bring water (*chu drongs*; = 'to irrigate,' 'to water') for the sake of the tree (*shing gi ched du*)!' [or] 'for the sake of the two trees (*shing dag gi ched du*)' [or] 'for the sake of the trees (*shing   rnams gi ched du*)'."[677]

The default construction of the example would be that of *shing **la** chu 'dren pa* (lit. 'to pull/bring water to the tree,' i.e. to water the tree). Thus, the verb frame *'dren pa* triggers *la*-marking which the author substituted with *ched du* ('for the sake of') in order to emphasize the purposive meaning of the sentence. This example figures very prominently in Tibetan grammatical

---

[674] Cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* 2006, 462.
[675] Cf. Negi 1993, 640.
[676] Cf. e.g. NGg's definition of the meaning of the fourth case, infra 285.
[677] Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250.

266

sources from the earliest time, either with *shing* ('tree') or *zhing* ('field') as the argument in the fourth case. Apparently, it was adopted from the Sanskritic tradition.[678] While it cannot be addressed here whether Dpang Lotsāwa substituted *ched du* for *la* because he regarded both constructions as interchangeable or because he was aware of the non-purposive functioning of *la* in this clause, in general grammarians did not hesitate to provide also *shing la chu 'dren* as an example for the fourth case.

The equation of the syntactic forms *shing la* and *shing gi ched du* may be questioned from a syntactic perspective, since *la* typically expresses information such as INDIRECT OBJECT, DIRECTION or, in this concrete example, perhaps also RECIPIENT or TARGET (?),[679] however without any indication of an involved need or purpose of the tree. Although a purposive meaning for the tree to be watered is readily comprehensible in the expressed scenario, an alternative classification of this and similar constructions as a second case in the traditional model would have also been possible and even more representative of WT. The non-purposive meaning of *la* in connection with the construction *chu 'dren pa* can be easily demonstrated when *la* and *ched du* are combined in one sentence:

> *shing tog gi ched du shing la chu 'dren* 'to bring water to the tree for the sake of fruits'

Through the addition of *shing tog gi ched du*, the sentence makes clear that the intended purpose of the action is that of gaining fruits from the tree. Although the tree is not the purpose of the action, the case marking pattern remains the same. Thus, *la* only expresses the information that the tree represents the TARGET, INDIRECT OBJECT, etc., but not the purpose of the watering.[680] The classification of *la don* as a fourth case in *shing/zhing la chu 'dren* is thus a genuine instance of an objectivist focus.[681]

Following academic accounts, the purposive functioning of *la* in general deserves closer scrutiny, but at least Michael Hahn identified rare purposive uses of *la* which he classified as "Lokativ des Ziels."

---

[678] I have encountered the example in the *Nyāyavārttika* (NV) as the only example for *sampradāna* in the Sanskrit equivalent construction *vṛkṣāyodakamāsiñcati* (cf. Thakur 1997, 189.9) as well as in the Tibetan canonical version of the *Kalāpavyākaraṇasūtravṛttiśiṣyahitā* (HSGLT 1, CG 14) in an altered form in the context of the *upasarga anu*: *vrīkṣaṃ vrīkṣa ma nu si tsa ti* (cf. CT *109 – 277*).

[679] On the general issue of the syntactic functioning of morpheme *la* in WT, cf. supra 201f.

[680] Also note that Tournadre classifies the use of *du* in *zhing du chu 'dren* ('to pull water onto the field') as an instance of *du*'s allative function, not the morpheme's purposive function (cf. Tourndadre 2010, 108). Dpang Lotsāwa did not specify the status of *du* as a fourth case, but for most *Sum rtags* commentators it can be assured that Tournadre's example would be fully equivalent with both, *zhing la* and *zhing gi ched du*.

[681] Cf. supra 106.

> "Der Lokativ des Ziels gibt an, zu welchem **Zweck** oder **Ziel** eine Verbalhandlung vollzogen wird.
>
> *zhing pa rnams kyis lo tog smin pa la chu 'dren no*
>
> 'Die Bauern leiten Wasser herbei, damit die Saat reif wird (… für die Reife der Saat).'
>
> Der Lokativ des Ziels ist nicht sehr häufig anzutreffen. Ein Finalsatz wird meist durch den Terminativ des Verbalsubstantivs oder durch perphrastische Konstruktionen mit finalen Postpositionen ausgedrückt."[682]

The purposive function of *du* as well as *-r* with nominalized verbs, in contrast, is well attested in modern academia and easily demonstrable in nominal, nominalized and verbal constructions:[683]

(1) *rong bas lto gos su zhing btab* 'The farmer ploughs the field for his subsistence.'

(2) *ring* [sic!][684] *po che len du song* '(X) went to fetch precious (stones).'

(3) *rin po che len par song* 'id.'

Although the precise taxonomies and categories vary also throughout the modern linguistic accounts, in principle they still support the general significance of the purposive function as a relevant semantic-syntactic category in the Tibetan context. More problematic, however, is once again the status of the morpheme *na*. Tournadre convincingly demonstrates that *na sgra* encodes *inessive locative* meaning in the sense of 'in' or 'at,' but he does not mention any purposive functioning.[685] The relatively narrow locative-temporal functioning of *na* in WT is also supported by numerous other studies.[686]

Similar to what was already encountered in the analysis of the second case, a comparison of more extensive lists of examples for the fourth case in Tibetan sources demonstrates a significant variety of different grammatical constructions. Zha lu and Pra ti, for example, in

---

[682] Hahn 2005, 94. Also note Si tu's example (6) *gar lta ba la sgron me thogs* 'to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere' (cf. infra 305f.).
[683] Examples (1) and (2) together with their translation are quoted from Tournadre 2010, 108f. (3) is my adaptation of (2). In the context of the verbal use of the morpheme *du* as a final clause maker (cf. example 2), Tournadre states that "for this function, along with *du sgra DU* (or its variants), one can also use *BAR* (or its variant *PAR*)." (ibid.)
[684] I read *rin*.
[685] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 110.
[686] Cf. e.g. Hahn 2005, 91ff.; Schwieger 2006, 277ff.; Hill 2011, 19.

their commentary on the category *ched* in SCP 11.3, which belongs to the five *la sgra* functions, give the following phrases to illustrate the fourth case:[687]

Zha lu:[688]

> *deng 'dir bde legs shog* ('Happiness for now!'), *de'i ched du* ('for the sake of that'), *de'i phyir du* ('for the purpose of that'), *bram ze la gzan byin* ('food was given to the brahmin'), *zhing la chu drongs* (lit. 'Pull/Bring water onto the field!' = 'Irrigate the field!'), *bdag la thugs brtse bar mdzod* (lit. 'Act compassionately to/towards me!' ~ 'Show compassion for me!'), *zas la sred* ('to crave for food')

Pra ti:[689]

> *mtho ris su smon lam thob* ('to attain/master (?) prayers for the [rebirth] in the higher realms'), *thar pa thob pa ru bdag med bsgom* ('to meditate on selflessness for the attainment of liberation [from cyclic existence]'), *gral gyi ched du 'tshangs* ('[someone] squeezed in for the queue,'or perhaps 'to queue up' ?), *'gyed kyi phyir du bsgrims* ('to concentrate for debate'), *skal ba'i don du 'thab* ('to fight for [one's] fortune/destiny/inheritance), *rgyan du gser brdungs* ('to cast gold for/into ornaments'), *tshogs na mang ja bskol* ('offering tea is to be cooked in/during/among the community/gathering'), *thar pa bsgrub tu nges 'byung bskyed* ('to bring forth renunciation in order to accomplish liberation [from cyclic existence]')

Zha lu restricted himself to one very general example for each *ched du* and *phyir*. He also only gives phrases with the morpheme *la*, except for the marker *-r* in the first phrase (*deng 'dir legs shog*) which may be interpreted as either an allomorph of *la* or *du*. A purposive meaning is indeed in some way perceptible in a semantic interpretation of all the depicted scenarios. However, is the purposive construal of these scenarios also present in the structure of the sample phrases? While *ched du* and *phyir du* clearly express these meanings, all examples of *la* would equally qualify as instances of INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or DIRECTION with regard to a semantic construal of the scenarios, and based on our knowledge of the distribution of *la*, this is the preferred understanding. Any need of the arguments marked by *la* that is at hand in the respective scenarios as such is not encoded in the semantic or syntactic structures

---

[687] The following will be restricted to only a few important observations, however a more detailed examination of these examples would certainly result in additional insights and a more accurate picture.
[688] Zha lu 2013A, 7f.
[689] Pra ti 2013A, 197.

of the samples for *la*.[690] Furthermore, morpheme *-r* in *deng 'dir* may simply be a specification of time. Of special interest is the final example, *zas la sred* ('to crave for food'), which not only requires an effortful interpretation to extract any purposive meaning[691] but also employs a verb of the group of affection verbs that all trigger *la*, regardless of whether the marked argument is craved, loved, cared, hated, feared, etc. Perhaps this was included by Zha lu because the verb *sred pa* in the translation of Sanskritic grammatical sources is the translational equivalent of the Sanskrit verbal root *ruc* ('to please'),[692] and the semantic field of *ruc* belongs to the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function *sampradāna* in *Pāṇini* and *Kātantra*.[693] From a Tibetan linguistic point of view, I argue that Zha lu's classifications of *la* fall short; they are the result of the objectivist focus which applies a wrong semantic construal of scenarios in the sample phrases and associates this construal with the morpheme *la*. Apart from the auxiliary constructions *ched du* and *phyir du*, Zha lu omits any samples for *du* as well as any exemplification of the fourth case usage of *na*.

Pra ti's list is somehow reverse to Zha lu's selection, since it includes mainly phrases with the morpheme *du* and its allomorphs as well as an example for *na*, while *la* is omitted. Following this list, however, he does note that "in all [examples] the letter *la* can be aptly applied [as well]."[694] The evaluation of this concise statement would require further investigation, but even if *la* may be substituted in all the examples for either *du* or *na*, the question remains whether the substituted *la* would still expresses the same type of information, or whether it would alter the sentence's meaning. Like in Zha lu's list, all the clauses allow for a purposive or beneficiary reading in a semantic construal of the situations referred to in the phrases, but there are also clearly instances which may be classified differently as well. In his example *rgyan du gser brdungs* ('to cast gold for/into ornaments'), *rgyan* as the goal of the action may be interpreted as the purpose of the casting ('*for* ornaments') but equally qualifies as an instance of the transformative function specific to *du* ('*into* ornaments'). This double value of *rgyan* ('ornament') obviously results from its status of being the result of the action, which directly

---

[690] Cf. e.g. Zha lu's example *bram ze la gzan byin*, if we add a purposive syntactic form:
  a ma'i ched du bram ze la gzan byin 'food was given to the brahmin for [his] mother'
Although the served need or action's purpose is clearly not that of the Brahmin but that of the mother, the case marking pattern does not change, which reveals that *la* does not encode purposive information.
[691] In view of the tradition, two options may be offered:
  1) The purpose or need is that of the agent, but not that of the marked object (cf. NGg on the fourth case, infra 287f.)
  2) The craving is favorable for the attainment of food, that is to say not for the marked argument, but an implied action connected to the marked argument (cf. infra 294f.).
[692] Cf. e.g. K 2.4.10 in HSGLT 2, 359.
[693] Cf. infra 272f.
[694] […] *thams cad la la yig sbyor rung ba* […] (Pra ti 2013A, 197)

270

relates to both functions. As will be evident also from the GC, examples of the fourth case in Si tu's list bear the same classificatory complication.[695]

Most interesting is Pra ti's only example for the morpheme *na*, namely *tshogs na mang ja bskol* ('offering tea is to be cooked in/among the community'). From the lexical meanings of the words *mang ja* ('offering tea'), *bskol* ('is to be cooked') as well as *tshogs* ('the community,' 'the gathering'), it is clear that this sentence refers to the common practice of the preparation of tea, which is usually offered during certain religious as well as secular gatherings of communities or people which may be identified as those favored or served in this entire scenario. Yet, *tshogs na* expresses much more the information 'in/within/among the community,' perhaps even temporally 'during the gathering,' if *tshogs na* is understood more freely in terms of *tshogs pa na*. Since *na* does not express purposive meaning but has a very distinctive locative function and therefore is difficult to exemplify, the choice of a phrase with a readily comprehensive purposive meaning when envisaging the situation at hand might have been Pra ti's strategy to circumvent this issue and establish the fourth case status of this morpheme. In any case, this example is yet another genuine instance of the objectivist focus triggered by the need to find representative examples for the established taxonomy of the fourth case.

The fact that the locative marker *na* in the context of the fourth case was the most troublesome of the *la don* morphemes to the grammarians is even more evident from Rnam gling's only example, namely *'tshang rgya 'dod na chos gyis* ('If [you] want to become enlightened, practice Dharma!').[696] Although he chose a common and established type of grammatical construction, it goes without saying that the morpheme *na* in this clause does definitely not express any purposive or beneficiary meaning, although it may still be agreed that serving the wish to become enlightened is a purpose of Dharma practice. Again, the strategy was to focus on a semantic interpretation of the underlying scenario as such rather than the sentence-specific representation of it (= objectivist focus), in this case with the result of an erroneous classification.

Even though the conception of the fourth case function as the purpose of the action is highly distinct and even represents a linguistically significant category in WT, the overall picture of the fourth case thus far presented reveals that there were noteworthy differences as to the type of grammatical constructions classified as fourth case. Moreover, within the traditional

---

[695] Cf. infra 300ff.
[696] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70.

taxonomy and against the backdrop of Tibetan syntax, many of the sample phrases more accurately qualify as the second case *las su bya ba*. Finally, the morpheme *na* caused substantial difficulties due to its clear non-purposive, locative functioning in WT, which in the *Sum rtags* commentaries evoked various acrobatic strategies concerning its implementation into the fourth case.

As to get a better understanding of the ways in which Tibetan grammarians have decided to adopt, adapt and adhere to the fourth case as *dgos ched* or *ched du bya ba*, the remaining historical survey will now address the relation between the Tibetan fourth case and the conception of the fourth case suffix in the Sanskritic tradition.

10.1.1 The Development of the Tibetan Fourth Case out of Sanskritic Grammar

10.1.1.1 On the Sanskritic Conception of the Fourth Case suffix

In most basic terms, the Sanskritic *kāraka*-function *sampradāna*[697] represents the prototypical trigger of the fourth case suffix in Sanskritic grammatical sources.[698] The *Pāṇinian* definition of *sampradāna* is that of

> P 1.4.32 *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam*, "Someone, whom [the agent] approaches through the *karman*, is *sampradāna*."[699]

A classic example for this rule is *upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti* ('he gives a cow to the teacher').[700] The prototypical instantiation of this *kāraka* is naturally that of giving something to someone, since 'to give' (*dā*) is already part of the technical term itself.[701] Apart from the general characterization in P 1.4.32, the *kāraka sampradāna* covers a variety of additional meanings, such as the object of anger (P 1.4.37), whoever is pleased in connection with verbs signifying the meaning of *ruc* ('to please;' P 1.4.33), etc., which are listed in P 1.4.33-1.4.41, excluding P 1.4.38, which is dedicated to *karman*.[702] In contrast, *Kātantra* explains the term in a much less abstract way:

---

[697] *samyak pradīyate asmai* "He to whom something is properly given." (Sharma 1990, 242)

[698] Cf. P 1.4.32, C 2.1.73, K 2.4.10/19.

[699] Cf. Sharma 1990, 242: "Someone, whom [an agent] intends as a goal of the object;" Joshi and Roodbergen (1995, 103) translate: "[the item] which one has in view through the *karman* [is called] *sampradāna* [when it becomes instrumental in bringing about an action]." On *sampradāna*'s definition in P 1.4.32, cf. also Cardona 1974, 232.

[700] Transl. Sharma 1990, 242.

[701] *Sampradāna* is commonly recognized as an etymologically significant term (*anvartha*), that is to say the term itself already indicates the meaning represented by the grammatical category (cf. Sharma 1990, 243).

[702] Cf. Sharma 1990, 242ff.

K 2.4.10 *yasmai ditsā rocate dhārayate vā tat sampradānam* "The one to whom one wants to give, [who] is pleased or [to whom] one owes is *sampradānam*."[703]

This definition merges the definitions of *kāraka* in P 1.4.32, 1.4.33 and 1.4.35 into a single rule and omits a more general or abstract definition such as P 1.4.32. It is important to remember that *sampradāna* is only the prototypical use of the Sanskrit fourth case suffix, the latter for which *Pāṇini* lists a total of seven different functions (P 2.3.12-17 and P 2.3.73), *Kātantra* lists six (K 2.4.19, 24-28), whereas *Cāndra* defines eleven triggers (C 2.1.64, C 2.1.72-80, C 2.1.97). Altogether, the Sanskritic fourth case suffix comprises a whole set of different uses. Even though the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function *sampradāna* survived in Tibetan grammar in the form of (*yang dag par rab tu*) *sbyin pa*, the main Tibetan labels of *dgos ched* and *ched du bya ba* are neither a direct translation of the Sanskritic term, nor do they directly reflect the quoted Sanskritic explanations of this *kāraka*. Thus, the transition from the Sanskritic to the Tibetan conception of the prototypical fourth case function deserves closer scrutiny.

The Tibetan canonical translations of all three Sanskritic grammars[704] as well as Si tu's commentary on *Cāndra*[705] have rendered Sanskrit *sampradāna* more literally as *yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa*.[706] Furthermore, *Pāṇini*'s definition of *sampradāna* in P 1.4.33-41 (excluding P 1.4.38) as well as the one of *Kātantra* in K 2.4.10 have associated several concrete semantic fields with this *kāraka*, but without explicitly mentioning any purposive function. The introduction of the standard Tibetan nomenclature *dgos ched*/*ched du bya ba* is historically much more likely connected to Sanskrit *tādarthya* ('for the sake of that'),[707] which is a separate fourth case trigger in K 2.4.27 and C 2.1.79:

K 2.4.27 *tādarthye* "If [there is the meaning] for the sake of which, [a fourth case suffix occurs]."

C 2.1.79 *tādarthye* "id."

Example in the *Vṛtti* of both grammars: *yūpāya dāru* 'wood for the sacrificial post.'[708]

The rule of *tādarthya* as a separate fourth case trigger in *Cāndra* and *Kātantra* is an amalgam of at least two rules in Pāṇini's grammar, and the latter source has no direct counterpart:

---

[703] Cf. Liebich 1919, 43: 'Dem man geben will (schenkt), gefällt oder schuldet, der (heißt) Saṃpradāna.'
[704] Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 1 (*Cāndra*), CG 10 (*Kātantra*) and CG 46 (*Pāṇini*).
[705] Cf. Si tu 2.42.5.
[706] Cf. HSGLT 2, Appendix C.
[707] Cf. also ibid., 217.
[708] Cf. Liebich 1919, 46; Liebich 1918, 109.

1) Pāṇini attributed the meaning of *tādarthya* to the fourth case suffix only in the section on *samāsa* ('compounds'), where in P 2.1.36 he states that a word form which ends in a fourth case may be combined into a *tatpuruṣa* in connection with a word form to denote *tadartha* ('a thing for that'),[709] for example:

> *yupāya dāru* → *yūpadāru* ('wood for the sacrificial post')

This meaning of the *caturthī* was not included in *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s section *on vibhakti*.[710] However, already Kātyāyana in his first *Vārttika* on P 2.3.13 (*caturthī sampradāne* 'If there is a *sampradāna*, a fourth [case suffix occurs].') has proposed to add the form *tādarthye* ('if there is a *tādarthya*') as an additional trigger in this rule.[711] If we follow Patañjali and the grammatical tradition on his *Bhāṣya* 1 ad P 2.3.13, the main reason for this *Vārttika* is to account for instances like *yupāya dāru*, which uses a fourth case suffix but does not indicate a relation of *kāraka*, because the relation is that between two substantives, whereas a *kāraka* as an accomplisher of the action must be related to the action.[712] Kaiyaṭa in the 11th century (?) further described *tādarthya* relations in terms of material cause and effect (*kārya*), as readily comprehensible from the example *yupāya dāru*. While Patañjali concluded in his *Bhāṣya* 14 on P 2.3.13 that the *Vārttika*'s addition of *tādarthye* in the section on *vibhakti* is unnecessary because P 2.1.36 already covers this use of the *caturthī* indirectly in the section on *samāsa*, *Cāndra* as well as *Kātantra* have both added a separate rule. Yet, examples such as *yuddhāya saṃnahyate* ('he equips himself for battle') in the *Vṛtti*'s to both non-*Pāṇinian* grammars reveal that neither Patañjali's point according to which instances such as *yupāya dāru* are only substantive relations nor Kaiyaṭa's much later explanation of *tādarthya* in terms of a relation between material cause and effect have been followed in K 2.4.27 or C 2.1.79.

2) Patañjali's discussion of P 1.4.32 in *Bhāṣya*s 7ff. investigates Pāṇini's definition of *sampradāna*, according to which a direct object (*karman*) is required through which the entity classified as *sampradāna* is approached.[713] Pāṇini's definition leads to the problem of how to explain intransitive uses of *sampradāna* in examples like *śrāddhāya nigarhate* ('he speaks with disapproval of the *śraddha* ceremony'), *yuddhāya saṃnahyate* ('he equips himself for battle'), or *patye śete* ('she lies down for the husband'). Patañjali provides different solutions as to how

---

[709] Kaiyaṭa derives *tadartha* from *tasmā idam* ('a (thing) for that') and *tādarthya* based on Patañjali (P 2.3.13, *Bhāṣya* 3) from *tadarthasya bhāvaḥ* ('being a thing for that).' For more information on the derivation of these technical terms, cf. particularly ft. 314 and 316 in Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 108.
[710] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 110.
[711] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 107.
[712] Cf. ibid., 107ff.
[713] Cf. supra 272.

the rule P 1.4.32 may still account for such instances but without a satisfactory solution, since they are either revised by Patañjali himself or have been subjected to criticism by later commentators.[714] The problematic character of these examples due to Pāṇini's *karman*-centered definition might have further supported *Cāndra*'s and *Kātantra*'s addition of the *tādarthya* rule. This is also suggested by the fact that precisely these examples of Patañjali were outsourced from *sampradāna* in the *Vṛtti*'s of *Cāndra* and *Kātantra* in which they are covered by *tādarthya* ('purpose'). This conveniently solves the problem of the suffix's intransitive use.[715]

3) and 4) In addition to P 2.1.36 and the problematic examples discussed by Patañjali under P 1.4.32, two more *Pāṇinian* rules in the *vibhakti*-section on the fourth case suffix probably were involved in *Cāndra*'s and *Kātantra*'s formation of the *tādarthya*-rule, namely P 2.3.14 and 15:

> P 2.3.14 *kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ* "[A fourth case suffix] also [occurs] if [there is] a *karman* of a conjoined, [though] not expressed intended action."

> P 2.3.15 *tumarthāc ca bhāvavacanāt* "[A fourth case suffix] also [occurs] after an action[-denoting] word form in the [same] meaning like [the affix] *tumUN*."[716]

Both are connected to a purposive meaning of the fourth case suffix. The former rule deals with sentences like *edhebhyo vrajati* ('he is going in order to bring some firewood'),[717] where no additional verb is explicitly mentioned but needs to be inferred from the meaning of the clause. A phrase like 'to go for firewood' results in 'to go in order to *bring* firewood' according to P 2.3.14, where the action of bringing is the actual purpose or intention of the main action of going. P 2.3.15 then refers to nominalized word forms which express *bhāva* ('the state of the action' or 'action per se') and have a meaning equivalent to that of the infinitive (*tumUN*), e.g. *pākāya vrajati* ('he is going in order to do the cooking'). P 2.3.14 was omitted in *Kātantra* as well as *Cāndra*, which suggests that they included it in *tādarthya*. *Kātantra* did add an equivalent rule for P 2.3.15 following the *tādarthya* rule,[718] but *Cāndra* omitted this fourth case trigger as well. The relation of P 2.3.14-15 to the *tādarthya* condition in K 2.4.27 and C 2.1.79 is more intricate compared to P 2.1.36 and Patañjali's treatment of P 1.4.32, since the comparison of sample phrases in the commentarial literature does not reveal any direct

---

[714] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 103ff.

[715] Cf. Liebich 1919, 46; Liebich 1918, 109. Note that Joshi and Roodbergen (1975, 110) do not see a *tādarthya* meaning in the phrase *śrāddhāya nigarhate* ('he speaks with disapproval of the *śraddha* ceremony'). Nonetheless, the *Cāndravṛtti* – not that of *Kātantra* – listed it under C 2.1.79 as an instance of *tādarthya*.

[716] For more information on these two rules, cf. Sharma 1995, 121ff. Also note that P 2.3.15 corresponds to K 2.4.28.

[717] Transl. Sharma 1995, 121.

[718] Cf. K 2.4.28.

borrowings. However, *Kātantra*'s and *Cāndra*'s (partial) omission of these two *Pāṇinian* rules with a clear purposive meaning does corroborate a connection.

The current investigation has demonstrated that the *tādarthya* trigger of the fourth case suffix in K 2.4.27 and C 2.1.79 as the most likely terminological antecedent of Tibetan *dgos ched/ched du bya ba* gathered together several purposive uses of the fourth case suffix that were more widely dispersed in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Yet, is there any relation between *sampradāna* and *tādarthya* in view of the fact that Tibetan grammarians focused more on a purposive interpretation of their fourth case function?

10.1.1.2 On the Relation of *sampradāna* and *tādarthya* in the Sanskritic Tradition

A first, most obvious direction to follow would be that the technical term *sampradāna* in terms of *samyak pradīyate asmai* ('he to whom something is properly given') involves the category of *tādarthya* ('for the sake of') or at least a purposive connotation in general and somehow refers to a purposeful giving that is intended for the sake of the recipient. Thus, the term raises the question of how to understand its specification *samyak* ('correctly,' 'properly,' 'in the right way'). A classical approach in the Sanskrit grammatical schools for explaining *sampradāna* is by means of the term's prototypical domain 'giving' and the counterexample *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti* ('s/he gives clothes to the washerman').[719] Compare the following contrastation:

(a) *rajakāya vastraṃ dadāti* 'S/he gives clothes to the washerman.' (fourth case)

(b) *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti* 'S/he gives clothes to the washerman.' (sixth case)

Both clauses have the same basic meaning of someone giving clothes to the washerman. However, the difference is that in (a) the clothes are given away for good, whereas in (b) the clothes are expected to be returnd upon washing. Therefore, there must be an exchange of ownership involved in the proper giving (*sampradāna*), otherwise a sixth case suffix is triggered by the condition of *śeṣa* (P 2.3.50ff.).[720] In his basic definition of *sampradāna* in *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.129, Bhartṛhari adds the further specifications that the giver must not be prohibited (by the recipient), or that the recipient requests the giving or that he gives his consent.[721]

---

[719] Cf. Sharma 1990, 243; Liebich 1918, 108; CG 14, *109* – 355; the following comparison of the example's variations is based on Sharma 1990, 243.

[720] Cf. ibid.

[721] V 3.7.129:
    anirākaraṇāt kartus tyāgāṅgaṃ karmaṇepsitam/   preraṇānumatibhyāṃ ca labhate sampradānatām
    "Was im Zusammenhang mit einer Hingabe durch ein Objekt erstrebt wird, ohne daß der Agens [vom Empfänger] abgewiesen würde, und zu dem [der Empfänger] auffordert oder zustimmt, erhält die Bezeichnung 'Empfänger' (*sampradāna*)." (Sanskrit and transl. quoted from Rau 2002, 228).
Cf. also Subramania 1971, 223:

276

The counterexample of *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti* clearly reveals that the addition of *samyak* was first of all intended to account for the Sanskrit-specific syntactic feature that there are instances of giving without the fourth case suffix.[722] The presented semantic analysis to explain this syntactic feature shows that a purposive interpretation was not suggested by these authoritative sources. While not mutually exclusive, the parameters of ownership, prohibition, request or consent do not automatically imply a purposive meaning. They do so only mediated through additional interpretation, if it is assumed, for example, that a change in ownership implies that the act of giving is for the sake or in favor of the recipient.

Already the early Sanskritic tradition has discussed the relation between *sampradāna* and *tādarthya*, however less based on the etymological derivation of the *kāraka* than in view of Kātyāyana's addition of *tādarthye* in his first *Vārttika* on P 2.3.13 (*caturthī sampradāne* 'If there is a *sampradāna*, a fourth [case suffix occurs].'). Already Patañjali has provided the following objection in *Bhāṣya* 11 on P 2.3.13:

> *yadi tādarthya upasaṅkhyānaṃ kriyate nārthaḥ sampradānagrahaṇena. yo 'pi hyupādhyāyāya gaurdīyata upādhyāyārthaḥ sa bhavati. tatra tādarthya ityeva siddham.*

> "If (the word) *tādarthye*: 'in (the sense of) being a thing for the sake of that' is (added), there is no point in mentioning (the word) *sampradāne*: 'to convey the (sense of) recipient' (anymore). Because (we can say that) the cow which is given to the teacher becomes a thing for the teacher. Therefore we can manage by just (saying) *tādarthye*."[723]

Since prototypical instances of *sampradāna*, such as *upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti* ('he gives a cow to the teacher'), equally fall under the semantic condition of *tādarthya*, according to the opponent's argument there is no longer a need for *sampradāna*. Patañjali immediately rejects this objection by stating that instances like *chātrāya rucitam* 'it has pleased the student,' which are not part of the semantic field of giving but belong to the domain of *sampradāna* by P 1.4.33, still require *sampradāna* as a separate fourth case trigger in P 2.3.13.[724] This information demonstrates that certain semantic fields or verb frames defined by Pāṇini as *sampradāna* are certainly not regarded as allowing for a purposive meaning in Patañjali's view.[725] However, an

---

"That factor in the act of giving which is sought to be reached by the thing given is called *sampradāna* when he does not prohibit the giver, or requests him or gives his consent."

[722] Cf. also Si tu's discussion of the washerman example in his *Cāndra* commentary (Si tu 2.43.1).

[723] Sanskrit transliterated from Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 41; transl. Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 112.

[724] cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 113.

[725] It has already been demonstrated how Zha lu has classified the Tibetan term *sred pa* ('to crave for') that is used as a translation of *ruc* in the grammatical context as a Tibetan fourth case *dgos ched* (cf. supra 269f.). He apparently followed the Sanskrit syntactic pattern of *ruc*, while contradicting or lacking awareness of the point that Sanskritic grammarians such as Patañjali did not attribute any purposive meaning to it.

overlap of *tādarthya* with *sampradāna*'s prototypical instances, i.e. the verb frame giving, was not refuted and thus indirectly accepted – willingly or not – by Patañjali, the argument seems only that *tādarthya* cannot cover the full range of *sampradāna*. Although Patañjali did not directly refute a purposive interpretation of the recipient in the action of giving in his response to the quoted objection, this does not necessarily imply that *sampradāna* as such involves a purposive aspect in terms of *tādarthya*. It may be only a subtle nuance, but I think Patañjali's point in the objection is that the recipient of the action of giving allows for two semantic construals, *sampradāna* and *tādarthya*, and in that sense these two are different semantic categories in his conception. An important distinguishing parameter between the two is probably the mentioned difference that *sampradāna* as a *kāraka* represents an accomplisher of the action, whereas *tādarthya* only establishes a relation of one thing that is for the sake of another thing in examples such as *yupāya dāru* ('wood for the sacrificial post').[726]

In any case, other Vaiyākaraṇas questioned much more openly the purposive interpretation of *sampradāna*'s generic domain 'giving,' for example Helārāja (10th century)[727] in his commentary to the already quoted *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.129:

> *dānakriyārthaṃ hi sampradānam, na tu dānakriyā tadarthā kārakāṇāṃ kriyārthatvāt sampradānārthaṃ tu dīyamānaṃ karmeti vākyārthabhūtāyā dānakriyāyā atādaryyāt*[sic!] [728] *tādarthyacaturthyā aprāptau tadarthaṃ sampradānasaṃjñā nyāyyā.*

> "Therefore, the *sampradāna* is for the action of giving (*dānakriyārthaṃ*), but the action of giving is not for [the *kāraka*s], because the *kāraka*s are for the action, nor has the action of giving a meaning in the sense that the given *karman* is for the *sampradāna*, because [the action of giving] is without purpose (*atādaryyāt* [sic!]). Therefore, when a fourth case suffix [in the meaning of] *tādarthya* has not been triggered (~ *aprāptau*), the technical term *sampradāna* (*sampradānasaṃjñā*) is correct."[729]

There is no need to address the details of this very technical discussion which requires detailed knowledge of the concept of *kāraka*s. If we follow Subramania's summary of the argument at hand,[730] the underlying rationale originates with the idea that *sampradāna* is a relation of *kāraka* and as such an accomplisher of the action or, in Helārāja's words, for the action

---

[726] Cf. supra 274, as well as Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 109.
[727] On Helārāja and his work, cf. Raja 1990, 194ff.
[728] I read *atādarthyāt*.
[729] Sanskrit transliterated from Subramania 1992, 525.
[730] Cf. ibid., 316f. and Subramania 1971, 223.

(*kriyārtham*). The category *tādarthya*, in contrast, indicates the opposite relation, that is to say the action is for something. In this sense, *sampradāna* as one constituent part in the accomplishment of the action cannot be *tādarthya*. And regarding the act of giving as the prototypical instance of *sampradāna*, it belongs to the domain of *sampradāna* but not to *tādarthya* according to the above understanding of Helārāja. Finally, the author concludes that a fourth case suffix in the meaning of *sampradāna* occurs in case there is no meaning of *tādarthya* at hand.

The two above passages of Patañjali and Helārāja hopefully demonstrated that the relation of *tādarthya* and *sampradāna* evoked scholarly attention in the Sanskritic tradition and posed various problems within the conceptual framework of Sanskritic grammaticography. Both authors were rather critical and established different criteria of distinguishing between *tādarthya* and the *kāraka* function. Yet, at least Patañjali did not explicitly refute the argument that instances such as *upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti* ('he gives a cow to the teacher,') can be interpreted in that the cow is for the teacher.

Turning to *Kātantra* and *Cāndra*, although they have not directly commented upon *sampradāna* as purposeful giving, the two grammars still feature noteworthy differences between the Sanskritic notions *sampradāna* and *tādarthya*. Perhaps the most crucial difference for the current context of the Tibetan fourth case is the fact that *tādarthya* represents a separate trigger for the fourth case in both the grammars of *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*, and it is definitely not a *kāraka* and consequently a non-prototypical use of the fourth case suffix that covers a different range of semantic fields compared to *sampradāna*. Compare the following examples for *Kātantra*'s *sampradāna* (K 2.4.10), which comprises the categories of giving, pleasing and owing, with that of *tādarthya* (K 2.4.27): [731]

sampradāna (K 2.4.10):

> (1) *brāhmaṇāya gāṃ dadāti* 's/he gives a cow to the Brahmin'

> (2) *Devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* 'Devadatta is pleased by/likes the sweet'

> (3) *Viṣṇumitrāya gāṃ dhārayati* 's/he owes Viśṇumitra a cow'

tādarthya (K 2.4.27):

> (4) *yūpāya dāru* 'wood for the sacrificial pillar'

---

[731] Examples are taken from Liebich 1919, 43f.

(5) *randhanāya sthālī* 'a pot for cooking'

(6) *yuddhāya saṃnahyate* 'he equips himself for battle'

(7) *patye śete* 'she lies down for the husband'

Note that *Cāndra*, in contrast to *Kātantra*, restricts *sampradāna* to its generic domain of giving and outsources the domains of owing and pleasing both to separate rules.[732] In view of Patañjali's argument that *sampradāna* cannot be replaced by *tādarthya* only due to such additional domains covered by the *kāraka*, *Cāndra*'s outsourcing may open space to substitute *tādarthya* for *sampradāna* or even allow for a more purposive interpretation of the latter itself. Yet, *Cāndra* did not follow this direction, since it adds nonetheless the rule of *tādarthya* (C 2.1.79) separately from *sampradāna*. Thus, whatever was the precise stance of the authors of *Cāndra* and *Kātantra* taken in their grammars, no relation between the two categories was suggested by them.

In contrast to the above sources which were critical of the relation of *sampradāna* and *tādarthya* or at least did not suggest any equivalence of the two, there are also traces which suggest that there were Sanskritic conceptions of the fourth case that attributed a purposive meaning to *sampradāna*.

Addressing first the historically earlier but also more problematic source, root text and commentary of the *Smra ba kun* are both unmistakable advocates of the fact that the *kāraka* *sampradāna* is a purposive category. In fact, already the short and concise root text refers to the *kāraka* *sampradāna* as *ched*:

> […] *las dang byed dang byed pa dang/   ched dang 'byung khungs 'brel pa dang/ gzhi dang* […]

> "[…] *karman* (*las*) and agency/instrument (*byed pa*) and purpose (*ched*) and source/origin (*'byung khungs*), connection (*'brel ba*) and substratum (*gzhi*) and […]"[733]

The commentary defines *sampradāna* as follows:

> *sbyin pa ni gang gi ched dang don dang dgos pa dang 'bras bu lta bu la'am/   gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag 'tshal ba'i sa ste/   'di ltar las dang byed pa'i 'bras bu ni bya ba ste/   bya ba'i don ni 'dir yang dag par sbyin pa'o/*

---

[732] Cf. C 2.1.73-75.
[733] CT *109* – 1701.
280

> "As for giving (*sbyin pa*), it is the semantic position (*sa*) of the sake (*ched*), meaning/intent (*don*), need/purpose (*dgos pa*) and result (*'bras bu*) of something, or [the semantic position of] offering (*mchod sbyin*) and paying homage (*phyag 'tshal ba*) to something. In that manner, the result of *karman* (*las*) and agency/instrument (*byed pa*) is the action, whereas the meaning/intent of the action (*bya ba'i don*) here is *sampradāna* (*yang dag par sbyin pa*)."[734]

Thus, (*yang dag par*) *sbyin pa* has been defined as covering the semantic positions of *ched*, *dgos pa*, *don*, *'bras bu*, *mchod sbyin* and *phyag 'tshal ba*. The final and overall definition of *sampradāna* at the end of this quotation suggests that all these semantic categories may be subsumed under the general meaning of the action's meaning, intent or purpose (*bya ba'i don*). If the commentary that uses *sbyin pa* as the *kāraka*'s designation is read against the backdrop of the root text's *ched*, the two categories were thus used interchangeably.

A similar and most likely historically connected definition of the fourth case will be encountered in the NGg, where the two categories of *phyag 'tshal ba* and *mchod sbyin* will be discussed in more detail, demonstrating that the former can be directly traced back to Sanskritic grammatical sources as a separate fourth case trigger apart from *sampradāna* while the latter's interpretation is more difficult. All the remaining notions of *ched*, *dgos pa*, *don* and *'bras bu* are different renditions of the purposive function, with *'bras bu* as the only unusual term which may perhaps be conceptually related to Kaiyaṭa's idea that the purposive function *tādarthya* indicates a relation between material cause and effect.[735] While a clear instance of a purposive interpretation of the technical term *sampradāna* itself is apparent, the Sanskritic origin of root text and commentary remains unclear and questionable. Whatever the sources' historical status, in the Sanskritic tradition the above definition would certainly be an unorthodox interpretation of *sampradāna*, most notably because the inclusion of *phyag 'tshal ba* (*namas*, 'to pay homage') expands the domain of the *kāraka* to a use which was not seen as part of it in Sanskritic grammar. Perhaps less problematic but still noteworthy, the idea of *sampradāna* as the meaning, intent or purpose of the action (*bya ba'i don*) directly contradicts Helārāja's quoted argument that distinguishes between *sampradāna* and *tādarthya* precisely on the ground that the *kāraka* is for the action, not the other way around.[736]

---

[734] CT *109* – 1712.
[735] Cf. supra 274.
[736] Cf. supra 278.

The second trace that indicates a purposive understanding of *sampradāna* in Sanskritic grammar is the Tibetan translation of the *Sārasvataprakriyā*,[737] a commentary to the *Sārasvatavyākaraṇa*(*sūtra*),[738] both attributed to Anubhūti (13th-14th century).[739] The two sources are known to have flourished south of the Himalaya and are preserved in Sanskrit as well as in the *bstan ʼgyur* in the form of a translation from the 17th century.[740] In the section on *kāraka*s (*byed pa can gyi rab tu byed pa*) under *sūtra* 17.4,[741] the Tibetan translation of the *Sārasvataprakriyā* adds a Sanskrit quotation followed by a short summary of the definition of *kāraka*s and their respective case suffixes. Regarding *sampradāna*, the Tibetan text reads as follows:

> *smras pa/   karta karma tsa ka ra ṇaṃ saṃ pra dā naṃ ta thai ba tsa/   a pā dā nā dhi ka ra ṇa mi tyā hu kā ra kā ni ṣaṭ/   byed pa po dang las dang byed pa dang/   yang dag rab tu sbyin dang de bzhin ʼdi/   nges par sbyin dang lhag par byed pa dang/ byed can drug po ʼdir ni bshad par bya/* […] *yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa ste deʼi ched du yod nges dang ʼgrub nges paʼi don la bzhi pa/*

> "It is said (*smras pa* ?): '*kartā karma ca karaṇaṃ sampradānaṃ tathaiva ca, apādānādhikaraṇam ityāhuḥ kārakāṇi ṣaṭ*.' Agent, *karman*, instrument, *sampradāna* and likewise *apādāna* (*nges par sbyin*) and *adhikaraṇa* (*lhag par byed pa*) are the six *kāraka*s to be explained here. […] The fourth [case suffix occurs] when [there is] the meaning of *sampradāna* (*yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa*), i.e. that [something/some action (?)] is set to take place (*yod nges*) or to be accomplished (*ʼgrub nges*) for the sake of that [which is marked] (*deʼi ched du*)."[742]

Thus, while the passage clearly and directly identifies the category of *sampradāna* with *deʼi ched du* ('for the sake of that,' ~ *tādarthya*), the text does not add any further information on this point in the context of the detailed discussion of the *kāraka*s, and so it remains unclear how precisely this relation between *sampradāna* and *deʼi ched du* has been established.

---

[737] Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 44; M.S. Joshi 2011.

[738] Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 31 and 43.

[739] Cf. Scharfe 1977, 189. For the controversy sourrounding the authorship of the *sūtrapāṭha*, cf. M.S. Joshi 2011, chapter 3. Some sources name Narendrācārya as the root text's author. Narendrācārya's dates seem to be uncertain, but if he was the author, the dates of the *Sārasvatasūtra*'s could be moved perhaps even to the 10th cent. (cf. M.S. Joshi 2011, 96).

[740] Cf. HSGLT 1, 138ff.

[741] I have consulted two editions of the Sanskrit text, M.S. Joshi 2011 and Nava Kishora Kara 1967. I relied on the latter edition for the numbering of the *sūtra*s. In M.S. Joshi's edition, the following quotation is found under *sūtra* 240.

[742] CT *110* – 125f.

Yet, upon comparing the Tibetan version with the two Sanskrit versions available to me, it has become evident that the entire passage on the summary of *kāraka*s and their case affixes which starts with *smras pa* is in fact not contained in the *Sārasvataprakriyā* and seems to be an addition to CG 44. Also the passage which follows this summary provides a short exposition of four types of *karman* that are listed in the consulted Sanskrit versions of the *Sārasvataprakriyā*, yet without this exposition. After a preliminary comparison with the Candrakīrti's *Subodhikā* commentary (16th century),[743] this text includes the same quotation '*kartā karma ca karaṇaṃ sampradānaṃ tathaiva ca, apādānādhikaraṇe*[744] *ityāhuḥ kārakāṇi ṣaṭ*' under *sūtra* 17.4, but it leaves out the subsequent summary of *kāraka*s found in CG 44.[745] Unfortunately, Candrakīrti also does not provide any reference to the given quotation. However, in his *Subodhikā*, he goes on to discuss the four types of *karman* despite their descriptions being only loosely connected to those found in CG 44. Given these observations, there is the possibility that the translators of CG 44 may have consulted this additional commentary (or another). Whatever was in fact the case, the identical Sanskrit quotation in *Subodhikā* may suggest that also the quoted definition of *sampradāna* in CG 44 was not just a Tibetan addition but goes back to Sanskritic sources, although at this point this is mere speculation.

A third noteworthy commentary of the *Sārasvata* school of Sanskrit grammar is the *Sārasvataprasāda* of Vāsudevabhaṭṭa (16th century).[746] Under *Sārasvatasūtra* 17.4, the *Prasāda* states the following concerning the notion of *sampradāna*, which in the *Sārasvataprakriyā* has already been explained by means of the paraphrase *dānapātra* ('vessel of giving,' *sbyin pa'i snod*, ~ RECIPIENT):

> *dānapātre ityetadvyākhyāṃ kurute sampradānakārake iti. dānaṃ nāma pūjānugrahakāmanayā svasvatvaparityāgena parasvatvāpādanaṃ tasya pātram.*

> "The utterance 'when [there is] a *dānapātra*' (*dānapatre*) is made in the sense of 'when [there is] the *kāraka sampradāna*.' The so-called giving (*dānaṃ nāma*) is the removal of another's ownership through the renunciation of one's own ownership with respect and favor in mind (*pūjānugrahakāmanayā*). The vessel (*pārtra*) of that [is the *dānapātra*]."[747]

---

[743] For general information on this commentary, cf. M.S. Joshi 2011, 176. The Sanskrit text of this commentary is contained in Nava Kishora Kara 1967.
[744] CG 44 reads *apādānādhikaraṇam*
[745] Cf. Nava Kishora Kara 1967, 211.
[746] The Sanskrit text of this source is included in Nava Kishora Kara 1967.
[747] Sanskrit transliterated from Nava Kishora Kara 1967, 215.

The commentary explains that *sampradāna* involves a change of ownership constituted by the renunciation of the giver's ownership, through which the gift then belongs to the recipient without any ownership of another person than the recipient itself. While this is very much in line with what was already discussed above,[748] this text does add the specifications *pūjā* ('worship,' 'honour,' 'respect') and *anugrahaka* ('kind,' 'favoring,' facilitating,' 'gracious'). These terms are neither direct equivalents of the Tibetan notion *de'i ched du* in *Sārasvataprakriyā*'s Tibetan translation (CG 44), nor of the Tibetan fourth case function *dgos ched/ched du bya ba* in general, but nevertheless the leap to a purposive interpretation of the *kāraka* is not far from there. It should be noted at this point that both characteristics (*pūjā* and *anugrahaka*) are well in line with the meaning of *dāna* as not just a neutral giving but more specifically in the sense of a donation (to monks, beggars, etc.) that includes a strong aspect of charity, and in fact *dāna* is the common term for donations also in the Buddhist context. If the category 'giving' (*sampradāna*) is therefore understood more in this sense, it automatically comes closer to a purposive or favoring meaning. This is especially noteworthy also for the Tibetan context, in which donation is an important issue in Buddhist theory and practice. It would thus be only natural to understand donation as the most genuine form of giving.

A final remark on the *Sārasvatavyākaraṇa* concerns the fact that, since its root text and the quoted commentaries of the *Sārasvata* school of grammar have arisen much later than the earlier Tibetan sources NGg and GNT, they cannot have been direct inspirational sources in the early development of the Tibetan fourth case. However, as established and well-known Sanskritic grammars, they attest that some Sanskritic conceptions have allowed room for a more purposive interpretation of *sampradāna*, and it is possible that such understandings have already circulated before the time of the *Sārasvata* grammar. And if the quoted passages from *Smra ba kun* (CG 16 and 17) indeed are of Sanskritic origin, a genuine purposive interpretation of the term *sampradāna* existed in the Sanskritic tradition before *Sārasvata*.

The investigation in this section has hopefully demonstrated that the Sanskritic tradition offered a multifaceted discourse with various conceptions of *sampradāna* and the functioning of the fourth case suffix in general. The different Sanskritic discussions on the semantics of *sampradāna*, be it the focus on the change of ownership, the recipient's consent or the favoring and respecting of the recipient, have not necessarily aimed at a purposive reading. Some sources have even stated their critique of a purposive understanding in terms of *tādarthya*, but none of the defined characteristics are mutually exclusive with such an understanding, the category of

---

[748] Cf. supra 276f.

284

anugrahaka in the *Sārasvataprasāda* even coming close to it. Additionally, the *Smra ba kun* could have been a concrete source of inspiration for a purposive reinterpretation of *sampradāna*, although the history of this text still remains unresolved. Whatever the historical and linguistic reasons involved in the transition from *sampradāna* as the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function to Tibetan *dgos ched*, the presented range of conceptions has hopefully demonstrated that the idea of a purposive meaning was certainly not a novelty, but that it must have been prepared in the Sanskritic tradition, either indirectly through the existence of a recurrent discourse on the relation between *sampradāna* and *tādarthya*, or it was more directly inspired by conceptions as existent in grammars such as the *Smra ba kun* or the *Sārasvata*.

Turning next to Tibetan conceptions of the fourth case themselves, the early Tibetan linguistic sources offer their own perspective on moving away from conventional *sampradāna* and towards a purposive interpretation of the fourth case.

10.1.2 Two Early Tibetan Conceptions of the Fourth Case in *Gnas brgyad 'grel pa* and *Sgra'i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa*

The two early Tibetan sources NGg and GNT provided additional information regarding the concepts at hand but only mention a selection of a few, fairly specific uses:

NGg:

> *gang la dgos ched dam/   don nam gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag 'tshal ba* […]

> "[This fourth case form expresses] a purpose (*dgos ched*) or intent (~ *don*) for someone/-thing or an offering (*mchod sbyin*) or homage to someone/-thing (*phyag 'thsal ba*) [...]."[749]

GNT:

> *de yang bzhi pa gang gis* [sic!][750] *phyir zhes pa ni sbyin pa dang/   phyag 'tshal ba dang/   ched gyis* [sic!][751] *bstan pa nyid yin* […]

> "Furthermore, the fourth [case], 'for the sake of someone/-thing', is the indication of the semantic domains giving (*sbyin pa*), paying homage (*phyag 'tshal ba*) and purpose (*ched*) […]."[752]

---

[749] NGg CT *115* – 432.
[750] I read *gi*.
[751] I read *gyi*.
[752] GNT CT *115* – 454. Note that although the reading of *ched gyis bstan pa* is not impossible, I read *ched gyi sa bstan pa*, since this is the common construction also used during the remaining cases in GNT.

NGg provides four (*dgos ched*, *don*, *mchod sbyin* and *phyag 'tshal ba*) and GNT three notions (*sbyin pa*, *phyag 'tshal ba* and *ched*) to describe the meaning of the fourth case. Both demonstrate a conceptual affinity to the definition of *sbyin pa* in the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* quoted above, NGg even to the extent that it could be a partial, slightly altered and condensed paraphrase.[753] The presented lists will shortly be discussed in the following:

1) NGg's notions *dgos ched* ('sake,' 'purpose') and *don* (*artha*, 'meaning,' 'purpose,' 'intent') are closely connected semantically and thus most likely to be understood as one and the same category, since they are synonymous in terms of their lexical value 'purpose'[754] and probably related to Sanskritic *tādarthya* ('for the sake of that'). *Don* ('meaning, purpose') is etymologically even closer to the Sanskrit term than *dgos ched*, and it represents the default translation of Sanskrit *artha* in Tibetan literature. Moreover, NGg's category of *ched* or *don* also figures in GNT in the form of *ched*.

2) The Sanskrit *sampradāna* has survived in the GNT in the form of the additional category *sbyin pa* ('giving'), and following the quoted passage of NGg it is also mentioned as a fourth case function. Moreover, in the *Sum rtags* tradition up to Si tu, *sbyin pa* frequently figures as an interchangeable label for *dgos ched*/*ched du bya ba*, less because of theoretical reasons and more due to the term's appearance in TKJ 22.4.

3) Interestingly and perhaps also relating to the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*, both treatises list *phyag 'tshal ba* ('to pay homage,' 'to prostrate') as a meaning of the fourth case, which has remained so even up to the time of Si tu, who then explicated his strong critique against this classification in the Tibetan context.[755] This function unambiguously goes back to the Sanskritic grammatical classification of *namas*, for which *phyag 'tshal ba* is the standard translational equivalent in WT. In Sanskrit, *namas* triggers a fourth case suffix:

> *namo devebhyaḥ* 'our obeisance to the gods'[756]

Pāṇini (P 2.3.16), *Cāndra* (C 2.1.78) and *Kātantra* (K 2.4.26) each include *namas* in a separate rule which covers several word forms that trigger a fourth case suffix without being an instance

---

[753] *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*:
> *sbyin pa ni* **gang gi ched dang don dang dgos pa dang 'bras bu lta bu la'am/   gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag 'tshal ba'i sa ste/** *'di ltar las dang byed pa'i 'bras bu ni bya ba ste/   bya ba'i don ni 'dir yang dag par sbyin pa'o/* (CT *109* – 1712; my emphasis)

NGg:
> *gang la dgos ched dam/   don nam gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag 'tshal ba* […] (NGg CT *115* – 432)

[754] Negi (1995, 1222), for example, gives *don du* ('for the sake of') as a synonym of *ched du* ('for the sake of').
[755] Cf. chapter 10.2.2.
[756] Example taken from Sharma 1995, 124.

286

of *sampradāna*. Thus, *namas* neither belongs to the *kāraka*s nor is it prototypical, but it is an additional or exceptional use of the fourth case suffix in Sanskrit. The classification of *namas* as a fourth case suffix has been retained and adopted by the early Tibetan grammarians.

4) Finally, the category of *mchod sbyin* ('offering') in NGg as well as in the *Smra ba kun* must either be an alternative rendition of the category *phyag 'tshal ba* or an unusual reference to the semantic field of giving (*sbyin pa*), however the treatises themselves provide no clear information on this question. If the use of the word *gang* ('someone/-thing') in NGg's quotation is an indication how to distinguish between the listed categories, then the structure of the sentence suggests that *mchod sbyin* forms a group with *phyag 'tshal ba* as much as *dgos ched* and *don*. Also the version in *Smra ba kun* gives the impression that *mchod sbyin* and *phyag 'tshal ba* belong to one category. On the contrary, *mchod sbyin*'s lexical value may also indicate a reference to the RECIPIENT role and thus be connected to the category of (*yang dag par rab tu*) *sbyin pa*/*sampradāna*.

In relation to the four semantic categories which describe the meaning of the fourth case, NGg introduces an unusual theory thus far unattested elsewhere:[757]

> *gang la dgos ched dam/   don nam gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag 'tshal bas kha cig yul de nyid kyi ched du sbyor ba yang yod/   kha cig mchod sbyin gyi yul du sbyor ba yang yod de/   don gyis na byed pa po'i ched yin par sbyar bar bya ste/*

> "Since [the fourth case expresses] a purpose (*dgos ched*) or intent (~ *don*) for someone/-thing or an offering (*mchod sbyin*) or homage to someone/-thing (*phyag 'thsal ba*), there are some applications [of the fourth case in the sense of being] for the sake of that very locus/domain itself (*kha cig yul de nyid du sbyor ba*) as well as some applications [of the fourth case] as the locus/domain of offering (*kha cig mchod sbyin gyi yul du sbyor ba*) that are actually to be applied in the sense of being for the sake of the agent."[758]

The term *sbyor ba* ('application') in this passage requires further scrutiny regarding the object of application, that is to say whether it refers to the application of the fourth case or the application of the action to the entity representing the fourth case. It may also be possible that *sbyor ba* more generally refers to the combination of word forms and thus has the meaning of

---

[757] In the following, the entire passage is quoted in order to provide a more representative picture of the treatise, including the already quoted portion about the fourth case meanings.
[758] NGg CT *115* – 432f.

'grammatical construction.' In the quotation above, the option that it means 'the application of the fourth case' has been tentatively favored.

In the current context, it suffices to note that NGg distinguishes between instances of the fourth case in which the argument in the fourth case itself represents the purpose, and those instances in which the marked argument becomes the locus/domain of the action of offering (~ RECIPIENT), however without being the purpose which is to be the agent. NGg provides two illustrations of this latter type for the sake of clarification:

> *de'i phyir bzhi pa sbyin pa dang phyag 'tshal ba zhes bya ba/ shing gi phyir chu 'dren pa yang shing nyid rgyas pa dang/ smin pa'i phyir sbyor yang/ don gyis chu 'dren pa'i byed pa po'i ched yin par 'gyur ba dang/ mchod rten la phyag 'tshal ba yang/ mchod rten nyid phyag gi yul lam gnas su sbyar yang don gyis phyag 'tshal ba'i ched yin par 'gyur ba* […]

> "Therefore, the fourth [case] called 'giving and homage' (*sbyin pa dang phyag 'tshal ba*) [in] 'to pull/bring water for the sake of the tree' (*shing gi phyir chu 'dren pa*) is an application [in the sense of being] for the sake of the growing and ripening of the tree itself (*shing nyid rgyas pa dang smin pa'i phyir sbyor*).[759] However, actually it is for the sake of the agent of pulling/bringing water. And also [in] 'to pay homage to the stupa' (*mchod rten la phyag 'tshal ba*), although the stupa itself is to be applied as the locus or domain (*mchod rten nyid phyag gi yul lam gnas su sbyar*),[760] it is actually for the sake of the homage […]."[761]

It will be demonstrated below in Si tu's lengthy critique of *phyag 'tshal ba* as a fourth case that he refused to accept NGg's claim of an agent's purpose. Regardless of the philological and theoretical details of the two quotations above, this entire section in the NGg clearly demonstrates that its author considered *ched* as the prevailing semantic parameter throughout the different categories of the fourth case proposed in the text (*dgos ched*, *don*, *mchod sbyin*, *phyag 'tshal ba*). This reading is derived from the explanation in NGg that among these four instances, some are for (*ched*) the marked object and some are for the agent, which is further illustrated by means of two examples, with the first presumably representing an instance of

---

[759] Alternatively: 'an application [of the action] for the sake of growing and ripening of the tree itself' (?)
[760] Alternatively:
(1) 'although [a fourth case] is to be applied to the very stupa, the locus or domain of homage' (?)
(2) 'although [an action] is to be applied to the very stupa, the locus or domain of homage' (?)
[761] NGg CT *115 – 433*.

sbyin pa, and the second an instance of *phyag 'tshal ba*. The author apparently saw – or perhaps construed – a purpose involved in all different uses of the fourth case he has initially outlined.

An important point which should also be considered regards the purposive interpretation of *phyag 'tshal ba*. P 2.3.16, C 2.1.78 and K 2.4.26 all cover the use of the fourth case suffix in connection with *namas* and thus clearly belong to the class of *upapadavibhakti*, i.e. case suffixes triggered by another word form in the sentence but not by any semantic condition of a *kāraka*. The semantic background for this class of case attributions often remains unclear, and many of the *upapadavibhakti*s are therefore regarded as additional or even exceptional uses of the case suffixes. It is thus safe to assume that the connection of the semantic conditions *sampradāna* and *tādarthya* to *namas* as a merely syntactically triggered condition was not suggested by any orthodox view of Sanskritic grammar. Yet, if the *Smra ba kun* goes indeed back to a Sanskritic source, it would provide strong evidence that this was less a Tibetan reinterpretation than an adoption of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge.

Furthermore, NGg's theory of a purpose either for the agent or the object of giving and prostration reveals the objectivist focus also in this work. The grammatical structures in *shing gi phyir chu 'dren pa* do not allow for the derivation of a purpose for the agent of watering the tree, such an interpretation is merely an investigation of the scenario at hand completely disconnected from syntax and reflects merely the author's understanding of the situation and its outcome.

The GNT seems to have pursued a similar approach to that of NGg, although it initially maintains its proposed threefold subcategorization into *sbyin pa*, *ched* and *phyag 'tshal ba* more consistently, providing separate exemplifications for each:[762]

> *sbyin pa*:   *bram ze la zan byin* 'food was given to the brahmin'
>
> *ched* or *rgyu mtshan*: *zhing la chu grongs* [sic!][763] *zhes pa ni zhing gi phyir ram ched du 'dren pa* "'Prag/Bring water on the fields!', that is to say that water is pulled/brought (= irrigated) for the sake of the field."
>
> *shing gi phyir ram ched du chu 'dren pa la sogs pa* "'to pull/bring water for the sake of the tree,' etc."

---

[762] The full list will not be provided and the following is restricted to a selection in order to illustrate their meaning. All examples are quoted from CT *115 – 454*.

[763] I read *drongs*.

phyag 'tshal ba: *sangs rgyas la phyag 'thsal lo* '[S/he] pays homage/prostrates to the Buddha.'

As indicated in this list, GNT alternatively refers to the function of *ched* as *rgyu mtshan* ('reason'), presumably in the sense of a final reason as expressed by the construction *'brel sgra + phyir* ('in order to'). The selected examples demonstrate the three different meanings straightforward. Despite this initially clear separation of the functions, the author brakes with it in the context of his short summary at the end of the section on the fourth case:[764]

> *de ltar na bzhi pa 'di ni ched dam rgyu mtshan gtsor byas pa'i sbyin pa dang/   phyag 'tshal ba kho na la blta bar bya lte/   de yang bslangs te/   shing la chu ni sbyin par gyis zhes pa lta bu'i don yin no/*

> "In such a manner, this fourth case should be regarded exclusively as a giving or as an homage (*phyag 'tshal ba*), [both in] which [the idea of] purpose or reason prevails (*ched dam rgyu mtshan gtsor byas pa'i sbyin pa*). [It] has the meaning such as [in] 'give water to the tree so that it can grow further!' (*de yang bslangs te shing la chu ni sbyin par gyis* ?)"[765]

GNT directly explicates that *ched* ('purpose') or *rgyu mtshan* ('reason') is the dominant or prevailing (*gtsor byas pa*) feature at least for the category of *sbyin pa*. There arises the philological question as to whether the genitive attribute *ched dam rgyu mtshan gtsor byas pa'i* ('[in] which [the idea of] purpose or reason prevails') specifies only *sbyin pa* or also *phyag 'tshal ba*. Against the backdrop of NGg as well as *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*, the more likely option seems that a purpose is also included in *phyag 'thsal ba*. Against the backdrop of the presented Sanskritic grammatical sources, *phyag 'tshal ba* may have also been regarded as an exceptional use to be separated from the prototypical function *ched*. In any case, it becomes evident from this final quotation that the author was not fully coherent in his initial distinction between the three subclasses s*byin pa*, *ched* and *phyag 'tshal ba* and finally regarded *ched* as the most dominant, perhaps even overarching category.

10.1.3 Note on the Term *yul* in the Context of the Fourth Case

Before this historical survey is concluded and Si tu's views are addressed, a final issue must be noted regarding the distinction of second and fourth case, namely the use of the grammatical

---

[764] Note that these final summaries form a pattern at the end of every case's presentation and are not an exception for the fourth case.
[765] CT *115 – 455*.

term *yul* ('locus,' 'domain,' 'focus'). This term already forms an integral part of the conceptual foundation of the second case, and in both the NGg and GNT it reappears in the context of the fourth case. The term was already encountered in NGg's distinction into purposes of the agent (*byed pa po*) and the recipient (*mchod sbyin gyi yul*),[766] and the following passage is an illustrative example of the term's use under the fourth case in the GNT:

> *bzhi pa 'di la rgya gar gyi sgra sbyar na/   gcig dang/   gnyis dang mang po'i tshig rnams te/   dang po ni manydzu badzra* [sic!][767] *ya zhes pa lta bu ming gi yi ge tha ma bsrings la ya yis mtshan pas 'jam pa'i rdo rje la/   zhes bya ba la phyag 'tshal ba'i yul du bzhag par grub ste/   de yang bye brag pa gcig tsam la phyag 'tshal ba'o/*

> "If [we] apply Sanskrit morphology to this fourth [case], then there are the singular, dual and plural forms: as for the first, for example 'Mañjuvajrāya', through the prolongation of the final sound (*yi ge tha ma*) and the addition of *ya*, 'for Mañjuvajra' is established as the locus/domain of homage (*phyag 'tshal ba'i yul*). This is the homage for only a single entity (*bye brag pa*). [...]"[768]

The author chose a classic Buddhist example for his illustration of the Sanskrit fourth case suffix's morphology, namely the homage to a deity. According to this passage, the fourth case in this example indicates the locus/domain of homage (*phyag 'tshal ba'i yul*). I have not been able to trace this notion back to any Sanskritic source, however Subba Rao makes the general mention that *viṣayatvam* ('objecthood') occurs as a fourth case function in the Sanskritic tradition.[769] Neither the GNT nor the NGg indicate any relation to the notion of *yul*/*gzhi* in their respective expositions of the second case. Without more knowledge about the conceptual roots of *yul* in the context of the fourth case, the use of *yul* in these quotations appears loose and unsystematic, nothing but a general characterization which lacks any theoretical foundation such as that encountered in the context of the Tibetan second case in terms of *yul du byas pa* and *gzhir byas pa*.

10.1.4 Résumé of the Tibetan Fourth Case pre-Si tu

The Tibetan fourth case is commonly known as *dgos ched* or *ched du bya ba* and represents a purpose of the action. It is another case next to the second case which is marked by the morphological category *la don*. Although the category of purpose has a multifaceted

---

[766] Cf. supra 287.
[767] I read *badzrā*.
[768] CT *115* – 455.
[769] Cf. Subba Rao 1969, 43.

significance in WT as well as in modern linguistics, the classification of grammatical constructions as a fourth case in WT was more based on the adoption of selected instances from Sanskritic role models that were deemed purposive. As a result, many of the examples classified as fourth cases – particularly the major ones – are not unproblematic and were more likely classified as purposive instances due to the application of unrepresentative semantic construals of the underlying scenarios to the grammatical constructions. This is a clear indication for the fact that Tibetan grammarians in their analyses did not primarily focus on Tibetan morphosyntax but rather on the different instances, situations or scenarios as such in their analysis.

The Tibetan fourth case function *ched du bya ba* has clear and distinct purposive meaning and is not directly adopted from the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function, i.e. *sampradāna* (*yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa*). Etymologically, it is more closely connected to the secondary trigger of the fourth case suffix named *tādarthya* in *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*. The above survey has discussed the fourth case suffix's purposive uses in P 2.1.36 and 2.3.14-15, the supplementation of the *tādarthya* function in *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*, the existence of a Sanskritic discourse on the relation of *sampradāna* and *tādarthya*, the traces of a more purposive reading of *sampradāna* in the *Sārasvatavyākaraṇa* as well as *Smra ba kun*'s conception of an overarching purposive fourth case. Although the grammars of *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* or *Kātantra* did not suggest any direct relation between the two categories, the discussion of the various theories surrounding *sampradāna* and *tādarthya* revealed that the Tibetan purposive reinterpretation of the category *sampradāna* was probably not an exclusively Tibetan development but has already been prepared in the Sanskritic grammar tradition. Additionally, NGg and GNT make clear that early Tibetan grammarians have focused on a small selection of meanings and uses of the Sanskrit fourth case suffix and combined them with the idea of a purpose prevailing throughout them. That the purposive aspect of the fourth case has surfaced already early in Tibetan grammar is further corroborated by the fact that the authors of MVY and the *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa* have decided to focus on *phyir* as the fourth case form.[770]

Turning to the major conceptual framework of the fourth case adopted by Tibetan grammarians, the examples in GNT give a fairly representative account:

     (1) *bram ze la zan byin* 'food was given to the brahmin'

     (2) *zhing/shing la chu drongs* 'Pull/Bring water on the fields/to the tree!'

---

[770] Cf. supra 265.

(3) *sangs rgyas la phyag 'thsal lo* '[S/he] pays homage/prostrates to the Buddha.'

These three verb frames are the most dominant and thus the prototypical instantiations of the fourth case in the Tibetan tradition. All three can be traced back to the fourth case suffix in the Sanskritic tradition: (1) as a generic instance of *sampradāna*, (2) as an example for *sampradāna* in sources like the NV,[771] and (3) as an instance of P 2.3.16, K 2.4.26 and C 2.1.78. An overarching purposive interpretation can only be maintained on an objectivist basis at least with regard to Tibetan syntax, treating these sentences as direct representations of phenomenal situations as understood by the author through Sanskritic role models. None of these grammatical constructions encode any purposive meaning, with the only exception of those versions that substitute *ched* or *phyir* for *la*. This list of major meanings and uses adopted from Sanskrit also clarifies why many grammars chose to focus on either *phyir*, *ched* or *la* as fourth case marker; while the former two are a direct indication of a purposive meaning as the overarching interpretation of the case's meaning in Tibetan sources, *la* is the generic marker in the Tibetan grammatical constructions of the adopted uses of the Sanskrit fourth case suffix.

10.2 The Fourth Case in the *Great Commentary*

During Si tu's times, *dgos ches* and *ched du bya ba* were the established designations of the fourth case, although *sbyin pa* survived at least in the *Sum rtags* commentarial literature on TKJ 22.4 and thus still figured as a secondary label. Without considering the continuities and discontinuities of the two nomenclatures, both versions were fixed technical terms that could be used interchangeably.[772] Si tu paraphrases TKJ 22.4 in the following way:

> […] *dang/   bzhi pa sbyin pa'i yul gyis mtshon nas ched du bya ba dang* […]

> "[…] and the fourth [case], being represented by the help of the domain/locus of giving (*sbyin pa'i yul*) [in this verse of the root text, is] the purpose (*ched du bya ba*) […]."[773]

---

[771] Cf. ft. 678.

[772] Note that TKJ refers to the fourth case function twice, first in 22.4 as *sbyin* and secondly in 25.1 as *ched byed* ('a purposive doing,' i.e. an action with a purposive meaning involved) in the context of semantic or syntactic conditions that trigger the syntactic links. TKJ itself therefore has already suggested the interchangeable use of *sbyin pa* and *dgos ched* in the *Sum rtags* literature.

[773] GC 590.5. Note that TKJ 22.3-23.1 is a mere enumeration of the eight case functions in their common order:
> *chos dngos las dang byed pa dang/*
> *sbyin dang 'byung khungs 'brel ba dang/*
> *gnas dang bod pa'i sgra yang drang/*
Further, note that Rnam gling and Pra ti have applied a very similar strategy to comment on the term *sbyin pa* in TKJ 22.4 and simply equated (*yang dag par rab tu*) *sbyin pa* with (*dgos*) *ched* (cf. Rnam gling 2013, 152; Prat i 2013, 245).

The *locus classicus* for the treatment of the fourth case is the section on *la sgra* in SCP 9.3-11.4. Si tu provides a first, concise definition in his gloss of the section of the root text:

> […] *dbul phongs la sbyin pa gtong lta bu ched du bya ba'i don can yin na/   dgos ched kyi sgra* […]

> "[…] if [these seven *la don* morphemes] have the meaning of the purpose (*ched du bya ba*), like 'to give alms to the poor' (*dbul phongs la sbyin pa gtong*), [they] are the purposive morpheme (*dgos ched kyi sgra*) [...]."[774]

In his explanation of the semantic application (*don gyi sbyor tshul*) of the *la don* link, he specifies how to interpret the purposive meaning of the fourth case and provides a variety of illustrations:

> *de bzhin du bya ba gang zhig gis bya ba'i yul de'am/   de dang 'brel ba'i las la phan 'dogs par 'gyur ba'i don gyis ched du bya ba'i yul la 'jug pa rnam dbye bzhi pa ni/ chos phyogs su dka' ba spyad/   dman par brtse/   bdud rtsi ru bsgrub/   shing gcod du sta re dgos/   grub tu re/   gar lta ba la sgron me thogs/   shing la chu 'dren/ tshogs na nor 'gyed/   la sogs pa rgya cher sbyar bar bya ste/   de'i ched du/   de'i ched la/   de'i don du/   de'i don la/   de'i phyir du lta bu dgos ched gsal byed kyi sgra dang ldan pa rnams ni ched kyi don yin pa smos ma dgos so/*

> "Likewise, a fourth case joins to the locus of purpose (*ched du bya ba'i yul la 'jug pa*), because of the meaning that, due to some action, a benefit (*phan 'dogs pa*) follows for the locus of that action or [for] some action related to that [locus]. [It] is to be abundantly applied, as in (1) 'hardships have been undertaken for the Dharma' (*chos phyogs su dka' ba spyad*), (2) 'to feel affection for the inferior' (*dman par brtse*), (3) 'to be accomplished for the nectar' (*bdud rtsi ru bsgrub* ?), (4) 'an axe is needed for cutting the wood' (*shing gcod du sta re dgos*), (5) 'to hope for the realization [of something or an event]' (*grub tu re* ?), (6) 'to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere' (*gar lta ba la sgron me thogs*), (7) 'to pull/bring water onto the fields' (= irrigate the fields) (*shing la chu 'dren*), (8) 'to provide/distribute riches in/among the community' (*tshogs na nor 'gyed*). There is no need to stress that *de'i ched du* ('for the sake of that'), *de'i ched la* ('id.'), *de'i don du* ('id.'), *de'i don la* ('id.') and *de'i phyir du* ('id.'), etc., which

---

[774] GC 472.2.

are endowed with morphemes that clarify/emphasize [the meaning of] purpose (*dgos ched gsal byed kyi sgra*), have purposive meaning."[775]

Si tu understands *ched du bya ba* in terms of a benefit (*phan 'dogs pa*) for the marked argument. The beneficiary may either be the locus of the action (*bya ba'i yul*, e.g. example 7) or an action which is connected to the locus (e.g. example 4). Si tu's specification of *phan 'dogs* ('benefit') fits well to the purposive category in general and the idea of a need to be served (~ *dgos pa*) in particular. A possible inspiration for Si tu's version may have been the fact that *phan pa* was used as a translation for Sanskrit *artha* in certain purposive contexts,[776] or perhaps also that in Kātyāyana's fourth *Vārttika* on P 2.3.13, Kātyāyana – and with him Patañjali in *Bhāṣya* 17 on the same rule – prescribe the fourth case ending in connection with the word *hita* (*phan pa*, 'beneficial,' 'advantegous'), an addition which is missing in *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*. Patañjali gives the example *hitam āmayāvine* ('beneficial for somebody suffering from indigestion')[777] and the *Kāśikāvṛtti* also quotes *gobhyo hitam* ('what is beneficial for cows').[778] The addition of this *Vārttika* is noteworthy insofar as it demonstrates that *hita* was regarded as a separate, more exceptional use of the fourth case that was part of neither *sampradāna* nor *tādarthya*. If indeed Si tu was inspired by it, then he must have generalized and applied it to the Tibetan purposive understanding of the fourth case. The idea of *phan 'dogs pa* is further elaborated in his summary of the fourth case under TKJ 25.4-28.3:

> *rnam dbye bzhi pa ched du bya ba'i don la 'jug pa ni/   lo tog la chu 'dren/   nor 'tshong du 'gro/   slong mo pa la zan sbyin/   lta bu/   chu 'dren pa dang/   'gro ba dang/   zan sbyin pa rnams bya ba yin zhing/   de gang gi don nam ched du bya ba'i yul/   lo tog   nor 'tshong/   slongs mo pa rnams la bzhi pa dgos ched kyi rnam dbye 'jug pa yin no/   des na bya ba gang zhig bya ba'i don gyi yul de la phan gdags pa'i ched du 'jug pa'i la don drug po rnams ni rnam dbye bzhi pa zhes bya ba yin la/   dper na/   sha'i ched du phyugs gsod par byed/   lta bu la mthson na/   gsod pa bya ba/   phyugs ni las/   sha ni bya ba'i don gyi yul yin pas gsod pa'i bya bas sha thob pa la phan 'dogs par byed pa dang/   slong mo par zan sbyin zer ba la/   sbyin pa ni bya ba/   zan ni las/   slong mo pa bya ba'i don gyi yul yin pa'i phyir sbyin pas slong mo par phan 'dogs pa sogs go dgos* […]

---

[775] GC 473.6.
[776] Cf. Negi 2002, 3482f.
[777] Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 115.
[778] Joshi and Roodbergen 1998, 28.

[…] yang gsod pa'i phyir du mtshon bsnun/ zhes pa lta bur mtshon bsnun pas gsad bya la phan gdags zer ba'i don ma yin gyi/ mtshon bsnun pa'i bya bas bya ba'i don gyi yul gsod pa la phan 'dogs par byed pa yin no/

"As regards [how] the fourth case takes on the meaning of purpose (*ched du bya ba*), it is like (9) 'to pull/bring water to/for the crops' (*lo tog la chu 'dren*), (10) 'to go selling jewels/goods' (*nor 'tshong du 'gro*), (11) 'to give food to the beggar' (*slong mo pa la zan sbyin*), where pulling/bringing water (*chu 'dren pa*), going (*'gro ba*) and giving food (*zan sbyin pa*) are actions and the loci (*yul*) – for the purpose (*don*) of which or for the sake (*ched*) of which these [actions] are to be done – are the crops (*lo tog*), the selling of jewels/goods (*nor 'tshong*) [and] the beggar, to which the fourth case of purpose (*dgos ched*) joins. Therefore, the six *la don* [morphemes],[779] which join for the sake of [expressing] that some action is to benefit (*phan gdags pa*) that locus, which is the reason/purpose (*don*) of the action, are called 'fourth case.' For example, if it is illustrated on the basis of (12) 'to kill cattle for meat' (*sha'i ched du phyugs gsod par byed*), to kill (*gsod pa*) is the action, cattle (*phyugs*) is the *karman* [and] the meat is the locus which is the purpose of the action. Thus, the action of killing benefits the attainment of meat. In 'to give food to the beggar' (*slong mo pa la zan sbyin*), it has to be understood that the giving benefits the beggar, since to give (*sbyin pa*) is the action, food (*zan*) is the *karman* [and] the beggar (*slong mo pa*) is the locus which is the purpose of the action. […]

[…] Furthermore, in 'to stab in order to kill' (*gsod pa'i phyir du mtshon bsnun*), the meaning does not state that the stabbing (*mtshon bsnun pa*) is to benefit that which is to be killed, but [it says] that the action of stabbing benefits the locus which is the purpose of the action, [in this case] the killing."[780]

Si tu's definition amounts to the idea that the argument which instantiates the fourth case function represents the meaning (*don*) of the main action, that is to say the purpose or reason for which the action is intended. In this sense, Si tu claims that there must be a benefit for the argument in the fourth case form. It will be demonstrated below[781] that this contrasts with NGg and also signifies that Si tu's conception of the fourth case does not allow for any other purposes

---

[779] Note that it remains unclear why Si tu refers to six and not seven forms of *la don* in this passage. Perhaps he referred to the six morphemes as they are explicitly mentioned in SCP according to his interpretation and thus omitted *tu* which goes unmentioned?
[780] GC 600.1 and GC 601.2.
[781] Cf. infra 312f.

or beneficiaries than the marked arguments themselves. However, Si tu adds the provision that the main action is not necessarily required to benefit the marked argument directly, but optionally an implicit or explicit action connected to it. This allows him to account for instances such as *sha'i ched du phyugs gsod par byed* or *nor 'tshong du 'gro* that exhibit clear purposive meaning, but in which there is no obvious benefit or purpose for the marked argument itself. While NGg's theory achieves to explain the purposive marking of such instances through the recourse to the agent's purpose, Si tu's strategy represents the semantic relations underlying the sentence more accurately. It may only be indirectly inferred through further pondering the scenario at hand that it is ultimately the agent who uses and thus benefits from the meat, although depending on the context this even might not be necessarily the case. In fact, the morphosyntax of the sentence does not connect to such an event construal, but it rather alludes to the meat itself as the purpose or meaning of the main action. Yet, as Si tu has clearly indicated, the meat is the purpose not in the sense of being the beneficiary but in the sense of that which is to be attained, and thus it is this implicit secondary action of attainment which is benefitted according to Si tu's theory.

In Tibetan grammar, the theorization of implicit or explicit secondary actions intended by the main action of a sentence in the conception of the fourth case seems to be uncommon. Si tu's theory is, however, well-attested in Sanskrit grammar, namely in the already quoted P 2.3.14 and 15.[782] A closer comparison of Si tu's examples with the *Pāṇinian* model nonetheless reveals at least one noticeable morphosyntactic difference:

(a) *edhebhyo vrajati* 'he is going in order to [bring] firewood' (P 2.3.14)

(b) *pākāya vrajati* 'he is going to do the cooking' (P 2.3.15)

(c) *shing gcod du sta re dgos* 'an axe is needed for cutting the wood'
(Si tu's example 4)

Despite the focus on action in the *Pāṇinian* rules, both Sanskrit fourth case suffixes are affixed to noun phrases. In contrast, Si tu directly and correctly applies the syntactic link *la don* after the verb. The difference between verbs and nouns has therefore once again been suspended in GC's case model, and Si tu focuses primarily on the semantic aspects of the Sanskritic rules according to which also secondary actions – either explicit or implicit – may represent the intended purpose of the main action. Si tu's decision is understandable from the point of view

---

[782] Cf. supra 275.

that the Tibetan example may be rephrased unproblematically and without a change in meaning through the nominalization of *gcod*:

(a) *shing gcod du sta re dgos*

(b) *shing gcod par sta re dgos*

Strictly speaking, there is a morphosyntactic difference between the two versions of this example, since *gcod* is nominalized in (b) but a proper verb in (a), and only a detailed scrutiny of their respective distributional behaviors across different syntactic-semantic environments in WT could evaluate their precise continuities and discontinuities. However, generally speaking, the two constructions may certainly be used interchangeably. Si tu's inclusion of this type of verbal use in the fourth case therefore has a linguistic basis at least on such a general level, although it cannot be further addressed here whether it also remains fully accurate from a linguistic perspective.[783]

In his summary of the fourth case under TKJ 25.4-28.3, directly following the final quotation, Si tu deviates from the former Tibetan grammarians and introduces a morphological adaptation of the case:

> *skabs 'dir 'ga' zhig gis don dang ched dang phyir zhes pa'i sgra rnams rnam dbye bzhi par byas pa mi 'thad de/   de rnams rnam dbye 'jug yul gyi ming tsam yin pa'i phyir te de dag la rnam dbye zhugs pas/   don du/   don gyi/   don gyis/   lta bur 'gyur ba'i phyir/   dper na/   legs sbyar la de'i ched du zhes par/   ta da rthā ya/   zhes 'byung ba'i artha'i sgra de rnam dbye ma yin pa bzhin no/*

> "In this context, the statement of some that the terms '*don*,' '*ched*' and '*phyir*' are fourth cases is incorrect, because these are only free lexical word forms (*mings*) that are the entity to which the case joins (*rnam dbye 'jug yul*), since the joining of the case (*rnam dbye zhugs pa*) results, for example, in *don du*, *don gyi* [or] *don gyis*. [It is], for example, like in Sanskrit, [where] the term *artha* in *tadarthāya*, [meaning] 'for the sake of that,' is not a case."[784]

The term *rnam dbye* in this quotation seems to refer more specifically to the meaning 'case marker,' unlike in many of the passages above in which the term refers more to case meanings

---

[783] Such examples may point towards that the distinction between nominalized and verbal forms is much less rigid in WT. The same phenomenon can be observed with the verbal use of *byed sgra* to express a causal relation between two clauses, where *byed sgra* may be applied more or less interchangeably after proper and nominalized verb forms.

[784] GC 601.3.

or functions. If it would not refer to 'case marker,' Si tu's statement would deny the purposive meaning of *phyir*, *ched* and *don*.

Si tu restricts the fourth case markers to the *la don* morphemes and excludes *don*, *ched* and *phyir*. His argument implies that, unlike case markers, these latter word forms are not syntactic links (*tshig phrad*) that join to lexical word forms (*ming*) to form a syntactically complete and functioning word form (*tshig*) in his derivational model. Rather, they are lexical word forms to be affixed with syntactic links. Thus, this is how his statement in SCP 9.3-11.4 should be understood that constructions such as *de'i ched du* and others are endowed with terms that clarify *dgos ched* (*dgos ched gsal byed kyi sgra dang ldan pa rnams*).[785] The fourth case marker in *phyir du*, *don du* and *ched du* is only the morpheme *du*, since *phyir* and the others are lexical items that clarify or highlight the purposive meaning, but which also require case marking as a functioning word form in the sentence. The example of *don* and the comparison with Sanskrit *tadartha* has strong explanatory power in this context, first of all because *don* and *artha* indeed are lexical items that may take on different grammatical markers to change their participation in the sentence, as Si tu has demonstrated through contrasting *don du*, *don gyi* and *don gyis*. However, whether the status as lexical stem forms for *ched* and *phyir* would withstand closer linguistic analysis is a more difficult question.

Although it will have no further impact on his conception of the fourth case, it is important to note that Si tu's exclusion of the auxiliary word forms *phyir du* and others from the fourth case once again reflects his inconsistent use of the category 'case' (*rnam dbye*). While the Tibetan case model – including Si tu's version – is strongly based on the distinction of seven or eight basic case functions[786] rather than morphology, the morphological-derivational constitution of the auxiliary forms is the reason for Si tu's exclusion of them from the fourth case. From a functional perspective, they fully qualify as fourth cases since they encode the information of purpose or beneficiary. Thus, Si tu's understanding of *rnam dbye* is not restricted to 'case function,' i.e. the meaning of cases and the distinction of these meanings, but it is mixed with morphological-derivational considerations as well.[787]

In total, Si tu's basic definitions of *dgos ched* under SCP 9.3-11.4 and TKJ 25.4-28.3 provide a simple and distinct parameter – namely the benefit (*phan 'dogs*) of the main action for the marked argument or an action connected to it – for establishing the fourth case and

---

[785] Cf. supra 294f.
[786] On the issue of seven or eight cases, cf. chapter 14.
[787] On this issue, cf. also infra 420f. and Si tu's conception of the eighth case, chapter 14.2. Moreover, it should be remembered that he did not include the causal use (*rgyu mtshan*) of *na* in the causal subcategory of the third case (cf. supra 258), presumably because the third case is restricted to the morphological category *byed sgra*.

distinguishing it from the remaining ones, especially the second and seventh that are marked identically. Thus far, the only deviation from the former tradition is his exclusion of the auxiliary or periphrastic constructions *don du*, *ched du* and *phyir* (*du*) from the fourth case markers, since in Si tu's view they represent a derivation in the form of *ming + rnam dbye*.

Unlike Si tu's conception of the second case, which raised a whole complex of questions regarding the understanding his definitions, the fourth case has much fewer philological issues in this regard. What remains to be achieved is a closer investigation of Si tu's selection of examples, in order to gain a better understanding of the way in which he argues for the homogeneity of the fourth case in terms of a purpose to be benefitted by the action across the seven *la don* morphemes. Thus, what may be said about Si tu's sensitivity regarding the Tibetan-specific morphosyntax in his selection of sample phrases?[788]

10.2.1 Analysis of Si tu's Examples

Although Si tu defined the fourth case homogeneously in terms of a beneficiary or benefitted action, his examples exhibit various grammatical constructions and cover a heterogeneous array of semantic scenarios. As part of his definition of the fourth case in SCP 9.3-11.4,[789] Si tu provided the following eight examples:

(1) *chos phyogs su dka' ba spyad* 'hardships have been undertaken for the Dharma'

(2) *dman par brtse* 'to feel affection for the inferior'

(3) *bdud rtsi ru bsgrub* 'to be accomplished for/as the nectar' (?)

(4) *shing gcod du sta re dgos* 'an axe is needed for cutting the wood'

(5) *grub tu re* 'to hope for the realization [of something or an event]' (?)

(6) *gar lta ba la sgron me thogs* 'to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere'

(7) *shing la chu 'dren* 'to pull water onto the fields' (= irrigate the fields)

(8) *tshogs na nor 'gyed* 'to provide/distribute the riches in/among the community'

Si tu dedicates one example to each of the seven morphemes. Only the case's prototypical marker *la* figures twice, once with a nominalized verb in phrase (6) and once with a proper

---

noun in (7). Si tu employed eight different verb frames, five *tha dad pa* verbs that require agentive marking (1, 3, 6, 7, 8) and three *tha mi dad pa* verbs (2, 4, 5). The distribution of the arguments marked by the syntactic link *la don* is as follows:

(7):	noun + *la*
(6):	nominalized verb + *la*
(1):	noun + *du*
(4), (5):	verb + *du*
(2), (3):	noun + *-r/ru*
(8):	noun + *na*

Supplementing the missing participants of the verb frame's default grammatical construction in square brackets, we arrive at the following morphosyntactic patterns for the eight selected phrases by Si tu:

(7):	[*byed sgra*] + *la* (noun) + unmarked
(6):	[*byed sgra*] + *la* (nominalized phrase) + unmarked
(2):	[unmarked] + *-r* (= *la*) (noun)
(1):	[*byed sgra*] + *du* (noun) + unmarked
(3):	[*byed sgra*] + *ru* (= *du*) (noun) + unmarked
(4):	[*la*] + *du* (verb) + unmarked
(5):	[unmarked] + *du* (verb)/*la* (noun) (?)
(8):	[*byed sgra*] + *na* (noun) [substituted for *la*] + unmarked

If we subsume morpheme *-ru* in (3) under *du* in (1), an unproblematic classification, then the eight examples exhibit a total of seven different morphosyntactic patterns. The main distinguishers of the above classification are first the three morphemes *la*, *na* and *du*, second the marked argument (noun, verb, nominalized verb) and finally any missing arguments of the verbs' default constructions (*byed sgra*, *la* or unmarked). Despite this variety in these examples, Si tu claims a beneficiary meaning for all arguments marked by one of the *la don* morphemes. The following questions therefore arise: does the precise information of the *la don* morphemes vary throughout these different syntactic and semantic environments; and to which extent does the morphosyntactic variety impact on the information expressed by *la don*?

To start with phrase (1), the action of performing or undertaking hardships (*dka' ba spyad*) according to Si tu is intended for the goal of the Dharma. It may only be speculated whether he saw the indicated benefit in the preservation of the Dharma, the accomplishment of the Dharma

301

by the agent or another outcome of practicing hardships that is related to the Dharma. The theme of Buddhist practice is likely inspired by Rnam gling's *sangs rgyas bsgrub tu chos byed* ('to practice Dharma in order to accomplish enlightenment'),[790] or one of the several other examples in the grammars of Rnam gling and Pra ti that are related to the attainment of spiritual realization through practice.[791] It may further be interpreted as a direct correspondent to P 2.3.14, according to which a fourth case suffix is used to indicate that the main action aims at a secondary action not explicitly mentioned but implicitly connected to the marked noun phrase, since a direct purpose or benefit for the Dharma itself is not perceived.[792]

I have not been able to precisely discern whether phrase (1) *chos phyogs su dka' ba spyad* could more literally mean 'to undertake hardships into the direction of the Dharma,' which does not necessarily result in a purposive encoding by *su*, but rather a specification what kind of hardships have been undertaken. Morpheme *su* would then qualify for either the allative function or perhaps also the transformative function in Tournadre's recent taxonomy.[793] For the time being, a purposive structure will be favored as the more intuitive reading and in analogy to *rong bas lto gos su zhing btab* ('the farmer ploughs the field for his subsistence') which Tournadre provides as an example of the purposive function of *du*.[794] If this reading is correct, Si tu's classification is able to withstand modern linguistic scrutiny.

Sample phrase (2), with the meaning of feeling affectionate or being compassionate towards an inferior being, must be interpreted against the backdrop of the Buddhist doctrine and its central ideal of loving kindness towards all sentient beings, especially those of the lower realms of existence. The benefit for the inferior beings thus is the result of our compassion or affection towards them. The example employs a verb of affection that prototypically triggers an unmarked experiencer and an object marked by *la*. Since this is a rather distinctive and exclusive use of the morpheme *la*, it is clear that *-r* in (2) must be classified as an allomorph of the former rather than of *du*. It has already been elaborated that verbs of affection form a distinctive group with regard to their syntactic pattern which Si tu does not take into account. Thus, altogether the beneficiary or purposive meaning in sample phrase (2) only results from Si tu's interpretation of the scenario of loving kindness against the backdrop of the category of purpose, but it does not result from distributional considerations. The beneficiary meaning of the phrase may be conceived through the argument that loving kindness, compassion and the

---

[790] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70.
[791] For Pra ti's list of examples, cf. supra 269; Also cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70.
[792] Cf. supra 275.
[793] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f.
[794] Cf. ibid., 108.

302

like result in a benefit for an inferior being, yet the functioning of *-r* in this clause is more homogeneously explained in accordance with the other verbs of affection as INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT. However, Si tu was neither the first to classify verbs of affection as a fourth case, nor the first to classify the verb frame *brtse ba* as a semantic field of the fourth case. We have seen that Zha lu provided *zas la sred* ('to crave for food'), likely based on the Sanskritic fourth case trigger *ruc*, as well as *bdag la thugs brtse bar mdzod* (lit. 'Act compassionately to/towards me!' ~ 'Show compassion for me!').[795] Rnam gling provided *ltas mo'i don du brtses* ('to show loving kindness for the sake of the play' ?), although the phrase's precise meaning remains unclear to me. In view of the former tradition, Si tu's classification of (2) clearly goes against the syntactic case marking patterns of WT, but it is clearly in line with the tradition.

Phrase (3) poses the hermeneutical problem that its minimalistic form lacks clarity regarding the intended meaning. From my understanding, the nectar (*bdud rtsi*) must be the result of the action of accomplishment (*sgrub pa*). Yet, in a default construction, the verb *sgrub pa* triggers an agent marked by *byed sgra* and an unmarked argument as the accomplished one. Thus, *bdud rtsi* marked by *du* appears to be only the third argument, therefore it qualifies first of all as an instance of the transformative function or *de nyid*. On the other hand, *bdud rtsi* as the result of the accomplishment not only qualifies as the transformed object, but also as the purpose of the action, which would justify Si tu's classification as a fourth case. Since this type of phrase has not been encountered in the Tibetan literature investigated for this research, it is impossible to be more specific about the use of *du* in phrase (3). However, the interface between the transformative and purposive function of *du* remains important for the other examples as well.

Phrase (4) may be regarded as a prototypical use of the traditional Tibetan fourth case due to the verb *dgos pa* ('to need,' 'purpose'), although this phrase lacks mention of the one who needs, usually marked by *la*. This is the first example in this list in which *la don* marks a proper verb. The morpheme *du* clearly expresses that the axe is intended for the action of cutting a tree and thus a purposive meaning, however the question remains whether the difference of marked noun vs. marked verb is significant regarding the intrasentential information expressed by the marker and thus needs to be accounted for. Tournadre distinguishes between a purposive case function of *du* and a (non-case) connective function in terms of a final clause marker, the latter which covers also verbal usages. If we compare Tournadre's examples for the two respective functions, namely *rong bas lto gos su zhing btab* ('the farmer ploughs the field for his

---

[795] Cf. supra 269f..

subsistence') and *rin po che len du song* ('[X] went to fetch precious [stones]'), the purposive value is clearly perceived in both.[796] From this perspective, Si tu did not take into account the distinction between an intra-clausal and interclausal purposive use of *du*, but his taxonomy remains significant at least insofar as the intrasentential value of *du* in (4) covers the information of a purpose or goal.

In phrase (5), *grub tu re* ('to hope for the realization [of something or an event]' ?), *la don* once again marks a verb. Although the lexical value of the verb *re ba* ('to hope') would fit well into the semantic field of affections, especially in verbal constructions it triggers the morpheme *du*. Si tu's underlying rationale for the classification of this example as a fourth case could have been multifaceted. Generally speaking, that the lexical value of hope is affiliated to the idea of a purpose is easily understood from the fact that hope in general has a strong intentional aspect of aiming at someone/thing, which may even be witnessed in English grammar in the expression 'to hope for.' According to Si tu's definition of the fourth case, there must be a benefit for the marked object itself or an action connected to it. From this perspective, Si tu has perhaps focused on the option that the action of hoping benefits, for example, the realization or establishment (*grub pa*) of Dharma or any other entity, or perhaps he has followed his intuitive understanding of the phrase as a native speaker. Although the morpheme *du* and its allomorphs are associated with a purposive function also in recent academic approaches to Tibetan case grammar, this particular instance (5) allows for an alternative classification as well. Compare the following two translations of the example:

(a) *grub tu re* 'to hope *for* the realization [of something or an event]'

(b) *grub tu re* 'to hope *that* [something or an event] is realized'

The second translation attempts to emphasize the value of being the object of hope, in the sense of the content of hope, rather than the intended object. It remains neutral with regard to the question of any involved intention, purpose, benefit or need. The second rendition of the phrase therefore interprets the marker *tu* more in sense of *de nyid* or Tournadre's transformative function. In the examples of Zha lu et al., there are equivalent constructions with the verb *gsol ba* ('to ask for, request, pray for'), which belongs to a similar semantic field like *re ba* ('to hope for'). Yet, the respective authors list these examples under the second case:

---

[796] Transl. by Tournadre 2010, 109.

304

Zha lu: *dbugs dbyung du gsol* 'to pray/ask/request for relief'

            bshad du gsol 'to ask/request to explain'[797]

Rnam gling: *dbang bskur du gsol* 'to ask/request for an initiation'[798]

Similar to the object of hope, that which is asked for is intended as well as favored by the agent of asking. Obviously, neither author regarded such instances as exhibiting primarily a beneficiary or purposive meaning. Si tu did not employ the verb *gsol ba* in his list of his examples for the second case, the fourth case or for the category of *de nyid*. However, a comparison of Si tu's, Zha lu's and Rnam gling's examples together with their English translations indicates that their classification is more intricate. However, this is less an issue of the traditional taxonomy, since the traditional model does offer categories which are representative for the quoted instances, and more a question of the precise methodology for discerning which of the categories is the most accurate one in this context.

Whether a purposive or rather a transformative reading is to be favored for (5) requires further synchronic as well as diachronic linguistic analysis. An etymological relation between these two uses would offer one possibility for both of the functions being marked by *du*. As for Si tu's classification of (5), it is difficult to evaluate to which extent he based it on semantic considerations of the lexical value of the action of *re ba*, on the morphosyntactic functioning of *du* or simply on his intuitive understanding of the phrase as a native speaker. Since *du* has a purposive function also according to contemporary academic linguistics, the Tibetan-specific linguistic relevance of his classification at this point should not be ruled out and may have been an important factor for the selection of this phrase as an instance of the Tibetan fourth case *dgos ched*.[799] Zha lu and Rnam gling's examples at least demonstrated that phrase (5) may be confronted with opposing classifications of similar instances by Si tu's predecessors, which reveals that any possible intuition of native speakers regarding this type of construction was not necessarily restricted only to a purposive understanding.

Phrase (6), *gar lta ba la sgron me thogs* ('to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere'), demonstrates the use of *la* in the meaning of the fourth case. The morpheme is applied to the

---

[797] Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 8.
[798] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70.
[799] Or was Si tu's decision influenced by P 1.4.36 which classifies the desired objects of verbs *spṛhĀ* 'to yearn for' as *sampradāna*? However, the lexical meaning of *re ba* is only loosely related to the Sanskrit term and this rule is also omitted in *Cāndra* and *Kātantra*.

nominalized verb (*lta ba* 'to look at') that is part of the secondary or subordinate clause *gar lta ba* ('to look somewhere'). I do not see any noteworthy possibility other than that the main and subordinate clause are in a final relationship, that is to say the morpheme *la* represents a final clause marker with purposive meaning. Si tu's decision to employ the marker *la* in this phrase is interesting insofar as the typical construction would rather be that of *lta bar*. However, in view of Hahn's "Lokativ des Ziels,"[800] the phrase does not seem to be artificially construed by Si tu. In fact, this instance is a clear indication that *la* – in an exceptional or perhaps even in common use – may have a purposive meaning in specific syntactic-semantic environments. Although no corresponding samples were encountered in earlier grammars, this example does not seem to represent any noticeable deviation from the former tradition, since the semantic content is clearly purposive and final clause-markers have already been identified as fourth cases before Si tu.[801]

Phrase (7) is the second instance in Si tu's list of examples for the fourth case under SCP 9.3-11.4 that employs the morpheme *la*, this time in the well-known example *shing la chu 'dren* (lit. 'to bring water to the tree,' in the meaning of 'to water the tree'). As already discussed above, the functioning of *la* in this clause is more likely that of either an INDIRECT or SECONDARY OBJECT or in Tournadre's nomenclature the BENEFICIARY.[802] It was also already mentioned in the historical survey how the classification of (7) as a fourth case is the result of Si tu's recurrent objectivist approach.

Phrase (8) is the final example of the fourth case in Si tu's commentary on SCP's *la'i sgra* and the only example Si tu provides for the use of the morpheme *na* as a fourth case. The problematic status of *na* has already been outline above and is basically rooted in its clear static-locative meaning without any purposive connotation. While most of the quoted early grammarians have remained silent on the question whether *na* qualifies as a fourth case marker, by the latest from *Smra sgo* onwards authors have proposed different grammatical constructions to demonstrate the application of *na* in the meaning of *dgos ched* or *ched du bya ba*.[803] Si tu's *tshogs na nor 'gyed* ('to provide/distribute the riches in/within/among the community'), directly

---

[800] Cf. supra 268.

[801] For Pra ti's list of examples, cf. supra 269; also cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70.

[802] Cf. supra 267. It should be kept in mind, however, that Tournadre's beneficiary function is not constituted by the category of benefit, but appears to refer to the INDIRECT OBJECT, if my understanding is correct (cf. Tournadre 2010, 97).

[803] *Smra sgo* is the earliest source encountered so far that provides an example for *na* as a fourth case:
      ched ni shing gi phyir na chu 'dren zhes pa lta bu'o
      "Regarding [the use of *na* in the meaning of] *ched*, [it is] as in 'to drag water for/because of the tree' (*shing gi phyir na chu 'dren*)." (Smṛti 2002, 79)

inspired or not, clearly resonates with Pra ti's only example of *na*, i.e. *tshogs na mang ja bskol* ('offering tea is to be cooked in/among the community'). Si tu also chose the scenario of a gathered community (*tshogs*) in which an action takes place, this time the provision of riches. The syntactic information encoded by the morpheme *na* is clearly that of the LOCATION in which the riches are distributed, thus my translation 'among' instead of 'for.' Yet, it may be inferred from the scenario at hand that the community is not merely the LOCATION but of course the RECIPIENT of the riches and thus a BENEFICIARY. However, from among all these semantic construals, the sentence only encodes the locative option and any other construal remains an objectivist imposition.

If it is asked how this misclassification occurred in the GC, two components may be distinguished. First, Si tu started from the Tibetan-specific generic case marking pattern of the verb frame *'gyed pa* ('to provide,' 'give,' 'distribute') which usually triggers *la* to mark the INDIRECT OBJECT or RECIPIENT. Yet, he substituted *na* for *la* and imposed the generic valency of the verb frame on *na*. Secondly, as an instance of the larger field of giving, Si tu also applied the typical purposive interpretation of the scenario of giving that was adopted from Sanskritic role models to the verb frame *'gyed pa* and its case marking pattern.

In his summary of the cases under TKJ 25.4-28.3, Si tu gives the following four examples in his definition of the fourth case *dgos ches* or *ched du bya ba*:

    (9) *lo tog la chu 'dren* 'to pull/bring water to/for the crops'

    (10) *nor 'tshong du 'gro* 'to go selling jewels/goods'

    (11) *slong mo pa la zan sbyin* 'to give food to the beggar'

    (12) *sha'i ched du phyugs gsod par byed* 'to kill cattle for meat'

From the four examples provided by Si tu, only phrase (9), namely *lo tog la chu 'dren* ('to pull/bring water on/for the crops'), deserves a closer look. The grammatical construction as well as the underlying semantic structure of the phrase directly corresponds to (7), the only difference being the lexical value of the argument marked by *la*. From what was already stated for phrase (7), the grammatical construction refers to the scenario that water is brought to the crops, i.e. the crops are irrigated, with *la* indicating the INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT without any purposive connotation. Yet, the Tibetan term *lo tog* ('crops') usually refers to the harvested grain from the fields and thus represents the result of farming, including the action of irrigation. From that perspective, Tibetan *lo tog la chu 'dren* comes much closer to *lo tog gi ched du chu 'dren* ('to irrigate for the sake of [attaining] crops'), and the morpheme *la* would

thus encode purposive meaning. While the grammatical marker suggests one reading, the lexical value of the marked argument suggests another understanding. Through the change of the lexical meaning of the marked argument to *lo tog*, Si tu intentionally or intuitively achieved to strengthen the purposive value of *la* due to the reader's intuitive understanding of the scenario at hand.

As for the remaining examples, phrase (10) is another clear instance of *du* as a final clause marker and corresponds to (4), whereas phrase (11) is Si tu's appreciation of the time-honored example *sbyin pa* ('to give'), which grammatically corresponds to (7) and poses similar taxonomical questions. Finally, phrase (12), *sha'i ched du phyugs gsod par byed* ('to kill cattle for meat'), is a typical instance of the purposive function, for which Si tu has used the form *ched + du*. Since the phrase corresponds to Tournadre's *rong bas lto gos su zhing btab*, it may be assumed that the morpheme *du* could be substituted for *ched du* in (12), but the question remains whether *la* may be used interchangeably as well.

Si tu's selection of examples include various kinds of scenarios and semantic-syntactic constructions. Several phrases are clear purposive instances also according to modern taxonomies, but the above investigation has exhibited several examples in which Si tu has gone against the sentence-specific structures. If we add together the clearly non-purposive instances such as (2) or (8), the clear non-purposive instances such as (11) that are more difficult to exclude from the fourth case due to their established status, as well as the more ambiguous instances such as (5), the result demonstrates that the overall homogeneity of the fourth case throughout the diverse purposive and non-purposive sample phrases was maintained through an objectivist focus. However, is Si tu's objectivist focus an occasional error to drift away from morphosyntax to the underlying scenarios as such? Is it an occasional strategy to maintain the authoritative taxonomy of the case model? Or is it a systematic approach to case grammar similar to what is encountered in GNT?[804] Although several instances of Si tu's objectivist focus have been encountered – clearer ones such as some of his examples for the fourth case and less clear ones such as his definitions of the second case[805] –, the material thus far encountered remains too diverse and inconclusive for a thorough decision on this matter.

Apart from phrase (5) which contrasts with the classifications of Zha lu and Rnam gling, Si tu's selection does not significantly deviate from former classifications. His two presentations in SCP and TKJ adhere to the traditional purposive interpretation of the fourth case, leaving alone

---

[804] Cf. supra 193ff.
[805] Cf. especially example (8), supra 306f. Regarding the second case's definitions, cf. supra 237f. and 243.

the morphological adaptation that *ched du* and the others no longer are fourth case markers in his view. However, Si tu has also expressed his strong critique against the classification of *phyag 'tshal ba* as a fourth case, which results from his unequivocal and consistent application of the parameter *phan 'dogs pa* ('benefit'). The same critique rejects NGg's theory of an agentive purpose and further specifies the notion of *yul* as a fourth case category together with its relation to the second case. Even more importantly, it sheds light on Si tu's objectivist focus as well as his claim of the multilingual validity of the cases.

10.2.2 Si tu's Exclusion of *phyag 'tshal ba* from the Fourth Case

Si tu's critique of the classification of *phyag 'tshal ba* as a fourth case is not part of the case's presentation under SCP 9.3-11.4 and TKJ 25.4-28.3, but it is explicated in his commentary on SCP's first homage:

> *gang la yon tan mchog mnga' ba'i/   dkon mchog de la phyag 'tshal lo/*

> "I prostrate to those jewels, which possess the highest virtue."[806]

Homage and prostration to the three jewels of Buddha, Dharma and the community of monks (*saṅgha*) is an all-pervasive theme in Tibetan literature. Rnam gling Paṇchen provides two different versions of the verse's interpretation, one of which classifies the *la don* in "*de la*" as *dgos ched*.[807] This classification has been followed in an unquestioned fashion by Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen Don grub in his commentary to SCP[808] and even goes back to NGg and GNT, both which included *phyag 'tshal ba* ('to pay homage,' 'prostrate') as a semantic field of the fourth case based on Sanskritic grammar (e.g. P 2.3.16, C 2.1.78 or K 2.4.26).[809] Despite the established character of *phyag 'tshal ba* as a semantic field of the Tibetan fourth case that was backed by the Sanskritic tradition, Si tu's assessment of the former *Sum rtags* commentators is very critical:

---

[806] SCP 1.1-2.

[807]   *de zhes pa don dgu la 'jug pa las nges bzung gi tshig dang/   la zhes pa don lnga la 'jug pa las 'dir dgos ched/*
"[...] from the nine meanings *de* [may] take on, [this] is the syntactic form of determination (*nges bzung gi tshig*), and from the five meanings *la* [may] take on, here [it] is purpose (*dgos ched*), [...]." (Rnam gling 2013, 55).
Rnam gling's second interpretation of the verse attributes the function of *yul* to the phrase *dkon cog de la* and thus leaves open whether it should be understood as a second or fourth case.

[808] *de zhes bya ba ni/   nges bzung gi sgra'o/   la zhes bya ba ni/   bzhi pa dgos ches kyi sgra'o/*
"As for the *de*, [this] is the morpheme of determination. As for the *la*, [this] is the fourth [case], the purposive morpheme (*dgos ched kyi sgra*)." (Pra ti 2013A, 182)

[809] Cf. supra 285f.

kha cig gis/ skabs 'dir gang la zhes pa'i la yig logs su bkar nas ngos gzung ba'i don

dang de la zhes pa'i la yig ched du bya ba'i don du bshad mod/ snga ma ni gzhung

'di'i la don 'chad pa'i skabs su de 'dra la 'jug par ma bshad par ma zad don gyis kyang

de 'drar 'jug mi srid pas mi 'thad cing/ gang zhig la yon tan mchog mnga' ba'am

ldan pa zhes sbrel dgos pas rnam dbye bdun pa gnas gzhi'i don nyid do/ phyi ma ni

legs sbyar she rlom gyis zhwa dpe lham la bkab par sad de/ ci'i phyir na/ ka lā par/

na mas/ swasti/ swāhā/ swadhā/ alaṃ/ baṣaṭ/ sbyor ba la bzhi pa'o zhe

'byung bar na mas kyi yul la spyir btang don 'thob kyi sgo nas gnyis pa 'jug kyang grags

pa dmigs bsal gyi sgo nas bzhi pa sbyor bar mkhas pa rnams gyis bkral mod gyi/ de

'dra'i bye brag ma phyed par/ na mas kyi yul la bzhi pa 'jug par bshad do snyam nas

phyag 'tshal ba'i don can gyi sgra'i yul thams cad la bzhi pa 'jugs par bsam zhing smra

ba'i phyir ro/ des na spyir btang gi sgrub pa'i dbang gis/ pra ṇa myaṃ sogs krīt

rkyen gzhan gyis bsgrubs pa dang/ na mā mi sogs ting mtha' rnams dang/ byings

gzhan las byung ba'i bande/ banda naṃ lta bu rnams kyang 'dud cing phyag 'tshal

ba'i don can du mtshungs kyang de dag gi yul la rnam du'ang gnyis pa las gzhan pa'i

rnam dbye 'jug pa ma yin pa 'di kun gyis shes par bya'o/ rgyu mtshan des na bod du

de lta'i grags pa dmigs bsal med pa'i phyir don thob gtso bas/ bzhi pa'i spyir bdang

gi don sbyin pa'i snod la sogs pa bya ba gang yin yang bya yul de'am de dang 'brel ba'i

don du song ba zhi dgos pa las/ yul khyad par can la phyag byed pa ni phyag byed

po nyid dam de dang 'brel ba'i don las phyag yul de'i ched du min pa ni gnag rdzis

kyang rtogs par sla ba'i phyir phyag gi yul rnam dbye gnyis pa 'jug pa las 'os med do/

"Although some [commentators] explained the letter *la* of *gang la* in this passage in the sense of identification through separation/isolation (*logs su bkar*) and the letter *la* of *de la* in the sense of the purpose (*ched du bya ba*), the first [point] is incorrect, since it is not mentioned during the exposition of *la don* in this treatise that [*la*] can take on such a [meaning], nor is it actually possible that [it] takes on such a meaning. Moreover, [the root text] should be glossed as 'that which possesses or is endowed with the highest virtue' [and] thus [this *la*] has precisely the meaning of the seventh case, abode/substratum (*gnas gzhi*). As for the second [point, *de la*,] it is nothing but putting on a hat onto the feet due to conceit. Why? The learned scholars teach that, although in general [and] in accordance to the actual meaning (*spyir btang don 'thob kyi sgo nas*), a second case [should] join to the locus/domain of [Sanskrit] *namas*, a fourth is applied due to a special worldly convention (*grags pa dmigs gsal*) as it is mentioned in *Kalāpa* [2.4.26]: 'In connection to *namas*, *svasti*, *svāhā*, *svadhā*, *alaṃ* [and] *vaṣaṭ* a fourth [case

suffix occurs].' Yet, thinking that a fourth [case] joins to the object of *namas* without differentiating such peculiarities, [the commentators] think and say that a fourth [case] joins to all loci of terms which have the meaning of prostration/homage.

Therefore, everyone should understand that from the perspective of the general grammatical construction (*spyir btang gi sgrub pa*), *praṇamyam*, etc., which is completed by a different *kṛt*-suffix, *namāmi*, etc., which ends in *tiṅ*, and *vande, vandanam* etc., which originate from different verbal roots, are also equivalent in the sense of bowing or prostration, but no other case than the second joins to the [action's] locus/domain of these [Sanskrit forms]. Such special worldly conventions [like Sanskrit *namas*] do not exist in Tibet [and] thus the actual meaning prevails. Therefore, the general meaning of the fourth case requires some purpose (*don du song ba*) for a recipient of giving (*sbyin pa'i snod*), etc., [or] whatever the action is, [i.e. for] the locus/domain of the action or [for something] connected to it. In contrast, that the prostration to a supreme locus/domain is for the sake of the prostrator himself or something connected to [him], rather than for the sake of the locus/domain of prostration, is easily realized even by the shepherd. It is due to these reasons that there is no valid [mode of application] other than [that] a second case joins to the locus/domain of prostration."[810]

Si tu dismisses two interpretations of *la don* in SCP's first homage, the first of which relates to the form *gang la* of the root text and the second to *de la*. Since the focus here is on the fourth case, the following analysis will be restricted to the second point. Si tu's main critique charges former commentators with an exaggerated, undifferentiated application of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge to WT, noting that they failed to differentiate between Sanskrit-specific exceptional uses and the general grammatical construction (*spyir btang gi sgrub pa*) of the semantic field homage or prostration, the latter which he apparently regards as valid across both languages. The Sanskrit-specific feature in question which Si tu demonstrates by help of *Kalāpa* 2.4.26 according to him is the result of a special convention (*grags pa dmigs bsal*) among the speakers of Sanskrit and thus not a genuine use of the fourth case suffix. The exceptional character of K 2.4.26 is made evident through an examination of other words of various grammatical constructions, all belonging to the same lexical field of prostration or homage and triggering a second case suffix. Si tu's observation in this context is very accurate, insofar as *Kalāpa* 2.4.26 (as well as P 2.3.16 and C 2.1.78) belongs to the domain of *upapadavibhakti* ('a

---

[810] GC 456.1.

case suffix [triggered by] an accompanying word form [in the sentence]') that is restricted only to *namas* and the other word forms listed in the rule. Thus, it is an exceptional and not a prototypical use of the *caturthī*. Consequently, Si tu concludes that such exceptions do not exist in Tibetan, and therefore the morpheme *la* in *dkon mchog de la phyag 'tshal lo* must be interpreted according to the common grammatical construction that requires a second case in its prototypical meaning *karman*.

The possible objection that NGg classifies *phyag 'tshal ba* as a fourth case and this classification could be retained through the treatise's theory of a purpose for the agent is immediately rejected by Si tu:

> *gnas brgyad rtsa 'grel gyi don 'ga' zhig bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi 'gro ba yod cing rnam dbye bzhi pa 'jug tshul 'di'ang brtag dgos te/   chu 'dren pa'i byed pa po'i ched yin pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis shing la bzhi pa 'jug pa dang/   phyag 'tshal ba'i bya ba'i ched yin pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis mchod rten la bzhi pa 'jug par 'dod pa de lta na/ shan pas phyugs gsod/   tshong pas nor sgrub/   kha zas la longs spyod/   lta bu rnams la'ang rim par gsod pa po dang sgrub pa po'i ched yin pas phyugs dang nor la bzhi pa 'jug par thal ba dang/   longs spyod pa'i bya ba'i ched yin pas kha zas la bzhi pa 'jug par thal ba sogs dang/   sprang po la zan sbyin lta bur sbyin bya'am sbyin byed kyi ched du ma yin pas sbyin yul la bzhi pa mi 'jug par thal ba sogs skyon mtha' yas shing/   brda sprod pa'i bstan bcos tshad ldan gang du'ang de 'dra'i rnam gzhag bshad pa ma mthong bas so/*

"There is some content (*don*) of the *Eight Linguistic Topics*' root and commentary that cannot be reasoned/evidenced (*bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi 'gro ba*)[811] and also this mode of application (~ *'jug tshul*)[812] of the fourth case here requires investigation. If it is like it is claimed that the fourth [case] joins to the tree because there is a purpose (*ched*) for the agent of the watering (*chu 'dren pa*), or the fourth [case] joins to the stupa because there is a purpose (*ched*) of the action of prostration (*phyag 'tshal ba'i bya ba*), then it follows that also in 'the butcher kills cattle' (*shan pa phyugs gsod*), 'the merchant acquires wealth' (*tshong bas nor sgrub*) [or] 'to enjoy the food' (*kha zas la longs spyod*), a fourth [case] joins to the cattle and the wealth respectively because it is for the

---

[811] Or more literally: "which do not go from [the stage of] a *probandum* to [the stage of] proof/reasoning/evidence."

[812] Since *'jug pa* is used in its *tha mi dad* form ('to engage,' 'enter,' etc.), the technical term *'jug tshul* would be more accurately 'the mode of how [the fourth case, etc.] joins.' The equally used *sbyor tshul* would then be the *tha dad pa* pendant ('mode of application'). With regard to the current investigation, this difference may be neglected.

312

sake (*ched*) of the killer and the acquirer, and to the food because it is for the sake of the action of enjoying. And as regards 'to give food to the beggar,' it follows that a fourth [case] does not join to the recipient (*sbyin yul*), since it is not for the sake of either the action of giving (*sbyin bya*) or the agent of giving (*sbyin byed*). [There would be] countless mistakes and [moreover] explanations of such a taxonomy (*rnam gzhag*) do not appear in any authoritative/reliable (*tshad ldan*) Sanskrit (?) grammatical treatise (*brda sprod pa'i bstan bcos*)."[813]

Si tu's argument against the theory of NGg is a typical example of a *reductio ad absurdum*. He demonstrates the arbitrariness of this theory by providing a number of additional sample phrases that would either require or reject fourth case marking under the provision of NGg's model. If the fourth case does not necessarily indicate a purpose or – in Si tu's conception – a benefit for the marked argument itself, it would no longer be possible to distinguish the syntactic or semantic circumstances under which an argument of a sentence takes fourth case marking. A purpose for the agent may be inferred in many of Si tu's provided counterexamples, the grammatical construction of which does not and cannot exhibit a fourth case marking. On the other hand, instances typically classified as fourth cases in the tradition may be required to drop their status because they no longer fulfill NGg's parameter of an agentive purpose.

It may be agreed that Si tu's observations are linguistically relevant insofar as the information encoded by a grammatical marker needs to be related to the marked argument itself rather than another argument in the sentence. As already discussed in the presentation of Si tu's own conception of the fourth case, his addition of an implied action connected to the marked argument is able to account for clear purposive instances, such as *sha'i ched du phyugs gsod* ('to kill cattle for meat'), in which there is no benefit for the marked argument itself, and it may be assumed that this refinement is more accurate with regard to WT.

Si tu's *reductio ad absurdum* by means of counterexamples also highlights the objectivist status of NGg's theory, since it mainly considers possible purposes of the entities involved in a scenario regardless of any grammatical construction and its encoded relations. This does not, however, necessarily imply that Si tu himself would not have followed a strongly objectivist

---

[813] GC 455.2. Note that in the GC this quotation is situated shortly following the previous one, despite the fact that the page numbering indicates that it comes first. In volume 6 of Sherab Gyaltsen's edition of Si tu's collected works (1990), pages 455 and 456 are interchanged.

approach in his classification of *la don* with *phyag 'tshal ba*, as demonstrated by his own argumentation for a second case *las/las su bya ba*.[814]

The initial issue of the correct classification of the *la*-morpheme in SCP 1.2 is primarily caused by the simple fact that according to the traditional case model the morpheme *la* encodes both the information of *las su bya ba* and *dgos ched*. Any argumentation for or against a certain classification may be based on different methodologies, rationales and approaches, and the former grammarians have basically adhered to the Sanskritic classification of *phyag 'tshal ba*'s translational equivalent *namas*. Conversely, Si tu has argued that the classification of the category *phyag 'tshal ba* as a fourth case has resulted from a direct adoption of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge already in the early Tibetan tradition, however with the lack of a sufficient linguistic basis. Thus, what is Si tu's linguistic basis to argue for the second case?

The interesting point in this context is that Si tu's argumentation did not and could not dispense with the old classification merely based on the grammatical features of the Tibetan phrase, instead he argued for his counter-classification first of all with recourse to Sanskritic grammar. Si tu's argument required Sanskritic support, since the best known grammatical construction to express the homage to a deity in Sanskrit was that of *namas* plus a fourth case suffix, and Si tu therefore needed to explain this discrepancy; and his demonstration that also in Sanskrit the majority of case affixations with verbs of homage or prostration are that of second case suffixes certainly supported his reclassification through recourse to the general authority of the Sanskritic role model.

Yet, Si tu's argument went much further than to merely demonstrate that there are different case marking patterns within the semantic field of homage or prostration in Sanskrit, since he did so by distinguishing between a generic and an exceptional pattern (*spyir btang gi sgrub pa* vs. *grags pa dmigs bsal*). This distinction, in turn, was not only based on a quantitative assessment of all the different case marking patterns throughout the listed Sanskrit grammatical constructions, but Si tu connects it to the actual meaning or constitution of the action of homage (*don thob/don 'thob*) that he provides at the end of the second last quotation: according to his theory, the fourth case is that of the beneficiary, and since the deity is not benefitted by the action of homage – a fact even known by the unlearned shepherd – a second case must be the generic case application. This interpretation of the action of prostration is the one 'acquired

---

[814] We are now returning to the second last quotation that presents his main argument against the fourth and for the second case (cf. supra 310f.).

through the meaning/content' (*don thob = don gyis thob pa*),[815] in other words, it represents the actual meaning of the action as such, i.e. the scenario of prostration in contrast to the worldly exceptional convention of *namas* + fourth case suffix. Consequently, the proposed Tibetan second case marking, as much as the Sanskrit second case marking pattern, is not just connected to their respective underlying semantic structures that may vary across languages but are also connected to the actual meaning of the scenario.

It is this actual meaning through which Si tu has decided how to classify *phyag 'tshal ba* and which of the case categories are at hand. If Sanskrit were to not employ any form of second case marking for the scenario of prostration in the various constructions presented by Si tu, this might be a sign that Si tu's semantic construal of prostration is not the actual meaning of the scenario, which could further undermine his classification in Tibetan that according to his views only follows the actual meaning in this case. If my understanding is correct, it is most likely due to this reason that Si tu has demonstrated different Sanskrit-specific case marking patterns for the scenario of prostration, since through demonstrating that Sanskrit shares the same pattern even more often than the fourth case suffix, there is no competing construal to be considered and Si tu is free to apply his modifications.

This argument of Si tu is one of the few clear instances in his work that the linguistic basis of case grammar and the classification of cases in general was deeply rooted in a focus on actions in the phenomenal world and their actual or objective meaning. Thus, Si tu did not simply occasionally fall victim to the objectivist *error*, in fact he systematically and intentionally followed an objectivist *approach*.[816] With the focus on actual meanings of actions that persist across languages, classifications such as his *tshogs na nor 'gyed* or *shing la chu 'dren* are only a matter of time – may they be inspired through comparison with Sanskrit case marking patterns, metalinguistic-philosophical or intuitively governed investigations into the nature of an action, or the established taxonomical framework of the case model.

Interestingly, Si tu's proposed taxonomy for Tibetan *phyag 'tshal ba* is indeed linguistically preferable, and perhaps it was even inspired by his intuitive understanding of Tibetan language, but he nonetheless took recourse to the idea of an actual meaning of the instance of prostration as such. The Tibetan-specific case marking pattern is determined not by simply asking how the Tibetan verb frame encodes this scenario, and thus Si tu needed to take a detour through the actual meaning of the verb frame. First, by help of Sanskrit he determined a generic case

---

[815] Si tu uses *don thob* twice in his argument against the fourth case (cf. supra 310f.).
[816] For the perhaps strongest evidence of the systematic character of this approach, cf. chapter 16.

marking-pattern that he regarded as connected to an actual meaning of the scenario. Then he argues that Tibetan follows the actual meaning and thus applies his understanding of the scenario to the Tibetan case marker *la*. This last point, however, implies that Si tu allowed for a difference between linguistic expression and the phenomenal world as its content. As revealed through his distinction between the generic patterns which follow the actual meaning and the exceptional or special uses of the cases, he accepts that languages not necessarily directly encode this actual meaning. He merely argues that Tibetan lacks such exceptional uses of the fourth case and that the Tibetan construction thus is a direct representation of the actual meaning. In his argument, Si tu has not elaborated how he has reached his conclusion that Tibetan follows the actual meaning and not an exceptional convention that would allow for a fourth case.

What can we say about Si tu's theoretical foundation of the case model if we connect the idea of an actual meaning of actions with his claim of the universality of the cases as necessarily existing in all meaningful languages? Si tu utilizes the proposed semantic case categories as a representative account of actions as such and their actual constitution. He frequently focuses on the understanding of a sentence's underlying phenomenal scenario in his linguistic analysis, and since such scenarios are shared by speakers across languages, this focus explains instantly why to him the cases exist in all languages.

This brings back the question already raised during the presentation of GNT's objectivist approach,[817] namely form and extent to which Si tu conceived the eight cases as linguistic universals, as well as what the ontological status of such universals may be. Although Si tu is very explicit in his claim of the universality of the cases and that it is related to the actual constitution of actions as such, he omits any further elaboration of the philosophical-linguistic foundation of this approach, nor does he provide a systematic methodology how to arrive at the actual meaning of an action. As mentioned above, Si tu seemingly followed more a commonsense approach by comparing and reconciling Sanskrit and Tibetan grammatical structures, meta-linguistic philosophical investigations and intuitive understandings of sample phrases for his interpretation of an action such as the prostration to a deity.[818] Similar to the GNT, Si tu's objectivist approach to the cases was likely inherited from or informed by more linguistic-philosophical conceptualizations of language and the case functions, perhaps coming from Sanskritic *kāraka*-theories, discourses in the larger context of *śābdabodha* ('verbal

---

[817] Cf. supra 193ff.
[818] Cf. supra 315.

316

cognition'), or even Buddhist linguistic-philosophical discourses in the context of *Madhyamaka*, *Yogācāra* or *Pramāṇa*. However, as this was not further commented or problematized, any such foundation survived in Si tu's GC only indirectly in the form of remnants as presented in this dissertation. In Si tu's context, it may also be repeated that he himself did not author any work on the mentioned Buddhist philosophical schools, perhaps a counterindication at least against the possibility that he may himself actively rooted his objectivist approach in one of these schools.[819]

While the representative character of the cases for an explanation of the world of phenomena explains immediately the supposed universal validity of the cases, why should they necessarily exist in all languages? Is a language with syntactic and semantic structures that do not follow the actual meaning of actions impossible? Through his distinction into generic and special/exceptional case marking patterns, Si tu seems to accept that languages may deviate from the actual meaning of a scenario, yet he apparently also seems to claim or believe that all languages must have some form to *directly* represent these case categories. Probably he regarded Sanskrit and Tibetan as two such templates that prove his point.

If this proposed interpretation of Si tu's argument and consequently of his objectivist approach to case grammar in general proves to be consistent, the following four noteworthy addendums to features of Si tu's case model discussed thus far must be considered.

1) Now that it can be ascertained that Si tu systematically followed an objectivist approach that focuses first of all on the actual meaning of actions, it is better understood how obvious misclassifications have arisen, such as *na* as a fourth case marker in *tshogs na nor 'gyed*, and that they were not simply his intentional attempt at reconciling an incorrect taxonomy with Tibetan morphosyntax. If an authoritative source such as SCP classifies *na* as a purposive marker, it is reasonable to test this assumption through finding representative instances that prove or disprove this classification. Si tu as well as Pra ti and others presumably struggled to find representative examples because of the distinct locative functioning of *na* in Tibetan. However, as already stated in the examination of Si tu's *tshogs na nor 'gyed*, there were two active components in his objectivist misclassification, one to impose the Tibetan-specific generic valency of *'gyed pa* on the case marker *na*, and another one to impose a purposive construal on this Tibetan-specific generic valency of *'gyed pa*. Both impositions come together in his focus on the actual meaning of the action *'gyed pa*. Si tu's more systematic focus on the

---

[819] Cf. supra 52. For more information on the theoretical foundation of the objectivist approach in Tibetan grammar, cf. also point 5 of chapter 15, in particular infra 427ff.

actual meaning of actions, and in this case of *'gyed pa*, must have led him to the impression that at least in such instances *na* has a purposive meaning in the language. The problem is a methodological one: If the focus is deflected away from the distributional behavior of morphemes across syntactic-semantic language environments to the actual meaning of the action as understood by Si tu, then this indeed suggests a purposive meaning of *na*. The same applies to the other incorrect classifications, such as *shing la chu 'dren*. If an actual meaning of *chu 'dren pa* is taken as the basis, and it is seen as connected to a purposive meaning due to the established Sanskritic interpretations of this instance, then this indeed gives the impression that one of the functions of *la* is purpose. To circumvent this issue and test whether a particular case marker has this or that function, a more systematic and distributional approach with a special focus on the morphemes' behavior rather than the meaning of the verb's action would have been required. On its own, a sample phrase does not provide sufficient information about the meaning of a morpheme, and a focus on the actual meaning of the action may then suggest all kinds of meanings encoded by the case markers, even more strongly if this meaning is accepted as persisting across languages. This is a decisive feature of the process in which an objectivist focus confirms the established taxonomy in a grammatical work such as Si tu's GC.

2) Another point regards what was referred to above as the interpretative approach in Si tu's general definition of the second case *karman* that covers the Tibetan-specific instances of ALLATIVE, INDIRECT OBJECT and even PATIENT. In this context, it was asked and not conclusively answered whether Si tu's interpretative approach to subsume the Tibetan-specific uses of *la don* under *karman* is connected to an objectivist approach. From what was just said above, it may be added that an action's engagement in its locus (~ *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*) is part of the actual meaning of certain actions, and thus a relevant linguistic category particularly for generic case marking patterns. Tibetan-specific case categories such as ALLATIVE, etc. are then to be subsumed under this category, since they are covered by the category of *karman* and appear only as secondary, minor variations or perhaps even a type of language-specific convention, although a convention that remains covered by *karman*, the latter being constitutive or representative for the actual meaning. In this way, Si tu's interpretative account of *la*, *na* and *du* as markers of *karman* is deeply embedded in his objectivist approach.

3) Likewise, the proposed double classification of *bum par* in *bum par chu blugs* in the context of the second case seems to be indeed based on Si tu's objectivist construal of the scenario of pouring water.[820] Does this mean that he allowed one and the same marker in a single clause to

---

[820] Cf. supra 233f.

have two meanings, as long as the action as such conveys two participations for one and the same participant in that semantic construal which is deemed representative for the actual meaning of the action? The passage does give this impression, if Si tu's interpretation of *bum par chu blugs* is read as it is contained in his work and without contextualizing it in Sanskrit case marking patterns. The idea seems then to be that *la* in this clause may have both meanings due to the actual meaning of the action of pouring, and yet, while they are not expressed simultaneously, whichever of the two meanings surfaces depends perhaps either on the context, the speaker's intention or the audience's understanding.

4) Without the need to provide definite answers and in view of the double classification of *bum par chu blugs*, it may further be asked whether in Si tu's view samples such as *tshogs na nor 'gyed* would allow for a double classification as a fourth and seventh case, depending on how he envisaged the action as such?

On a final note, Si tu's argument for the exclusion of *phyag 'tshal ba* from the fourth case also contains a clarification about the semantic difference between the second and fourth case in terms of an action's locus/domain (*bya yul*) that is either benefitted (= fourth case) or not benefitted (= second case). It was already demonstrated in the historical survey of the fourth case that NGg and GNT, although they use the term *yul* ('locus,' 'focus,' 'domain,' 'object'), do not feature any clear indication of an underlying theory. In contrast, Si tu's use of the term seems to be more systematic. Both his renditions of the fourth case under SCP 9.3-11.4 as well as SCP 1.1-2 explicitly identify the *bya (ba'i) yul* as the beneficiary in case of a fourth case. As he states in his remarks on *phyag 'tshal ba*, the item marked by the syntactic link *la don* is a domain or locus of the action in both cases, yet in one instance it is the benefitted one, resulting in a fourth case marking. However, it has not been specified whether this means that both the arguments in the second and the fourth cases are an action's locus in the sense that an action engages (*bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*), or whether Si tu wished to distinguish between that locus of the action in which the action engages (= second case) and that locus of the action which is benefitted from that action (= fourth case). In other words, is *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* the overarching category for both cases or is *bya ba'i yul* the overarching category in his model that may be subdivided into *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul* and *ched du bya ba'i yul*? In any event, it may only be speculated whether Si tu's use of the term *bya ba'i yul* in both contexts was meant to acknowledge the Tibetan-specific structural affinity of constructions such as *bram zas la zan*

byin ('food was given to the brahmin;' fourth case) and *bum pa la chu blugs* ('water was poured into the pot;' second case).

In total, Si tu's exclusion of *phyag 'tshal ba* represents an important refinement in line with the structures of Tibetan language, since *phyag 'tshal ba* indeed does not exhibit any purposive meaning in its syntax, although many aspects of his reclassification are not based on Tibetan-specific considerations but include Sanskrit grammatical as well as objectivist arguments.

10.2.3 Résumé on the Fourth Case in the *Great Commentary*

In the GC, the fourth case *dgos ched* or *ched du bya ba* follows the established purposive function of the former tradition. However, Si tu's conception has also added important morphological and functional refinements. On the level of morphology, he excluded periphrastic constructions such as *ched du*, *phyir du* and others, which encode purposive information but are only constructions endowed with clarifying terms (*gsal bar byed pa'i sgra dang ldan pa*) and thus not case markers as such. It was stated above that this represents a clear instance which demonstrates Si tu's multilayered understanding of *rnam dbye* which also included morphological-derivational parameters despite its strong focus on the functions in general.

Regarding the meaning of the fourth case, Si tu has first specified the category *dgos ched* in terms of *phan 'dogs* ('benefit'), more specifically a benefit of the action either for the marked argument or an action connected to it. This adaptation was perhaps inspired to some extent by Sanskritic grammar, the notion of benefit possibly by *Vārttika* 4 on P 2.3.13 and the inclusion of (implicit) actions that are benefitted presumably by P 2.3.14-15 or K 2.4.28. The restriction of the purpose or benefit to exclusively the marked argument or a connected action also went hand in hand with the rejection of NGg's theory of an agentive purpose that Si tu charged with the fault of arbitrariness. A second adaptation is the exclusion of *phyag 'tshal ba* from the fourth case, a classification that was previously accepted in the Tibetan tradition mostly due to its relation to the Sanskrit equivalent *namas*. Si tu, in contrast, classifies *phyag 'tshal ba* as a second case by help of his Sanskrit expertise and a recourse to the idea of an actual semantic constitution of the action at hand that in his theory does not exhibit any benefit for the marked argument.

It is of utmost importance for a proper understanding of Si tu's case grammar that he presupposes the existence of an actual meaning of the action that ultimately decides between actual and exceptional case marking patterns. This provides a pivotal insight in the conceptual

foundation of his claim to the multilingual validity of the cases, and it also improves our understanding of the frequent objectivist classifications such as *tshogs na nor 'gyed* ('to distribute wealth among the community,' example 8 in Si tu's fourth case). The case functions as basic semantic categories that are valid and manifest in any meaningful language are established through the supposition of an actual semantic constitution of phenomenal actions that persists across languages.

Through his indeed accurate observation that in Sanskrit grammars *namas* is a non-*kāraka* trigger of the fourth case suffix, Si tu was able to adapt established taxonomies and account more accurately for the Tibetan-specific structure of the verb frame *phyag 'tshal ba*. Although based on objectivist grounds, he therefore achieved a reconciliation of established Sanskritic taxonomies and Tibetan language without violating the significance of the fourth case suffix in the Sanskrit context.

11 *Rnam dbye lnga pa 'byung khungs*

11.1 Historical Survey

The standard designation for the fifth case is *'byung khungs* ('source,' 'origin'), a function expressed in the Tibetan grammatical system by the two morphemes *las* and *nas*. Some sources do not mention both morphemes but focus exclusively on *las*.[821] In *Sum rtags*, these two morphemes including their function as *'byung khungs* are treated in SCP 16.2-4:

> *rjes 'jug yi ge bcu po yi/*
> *bzhi pa dgu pa la bcu pa/*
> *sbyar ba 'byung khungs sa yin te/*

> "Of the ten postscript letters,
> the tenth [*sa*] to the fourth [*na*] and ninth [*la* respectively]
> applied is the semantic domain of source/origin."

In his *Mkhas 'jug* (KhJ), Sakya Paṇḍita gives the following concise definition of the fifth case:

> *shing las 'bras bu 'byung zhes bya ba lta bu lnga pa 'byung khungs* […]

> "As in 'the fruit originates/comes from the tree' (*shing las 'bras bu 'byung*), the fifth [case is] source/origin (*'byung khungs*)."[822]

In this definition, the technical term *'byung khungs* is treated as more or less self-explanatory and is merely defined by the use of the case's prototypical verb frame *'byung ba* ('to come forth,' 'originate,' 'appear,' 'occur') that is part of the technical term itself. The verb *'byung ba* usually triggers the morpheme *las* to indicate the origin or source from which the unmarked argument arises from. Depending on the context, *'byung ba* may involve a causal dimension in the sense of an actual origination from the item marked by *las* (as in *sa bon las myu gu 'byung* 'a sprout originates from the seed'), or it more generally indicates only the appearance or occurrence at/from the item marked by the morpheme *las* (as in *gzhung 'di las 'byung* '[this quotation/point/argument] occurs in this text'). For the sake of clarity, in the following the category 'origination/origin' will be taken to refer to the narrower, causal understanding of *'byung ba* and *'byung khungs*, whereas 'appearance/source' will refer to its broader, non-causal understanding. As this historical survey is designed to demonstrate, these two categories are

---

[821] MVY (4742) only lists *shing las* (cf. HSGLT 2, 26) and Facheng only *ljon shing las* (cf. ibid., 362). Similarly, NGg and GNT both only employ *las* (cf. CT *115* – 433; CT *115* – 456ff.).
[822] KhJ 2009, 25.

crucial in the context of the Tibetan fifth case *'byung khungs*, not only because *'byung ba* as the core of the fifth case's conception can have both meanings in WT, but even more so because both categories have already figured in Sanskritic conceptions of the prototypical fifth case function *apādāna* and in this form have shaped the Tibetan adoption and adaptation of this case. Moreover, it must be noted that these two uses of *'byung ba* may also impede a precise understanding of the fifth case *'byung khungs* in grammatical sources, whether it refers to a causal origin or a more general source.

As for Sakya Paṇḍita's definition of the fifth case in the KhJ, his condensed presentation does not explicate the precise understanding of *'byung khungs* in terms of causal origin vs. general source. Judging from his only example of fruits coming from the tree, a causal origination seems to be indeed emphasized, however a reading of the phrase in terms of 'fruits appear/occur at or come from the tree' cannot be ruled out without more detailed information.

Many *Sum rtags* commentators have provided more extensive lists of examples, for example that of Pra ti in his SCP commentary *Kun bzang dgongs rgyan*:

> *de yang rnam dbye lnga pa la 'jug pa ni/ dper na/ ri nas chu byung/ gnam las char babs/ sa las myu gu smin/ rta las lhungs/ chos nas bshad lta bu 'byung khungs gang nas byung ba ston pa'o/*

> "Likewise, as for [how the morphemes derived in SCP 16.2-3] take on the fifth case, it indicates the origination/appearance (*byung ba*) from some origin/source (*'byung khungs*), as in 'water has come from the mountain' (*ri nas chu byung*), 'water has fallen from the sky' (*gnam las char babs*), 'sprouts ripen out of the soil' (*sa las myu gu smin*), 'fallen from the horse' (*rta las lhungs*), 'explained from the Dharma' (*chos nas bshad* ?)."[823]

Following SCP, Pra ti provides examples which employ both the morphemes *las* as well as *nas*, with *nas* being used twice in *ri nas chu byung* ('water has come from the mountain') and *chos nas bshad* ('explained from the Dharma'?). The fact that the verb frame *'byung ba* as part of the fifth case's designation usually triggers the morpheme *las* and not *nas* raises the question regarding Pra ti's grammar whether his example *ri nas chu byung* is actually grammatical, or if it is rather the attempt to find a representative instance of origin/source with the morpheme *nas*.

---

[823] Pra ti 2013A, 212.

A perhaps more genuine use of the morpheme *nas* would be Zha lu's example *shar nas nyid ma 'char* ('the sun rises from the east').[824]

The fact that *'byung ba* triggers *las* rather than *nas* points towards the direction that the two morphemes are not interchangeable, and even if Pra ti's use of *nas* is thus grammatical, this does not necessarily indicate that *nas* in this phrase encodes precisely the same type of information as *las*. Tournadre distinguishes between an ABLATIVE (= *las*) and an ELATIVE (= *nas*), stating that "the meaning of the ablative is rather specific and much more restricted semantically than the elative *nas*."[825] According to him, the two morphemes are "practically equivalent"[826] in phrases such as *rta las/nas babs* ('(X) dismounted the horse'), in which both markers indicate a mere spatial origin in Tournadre's terminology.[827] Additionally, *las* may also express more specific information which Tournadre explains in terms of an "origin of a transformation."[828] This type of *las*'s use indicates from where something is extracted, generated or produced, such as in *ba las 'o ma byung* ('the milk comes from the cow') or *ma las bu skyes* (lit. 'from the mother a son was born,' i.e. 'the mother gave birth to a son'). As Tournadre further notes, "for this function, the replacement of *las* by *nas* is really problematic:

> ? *ba+nas 'oma+O byung* 'The milk comes from the cow.',
>
> ? *'oma+nas mar+O blangs* 'One take (extract) butter from milk.',
>
> ? *ma+nas bu+O skyes* 'A son was born to (litt. from) the mother.',
>
> ? *sabon+nas myugu skyes* 'A sprout was born from the seed.'.

The use of *nas* in the above sentences would be acceptable only if one wants to indicate only a spatial origin."[829] Although not all recent academic accounts make such a distinction between the prototypical functions of *nas* and *las*,[830] the distinction of the two morphemes such as it is found in Tournadre's study is significant. His examples demonstrate an important indication of these morphemes' difference, in the sense that verb frames which possibly or necessarily take on causal meanings usually prefer *las* over *nas*, such as *'byung ba* ('to originate') or *skye pa* ('to come forth,' 'being born'), both of which are *tha mi dad pa* verbs. If we return to Pra ti's

---

[824] Zha lu 2013A, 13.
[825] Tournadre 2010, 111. On the difference between *las* and *nas* in terms of ABLATIVE and ELATIVE, cf. also DeLancey 2003; Hill 2012; Hahn 2005, 372f.
[826] Tournadre 2010, 111.
[827] Note that Tournadre specifies that the originated entity in this spatial origin is on the surface of the entity from where it departs and not inside (cf. Tournadre 2010, 111).
[828] Tournadre 2010, 111.
[829] Ibid.
[830] Cf. e.g. Schwieger 2006, 281 and 314.

example *ri nas chu byung*, Tournadre allows for such a construction, however its meaning would be more that of water occurring at or coming from the mountain, without any other relation between the mountain and the water than the mountain being the location of the water's appearance (= general source).

The outlined syntactic difference between *nas* and *las* has not been distinguished in Tibetan grammatical sources, in which both are equally treated as the marker of the fifth case, at least in those sources that list both morphemes. It was already quoted that Pra ti, for example, states that all the different semantic as well as syntactic constructions in his examples fall under the domain of the origination or appearance from or out of some origin/source (*'byung khungs gang nas byung ba*), a definition in which he also prefers the morpheme *nas* over *las*. How should his definition of *'byung khungs gang nas byung ba* ('the origination/appearance from some origin/source') be understood: do *'byung khungs* and *'byung ba* refer to its narrower, i.e. causal understanding in the meaning of 'to originate from'? Or does Pra ti use it more generally in the meaning of 'something appears/occurs (from) somewhere'? While this is a difficult question that requires a separate study, the use of *nas* instead of *las* in the definition may have served the purpose – either intentionally or intuitively – to emphasize the more general meaning of source for *'byung khungs*. This would allow him to cover all the different semantic-syntactic constructions regardless of which of the morphemes is used or whether the sentence involves a causal dimension or not, since also the causal origin may be brought under the category of the source from which something appears. In the context of a critique of *Smra sgo* to separate a causal function (*rgyu*) from *'byung khungs*, Pra ti even states that "it is incorrect to separate (*logs su byed*) the meaning of cause (~ *rgyu'i 'jug pa*) from the meaning of source (*'byung khungs*), and in general it is correct to distinguish between the two mere source (*'byung khungs tsam*) and taking on the meaning of cause (*rgyu'i don la 'jug pa*) [as] a particular instance (*khyad par*) of that [mere source] […]."[831] A broader understanding of the fifth case in Pra ti's grammar in terms of a general source is also corroborated by the example *ri nas chu byung*, which in terms of syntax through its use of *nas* as well as in terms of content does not necessarily indicate a causal relation between the mountain and the water/river.[832]

---

[831] [...] *rgyu'i 'jug pa 'byung khungs kyi don las logs su byed na mi 'thad la/   spyir 'byung khungs tsam dang/ de'i khyad par rgyu'i don la 'jug pa gnyis kyi dbye bar byed na* […] *'thad do/* (Pra ti 2013A, 214).
For the category of *rgyu* ('cause'), which already figures in early Tibetan sources and is derived from a secondary meaning of *apādāna* in P 1.4.30 that covers causal origins such as the material cause, cf. also infra 327f. and 329ff. On Si tu's critique of Pra ti's suggestion to not separate between source and cause, cf. infra 341f.

[832] In fact, Sanskritic grammars such as the *Kāśikāvṛtti* classify precisely this type of example as an instance of mere source of appearance or first sight, but not as an example of a causal origination (cf. P 1.4.31; infra 331).

If the proposed reading of Pra ti's account proves consistent, his strategy to base the homogeneity of the fifth case on a very broad understanding of *'byung ba* and to not account for differences between the two morphemes *las* and *nas* was certainly motivated by his adherence to the established taxonomy of the fifth case in SCP. However, it will be demonstrated below that despite the unequivocal adherence to the equivalence of *nas* and *las* in the context of the fifth case function *'byung khungs*, the precise understanding of this category still varies. Ultimately, an understanding of the Tibetan grammatical term as well as the strategy for bringing together *nas* and *las* under the fifth case will have to be investigated separately for each author. In general, silence regarding this issue represents a common strategy and the exclusive point of reference is often the selection of examples.

However, Pra ti's critique of Smṛtijñānakīrti's *Smra sgo* reveals that there were accounts in Tibetan grammaticography which distinguished between the categories causal origin and spatial source. *Smra sgo*'s autocommentary states the following on *nas* and *las*:

> *rgyu'i don ni sa bon las myu gu zhes pa lta bu'o/   'byung khungs kyi don ni ri las gser zhes pa lta bu'o/   dgar ba'i don ni khyim pa las dge bsnyen zhe pa lta bu'o/   nas kyi don ni las dang mthun no/*

> "Regarding the meaning of cause (*rgyu*), [it is] as in 'the sprout from the seed.' As for the meaning of source (*'byung khungs*), [it is] as in 'gold from the mountain.' As for the meaning of distinction (*dgar ba*), 'the lay devotee from the householder.' As for the meaning of [morpheme] *nas*, it agrees with [morpheme] *las* [in these three meanings]."[833]

This quotation fully explicates the distinction of a causal origination, in examples such as the sprout originating from the seed, from a spatial appearance, in instances such as gold appearing at the mountain (without the gold and the mountain being causally related). However, Smṛti's exposition also makes clear that such a distinction was unlikely inspired by Tibetan-specific morphosyntax and the difference between *las* and *nas*, emphasizing that both may take on both meanings. [834] As a Sanskritic scholar, he rather adopted this distinction from the prevalent Sanskritic grammatical taxonomies.[835]

The question remains to which extent an understanding of *'byung khungs* that brings together *nas* and *las* is a representative account of the structures of WT. This is a rather intricate question

---

[833] Smṛti 2002, 91.
[834] On the third mentioned function, *dgar ba*, cf. infra 334f. and chapter 11.2.1.
[835] Cf. infra 331f.

326

in which different foci will result in different taxonomies. On the one hand, Tournadre states in his account that *las* and *nas* overlap in their uses as markers of a spatial origin (= source), and to my knowledge only few or even none of the verb frames are fully restricted to one of the two morphemes. On the other hand, although the category of *'byung khungs* in general correctly covers the information expressed by both morphemes, their use across different semantic-syntactic environments reveal that the two are anything but fully interchangeable and they may be more accurately differentiated regarding the precise information encoded by them.

From what was said thus far, it is evident that the precise use of the fifth case markers *nas* and *las* throughout WT was not the primary focus of the conception of *'byung khungs*. Consequently, this category loses some of its explanatory power, since the overarching understanding of *'byung khungs* above *nas* and *las* blurs certain aspects of the morphemes' precise distribution. This issue is rooted in the fact that the Tibetan conception of *'byung khungs* is not only based on the fifth case markers' language-specific uses, but it also involves the adoption of a selected conceptual-terminological framework from Sanskritic grammar that needs to be investigated in the context of the early Tibetan grammatical tradition and Sanskritic grammatical sources.

11.1.1 The Development of the Category *'byung khungs* out of Sanskritic Grammar

Based on the *kāraka*-scheme, the Sanskritic prototypical fifth case function is known as *apādāna*.[836] According to the *Cāndra* model, which has simplified the *Pāṇinian* model by providing self-explanatory notions without any definitions, it is known as *avadhi* ('limiting point,' C 2.1.81).[837] Pāṇini dedicated a total of eight rules in P 1.4.24-31 to the specification of *apādāna*, with the prototypical definition of P 1.4.24:

> *dhruvam apāye 'pādānam* "The fixed point in relation to moving away (is called) *apādāna*."[838]

Classic exampflications of this definition are *grāmād āgacchati* ('s/he comes from the village') or *rathāt patitaḥ* ('fallen from the chariot').[839] Evidently, the prototypical definition of the prototypical fifth case function in *Pāṇini* focuses on the idea of a spatial separation or departure. The remaining *Pāṇinian* rules specify *apādāna* as various intrasentential arguments in connection with either clearly defined verbal roots or more general semantic fields: the semantic

---

[836] Cf. P 2.3.28 *apādāne pañjamī* "If *apādāna*, then a fifth [*vibhakti* occurs]." Also cf. K 2.4.19; C 2.1.81.
[837] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, xvii.
[838] Transl. by Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 90.
[839] Cf. Sharma 1990, 234.

fields of *bhī* ('to fear') and *trā* ('to protect,' P 1.4.25), the verb *parāji* ('to be overcome (by),'
P 1.4.26), the semantic field *vāraṇa* ('warding off,' 1.4.27), the word form *antarddhi* ('to hide
(from),' P 1.4.28), the conveyer of knowledge in the act of teaching somebody (*ākhyātopayoge*,
P 1.4.29), the material cause or origin (*prakṛti*) out of which something comes into being (P
1.4.30), the source of appearance (*prabhava*) in connection with *bhū* ('to be (first sighted at),'
P 1.4.31).[840] *Kātantra* uses *apādāna* as well but provides only two rules, comprising a selection
of four functions from the *Pāṇinian* model (P 1.4.24, 25, 27 and 29):

> K 2.4.8 *yato 'paiti bhayam ādatte vā tad apādānam* "That [*kāraka*] from which one
> moves away, for which one fears, or from which one takes [or receives] is [termed]
> point of departure."[841]

> K 2.4.9 *īpsitaṃ ca rakṣārthānām* "[With verbal roots] of the meaning 'protecting,' also
> the desired is *apādāna* (= point of departure)."[842]

The semantic fields and word forms thus far quoted from Sanskritic grammar merely define the
prototypical trigger *apādāna* of the fifth case suffix, but not its remaining uses defined in P 2.3,
C 2.1 and K 2.4. Just like the first and fourth case, the Tibetan term *'byung khungs* is not a
direct translational equivalent of *apādāna*. The Tibetan canonical translations of *apādāna* in
Pāṇini and *Kātantra* have rendered the term more literally as *nges par kun sbyin pa*.[843]
Although Si tu was well aware of this translation, he suggested as a more accurate rendition the
alternative translation *'bral bar len pa* (lit. 'to separatingly take' ~ 'to take away').[844]

It is important to note however that Negi in his Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary by contrast does list
'byung khungs as a translation of *apādāna*.[845] Moreover, *Cāndra*'s alternative label of this
kāraka-function as *avadhi* ('limiting point') was translated with *kun nas 'dzin pa* in the Peking
and *Snar thang* editions of the canonical translation of *Cāndravyākaraṇa* (CG 1; 13th/14th
century) but with *'byung khungs* in CG 24 (probably 14th century),[846] an alternative translation
of the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* contained only in the Sde dge and Co ne editions of the *bstan 'gyur*.[847]
The translations of both the terms *apādāna* and *avadhi* in the Tibetan tradition therefore allow
for the possibility that *'byung khungs* was directly derived from the two Sanskritic terms as

---

[840] Cf. e.g. Sharma 1990, 234ff.
[841] Transl. Verhagen HSGLT 2, 281.
[842] E.g. *yavebhyo gāṃ rakṣati* '(s)he keeps the cow off the grass'
[843] Cf. HSGLT 2, 356 and 359.
[844] Cf. GC 495.3.
[845] Cf. Negi 2002, 4050.
[846] Cf. HSGLT 2, 109, ft. 2.
[847] Cf. HSGLT 2, 357; HSGLT 1, CG 1 and CG 24.

their less literal but general equivalent. Yet, the early Tibetan accounts suggest a more intricate and layered transition from the Sanskritic to the Tibetan conception of the prototypical fifth case function than that through merely the translation of technical terms.[848]

11.1.2 Early Accounts of the Fifth Case and the Transition from Sanskritic *apādāna* to Tibetan *'byung khungs*

Already before *Smra sgo*, GNT provided a selection of three functions for the fifth case, namely *rgyu* ('cause/reason'), *'byung ba'i sa* ('semantic domain of origination/appearance') and *dgar ba'i sa* ('semantic domain of distinction'), which are all separately explained and illustrated.[849] The causal function is explained as follows:

> *de rnams las rgyu lnga pa ni sa bon las myu gu zhes pa'i* [sic!][850] *dang/   pha las bu 'byung zhes pa la sogs pa yin la/   de yang gnas gsum pa'i rgyu yis 'bras bu skyed pa thams cad kyang byed pa po'i gsum pa yin pa dang/   don gyi ngo bo gcig la gnas skabs kyi bye brag gis gsum pa ni rgyu yi 'bras bu byas pa'i byed pa po'i ldog pa nas bshad la/   'dir ni rgyu las 'bras bu 'byung ba'i 'byung gnas 'then pa yin te/   rgyu'i lnga pa'i don to/*

> "Of these [three semantic domains], the fifth [case] of cause is, for example, 'a sprout [originates] from a seed' (*sa bon las myu gu*) and 'a son originates from the father' (*pha las bu 'byung*). Furthermore, all creations of a result (*'bras bu skyed pa*) by a cause of the third semantic domain are the third [semantic domain] of the agent. A single instance [of cause] (~ *don gyi ngo bo gcig*) is explained due to the specific situation/context [either] as a third [case] from the side (~ *ldog pa nas*) of an agent who made (*byas pa*) the result of the cause, or here, [in these examples, the semantic domain of] origin (*'byung gnas*) follows, [according to which] the result originates (*'byung ba*) from the cause. [This latter is] the meaning of the fifth [case as] cause (*rgyu*)."[851]

The category of *rgyu* is only briefly illustrated by means of two examples, namely the sprout which originates from the seed as well as the son which originates from the father. Of less importance to the current context but still noteworthy, the author also distinguishes between the causal meaning of the third and the fifth case based on the verbs *byed pa* ('to do,' 'to make') and *'byung ba*, which respectively constitute the semantic foundation of the two cases (*byed pa*

---

[848] Cf. also HSGLT 2, ft. 421. Here, Verhagen disagrees with a categoric identification of *'byung khungs* with the term *apādāna*.
[849] Cf. CT *115 – 456*.
[850] I read *pa*.
[851] Ibid.

po vs. *'byung khung*).[852] As for GNT's secondary fifth-case function, i.e. *'byung ba'i sa* ('the semantic domain of origination/appearance'), the text continues as follows:

> *'byung khungs kyi lnga pa ni ldog pa'i bye brag mang ste/   nyes dmigs kyi 'byung khungs dang yon tan gyi 'byung khungs dang/   brko zhing blangs pa'i 'byung khungs dang/   'phel ba'i zhing* [sic!][853] *mched pa'i 'byung khungs dang rnam par 'gyur ba'i 'byung khungs la sogs ldog pa shin tu mang ste/   de la nyes dmigs 'byung khungs ni 'khor ba'i sems can las skyon nam nyes pa thams cad 'byung ngo/   zhes pa la sogs pa dang/   yon tan gyi 'byung khungs ni 'phags pa las yon tan thams cad 'byung zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa dang/   brko zhing blang ba'i 'byung khungs ni ri 'ka' zhig las gser 'byung zhes pa dang/   brad 'ga' zhig las dngul 'byung zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa'o/   'phel zhing mched pa'i 'byung khungs ni/   mar me gcig las stong la sogs pa sbar te zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa'o/   rnam pa gzhan tu 'gyur ba'i 'byung khungs ni snang ba las mi snang bar gyur to/   zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa dang/   snga ma'i gzugs de nyid las gzhan du sprul te/   zhes pa la sogs pa lta bu'o/   lnga pa'i 'byung khungs 'di nyid de nyid las gzhan du brjod du med pa la yang mthong ste/   gzugs las kyang stong pa nyid gzhan ma yin stong pa nyid las kyang gzugs gzhan ma yin no zhes pa la sogs pa lta bu du ma snang ngo/   de lta bu la sogs pa'i 'byung khungs ni spros na bsam gyis mi khyab par zhes par bya'o/*

"The fifth [case] of source/origin (*'byung khungs*) has many different facets (*ltog pa'i bye brag mang*), viz. lots of facets such as the source/origin of defects (*nyes dmigs*), the source/origin of qualities (*yon tan*), the source/origin of digging out and taking (*brko zhing blangs*), the source/origin of enlargement and increasing (*'phel zhing mched pa*), the source/origin of change (*rnam par 'gyur ba*), etc. Thus, the source/origin of defects [would be], for example, 'all the faults and defects (*skyon nam nyes pa*) come from (*las*) samsaric beings (*'khor ba'i sems can*).' The source/origin of qualities [would be] 'all the qualities come from noble beings (*'phags pa*).' The source/origin of digging out and taking [would be], for example 'gold comes from some mountains,' or 'Silver comes from some rocks.' The source/origin of enlargement and increasing [would be], for example, 'From one butter lamp, a thousand and so on are inflamed.' The source/origin of changing into another aspect (*rnam pa gzhan du 'gyur ba*) [would be], for example, 'From appearance [it] changed into disappearance' or '[he/she] incarnated

---

[852] Note that also NGg relates the two categories of agent and origin in a very condensed manner (cf. infra 337f.).
[853] I read *'phel zhing*.

330

(*sprul*) from that earlier body/form (*gzugs*) into another,' etc. The fifth [case's] source/origin als occurs for [the indication] that this very entity is not to be differentiated (*gzhan du brjod du med pa*) from that very entity. [This use] figures frequently such as in 'neither is emptiness different from form, nor is form different from emptiness' (*gzugs las kyang stong pa nyid gzhan ma yin stong pa nyid las kyang gzugs gzhan ma yin no*). [All] these and similar [types of] source/origin are to be known as extendable beyond imagination (*de lta bu la sogs pa'i 'byung khungs ni spros na bsam gyis mi khyab par shes par bya'o*)."[854]

The author introduced a variety of subcategories that are regarded as incomplete but may be extended. The provided categories of *rgyu* and *'byung khungs* together with their examples in the GNT allow a comparison of these categories with the *Pāṇinian* definition of *apādāna*. As it was already outlined above,[855] from the eight rules that define the *kāraka* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the final two are dedicated to the categories *prakṛti* ('origin, material cause') and *prabhava* ('source'):

> P 1.4.30 *janikarttuḥ prakṛtiḥ* "The origin/material cause of the agent of origination [is *apādāna*]."

> Example from *Kāśikāvṛtti*: *śṛṅgāc charo jāyate* 'an arrow originates (is made) from horn'

> P 1.4.31 *bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ* "The source [of the agent of] first appearance [is *apādāna*]."

> Example from *Kāśikāvṛtti*: *himavato gaṅgā prabhavati* 'the Gaṅgā appears in the Himālaya'[856]

Following the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, the term *prakṛti* should be understood in terms of *kāraṇa* ('instrument,' 'cause') or *hetu* ('cause'). In this sense it represents a genuine causal origin, although the commentarial literature seems to disagree whether P 1.4.30 is restricted to material causes in terms of *upādāna* or whether it allows for any type of cause.[857] According to the *Nyāsa* commentary, the difference to P 1.4.31 is that the latter covers only those sources in which something is first sighted or appears for the first time but without it being the cause.

---

[854] CT *115* – 456f.
[855] Cf. supra 327f.
[856] For the translation of these rules, cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 100 and 106; Sharma 1990, 240ff.
[857] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 101; Sharma 1990, 241.

Thus, the Gaṅgā is regarded as merely springing from the Himālaya, but the latter is not seen as its actual causal origin, and therefore this instance cannot be covered by P 1.4.30.[858]

On a mere terminological basis, the Tibetan terms *rgyu* and *'byung khungs* directly resonate with Sanskrit *prabhava* as well as *prakṛti*, the latter understood as *kāraṇa* ('cause') or *hetu* ('cause').[859] While *rgyu* is the common translational equivalent of both *kāraṇa* and *hetu*, Tibetan *'byung ba* has been used as a common translation for the verb *prabhavati* ('to appear,' 'come forth').[860] Apart from this terminological congruence, GNT's category of *rgyu* ('cause,' 'reason') and the two provided examples of *sa bon las myu gu* ('the sprout [originates] from the seed') and *pha las bu 'byung* ('the son originates from the father') also directly resonate with P 1.4.30 and the category of a (material) cause. In contrast, GNT's *'byung khungs* is more intricate, since it poses the question whether all its subcategories and examples are to be interpreted as only indicating a non-causal source such as that in P 1.4.31. For example, 'all the faults and defects originate from samsaric beings' (*'khor ba'i sems can las skyon nam nyes pa thams cad 'byung ngo*) as well as 'all the qualities originate from noble beings' (*'phags pa las yon tan thams cad 'byung*) may be – and perhaps even are preferred to be – interpreted in the meaning that samsaric beings have brought forth these defects due to their karmic actions, whereas noble beings have developed these qualities through practice and realization, in which sense they are equivalent to *pha las bu 'byung* ('the son originates from the father'). On the contrary, the same examples may be interpreted less causally and in the meaning of 'all the faults and defects (*skyon nam nyes pa*) appear/occur in (*las*) samsaric beings (*'khor ba'i sems can*)' as well as 'all the qualities appear/occur in noble beings (*'phags pa*).' The same holds true for examples such as *ri 'ga' zhig las gser 'byung* ('gold originates from/appears at some mountains'), which may be more neutral and must not necessarily involve a causal relationship, merely emphasizing the place of appearance in the sense of 'gold comes from some mountains' or 'gold occurs at some mountains.' However, the existence of *rgyu* (cause) as a separate category in GNT might be a strong argument towards the category *'byung khungs* as a more general source, whereas any causal origin belongs to the causal subcategory. In any case, the examples for *'byung khungs* are rather ambiguous and thus allow for different understandings of the author's possible interpretations of each of them.

Whatever was the author's precise understanding of *'byung khungs*, I argue that the subcategories and examples of GNT's *'byung khungs* relate much stronger to the idea of source

---

[858] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 102f.
[859] For the terminological congruence of *'byung khungs* and *prabhava*, cf. also HSGLT 2, 290f.
[860] Cf. Negi 1993, 793 and 2002, 4057.

332

(*prabhava*) in P 1.4.31 than to the prototypical *apādāna* that is the movement away or the spatial separation from a fixed point of departure (*apāya* and *dhruva*) in P 1.4.24. Compare also the typical examples of P 1.4.24 and 1.4.31 with those in the GNT:

P 1.4.24:

> *grāmād āgacchati* 'he is departuring from the village'
> *parvatād avarohati* 'he is climbing down the mountain'
> *sārthād hīnaḥ* 'separated from the caravan'
> *rathāt patitaḥ* 'fallen from the chariot'

P 1.4.31:

> *himavato gaṅgā prabhavati* 'Gaṅgā appears in the Himālaya'[861]

GNT on *'byung khungs* (selection):

> *'phags pa las yon tan thams cad 'byung* 'all the qualities come from noble beings'
> *ri 'ga' zhig las gser 'byung* 'gold comes from some mountains'
> *brag 'ga' zhig las dngul 'byung* 'silver comes from some rocks'
> *mar me gcig las stong la sogs pa sbar* 'from one butter lamp, a thousand and so on are inflamed'

Although the examples of GNT do not directly relate to any of the two *Pāṇinian* rules, they do exhibit a much stronger affinity to the example in P 1.4.31, since due to the employed verb frames in the Tibetan phrases, the idea of a source of appearance or causal origin prevails over that of separation or departure.

In sum, it is proposed that the *Pāṇinian* categories of *prakṛti* and *prabhava* are indeed the conceptual-terminological antecedents of the Tibetan terminology that have found their way into the Tibetan tradition, either directly or mediated by other sources and conceptions. However, future research is necessary to determine whether the distinction between the two notions has followed different and perhaps less clear-cut parameters in sources such as the GNT. Since this question cannot be decided here, a more neutral rendition of *'byung ba* as 'to come from' was preferred throughout the translation of the entire passage on *'byung khungs* in the GNT, since the demarcation between causal origin and a mere spatial source within the category of *'byung khungs* as well as the distinction of *'byung khungs* and *rgyu* is not

---

[861] The examples for P 1.4.24 and 31, which are from the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, are quoted with their translation from Sharma 1990, 234.

sufficiently clear to me and a matter of further interpretation that has not been provided by GNT itself.

GNT's third category which is subsumed under the fifth case is that of *dgar ba* ('distinction, separation'), which also figures in NGg, *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*,[862] *Smra sgo*[863] as well as SCP 17.1. GNT distinguishes two types of *dgar ba*, namely *rigs mi 'thun pa* ('discordant class') and *rigs 'thun pa* ('accordant class'):

> *de la dang po ni mi las lha'i 'gro ba zhes pa'am/   dmyal ba las yi dwags zhes pa'am/ dud 'gro las ni mi zhes pa lta bu'o/   rigs 'thun pa las dgar ba ni mi nyid las kyang skyes pa las bud med ces pa'am/   khyim pa las rab tu byung ba zhes pa'am/   bram ze las rgyal rigs zhes pa la sogs par blta'o/*

> "Regarding the first [of these two types of separation, the distinction from a discordant class would be], for example, 'divine beings from humans' (*mi las lha'i 'gro ba*), '*preta*s from hell beings' (*dmyal ba las yi dwags*) or 'humans from animals' (*dud 'dro las ni mi*). The distinction from an accordant class (*rigs 'thun pa las dgar ba*) has to be regarded as within the [class of] human itself (*mi nyid las*), 'a woman from a man' (*skyes pa las bud med*), 'an ordained person from a house-holder' (*khyim pa las rab tu byung ba*) or 'the royal class from the brahmins' (*bram ze las rgyal rigs*)."[864]

Although GNT's subdivision into *rigs 'thun* and *rigs mi 'thun* as well as the respective examples are rather unusual, the category of *dgar ba* is to be traced to either P 2.3.41 or 42 and the grammatical terms *nirdhāraṇa* ('separation,' 'specification,' 'singling out') or *vibhakta* (lit. 'divided;' 'distinctiveness,' 'separateness'). In most general terms, these Sanskrit grammatical rules define the case marking patterns for the comparison of two entities and do not belong to any *kāraka* function:

> P 2.3.41 *yataś ca nirdhāraṇam* '[A sixth or seventh *vibhakti*] also [occurs after that item] from amongst which [one] is singled out.'

> Example: *gavāṃ kṛṣṇā sampannakṣīratamā* 'the black among cows is richest in milk'[865]

[862] Cf. infra 336f.
[863] Cf. supra 326.
[864] GNT CT *115 – 457*.
[865] Example transl. by Sharma 1995, 146.
334

P 2.3.42 *pañjamī vibhakte* 'The fifth [*vibhakti* occurs], if [there is] distinctiveness/ separateness.'[866]

Example: *māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ sukumārataraḥ* 'the people of Mathurā are more youthful than the people of Pāṭaliputra'[867]

These rules cover two types of comparison: one in terms of a relation of a part to the whole, i.e. a part of a whole is distinguished from the rest by means of a certain parameter (*nirdhāraṇa*; P 2.3.41), and a second one in terms of two distinct entities that are distinguished by means of another certain parameter (*vibhakta*; P 2.3.42). Most importantly, these two types follow different case marking patterns, namely a sixth or seventh case suffix for *nirdhāraṇa* and a fifth case suffix for *vibhakta*.

Unfortunately, GNT omits any comparing parameters in its exemplification of *dgar ba*. Reading GNT's phrases on their own, for example *mi las lha'i 'gro ba* ('divine beings from humans'), there is even the question whether this category in fact aims at a comparison in terms of a distinction by means of a parameter. The phrase may equally be understood as 'divine beings are distinct (*dgar ba*) from humans,' and the author may have understood this as the entire and thus exclusive use of this function. Nonetheless, it can be safely assumed that the category as such goes back to the concepts of *nirdhāraṇa* or *vibhakta*. Verhagen proposes *nirdhāraṇa* as the Sanskritic antecedent of Tibetan *dgar ba*,[868] which is likely since *nges par bkar ba* is found as the Tibetan translation of this term in K 2.4.36 of the *Kalāpaśiṣyahitā* (CG 14).[869] Moreover, the *Vṛtti* on C 2.1.92 discusses both Sanskritic types of comparison (*nirdhāraṇa* and *vibhakta*) under the category of *nirdhāraṇa*, thus allowing for the use of this term for the fifth case.[870]

Furthermore, the distinction of *dgar ba* into *rigs 'thun pa* and *mi 'thun pa* may be expected to correspond to P 2.3.41 and P 2.3.42 respectively, but GNT seems to aim at a different distinction and gives an illustration of it based on the Buddhist concept of the six realms of rebirth: across the realms (= *rigs mi 'thun*), divine beings are different from humans, whereas within one realm (= *rigs 'thun*), e.g. the realm of humans, women are different from men. If GNT's category of *dgar ba* is indeed aimed at a comparison, then both proposed types belong to P 2.3.42, since neither the type of *rigs 'thun* nor the one of *rigs mi 'thun* singles out a part within a whole. This unusual subcategorization did not survive in the later grammatical tradition, however the

---

[866] On the translation of these rules, cf. Sharma 1995, 145f.; Joshi and Roodbergen 1980, 74f.
[867] Example transl. by Sharma 1995, 146.
[868] HSGLT 2, 219.
[869] Cf. CT *109* – 367.
[870] Cf. Liebich 1918, 112.

category of *dgar ba* ('distinction') remained an important category – albeit more in the comparative value of the *Pāṇinian* rules – mainly because it figures in SCP 17.1 as an additional function of *nas* and *las*.

In GNT's final summary of the fifth case, *'byung khungs* is explicated as the category which prevails over the remaining two functions:

> *de ltar na lnga pa'i don ni rgyu dang/ 'byung ba'i las/ dgar ba'i sa rnams las 'dir ni 'byung khungs gtsor byas nas/ tshigs su bcad pa las kyang/ me tog ldan pa'i shing las yal ga'o/ zhes pa lta bu'i don to/*

> "Accordingly, regarding the meaning of the fifth [case, it is] cause and the semantic domain of origination/appearance[871] [as well as] the semantic domain of distinction (*dgar ba*). Making here origin/source (*'byung khungs*) the main [semantic domain] out of these [three], the meaning is like in the [initially provided] verse 'branches [originate] from the flowering tree' (*me tog ldan pa'i shing las yal ga'o*)."[872]

Apart from the GNT, the most direct link between the Tibetan focus on *'byung khungs* and the Sanskritic tradition is the canonical *Smra ba kun* (HSGLT 1, CG 16) and its autocommentary (HSGLT 1, CG 17), in case their Sanskritic origin may be assumed as fact. The commentary explains *'byung khungs* as follows:

> *'byung khungs sam rgyu'i don ni gang la gang yod pa las de de las bral ba dang skyes pa dang dgar zhing khyad par du byas na don der 'gyur de/ bdun pa'i don la rag las pas de'i don la shes par bya'o/*

> "Regarding the meaning of origin/source or cause (*'byung khungs sam rgyu'i don*), this meaning results from [the relation that] something exists somewhere (*gang la gang yod pa las*), if something is separated from something (*bral ba*), comes into being [from something] (*skyes pa*) or is distinguished (*dgar ba*) and specified/singled out (*khyad par du byas*). Since it depends on the meaning of the seventh [case], it is to be understood from that [case's] meaning."[873]

In this source, the categories of *rgyu* and *'byung khungs* seem to be alternative labels, and thus any distinction between origin and source is blurred. In addition to the categories that have already figured in the GNT, the commentary's definition adds the notions of *bral ba*

---

[871] I read *'byung ba'i sa* instead of *'byung ba'i las*.
[872] GNT *CT 115* – 458.
[873] CT *109* – 1712f.

('separation'), *skyes pa* ('coming into being,' 'being brought forth') and *khyad par du byas pa* ('specification,' 'particularization,' 'singling out') to specify this *kāraka*. The definition at hand do not need to be detailed, it suffices to note that the shift of focus away from the prototypical *apādāna* (P 1.4.24) towards *'byung khungs* and – in this source – also *rgyu* has been already executed. The away movement or spatial separation from a fixed point of departure (*apāya* and *dhruva*) of P 1.4.24 does figure in the text in the form of *bral ba* ('separation'),[874] but only as one category among many that specify the pair *'byung khungs* and *rgyu*. However, nothing is known about the Sanskritic version of CG 16 and CG 17 or possible Sanskrit terms that these two sources have translated with *'byung khungs*, therefore any further conclusions at this point are mere speculations.

The quoted definition of *'byung khungs* in the autocommentary of *Smra ba kun* directly resonates with NGg:

> *lnga pa'i don ni gang zhig la/   gang gis yod pa las/   de gzhi de las byung ba dang/ bral ba dang/   dgar ba dang/   khyad par du byed na/   gang las zhes bya ba'i sgra yod de/   de ci'i phyir lnga pa gang las zhes bya bas rgyu dang 'byung khungs kyi sa zhes bya'o/*

> "As for the meaning of the fifth [case], from [the combination of the two relations], where something exists [as well as] by which it exists (*gang zhig la gang gis yod pa las*),[875] [the meaning results that] something appears/originates from some substratum (*gzhi*), or becomes separated (*bral ba*), or distinguished (*dgar ba*), or singled out (*khyad par du byed*). [For such instances], there is the term (*sgra*) '*gang las*,' and for the reason (*ci'i phyir* ?) that it is the fifth [case in the form of] '*gang las*,' it is called the 'semantic domain of cause and source/origin.'"[876]

The exact interpretation of this passage poses a challenge since the Tibetan is very condensed and cryptic. The most problematic part is the phrase *gang zhig la gang gis yod pa **las***, where I

---

[874] According to Negi (2002, 4074) the term *'bral ba* is used as a translation for Sanskrit *viśleṣa* ('separation,' 'disjunction'), a term which was used in Sanskritic grammatical literature for the definition of *apādāna*/*avadhi*, although thus far I have only encountered it in the *Sārasvata* school that commonly is dated much later (cf. M.S. Joshi 2011, 313). Moreover, also Si tu in his alternative rendition of Sanskrit *apādāna* provided *'bral ba* as his translation for Sanskrit *apa* (cf. supra 328).

[875] Verhagen (HSGLT 2, 401) notes in his tentative translation of this phrase that there are noteworthy differences in the different editions: the Peking edition reads *gang **gi** yod pa las*, whereas the versions in Sde dge and Co ne are unclear on the point whether the phrase reads *gang **gi sa** yod pa las* or *gang **gis** yod pa las*. I follow the Sde dge edition as it is contained in the CT, which is identical with the version of this passage quoted in Si tu's GC (cf. GC 496.2). Moreover, my decision is based on the reading of this passage against the background of the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*.

[876] CT *115 – 433.*

have read the syntactic link *las* in its meaning as source/origin, i.e. '**from** (lit. 'out of') *gang zhig la* and *gang gis yod pa* results that something originates, etc.'. Alternatively, this syntactic link may also be read as an adversative connection in the meaning of '**instead** of *gang zhig la* and *gang gis yod pa*, something originates from some basis, becomes separated, etc.' My translation is based on a comparison with the phrase *gang la gang yod pa las* in *Smra ba kun*'s commentary (CG 17).[877] The two are conceptually close insofar as they both connect the category of *'byung khungs/rgyu* to a locative aspect. In other words, source/origin (*'byung khungs*) and cause (*rgyu*) are to be regarded as the place or location from where something emerges, comes from, originates, etc. In addition, NGg brings in a causal-agentive aspect through *gang gis*, if my interpretation is correct, making the fifth case a combination of a locative and agentive dimension. Whether this addition was meant to better account for the fifth case's function of *rgyu* or perhaps to even represent a Tibetan-specific adaptation in line with the prototypical marker *las* requires further scrutiny elsewhere.

A second philological question regards the phrase *ci'i phyir* in the final quotation, and whether it is either part of the syntactic structure of the sentence as a causal connector or an additional rendition of the fifth case's causal function in terms of 'because of something.' It was preferred above to read *ci'i phyir* as part of the syntactic structure of the sentence, for the simple reason that in this treatise the syntactic link *phyir* is already used as the prototypical case form of the fourth case, and no classification of *phyir* as a fifth case has been identified.

Concerning the focus on *'byung khungs/prabhava*, it is clear that also in NGg the category of *'byung khungs* together with that of *rgyu* have prevailed over *apādāna*'s prototypical category of a departure or separation from some fixed point, while the latter survived in terms of *bral ba* as a specification or subcategory of the fifth case's main labels *'byung khungs* and/or *rgyu*. In comparison, GNT has fully omitted *bral ba*, whereas SCP 16.2-17.1 has even excluded *rgyu* and mentiones only *'byung khungs* as well as *dgar ba* and *sdud pa* ('collection') as functions of *las* and *nas*.[878]

If the proposed hypothesis is correct that *'byung khungs* was derived from *prabhava* in P 1.4.31 rather than from the prototypical conception of the *kāraka apādāna* in P 1.4.24, K 2.4.8 or

---

[877] The two sources must be in some historical relation in this particular context: not only that these two phrases directly resonate with each other except for NGg's addition of *gang gis*, but also the entire definition of the fifth case in the NGg appears to be a free rendition of the definition of *'byung khungs* in CG 17, to the extent that even the phrasing of the two passages are very close to each other. Both mention almost the same selection of technical terms, namely *'byung khungs*, *rgyu*, *bral ba*, *dgar ba* and *khyad par du byed pa*, the only deviation being the additional *skyes pa* in the *Smra ba kun*, whereas NGg uses *byung ba* that is obviously related to *'byung khungs*.
[878] On *sdud pa*, cf. infra 349f. and 352.

Cāndra's *avadhi* in C 2.1.81, then the question still remains how *prabhava* has become the dominant category for the fifth case in the Tibetan tradition. The *prabhava* rule P 1.4.30 belongs to the domain of *apādāna* and thus is part of the *kāraka*. The prototypical definition in *Pāṇini*, however, has focused on the idea of a movement away (*apāya*) from some point of departure (*dhruva*) and not on any type of source of appearance. This definition has remained the dominant one in the Sanskritic tradition, and I did not find any noteworthy traces of a shift of focus to the category of *prabhava*. Moreover, I could not identify further noteworthy material on the relation of *prabhava* to *apāya*, apart from the discussion in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, according to which both the categories *prakṛti* (P 1.4.30) and *prabhava* (P 1.4.31) are rejected since they can be subsumed under P 1.4.24.[879] While this is in direct opposition to the Tibetan focus on *'byung khungs*, Patañjali's subsumption of P 1.4.30 and 31 under the single rule P 1.4.24 as well as *Cāndra*'s identical strategy in C 2.1.81 at least reveal that the categories of movement away from some point of departure (P 1.4.24), causal origin (P 1.4.30) and non-causal source (P 1.4.31) can and have been related to each other in one way or another; and it is to be assumed that it is ultimately a matter of metalinguistic-semantic interpretation whether the point of departure or the source of appearance is chosen as the prevailing one. At this point, however, the factors which have governed this interpretation in the Tibetan context may only be speculated about.

The category *'byung khungs* – especially in its interpretation as a source of appearance – was apparently regarded as the most inclusive one under which the remaining uses (*bral ba*, *dgar ba*, etc.) are best subsumed. The focus on case functions with the tendency to choose one major function per case in the Tibetan case model has perhaps urged towards the selection of a single category. There also remains the possibility that the Tibetan fifth case markers *las* and *nas* suggest a shift of focus within *apādāna* towards *prabhava*, since especially the Tibetan-specific usage of *las* as the prototypical and more inclusive marker of the fifth case compared to *nas* has a strong function of source and origin, which in the eyes of Tibetan grammarians may have been more representative than a mere spatial departure or separation.

Moreover, although *'byung khungs* and *rgyu* seem to be equal and perhaps even interchangeable categories in NGg and *Smra ba kun*, the dominance of *'byung khungs* over the narrower category *rgyu* in GNT as well as the omission of *rgyu* in SCP probably was due to its subsumption under *'byung khungs*, since the broader category of a general source may cover instances of causal origination without much additional effort once the distinction between P

---

[879] Cf. *Bhāṣya* 1ff. on P 1.4.30 and P 1.4.31 respectively in Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 101ff.

1.4.30 and 31 is no longer effected.[880] Such a subsumption of *rgyu* under *'byung khungs* may have happened due to the ambiguity of different semantic instances regarding causal origination vs. non-causal source such as encountered it in the GNT, which may have fostered the conflation of origin and source. It is assumed that there must be numerous semantic fields that do not allow for a clear-cut classification in terms of causal vs. non-causal which have thus compromised the originally *Pāṇinian* distinction to an extent that it might have become obsolete; and although the precise distribution of *las* and *nas* has been blurred in Tibetan, this subsumption may even have been supported by the Tibetan-specific morphosyntax, at least insofar as *las* indeed covers both uses. However, as mentioned at the very beginning of this survey, the precise understanding of *'byung khungs*, whether origin or source prevail and the ways they are subsumed under the fifth case *'byung khungs* will have to be investigated separately for each grammatical source.

11.1.3 Résumé on the Fifth Case pre-Si tu

Following traditional accounts of Tibetan case grammar, the fifth case *'byung khungs* ('source/origin') marked by the two morphemes *nas* and *las* was not a direct adoption of the Sanskritic prototypical fifth case function *apādāna*. Already early sources decided on a selection of *kāraka* as well as non-*kāraka* functions that they have subsumed under the fifth case, the most dominant one being the three domains of *'byung ba* ('origination/appearance'), *rgyu* ('cause') and *dgar ba* ('separation,' 'distinction'). It was proposed in this survey that the Tibetan nomenclature goes back to the Sanskritic categories of *prabhava*, *prakṛti* and *nirdhāraṇa*. While in NGg and *Smra ba kun* both *'byung khungs* and *rgyu* equally figure as major labels above the other categories, *'byung khungs* has prevailed in the concluding passages of GNT. The prototypical characteristic of *apādāna* in Sanskritic grammatical sources, i.e. departure or spatial separation (*apāya*), has survived in sources such as the NGg or the *Smra ba kun*, but it has noticeably lost its prototypical status.

Apart from these observations, at this point the precise transition from Sanskritic *apāya* to Tibetan *'byung khungs* remains unclear. Sanskritic discussions such as in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* only reveal that the difference between *apāya*, *prabhava* and *prakṛti* was regarded as fluid and even superfluous, which may have facilitated the shift of focus towards *prabhava* in the Tibetan context. Further, sources like *Cāndra* or *Kātantra* do not distinguish between P 1.4.24, 30 and 31, even omitting the latter two. This survey has not addressed whether any

---

[880] We have seen in the account of Pra ti that this line of thought was indeed followed at least in later *Sum rtags* commentarial literature (cf. supra 325).

theoretical or perhaps also Tibetan language-specific factors, e.g. a stronger linguistic significance of the markers *las* and *nas*, has been involved in the reintpretation of the fifth case function. However, at least the presentations of the fifth case in *Smra sgo*'s autocommentary as well as in NGg make clear that these sources do not relate the distinction of *rgyu* and *'byung khungs* to the distributional difference of *las* and *nas*. Moreover, the Tibetan sources considered in this survey do not feature any noteworthy signs of an awareness that the Tibetan conceptions of this case differ from those in the Sanskritic grammars.

As for the main function of the Tibetan case, i.e. *'byung khungs*, the question was raised whether it refers to a causal origination or more generally to a source of appearance. The relation of *'byung khungs* to *prabhava* as well as the existence of *rgyu* ('cause') as a distinct category would suggest the latter option. However, the Tibetan sources in their conceptions of the fifth case have not further problematized the issue to which extent these categories should be consistently distinguished. Although I would intuitively adhere to the option that *'byung khungs* represents a general source of appearance in most grammars, either exclusively or in a more inclusive way that includes instances of cause or causal origination, this has intentionally remained undecided in the translation of most passages.

Overall, the fifth case appears to be a condensed or comprised version of Sanskritic conceptions of the fifth case suffix's functions that was based on a selection of several of these functions. Further research will hopefully shed more light on the question of how and to which extent Tibetan language or additional conceptions not considered in this survey have influenced this selection.

11.2 The Fifth Case in the *Great Commentary*

Si tu's GC on SCP 16.2-4 gives a concise definition of the notion of *'byung khungs sa* ('semantic domain of origin'):

> *rjes 'jugs yi ge bcu po de'i bzhi pa na dang dgu pa la gnyis la so sor bcu pa sa yig sbyar bas/ nas/ las/ zhes grub pa ni chos gang las gang zhig bral ba'am byung ba ston pa'i don du mtshungs par 'jug pas gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye lnga pa zhes bshad pa 'byung khungs kyi sa yin no/ zhes so/*

> "[The root text 16.2-4] says that if from the ten postscript letters the tenth, the letter *sa*, is applied to the fourth *na* and the ninth *la* respectively, *nas* and *las* form. Since they equally join in the meaning that indicates that from some phenomenon something is

separated (*bral ba*) or came into being (*byung ba*), [they] are the semantic domain of source, which in other treatises is explained as the fifth case."[881]

After explaining the morphological derivation of the two morphemes *nas* and *las* from the ten postscript letters, GC identified the category of *'byung khungs* as the fifth case and gives its definition by help of the two specifications *bral ba* ('being separated') and *byung ba* ('came into being,' 'originated,' 'appeared'). While the latter is obviously connected to the technical term *'byung khungs* itself, Si tu also emphasizes the category of a spatial separation (*bral ba/'bral ba*), which is the primary defining category of *apādāna* in the Sanskritic tradition. Despite his adoption of the established Tibetan nomenclature, Si tu therefore has attempted to follow Sanskritic grammar and to model his conception of the fifth case function in close connection with the classical definition of *apādāna*. However, in his demonstration of the uses of the two morphemes in the meaning of *'byung khungs*, a first important deviation also becomes apparent:

> *'byung khungs kyi don la ji ltar 'jug pa ni dper na/　sangs rgyas las chos chos las 'phags pa'i tshogs/　tshogs las snying po ye shes khams thob mthar/　zhes dang/ gser kha nas gser/　rgya mtsho nas nor bu/　ba las 'o ma/　mkhas pa las rig pa/ lta bu dang/　'byung khungs dngos ma yin yang skabs der de las byung bas 'byung khungs dang 'dra ba/　rta las lhung/　ri las lhung/　skas nas babs/　shar phyogs nas 'od snang lta bu rnams su shes par bya'o/*

"Regarding the way in which [these two morphemes] take on the meaning of source, it is to be known as in, for example, (1) 'from the Buddha the Dharma, from the Dharma the noble *saṅgha* [and] from the *saṅgha* the attainment of the realm of the wisdom nature. At the end […]' (*sangs rgyas las chos chos las 'phags pa'i tshogs/ tshogs las snying po ye shes khams thob mthar*),[882] (2) 'from the gold mine gold' (*gser kha nas gser*), (3) 'from the ocean jewels' (*rgya mtsho nas nor bu*) and (4) 'from the cow milk' (*ba las 'o ma*), (5) 'from the scholar knowledge' (*mkhas pa las rig pa*). Not actual sources, but, since on that particular occasion (*skabs*) something came from (~ *byung ba*) it, quasi-sources (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*) are to be understood as in (6) 'to fall off the horse' (*rta las lhung*), (7) 'to fall off the rock/mountain' (*ri las lhung*), (8) 'to

---

[881] GC 492.5.

[882] This verse has already been quoted before Si tu as an example for *'byung khungs* by Rnam gling (2013, 77) on SCP 16.2- 17.1, and it is taken from the very beginning of the *Mahāyānottratantraśāstra* (*Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos*).

fall from the ladder' (*skas nas babs*) [and] (9) 'light shines from the east' (*shar phyogs nas 'od snang*)."[883]

Here, Si tu introduces a subdivision between actual sources (*'byung khungs dngos*) and quasi-sources (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*), i.e. locations that on certain occasions (*skabs*) serve as the point from where something arises. Thus, these are only similar to the actual sources (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*). The distinguishing parameter is that of *skabs* ('occasion'), which means that actual sources are defined by the fact that the appearing entity always, usually or typically comes from that source. Judged from the examples, the category of actual source (*'byung khungs dngos*) is restricted to the proper or genuine source (from) where an item comes into being, whereas *skabs* only represents a temporally or occasionally limited source. However, the question arises whether Si tu saw the category of a non-occasional genuine source connected to the causal relation between origin and the originated item. This is ultimately a matter of interpretation, as the underlying scenarios of sample phrases such as (1), (4) or (5) may suggest a causal origination, whereas the underlying instance in (3) also allows for a more non-causal interpretation in terms of the common or typical place of origination, without being the causing originator itself. It seems that Si tu did not provide conclusive information on this matter. Yet, since Si tu focused on the parameter of *skabs* and did not explicitly refer to a causal relation involved in actual sources, the option will be tentatively favored that *'byung khungs dngos* ('actual source') is only defined through the parameter of being the actual or genuine source (from) where an item normally comes into being, which possibly but not necessarily is a causally related origin(ator). GC's actual type of source then covers places where something comes into being, and that place may be the actual originator, such as the cow of the milk, or only the place of origin without being the actual originator, such as the ocean for jewels. Therefore, the term *'byung khungs* in Si tu's context is translated with 'source' in this thesis. In freer terms, the difference between actual and quasi-sources is that in the latter case something may come from that quasi-source, yet it does not come *into being* from that source.

Si tu's subdivision of *'byung khungs* makes clear that the fifth case function is not only defined by the parameter of *'bral ba* ('separation'), since instances such as 'to fall off the horse' (*rta las lhung*), which fully meet the parameter of spatial separation, are not actual sources in Si tu's taxonomy. He therefore significantly deviates from the prototypical definition of the Sanskritic prototypical fifth case function *apādāna/avadhi* (P 1.4.24, C 2.1.81), since the latter is only defined through spatial separation or departure, and instances such as *rathāt patitaḥ* ('fallen off

---

[883] GC 492.6.

the chariot') are classified as prototypical examples of *apādāna* according to the *Pāṇinian* tradition.[884]

Si tu then continues by introducing the additional use of *las* as a variation of *'byung khungs*, which he identifies as another instance of *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*:

> *yang du ba las mer shes/   chu skyar las chur shes/   skye zhing 'jig pa las dngos por rtogs/   lta bu las kyi sgra kho na rgyu mtshan la 'jug pa yod kyang/   mer shes pa sogs rgyu mtshan can de du ba mthong ba sogs kyi rgyu mtshan las byung ba'i phyir 'byung khungs dang 'dra ba'i rnam dbye lnga pa nyid do/*

> "Furthermore, as in (10) 'to know from smoke [that there is] fire' (*du ba las mer shes*), (11) 'to know from the spoonbill [that there is] water' (*chu skyar las chur shes*)[885] [and] (12) 'to recognize [something] as a thing from birth and destruction' (*skye zhing 'jig pa las dngos por rtogs*), only the morpheme *las* takes on [the meaning of] reason (*rgyu mtshan*). Yet, since that which has a reason, [i.e.] the knowledge about the fire, etc. comes (*byung ba*) from the reason of seeing the smoke, etc., it is nothing but the fifth case of quasi-origin (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*)."[886]

Si tu's *rgyu mtshan* ('reason') should not be misunderstood as the Tibetan fifth case function of *rgyu* ('cause'), which he will in fact address in his discussion of other sources. Si tu's sample phrases clearly reveal that *rgyu mtshan* refers to a genuine reason in sentences expressing an inference rather than a causal relation in terms of originator and origin. This reasoning function is furthermore restricted to the morpheme *las* and classified only as *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*. Thus, if the reason in an inference is marked by *las*, the knowledge about some fact arises out of that reason, in which sense the latter is a source and even a causally related origin(ator). However, it is more intricate to answer why these instances are not classified as actual *'byung khungs*. Judging only from the above quotation itself, one option may be that the reason only serves as the source of knowledge, i.e. the action of the sentence, yet the reason is not the genuine source of the inferred entity itself. Compare, for example, phrase (11), in which the perception of a water bird brings forth the knowledge that there must be water, but neither the bird nor its perception is the genuine source of the water as such, which would rather be

---

[884] Cf. Sharma 1990, 234.

[885] *Chu skyar* refers to a type of water bird. Rangjung Yeshe's online dictionary identifies different species with the Tibetan term, e.g. spoonbill, bittern, etc. (cf. rywiki.tsadra.org/index.php/chu_skyar, accessed April 25th, 2017). The *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* describes it as a 'fish-eating water bird' and lists as synonyms *rkgang gcig pa*, *chu can*, *nya 'bigs byed* and *mdza' mo bcas* (cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* 2006, 796).

[886] GC 493.2.

represented by the rain and so on. It may even further be said that the perception of the water is only the temporal source of the water's appearance/occurrence (*'byung ba*) during the occasion of this inference, in which sense it then indeed comes closer to Si tu's occasional sources, such as in *rta las lhung* ('to fall off the horse'). A second option may be that the reason only serves as the occasional source of a particular knowledge, while the genuine source of knowledge is the mind; and a third option would be the missing parameter of separation (*'bral ba*) in the *rgyu mtshan* type of *'byung khungs*, which Si tu has already mentioned but which he will also repeat as constitutive for *'byung khungs dngos* in the following.

Although he did not mention it in his own definition of the fifth case *'byung khungs*, Si tu was well aware of the function of *rgyu* that was implemented in the Tibetan case model as early as in NGg and GNT. He discusses it in the context of *Smra sgo*:

> *smra sgo las/   las ni rgyu dang 'byung khungs dang/   dgar ba yin te nas de bzhin/ zhes las nas kyi sgra dag rgyu la 'jug par bshad cing/   'grel par/   rgyu'i don ni sa bon las myu gu zhes pa lta bu'o/   zhes 'byung ba/   kha cig gis de 'dra de 'byung khungs dngos yin par byas nas/   'byung khungs las logs su dbye ba mi 'thad ces smras kyang/   de 'byung khungs ndgos ni ma yin te/*

> "In *Smra sgo*, it is said 'Regarding *las*, it is cause (*rgyu*) and source/origin (*'byung khungs*), and distinction (*dgar ba*), just as *nas*.', explaining that the morphemes *las* and *nas* take on [the meaning of] cause (*rgyu*). In the commentary, it is stated 'Regarding the meaning of cause, it is as in 'sprouts from the seed' (*sa bon las myu gu*).' Some have said that such [causes] are actual sources (*'byung khungs dngos*) and then stated that 'the distinction [of cause] from source is incorrect.' However, this [meaning of cause] is not an actual source."[887]

Si tu's critique in this passage is directed towards his older contemporary Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub.[888] As already discussed in the historical survey of this case, Pra ti's conception of *'byung khungs* and his provided examples suggest a very broad understanding in terms of a source that can also cover causal origination, the latter which therefore does not need a separate categorization. However, Si tu's critique may not be fully accurate, because Pra ti indeed

---

[887] GC 494.6.
[888] The whole passage in Pra ti's SCP commentary *Rnam bshad kun bzang dgongs rgyan* reads as follows (with Si tu's quotation in bold type):
> [...] *rgyu'i 'jug pa **byung khungs kyi don las logs su byed na mi 'thad** la/   spyir 'byung khungs tsam dang/   de'i khyad par rgyu'i don la 'jug pa gnyis kyi dbye bar byed na rig pa'i sgo 'phel ba'i thabs su 'gro zhing don la'ang gnas pas 'thad do/* (Pra ti 2013A, 214)
On this passage, cf. also supra 325.

explicated that *'byung khungs* and *rgyu* are not to be separated, but nonetheless he distinguished between 'mere source' (*'byung khungs tsam*) and 'cause as a particular [instance] of it' (*de'i khyad par rgyu*).

In any event, Si tu was unsatisfied with Pra ti's taxonomy, and he made efforts at explaining why cause (*rgyu*) is not a genuine form of source. This argumentation contains further information about his understanding of the fifth case and the prototypical function *'byung khungs*:

> *'byung khungs kyi don gong smos ltar/   rgya mthso nas nor bu lta bu nor bu'i 'byung khungs rgya mtsho yin zhing nor bu mi'i lag tu byung ba'i tshe rgya mtsho las bye dgos pa dang/   dngos su 'brel ba bye mi dgos kyang rig pa'i 'byung khungs mkhas pa yin zhing de las slob mas rig pa lob pa na rgyud tha dad du gyur pas bye bar snang ba lta bu zhig ste/   brda sprod pa'i gzhung rnams su 'byung khungs kyi don 'chad pa na/ gang las 'bral ba'am/   len pa'am/   zhes dang/   bye zhing lhung ba/   zhes dang/ a pā da* [sic!][889] *na nges par sbyin pa zhes bsgyur kyang a pa'* [sic!][890] *bral ba ā da* [sic!][891] *na tshur len pa yin pas 'bral bar len pa zhes sogs rgyas par byung la/   myu gu ni sa bon dang med na mi 'byung gi 'brel par grub kyang sa bon nyid myu gur 'gyur bas sa bon gyi skabs na myu gu med cing myu gu'i gnas skabs na sa bon gyi gnas skabs gtong ba'i phyir de 'dra'i 'byung khungs kyi don med pas so/   des na de 'dra de 'byung khungs dngos ma yin yang de las de skye ba'am 'byung ba yin pa'i phyir 'byung khungs dang 'dra bar rigs pas/   gong smos shar phyogs nas 'od snang sogs dang phyogs mthsungs par shes par bya'o/*

"The meaning of source (*'byung khungs*) is like it was said above; for example, in 'jewels from the ocean,' the ocean is the source of jewels, and at the time when the jewel appears (*byung ba*) in the hands of the person, it has to be separated (*bye*) from the ocean. And although not necessarily really disconnected (*'brel ba bye*), the scholar is the source of knowledge, which, after the student is learned in it, transfers into another mental continuum and thus appears to have been separated from that [scholar as the source]. In the (Sanskrit ?) grammatical treatises (*brda sprod pa'i gzhung rnams su*), it is said in the exposition of the meaning of source (*'byung khungs*) [that it is] 'becoming separated (*'bral ba*) or taking (*len pa*) from something' and 'dividing (*bye*) and falling

346

[from something];' and although *apādāna* has been translated as '*nges par sbyin pa*' ('to give definitely' ?), it is widespread that *apa* is 'separation' ('*bral ba*) and *ādāna* is 'to take close/receive' (*tshur len pa*), thus the term meaning 'to separatingly take' ('*bral bar len pa*). As for the sprout, a relation is established that it does not appear if without the seed (*myu gu ni sa bon dang med na mi 'byung gi 'brel bar grub*). Yet, since the seed itself becomes the sprout, there exists no sprout when there is a seed, and during the timespan of the sprout, the timespan of the seed is discarded (*gtong*). Therefore, such [instances] do not have the meaning of source (*de 'dra'i 'byung khungs kyi don med*). Consequently, although these [instances] are no actual sources, it is reasonable that they are quasi-sources ('*byung khungs dang 'dra ba*), since something is born or appears (*skye'am 'byung ba*) from something. Thus, [the causal meaning] is to be similarly understood (*pyhogs mthsungs par*) like the above mentioned 'light shines from the east', etc."[892]

Si tu's initial introduction of the distinction of actual from quasi-sources is based on the criterion of a genuine, non-occasional source. In examples like 'to fall of a horse,' the source and appearing entity are in this relation only on this particular occasion or due to temporal circumstances (*skabs*). In contrast, Si tu now stresses the parameter that in order to qualify for an actual source there needs to be spatial separation (*bye ba, bral ba*). A separation from the source is obviously lacking in instances such as 'the sprout [originates] from the seed,' since it is the seed itself which turns into the sprout. Si tu, who bases his investigation on the *Smra sgo*, only accounted for the example *sa bon las myu gu*, and it would be interesting to know how he would have classified the instance *ba las bu 'byung*, which the GNT provides as a second example for *rgyu* ('cause'). This latter phrase involves a spatial separation between father and son who both exist simultaneously. Since it is therefore equivalent to Si tu's example (4) *ba las 'o ma* ('milk from the cow'), it may be assumed that Si tu would have classified it as an actual source.

The question arises whether Si tu's argument should be understood in the sense that the causal dimension is not a sufficient but still necessary and constitutive criterion for the category *'byung*

---

[892] GC 495.2. Note that I have been unable to unanimously identify the quoted Sanskritic grammatical sources. The quotation "*gang las 'bral ba'am/ len pa'am*" is partially reminiscent of K 2.4.8, although the latter provides more functions than those quoted by Si tu (cf. HSGLT 2, 359). As for the second quotation, "*bye zhing lhung ba*," the Tibetan translation of the *Sārasvataprakriyā* (CG 44) translates Sanskrit *viśleṣāvadhau* ('separation and *avadhi*') of *sūtra* 17.4 with *bye zhing lhung ba* (cf. CT *110 – 125*). I assume that Si tu quoted these two very short passages for the terms *len pa* ('to take') and *bye ba* ('separation') respectively, in order to derive his etymological translation of *apādāna* as '*bral bar len pa* ('to take separatingly'). This would also explain why he did not fully quote K 2.4.8, presuming that this is the source of this quotation.

khungs dngos ('actual source'), or whether this causal dimension is a different parameter and not constitutive of *'byung khungs dngos*. Since Si tu's conception of the fifth case is preferably understood in this thesis as a general source function rather than a causal origin,[893] it is also to be assumed that Si tu's discussion amounts to the second option, i.e. that the causal aspect is to be separated from the category source and rather not a constitutive component to be fulfilled by actual sources (*'byung khungs*). Causes only qualify as quasi-sources because something comes non-occasionally into being ('*skye ba'am 'byung ba*') from/out of the cause marked by *las* or *nas*.[894] However, since the defining parameter *'bral ba* ('(spatial) separation') of *'byung khungs dngos* is not a characteristic of *rgyu* ('cause'), in Si tu's taxonomy it does not qualify as an actual source. Yet, it should also be kept in mind that *'bral ba* as such does not serve as a sufficient parameter for *'byung khungs*, since actual sources are only those sources from where the appearing entity comes into being or in other words becomes non-occasionally separated from. Separation (*'bral ba*) and coming (non-occasionally) into being (*'byung ba*) represent the two necessary parameters which in Si tu's taxonomy define *'byung khungs dngos* and together result in a non-occasional separation.

Thus far, Si tu has established two types of *'byung khungs*, i.e. actual (*'byung khungs dngos*) and quasi-sources (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*). The latter consists of three uses: (1) sources with a clear separative meaning that are only occasionally the source of the separated entity, such as *rta las lhung* ('to fall off the horse'); (2) the reasoning function (*rgyu mtshan*) of the morpheme *las*, such as in *du ba las mer shes* ('to know from the smoke that there is fire'); and (3) the causal function in which the cause may appropriately be called genuine and not only occasional source, but the category cause alone lacks the parameter of separation, such as in *sa bon las myu sgu* ('from the sprout the seed'). The resulting picture demonstrates that Si tu has attempted to handle the main categories of the fifth case defined in the Sanskritic and Tibetan grammatical traditions, i.e. *'bral ba* ('(spatial) separation'), *rgyu* (from *prakṛti/hetu/kāraṇa*, '(material) cause') as well as *'byung ba* (*prabhava*, 'appearance,' 'being first sight at'), and to systematize the fifth case by distinguishing these as different types within the category of *'byung khungs*. While the Sanskritic tradition has had its own discourses on the relations and requirements of these different categories, the Tibetan tradition has adopted them but mostly abstained from the attempt to relate or distinguish them in more detail. In sources such as the *Smra ba kun*, the NGg and also the GNT, it is evident that these notions coexist without any

---

[893] Cf. supra 343.
[894] Note that in contrast to the function of *rgyu mtshan*, Si tu did not specify whether or not the function of *rgyu* is restricted to *las*, although the single example he quoted uses *las*.

348

systematic understanding of their relation. In contrast, many other Tibetan grammarians have not considered any other category than *'byung khungs*. From this perspective, Si tu has therefore certainly advanced the existing Tibetan conceptions of the fifth case by bringing them together under one category and homogenizing this case.

11.2.1 Two Additional Functions of the Fifth Case in the *Great Commentary*

Directly following *'byung khungs*, SCP in 17.1 also provides two additional functions of the morphemes *las* and *nas* that must be considered in order to arrive at a more complete picture of the fifth case in Si tu's GC:

> *dgar dang sdud pa'ang de bzhin yin/*

> "[*Las* and *nas*] are likewise distinction (*dgar*) and collection (*sdud pa*)."[895]

While this verse line has not been separated from SCP 16.2-4 but is treated within the context of *'byung khungs* itself in the topical outline (*sa bcad*) of the commentaries of Rnam gling and Pra ti, Zha lu treated the functions *dgar ba* ('distinction, separation') and *sdud pa* ('collection') under the separate theme *zhar byung* (~ 'addendum,' 'extra [teaching]').[896] In Si tu's topical outline, a separate section is dedicated to SCP 17.1 in which he commented on *dgar sdud* as follows:

> *bshad ma thag pa'i las nas kyi sgra de dag 'byung khungs kho nar ma zad/   rnam dbye sbyar gzhi de las rigs dang bya ba yon tan rnams kyi khyad par gang yang rung ba logs su dgar ba'i don la'ang 'jug cing/   de las nas kyi sgra gcig pu ni yul dang dus dang dngos po la sogs pa mtshams 'dzin cing sdud pa'i don du'ang de bzhin du 'jug pa yin no/   zhes pa'o/   de dag dbye ba dang bcas te dper brjod na/   rigs dang bya ba yon tan rnams kyi khyad par gyis gzhi gcig las dgar ba ni/   mi'am ci las dri za tha dad do/ bshes gnyen ngan pa la bkur sti byed pa las lha mchod pa niyd legs/   yang sos las thig nag pa sdug bsngal che/   lha chen po las bde bar gshegs pa yon tan du mas 'phags so/ zhes pa lta bu ste 'di 'dra'i rigs la las kyi sgra nyid 'jug go/*

> "[The root text] says that the two just elaborated morphemes *nas* [and] *las* take on not only the meaning of source (*'byung khungs*) but also [that of] the distinction (*logs su dgar ba*) of any specific class (*rigs*), quality (*yon tan*) [or] action (*bya ba*) from that basis where the case is to be applied (*rnam dbye sbyar gzhi*). And of these [two

---

[895] SCP 17.1

[896] cf. Rnam gling 2013, 77; Pra ti 2013A, 212; Zha lu 2013A, 13.

morphemes], only *nas* likewise takes on the meaning of a limitation (*mtshams 'dzin*) and collection (*sdud pa*) of space (*yul*), time (*dus*) or things (*dngos po*).

If [we] exemplify these [uses] together with the [mentioned sub-]divisions (*dbye ba*), distinction (*dgar ba*) from one basis through a difference in class, quality [or] action [would be] (13) '*gandharva*s are different from humans or whatever else' (*mi'am ci las dri za tha dad*), (14) 'the offering to gods is better than paying respect to an evil spiritual guide' (*bshes gnyen ngan pa la bkur sti byed pa las lha mchod pa nyid legs*), (15) 'the hell of *thig nag* is more painful than the hell of *yang sos*' (*yang sos las thig nag pa sdug bsngal che*),[897] '(16) 'The Sugata surpasses the Mahādevas by many qualities.' (*lha chen po las bde bar gshegs pa yon tan du mas 'phags so*). Only (*nyid*) the morpheme *las* joins for this type [of use]."[898]

Si tu has further subdivided the first of the two functions, *dgar ba* ('distinction'), which was already encountered in NGg and GNT, into the three types of *rigs* ('class'), *yon tan* ('quality') and *bya ba* ('action'). However, this subdivision was already well-known and referenced in the context of SCP 17.1 already before Si tu's times. Rnam gling, who had introduced the same threefold typology, refers it to the *Kalāpaśiṣyahitā* commentary (CG 12 or CG 14).[899] Interestingly, the *Kalāpaśiṣyahitā* introduces the quoted threefold subdivision in the context of K 2.4.36 and the technical term *nirdhāraṇa*,[900] that is to say not as a trigger of the fifth case suffix but of the sixth and seventh case suffixes. The same distinction into class, quality and action already occurs in the *Cāndravṛtti* under C 2.1.92, which discusses both types of comparison distinguished in P 2.3.41 (*nirdhāraṇa* for sixth and seventh case suffixes) and P 2.3.42 (*vibhakta* for fifth case suffix) under the label of *nirdhāraṇa*.[901] Moreover, Si tu's subdivision of *dgar ba* into *rigs*, *yon tan* and *bya ba*, either in the same form or with slight

---

[897] *Thig nag*, lit. 'black line,' 'black thread;' *yang sos*, lit. 'revival,' 'continuous revival.' According to Buddhist cosmology, both belong to the eight hot hells of the hell realm. The hell realm is usually explained to gradually cause increased suffering to beings throughout its different sub-realms.

[898] GC 493.3.

[899] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 78.

[900] K 2.4.36 *nirdhāraṇe ca* "[A sixth and seventh *vibhakti* occurs] also if [there is] distinction;" cf. *Kalāpaśiṣyahitā* (CG 14), CT *109 – 367*. On *nirdhāraṇa*, cf. also supra 334f.

[901] C 2.1.92 (~ P 2.3.41):

　　yato nirdhāraṇam

Vṛtti:

　　jātiguṇakriyābhiḥ samudāyād ekadeśasya pṛthakkaraṇaṃ nirdhāraṇam. yatas tat kriyate tataḥ ṣaṣṭhīsaptamyau bhavataḥ. [...] Māthurāḥ Pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ sukumāratarā ity avadher eva pañjamī. "Distinction (*nirdhāraṇa*) [is] the splitting off of one part from a collection by [a difference in] class, quality [or] action. From where this [distinction] is effected, there the sixth or seventh [case suffix] occurs. [...] A fifth [case suffix occurs], if [it is] like a limiting point, as in 'the people of Mathurā are more youthful than the people of Pāṭaliputra." (Sanskrit quoted from Liebich 1918, 112)

variations, also figures in Zha lu and Pra ti and appears as well in the *Sārasvataprakriyā* (CG 44).[902]

All the four provided examples of (13) to (16) are instances of the *vibhakta* type of comparison (P 2.3.42), that is to say two distinct entities which are distinguished by means of a certain parameter. This type of comparison in WT is restricted only to the morpheme *las*, whereas the *nirdhāraṇa* type (P 2.3.41), i.e. the singling out of one entity within a group indicated by a sixth or seventh case suffix in Sanskrit, according to the GC in Tibetan is restricted to *nas*:

> *rigs sogs kyi khyad par gyis tshogs kyi nang nas 'byin pa lta bur dgar ba ni/   mi rnams kyi nang nas rgyal rigs dpa'/   gser dngul gniys kyi nang nas gser gong che/   rigs bzhi'i nang nas dmangs rigs dman/   ba rnams kyi dkyil nas nag mo 'o ma mang/   bya ba rnams kyi nang nas sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das la mchod pa ni phul du byung ba'o/ lta bu ste 'di 'dra la nas nyid 'jug go*

> "As for the distinction (*dgar ba*) similar to the singling out (*'byin pa*) from a group (*tshogs*) by a difference of class, etc., [this would be] as in (17) 'among humans, the royal class is the bravest' (*mi rnams kyi nang nas rgyal rigs dpa'*), (18) 'among the two, silver [and] gold, gold is more precious' (*gser dngul gnyis kyi nang nas gser gong che*), (19) 'among the four castes, the *śūdra*s are the most inferior' (*rigs bzhi'i nang nas dmangs rigs dman*), (20) 'within the cows, the black one has the most milk' (*ba rnams kyi dkyil nas nag mo 'o ma mang*), (21) 'Among actions, the offering to the Buddha is [the most] outstanding.' (*bya ba rnams kyi nang nas sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das la mchod pa ni phul du byung ba'o*). Only (*nyid*) *nas* joins for such [uses]."[903]

Commentators such as Zha lu have already provided examples for both types of distinction or comparison (P 2.3.41 and 42), however the theoretical explication of their difference might be Si tu's addition which has not been encountered in any other Tibetan grammatical source in this research. His idea of *rigs sogs kyi khyad par gyis tshogs kyi nang nas 'byin pa lta bur dgar ba* ('distinction similar to the singling out of a collection by a difference of class, etc.') was perhaps directly inspired by the *Cāndravṛtti*.[904] Si tu's restriction of the whole-part comparison to the morpheme *nas* was apparently not shared by all grammarians, at least examples such as *las thams cad las yi ge 'bri ba khyad par du 'phags pa'o* ('Out of all actions, writing is the most

---

[902] Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 13; Pra ti 2013A, 212; CT *110 – 131*.
[903] GC 494.1.
[904] *Cāndravṛtti* on 2.1.92:
    jātiguṇakriyābhiḥ samudāyād ekadeśasya pṛthakkaraṇaṃ nirdhāraṇam
    "The singling out of one part from a group by [a difference in] class, quality [or] action is *nirdhāraṇa*."

outstanding.') in Pra ti's commentary to SCP demonstrate the existence of alternative taxonomies.[905]

In order to complete the picture, the second function in SCP 17.1, namely collection (*sdud pa*), is explained by Si tu in terms of limitation (*mtshams 'dzin pa*), providing examples such as *lha sa nas gzhis ka rtse'i bar* ('from Lhasa to Shigatse') or *gcig nas brgya'i bar* ('from one to hundred'), in which a range of items is collected together or demarcated and the argument marked by *nas* represents the first item.[906]

It should be noted that the Tibetan term *'byin pa* ('to take out,' 'single out,' 'to root out,' 'split off') in Si tu's definition of the whole-part comparison is the *tha dad pa* counterpart to the Tibetan fifth case's prototypical verb frame *'byung ba* ('to come forth,' 'appear,' 'occur,' 'originate'). This may be read as a very careful use of terminology in the GC, in order to relate this function of *nas* to the semantic domain of the fifth case *'byung khungs*. Although in the topical outline of his commentary Si tu has separated the fifth case *'byung khungs* from the additional functions *dgar ba* and *sdud pa*, he nonetheless elaborates in some detail how *dgar ba* and *sdud pa* are to be related to the category of *'byung khungs*:

> *de ltar dgar sdud la 'jug pa'i sgra 'di rnams kyang 'phrad gzhan ma yin par rnam dbye lnga pa'i yan lag nyid du shes dgos te/ dgar ba ni gang las dgar ba'i gzhi de las khyad par du byung ba ltar snang ba dang/ sdud pa ni thog ma gang nas brtsams pa de las bsdu rgyu'i gnas skabs thams cad byung ba dang 'dra ba'i phyir 'byung khungs kyi rnam dbye sbyar bar snang ba'i phyir ro/*

> "In addition, it must be known that also these morphemes [*nas* and *las*] that take on [the meaning of] distinction [and] collection (*dgar sdud*), not being a different syntactic link, are only a branch of the fifth [case] (*lnga pa'i yan lag*). Regarding distinction (*dgar ba*), [something] seems like (*ltar snang*) coming forth as differentiated (*khyad par du byung ba*) from that basis from which [it] is separated. And regarding collection (*sdud pa*), it is like all instances (*gnas skabs*) to be collected come forth from that beginning from where [the collection] starts. Therefore, [distinction and collection] appear as applications of the source-case."[907]

[905] Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 212.
[906] Cf. GC 494.2. Since this category is intuitively comprehensible, its further elaboration has been omitted in this thesis.
[907] GC 494.3.

Si tu obviously makes use of his eloquence and mastery of WT in order to relate the functions of *dgar sdud* to *'byung khung*, simply repeating an explanation of their meaning by help of expressions of the type *las* plus *'byung ba*. Distinction (*dgar ba*) thus becomes that function in which *khyad par du byung ba* ('to appear distinctively' or 'appear as distinct') takes place, and collection (*sdud pa*) becomes *'byung ba* in terms of the collected parts which come forth from the first part from which the collection starts. In this sense, the arguments marked by *las* and *nas* retain their meaning as a source. Yet, the terms *snang ba* ('to appear,' 'to seem') and *'gra ba* ('to be similar'), which are consistently employed by Si tu throughout this passage to specify the *dgar sdud* type of *'byung ba*, have to be taken seriously since Si tu adds:

> *'o na 'byung khungs nyid smos pas chog go snyam na/   'byung khungs la 'jug par bstan pa ni 'byung khungs dngos dang/   de dang cha 'dra ba gtso bo rnams sdud pa'i don dang/   dgar sdud gsungs pa ni 'byung khungs dngos dang cha mthun pa gnyis ka ma yin yang tshig sbyor tsam gyis cha mthun dang 'dra rung du yod pa'i phyir lnga pa'i yan lag phal par gyur pa rnams sdud pa'i don yin pas skyon med do/*

> "But if one thinks 'would it then not suffice to say they are source (*'byung khungs*) itself,' the exposition that [*las* and *nas*] take on source is the content (*don*) encompassing the main [functions of] actual and quasi-source (= SCP 16.4), whereas the teaching of distinction and collection (*dgar sdud* = SCP 17.1) is the content (*don*) encompassing the secondary branches of the fifth [case]. Despite them being neither actual nor quasi-source (*'byung khungs dngos dang cha mthun gnyis ka ma yin yang*), they are partially accordant and appropriately similar by the mere syntactic application [of the case morphemes] (*tshig sbyor tsam gyis*). Therefore, there is no fault."[908]

Si tu's reconciliation of *dgar sdud* with *'byung khungs* is based on the introduction of another type of source, referred to as the secondary branch of the fifth case (*lnga pa'i yan lag phal pa*). If it is attempted to trace the constitutive features of this third type of source, the first and most important pointer may be the phrase *tshig sbyor tsam gyis cha mthun dang 'dra rung* ('partially accordant and appropriately similar by the mere syntactic application'). Si tu seems to aim at the fact that *sdgar ba* and *sdud pa* do not really share any aspects of the defining parameters of actual and quasi-sources, and thus their similarity is based on the mere 'syntactic application' (*tshig sbyor*), which here is understood as the mere application of the syntactic links *nas* and *las*. Thus, the marked arguments appear as sources only because *las* and *nas* are used, yet not

---

[908] GC 494.4.

according to their actual meaning. In other words, Si tu argues that the language only encodes *dgar ba* and *sdud pa* as a source-function, although their actual semantic nature is not that something comes from some source by any means. Therefore, such types of sources may be rendered more freely as only figurative sources for figurative appearances.

In the context of the function *dgar ba* ('distinction'), Si tu rendered the relation between source and the entity that comes from that source in terms of *ltar snang* (*ltar* 'like,' 'as,' *snang ba* 'to seem,' 'to appear as'). After he referred to *sdud pa* ('collection') as similar (*'dra ba*) to the meaning that the collected instances come forth from the starting item, he summarized both functions as 'appearing as applications of the source case' (*'byung khungs kyi rnam dbye sbyar bar snang ba*), in which he again used the term *snang ba* ('to seem,' 'to appear as'). The technical term *ltar snang* also occurs in the context of argumentation, where opponents are accused of making use of what is referred to as *rgyu mtshan ltar snang*, i.e. an invalid reason unable to withstand a close examination and thus only appearing superficially to be a reason. Based on this use of the term *ltar snang*, I tentatively render this last type of source as 'pseudo-source' (*'byung khungs ltar snang*), although Si tu did not in fact employ this term in the quoted passages.[909]

Si tu has defended his subsumption of *dgar sdud* under the fifth case *'byung khungs* and charged the preceding tradition with the mistake of missing it:

> *skabs 'dir 'grel byed phal cher gyis dgar sdud la 'jug pa'i las nas kyi sgra dag rnam dbye lnga par mi 'dod par snang yang mi 'thad de/   rgyu mtshan gong du smos pa ltar 'thad pa'i phyir te/   legs sbyar la'ang/   tshogs kyi nang nas dgar ba la/   ga bāṃ krīṣṇā saṃ pannā* [sic!][910] *kṣī rā/   ba rnams las nag mo 'o ma phun sum tshogs/   lta bu dmigs bsal du drug pa 'jug kyang/   spyir btang dgar ba tsam la/   tasmāt anyasmin/ de las gzhan du/   anyo krī hā dbi hā raḥ/   khang pa las gzhan du gtsug lag khang/ lta bu lnga pa nyid 'jug pa dang/   mtshams bzung nas sdud pa la'ang/   ā pā ṭa li pu trādbṛīṣṭo de baḥ/   'di nas skya nar bu'i yul gyi bar du lhas char 'bebs so/   lta bu rnam dbye sbyor yul snga phyi cung zad mi 'dra ba las/   don gyi mthsungs par lnga pa 'jug pa'i phyir* […]

> "In this context, most commentators did not assert that the two morphemes *nas* and *las* [are] the fifth case [after] taking on [the meaning of] distinction [and] collection (*dgar*

---

[909] He only used it once during his summary of the fifth case at the end of his TKJ commentary (cf. infra 360).
[910] I read *panna*.

354

sdud). However, this is incorrect, because it is correct like it was reasoned above. Moreover, also in Sanskrit the sixth [case suffix] joins [only] as an exception (*dmigs bsal du*) for the distinction [of one entity] within a group, as in *gavāṃ kṛṣṇā sampannakṣīrā* 'among the cows, the black is outstanding regarding the milk' (*ba rnams las nag mo 'o ma phun sum tshogs*). Yet, in general the very fifth [case suffix] joins for a mere distinction (*spyir btang dgar ba tsam la*), as in *tasmāt anyasmin* 'different from that' (*de las gzhan du*) [or] *anyo gṛhād vihāraḥ* 'the temple is different from the house.' And also for the limiting collection (*mtshams bzung nas sdud pa*), for example *ā pāṭaliputrād vṛṣṭo devaḥ* 'the god made it rain from here up to the land of Pāṭaliputra' (*'di nas skya nar bu'i yul gyi bar du lhas char 'bebs so*), a fifth [case suffix] joins in an equivalent meaning, although this last argument to which the [fifth] case[-suffix] is applied is slightly different [from] before. […]"[911]

Si tu supports his taxonomy by help of Sanskrit grammar and the argument that also in that tradition the fifth case suffix is used generically (~ *spyir btang*) for distinction (*dgar ba*). It should be noted that although Si tu correctly claims that the quoted examples trigger either a fifth or sixth case suffix, all the fifth case suffixes in the quoted instances are *upapadavibhakti* since they do not belong to the domain of *apādāna* in *Pāṇini* but are additional triggers. While *tasmāt anyasmin* ('different from that,' 'other than that') and *anyo gṛhād vihāraḥ* ('the temple is different from the house') are probably Si tu's examples for the typical *vibhakta* type of comparison (P 2.3.42), *ā pāṭaliputrād vṛṣṭo devaḥ* ('the god made it rain up to the land of Pāṭaliputra') belongs to P 2.3.10, which defines the rule for the fifth case suffix in connection with the *karmapravacanīya*-form *ā*, as well as others.[912] Yet, in his taxonomy Si tu subsumes *dgar ba* not only under the fifth case but also under *'byung khungs*. While this amounts to the same in the Tibetan case model, it does not in Sanskrit grammar, where it is one thing to say that *dgar ba* belongs to the fifth case suffix, but another to say that it belongs to *apādāna*. Since in *Pāṇini* all the quoted instances are clearly *upapadavibhakti*s and thus do not belong to the *kāraka*, Si tu more likely based his argument on *Cāndra* and its *Vṛtti* on C 2.1.82 and 92, according to which the example *ā pāṭaliputrād vṛṣṭo devaḥ* as well as the *vibhakta* type of distinction are not subsumed under *avadhi* in C 2.1.81, but still related to the *kāraka* under their respective rules.[913]

---

[911] GC 495.5.
[912] Cf. Sharma 1995, 117; Joshi and Roodbergen 1998, 22; Liebich 1918, 110.
[913] Cf. Liebich 1918, 110 and 112.

A closer look at the quoted examples moreover reveals that Si tu's recourse to Sanskritic grammatical knowledge was interpretative in at least one point. One of the most important issues regarding the *nirdhāraṇa* type of comparison (P 2.3.41) is that regardless of any taxonomical differences, all three Sanskritic grammatical schools of *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* and *Kātantra* have associated the sixth and optionally the seventh case suffix with this function, however not the fifth, obviously because they simply followed the syntactic facts of Sanskrit language. The subsumption of the whole-part comparison (*nirdhāraṇa*) under the morphemes *las* and *nas* is therefore a genuine Tibetan-specific adaptation, followed by Tibetan grammarians such as Si tu in order to account for the altered structures of Tibetan language. In order to negotiate this language-specific difference, Si tu has classified the use of the sixth case suffix in the context of the *nirdhāraṇa* type of distinction (P 2.3.41) as an exceptional (*dmigs gsal*) use, as opposed to the general type (*spyir btang dgar ba tsam*) of distinction that triggers the fifth case. This represents a rather interpretative account of P 2.3.41, C 2.1.92 and K 2.4.36, since *nirdhāraṇa* (P 2.3.41, C 2.1.92) and *vibhakta* (P 2.3.42, C 2.1.92, K ?) are two different types of comparison, each with their respective case marking patterns that cannot be said to be either exceptional or generic. Moreover, Si tu has left out the fact that *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* and *Kātantra* use not only the sixth but also the seventh case suffix for *nirdhāraṇa*. Thus, Si tu's distinction into the special or exceptional use of the sixth case and the more general use of the fifth case in the context of the different types of *dgar ba* ('distinction') has not been proclaimed by any of the three Sanskritic grammatical sources to my knowledge.

Unlike the fifth case marking of *vibhakta* that has been related to *avadhi*, *nirdhāraṇa*'s sixth case marking is unrelated to any *kāraka* in *Cāndra*, and perhaps this fact has led Si tu to the conclusion that the sixth case suffix for *nirdhāraṇa* is a special convention which does not follow the actual meaning, even more so in view of the fact that in Tibetan both types are expressed by markers that encode source-meaning.

Why did Si tu feel the need in this case to reconcile the Sanskrit with the Tibetan case marking-pattern and to distinguish a generic from a special pattern in Sanskrit? It is known from his discussion of the Tibetan verb *phyag 'tshal ba* that generic case marking patterns are connected to the actual meaning of underlying scenarios as opposed to special conventions that do not follow the actual meaning. At least the *vibhakta* type of comparison was connected to *avadhi* in C 2.1. 92 and thus can be treated as a form of *kāraka* usage that represents the underlying actual meaning. The Tibetan case marking pattern not only confirms this, but it also suggests that the *nirdhāraṇa* type of comparison belongs to the same *kāraka*. If the sixth case marking

for *nirdhāraṇa* were not special or exceptional but a generic use, then the whole-part comparison of *nirdhāraṇa* could no longer be part of *'byung khungs*. This would compromise Si tu's proposed theory of how both types – although no real source appears in a comparison – are connected to the category of *'byung ba*. Then he would have either needed to restrict *dgar ba* only to *vibhakta* and accept that the Tibetan use of *nas* for *nirdhāraṇa* comparisons do not follow the actual meaning, or he would have needed to retain *dgar ba* as comprising both types but also to accept that both types no longer are fifth cases. This latter option would certainly go against the connection of *vibhakta* with *avadhi* as we can find it in *Cāndra* at least. A perhaps more feasible option – yet not exploited by Si tu – would have been to develop a common semantic ground for the competing Sanskrit and Tibetan case marking-patterns based on which both can be reconciled as representing the actual meaning, a strategy Si tu made use of in his explanation of the syntactic difference between Sanskrit and Tibetan verbs of fear.[914] In any case, any exclusion of one of the two types of comparison from *'byung khungs* would have probably gone against his intuitive understanding of the types of comparisons he had as a Tibetan native speaker. In addition, the Sanskrit sixth case suffix is not as directly related to any of the *kāraka*s as the typical *kāraka*-markers (second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh case suffix), a fact which makes any sixth case marking easily appear as exceptional and unrelated to the actual meaning of a sentence and its expressed phenomenal scenario. To Si tu the more uniform Tibetan case marking-pattern was probably more representative for the actual meaning of comparison than the Sanskrit difference of fifth and sixth case marking.

It is evident form the above that Si tu's investigation into the meaning of *dgar ba* in relation to *'byung ba* is intended to represent the actual meaning of *dgar ba* as such that is valid across languages. Similar to Tibetan *phyag 'tshal ba* vs. Sanskrit *namas* in the context of the fourth case, Si tu states that Sanskrit follows an exceptional use with the sixth case marking pattern while typically following the generic pattern with the *vibhakta* type, whereas Tibetan only follows the generic type. However, in contrast to Si tu's interpretation of *namas* and its case marking pattern, his classification of the sixth case suffix as only special or exceptional in relation to the fifth case suffix in the context of comparison is not explicated by Sanskritic grammars. This is interesting insofar as it seems to be an instance in which Si tu – either intentionally or intuitively – has reinterpreted Sanskritic grammatical knowledge and accommodated it to his understanding of comparison that was partially build on taxonomies such as those found in *Cāndra* and partially based on Tibetan language.

---

[914] Cf. infra 402f.

11.2.2 Summary and Résumé of Si tu's Scaled Fifth Case *'byung khungs*

Si tu developed the fifth case based on the main category *'byung khungs* ('source') and also subsumed under it several other uses of the morphemes *las* and *nas* as sometimes closer, sometimes more distant forms:

***'byung khungs gtso bo* ('main [use of] source'):**

1) *'byung khungs dngos* ('actual source'):

> *gser ka nas gser* ('gold from the gold mine')

> *rgya mtsho nas nor bu* ('gemstones from the ocean')

> *ba las 'o ma* ('milk from the cow')

2) *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba/cha mthun* ('quasi-source'):

> a) occasional *'byung khungs*:

> > *rta las lhung* ('to fall off the horse')

> > *skas las babs* ('to fall off the ladder')

> > *shar phyogs nas 'od 'char* ('light shines from the east')

> b) *rgyu mtshan* ('reasoning'):

> > *du ba las mer shes* ('to know from the smoke that [there is] fire')

> c) *rgyu* ('cause'):

> > *sa bon las myu gu* ('the sprout from the seed')

***lnga pa'i yan lag phal par* (secondary branch of the fifth case):**

3) *'byung khungs ltar snang* ('pseudo-source'):

> a) *dkar ba* ('distinction')

> > *yang sos las thig nag pa sdug bsngal che* ('the *thig nag* hell is more painful than the *yang sos* hell')

> > *mi rnams kyi nang nas rgyal rigs dpa'* ('among humans, the royal class is the bravest')

b) *sdud pa* ('collection')

> *lha sa nas gzhis ka rtse'i bar* ('from Lhasa to Shigatse')

> *gcig nas brgya'i bar* ('from one to hundred')

Si tu's fifth case *'byung khungs* is a scaled category of three grades: actual source (*'byung khungs dngos*), quasi-source (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*/*cha mthun*) and pseudo-source (*'byung ba ltar snang*). The distinguishing criteria are already stated at the very beginning in his paraphrase of SCP 16.2-4, where he says that "since they (*las* and *nas*) equally join in the meaning which indicates that from some phenomenon something is **separated** (*bral ba*) or **has come into being** (*byung ba*), [they] are the semantic domain of source, which in other treatises is explained as the fifth case."[915] (1) Actual sources are defined by *'byung ba* in its genuine sense, i.e. something comes into being at that source, as well as *'bral ba*, i.e. a spatial separation from that source which must be involved. The question remains whether or not a genuine instance of *'byung ba* in Si tu's conception implies that the source must also necessarily be the originating cause, and the tentative answer in this study was that it may possibly be but need not be so.

(2) Quasi-sources are those where separation is clearly involved, but they are only occasional sources and not those where the appearing entity typically comes into being (2a). Alternatively, the reason (*rgyu mtshan*) of an inference marked by *las* as well as actual cause (*rgyu*) marked by *las* are also only quasi-sources. No reasons are specified in the GC for the status of *rgyu mtshan* as merely a quasi-source (2b), and causes (*rgyu*) are only *'byhungs khungs dang 'dra ba*, because according to Si tu they lack the parameter of separation (2c). In sum, quasi-sources are therefore those which only exhibit one of the two parameters.

(3) Pseudo-sources are twofold, either in terms of *dgar ba* ('distinction,' 3a) or *sdud pa* ('collection,' 3b), the two additional functions of *nas* and *las* provided in SCP 17.1. They are sources only due to grammatical construction, that is to say the application of *las* and *nas*, which make them appear as (quasi-)sources in the syntactic structure of Tibetan sentences despite their actual lack of any meaning of source. In contrast to (2a), there is no spatial separation involved in (3), and in contrast to (2a), (2b) and (2c), nothing comes from or appears at pseudo-sources other than in a figurative sense which is encoded by the syntactic structure of Tibetan. In a comparison expressed through this syntactic structure, nothing really comes into being from or

---

[915] Cf. supra 341f.; my emphasis.

appears occasionally at (~ from) some source. In that sense, (3) completely lacks both defining parameters *'byung ba* and *'bral ba*.

As was already argued for Si tu's main functions of the fifth case, the entire conception of this case, including the secondary functions *dgar ba* and *sdud pa*, was his attempt to systematize and organize the different categories that prevailed in the preceding Sanskritic as well as Tibetan tradition. However, this threefold categorization should not be exaggerated into a full-fledged systematic model. Its limits become apparent in Si tu's summary of the fifth case under TKJ 25.4-28.3, where he suddenly changes the nomenclature of (2) and (3). The function of *rgyu mtshan*, classified in his SCP commentary as *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*, is now specified with the term *ltar snang* ('pseudo'), whereas *dgar ba* is classified as *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*:

> *du ba'i rtags las me yod par rjes su dpag go/   lta bu rgyu mtshan gyi don la'ang rtags de las rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma skye bas 'byung khungs ltar snang ba'i phyir lnga pa sbyar ba dang/   bud med rnams las sngo bsangs mdzes/   lta bu yon tan sogs kyi sgo nas logs su bkar ba ste bud med rnams kyi nang nas blos khyad par phye nas phyung ba yin pa'i phyir 'byung khungs dang 'dra ba'i don gyi lnga pa sbyar ba* […]

> "A fifth [case] is also applied in the meaning of a reason (*rgyu mtshan*), as in 'From the sign/reason (*rtags*) of smoke it is inferred that there is fire.' (*du ba'i rtags las me yod par rjes su dpag go*), since a valid cognition (*tshad ma*) [in terms] of an inference is born from a certain sign/reason (*rtags*), which thus is a pseudo-source (*'byung khungs ltar snang ba*). And as in 'among girls the pale blue ones are the most beautiful' (*bud med rnams las sngo bsangs mdzes*), the singling out (*logs su bkar ba*) through a quality, etc., is the application of the fifth [case] in the meaning of quasi-source (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*), since [something] has been made to appear (*phyung ba*) through differentiating [it] with the mind from the [remaining] girls."[916]

Si tu's use of terminology is not fully consistent, and therefore his threefold graduation should not be regarded too strictly. His model may further be challenged by various instances that are difficult to classify in his taxonomy. For example, a person's birthplace is genuine to each specific person, yet every person has a different birthplace and thus there is no genuine birthplace as such. Thus, in Si tu's taxonomy, is a person's birthplace *'byung khungs dngos*, because it is the actual source from where this particular person has come into being? Or is it

---

[916] GC 601.6.

'byung khungs dang 'dra ba, because it is merely the birthplace of that particular person and thus an occasional birthplace from the perspective of all people? It is to be assumed that there are several such instances that are problematic in view of Si tu's typology, and therefore it remains a question to which extend Si tu himself had intended a clear-cut distinction of the different types. He has certainly attempted to render the different categories of the fifth case that were established long before him in such a way that they may be brought together under the meaning of source. Yet, it is a different question and ultimately a matter of interpretation how distinct he himself regarded the different types of main and secondary fifth cases, actual sources, quasi- and pseudo-sources. In his GC on TKJ, Si tu summarized his understanding of the fifth case in his own words as follows:

> *legs sbyar la ni gang las 'bral ba'i don la lnga pa bshad cing don des lnga pa'i 'jug yul thams cad la   khyab par yang bshad pa mthong bas bod skad la'ang zhib mor brtags na 'chad tshul de 'byor bar sem* [sic!] *mo/*

> "In Sanskrit, it is explained [that] the fifth [case is] for the meaning of separation from something, and moreover [we] see the explanation that this meaning covers all arguments to which the fifth [case] joins (*lnga pa'i jug yul thams cad*). Therefore, I think that this way of explaining [the fifth case] applies (*'byor ba*) also to Tibetan language, if closely examined."[917]

Thus, upon this investigation of Si tu's conception of the fifth case, what can be said about his examination based on which he has come to this conclusion?

Despite his claim that *'bral ba* ('(spatial) separation') covers all the uses of the Tibetan fifth case *'byung khungs* just like in the Sanskritic grammatical sources, it is in fact not a sufficient parameter and in his conception, which consequently differs from Sanskritic sources. In Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* or *Cāndra*, two sources in which *apādāna* and *avadhi* in their respective prototypical senses of 'fixed point of departure' and 'limiting point' are understood to cover many if not most of Si tu's categories, these very values of 'fixed point of departure' and 'limiting point' alone define the prototypical meaning of the *kāraka*. In contrast, Si tu even explicitly quotes *lhung ba* ('to fall') as a genuine instance of *apādāna* in Sanskritic grammatical sources, yet he does not feel the need to comment why in his own taxonomy he has classified this semantic field only as quasi-source (*'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*). The criterion of spatial

---

[917] GC 602.1.

separation is apparently not sufficient and not operative in the distinction of actual sources from occasional sources such as *rta las lhung*.

It seems that through the systematization of categories, Si tu has not only attempted to reorganize and homogenize them, but he has also attempted to retain the prototypical status of both traditions' basic conceptions of the fifth case function, the Sanskritic in terms of spatial departure/separation and the Tibetan in terms of a source. Si tu's strategy to reconcile competing notions of the fifth case's prototypical function was to define *'byung khungs dngos* through its genuine meaning in terms of a source from where something comes into being, but then he has also added separation as another main criterion. Through this compromise, *'bral ba* has lost its status as a sufficient parameter. Moreover, the function of *rgyu* ('cause') is at least one subcategory in Si tu's typology that lacks the parameter *'bral ba* and compromises Si tu's claim that separation persists throughout.[918] In any event, when Si tu claims *'bral ba* as a defining parameter of *'byung khungs* that prevails throughout all its uses, this does not result in a full conformity with the basic Sanskritic conception.

Si tu's entire subdivision is based mainly on investigations into the nature of the category *'byung khungs*, but it is derived neither from Sanskritic nor from Tibetan syntactic features. This is also evident from the fact that Si tu's typology does not take into account any language-specific difference between the morphemes *nas* and *las*, since both figure as examples of actual and quasi-sources.

For example, Si tu's distinction between actual and occasional source in instances such as *gser kha nas gser* ('from the gold mine gold;' *'byung khungs dngos*) and *shar phyogs nas 'od snang* ('the sun shines from the east;' *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*) is only of little relevance to Tibetan language, since it syntactically encodes the two scenarios in the same way. The same critique applies to the difference between *ba las 'o ma* ('milk from the cow;' *'byung khungs dngos*) and *sa bon las myu gu* ('from the seed the sprout;' *rgyu* or *'byung khungs dang 'dra ba*) as well as the distinction between actual sources and causes. This type of grammatical analysis lacks explanatory power not because it contradicts the structures of Tibetan language by default, but because its focus on the constitution of sources and their manifestations in different situations easily becomes arbitrary without any language-specific reference and thus has only limited significance for WT.

---

[918] Or is this perhaps the reason why he swapped the terminology in TKJ for quasi- and pseudo sources? Is *rgyu* there a pseudo-source, because it lacks separation, whereas *dgar ba* is a quasi-source, because at least figuratively there is included a separation from another entity?

In sum, when Si tu closes his discussion of the fifth case in TKJ 25.4-28.3 with the statement that a close or detailed examination (*zhib mor brtags pa*) reveals that *apādāna*'s prototypical criterion of *'bral ba* represents the overarching category prevalent in all uses of the fifth case not only in Sanskrit but also in Tibetan language, then this validation in his examination of the fifth case function is not only derived from Sanskrit and Tibetan language structures; in fact, it is much more firmly based on Si tu's objectivist focus of exploring a few categories and parameters and their relation in general by help of different scenarios and sample phrases to then apply his taxonomy to the fifth case markers *las* and *nas*. The perhaps clearest illustration of his objectivist approach in this context is his metalinguistic but syntactically irrelevant investigation into the category of cause and its relation to separation by which he reaches the conclusion of outsourcing causes from actual sources. Yet, in the context of the fifth case, this did only little harm, since in general the category source has remained a significant category of the morphemes *nas* and *las* in Tibetan.

12 *Rnam dbye drug pa 'brel ba*

12.1 Historical Survey

The traditional Tibetan sixth case is labelled *'brel ba/pa*[919] ('connection,' 'relation') and is marked by the morphological category *'brel sgra* ('connecting morpheme'), which consists of the five allomorphs *gi*, *kyi*, *'i*, *yi* and *gyi*. Like the third case and its morphological realization *byed sgra*, the homogeneity of these five morphemes is supported in modern linguistics and, generally speaking, also their identification with the function of *'brel ba* has strong linguistic significance. SCP treats their morphology and function under 12.3-13.3:

> *dang po gnyis la dang po mthun/*
> *gsum lnga bcu la kya dang sbyar/*
> *bdun pa nyid la bdun pa ste/*
> *lhag ma rnams la gya sbyar ba/*
> *de dag i sbyar 'brel ba'i sa/*

> "With the first two [postscripts] the first [postscript] is in accordance, (*ga*, *nga* →*gi*)
> to the third, fifth and tenth [postscript] *kya* is to be applied,   (*da*, *ba*, *sa* →*kyi*)
> the seventh to the seventh [postscript] itself,   (*'a* → *'i*)
> to the remaining [postscripts] *gya* is to be applied.   (*na*, *ma*, *ra*, *la* →*gyi*)
> [To] these [morphemes the vowel] *i* applied, [is] the semantic domain of connection."

Since the triggering of the allomorphs depends on the final letter of the preceding word form, SCP elaborates which postscript letter triggers which allomorph. Postscript *ga* and *nga* trigger *gi*, whereas the final letters *da*, *ba* and *sa* trigger the allomorph *kyi*, and *na*, *ma*, *ra* and *la* govern *gyi*. The seventh postscript letter *'a* triggers *'i* (e.g. *mtha'* → *mtha'i* 'of the end') as well as *yi* in cases where an additional syllable is needed for the verse metre, but which is not mentioned in SCP itself but added by commentators such as Zha lu.[920] In Tibetan grammatical sources, the term *'brel ba* ('connection,' 'relation') is often treated as self-explanatory, at least in connection with examples. Compare the following selection of Rnam gling's example list of this case:[921]

> *bdag gi lha* ('deity of myself,' 'my deity'), *khyod kyi nor* ('wealth of yours,' 'your wealth'), *dpal gyi bdag po* ('owner/possessor of glory')

---

[919] Both versions are found in literature.
[920] Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 10. Note that the same morphology applies to the third case marker *byed sgra*, the only difference being the additional letter *sa* (*gyi* → *gyis*, etc.). On the omission of *yi* and *yis*, cf. supra 252.
[921] Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 72.

The sixth case *'brel ba* thus establishes a relation or connection between two noun phrases and may be – and frequently is – compared to the genitive function of Indo-European languages. In fact, the Tibetan sixth case *'brel ba* was developed based on the Sanskrit genitive case suffix.

The historical development of the sixth case function *'brel ba* is comparatively unproblematic. Sanskritic grammars such *Cāndra* and *Sārasvata* define the generic use of the sixth case suffix as *sambandha* ('relation,' 'connection'), thus the direct terminological antecedent of the Tibetan term.[922] *Cāndra* established the following rule for the prototypical use of the sixth case suffix:

> C 2.1.95 *ṣaṣṭhī sambandhe* "A sixth *vibhakti* if [there is] connection."

In comparison, *Pāṇini* and *Kātantra* rendered the sixth case function differently:

> P 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* "The sixth *vibhakti* if there is a remainder."

> K 2.4.19 *śeṣāḥ karmakaraṇasampradānāpādānasvāmyādyadhikaraṇeṣu* "The remaining [case suffixes] if [there is respectively] a *karman*, an instrument, a *sampradāna*, an *apādāna*, an owner, a location, etc."

Pāṇini's definition of the prototypical sixth case function in terms of *śeṣa* ('remainder,' 'rest') is highly technical. The rule initiates an entire section up to P 2.3.73 that covers a variety of uses. The *Pāṇinian* commentarial tradition usually explains the term *śeṣa* through the distinction of *kāraka-* and *śeṣa*-relations, that is to say *śeṣa* refers to the remaining syntactic and/or semantic relations apart from the *kāraka*s. At least generally speaking, this implies first of all that *kāraka*-relations are between nouns and verbs, whereas *śeṣa*-relations are those between two nouns.[923] For the current context, there is no reason to go further into the intricacies of P 2.3.50 or the variety of uses of the sixth case suffix that are specified in the subsequent rules.[924]

Kātantra's definition of the prototypical sixth case function *svāmyādi* ('owner, etc.') is probably inspired by the *Pāṇinian* tradition, where *svāmitva* ('ownership') already figures as an important meaning of the *śeṣa*-relation in Patañjali's *Bhāṣya* 17 on P 2.3.50. In later commentaries, such as the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, there are also more extensive typologies of the syntactic or semantic relations covered by *śeṣa,* including again what is known as *svasvāmisambandha*

---

[922] Cf. Liebich 1918, 113; M.S. Joshi 2011, 313.
[923] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1981, 53; HSGLT 2, 282.
[924] Cf. e.g. P 2.3.50 and the subsequent rules in Joshi and Roodbergen 1998, 87ff.

or *svasvāmibhāva* ('owner-owned relation') with the example *rājñaḥ puruṣasya gṛham* ('the house of the king's officer').[925]

Thus, it is likely that *Cāndra*'s alternative rendition of the sixth case function as *sambandha* is connected to these typologies – either as a source of inspiration or an inspired source – in which the term *sambandha* figures as a technical term as well. The focus of *Cāndra* on this notion rather than on Pāṇini's *śeṣa* itself may be explained through *Cāndra*'s attempt to provide more self-explanatory notions that do not require separate *saṃjñā* rules ('defining rules').

In the early Tibetan linguistic sources, the Tibetan sixth case *'brel ba* figures not as a simple adoption but involved processes of selection as well as the concentration on a dominating function. NGg and GNT both provide more functions than simply *'brel ba*. In the following, these will be touched upon only briefly, since they did not have a major role in Si tu's work. The meaning of the sixth case is explained in the *vibhakti* section of NGg in a single sentence:

> *'di ni bdag po'i don du tshig snga ma byed cing brten par bya ba'i don du tshig phyi ma byed par ston pas drug pa bdag po dang 'brel pa'i sa zhes pa dang lhag ma'i dbang du byas zhes bya ba'o/*

> "Regarding these [sixth case forms], since they indicate that the preceding syntactic form (*tshig*) functions in the meaning of owner (*bdag po*) and the following syntactic word form functions in the meaning of the dependent (~ owned ?, *brten par bya ba*), the sixth [case] is termed 'the semantic domain of owner and connection' (*bdag po dang 'brel pa'i sa*) and called 'the header of the remainder' (*lhag ma'i dbang du byas*)."[926]

The three listed functions of *bdag po* ('owner'), *'brel pa* ('connection') and *lhag ma* ('remainder') all figure in the Sanskritic tradition as the generic functions mentioned in *Kātantra* (K 2.4.19), *Cāndra* (C 2.1.95) and *Pāṇini* (P 2.3.50) respectively. Apart from this, it is unclear why NGg mentions precisely these three functions and how they relate to each other. Judging from the grammatical construction of the Tibetan quotation, the terms *bdag po* and *'brel pa* may have been understood as interchangeable labels or also as two separate subcategories. Either option would not be fully in accordance with the Sanskritic tradition, according to which the owner-owned relation is usually just one type of relation (*sambandha*, *'brel pa*) that falls under *śeṣa* ('remainder'), but neither the only nor a separate function apart from *sambandha*. The notion of *lhag ma'i dbang du byas* ('the header of remainder') is

---

366

reminiscent of Chos grub's *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa*, in which the sixth case is defined as *lhag pa'i dbang du byas* ('header of remainder').[927] The Tibetan term *dbang du byas pa* has been also used as a translation of Sanskrit *adhikāra*.[928] In the context of grammar, the Sanskrit term refers to a certain type of topical or heading rules, which apply to a defined number of subsequent rules and thus form a domain.[929] The Tibetan notion may be inspired by P 2.3.50, as Pāṇini's *śeṣa* rule indeed initiates a separate section on the sixth case suffix, which was interpreted by the Sanskritic commentarial tradition as consisting of several subtypes of relations, one of which is the owner-owned. However, compared to Sanskritic grammar, the term *dbang du byas* was used less systematically in the NGg, since it indicates the subsumption of *bdag po* and *'brel pa* only in very general terms, but without establishing an entire domain that covers a clearly defined set of syntactic or semantic triggers. Other than these categories and the short definition of the owner-owned relation in terms of *bdag po* and *brten par bya ba*, NGg did not provide any examples to demonstrate the sixth case.

The GNT, in contrast, gives a clearer and more detailed presentation of the sixth case:

> *da ni gnas drug pa ston te/   de yang drug pa gang gi zhes pa ni bdag po dang 'brel pa'i sa bstan pa yin la/   de yang bdag por 'gyur ba'i don ni dbang bya rgyu'i dngos po gang la dbang byed pa'i bdag por 'gyur ba ni drug pa kho nas 'gyur te/   de yang lhas byin gyi rdzas dang longs spyod lhas byin gyi khang pa zhes pa la sogs pa/   dbang byed pa'i bdag po thams cad la yang drug pa kho nas shes par bya'o/   'brel pa ni gnyis te/   gzhi 'thun gyi drug pa dang/   skyes bu'i drug pa'o/   de la gzhi 'thun gyi drug pa ni chos kyi dngos po gcig ste rdzas su grub pa gnyis med kyi dngos po gcig gi steng du gzhi 'thun pa yin pa la yang drug pas sbyor ba yod de/   de yang utpa la'i sngon po zhes pa lta bu/   utpa la dang sngon po gnyis ka yang rdzas gnyis med kyi gzhi'thun pa kho na yin pa la drug pas sbyor te/   de lta bu'i rigs mang du rgyas par blta'o/   skyes bu'i drug pa ni dngos po'i rdzas tha dad pa gnyis drug pas sbyor ba yin te/   de yang 'di ltar lhas byin gyi zhang po zhes pa lta bu lhas byin rdzas su grub pa dang zhang po rdzas su grub pa gnyis 'brel par ston pa la yang drug pa kho nas sbyor ro/*

> "Now to the exposition of the sixth semantic domain. The sixth [case] 'of which' (*gang gi*) is the indication of the semantic domains of owner (*bdag po*) and connection (*'brel*

[927] Cf. HSGLT 2, 288 and 362.
[928] Cf. Negi on 2002, 3947.
[929] Cf. Abhyankar 1986, 14.

pa). The meaning of [something] becoming the owner is that [something] becomes the owner who controls/possesses (*dbang byed pa*) something to be controlled/possessed. [This] is only the sixth [case]. All controlling owners (*dbang byed pa'i bdag po*) [as] e.g. [in] 'the possessions and goods of Devadatta' (*lhas byin gyi rdzas dang longs spyod*) [or] 'the house of Devadatta' (*lhas sbyin gyi khang pa*) have to be known only as sixth [cases].

As for connection (*'brel pa*), [there are] two types: the sixth [case] of coreferentiality (*gzhi 'thun gyi drug pa*) and the sixth [case] of person (*skyes bu'i drug pa*). As for the sixth [case] of coreferentiality, [it is] a single entity with a property (*chos kyi dngos po*). [That is to say] there is also the application of a sixth case (*drug pas sbyor ba*) when two [entities] are coreferential (*gzhi mthun*) with regard to a single entity, whereas they are not established as two substantially [different entities] (*rdzas su grub pa gnyis med*). For example, in 'the blue of the lotus' (*utpa la'i sngon po*), the two, lotus and blue, do not exist substantially as twofold but only as being coreferential, for which a sixth [case] is applied. Such a type [of connection] appears frequently and widespread. The sixth [case] of person is the application of a sixth [case when there are] two substantially different entities (*dngos po'i rdzas tha dad pa gnyis*). When [it is] indicated as in 'the maternal uncle of Devadatta' (*lhas byin gyi zhang po*) that the two, Devadatta, who is substantially established, [and] the maternal uncle, who is [equally] substantially established, are connected, also only a sixth [case] is applied."[930]

The two functions of *bdag po* ('owner') and *'brel pa* ('connection'), which are already mentioned in NGg, are repeated, but here unmistakably as two separate functions. Pāṇini's *śeṣa*/*lhag ma* ('remainder'), however, has not been retained. The category *bdag po* is more or less self-explanatory, whereas *'brel pa* has been further divided into two subcategories, which appear rather unconventional. The author apparently focused on the criterion of substantial identity/difference (*rdzas su grub pa gnyis yod/med*) to define different types of connections. The first type is that of two terms that specify a single entity and are both instantiated in this very same entity. They are therefore substantially identical or coreferential (*gzhi 'thun*, *samānādhikaraṇa*, lit. 'common substratum'). In this sense, the blue of the lotus is not different from the lotus, since both lotus and blue refer to the same entity. The second type of connection, i.e. that of a person (*skyes bu*), covers those connections of entities that are substantially distinct, such as uncle and nephew. This example is somewhat misleading, since it gives the impression

---

[930] CT *115* – 458f.

that the *skyes bu* type of connection indeed only refers to persons. In the context of GNT's sixth case function *'brel pa* ('connection'), the influx of the category *gzhi 'thun/mi 'thun* appears more like an attempt of a metalinguistic investigation into the nature of possible connections based on the *relata* as either the same or separate substances (*rdzas*). It remains unclear why the notion of substantial identity/distinctiveness has become the relevant distinguishing criterion and there is no apparent syntactic or semantic significance of it in Sanskrit or Tibetan visible to me.

In this research, no other sources on the sixth case were encountered in which this type of subclassification is also figured. Without a further detailed discussion, a general direction for future research may be suggested by the employed terminology of *gzhi mthun pa* (*samānādhikaraṇa*, 'common substratum,' 'coreferential'), *skyes bu* (*puruṣa*, 'person') as well as the example of *utpa la'i sngon po* ('blue lotus,' 'blue water lily'). Both the terminology and the example are reminiscent of compound formations (*bsdu ba*, *samāsa*), and more accurately GNT's class of *gzhi 'thun pa* resonates with *karmadhāraya* compounds while *skyes bu* resonates with *tatpuruṣa* compounds. *Karmadhāraya* is typically a subclass of *tatpuruṣa* and covers descriptive compounds, mostly in which the former part specifies the latter in the form of apposition, *nīlotpala* ('blue lotus,' 'blue water lily') figuring as a frequent illustration in Sanskritic grammatical sources.[931] The compound form *tatpuruṣa* is a larger class, comprising e.g. subclasses such as case relations between the two members of a compound (*vibhakti-tatpuruṣa*), the mentioned *karmadhāraya*s as well as so-called *dvigu* compounds.[932] However, while the conceptual and terminological congruences between GNT's subclassification of *'brel pa* and Sanskritic theories on compound formations are strong and a borrowing would be comprehensible from the fact that both are concerned with the relation between two word forms, the respective contexts are different and it remains unclear how Sanskritic knowledge of *samāsa* may have entered the conception of the sixth case in GNT. Therefore, at this point the suggested historical connection still remains speculative.

In the GNT, the dominance of the category *'brel pa* that has become the most important meaning of the sixth case in the subsequent Tibetan tradition is already indicated at the end of the section on the sixth [case]:

---

[931] Cf. also ft. 614; Tubb and Boose 2007, 102. Cf. also the presentation of *karmadhāraya* (*khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa*) in NGg, CT *115 – 421*.
[932] Cf. Tubb and Boose 2007, 96ff.

*de ltar byas pas drug pa'i sgra 'di bdag po dang 'brel par 'gyur ba yin la/   de yang
'brel pa'i sgra gtsor byas nas shing gi yal ga shin tu ring bar 'dug ces pa lta bu la sogs
pa bshad pa yin no/   de rnams kyi gnas drug pa bshad zin to/*

"Since it is like this, this sixth case-term (*drug pa'i sgra*) becomes owner and
connection, and having made the notion of connection (~ *'brel pa'i sgra*) the main
[meaning], it is explained e.g. as in 'the branches of the tree are very long' (*shing gi yal
ga shin tu ring bar 'dug*)."[933]

How this focus on *'brel ba* has precisely arisen in the tradition will have to be evaluated
elsewhere. However, since already *Cāndra* has focused mainly on this very function, any
possible deviations in this context from the Sanskritic tradition are only minor ones. It may be
imagined that *'brel ba* ('connection') as the broader notion than the very narrow *bdag po*
('owner') but also the clearer and more self-explanatory term than *lhag ma* ('remainder') was
the simplest solution with the strongest explanatory power within the framework of the
semantically dominated Tibetan case model. Moreover, the general category of connection
easily allows for its application to the specifically Tibetan use of *'brel sgra*, which is fairly
representatively covered by it.

Subsequent sources such as the *Smra sgo*, *Mkhas 'jug* or *Tshogs gsum gsal ba* have all already
dispensed with any other function than *'brel ba*.[934] *Smra sgo* makes the following statement:

*drug pa'i phrad bstan pa/   kyi ni 'brel ba'i tshig yin te/   zhes bya ba yin te/   lha
sbyin gyi rta zhes pa lta bu ste/   phan tshun gyi don 'brel bar sbyor ba'i brda sprod
par 'dod pa'o/*

"[Regarding the root text's] teaching of the syntactic link of the sixth case, [it] is '*kyi* is
the syntactic form of connection.' In the grammatical tradition (*brda sprod pa*), it is
claimed that [a sixth case] is applied as the mutual connection of items (*phan tshun gyi
don 'brel ba*) as in 'the horse of Devadatta.'"[935]

In sum, the general historical development of the Tibetan sixth case *'brel ba* is comparatively
clear. A major reason for this is the fact that the connective function as such has a strong
linguistic significance in WT, in which a homogeneous and distinctive set of morphemes is
indeed used in this way.

---

[933] CT *115 – 459*.
[934] Cf. KhJ 2009, 25; Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250.
[935] Smr̥ti 2002, 90.

12.1.1 The Tibetan Sixth Case function in the *Rtags kyi 'jug pa*

Before next turning to Si tu's exposition of the sixth case in the context of his *Sum rtags* commentary, the only noteworthy issue regarding the historical development of the Tibetan sixth case is the terminology used in the TKJ. Without any reference to case grammar or the notion of case as such, TKJ refers twice to the sixth case function, at least according to the commentarial literature. While TKJ 22.4 uses no other term than *'brel pa* ('connection') itself, TKJ 25.2 uses the rather opaque *bsgrub par bya*:

TKJ 24.4-25.3:

spyi(r) 'jug yod dam byed pa yod/	(= first and third case)
de bzhin ched byed rten byed dang/	(= fourth and seventh case)
las bya blang bya bsgrub par bya/	(= second and fifth case; sixth case ?)
sngon tu 'os pa gnas pa 'am/	(= eighth case)

This entire section up to TKJ 28.3 is dedicated to the semantic/syntactic environment that triggers the different syntactic links. TKJ 24.4-25.3 treats the triggering of the case-links and states, for example, that the existence of an active doing (*byed pa*) triggers *byed sgra* or that a purposeful action (*ched byed*) triggers *la don*, etc. The entire list is unproblematic and may be directly associated with the respective case functions, except for the sixth case, which is termed *bsgrub par bya* ('to be established/accomplished').[936] The use of this term as a designation of the sixth case is rather unusual, if not to say confusing. It was untraceable in any Sanskritic source so far, however in TKJ 11.4 the same term 'to be accomplished' is used in a very different sense of a formation or construction of verbs.[937] The problematic character of the term is reflected in the different solutions offered by the commentators to interpret this term as a reference to the sixth case, for example in Zha lu's commentary:

> *bsgrub par bya ba drug pa 'brel ba ste/   shing gi yal ga zhes par/   yal ga de shing gi yin par bsgrub par bya ba lta bu* […]

---

[936] Note that also the first case as *spyir 'jug* posed problems to commentators such as Zha lu and evoked different interpretations (cf. Zha lu 2013B, 36). However, we can at least relate it to GNT's (*khyab pa* ?) *spyi'i don* as a first case label (cf. CT *115 – 444*).

[937] Cf. TKJ 11.4:
> *pho ni 'das dang gzhan **bsgrub** spyir*
> "The masculine [letters] in order **to form** the past [and the category termed] other" (my emphasis).

"'to be accomplished' (*bsgrub par bya*) is the sixth [case], connection; such as in 'the branches of a tree,' these branches are to be accomplished/established/constructed as being that of the tree […]."[938]

I have to admit that I do not see the reason why his interpretation of *bsgrub par bya* is genuine to the sixth case and thus not transferable to any of the other cases. Any entity which takes on a case meaning in a sentence may be said to be accomplished as a *karman*, agent, etc. This interpretation comes close to the *bsgrub par bya* in TKJ 11.4, where it refers to the grammatical construction of word forms, which applies to any kind of grammatical construction and not to that of the sixth case. Although his rendition is slightly more specific, Rnam gling seems to stay in line with Zha lu without offering a more straightforward interpretation:

> *chos kyi sku zhes pa lta bu drug pa'i sgras bsgrub par bya ba'i sgra'am bdag po dang 'brel ba'i sgra 'dren pa dang/* […]

> "As in 'the body of Dharma' (*chos kyi sku*, *dharmakāya*), the term to be accomplished/formed/constructed by the sixth [case]'s morpheme, that is to say the term of owner and connection (*bdag po dang 'brel ba'i sgra*), is derived and […]."[939]

If I understand him correctly, he indeed seems to read the term in the very sense of TKJ 11.4. Si tu shows the same indirect awareness of this notion's problematic character, as he feels compelled to explain it, despite providing little new information compared to Rnam gling:[940]

> *rnam dbye drug pa 'brel pa'i don la 'jug pa ni/   phyug po'i nor/   khyim gyi lha/ chos kyi sku/   bdag gi don/   shing gi yal ga lta bu/   nor/   lha/   sku/   don/ yal ga rnams rim pa bzhin/   phyug po/   khyim/   chos/   bdag   shing rnams dang 'brel pa yin pa'i phyir/   de dag la rnam dbye drug pa 'jug cing 'dir gong du bsgrub bya zhes gsungs pas zhib mor brtags na drug sgra/   'i/   gyi/   kyi rnams bsgrub bya nor dang/   lha dang/   sku rnams/   bdag po phyug po dang/   rten gnas khyim dang/   zhi ba'i chos rnams dang 'brel pa'i sgrub byed du 'gro ba lta bur go dgos so/*

> "Regarding [the mode how] the sixth case takes on the meaning of connection, since in 'the wealth of the rich' (*phyug po'i nor*), 'the god of the house' (*khyim gyi lha*), 'the body of dharma' (*chos kyi sku*, *dharmkāya*), 'the purpose of oneself' (*bdag gi don*) [and] 'the branches of the tree' (*shing gi yal ga*), the wealth, god, body, purpose and branches

---

[938] Zha lu 2013B, 36.
[939] Rnam gling 2013, 154.
[940] Since this terminological issue appears to be minor in the conception of Si tu's sixth case, I did not further discuss it in the section on the *Great Commentary* and his standpoint is given in the historical survey.

are connected respectively with the rich, house, Dharma, oneself and tree, a sixth case joins to them. Since [the sixth case] is taught in this [section] above as *bsgrub bya,* if examined more detailed, the sixth [case's] morphemes *'i, gyi, kyi* should be understood like that which turns into the accomplisher/constructor (*sgrub byed*) of that which is to be accomplished/constructed/formed (*bsgrub bya*), i.e. the connection of the wealth, god and body with the rich [as] the possessor, the house [as] the support and the peaceful Dharma [respectively]."[941]

Also here it remains unclear whether this is an accurate interpretation of the root text. The whole section in TKJ 24.2-28.3 is dedicated to a summarized discussion of the ways in which the meaning of subsequent phrases triggers the syntactic links according to their different functions, and thus the passage is clearly concerned with the different meanings of these links. The general notion of grammatical construction, however, does not provide any information about the specific meaning or function of this grammatical category labelled *bsgrub bya*, may it be the sixth case or any other category. Lacking more knowledge about the Sanskritic body of source materials, it may therefore be concluded that this is perhaps an instance in which the original meaning of the root text has been lost and consequently the commentators have been forced to find their own solutions.

12.2 The Sixth Case in the *Great Commentary*

The discussion of the sixth case *'brel ba* takes up comparatively little space in GC, since compared to most of the other cases, this case is intuitively comprehensible in the context of Tibetan language and less problematic historically as well as linguistically. Si tu comments upon the notion of *'brel ba'i sa* ('semantic domain of connection') in SCP 12.3-13.3 and following the syntactic link's morphology:

> […] *gi   kyi/   'i/   yi/   gyi rnams su grub pa de rnams gang zhig gang dang sgra mthun pa'i ming mtha' so so dang sbyar bas/   bdag gi   gang gi   thams cad kyi/ rab kyi/   phyogs kyi/   de'i/   de yi/   gtan gyi/   lam gyi/   gser gyi/   dpal gyi sogs su 'gyur te de dag ni gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye drug pa zhes 'byung ba rten dang brten pa'am yan lag dang yan lag can sogs ming don phan tshun 'brel pa brjod pa'i don can gi sgra yin pas 'brel pa'i sa zhes bya'o*

> "[…] the resultant *gi, kyi, 'i, yi* and *gyi* are applied to the respective word ending (*ming mtha'*) that is phonologically accordant, thus resulting in (1) *bdag gi* ('mine'), (2) *gang*

---

gi ('of which,' 'whose'), (3) *thams cad kyi* ('of all'), (4) *rab kyi* ('of very'), (5) *phyogs kyi* ('of direction'), (6) *de'i* ('of that'), (7) *de yi* ('of that'), (8) *btan gyi* ('of permanent'), (9) *lam gyi* ('of the path'), (10) *gser gyi* ('of gold'), (11) *dpal gyi* ('of glory/magnificence') etc. These occur as the sixth case in other treatises, and they are the morphemes that have the meaning of expressing the mutual connection [of] word meanings (*ming don phan tshun 'brel pa brjod pa*), [such as] support and supported (*rten dang brten pa*), part and whole (*yan lag dang yan lag can*), etc. Thus, it is called 'the semantic domain of connection.'"[942]

In view of the preceding tradition, Si tu adds no new information either about the root passage of SCP or about the sixth case. The phonological accordance of *'brel sgra* with the final sound of the preceding word is already mentioned in Zha lu et al. The core definition of the sixth case, i.e. *ming don phan tshun 'brel pa* ('mutual connection [between] word meanings'), comes close to what was encountered in the *Smra sgo*, a source Si tu was very well acquainted with, although the current passage does not provide a direct reference. Moreover, *'brel pa* remains the only function in his commentary on SCP. Si tu also provided specifications of *ming don phan tshun 'brel pa* by providing examples for different semantic types of connection, e.g. support/supported (*rten/rten pa*) and parts/whole (*yan lag/yan lag can*), however the subcategorization of GNT into the connection of common substratum and that of person is not further discussed. The eleven examples, which are rather meaningless on their own, are as usual a selection of the different morphological forms of *'brel sgra*, in order to illustrate the morphological application of this link in connection with the ten postscript letters.[943] In fact, these are part of full phrases which Si tu provided also in SCP 12.3-13.3 as an illustration of the syntactic/semantic application of the syntactic link:

> *'brel sgra de dag tshig grogs dang ji ltar sbyor ba'ang/ bdag gi nor/ gang gi drin/ thams cad kyi don/ rab kyi phul/ phyogs kyi glang po/ de'i tshul/ de yi phyogs su ci zhig lhung/ gtan kyi don/ lam gyi yon tan/ gser gyi rgyan/ dpal gyi be'u/ kund kyi mchog rab 'byor kyi tshul/ bka' stsald kyi snying po sogs te rtogs par sla'o/*

"Furthermore, it is easy to understand how these connection morphemes are applied with an accompanying phrase: (12) 'my riches' (*bdag gi nor*), (13) 'whose/which kindness (*gang gi drin*), (14) 'purpose/meaning of all' (*thams cad kyi don*), (15) 'the

---

[942] GC 484.6.
[943] Postscript *'a* has two examples, *de'i* and *de yi*.

most superior' (*rab kyi phul*), (16) 'Dignāga' (*phyogs kyi glang po*), (17) 'mode of that' (*de'i tshul*), (18) 'whatever falls into the extreme of that' (*de'i phyogs su ci zhig lhung*), (19) 'ultimate purpose' (*gtan gyi don*), (20) 'virtues of the path' (*lam gyi yon tan*), (21) 'golden ornament' (*gser gyi rgyan*), (22) 'knot of glory' (*śrīvatsa/, dpal gyi be'u*), (23) 'the highest of all' (*kund kyi mchog*), (24) 'the way of Subhūti/welfare (?)' (*rab 'byord kyi tshul*), (25) 'the essence of the teaching' (*bka' stsald kyi snying po*), etc."[944]

This is all the information on the sixth case contained in the GC ad SCP 12.3-13.3. The rest of Si tu's commentary on this passage is dedicated to the 'non-case meaning' (*rnam dbye'i don ma yin pa*) of the syntactic link, which he renders in terms of *phyi tshig 'khal ba'am mi mthun par ston pa'i tshig gi rgyan*, a 'phrase ornament which indicates contradiction or discordance of the subsequent phrase':[945]

> *'di ni bden **gyi** gzhan ni gti mug go* 'As regards this, it is true, **whereas** the other one is dullness.'[946]

Turning to the case functions of TKJ 24.4-25.3, the term that *Sum rtags* commentators have associated with the sixth case is the notion *bsgrub par bya* ('to be accomplished').[947] Since Si tu did not add any new material on this notion in the passage quoted in the historical survey above, the only noteworthy information Si tu provided on the sixth case in his summary of the case functions following TKJ 25.4-28.3 is an extended and more detailed version of the different types of connections:

> *'brel pa'ang bdag nyid gcig pa'i 'brel pa brjod pa/   chos kyi sku/   rgya mtsho'i chu/ gser kyi bum pa lta bu dang/   phyug po'i nor lta bu/   bdag po dang yul gyi 'brel pa/ khyim gyi lha lta bu rten dang brten pa'i 'brel pa/   shing gi yal ga dang yan lag can gyi 'brel pa sogs du mar 'gyur ba ste rtog par sla'o/*

> "It is moreover easy to understand that connection is manifold, [e.g.] the expression of a connection of single identity (*bdag nyid gcig pa'i 'brel pa*) as in 'the body of the dharma' (*chos kyi sku, dharmakāya*), 'water of the ocean' (*rgya mtsho'i chu*), 'the pot of golden [colour]' (*gser gyi bum pa*), and as in 'the wealth of the rich' (*phyug po'i nor*), the connection of owner and object (*bdag po dang yul kyi 'brel pa*), [or] as in 'the god

---

[944] GC 485.2. Examples 23-25 illustrate the use of *'brel sgra* after *da drag* (postpostscript *da*), which is no longer used in Tibetan orthography already long before Si tu's times. Si tu has nonetheless explained how *da drag* triggers the different allomorphs of *'brel sgra*.
[945] Cf. GC 485.4.
[946] My emphasis.
[947] Cf. supra 371ff.

of the house' (*khyim gyi lha*), the connection of support and supported (*rten dang brten pa'i 'brel pa*), [or] as in 'the branches of the tree' (*shing gi yal ga*), the connection of part and whole (*yan lag dang yan lag can gyi 'brel pa*)."[948]

This time, not only are found NGg's and GNT's *bdag po* ('owner'),[949] but Si tu's *bdag nyid gcig pa'i 'brel pa* ('connection of single identity') also corresponds to GNT's *gzhi 'thun pa'i 'brel pa* ('connection of common substratum'), according to which two entities are connected that are substantially indistinguishable, such as the lotus and its blue colour. Yet, Si tu organizes the various categories differently in that *bdag po* is not a separate sixth case function apart from *'brel pa*, but only a subtype. Moreover, Si tu did not introduce a clear and twofold distinction of *'brel pa* into substantially identical or different, but he started from one general function under which a variety of semantic subtypes is then subsumed. Finally, *skyes bu'i 'brel pa* ('connection of person' ?) in GNT does not seem to correspond to any of Si tu's subcategories.

12.2.1 Résumé on the Sixth Case in the *Great Commentary*

Si tu did not dedicate much space to the sixth case in his GC, the main reason being that he did not offer any modification or critique of former conceptions. This stands to reason, since, as it was said, the Tibetan conception of the sixth case as *'brel ba/pa* ('connection,' 'relation') along with its association with the morphological category *'brel sgra* is linguistically straightforward and does not pose larger problems or questions. There is also no real divergence from the Sanskritic conception of the sixth case suffix as *sambandha* that would have required noteworthy reconciliation to confirm Sanskritic authority and the cross-lingual validity of the cases. As for the problematic sixth case label *sgrub par bya*, Si tu directly addressed this alternative label but abstained from any effort to further problematize it apart from adhering to former strategies that give the impression of a stopgap solution.

---

[948] GC 602.5.

[949] In comparison, Zha lu restricted the sixth case function to *'brel ba* without mentioning *bdag po* at all. Rnam gling, in contrast, mentioned *bdag po* in his rendition of the sixth case in the TKJ (cf. supra 372).

13 *Rnam dbye bdun pa bnas gzhis* or *rten gnas*

13.1 Historical Survey

The Tibetan seventh case is known under the two labels *gnas gzhi* (lit. 'basis of abiding,' 'abode;' 'substratum') and *rten gnas* (lit. 'place of support,' 'supporting place;' 'substratum'). According to the *Sum rtags* commentarial literature, it is the third and final of the three *la don* cases and thus indicated by the three morphological categories *la*, *na* and *du* and their respective allomorphs. In his *Mkhas 'jug*, Sakya Paṇḍita provided the following simple illustration of the seventh case:

> *shing la bya tshang chags zhes bya ba lta bu bdun pa gnas gzhi'i tshig* […]

> "As in 'there is a bird nest on/in the tree' (*shing la bya tshang chags*), the seventh [case] is the syntactic form of abode (*gnas gzhi'i tshig*)."[950]

The precise morphological realization of the seventh case differs in Tibetan grammatical sources. The two morphemes *la* and *na* were associated with the seventh case already as early as in the NG(g) and GNT. Both the root text and commentary of the NG have associated the function *gnas gzhi* with *na* and *la* in the *kāraka* section (= topic 1),[951] but they only provide *gang la*, *gang dag la* and *gang rnams la* as the seventh case forms during the *vibhakti* section (= topic 6).[952] GNT, in contrast, explicitly elaborates that both morphemes are seventh case markers:

> *de gnyis ka la yang bod kyi sgra la ni la dang na gnyis kas ci rigs par bdun par 'gyur te/*

> "Also for both these [seventh case functions], the seventh [case] results in Tibetan morphology by means of the two, *la* and *na*, whichever is suitable."[953]

MVY 4744 and *Chos grub*'s short text on the eight cases, *'Jug pa'i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le'ur byas pa*, both only provide *la*, which I see once more connected to the minimalistic

---

[950] KhJ 2009, 25.
[951] Cf. CT *115* – 407f and 418f. The root text provides both the prototypical forms *gang na byed* ('to act somewhere') as well as *gang la byed* ('id.') for *gnas gzhi*, whereas NGg provides morpheme *la* only in its example phrases.
[952] Cf. CT *115* – 412 and 433f.
[953] CT *115* – 460. Note that the two case functions referred to in this passage are not *gnas gzhi* and *rten gnas*, but represent a subcategorization of the seventh case that thus far I only encountered in this source: *mtshan ma dang gnas kyi sa* ('semantic domains of characteristic and place') (cf. CT *115* – 459f.). Only the second subtype corresponds to the dominant conception of the seventh case function in the Tibetan tradition, whereas *mtshan ma* (e.g. *mchod sbyin gyi lag pa la 'khor lo'i ri mo yod* 'Yajñadatta's hand has a painting of a wheel') does not seem to have played any significant role outside this source.

presentational style of these sources and thus not indicative of *na*'s and *du*'s status as a seventh case marker.[954] None of the mentioned early sources, however, listed *du* as a seventh case marker, also not in any of the sample phrases, although this may also be the result of the economical style of many of the texts.

Turning to the seventh case's morphology in SCP 9.3-11.4, all three morphemes *du*, *na* and *la* occur together with the seventh case function *rten gnas*. Yet, similar to what was said during the fourth case, the question remains whether it should be understood that all three are equally associated with this function.[955]

The earliest source that unmistakably identified *du* with the seventh case is therefore the *Smra sgo*, although it only features the statement that the morphemes "*du*, etc. are accordant with *la*,"[956] meaning that *du* is used in the same way as *la*, including the three case functions. Any further illustration in the *Smra sgo* is omitted.

13.1.1 The Tibetan Seventh Case in Relation to Sanskritic Grammar

The Tibetan seventh case was adopted from the Sanskritic conceptualization of the seventh case suffix that represents the prototypical locative marker in Sanskrit:

> P 2.3.36 *saptamy adhikaraṇe ca* "A seventh [case suffix occurs] also if there is *adhikaraṇa*."

> K 2.4.19 *śeṣāḥ karmakaraṇasampradānāpādānasvāmyādyadhikaraṇeṣu* "The remaining [case suffixes occur] if [there is respectively] a *karman*, an instrument, a *sampradāna*, an *apādāna*, an owner, etc., an *adhikaraṇa*."

> C 2.1.88 *saptamy ādhāre* "A seventh [case suffix occurs] if there is a support/location."

The technical term *adhikaraṇa* that defines the prototypical function of the seventh case suffix in *Pāṇini* and *Kātantra* is another *kāraka* that these two grammars define as follows:

> P 1.4.45 *ādhāro' dhikaraṇam* "*Adhikaraṇa* is the support/location."

> K 2.4.11 *ya ādhāras tad adhikaraṇam* "That which is the support/location is *adhikaraṇa*."

We can see from these latter two definitions that *Cāndra*'s *ādhāra* in C 2.1.88 was not an innovation, and that this grammar rather omitted the technical term *adhikaraṇa* and directly

---

[954] Cf. HSGLT 2, 26 and 362.
[955] Cf. supra 264f.
[956] *du la sogs pa la dang mthun* (Smṛti 2002, 92).

defined the meaning of the seventh case suffix by means of the more straightforward and self-explanatory category *ādhāra*. Exemplifications of the category *adhikaraṇa*/*ādhāra* usually focus on the instance 'some entity exists/resides/is located at some location,'[957] although it is clear from Sanskrit syntax that *adhikaraṇa*/*ādhāra* applies to any kind of verb and equally covers all the different instances of 'some action takes place/happens at some location.'

The much later *Kāśikāvṛtti* derives the notion of *ādhāra* from *ādhriyante 'smin kriyāḥ* ('where actions are located'). It explains P 1.4.45 as follows:

> *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kriyāśrayabhūtayoḥ dhāraṇakriyāṃ prati ya ādhāraḥ tat kārakam adhikaraṇasaṃjñaṃ bhavati* "That *kāraka* which, with regard to the action of supporting, is the location of the *kartṛ* or the *karman*, which are the substrata of the action, receives the designation *adhikaraṇa*."[958]

Respective examples are provided in *Kāśikāvṛtti* on P 1.4.45:[959]

> *kaṭe āste* '(s)he sits on the mat'

> *kaṭe śete* '(s)he lies on the mat'

> *sthālyāṃ pacati* '(s)he cooks in the pot'

While KV's etymological derivation of *ādhāra* renders this category as the location of the action, the commentary's explanation of P 1.4.45 states that it is the location of either agent or *karman*. Without the need to inquire into the details of this theory, the reason for the seeming inconsistency is another common theory in Sanskritic grammar, according to which every action may be classified following the parameter whether it is located in the agent or the *karman*. Taking *Kāśikāvṛtti*'s examples of *adhikaraṇa* as an illustration, *kaṭe āste* would be an instance of the so-called *kartṛsthā kriyā* ('action located in the agent'), whereas *sthālyāṃ pacati* would be an instance of *karmasthā kriyā* ('action located in the *karman*'). The precise conception of this difference might vary from source to source, but in the context of the *Nyāsa* commentary, for example, Joshi and Roodbergen mention as the distinguishing criterion where the outcome of the action is located.[960] In *kaṭe āste*, it is the agent itself which experiences the

---

[957] Cf. e.g. on K 2.4.11 in Liebich 1919, 44, and C 2.1.88 in Liebich 1918, 111f.

[958] Sanskrit and translation quoted from Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 127.

[959] Sanskrit examples are quoted from Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 127.

[960] Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 127f. In his Sanskrit grammatical dictionary on the entry *kartṛsthakriya*, Abhyankar provides the criterion whether the verb can take a *karmakartṛ*, that is to say whether a transitive verb can be used intransitively (cf. Abhyankar 1986, 109). The following phrase is an example of a *karmakartṛ* construction:

> *bhidyate kāṣṭham svayam eva* 'the wood is splitting by itself' (cf. Sharma 1995, 308)

outcome, whereas in *sthālyāṃ pacati*, it is the cooked entity, for example the rice, which experiences the outcome, insofar as it becomes softened (*viklitti*).

Since *Kāśikāvṛtti*'s etymological definition of *ādhāra* would therefore interfere with this classification of verbs, it attempts to reconcile the two theories by stating that the grammatical category *ādhāra* is only indirectly the location of the action, mediated through either the agent or *karman* as the actual location of the action. Thus, agent and *karman* are the direct location of the action, whereas *ādhāra* represents the direct location of agent and *karman* and consequently the mediated or indirect location of the action. Without additional details, it suffices in the current context to note that although *Kāśikāvṛtti* defines *ādhāra* as the place where the entities agent and *karman* are located, rather than the place where an action takes place, both types of definition figure in this source and the latter in the etymological derivation of *ādhāra*. Moreover, the examples reveal that *Kāśikāvṛtti* did not distinguish between verbs of residence/existence and verbs of proper activities, for both the sample phrases *kaṭe āste* and *sthālyāṃ pacati* have been classified as genuine instances of P 1.4.45.

Pāṇini originally did not define *ādhāra* itself as the prototypical seventh case function, since according to P 1.4.46-48 the category *ādhāra* ('support,' 'base,' 'location') not only becomes *adhikaraṇa* but alternatively the *kāraka karman* with certain verbal prefixes, thus triggering a second case. Compare the two following phrases:

(a) *kaṭe śete* 's/he sleeps on the mat' (P 1.4.45)

(b) *grāmam adhiśete* 's/he sleeps in the village.' (P 1.4.46)[961]

A detailed analysis of differences and relations between (a) and (b) according to Pāṇini's grammar would lead far deeper into the intricacies of his *kāraka* model required in the current context. It suffices to note that, although both the mat and the village may be considered the location or base where the person sleeps, the grammatical constructions differ due to the use of the verbal prefix *adhi* in (b).[962] Phrase (a) marks the *ādhāra* with the seventh case and is a

---

Abhyankar's parameter amounts to the point that only transitive verbs that can take a *karmakartṛ* qualify as *karmasthā kriyā* ('action located in the *karman*'), whereas intransitive verbs (*akarmaka*) as well as transitive verbs without *karmakartṛ* construction are *kartṛsthā kriyā* ('action located in the agent'). One simple example with a transitive verb without *karmakartṛ* construction would be that of *rāmo grāmaṃ gacchati* ('Rāma goes to the village'), since the verbal root *gam* ('to go') cannot be used intransitively:

   *grāmo gamyate svayam eva ('the village is going by itself')

To which extent Joshi and Roodbergen's as well as Abhyankar's criteria agree or disagree cannot be followed up further. On the difference between *karmasthā kriyā* and *kartṛsthā kriyā* cf. also Sharma 1990, 183ff. and 254f., as well as commentaries on P 3.1.87 which cover the category *karmakartṛ*.

[961] Examples are taken from the respective rules in Sharma 1990.
[962] Cf. German forms like 'wohnen' and 'bewohnen,' which operate in a similar way.

typical instance of *adhikaraṇa* in Pāṇini's grammar, whereas the *ādhāra* in (b) is classified as a *karman*. The reason, why (b) was not simply classified as an exceptional instance of *adhikaraṇa* as a second case trigger is that this is not only a morphological change of case suffixes, but also a functional change in terms of the relation between the arguments of the sentence. Phrase (b) encodes the village (*grāma*) not as the location as such, but as the object that is affected by the action. Nonetheless, Pāṇini apparently saw a relation between the respective constructions in (a) and (b), otherwise he would not have characterized both NP's of (a) and (b) as *ādhāra*. By introducing this notion to characterize both phrases, his strategy was to take recourse to an additional derivational level, underlying that of the *kāraka*s, on which both, the mat in (a) and the village in (b), instantiate the same category *ādhāra*, with this category then being expressed in Sanskrit sentences in the form of both *kāraka*s, *adhikaraṇa* as well as *karman*. According to *Pāṇinian* grammar, it is ultimately the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) that decides by means of which *kāraka*, that is to say by which type of participation in the action of the sentence, a certain scenario is encoded.[963]

Such a nuanced distinction between the different levels of linguistic analysis and the related status of *kāraka* functions is difficult to recognize, even more so in view of the fact that the Sanskritic tradition as a whole has pursued this approach in very different ways and to varying extents. Already Patañjali's conceptualization of the *kāraka*'s in terms of accomplishing participants in an action to be accomplished, independently of whether or not he generally adhered to the multilayered *Pāṇinian* approach, puts the focus on a very different aspect of the notion *kāraka* ('doer,' 'cause'); and although Peter Verhagen has argued that *Cāndra* did not dispense with the multilayered derivational scheme in which the *kāraka*s occupy an intermediate state between semantics and syntax, *Cāndra*'s strategy to omit the technical term *adhikaraṇa* and directly associate *ādhāra* with the seventh case suffix nonetheless inhibited the recognition and understanding of the difference between the levels of *ādhāra* and *adhikaraṇa*.[964] Once this subtle and intricate detail is omitted, the basic scheme of Sanskritic case grammar amounts to a simple twofold model of case suffixes or forms and their meanings, such as in P 2.3.36 or C 2.1.88 as well as in fact in the entire *vibhakti* section of Sanskritic grammars.

---

[963] On the intricate question of the different levels (semantic, syntactic, morphological, etc.) in the *Pāṇinian* derivational model as well as where the *kāraka*s are to be situated therein, cf. chapter 5.4. Cf. also e.g Kiparsky and Staal 1969; Cardona 1974; or Houben 1999.

[964] Cf. Verhagen 1992, 838. It should be noted that he pointed out clearly that "at first sight there seems to be no intermediate position assigned to the *kāraka* categories in *Cāndra* either" (HSGLT 2, 292).

It is therefore understandable that no indication of a differentiation between these two notions *adhikaraṇa* and *ādhāra* is found in any of the Tibetan grammatical sources considered in this study. Although neither *gnas gzhi* nor *rten gnas* are literal, etymological translations of *ādhāra* or *adhikaraṇa*,[965] mainly *gnas gzhi* figures as a prominent translation for both Sanskrit terms, whereas Tibetan *rten gnas* is at least reminiscent of the translation of C 2.1.88 in CG 1.[966] That the term *gnas gzhi* has been used as a translation for both Sanskrit terms in the Tibetan tradition already indicates that, at least generally speaking, Tibetan grammarians were not overtly meticulous about the terms' difference in the *Pāṇinian* model, although this will have to be decided separately for each of the translations.

A more liberal translation in terms of *gnas gzhi* and *rten gnas* also stands to reason, since these terms are much more self-evident in Tibetan than the rather artificial *kun nas 'dzin pa* (lit. 'to hold from all [sides],' 'to hold completely/totally,' *ādhāra*) and *lhag par byed pa* (lit. 'to do/act exceedingly,' *adhikaraṇa*), since they directly capture the meaning of *ādhāra* ('support,' 'location') as well as *adhikaraṇa* understood as *ādhāra*. Apart from *ādhāra* and *adhikaraṇa*, no indication was encountered in this research that the Tibetan terminology was inspired by any other subcategory of *adhikaraṇa* or by a non-*kāraka* function of the seventh case suffix.[967] It is therefore most likely that the terminological shift from *adhikaraṇa*/*ādhāra* to *gnas gzhi*/*rten gnas* was not mediated by any other category, but that the early Tibetan grammarians and translators simply took recourse to the technique of *don 'gyur* ('intention-based translation')[968] to directly reproduce the meaning rather than the etymology of the Sanskritic technical terms.

Tibetan grammarians directly adopted the notion *adhikaraṇa*/*ādhāra*. This may be connected to several factors, such as the straightforward conception of the *kāraka adhikaraṇa* as *ādhāra* in common grammatical sources without any secondary meanings, the category's very fundamental and distinct semantic meaning in general as well as its linguistic significance in the Tibetan context.

---

[965] Literal translations would be *kun nas 'dzin pa* and *lhag par byed pa* respectively, two terms that were occasionally used in the translation of Sanskritic grammatical treatises. For illustrations, cf. P 1.4.45, P 2.3.36, C 2.1.88, K 2.4.11 and K 2.4.19 in HSGLT 2, 355ff.

[966] Cf. ibid.

[967] Note that *adhikaraṇa* is only defined by a single rule in *Pāṇini* and *Kātantra*, which are the quoted rules P 1.4.45 and K 2.4.11.

[968] Cf. Verhagen 2015, 184. *Don 'gyur* is a translational method that focuses on the meaning of the translated term rather than its morphology and etymology, as opposed to *sgra 'gyur* ('convention-based') that retains the original morphology and etymology of the source language as precisely as possible. Both these techniques are already mentioned in the edict contained in the SSBP.

13.1.2 Tibetan Conceptualizations of the Category *Gnas gzhi/Rten gnas* pre-Si tu

Returning to the Tibetan conception of the seventh case *gnas gzhi* ('abode,' 'location'), there exist two major strategies of interpreting this category, which may be rendered as the broader and the narrower version. Both versions seem to be connected to the idea of a place where some entity exists or resides. In the broader version of this understanding, it makes no difference whether the entity is actively performing an action or whether it is nothing but existing, residing, etc. at that place. This version of the seventh case includes locations of entities with proper actions. The narrower version excludes any performances of actions and restricts the seventh case only to those instances in which some entity is statically present (existing, sitting, residing, etc.) at some place. Although sources often do not provide enough material to evaluate which of the versions they adhered to, both seem to have existed side by side already in early sources.

The NGg, for example, features a concise prototypical definition of the seventh case as "the meaning of the seventh [case is] the meaning that something exists somewhere,"[969] thus focusing on the mere existence of something somewhere. However, in the *kāraka* section, we do find the phrase *tshang bang na 'tshed par byed pa* ('to cook in the kitchen') as an example of *gnas gzhi*, which was probably adopted or derived from Sanskritic grammatical sources.[970]

GNT, in contrast, offers two subcategories of the seventh case, i.e. *mtshan ma'i bdun pa* ('seventh [case] of characteristic') and *gnas gzhi'i bdun pa* ('seventh [case] of abode'). The latter is defined as follows:

> *gnas gzhi'i bdun pa ni lhas byin la sogs pa gang yang rung ba zhig 'dug gnas sam gzhi ma gang gi steng na 'dug cing gnas pa de nyid ston par byed pa ni gnas gzhi'i 'dug pa* [sic!][971] *yin te/   de yang 'di ltar lhas byin rang gi stan na sdod cing 'dug ces pa lta bu dang/   de bzhin du lhas byin khang bzang gi steng na 'dug ces pa lta bu dang kun dga' ra na 'dug ces pa la sogs pa 'dug gnas du ma la 'dug pa ni gnas gzhi'i bdun pa'o/*

> "Regarding the seventh [case] of abode (*gnas gzhi'i bdun pa*), it indicates precisely at which abode or basis (*'dug gnas sam gzhi ma gang gi steng na*) Devadatta, etc., whatever is suitable, stays or resides (*'dug cing gnas pa*). That is the seventh [case] of abode (*gnas gzhi'i bdun pa*). Likewise, [such a] residence [is possible] at many abodes, such as 'Devadatta sits and stays on his mat' (*lhas byin rang gi stan na sdod cing 'dug*)

[969] […] *gang la gang yod pa'i don ni bdun pa'i don to/* (CT *115* – 434).
[970] Cf. CT *115* – 418.
[971] I read *gnas gzhi'i bdun pa*.

and 'Devadatta stays in/on/at the palace' (*lhas byin khang bzang gi steng na 'dug*), etc. These are the seventh [case] of abode (*gnas gzhi'i bdun pa*)."[972]

The construction *sdod cing 'dug* in the first of the two provided examples may alternatively be interpreted as an auxiliary construction to express the present continuous tense: 'Devadatta is sitting on his mat.' However, the above version is preferred because the addition of *'dug* ('to stay') is interpreted as a gloss of *sdod pa* (~ 'id.') for the sake of an additional emphasis that the mat (*stan*) is one of the many *'dug gnas* ('abode,' 'residence') where an entity may stay (*'dug*). The author obviously wished to maintain the definitional term *'dug pa* throughout the examples, which can be also seen from the second example, in which he used *'dug* alone instead of maintaining the auxiliary construction.

Although not directly contrasted with verbs of action, GNT's definition and examples suggest that the author applied the narrower and literal interpretation of the category *gnas gzhi*, restricting it to the mere residence of an entity at some location without any involved activity. The examples for the other category *mtshan ma'i bdun pa* ('seventh case of characteristic') also only exhibit the verb frame *yod pa* ('to exist', 'to have').[973] A counterargument would be that, in case the GNT did not apply the broader understanding of the seventh case, arguments marked by *la don* in phrases such as *bod na bu skyed* ('a son is born in Tibet'), in which the genuine role of *karman* is already occupied by another argument, would perhaps not be covered by the case model – which is in direct contradiction to the claim that the eight cases cover all possible terms.

Whichever one of the two versions was employed in later Tibetan grammaticography in and outside *Sum rtags* will have to be decided separately for each source. Unfortunately, most Tibetan sources are rather parsimonious regarding this detail, with the examples as the only point of reference. In general, there is the tendency to provide examples with verbs that express existence or residence, such as those encountered in Sakya Paṇḍita's KhJ.[974] However, this is to be expected, since the instances of 'something exists somewhere,' 'something resides somewhere,' etc. are among the clearest illustrations of the meaning of the seventh case as location, but they do not automatically indicate that a grammatical source excluded locations of entities involved in actions.

---

[972] CT *115* – 460.
[973] Cf. ibid.
[974] Cf. supra 377.

One of the most direct and explicit accounts of the seventh case's narrower reading is that of the much later author Pra ti, who explained the difference between the three cases of *la don* as follows:

des na 'di dag gi khyad par ni/   thab la med btang zhes pa lta bu/   gzhi gzhan la bya ba byas pa dang/   byed pa sogs ston pa'i la sgra rnams rnam dbye gnyis pa dang/ mgron po la me btang lta bu bya ba byed pa'i gzhi dngos ma yin par/   de la me bdang ba ni/   de'i ched du me btang ba yin la/   de ltar dgos pa la/   la sgra sbyar te/   bya ba me btang bar ston pa'i la'i sgra ni rnam dbye gzhi pa'o/   thab la me yod lta bu/ gzhi thab la me btang ba sogs kyi bya ba byas pa mi brjod par/   me'i ngo bo tsam yod par brjod pa'i la'i sgra ni rnam dbye bdun pa'o […]*

"Therefore, regarding the difference between these [five functions in SCP 11.3-4], a *la*-morpheme which indicates that an action has been performed or is being performed etc. upon some other substratum (*gzhi gzhan la bya ba byas pa dang byed pa sogs*) is the second case, as in 'to light a fire on the stove' (*thab la me btang*). In 'having lit a fire for the guest' (*mgron po la me btang*), without being the actual substratum where the action is performed, 'having lit a fire for him' (*de la me btang ba*) [means that] the fire is lit for the sake of him (*de'i ched du*). Accordingly, a *la*-morpheme indicating the action of fire-lighting for a purpose (*dgos pa*) to which the *la*-morpheme has been applied is a fourth case. In 'there is fire on the stove' (*thab la med yod*), not saying that an action of lighting a fire on the stove etc. has been performed, a *la*-morpheme expressing that the mere essence of fire exists (*me'i ngo bo tsam yod pa*) is the seventh case."[975]

His list of seventh case examples under SCP 11.3-4 exclusively covers verb frames without any obvious activity:

'to be/exist in the east' (*shar phyogs su yod*), 'water resides/dwells in the pot' (*bum pa ru chu gnas*), '[it] is not in front/at the front' (*bdun du mi 'dug*), 'the mirror is clear at the bottom' (*gsham du me long gsal*), 'the salt is much in the north' (= 'there is much salt in the north,' *byang du tshwa mang*), 'the Dharma is spread in India' (*rgya gar du chos dar*), 'in Tibet, the woolen cloth is good' (*bod du snam bu legs*), 'the master resides in Rab gsal' (*rab gsal du dpon po bzhugs*), 'the pottery in front is beautiful' (*mdun du*

---

[975] Pra ti 2013A, 203f. Note that this passage was already quoted and discussed in the context of the second case, supra 207f.

dkar yol mdzes), 'in China, the banners/scarfs (?) are many' (= 'there are many banners/scarfs (?) in China' (*rgya nag tu dar mang*), 'the queen resides in the royal palace' (*rgyal khab tu btsun mo gnas*), 'the beggar is bound to the outside (?)' (*phyi rol tu slong mo pa 'byor*)[976]

As already mentioned in the context of the second case, Pra ti focused on a narrow and literal interpretation of the category *gnas gzhi/rten gnas* ('abode/supporting place'). It is most likely that the morphological identity of second, fourth and seventh case in the traditional model motivated this understanding of *gnas gzhi/rten gnas* to arrive at clear-cut parameters for the cases' distinction.

Traces of both the broader and the narrower interpretations of the seventh case *gnas gzhi/rten gnas* are already found in the Sanskritic tradition. The quoted Sanskritic examples reveal that verbs which express proper activities are included in the categories *adhikaraṇa* and *ādhāra* at least in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*.[977] This Sanskritic source even explicitly defines the latter as the location of actions (*ādhriyante 'smin kriyāḥ*) in its etymological explanation of *ādhāra*, which makes clear that in the Sanskritic taxonomy the seventh case is used in sentences with verbs of proper actions. On the other hand, classical examples of *adhikaraṇa/ādhāra* in Sanskritic grammatical treatises commonly focus on instances of residence and existence, which may have given the impression that it is restricted to these. Moreover, the Sanskritic theory encountered in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, according to which *adhikaraṇa/ādhāra* is the direct location of the two entities agent and *karman* and only indirectly represents the location of the action, focuses more on the location of entities. This focus may then have been generalized and further developed into a general function of mere residence or location of entities. On a final remark, the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* offers its own rather unusual typology of the category *gnas gzhi*, but does not restrict the seventh case to a mere location of existence or residence.[978] Regardless the precise historical genesis of the narrower interpretation of the seventh case in the transmission of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge to Tibet and regardless the precise factors and actors involved in it, we will see that Si tu took a clear stance in his assessment of the seventh case as a mere location of residence.

---

[976] Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 197.
[977] Cf. supra 379f.
[978] Cf. CT *109* – 1713f.

13.1.3 On the Linguistic Significance of the Seventh Case and the Distribution of the *la don* Morphemes in Old Tibetan

The locative uses of all three *la don* morphemes is in line with most academic studies of Tibetan syntax, with the morpheme *na* certainly as the most distinctive locative marker, since the vast majority of this morpheme's uses is restricted to the indication of a mere static locative without movement, either spatially in terms of 'something is located or happens in/at a certain place' or temporally in terms of 'something is located or happens at a certain time':

> *lag na 'phreng ba bzung* '(X) held a rosary in the hand.'[979]
>
> *'chi ba'i tshe na* 'at the time of dying'[980]

Case models such as that of Tournadre's study even list the locative function as the only case function of *na*.[981] Hahn's textbook for classical Tibetan, in contrast, mentions a very rare directional meaning.[982]

According to academic studies, the morpheme *la* may equally encode both spatial and temporal locative meaning, and in this function it is interchangeable with *na*:

> *rgya mtsho la nor bu gnas so* 'Jewels are located in the ocean.'[983]
>
> *pha mes kyi dus la* 'at the time of the ancestors'[984]

Tournadre more specifically distinguishes between an inessive locative (*khyim na/la/du mi med* 'there are no people **in** the house') and a superessive locative (*ri la rtswa ni mi 'dug* 'there is no grass **on** the mountain'), attributing the inessive function to *la*, *na* and *du*, while the superessive is mostly restricted to *la* and *du* and only sometimes expressed by *na*.[985]

Finally, the morpheme *du* equally and often interchangeably with *na* and *la* takes on the function of locative:

> *thab tu me 'bar* 'the fire burns in the stove'
>
> *de'i dus su* 'at that time'[986]

---

[979] Example and translation taken from Tournadre 2010, 110.
[980] Example taken from Schwieger 2006, 277.
[981] Cf. Trounadre 2010, 110.
[982] Cf. Hahn 2005, 92.
[983] Example taken from ibid., 95.
[984] Example taken from a longer sample phrase in Schwieger 2006, 310.
[985] Cf. Tournadre 2010, 106ff.
[986] Examples taken from ibid., 108.

Regarding the first example, in his study Tournadre equates it with *thab na me 'bar* ('the fire burns in the stove'), noting that "for this inessive function, *du* may usually be replaced by the locative *na*."[987]

In sum, a spatio-temporal locative functioning of all three *la don* morphemes is commonly accepted by modern academia, either with or without more detailed attempts to distinguish between the morpheme's precise locative uses such as Tournadre's inessive/superessive subdivision. It is due to this very reason that the merging by Tibetan grammarians of the three morphemes under the seventh case is less problematic than in the context of the second and fourth case.

There is, however, one important distributional difference which may be extracted from Hill's study on the *la don* morphemes in the Old Tibetan Annals. In his paper, Hill lists as trigger of *na* only verb frames with a dominant static meaning without any noticeable activity involved, such as *bzhugs pa* ('to reside'), *mchis pa* ('to stay') or *mkhyud pa* ('to be interred').[988] According to Hill's findings, the morpheme *du* is used in contrast to mark the location of proper actions and destinations of motion verbs, with one example being *bltam pa* ('to take birth').[989] While this distributional difference between *na* and *du* does not seem to have survived in later stages of WT, additional corpus linguistic research in the future will hopefully bring about further insights into whether Hill's findings have diachronic significance in Old Tibetan. This may be an important observation also for future research on Tibetan grammaticography, since it may be a factor which must be considered in the development of the narrower notion of *gnas gzhi* as much as in the exclusion of *du* especially in several early sources.

13.1.4 Résumé on the Tibetan Seventh Case pre-Si tu

The Tibetan seventh case *gnas gzhi*/*rten gnas* ('abode/support') as the representation of the category location was directly derived from the two Sanskritic notions *adhikaraṇa* and *ādhāra*, the former a *kāraka* function and the latter the semantic definition of this *kāraka*. The separation of the derivational levels on which these two Sanskritic notions operate in grammars such as *Pāṇini* was not maintained. Linguistically, the adoption of this case function does have significance, since all the three *la don* morphemes usually associated with this case have a locative function in WT, although synchronic and diachronic differences between the locative functions of *la*, *na* and *du* are discussed in linguistic studies.

---

[987] Ibid.
[988] Cf. Hill 2011, 15ff.
[989] Cf. ibid., 25 and 35.

The only hermeneutical issues that deserve future scrutiny are the morphological realization of this case throughout different Tibetan sources, the question of whether the tradition unequivocally classified the morpheme *du* as a seventh case marker from the very beginning, as well as the conceptual question of which of the sources adhered to the narrower or the broader meaning of the seventh case. Especially the narrower version raises the question how it was developed, since it does not represent the typical Sanskritic understanding of *adhikaraṇa* and *ādhāra* which is applicable to phrases with proper actions.

13.2 The Seventh Case in the *Great Commentary*

Si tu followed his usual twofold format to discuss the seventh case *gnas gzhi*/*rten gnas* first in his commentary on SCP 9.3-11.4[990] and then in his summary of the case model at the end of GC's part on TKJ. In his paraphrase of the root text SCP 9.3-11.4, he provides the first concise rendition of the seventh case:

> […] *shar phyogs su yod lta bu bdun pa gnas gzhi'i don can yin na/   rten gnas kyi sgra dang/* […]

> "[…] as in 'exists at the east' (*shar phyogs su yod*), if [these seven *la don* morphemes] have the meaning of the seventh [case], abode (*gnas gzhi*), [they are] the morpheme of support (*rten gnas kyi sgra*) […]"[991]

In his section on the semantic mode of application (*don gyi sbyor tshul*) of the *la don* morphemes under SCP 9.3-11.4, Si tu specifies the seventh case as follows:

> *rten gnas te gang zhig gang la brten pa'am yod pa'i don can du 'jug pa rnam dbye bdun pa ni/   shar phyogs su 'od snang/   mer me lha gnas/   lte ba ru rdzing bcas/   lha khang du mchod rten yod/   sa 'og tu stobs ldan gnas/   gzugs khams na tshangs pa/ lcags la gser 'byug   lta bu ste go bar sla'o/*

> "As for support (*rten gnas*), it is easy to understand: [it is] the seventh case, the joining (*'jug pa*) [of the *la don* morphemes] in the meaning that something is supported or exists somewhere (*gang zhig gang la brten pa'am yod pa*), as in (1) 'light shines in the east' (*shar phyogs su 'od snang*), (2) 'the fire deity lives in the fire' (*mer me lha gnas*), (3) 'a pond/reservoir is located/exists at the center/core (?)' (*lte ba ru rdzing bcas*), (4) 'there is a stupa in the temple' (*lha kang du mchod rten yod*), (5) 'the Asura

---

[990] SCP 11.3 employs the term *rten gnas*. Also note that the exact same verse line as SCP 11.3 can be found in the *Smra sgo* on morpheme *na* (cf. Smṛti 2002, 78).
[991] GC 472.2.

live underground' (*sa 'og tu stobs ldan gnas*), (6) 'Brahma [lives] in the form realm' (*gzugs khams na tshangs pa*), (7) 'gold is applied to/spread on the iron' (*lcags la gser 'byug*)."[992]

The definition of the seventh case as *gang zhig gang la brten pa'am yod pa* ('something exists or is based/supported somewhere') is reminiscent of NGg's definition *gang la gang yod pa* ('something exists somewhere'),[993] the only noteworthy addition being the term *brten pa*, which is probably a gloss to refer to SCP's *rten gnas* as the technical term under investigation in this passage. In the quotation above, Si tu provided the following list of examples, revealing that he has adopted the broader notion of the seventh case:

> (1) *shar phyogs su 'od snang* 'light shines in the east'
>
> (2) *mer me lha gnas* 'the fire deity lives in the fire'
>
> (3) *lte ba ru rdzing bcas* 'a pond/reservoir is located/exists at the center/core (?)'[994]
>
> (4) *lha kang du mchod rten yod* 'there is a stupa in the temple'
>
> (5) *sa 'og tu stobs ldan gnas* 'the Asura live underground'
>
> (6) *gzugs khams na tshangs pa* 'Brahma [lives] in the form realm'
>
> (7) *lcags la gser 'byug* 'gold is applied to/spread on the iron'

Si tu listed seven examples, one for each of the seven *la don* morphemes. He employed five different verb frames, namely *snang ba* ('to shine'), *gnas pa* ('to live/abide'), *'cha' ba* ('to be endowed with'), *yod pa* ('to exist'), *'byug pa* ('to spread,' 'apply,' 'put on'), with *gnas pa* being used twice; and if example (6) is included, in which *gnas pa* is most probably implicated, this verb frame was used three times. The list therefore includes one *tha dad pa* verb (*'byug pa*), at least two *tha mi dad pa* verbs (*gnas pa, snang ba*) as well as *yod pa* ('to exist') which often remains unclassified in Tibetan dictionaries, since it is not considered an action in any sense.[995] As for *bcas*, it is either another *tha mi dad* verb (*'cha' ba*) or the denominalization of *bcas pa* and thus unclassified. The distribution of the three morphemes *du*, *na* and *la* with their respective allomorphs in this passage is insignificant, since the restriction to only one example per morpheme and the limited number of verb frames does not allow any representative

---

[992] GC 474.2.

[993] Cf. supra 383.

[994] Note that the form *bcas*, which is understood here as the perfect tense of the verb *'cha' ba* in its *tha mi dad* meaning ('to settle,' 'dwell,' 'abide,' 'exist'), may be also interpreted as a denominalization of *bcas pa* ('having,' 'being endowed with'): 'the center/core is endowed with a pond/reservoir (?)'. Presumably, there is an etymological relation between *bcas pa* in the meaning of 'being endowed with' and the verb *'cha' ba*.

[995] The same applies to the copula *yin*. Cf. e.g. the entries of *yin* and *yod pa* in the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* 2004, 2578 and 2605 respectively.

conclusions about homogeneity or heterogeneity of their uses, neither with regard to Si tu's conception of the seventh case nor with regard to WT.

Examples (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) are all unproblematic instances of basic locative marking. The only two examples that deserve further investigation thus are the remaining phrases (1) and (7).

Example (1) raises the question whether Si tu understood the lexical value of *snang ba* ('to shine,' 'to appear') as a mere expression of location and without any action or change taking place. Although intuitively it may be assumed that the action of shining is more than a mere expression of residence or existence, this is a difficult question to address, since it is more a matter of the grammarian's perception of a verb's semantics and underlying scenario, about which often there is insufficient available material. Pra ti, for example in *rgya gar du chos dar* ('Dharma is spread in India'), classified the verb frame *dar ba* ('to be spread') as a seventh case and thus an expression of mere location, although it may be argued that the intransitive-resultative lexical value of *dar ba* also includes that an action of spreading was involved in the past.

Due to the passive lexical value of *snang ba* that exhibits comparatively weak activity, it cannot be conclusively decided whether Si tu regarded example (1) as another instance of mere location of the light or an actual action performed by the light at a location.

The instance which deserves the most attention in this list, however, is phrase (7). First of all, *'byug pa* ('to apply,' 'to put on,' 'to spread') is unmistakably a *tha dad pa* verb expressing an action in its most genuine sense that somebody performs an action through which an object is affected. This makes clear that Si tu's definition of the seventh case in the passage quoted above was not restricted to the expression of an item's mere location, place of residence or place of existence. The definition *gang zhig gang la brten pa'am yod pa* ('something exists or is based/supported somewhere') should be understood in the broader sense that some entity or item is based somewhere, regardless of any involvement of this item in an action. This inclusion of proper actions in the seventh case, through which Si tu clearly sets himself apart from conceptions such as those found in Pra ti or perhaps also in GNT, is further explicated in his TKJ commentary.[996]

Secondly, Si tu's classification of this phrase as a seventh case is not unproblematic with regard to both the traditional case model and the structures of WT. In fact, Si tu was contested by Tshe

---

[996] Cf. infra 398f.

tan zhabs drung. The scenario referred to in example (7) is that some golden material (*gser*), presumably in molten form or as colour, is spread on or applied to (*'byug pa*) by an unmentioned agent on some iron material (*lcags*), presumably an item made of iron. As tentatively indicated by the English translation, the scenario as such allows a more locative semantic construal and thus also a locative syntactic encoding, in the sense that the action of spreading takes place on the iron material. Alternatively, the iron may be the INDIRECT OBJECT or DIRECTION of the action, in the sense of that item which the gold is applied to. The decisive question concerns the information encoded by the morpheme *la* in example (7). In view of the fact that the morpheme *la* does have locative uses but prototypically encodes the information of either INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or DIRECTION,[997] this question cannot be promptly responded to. The verb frame *'byug pa* appears in dictionaries mainly with two syntactic constructions, one being that of example (7) with an unmarked argument and an argument marked by *la* or its allomorph,[998] whereas in his Tibetan verb lexicon Hackett offers the alternative construction of an unmarked argument plus the item to be spread marked with *byed sgra*.[999] If we apply both constructions to example (7), the difference is as follows:

(a) *lcags la gser 'byug* 'to apply gold to iron/to spread gold on iron'

(b) *lcags gser gyis 'byug* 'to anoint/smear/cover iron with gold'

Without being a linguist, I would argue that in phrase (a), the *tha dad pa* verb *'byug pa* rather triggers *la* in its objective or directional function. One argument may be that none of the dictionaries list the more distinctive locative marker *na* as a possible substitute for *la*, but this is not necessarily indicative. Morpheme *la*'s objective or directional functioning in example (7) may also be corroborated by Tshe tan zhabs drung's correct observation that Si tu inconsistently classified *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* ('to make a picture on/onto the stone') as an instance of the second case *las su bya ba* but *lcags la gser 'byug* ('gold is applied to the iron') as an example of the seventh case *gnas gzhi*:[1000]

(a) *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* 'to make a picture on/onto the stone' (GC: second case)

(b) *lcags la gser 'byug* 'gold is applied to the iron' (GC: seventh case)

[997] On the question whether *la* represents more likely an indirect objective marker or a genuine allative marker, cf. the second case *las su bya ba*.
[998] Cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* 2004, 1980; Goldstein 2001, 766.
[999] Hackett 2003, 135.
[1000] Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 121; supra 215 and ft. 557.

The two phrases are structurally equivalent as long as the morpheme *-r* in *rdo bar* is interpreted as an allomorph of *la*. If thus both phrases are treated as equivalent, the inconsistency of Si tu's classification at least corroborates that a locative interpretation of morpheme *la* in example (7) is not at all necessary.[1001] Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out at this point that *lcags la gser 'byug* qualifies as a locative instance in the sense of 'to spread gold *on* iron.' The precise meaning of *la* in example (7) as well as the grammaticality of *na* and perhaps also that of *du* in this instance will have to be discussed elsewhere. Yet, as a word of caution it must be mentioned that in this context also the question might be raised to which extent native speakers in fact distinguish between the locative and objective or directional uses of *la* in instances such as example (7), which allow for both readings, since the meaning of the sentence as such remains clear and in most contexts does not require any specification of this issue.

The question remains why Si tu chose to classify example (7) as an instance of *gnas gzhi* as well as the equivalent phrase *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* as a second case in the traditional model. While the above linguistic issues surrounding the syntactic value of *'byug pa* may have figured as one possible factor for his classification, Si tu's already examined example of *bum par chu blugs* ('having poured water into the pot'), which he briefly discussed in his summary of the second case at the end of TKJ,[1002] offers a theoretical-conceptual explanation which is more connected to his objectivist approach. The inconsistency encountered in the classification of the grammatically equivalent phrases *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* and *lcags la gser 'byug*, namely to classify one as a second and the other as a seventh case, has already previously appeared within one and the same phrase *bum par chu blugs*:[1003]

> *de bzhin du bum par chu blugs zhes pa lta bu bum pa la bya ba blugs pa'i yul yin pas gnyis pa'am chu brten pa'i cha nas gnas gzhi ste rnam dbye gnyis pa gang rung 'jug* […]

> "Likewise, for example in 'having poured water into a pot' (*bum par chu blugs*), since the pot is the domain of the action of 'having poured' (*bya ba blugs pa'i yul*), the second

---

[1001] It should be noted that Tshe tan zhabs drung did not conclusively decide which of the two classifications is correct, but only stated that (a) is in conformity with Si tu's rendition of the seventh case as *bya ba'i rten* (cf. infra 399) and thus qualifies as a seventh case in Si tu's model (cf. ibid., 124f.).
However, from Tshe tan zhabs drung's own conception of the cases it appears that in his system both instances only qualify as a second case. This is, however, less due to *la*'s and *-r*'s functioning in the respective phrases than his adherence to Pra ti's conception of the second and seventh case, according to which any type of action-verb categorically excludes the possibility of a seventh case. This allows him to maintain a clear distinction between the traditional *la don* cases despite their morphological identity (cf. ibid., 130ff.).
[1002] Cf. supra 232ff.
[1003] The following passage was already quoted and translated supra 232f.

[case], or from the perspective of the water being supported, the abode (*gnas gzhi*)[1004] – whichever of the two cases – join to ['the pot']."[1005]

It was argued in the context of the second case that this semantic construal of the underlying scenario probably was Si tu's strategy to find a reason for why Sanskrit language may employ a seventh case suffix in such instances. However, the same theory may provide an answer to the current issue regarding Si tu's classification of example (7). If the proposed interpretation of Si tu's analysis of *bum par chu blugs* is correct, then he conceived the action of pouring water as a spatio-temporal continuum in which parts of the action are already accomplished, whereas other parts are yet to be accomplished. Instead of the entire water being poured within the instance of a single moment, the entire action is constituted through a process in which parts of the water are already poured and thus located in the pot, whereas other parts of the water are still awaiting to be poured or in the process of being poured and thus outside the pot. Depending on which of the two perspectives is taken on, the pot appears as an instance of the second case *las su bya ba* or the seventh case *gnas gzhi/rten gnas*. The very same semantic construal may of course be applied to both the examples *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* ('to make a picture onto the stone' vs. 'to make a picture on the stone') and *lcags la gser 'byug* ('to apply gold to iron' vs. 'to spread gold on iron'). The finished parts of the picture as well as the applied parts of the gold are located at the stone and the iron respectively, whereas the respective unfinished parts are not. In this sense, it may be asked whether Si tu ultimately allowed for a double classification of second and seventh case for all three phrases, or perhaps even for all phrases to which this type of semantic analysis applies. If this was indeed Si tu's point of view, then the opposing classifications of *rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed* and *lcags la gser 'byug* were not inconsistent but rather incomplete, since he lacked to specify the complementary case marking for both phrases. However, the lack of such a specification may be also interpreted as an indication that he did not allow for any double classification in the context of these two phrases, or that he was generally unconcerned with this issue.

Despite the issues surrounding examples (1) and (7), the basic definition of the seventh case *gnas gzhi/rten gnas* in the part of the GC on SCP remains clearly that of an entity's location, primarily in direct expressions of the form 'something exists/resides/etc. somewhere,' but also in sentences with proper actions taking place.

[1004] I.e. the seventh case.
[1005] GC 599.4.

13.2.1 The Seventh Case and *tshe skabs* ('time occasion')

Si tu did not restrict the seventh case to spatial locations but included the category *tshe skabs* ('time frame,' 'time,' 'occasion'), the final one of the five functions mentioned in SCP 11.3-4:

> *tshe skabs te rnam dbye bdun pa nyid dus brjod pa'i don la 'jug pa ni/   tshes gnyis su nyi ma zlog/   nyi ma shar bar ldang/   'char kha ru dus gdab/   rgyun du kha ton byed/   rtag tu bden par smra/   nam langs pa na chos ston/   srod la bdud btul/ sogs mang du shes par bya'o/*

> "As for time occasion (*tshe skabs*), that is to say, the very seventh case takes on the meaning of a time expression (*dus brjod pa*), [it] is to be known as for example in (8) 'the solstice is at the second day [of the month]' (*tshes gnyis su nyi ma zlog*), (9) 'to get up when the sun shines' (*nyi ma shar bar sdang*), (10) 'an appointment is to be set at dawn' (*'char kha ru dus gdab*), (11) 'to recite continuously/daily' (*rgyun du kha ton byed*), (12) 'to always speak truly' (*rtag tu bden par smra*), (13) 'to teach the Dharma at dawn' (*nam langs pa na chos ston*), (14) 'having tamed the demon in the evening' (*srod la bdud btul*)."[1006]

The identification of the seventh case with SCP's *tshe skabs* cannot be found in the commentaries of Zha lu et al. Although also Pra ti did not mention it, this fact has more significance in his work, since time expressions in connection with genuine actions such as in GC's examples (9) or (11) could not qualify as seventh cases in his conception of the case model. He would have therefore needed to distinguish between time expressions belonging to the second case and those belonging to the seventh, a rather cumbersome and artificial taxonomy that would also lack any support in the preceding Sanskritic and Tibetan tradition. Si tu, who did not adhere to Pra ti's distinguishing parameter for the second and seventh cases, did not face such issues, as is evident from his list of examples which includes instances of unmistakable actions. Thus, he was able to subsume the category *tshe skabs* under the seventh case. Si tu's strategy seems to be reasonable from a linguistic perspective, since it is a common feature of languages, including WT, to express spatial and temporal locations through the same morphosyntactic means.

Si tu provided a second set of seven examples, again citing one phrase for each *la don* morpheme. Although the general subsumption of the category time expression under the seventh case seems linguistically reasonable and all the examples are temporal specifications,

---

[1006] GC 475.2.

the phrases are syntactically more diverse and thus raise questions in terms of their homogeneity as instances of one and the same grammatical category.

Phrase (8), (10) and (14) may be seen as the most explicit expressions of time, where a single noun phrase is marked by *la don* in a simple clause to indicate the time when the action takes place. In contrast, phrases (9) and (13) mark entire subclauses with an additional verb, namely *nyi ma shar ba* ('the sun shines') and *nam langs pa* (lit. 'the day gets up;' 'dawn'). The same strategy was already encountered in the GC in the context of the third case, where *byed sgra* in its function to indicate a causal relation between clauses was subsumed under the agentive function due to its semantic affinity.[1007] Although the morphology and the semantic information expressed by the morphemes is identical throughout the two grammatical constructions (noun phrase vs. subclause), Si tu's strategy raises the question whether the difference of marking noun phrases and marking entire clauses that have an additional verb should be reflected in the taxonomy, which requires the consideration of a number of syntactic and distributional features such as word order, nominalization of verbs, etc.

Finally, the two phrases (11) and (12), which both employ the morpheme *du* or its allomorphs, raise the question whether *rgyun du* ('continuously, daily') and *rtag tu* ('always') are more accurately adverbial specifications rather than locative cases. While both again unmistakably are time expressions, are there any additional features to be recognized that allow a distinction of these two specifications from, for example, *tshes gnyis su* ('at the second day [of the month]') in example (1)? To point towards one of the possible direction, the forms *rgyun du* and *rtag tu* figure both very frequently in Tibetan literature and tend to be placed close to the verb and commonly right before it, whereas time expressions such as *tshes gnyis su* are more free in their placement, although they tend to appear more often at the beginning of sentences which only consist of simple clauses. Word order may therefore be one significant feature that allows us to distinguish between these different uses. Even in Si tu's own taxonomy, the question appears, whether (11) and (12) may be equally or even better classified as instances of *de nyid*, that is to say an expression of identity between the marked argument and the verb.[1008] It will be assumed here that Si tu's classification was mainly inspired by the mere lexical value of the marked words that both have strong temporal meaning and without much consideration of syntactic features. This focus on the lexical value is also well in line with Si tu's objectivist approach.

[1007] Cf. e.g. supra 257f.
[1008] Cf. chapter 8.2.5.

As a final remark on *tshe skabs*, with the subsumption of this category under the seventh case, all five functions listed in SCP 11.3-4 are classified as case functions in the GC.

13.2.2 The Seventh Case in the *Great Commentary* on the *Rtags 'jug*

Si tu's summary of the seventh case starts with a simple illustration of the category *gnas gzhi* ('abode') that stays in close proximity to his SCP definition as *gang zhig gang la brten pa'am yod pa* ('something exists or is based/supported somewhere'):

> *la don drug po* [sic!] *rnam dbye bdun pa gnas gzhi la 'jug pa ni/ shing la bya/ khyim du mi/ bum par chu/ gdan la 'dug sa la nyal/ rgyab tu ri yod/ lta bu/ bya mi/* [sic!][1009] *chu/ 'dug nyal/ ri rnams kyi rten gnas sam gnas pa'i gzhi ni/ shing/ khyim/ bum pa/ gdan/ sa/ rgyab phyogs rnams yin pas de dag pa* [sic!][1010] *rnam dbye bdun pa 'jug pa yin* […]

"As for [how] the six [sic!] *la don* [morphemes][1011] take on the seventh case abode (*rnam dbye bdun pa gnas gzhi*), it is as follows. For example, in (15) 'birds on/in/at the tree' (*shing la bya*), (16) 'humans in the house' (*khyim du mi*), (17) 'water in the pot' (*bum par chu*), (18) 'to sit on the mat' (*gdan la 'dug*), (19) 'to sleep on the ground' (*sa la nyal*), (20) 'there is a mountain at the back' (*rgyab tu ri yod*), the support (*rten gnas*) or abode (*gnas pa'i gzhi*) of the birds (*bya*), the humans (*mi*), the water (*chu*), the sitting (*'dug*), the sleeping (*nyal*) [and] the mountain (*ri*) are the tree (*shing*), the house (*khyim*), the pot (*chu*), the mat (*gdan*), the ground (*sa*) [and] the back (*rgyab phyogs*). Therefore, a seventh case joins to these [arguments tree, house, pot, etc.] (*de dag pa* [sic!] *rnam dbye bdun pa 'jug pa yin*)."[1012]

Si tu explains the seventh case as the support/basis (*rten gnas*) or place of abiding (*gnas pa'i gzhi*), where something is placed or located. He provided six additional examples, all which consist of two arguments, one marked by *la don* plus either a noun (phrases 15, 16, 17, 20) or a verb (phrases 18, 19). As his list reveals, it does not further matter for Si tu whether the seventh case syntactically indicates a relation of the location to a noun or to a verb, since word forms such as *bya* ('bird'), *mi* ('human'), *'dug* ('to sit') and *nyal* ('to sleep') are all equally classified as that which is located at a certain place marked by *la don*. That Si tu did not differentiate between these two types of location may be related to the already presented Sanskritic theory

---

[1009] I read *bya/ mi/*.
[1010] I read *de dag la*.
[1011] It remains unclear why Si tu only speaks of six instead of the usual seven morphemes in the GC. It may only be speculated that he either did not distinguish between the allomorphs *du* and *tu* or between the forms *-r* and *ru*.
[1012] GC 602.5.

that *adhikaraṇa* is the direct location of either the agent or the *karman* and consequently the indirect location of the action, since the latter is directly located in the agent or the *karman*.[1013] From this perspective, it makes no difference whether the action, the agent or any other participant of the action is located at a certain place, since action and participants of the action are located at the same place. Disregarding the difference of direct vs. indirect, this *kāraka* is the location of both entities and the actions performed by them, a perspective which also fits well to the objectivist approach, since scenarios in the phenomenal world do not distinguish whether the action or its participants are located at a certain place. If it is allowed to apply this idea to phrases such as *sa la nyal* ('to sleep on the ground'), it probably made no difference to Si tu whether it is the sleeping as such or the unmentioned sleeper that is located on the ground, and therefore he also saw no difference in whether the seventh case refers to the location of an action or the location of an entity. Si tu demonstrates an awareness of the Sanskritic theory of direct vs. indirect location at least in his *Cāndra* commentary on C 2.1.88, where he explains the category *ādhāra* of the root text as follows:

> *byed pa po dang las dag gi bya ba gang la gnas par gyur pa de 'dzin par byed pa ni gzhi'i byed pa can te/*

> "To contain (*'dzin par byed pa*) that [location], where the action of the two, agent and *karman*, is located (*gnas par gyur pa*), is the *kāraka ādhāra* (*gzhi'i byed pa can*)."[1014]

Si tu's identification of *ādhāra* (*gzhi*) as a *kāraka* in the phrase *gzhi'i byed pa can* is one direct demonstration that the Tibetan tradition did not see a difference between *ādhāra* and *adhikaraṇa*.[1015] He gave the etymological explanation of the term *ādhāra* (lit. 'that which holds,' 'contains,' 'keeps') as that it contains (*'dzin par byed pa*, 'to take,' 'to hold,' 'to contain') the place of the action of agent and *karman*.

Unlike other sources, such as the quoted *Kāśikāvṛtti*, Si tu did not distinguish in this passage between a direct location of agent and *karman* and an indirect location of the action, but the idea of a location which is that of the action of agent and *karman* (*byed pa po dang las dag gi bya ba gang la gnas par gyur pa*) nonetheless refers most likely to the same Sanskritic theory.

In his summary of the seventh case in the GC, Si tu continues to stress that actions (*bya ba*) equally qualify as seventh cases and are not to be classified as *las su bya ba*:

[1013] Cf. supra 380.
[1014] Si tu 2.53.1.
[1015] Cf. supra 380f.

de bzhin du chu la zhugs/ khung du 'dzul/ gyul du go bgos/ gyul du bsad/ lta bu rnams kyang zhugs pa dang 'dzul ba dang go bgos pa dang bsad pa rnams kyi bya ba de dag gi rten rim bzhin du chu la sogs pa de dag yin pas la don gyi rnam dbye de rnams bdun pa'i don du 'gyur ba yin gyi rnam dbye gnyis pa las kyi don ma yin par shes par bya'o/

"Likewise, as for (21) 'having entered the water' (*chu la zhugs*), (22) 'to enter/having entered a hole' (*khung du 'dzul*),[1016] (23) 'to wear an armor in battle' (*gyul du go bgos*), (24) 'having killed in battle' (*gyul du bsad*), the basis of these actions (*bya ba de dag gi rten*) of having entered (*zhugs pa*), hiding/entering (*'dzul ba*), wearing armor (*go bgos*) and having killed (*bsad pa*) are the water, etc. respectively. Therefore, these *la don* cases (*la don gyi rnam dbye*) result in the meaning of the seventh [case], whereas they are not to be understood as being the meaning of the second case *karman* (*las*)."[1017]

Si tu directly goes against the definition of the seventh case as the location only of a mere static residence or existence, and he explicitly criticizes Pra ti's conception of the seventh case, according to which examples (21) to (24) only qualify as a second case. Si tu therefore remained closer to the Sanskritic grammatical authority, which defines the seventh case as the (indirect) location of action without any difference between static-residential and active verbs.

Apart from example (24), the underlying rationale for these classifications is difficult to evaluate. Example (24) is a clear and unmistakable instance of a genuine action (*gsod pa* 'to kill') that was performed at a certain location (*gyul du* 'in battle') and thus a straightforward demonstration of Si tu's argument. The locative meaning of the first three phrases, however, raises questions.

In example (21) *chu la zhugs* ('having entered the water'), the form *zhugs* is the perfect tense of *'jug pa* in its *tha mi dad* meaning ('to enter'). The lexical value of the verb suggests that *chu* ('water') is less the LOCATION of the action or agent than the TARGET, DESTINATION. Accordingly, the phrase's locative interpretation is also problematic within Si tu's case model, as it was noticed by Tshe tan zhabs drung who compared example (21) with two of Si tu's second case examples, namely *rgya gar du 'gro* ('to go to India') and *mdun na rgyu* ('to move in front of' or 'to move forward' ?).[1018] Regarding their mere lexical value, all three verbs (*'jug*

[1016] Lit. 'to enter/get into the hole.'
[1017] GC 602.6.
[1018] Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 121.

pa, *'gro ba* and *rgyu ba*) are equivalent in the sense that they exhibit a strong directional value.[1019]

If this was based more on an objectivist focus, one reason for Si tu's classification may be the presented theory of an action's continuum, according to which the accomplished parts are already located at the TARGET. Although in instances like example (21) this theory may appear somewhat technical and even artificial, the idea would remain that in the process of entering, those parts of some item that already entered the water are located in the water (= seventh case), whereas with regard to those parts yet to enter the water, the water appears as the domain where the yet unaccomplished entering engages (~ *bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*, second case). This raises the question whether example (21), similar to Si tu's second case example *bum par chu blugs* ('having poured water into the pot'), allows for a double classification in terms of seventh and second case according to his taxonomy. It may be assumed that in an objectivist approach, any action in the process of which a spatio-temporal separation is perceived as transitioning into some form of contact or placement poses the same taxonomical issue.

Another related solution to Si tu's classification may be connected to the use of the perfect tense in example (21). The genuine meaning of the perfect tense, a time-related form of the verb that is common in different languages, indicates that the action has been already *fully* accomplished in the past. Thus, from the perspective of the present result of the action, the water is not the TARGET anymore but indeed the LOCATION. Regardless of its linguistic significance, if this was Si tu's understanding of example (21), then his proposed reading is more accurately rendered as 'being located in the water after having entered it.'[1020] If the outlined perfective understanding of the verb proves to be linguistically significant, Si tu's classification of *la* as a seventh case in example (21) directly reflects the structures of WT and its tense system – and his classification was then likely inspired by it.

[1019] This does not necessarily mean that the grammatical markers *la* and *du* both directly encode this directional value, nor that verb frames such as *'jug pa*, *'gro ba* or *rgyu ba* cannot exhibit the value of INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT depending on the used marker.
Without having conducted the necessary linguistic research, it cannot be excluded that the function of the morpheme *la* may still be that of an INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT rather than an ALLATIVE with the *tha mi dad* verb *'jug pa* ('to enter'), since the unmarked argument is not only the agent who enters, but also the most or primarily affected participant as the one who undergoes movement, thus making the argument marked by *la* the less affected object. The zero-marking of the agent might be an important indication that such an interpretation of this phrase's syntax may have linguistic significance, be it synchronically or diachronically. In any event, although *la* can have locative meaning in WT, the main point remains that its locative value in example (21) is rather counterintuitive from the meaning of the verb and the content as such.

[1020] Since the perfect tense typically focuses on the present result of the action rather than the past performance of the action, a resultative interpretation of the verb form *zhugs* might have linguistic significance. Typical example in Latin to demonstrate the perfective meaning of the perfect tense is the verb *cōgnōscō* ('I learn,' 'recognize'), of which the perfect tense *cōgnōvī* (lit. 'I have learned,' 'recognized') more accurately means 'I know.' The question is to which extent Tibetan language makes use of this genuine form of the perfect tense.

400

A very similar issue is the case of example (22), *khung du 'dzul* ('to enter/having entered a hole'), where the verb *'dzul ba* ('to enter,' 'to slip in;' 'having entered' ?) has a very similar lexical value, and thus *khung* ('hole') appears to be more the TARGET or DESTINATION than the actual LOCATION.[1021] Yet, the issue is complicated, since the form *'dzul ba* does not distinguish tense forms, and thus it is difficult to assess without any context which form was used in example (22).[1022] While this verb's entries in Tibetan-English dictionaries give the meaning of 'to enter,' 'join,' etc., the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* gives *zhugs pa* ('having entered') as the only meaning. According to the latter, *'dzul ba* therefore only has perfect tense meaning. If a perfective understanding of *'dzul ba* is that of Si tu in example (22), then his classification of *khung du* as a seventh case may have been based on a resultative-perfective interpretation in the sense of 'being located in the hole after having entered it.' Probably even more accurately, the whole example could then be translated as 'to hide in a hole,' in which the locative meaning comes out clearly.[1023]

Si tu apparently interpreted example (23), *gyul du go bgos*, in the sense of 'to wear an armor in battle,' thus with the battle as a seventh case, i.e. the location of the action of wearing armor. Interestingly, Tshe tan zhabs drung criticized also this classification and contrasted it with Si tu's example of the fourth case *shing la chu 'dren*, i.e. 'to pull/bring water to the tree,' which is classified as a fourth case in the meaning of 'to pull/bring water for the tree.'[1024] This is an indeed important observation, since it brings up the question whether the purposive marker *du* more likely indicates that the armor in example (23) is worn for the battle rather than in the battle.

Although most dictionaries usually provide the lexical meaning of 'to put on (clothes, etc.)' for *bgo ba*, Goldstein also provides 'to wear.'[1025] It is difficult to evaluate at this point whether the present tense itself has this second meaning, or whether it is more accurate that only the perfect form *bgos pa* (lit. 'having put on (clothes, etc.)') can mean 'to wear' in certain contexts due to a resultative connotation of this tense. In any case, Si tu certainly understood the perfect form *bgos pa* in example (23) in the sense of 'to wear,' since the meaning 'having put on the armor

---

[1021] Cf. also Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 121. Tshe tan zhabs drung compared phrase (22) with Si tu's example of the second case *rgyab tu phyogs* ('to turn backwards').

[1022] Cf. Jäschke 1987, 466; Goldstein 2001, 911; *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* 2004, 2347.

[1023] Cf. the word *'dzul khung* (lit. 'a hole [where somebody] enters/has entered'), which refers to a hole where somebody hides, i.e. a hideout.

[1024] Note that Tshe tan zhabs drung (2005, 121) mentions the example *zhing la chu 'dren* ('to drag water to the field') and states that Si tu classified it as a second case. Both the version *zhing la chu 'dren* as well its classification as a second case cannot be found in the GC. Due to the phrase's status as the most common example of the fourth case, it is assumed that Tshe tan zhabs drung's version is more likely a typographical error and that he was well aware of Si tu's classification.

[1025] Cf. the entry *bgo* (*ba*) e.g. in Jäschke 1987, 89; Goldstein 2001, 227; Hackett 2003, 60.

in battle' makes little sense. Therefore, the classification of *gyul du go bgos* ('to wear an armor in battle') as an instance of the seventh case is intuitive and understandable. However, this does not solve the issue whether alternatively *du* may have purposive meaning in example (23), in the sense of 'to wear an armor for battle,' making it an example of the fourth case in Si tu's taxonomy. The conflict between a locative and a purposive classification of example (23) is difficult to resolve, particularly since the marker *du* has both functions. In this context it may be asked again whether Si tu was aware of this conflict and would have allowed for a double classification of this phrase, similar to the second and seventh case example *bum par chu blugs*.

In his summary of the seventh case at the end of the TKJ, Si tu also included as a trigger of this case verbs with the lexical value of 'to fear,' 'to be afraid of':

> *sdig pa la 'jigs/   seng ge la skrag sogs gang las 'jigs pa 'byung ba'i gnas de la rnam dbye lnga pa 'jug pa legs sbyar gyi lugs yin yang/   bod skad la 'jigs pa skye ba'i yul lam rten du gyur pa'i cha nas bdun pa nyid sbyor ba* […]

> "[Regarding], for example, 'to fear harmful deeds' (*sdig pa la 'jigs*), 'to be frightened of a lion' (*seng ge la skrag*), although it is the Sanskrit system that a fifth case joins to that place/position/object (lit. 'place;' *gnas*) from where the fear comes forth (*gang las 'jigs pa 'byung ba*), in Tibetan the seventh case is applied from the perspective (*cha nas*) that [this place/position/object] is the locus (*yul*) or basis (*rten*) [where] the fear arises (lit. 'takes birth;' *'jigs pa skye ba*)."[1026]

It was already outlined in the context of the second and fourth cases that verbs of affection form a distinct group in WT that triggers an unmarked argument as the experiencer of the affection and an argument marked by *la* or its allomorphs as the object or target of the affection.[1027] In contrast, in the GC Si tu distinguished the different verbs of affection and associated them with different cases in his model:

Second case (*las su bya ba*):	*kun la dga'* 'to like/love all'
	de ru skyid 'to be delighted about it'
Fourth case (*dgos ched*):	*dman par brtse* 'to feel affection for the inferior'
Seventh case (*gnas gzhi*):	*sdig pa la 'jigs* 'to fear harmful deeds'
	seng ge la skrag 'to be frightened of a lion'

[1026] GC 603.2.
[1027] Cf. supra 222 and 302f.

Under the condition that the morphemes *-r* and *ru* are allomorphs of *la*, the distribution of morphemes in these phrases suggests that the syntactic structure of all the examples is identical. From this perspective, Si tu's classification is not representative for the structures of WT. It remains unsure whether the very limited set of only five examples with verbs of affection that Si tu provided in the GC allows to draw any definite conclusions about the underlying rationale of these classifications. The general observation may be made that the second case covers two instances of positive affections towards the object that might include aspects such as joy or inclination, whereas the fourth case covers one instance of affections that presumably results in a benefit for the object. Finally, the seventh case covers two instances of negative affections towards the object that might include aspects such as aversion. The classification of *dman par brtse* ('to feel affection for the inferior') as a fourth case seems to be the most comprehensible one, since the word form *brtse ba* ('to show affection for;' 'loving kindness,' 'compassion') exhibits a noticeable beneficial or purposive character, even more so if it is assumed that this type of affection is often accompanied by actions that help the object of affection, such as giving alms, etc. However, such an interpretation of the scenario referred to in *dman par brtse* does not reflect the grammatical structure of the sentence.

At least Si tu provided the basis for his classification of the examples for the seventh case in the passage quoted above, according to which that item or more literally that place (*gnas*) which is feared is the locus or basis where the fear comes into being (*'jigs pa skye ba'i yul lam rten*). Si tu obviously attempted to explain his classification by making reference to spatial notions such as *gnas* ('place, abode') and *rten* ('support, basis'), both which are part of the labels for the seventh case. The idea behind Si tu's explanation becomes more evident as soon as it is compared with his conceptualization of the Sanskrit case marking patterns according to which a fifth case suffix is triggered. The Sanskrit rationale according to Si tu is that the feared item is the place (*gnas*) where the fear comes from or originates from (*'byung ba*), an idea which is more intuitive than that the feared object is the location of the fear. However, this theory demonstrates that the feared item was conceived by Si tu as the source of fear, in the sense that it is the place or basis where the fear arises, comes into being or more literally takes birth (*'jigs pa skye ba'i yul lam rten*). This theory amounts to the very point that Sanskrit represents the scenario of fear in the form that fear appears out of the feared item – after which the fear presumably enters the fearing entity –, while the Tibetan merely focuses on the feared item as the 'birthplace' of fear. Therefore, the two patterns are not in contradiction but rather equivalent in the sense that they offer two fully compatible semantic perspectives of the scenario of somebody fearing something. More accurately, both semantic structurings are based on the

403

same underlying constitution of this scenario, namely that the feared item is the source, origin or 'birthplace' of the fear.

With regard to Si tu's distinction of different affections, it is not fully evident how his explanation of fear does not apply to his second case examples of *kun la dga'* and *de ru skyid* as well as to his fourth case example *dman par brtse*. Independent of the fact whether the object of affection is loved, feared, etc., it still qualifies as the source of the affection and thus its 'birthplace.' Conversely, Si tu's definition of the second case as that domain which the action engages in (*bya ba 'jug pa'i yul*) equally applies to his fourth and seventh case examples regarding affection verbs.

Regarding his second case affections, one option could be that he understood his definition of the second case, i.e. the engagement of an action with an item (~ *bya ba 'jug pa pa'i yul*) more in terms of an actual engagement of the agent with that item. From this perspective, affections such as love or delight may have been seen by Si tu as going hand in hand with an active engagement with the object of affection, for which reason he may have regarded the instances of love and delight closer to the second case *las su bya ba*.

Another question in this context is how Si tu understood different case marking patterns with affections such as love, delight and others. Sanskrit verbs with the lexical value of 'to love,' 'to like,' 'to be pleased' and others – a semantic domain that Si tu classifies as a second case – may follow various case marking patterns. For example, already encountered above was the verbal root *ruc* ('to please') which triggers a fourth case suffix for the one who is pleased or likes in the meaning of *sampradāna*, with the pleasing object taking a first case suffix.[1028] The verbal root *prī*, in contrast, allows for several grammatical constructions to express meanings such as 'to please/be pleased,' 'to delight in,' 'to like' or 'to love,' in which the case marking of the object of affection can range from the second to the third, fifth, seventh or even sixth case suffix according to Monier-Williams's dictionary.[1029] In contrast, the verbal root *snih* ('to be attached to,' 'to be fond of,' 'to feel affection for') in its active form usually triggers a sixth or seventh case suffix to mark the object of affection.[1030] Due to the lack of further information in the GC, it is difficult to assess whether Si tu regarded one of these or any of the other constructions as the generic or most dominant one that represents the actual meaning of love, etc. and consequently modelled his Tibetan taxonomy according to it.

[1028] Cf. P 1.4.33.
[1029] Cf. Monier-Williams 1981, 709f.
[1030] Cf. ibid., 1267.

Certainly, there are several options as to how he has concretely perceived the difference between affections and how precisely the resulting taxonomy has been inspired. Unfortunately, apart from his theory on fear, Si tu did not offer any additional information.

However, his elaboration on the instance of fear is most representative for his objectivist approach. His classification of Tibetan verbs of fear as seventh case triggers was definitely inspired by the Sanskrit fifth-case marking pattern and the attempt to reconcile the two languages based on his understanding of the semantic constitution of the phenomenon of fear. The instance of fear is an established part of *apādāna* in Sanskrit grammar.[1031] As such, it certainly forms the generic Sanskrit case marking pattern and represents the actual underlying meaning or understanding of this type of scenario. Since this actual meaning is not rooted in any language-specific structures, its validity persists across languages that may deviate from it, but only through special conventions. Tibetan language apparently follows this actual meaning and not any special conventions,[1032] for which reason the Tibetan case marking pattern had to be brought in line with the Sanskrit semantic construal of fear in terms of *apādāna*. To claim that *la* may have the meaning of *'byung khungs* would have been too removed from Tibetan language and its accepted taxonomies, thus the seventh case was his solution – and certainly not a fully artificial one, since a spatial affinity between the categories location and source has already been expounded in sources such as *Smra ba kun* or NGg,[1033] and thus the semantic-conceptual basis of Si tu's proposed relation was already established to some extent before his times.

Yet again, it is a different question altogether to which extent Si tu was aware of his misconstrual of the scenario in the Tibetan context. If the generic case marking pattern and thus the actual meaning of fear is established and tested over centuries based on Sanskritic role models and it is equally accepted that *la* has locative meaning, Si tu's objectivist focus on a few selected scenarios and their representation in the language instead of a focus on the overall distribution of *la* may have easily given the impression that Tibetan verbs of fear govern a locative.

13.2.3 Résumé on the Seventh Case in the *Great Commentary*

Si tu has adopted the established terminology of *gnas gzhi* ('abode') and *rten gnas* ('support,' 'basis') and thus remained in line with the preceding Tibetan tradition regarding the seventh

---

[1031] Cf. e.g. P 1.4.25.
[1032] On the difference between actual meaning and special convention, cf. also supra 311 and 314f. On Si tu's important claim that Tibetan follows in general the actual meaning of actions without special or exceptional conventions, cf. chapter 16.
[1033] Cf. supra 336ff.

case's basic conception as a location or place. Yet, he explicitly distanced himself from those conceptions which restrict the seventh case to the mere expressions of an item's static residence or existence, and he included the location of an item's performance of an action. Therefore, in his taxonomy instances such as 'existing somewhere' (*gang zhig la yod*) and 'killing somewhere' (*gang zhig la gsod*), etc. equally qualify as examples for the seventh cases.

Moreover, the GC does not make any noteworthy difference between noun phrases and verb phrases as syntactic heads that govern the seventh case, in other words, Si tu allows for both, the seventh case as the location of a thing or entity – be it only residing or actually performing an action – and the location of the action expressed by the verb.

Finally, Si tu included objects of fear in the seventh case, a classification which is clearly in contradiction to Tibetan syntax. Although the precise rationale of his taxonomy, that is to say the distinction between second, fourth and seventh cases with regard to affections, remains unclear in this study, Si tu's theory on the classification of verbs of fear does exhibit unmistakable traces of his objectivist approach.

14 *Rnam dbye brgyad pa bod pa*

14.1 Historical Survey

The Tibetan eighth case is labelled (')*bod pa* ('address') and is indicated by the morpheme *kye*.[1034] From a morphological perspective, this case holds a special status in the case model, in the sense that it is the only marker that usually precedes the word it relates to in the sentence. The *locus classicus* for the treatment of the eighth case in the *Sum rtags* tradition is SCP 17.2-3:

> *gang ming brjod pa'i dang po ru/*
> *kye sbyar ba ni bod pa yin/*

> "In front of (*dang po ru*) an expression of any word form,
> the application of *kye* is address."

In his SCP commentary *Kun bzang dgongs rgyan* on the quoted root text, Pra ti encapsulates the meaning of the eighth case as follows:

> *gang zag gang yang rung ba'i ming brjod pa'i dang po'am thog mar kye zhes sbyar ba/*
> *dper na/   kye rgyal ba'i sras/   kye grogs po/   kye lha'i dbang po lta bu'i kye'i sgra*
> *ni rnam dbye brgyad pa bod pa yin no/*

> "The application of '*kye*' in front of or at the beginning (*dang po'am thog mar*) of the expression of a free lexical word form of any suitable individual (*gang zag gang yang rung ba'i ming brjod pa*) [would be], for example, 'Dear prince!' (*kye rgyal ba'i sras*), 'Dear friend!' (*kye grogs po*), 'Dear Lord of gods/Dear Indra!' (*kye lha'i dbang po*). Such a morpheme *kye* is the eighth case address."[1035]

In most basic terms, the Tibetan eighth case *bod pa* refers to the vocative function. However, it should be noted that the morpheme *kye* not only expresses that a speaker directly addresses another person in a speech, but that the addressee is recognized by the speaker as higher in rank or social status. Thus, it is the most formal and politest form to address a person. Other forms like *ka ye* or *kwa ye* that exhibit the same morphosyntactic behavior are used to address individuals as equal or inferior in social status.

[1034] Other designations of this function are *gdags pa'i tshig* ('syntactic form of calling out') in NG's and NGg's eightfold *kāraka*-scheme (cf. CT *115* – 418) as well as *'os pa* ('the eligible one,' 'the proper one,' 'the right candidate' ?) in TKJ 25.3.
[1035] Pra ti 2013A, 214.

Although examples such as those found in Pra ti's grammar are indeed instances of *bod pa* or the vocative function, the case status of *kye* or the form *kye* + noun is certainly questionable. Although it refers to the argument in the vocative, the morpheme *kye* is more accurately a separate argument of the sentence that emphasizes any vocative meaning in the sentence and adds information about the social status of the addressee as well as the politeness of the speaker or the formal character of the speech. It has the syntactic value of an interjection such as 'Oh!', 'Hey!', 'Dear!' and the like. That *kye* itself is not part of the syntactic word form (*tshig*) which expresses the vocative is apparent from the fact that the mere vocative or *bod pa* can be expressed without the addition of *kye*.[1036] Moreover, since the morphological feature of *kye* as usually being applied in front of the addressee is not shared by any other grammatical marker, the morphological distribution supports that *kye* is not a syntactic marker to express a relation to other arguments in the sentence. This may be further corroborated by the fact that *kye* can appear after the addressee in certain contexts as well.[1037] A morphological flexibility in the form that the case marker may appear before or after the marked argument is not attested for any other grammatical marker in WT and would severely impede the identification of the marked argument and consequently the grammatical structure of the entire sentence. In contrast to the Tibetan traditional case model, it may therefore be more representative to analyze examples such as *kye rgyal ba'i sras* ('Dear prince!') as *kye* + unmarked noun phrase, where the unmarked noun phrase alone represents the vocative case form and *kye* an optional interjection.

14.1.1 The Eighth Case in Relation to Sanskritic Grammar

The historical development of the Tibetan eighth case, including its identification with *kye*, is closely connected to Sanskritic grammar. The technical term (*'*)*bod pa* ('address') is directly derived from the two Sanskritic notions *sambodhana* ('id.') and *āmantraṇa* ('id.') that cover the vocative function:

> P 2.3.47 *sambodhane ca* "Also if [there is] address, [a first case suffix occurs]."

[1036] Cf. Hahn 2005, 53.

[1037] Cf. ibid. Si tu also acknowledged that there exist exceptional applications of *kye* after the addressee in the sentence, especially in poetry, where the metre of the verse may require it:
> *'di'ang thog mar sbyor ba gtso che ba'i dbang gis gsungs pa las/   tshigs bcad sogs sbyor ba'i tshe/ bdag la dgongs shig mgon po kye/   zhes pa lta bu mthar sbyar ba'ang yod do/*
> "[…] Yet, while this has been taught [by master Thon mi] from the perspective that this [morpheme *kye*] is predominantly (*gtso che ba*) applied at the beginning [of the first case], there also exists the application at the end during the formation of verses etc. (*tshigs bcad sogs sbyor ba*) as in (5) 'Remember/Care for me, lord, dear!' (~ *bdag la dgongs shig mgon po kye*)." (GC 498.2)

P 2.3.48 *sā' mantritam* "[If there is address,] this [first case suffix is called] *āmantrita* ('the addressed')."

K 2.4.18 *āmantraṇe ca* "Also if [there is] address, [a first case suffix occurs]."

C 2.1.94 *sambodhane* "If [there is] address, [a first case suffix occurs]."

The quoted rules make clear that there is no separate case suffix that marks *sambodhana* or *āmantraṇa* according to Sanskritic grammar, but that the vocative is an additional function of the first case suffix.[1038] This is mainly based on Sanskrit morphology, namely the fact that many paradigms of the Sanskrit nominal inflexion do not distinguish between the nominative and vocative case forms, and those which do only in the singular form.[1039] Accordingly, Sanskrit grammatical sources do not provide a separate case form for the vocative and restrict the default paradigm of *vibhakti*s to only seven triplets, i.e. twenty-one suffixes divided into seven groups á singular, dual and plural.[1040] The different paradigms of the nominal inflexion used in Sanskrit language, including possible deviations of the vocative singular from the nominative case form, are then derived in Sanskritic grammars through morphological operations such as elision or substitution of the twenty-one default suffixes, but these operations remain within the general framework of seven triplets. As for the deviation of some of the vocative singular forms, they are accounted for by Pāṇini directly following P 2.3.47-48:

P 2.3.49 *ekavacanaṃ sambuddhiḥ* "The singular [of a term called *āmantrita* is termed] *sambuddhi*."

The separate technical term for the vocative singular allowed Pāṇini to single out these forms and refer to them separately during the derivation of vocative word forms wherever they deviate from the first triplet of case suffixes (= nominative).[1041]

Since the Sanskritic case model is strictly based on the distinction of case suffixes and the number of case suffixes remains within the framework of seven triplets throughout the entire derivation of any nominal word form, the function *sambhodana/āmantraṇa* is not a case, nor is there a separate case suffix for it. Strictly speaking, Sanskritic grammatical sources therefore only accept seven cases (*vibhakti*).

[1038] Note that the application of the first case suffix (*prathamā vibhakti*) in the quoted rules must be derived through the operation of *anuvṛtti* from the preceding rule in all three grammars respectively (cf. P 2.3.46, K 2.4.17 and C 2.1.93).
[1039] Cf. e.g. Mayrhofer 1978, 34ff.
[1040] Cf. P 4.1.2 and 1.4.103; K 2.1.2a; C 2.1.1.
[1041] Cf. e.g. P 6.1.69 or P 7.3.106.

Nonetheless, the majority of Tibetan grammatical sources considered in this study refer to the Tibetan pendant (*’*)*bod pa* together with the morpheme *kye* as the eighth case (*rnam dbye brgyad pa*), and the notion of *rnam dbye brgyad* ('eight cases') is widely accepted in the Tibetan tradition. However, already early Tibetan grammarians were aware of the Sanskritic scheme of only seven times three suffixes, as is evident from NGg's presentation of the eighth case *bod pa*:[1042]

> *brgyad pa bod pa la ni bsgyur ba med de/   bsgyur ba bdun gang du bsgyur ba rnams la bod pas brgyad pa bod pa’i sa zhes bya*[1043] *ste/   de ltar bsgyur ba bdun bod pa dang brgyad la rnam par dbye ba yin no/*

> "Regarding the eighth [case], address (*bod pa*), it has no inflexion/form (*bsgyur ba*). Since [it] addresses a [term that is] in whichever of the seven inflected forms (~ *bsgyur ba bdun gang du bsgyur ba rnams la bod pa* ?), it is the eighth [case] called the semantic domain of address (*bod pa’i sa zhes bya*). Accordingly, the seven inflected forms together with address result in [the number] eight. [These] are the cases (*rnam par dbye ba*)."[1044]

The translation of the phrase *bsgyur ba bdun gang du bsgyur ba rnams la bod pa* is tentative, since its meaning at this point is not fully clear to me. The above reading bears the issue that the verb *’bod pa* ('to address') usually does not trigger the morpheme *la* for the addressed object, but zero-marking. Moreover, the idea that the eighth case may be the address of any noun phrase regardless its inflection is certainly against Sanskritic grammar and Sanskrit language, but also counterintuitive from a general linguistic perspective. Regardless of these

---

[1042] Since NGg provides the basic morphology of Sanskrit nominal inflexion throughout the topic of *vibhakti*, it can be safely assumed that the following quotation refers first of all to Sanskrit morphology. In the context of the topic of *vibhakti*, NGg does include Sanskrit morphology in the form of the twenty-one default suffixes based on *Pāṇini*'s/*Cāndra*'s system together with their Tibetan pendants. In contrast, Tibetan morphology seemed to have been secondary for the author in this topic, although it cannot be ruled out that at least the following quotation equally refers to Tibetan language, since the vocative function also has no separate form in WT.
However, the dominance of Sanskrit morphology in the topic of *vibhakti* does not mean that NGg's case model as such was regarded as Sanskrit-specific. Note that in this dissertation NGg is treated as a treatise on general linguistic topics not restricted to either Sanskrit or Tibetan language. This holds especially true for the context of the presentation of the eight prototypical case functions.
[1043] Note that according to CT, the Sde dge and Co ne editions read *bod si zhes bya* ('address called '*si*'') instead of *bod pa’i sa zhe bya*. This would make sense insofar as the text would then associate suffix *si*, i.e. the default first case suffix in the *Kātantra*-system, with the vocative case function, which would be in line with Sanskrit grammar. However, I prefer the reading of *bod pa’i sa zhe bya*, mainly because NGg employs the *Pāṇinian* and *Cāndrian* system of case suffixes for the first case form, i.e. suffix *su* (cf. CT *115 – 432*). Moreover, the expression *brgyad pa bod pa’i sa zhes bya* in its form case number + function + *’brel sgra* + *sa zhes bya* is frequently used in the NGg during the other cases and seems to form a more or less consistent pattern (cf. CT *115 – 432ff.*).
[1044] CT *115 – 434*.

philological-hermeneutical issues, it suffices to note that NGg did acknowledge that there are only seven and not eight triplets, yet it included address as the eighth case.

Independent of whether or not there existed relevant Sanskritic role models, it will be argued here that the inclusion of *bod pa* as a separate case was first of all based on its distinct functional value and the fact that the Tibetan case model as a whole is based on a distinction of case functions and not -forms or -suffixes. GNT, for example, emphasized the distinctiveness of the category *bod pa* as a separate category in the following:

> *de yang kye gang zhig ces pa lta bu brgyad pa bod pa'i sgra ston pa yin te/   brgyad pa bod pa'i sgra 'di ni sgra rkyang pa'am ngo bo nyid yin pas gcig dang/   gnyis dang mang po'i tshig dang gsum du dbyer yang med la/   gzhan yang brgyad pa 'di rkyang pa'am ngo bo 'ba' zhig yin pas brgyad pa 'di la gnas bdun po gzhan sbyar la bod par 'gyur ba'i skabs kyang med do/   dper na gos nag po la mtshon gzhan mi 'dzin pa dang 'dra bar brgyad pa 'di la yang sgra gzhan gang yang sbyar la bod par bsgyur ba'i skabs cung zad kyang med de rang gi ngo bo 'ba' zhig nas 'bod pa tsam du zad do/*

> "Furthermore, the eighth [case/semantic domain] indicates that a term has been addressed (*bod pa'i sgra ston pa*) as in 'Dear so-and-so!' (*kye gang zhig*). Since this eighth [case/semantic domain], an addressed term (*bod pa'i sgra*), is a bare term or the mere essence (*sgra rkyang pa'am ngo bo nyid*), it has no threefold distinction into singular, dual and plural. Moreover, since this eighth [case/semantic domain] is only the bare [term] or essence, it is impossible (*skabs med*) regarding this eighth [case/semantic domain] to apply the other seven semantic domains and to become the addressed (*bod par 'gyur*) [at the same time]. For example, just as a black cloth is not taken as [having] a different colour, there is also not the slightest possibility regarding this eighth [case/semantic domain] that any other [case] term (*sgra*) is applied and that [the resulting term then] is turned into the addressed. Apart from the mere self-essence, [the eighth case/semantic domain] is only address."[1045]

If the above reading is correct, then it amounts to the basic argument that although the addressing of a person is essentially the reference to that person's mere essence (*ngo bo 'ba' zhig*) without any function attributed to it in a sentence's scenario, this does not mean that this person can take any additional function, since it has the function of the addressee. GNT's explanation apparently attempts to account for the special status of the vocative function that

---

[1045] CT *115 – 462*.

the mere address of a person is not part of any action or scenario expressed in the sentence, and thus the vocative item does not have any function in the action. Nonetheless, it remains a distinct semantic category and the simultaneous application of any other semantic domain to one and the same item is prohibited. Since only one semantic domain may apply at a time and address qualifies as a distinctive semantic domain, it forms a separate case in GNT's case model.

GNT also features clear traces as to how the interjection *kye* has become the marker of the eighth case in the Tibetan model:

> *bod pa 'di nyid rgya gar gyi sgra la he'am e ston pa yin la/   de la he ston pa ni/   he he bha ga bhan zhes pa lta bu ste/   kye kye bcom ldan 'das zhes pa lta bu dang he badzra zhes pa lta bu kye'i rdo rjer bsgyur ba la sogs pa lta bu'o/*

> "This very address is indicated in Sanskrit morphology [by] '*he*' or '*e*'. Regarding the indicator '*he*,' [this would be] as in '*he he bhagavan*!' [that translates as] 'Dear Bhagavan!' (*kye kye bcom ldan 'das*) and '*he vajra*' that translates as 'Dear Vajra!' (*kye'i rdo rje*), etc."[1046]

Kye has been commonly used as the translation of the Sanskrit indeclinable *he*, a vocative particle that is also placed in front of the addressee to emphasize the address by the speaker.[1047] Morphosyntactically, it therefore behaves in a similar way to *kye*. Despite its clear vocative meaning, Sanskritic grammars never classified this particle as a case suffix or case form, obviously because it is not part of the nominal inflexion, and vocative word forms still require a case suffix to become a complete and functioning word form (*pada*). However, a look at Sanskritic grammatical sources demonstrates that Sanskritic grammarians and commentators have typically illustrated the vocative function of the first case suffix in P 2.3.48-50, K 2.1.18 and C 2.1.93 by help of various vocative particles or interjections such as *he*, *dhik*, etc., presumably to emphasize and clarify the vocative meaning of the first case suffix.[1048] This stands to reason, since the first case suffix might be otherwise misinterpreted as the indication of its prototypical function, i.e. the mere expression of a nominal stem's lexical value (*prātipadikārtha*). Tibetan grammarians did not further consider the difference between these examples, which are full phrases of the form indeclinable particle + *pada*, and the actual Sanskrit vocative case suffix. Consequently, the morphology of the vocative case form transformed into *he* + *pada*, and this understanding of the vocative case form was then applied

---

[1046] CT *115 – 463*.
[1047] Cf. Negi 1993, 81.
[1048] Cf. Sharma 1995, 151f.; Liebich 1919, 44; Liebich 1918, 113.

to the semantically as well as morphosyntactically equivalent form *kye* + unmarked noun phrase in Tibetan, from where it is only a minor step to that grammatical sources such as Pra ti's SCP-commentary started providing *kye* alone as the actual case marker.

This entire shift of the morphology was probably facilitated by the fact that in both languages, Sanskrit and Tibetan, the vocative case does not have any distinct morphology, and the actual indicator of the meaning *sambodhana*/*āmantraṇa* or *bod pa* in the quoted examples are the indeclinable particles *he* and *kye*. Moreover, that Tibetan grammarians have disregarded the precise morphological derivation of these forms as well as the morphological status of Sanskrit *he* and Tibetan *kye* clearly reveal how in Tibetan conceptions of the case model morphology has faded from the spotlight in favor of the case functions. The Tibetan traditional conception of the eighth case form would have been allowed neither in a strict adherence to Sanskritic derivational procedures nor in Tibetan morphology. Apart from the lack of a distinct vocative case marker in Tibetan (and Sanskrit), *kye* attained its case status mainly due to its vocative meaning.

14.1.2 Résumé of the Eighth Case pre-Si tu

The Tibetan eighth case (')*bod pa* ('address') was directly adopted from Sanskritic grammar and the category *sambodhana*/*āmantraṇa* ('id.'). It has a special status in the traditional model, since it is the only case of which the case marker, i.e. the interjection *kye*, precedes the marked argument in the sentence. Although against Sanskritic grammatical sources as well as Tibetan morphology, the case's form was derived from Sanskritic sample phrases in grammatical sources on *sambodhana*/*āmantraṇa*. Sanskritic sources usually employed indeclinable word forms, such as *he*, in order to emphasize the vocative meaning. This served the purpose of avoiding any ambiguity between the two categories *sambodhana*/*āmantraṇa* and *prātipadikārtha*, which both trigger the first case suffix according to Sanskrit grammatical sources. Tibetan grammarians did not further consider this merely didactic application of Sanskrit *he*, etc. and have associated the Tibetan pendant *kye* with the eighth case form.

Secondly, since Sanskritic grammar based the case model primarily on case suffixes and the category *sambodhana*/*āmantraṇa* triggers no separate case suffix, Sanskritic sources usually only distinguish seven cases. Independent of whether or not there existed any Sanskritic role models, Tibetan grammarians introduced (')*bod pa* ('address') as a separate case, presumably based on its distinct semantic value.

14.2 The Eighth Case in the *Great Commentary*

The only presentation of the eighth case (*’*)*bod pa* in the GC is located at SCP 17.2-3. Except for a short remark, the eighth case (’)*bod pa* has not been discussed at the end of TKJ-GC in the summary of case grammar. Si tu glossed SCP's root text as follows:

> *gang yang rung ba'i ming brjod pa'i thog mar kyi* [sic!][1049] *zhes bya ba sbyar ba ni bod pa'i rnam dbye gsal bar byed pa'i sgra yin no/*

> "As for the application of '*kye*' at the beginning of the expression of any suitable word stem (= free lexical word form, *ming*), [it] is the morpheme that clarifies the eighth case 'address' (*bod pa'i rnam dbye gsal bar byed pa'i sgra*)."[1050]

Si tu's definition is close to that of Pra ti.[1051] The only important difference is that Si tu does not classify the morpheme *kye* as the eighth case as such, but only as that morpheme which makes the eighth case clear, visible, distinct, intelligible or explicit (*gsal bar byed*). This terminology of *gsal bar byed pa'i sgra* was already encountered briefly in the context of the fourth case *dgos ched*, where Si tu classified periphrastic constructions such as *ched du*, *phyir du*, etc. as terms making explicit the meaning of *dgos ched* (*dgos ched gsal byed kyi sgra*), and later, in his summary of the cases, he distanced himself from former grammarians who did not distinguish between the seven *la don* morphemes as fourth case markers and these non-case periphrastic constructions.[1052] Regarding the morphological realization of *bod pa*, Si tu goes on to explain:

> *de'ang rnam dbye gnyis pa la sogs pa'i mtha' can la ni mi 'jug cing bod skad kyi rnam dbye dang po dang ming tsam la khyad par med pas de'i sngon du sbyor ba/   kye lha'i lha/   kye kha lo sgyur ba/   kye lha/   khye rgyal po chen po/   lta bu ste* […]

> "Furthermore, [this morpheme *kye*] does not join any [word form] ending in the second case, etc. and since there is no difference between the Tibetan first case and the mere word stem (*ming tsam*), [it] is applied before this [word stem] as in (1) 'Dear deity of deities!' (*kye lha'i lha*), (2) 'Dear helmsman!' (*kye kha lo sgyur ba*), (3) 'Dear deity' (*kye lha*), (4) 'Dear great king!' (*kye rgyal po chen po*) […]."[1053]

[1049] I read *kye*.
[1050] GC 498.1.
[1051] Cf. supra 407.
[1052] Cf. supra 294f. and 299.
[1053] GC 498.2.

Si tu first acknowledges the fact that *kye* cannot be applied to any word form in the sentence that is already marked by one of the case markers. Thus, an argument in the second to the seventh case cannot take *kye*. Presumably, the reason is that such arguments already express other functions than *bod pa* ('address') and consequently interfere with the vocative meaning of *kye*. The only remaining case that *kye* may be applied to in Si tu's model is the first case, which in Tibetan falls together with the mere word stem. If *kye* is only a clarifying form attached before the word stem qua first case form, it can be inferred that the eighth case form is that of the first case.

At the beginning of his case summary at the end of TKJ, Si tu addresses the eighth case only with the following remark, stressing that *kye* is not part of the eighth case form and that the latter is not distinguishable from the first case:

> […] *cing/ brgyad pa bod pa zhes zer yang bod pa'i yul la rnam dbye dang po nyid 'jug cing kye dang kwa dang sogs ni bod pa gsal byed kyi sgra yin gyi rnam dbye ma yin pas logs su dbyer med do/*

> "[…] and although the eighth [case] is called 'address,' the first case[-form/-ending] itself joins to the object of address (*bod pa'i yul*) and *kye* or *kwa*, etc. are clarifying morphemes, yet no cases. Therefore, [the eighth case form/-ending] is not to be separated [from the first case form/-ending]."[1054]

Si tu's argument is about the eighth case's morphology. However, his use of the term *rnam dbye* in terms of either case form or case function is rather ambiguous. If the above reading is correct, he first states that the eighth case in general (regardless its form or function) is called *bod pa*, yet with regard to the case's morphology, it is not to be differentiated from the first case form, since it is no other than the first-case form that is used. Si tu's argument would have been easier to understand, if he would have clearly distinguished the occasions in which he refers to the cases in their forms and in their functions, particularly in such contexts where the more common use of *rnam dbye* as case function does not apply. The focus of *rnam dbye* as case form is corroborated by the phrase *bod pa'i yul la rnam dbye dang po nyid 'jug* that describes a morphological operation, and moreover any functional identity between first and eighth case cannot be part of Si tu's argument.

The eighth case address shares the same morphological realization as the first case, which is an intuitively comprehensible and also linguistically more accurate point. In this sense, first and

---

[1054] GC 598.1.

eighth case are similar to the triad of second, fourth and seventh case that also share the same morphological realization *la don*.

Returning to Si tu's discussion of *bod pa* in his commentary on SCP 17.2-3, he directly criticized the assumption that *kye* is an actual case form, for which he provided the following reasons for his own taxonomy:

> *skabs 'dir 'grel byed phal cher gyis/   kye/   zhes pa bod pa'i rnam dbyer 'dod kyang mi 'thad de/   rnam dbye ming gi thog mar sbyar ba med pa dang/   bod pa'i rnam dbye legs sbyar gyi gcig tshig la khyad par yod pa tsam ma gtogs ngo bo rnam dbye dang po las logs su dbyer med cing bod skad la dang po'i gcig tshig gi rjes mi gsal yang gnyis tshig dang mang tshig gi rjes cha mthun yod par ma zad rnam dbye zhig nges par 'jug dgos shing gnyis pa sogs gzhan mi 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan las don thob kyis de dang mthsungs par ming mtha' rnam dbye dang po nyid du nges pa la slar rnam dbye sbyin mi dgos pa'i phyir ro/   des na kye zhes pa rnam dbye ma yin zhing bod pa gsal byed kyi sgra yin te/   legs sbyar gyi he bho bhos sogs dang mthsungs par shes dgos so/*

"Although most commentators claimed in the context of this passage [in SCP] (*skabs 'dir*) that '*kye*' [would be] the case of address (*bod pa'i rnam dbye*), this is incorrect for the following reasons:[1055] (1) The application of a case at the beginning of a word stem (*ming gi thog mar*) does not exist. (2) [In] Sanskrit, only the singular has a different [morphological form], apart from which [the morphological form of the case 'address' in its] essence is not to be separated from the first case suffix. And although in the Tibetan language, the ending of the singular of the first [case] is not manifest/visible (*mi gsal yang*), not only are the dual and plural endings equivalent (~ *cha mthun*) [as regards the non-manifest first case ending], but a case (*rnam dbye zhig*) must join obligatorily. Yet, no other [case such as] the second, etc. joins, for which reason [the Tibetan system is] in fact (*don thob gyis*) equivalent with this [Sanskrit system and] no case must be additionally (~ *slar*) given to a word stem's ending that is fixed as the first case itself (*rnam dbye dang po nyid du nges pa*). Therefore, '*kye*' is no case, [it] is a morpheme that clarifies address. [It] has to be understood as [being] equivalent with Sanskrit *he*, *bho*, *bhos*, etc."[1056]

[1055] The following numbering of the arguments was added by Graf.
[1056] GC 498.4.

416

In this passage, Si tu again used the term 'case' (*rnam dbye*) as a reference to the case forms or more accurately now case endings and thus treated the technical term as a morphological category. Si tu expounded two arguments why, according to him, *kye* cannot qualify as the eighth case form or a part of it. The first argument is the simple fact that all case markers are placed after the marked argument. This holds true for Sanskrit, where the case suffixes that complete a word form are only affixed at the end of the stem, as well as for the first seven Tibetan cases – although the first remains unmarked – and must therefore also apply to the eighth. This argument is certainly valid, and as already discussed during the historical survey of this case, *kye*'s status as a case marker is incorrect from a linguistic perspective.

Although Si tu's argument is linguistically valid, his switch from function to morphology regarding the notion of *rnam dbye* results in an inconsistent understanding of this notion in the GC. The distinction of the Tibetan case model into eight cases is first of all based on the case functions, which is directly evident from the fact that three cases distinguished in the model are marked identically. Based on the Tibetan case model as a model of functions or meanings, *kye* does express vocative meaning and would consequently belong to the eighth case, regardless of its morphological usage before or after the marked word form. Yet, *kye* does not qualify as a case in Si tu's taxonomy because of its morphological features. Strictly speaking, former grammarians were indeed more consistent within the framework of the traditional case model to classify the form *kye* + unmarked argument as an eighth case. Yet, Si tu's strategy included a morphological parameter to bring the eighth case more in line with the morphological structures of Tibetan and Sanskrit. This adaptation of the eighth case is illustrative for the conflicts that may emerge between features of the Tibetan traditional taxonomy and the attempt to refine it for a more accurate representation of Tibetan (and Sanskrit) language.

Si tu's second argument discusses in more detail the actual eighth case form and the vocative's zero-marking in Tibetan language by taking recourse to Sanskrit morphology. As he correctly notes, with the exception of the singular, the Sanskrit vocative forms are mostly that of the first case suffix. Although Tibetan does not have separate first case endings, neither in the singular, dual, nor plural, it exhibits the same feature that the first case forms and that of the vocative are identical. Si tu explains this feature by arguing that a case (*rnam dbye*), i.e. a certain case ending, must be applied to a word stem, yet, no other case morpheme such as *la*, etc. joins to Tibetan vocative arguments, for which reason the vocative form remains an unmarked stem form. As an unmarked stem form, the eighth case form is fixed as a first case form or more accurately, the stem's final letter takes over the role of the first case ending.

His reference to Sanskrit morphology does not seem to have any deeper conceptual foundation other than that Si tu can illustrate and clarify his own taxonomy based on a comparison with Sanskrit morphology. Although SCP and TKJ have left all hermeneutical freedom to interpret *kye* as a non-case marker due to the lack of the term *rnam dbye*, a variety of Tibetan grammars throughout the centuries have regarded *kye* as an established and integral part of the eighth case form, for which reason Si tu perhaps has felt the need to prove that his adaptation is linguistically feasible against the backdrop of at least one language that is accepted to be a reliable source and exhibits the same morphological feature.

However, it may be inquired in this context whether a narrower reading of Si tu's proposed taxonomy against the backdrop of Sanskritic case grammar is to be preferred. Is his argument perhaps less that the first and the eighth case share the same morphology, resulting in two cases with the same morphology like the three *la don* cases, and more that they are one and the same case based on morphology? In other words, perhaps inspired by Sanskritic case grammar in which the notion of *vibhakti* is restricted to case suffixes and not functions, did Si tu accept only seven cases? Even more so in view of the fact that there are seven case suffixes in Sanskritic grammar, was this his attempt to accommodate the number of cases to Sanskritic role models?

This understanding would be highly inconsistent within the framework of the Tibetan case model. The first case is then a morphological case that has two case functions, while the remaining six cases are single case functions that may or may not share their morphological realization with the others. Since it is unlikely that Si tu required such direct correspondence between Sanskritic and Tibetan case models that is merely based on the number of cases, a broader reading as outlined above is strongly preferred. On its own, the number of cases would not add any explanatory power to the Tibetan case model. The multilingual validity of the cases is based on their functional value and the significance these functions have with regard to an objective understanding of actual scenarios. Any differences in number of the cases between the respective models remains minor, since the eight functional categories remain pivotal in both models, no matter how they end up counting their cases.

14.2.1 Résumé on the Eighth Case

Si tu's conception of the eighth case *bod pa* ('address') is constituted by his adaptation of the morphological form of the case. His classification of the traditional eighth case marker *kye* as a morpheme that only clarifies the vocative meaning is fully reasonable from a linguistic perspective and represents a refinement of the Tibetan case model with regard to Tibetan

language, even though it is not fully consistent within the traditional case model that distinguishes the cases based on functions and not morphological features.

Both arguments through which Si tu has renounced the case status of *kye* are based on the notion of case as a morphological category, more specifically in terms of case endings or suffixes. While the first argument simply states that cases are endings and must be applied at the end of the marked word form, the second one demonstrates how the the eighth case form is that of the first case, i.e. zero-marking. Among the two proposed readings of Si tu's understanding of the eighth case, it was argued for a broader reading that accepts *bod pa* as a separate case, despite its morphological identity with the first case and similarly to second, fourth and seventh case that share the same morphological realization *la don*.

Si tu's modifications have brought to light that his notion of case (*rnam dbye*) was not only based on the meaning of the eight cases, but included at least the morphological parameter that case markers can only be applied after the marked word form. The exclusion of *kye* from the eighth case form is perhaps the clearest instance in the GC that morphological and functional parameters intermingled and were not clearly kept apart in the question which morphemes qualify as a case forms for one of the eight case functions.

15 Summary of Part II – Major Features of Tibetan Case Grammar in and before Si tu's GC

Part II offered a detailed analysis of the entire eightfold Tibetan case model in and before Si tu against the background of Sanskritic grammatical systems. It was structured along the lines of the traditional order of cases for a comprehensive and referenceable account of each case. However, structure, length and depth of the analysis made it difficult to provide a coherent logic of the major findings and arguments in this second part of the dissertation. The present chapter addresses this shortcoming by extracting and collecting the main hypotheses on the features of Tibetan case grammar from the investigations in chapters 6-14. It summarizes the eightfold Tibetan case model and its heterogeneous manifestations in and before Si tu's work, including major continuities and discontinuities between Tibetan and Sanskritic grammatical knowledge. Selected cross-references to part II for each of the following arguments and hypotheses serve as supporting evidence.

1) *Tibetan case grammars including Si tu's GC have not clearly defined the grammatical category case* (rnam dbye, vibhakti) *as either case form or case function, and the GC employs the term in both meanings depending on the context and the line of reasoning.*

In contrast to classical Sanskritic grammars such as *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* or *Kātantra*, in which morphological suffixes are unmistakably the reference point of the notion *vibhakti*, the Tibetan case model from its earliest time was based on the distinction of eight basic case functions. Consequently, in grammatical works like Si tu's GC the notion of *rnam dbye* frequently and primarily refers to the case functions. Yet, a closer examination of case classifications in the GC reveals that the notion of *rnam dbye* in certain contexts refers to the case morphemes as well. In less clear contexts, this ambiguity of the notion of case may lead to a severe impediment of an accurate reading of Si tu's argumentation, and he himself has frequently refrained from offering clear-cut distinctions. One important ramification of this bivalent understanding of *rnam dbye* is that the case status of grammatical constructions is governed by both morphological as well as functional considerations.

The perhaps clearest instances of *rnam dbye* qua case form in the GC is Si tu's discussion of the eighth case and his linguistically correct observation that the actual form of the eighth case *bod pa* ('address') is the unmarked argument without preceding interjections such as *kye*.[1057] In this statement, *rnam dbye* is not only a clear reference to case markers as morphological

---

[1057] Cf. supra 416ff.

categories, but morphological considerations are also the foundation to exclude *kye* from the eighth case form.

Another example of the ways in which morphological and functional features constitute Si tu's notion of *rnam dbye* and intermingle in the classification of cases is Si tu's classification of the verbal uses of *byed sgra* in the meaning of *rgyu mtshan* as a third case, arguing for its functional affinity to the agentive meaning in terms of an accomplisher or establisher of something (*rgyu mtshan des de ltar 'grub par byed pas byed pa po dang mtshungs pa*).[1058] In contrast, verbal uses of *na* as a causal connector are classified neither as second, fourth or seventh case, despite the morphological identity with these cases, nor as third case despite Si tu's labelling of this use with the grammatical category *rgyu mtshan*. Such comparisons of the causal functioning of *na* and *byed sgra* after verbs reveal that Si tu's respective classifications were not exclusively based on the morphemes' meanings, but also on the fact that *byed sgra* is the only third case marker in the established taxonomy, whereas *na* belongs to *la don* which only marks the second, fourth and seventh cases.

In sum, examples such as the above reveal how the ambiguous value of *rnam dbye* as either case form or case function has created conflicts and sometimes resulted in inconsistent classifications within Si tu's taxonomical system. It may be concluded that GC's distinction between case and non-case usages of grammatical morphemes is primarily determined by two parameters: is the morpheme an established case marker also accepted by Si tu (morphological)? And if so, is the applied marker's value in a sample phrase related to the marker's established case function (functional)? If one of these two parameters is not met, a morpheme loses its case status, either in general (no established case morpheme), or only in a particular function (particular functional value does not match the morpheme's established case function).

2) *The GC did not retain the strict demarcation between nouns and verbs, which represents the very foundation of the Sanskritic grammatical derivational system including its case grammar.*

Based on Sanskrit-specific morphology, there is a strict distinction between nominal and verbal inflection in terms of two separate sets of suffixes that has been unequivocally followed by the Sanskritic grammatical schools. Although in Pāṇini's grammar the notion of *vibhakti* may refer

---

[1058] Cf. supra 258.

to the entirety of nominal and verbal inflections,[1059] the established use of the term refers mostly to the nominal inflection and thus to the case suffixes.

Already in Tibetan grammatical sources before Si tu that provide more extensive lists of examples, different applications of the case markers following proper and nominalized verbs were frequently classified as cases,[1060] and Si tu has gone on to argue explicitly for the inclusion of proper verbs into the case model in the context of his discussion of the first case.[1061] Although Si tu based the inclusion of verbs on the argument that it agrees with the Sanskritic derivational model, the main reason is more likely to be seen in the combination of two points: first, there is the Tibetan-specific feature that all case markers except for the eighth may be used following nouns and verbs, and consequently that Tibetan nouns and verbs cannot be distinguished in terms of two separate sets of suffixes that join them; secondly, the objectivist focus on the semantic value of the case functions and their manifestation in the underlying meaning of sample phrases also moved morphosyntactic considerations about different word forms into the background.[1062] Thus, as long as the proposed underlying semantic structure of linguistic expressions (single words, phrases, sentences) suggests a mere essential, agentive, purposive, etc. meaning, it may be classified in this sense. Any difference between nominal and verbal forms in Si tu's case grammar has become secondary, a fact which resulted in numerous classifications of marked and unmarked, nominalized and proper verb forms as first, third or fourth cases in the GC.[1063]

3) *The eight case functions of the Tibetan model all have explanatory power with regard to the structures of written Tibetan, yet, from the earliest period onwards, the precise distribution of case markers in written Tibetan as well as the distribution of the eight functions onto the markers has been severly blurred in Tibetan taxonomies.*

The linguistic significance of the case functions is to varying degrees corroborated by modern academic research which despite its critique of traditional case grammar employs a terminological apparatus strongly reminiscent of the Tibetan case categories. For example, categories such as AGENT, PURPOSE, SOURCE, ORIGIN or LOCATIVE figure prominently in modern studies on Tibetan language, and also the European term 'genitive' to render the sixth case marker *'brel sgra* is certainly in line with Tibetan conceptions of *'brel ba*.[1064]

[1059] Cf. P 1.4.104.
[1060] Cf. e.g. supra 269.
[1061] Cf. supra 162ff.
[1062] Cf. point 5 in the current list, infra 424ff.
[1063] Cf. supra 161ff. (first case), 258 (third case) and 303f. (fourth case).
[1064] Cf. chapter 12.

Equally, the vocative (~ *bod pa*, 'address') is a relevant use of unmarked word forms in Tibetan language,[1065] and while word forms that only express lexical meaning (= first case) are not incorrect per se, they have only limited relevance in WT when it comes to syntax and case grammar as part of syntactic theory.[1066] Even concerning the category of *las/las su bya ba*, although it conflates the distinct syntactic uses of Tibetan case marking such as DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT, INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or DIRECTION and thus results in a broad and imprecise objective function, the fact cannot be denied that its prototypical value PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT, in which it was known to Tibetan grammarians from Sanskritic role models, is a linguistically significant category in WT.

This does not mean to say that these eight case categories exhaustively represent the functional side of Tibetan case grammar or that a more accurate representation of Tibetan case grammar could not be accomplished through the addition, splitting or further specification of case functions and perhaps also the change of traditional case functions into non-cases, etc. However, the general linguistic relevance of these functions also for Tibetan is evidence for the fact that the primary flaw of the model is less these case categories than their association with the traditional case markers. In fact, this has resulted in a variety of problematic classifications such as morpheme *na* as an objective and purposive marker, the merging of *la*, *na* and *du* into a single morphological category as well as several others.[1067] This issue may be traced back already to sources such as SCP, NG(g), GNT and the *Smra sgo*, but it prevailed in the entire tradition up to and beyond Si tu's GC.

4) *Si tu conceived the cases as universally valid across all meaningful languages. He was not the first to explicate the universal character of the cases, since at least GNT shows clear evidence of this assumption. Despite such claims in Tibetan grammaticography, the question of the cases' status as linguistic universals and how it may be related to different Indo-Tibetan schools of thoughts (e.g. grammarians,* Madhyamaka, Yogācāra *or* Pramāṇa*, etc.) has not been further addressed in the tradition.*

This point, which is closely connected to the following one, is pivotal to a proper understanding of traditional Tibetan case grammar. Already before Si tu, there is testimony that GNT explicated in even more radical terms that there is not a single meaningful word which does not come under one of the eight cases.[1068] Regarding Si tu's GC, this required not only a certain

---

[1065] Cf. chapter 14.
[1066] Cf. supra 153 and 167f.
[1067] C.f. e.g. supra 197f., 214ff. and 219ff. (second case), as well as supra 271 and 306f. (fourth case).
[1068] Cf. supra 95f.

conceptual convergence between Sanskritic and Tibetan taxonomies, but occasionally also the reconciliation of divergent case marking patterns between Sanskrit and Tibetan language. This has led him to taxonomical choices such as his double classification of *bum par chu blugs* as either a second or seventh case,[1069] his classification of the Sanskrit sixth case suffix in the meaning of *nirdhāraṇa* as an exceptional use of comparison that prototypically triggers a fifth case[1070] or the classification of *la* with verbs of fear as a seventh case.[1071] Although many grammarians did not explicitly commit to the universality of the cases, an idea of such multilingual validity must have existed throughout Tibetan grammaticography which accepted the case's applicability to Tibetan.

On different occasions, the cross-lingual, universal validity of the cases raised questions in terms of linguistic universals and their ontological status.[1072] Although this validity as such and the ways in which it was negotiated in different sources (see next point) was likely informed by one or several linguistic and/or philosophical schools, Tibetan grammatical sources do not go deeper into the conceptual foundation of it. There was no systematic attempt to build the case model and its multilingual validity on a consistent linguistic-ontological theory of language, the world of phenomena and the relation between these two. Apparently, this was not deemed relevant in the context of grammatical investigation. Unfortunately, the general silence on these matters severely inhibits the speculation on the conceptual roots of the cases' universally applicable character. The only exception in this context may be the NGg, which provides more detailed material on nature and relation of terminology such as meaning (*don*), linguistic sign (*brda*) and others which may be compared to Buddhist theories of language.[1073] A second direction to follow may be the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* which appears to be concerned with general or universal (?) linguistics in a more philosophical fashion, yet opacity of its history and content do not allow for any conclusions at this point.[1074]

The question of how, then, any such multilingual or universal validity of the cases was negotiated leads on to the following and most crucial insight of this research.

5) *The eight case functions of the Tibetan case model are predominantly references to eight fundamental semantic domains* (gnas, sa)*. They are typically negotiated through an objectivist approach accompanied by metalinguistic-semantic investigations of case categories and the*

[1069] Cf. supra 232f.
[1070] Cf. supra 354f.
[1071] Cf. supra 402f.
[1072] Cf. supra 194 and 316f.
[1073] Cf. NGg topic five, CT *115* – 425ff. Cf. also infra 427f. for a short exemplification in the context of *don*.
[1074] Cf. supra 32.

underlying phenomena expressed in sample phrases, without a clear distinction between different derivational levels such as syntax, semantics, underlying scenarios etc.

This decisive feature of the Tibetan case model may be traced back to the early period of Tibetan linguistic analysis, and various grammarians have followed it more or less systematically in different forms and extents. The investigation of sources that provide more elaborate material on the case functions, such as GNT, GC or also Zha lu et al.,[1075] has revealed that the case functions are not merely treated as intrasentential information carried by a grammatical marker about the syntactic or semantic relation between an argument and its head,[1076] but as direct semantic representations of the phenomenal basis underlying a linguistic expression. Semantic structures along the lines of the case functions were understood as the representative, actual construals of the underlying phenomena and everything that may be said about them.[1077] The eight case categories such as agent, *karman*, source, etc. as well as the classification of case markers in specific sample phrases are often determined through investigations of the categories agent, *karman*, etc. as such and the constitution of the phenomenal scenarios as such, in other words, largely disconnected from the specific structures of a language or sample phrase.[1078] The validity of the cases on the level of phenomena immediately explains their multilingual or even universal applicability, since the constitution of phenomena persists across languages. A semantic construal that is deemed representative of a particular scenario is then applied to the semantic and equally to the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language-specific sentence.

This approach was defined in this dissertation as objectivist in nature based on DeLancey (1991),[1079] since it directly reads a certain semantic interpretation of a phenomenon into grammatical structures of a language without any further mediation. The objective character stems from the fact that the semantic construals of phenomena are deemed representative for these phenomena as such in one way or another and are thus assumed to be shared among different languages and its speakers.[1080] Equally, the cases are treated as a representative analytical framework for the formation of such semantic construals. Consequently, language-specific grammatical structures are obscured by directly reading such 'objective' construals of phenomena into the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language. If the objectivist approach was rendered problematic or even erroneous in the present work on different occasions, then

---

[1075] Cf. e.g. chapters 8.1.2.5 and 10.2.2.
[1076] Cf. chapter 5.2.
[1077] On the use of the term phenomenon in this dissertation, cf. ft. 302.
[1078] Cf. the investigation of GNT's second case as a particularly illustrative example, supra 192ff.
[1079] Cf. supra 105f. and ft. 302.
[1080] On the definition of 'objective' in this dissertation, cf. supra 194f.

not because of any assumption of the universal or objective character of the cases per se. Linguistic issues arise from the fact that Tibetan grammarians assumed that a semantic interpretation of a phenomenon, may it be objective or not, can be directly applied across languages to language-specific grammatical structures without further mediation.

The use of this approach manifests in grammatical sources in various ways. The GNT, for example, argues for a radical version of it and states the assumption that there is no linguistic expression about the world of phenomena outside the scope of the eight cases.[1081] This is demonstrated through providing an entire range of subcategories and sample phrases that are covered by these eight cases, often adding that these lists are extendable without limit. In the context of the second case *karman*, it was revealed that the applicability and significance of this category – despite noticeable sensitivity for the structures of WT – was not focused on Tibetan-specific morphosyntax, but the author instead classified the various *la don* morphemes based on his understanding of the underlying scenarios expressed in selected sample phrases. The classification of *la don* as a second case was therefore based on GNT's direct association of Tibetan language-structures with the phenomenal world as construed by the text's author.

Si tu's GC features a form of conceptualization of the difference between language structures and underlying scenarios. Through his distinction of generic and exceptional case marking patterns, Si tu clarifies that languages do not always follow the meaning of underlying scenarios and may develop special conventions. Nonetheless, he followed an explicit and systematic objectivist approach which starts from the idea of an actual meaning of actions that persists across languages and governs the generic case marking patterns of linguistic expressions throughout languages, in contrast to exceptional or special conventions that do not follow the actual meaning.[1082] Based on the second assumption that Tibetan follows more the generic case marking patterns, he then applies his understanding of the actual meaning of an action to the sentence and its markers. Although Si tu's work exhibits more sensitivity at least for the difference between the morphosyntactic surface structure and the underlying semantic structure through his acknowledgement of special conventions of case marking, he did not further distinguish between a language-specific semantic structure of a sentence and the idea of an actual meaning of the underlying scenario. However, despite the presupposed direct correlation of different derivational levels involved in the meaning of linguistic expressions, on different occasions Si tu allowed for a difference between language-structures and the actual meaning of

---

[1081] Cf. supra 95f.

[1082] Cf. supra 310f. and 314f. Cf. also supra 402ff., where Si tu reconciles competing Tibetan and Sanskrit case-marking patterns for verbs of fear through the objectivist approach, treating both patterns as generic.

scenarios. Apart from the general distinction into generic case marking patterns and special conventions in his work is most notably the fifth case *'byung khungs*, in which he argued that the function of *dgar ba* is to be subsumed under the case, yet not as an actual instantiation of source but only due to syntactic application (*tshig sbyor ba*).[1083] It is also evident that he considered clearly non-semantic, syntactic parameters (as defined in chapter 5.2) in his exclusion of *slar bsdu* from the first case, a clear sign that he not only focused on the underlying scenarios but also was aware of the sentence and its structure.[1084]

In other sources that often offer less material on their understanding of sample phrases and the case functions, the objectivist focus was followed perhaps less systematically, yet it still surfaced in a variety of semantic construals of scenarios underlying the sample phrases that are in clear conflict with these phrases' syntactic and semantic structures.

At this point, the question arises to which extent the frequent and direct association of the two levels of phenomenal world and language structures in Tibetan case grammar is connected to a deeper theoretical foundation in Tibetan scholarship. Traces are scarce, but characterizations of the category *don* ('meaning') in linguistic sources – typically the counterpart of *sgra* ('morphology') in linguistic and epistemological fields – give the strong impression of an objectivist focus in which the meaning of the cases is not clearly kept apart from the phenomenal world. The root text of the *Gnas brgyad* (NG) defines *don* in topic number five (*yi ge'i 'jug pa'i gnas* 'the topic of the domains pertaining to letters/sounds/phonemes'), i.e. the topic concerned with the eight linguistic notions for which letters are integral, as follows:[1085]

> *don ni chos rang gi ngo bo ji ltar gnas pa'o/*

> "Regarding meaning (*don*, *artha*), it is how the self-essence of a phenomenon (*chos rang gyi ngo bo*) abides (*gnas*)."[1086]

Zha lu's paraphrase of this passage in his TKJ commentary renders *don* as follows:

> *don ni chos rnams kyi gnas lugs ji ltar gnas pa nyid do/*

> "Regarding meaning, it is precisely how the mode of abiding (*gnas lugs*) of phenomena (*chos rnams*) takes place (*gnas*)."[1087]

[1083] Cf. supra 353f.
[1084] Cf. supra 156ff.
[1085] On topic 5 in the NG(g), cf. also ft. 99.
[1086] CT *115 – 411*.
[1087] Zha lu 2013B, 39.

Both quotations make clear reference to the level of phenomena and the mode of their abiding. Zha lu even goes on to explain how letters pertain to or engage in these eight linguistic notions outlined in the NG, elaborating the relationship between morphology and meaning, form and function (*sgra* and *don*):

> *de ltar sgra dang skad la sogs pa brgyad po de dag la yi ge ji ltar 'jug na sgra dang don gcig tu bsres nas 'dzin pa'i blo'i dbang gis 'jug ste/*

> "Likewise, if [we are to ask] how letters engage in these eight [notions], sound/morphology (*sgra*), language (*skad*), etc., they engage through the power of the intellect (*blo*) that grasps [meaning] after having merged sound/morphology and meaning (*sgra dang don*) into one."

The merging of *sgra* and *don*, the former consisting of *yi ge* as phonemes or letters, results in *sgra* as meaningful linguistic expressions. As made clear by Zha lu, his understanding of *don* refers to the level of phenomena and their mode of abiding. Without reference to any intermediate levels such as language-specific semantic construals or the standardization and consolidation of semantic construals into more syntactic functions, such passages give the impression that e.g. case meanings as present in the morphosyntactic surface structure of linguistic expressions are more or less direct representations of the phenomenal world.

As mentioned under the previous point of this chapter, NGg topic 6 which comments the quoted passage on *don* from NG may provide some more material to trace the linguistic-philosophical foundation of the cases universal validity, and also of the objectivist approach in Tibetan grammar.[1088] However, the Tibetan grammatical tradition in general was not concerned with the philosophical intricacies and implications connected to this objectivist approach. Definitions of basic terminology such us phenomenon (*chos*, *dngos po*), action (*bya ba*, *las*), language (*sgra*, *skad*), etc. and which (Buddhist) school of thought grammarians followed in their use of such terms are scarce, condensed and often missing in grammatical sources. The lack of a deeper theoretical foundation of Tibetan case grammar also seems to be confirmed by the fact that in practice, grammarians typically do not derive semantic construals of phenomena for the classification of sample phrases through any systematic methodology.[1089]

[1088] A second direction to follow may be the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos* which appears to be more philosophical in nature. However, its opaque character does not allow any more concrete conclusions at the current state of research.

[1089] Cf. supra 315 and 316.

Overall, this gives the impression that the linguistic-philosophical foundation and its implications for grammar and linguistics only survived in the form of remnants without active problematization. Possible candidates which may have informed the objectivist approach include the various Sanskritic *kāraka*-theories, discourses in the larger context of *śābdabodha* ('verbal cognition'), or perhaps even Buddhist linguistic-philosophical discourses in the context of *Madhyamaka*, *Yogācāra* or *Pramāṇa*.[1090] In particular, we have seen that the notion of *kāraka* evoked metalinguistic investigations into the nature of actions in the Sanskritic context.[1091] In addition, it should also be remembered that the use of *kāraka*s in grammars such as *Pāṇini*, *Cāndra* and *Kātantra* differs significantly, including the question of where they are located on the continuum stretching from actual phenomenon to morphosyntactic surface structure.[1092]

Since investigations into the case categories based on the semantic constitution of the phenomenal world are not strictly bound to any language-specific structure, they may be informed by Sanskritic role-models, particularly the *kāraka*-theory with its own investigations into the nature of action, as well as language-specific case marking patterns in Tibetan and Sanskrit, philosophical discourses on action, agency, etc., as much as a grammarian's own intuitive perception and experience with regard to concrete underlying situations or scenarios referred to in linguistic expressions.[1093] However, the 'objectivity' of semantic construals and of the cases was never fully elaborated in grammatical sources, nor was it related to any (Buddhist) philosophical school of thought to my knowledge.

Other than these traces mentioned here, the philosophical roots of the objectivist approach as well as related questions such as the universal and ontological status of the cases, or the methodological foundation how to derive any form of 'objective' representation of a phenomenon are intriguing and important issues, but they go far beyond the scope of this dissertation.[1094] Future research will hopefully be able to put together the scarce bits and pieces scattered across grammatical sources and lead to further insights.

If some form of the objectivist approach as outlined above was indeed the underlying understanding in Tibetan linguistic analysis, then Tibetan case grammar is rooted in a conception of language according to which linguistic expressions are more direct

---

[1090] Note for the GC, however, that Si tu did not author any work in the fields of *Madhyamaka*, *Yogācāra* or *Pramāṇa* (cf. supra 52).
[1091] Cf. e.g. supra 135f. and 250f.
[1092] Cf. supra 380ff.
[1093] Cf. e.g. supra 315.
[1094] Cf. therefore also the rather pragmatic definition of 'objective' in this dissertation, supra 194f.

representations of phenomena than generally accepted in modern linguistic research. In any case, it may be concluded in more simple terms that in Tibetan case grammar language description and phenomenal description strongly intermingle and were not clearly kept apart in the often metalinguistic-semantic investigations concerning the nature of case categories and the semantic construals of phenomenal scenarios.

Putting together what was said thus far about the Tibetan notion of *rnam dbye*, we can see the following dimensions important in case grammar:

Figure 10: Dimensions of the category rnam dbye *('case') in the Tibetan case model*

It will have to be decided separately for each source, where precisely the notion of *rnam dbye* is situated in this figure and how much sensitivity there is for the differences and relations of these levels. Generally speaking, *rnam dbye* in grammatical sources is both a morphological form and its meaning, the latter which combines morphosyntactic surface structure, any form of intermediary structures and phenomenal world in one way or another.

In sum, when it is was mentioned under point 3 of this chapter that the major taxonomical issues of the traditional Tibetan case model are largely connected to an inadequate mapping of the eight case functions against Tibetan morphemes,[1095] this resulted from the following two

---

[1095] Cf. supra 423.

closely related factors: The objectivist approach in its different manifestations and the insufficient differentiation between the different derivational levels of linguistic expressions without clearly defining on which level the Tibetan category of *rnam dbye* operates.

6) *The fact that the eight cases represent eight basic semantic categories also implies that case grammar in Tibetan linguistic studies is not part of syntactic theory in the strict sense.*

The focus on the semantic value of the case categories is most evident from the first case. Many grammars leave open the syntactic status of the first case as an intrasentential, syntactically functioning word form in Tibetan language.[1096] The focus is more on the semantic value which is the reference to the essence of a word meaning or phenomenon. In his derivational model, Si tu has further reduced the first case to stem forms and presents this case as merely the basis for the formation of the remaining cases.[1097] Likewise, the objectivist focus in the classifications of sample phrases makes clear that the semantic value of the cases with regard to the 'meaning' of the sentence prevails over intrasentential relations. To repeat this point in all its clarity: traditional Tibetan case grammar is not a theory of the sentence.

7) *The majority of cases (both in their form and function) in the Tibetan model have undergone noteworthy adaptations in the adoption of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge already before Si tu, starting to surface from the earliest period of Tibetan grammatical theory formation.*

The eight Tibetan case functions are unmistakably the Tibetan reflection of the Sanskritic prototypical case functions of the seven distinct case forms, namely the six *kāraka*s as the main block plus *prātipadikārtha* (first case function), *sambandha* (sixth case function in *Cāndra*) and *sambodhana* (vocative case function belonging to the first case suffix). Except for the Tibetan sixth case *'brel ba* ('connection'), which may be directly related to *Cāndra*'s *sambandha* in C 2.1.95 and the use of the same notion in Sanskritic grammatical commentarial literature, all the remaining cases of the Tibetan traditional case model neither fully nor directly correspond to classical Sanskritic grammars.[1098] Such adaptations range from terminological shifts (first, fourth, fifth case) to conceptual adaptations of different degrees (first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh cases), to morphological changes (eighth case) and even to a change of the syntactic status as an intrasentential argument (first case). Even seemingly minor changes of technical terms, such as the shift from *sampradāna* to *dgos ched*/*ched du bya ba* (fourth

---

[1096] Cf. supra 149f.
[1097] Cf. supra 153ff.
[1098] Cf. the respective historical surveys in chapters 7-14.

case)[1099] or from *apādāna*/*avadhi* to *'byung khungs* (fifth case),[1100] reflect a reinterpretation and shift of focus regarding these categories.

Nonetheless, many of these modifications are most likely still rooted in the conceptual framework offered by the Sanskritic tradition. The reinterpretation of the fourth and fifth case functions may be traced back to additional *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* uses of the respective case suffixes in Sanskritic grammar. The second case *karman* as the resultative part of a bivalent action-model with the agent's activity being its counterpart as well as the conceptual fusion of the *kāraka*s *kartṛ* ('agent') and *karaṇa* ('instrument') under the agentive case (= third case) were compared in this dissertation to models in *Nyāya* literature in order to demonstrate that conceptual antecedents in some form have already existed in India.[1101] Concerning the first case *ngo bo tsam*, there is a clear relation to the same notion in the Abhidharmic *tshogs gsum* model.[1102]

In most of these instances, the current study has not gone beyond a demonstration of the fact that similar theories or related discourses have already existed in the Sanskritic tradition. The *actual* sources of inspiration in many cases could not be identified due to limited information about source materials offered by Tibetan grammarians. Without additional knowledge about the accessibility or availability of written and oral knowledge and the interactions between actors and sources, in this dissertation the ways in which the outlined adaptions have precisely emerged must remain open. While the most concrete link between Sanskritic and Tibetan case grammar certainly remains the *Smra ba kun la 'jug pa'i sgra'i bstan bcos*, its problematic historical status as either a Sanskritic or Tibetan source as well as the opacity of its content severely impede more concrete conclusions about this source's involvement in the transition from classical Sanskritic to Tibetan conceptions of the cases.

This study has also identified adaptations of case functions that were not necessarily or exclusively inspired by Sanskritic knowledge but also involved other factors. The shift from *prātipadikārtha* to *ngo bo tsam*, for example, reflects the grammarians' recourse to the authority of the Buddhist *tshogs gsum* model, and Tibetan grammarians like Dpang Lotsāwa or Si tu also explicated the inexistence of separate stem forms in WT.[1103] It is not unlikely that already in early Tibetan grammaticography the terminological adaptation of the first case involved the

---

[1099] Cf. chapter 10.1.1.
[1100] Cf. chapter 11.1.2.
[1101] Cf. supra 250f.
[1102] Cf. supra 145.
[1103] Cf. supra 142 and 153.

Tibetan-specific feature that the idea of separate stem forms as incomplete word forms is not applicable to Tibetan language, a fact which renders the notion of *prātipadikārtha* rather meaningless. Possibly, language-specific features may have been involved in the Tibetan conception of the fourth and fifth cases, since the categories of purpose (*dgos ched*/*ched du bya ba*; fourth case) and source/origin (*apādāna*/*avadhi*; fifth case) do have stronger explanatory power in WT than their Sanskritic counterparts *sampradāna* and *apādāna*/*avadhi*. However, the historical surveys of these two cases have not been able to provide any conclusions in this regard. Although this requires future scrutiny of the distribution of the *la don* morphemes, the seventh case as a mere static location of existence or residence in several grammatical sources may also be related to the specific functioning of morpheme *na* in Old Tibetan.[1104]

It must be noted that the Tibetan sources considered in this dissertation do not exhibit any noticeable signs that such terminological and conceptual adaptations were regarded as deviations from the Sanskritic conception of the prototypical case functions. Such deviations were only acknowledged in the context of the Tibetan first case form that equals stem forms as well as in certain classifications of sample phrases that deviate from Sanskritic classifications of equivalent samples, yet not in the context of the cases' conception as such.

[1104] Cf. chapters 13.1.2-3.

16 Concluding Observations – On the Conceptual-Theoretical Mechanisms which Shaped the Development of the Tibetan Case Model and the Dis-/Continuation of Sanskritic Grammatical Knowledge

This thesis started in part I from the broader context of Tibetan intellectual history and its knowledge production which is intimately related to Sanskritic authority. In the context of grammatical knowledge production and more particularly that of case grammar, this issue manifested as an adherence to Sanskritic models which lacks important adaptations for a more precise representation of the written Tibetan language. It was the obvious – and perhaps the only rational – choice to start with and draw from the experience of Sanskritic linguistic knowledge. However, the diversity and complexity of this knowledge and the substantial differences between the two languages have not necessarily facilitated this task. Part II of the current study has revealed ample instances in which the Tibetan case system deviates from Sanskritic role models, but the adherence to Sanskritic models of description remained strongly discernible in and before Si tu.

Following these investigations into Tibetan case grammar and the specific processes of adoption and adaptation that have shaped it, what is the emerging picture of the cross-cultural transfer of grammatical knowledge from India to Tibet? In view of the collected features of Tibetan case grammar, what conceptual-theoretical mechanisms may be extracted for an understanding of why and how grammatical knowledge has been adopted from the Indian tradition and adhered to as a valid description of Tibetan language? And how do these mechanisms connect to scholastic-methodological factors, e.g. SCP's and TKJ's fully authenticated status in the GC or the 'secondary' authority of Sanskritic knowledge?

The major theoretical mechanism that has shaped Tibetan case grammar is its foundation in the presupposition of the multilingual applicability of the case model across all meaningful languages which has been negotiated based on an objectivist focus. The Sanskritic grammatical case categories have been adopted because they offered an established analytical framework representative for an analysis of the content or meaning of linguistic expressions, but without differentiating between the linguistic derivational levels involved.

The eight adopted cases, particularly the *kāraka*-functions, were proven and accepted to have strong explanatory power in the analysis of semantic structures of linguistic expressions. Yet, once no clear difference is being maintained between the semantic structure of linguistic expressions and the underlying scenarios that may be represented through multiple semantic

structures, there is sufficient freedom in grammatical analysis to focus more on the underlying scenarios and the metalinguistic investigations of categories such as agent, etc. Already Sanskritic sources have strongly varied in their approach to the *kāraka*s and in their degree to which they have differentiated between the Sanskrit semantic structural framework the scenarios as such. Certain presentations and uses of the *kāraka*-theory have given rise to the impression that they are more concerned with actions as such rather than Sanskrit-specific semantic structures.[1105] In these investigations, language-specific considerations intermingle with general semantic, philosophical, etc. arguments. Within in the Sanskrit linguistic environment, such approaches did comparatively little harm to the description of the language, since any metalinguistic negotiation of grammatical categories and phenomenal world have evolved out of and remained embedded in the constraints offered by Sanskrit language.

However, problems started arising with the decontextualization of this approach and its application to Tibetan language: Tibetan grammarians seemed to have strongly held the notion that linguistic expressions directly represent the phenomenal world with all its possible scenarios. If languages directly relate to the world of experience shared by speakers regardless of their language, then at least principally the structures of one language are shared among all languages. Consequently, any difference between *grāmaṃ gacchati* and *grong la 'gro* vanishes and the same analysis applies to both.

As a result of this general objectivist approach, the morphosyntactic surface structure of WT and the distribution of grammatical markers has become severly blurred. Likewise, many of the Tibetan case classifications of sample phrases in grammatical sources are based on this approach, applying morphosyntactically insensitive semantic construals of underlying scenarios directly to the case markers.

A final passage in Si tu's GC will assist our understanding of the foundation of his objectivist approach:

> *legs sbyar la'ang spyir btang gi 'jug yul 'di dang mthun kyang dmigs bsal mi mthun pa ni/   mgo bor dbyug pas bsnun pa'i don la/   masta kā ya daṇḍaṃ da dā ti/   mgo bor dbyug pa sbyin zhes dang/   bum par chu blugs pa'i don la/   gha ṭā ya ja laṃ da dā ti/   bum par chu sbyin/   zhes pa lta bu yod pa ni sbyin pa'i yul la bzhi pa 'jug pa spyir btang pas 'dir bsnun pa dang/   blugs pa la sbyin pa'i sgras bstan pa'i tshe tshig tsam gtso bor byas nas de'i yul la bzhi pa sbyar ba yin gyi skabs de'i sbyin pa sbyin pa*

[1105] Cf. e.g. chapter 5.4.

dngos ma yin pa bzhin du de'i yul gyi rnam dbye bzhi pa'ang bzhi pa dngos ma yin te/ snga ma gnyis pa dang phyi ma bdun par don gyis 'thob pa la bzhi pa sbyar ba tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/   de bzhin du na mas sogs kyi yul la bzhi pa 'jug pa'ang don thob kyi bzhi pa'i 'jug yul dngos ma yin yang/   'jig rten pa'i nyer spyod las de bzhin du 'jug pa ste skabs 'dir ma zad rnam dbye gzhan dang gzhan la'ang 'di 'dra'i rigs mang du 'byung ba rnams rnam dbye de dngos kyi don du mi 'gyur bas tsam po pa zhes bya'o/   bod 'dir ni dmigs bsal de 'dra dbye ba la dgos pa med pas don 'thob nyid kyi dbang du byed dgos pa yin no

"Although also in Sanskrit [the object of application of the fourth case] agrees with this generic object to which [the fourth case] joins, [there are] special/exceptional [instances] that deviate [from this generic use] for the following reason: there are e.g. *mastakāya daṇḍaṃ dadāti*, [literally] 'to give a stick to the head' in the meaning of 'to hit with a stick at/on the head' or *ghaṭāya jalaṃ dadāti*, [literally] 'to give water to the pot,' in the meaning of 'to pour water into the pot.' When here hitting and pouring are indicated by the term 'giving', the fourth case is applied to the [object of giving] only based on the syntactic [structure] (*tshig tsam*), because generically a fourth case joins to the object of giving (~ *sbyin pa'i yul*; = recipient). Yet, as the giving of these instances is not an actual giving (*sbyin pa dngos ma yin pa*), also the fourth cases of the objects of these [givings] are no actual fourth [cases]. The former is a second and the latter is a seventh [case], based on the meaning [*don gyis 'thob pa*] to which [then] only a fourth case has been applied. Likewise, also the fourth case which joins to the object/locus of *namas*, etc. joins in this way (*de bzhin du*) out of worldly practice/necessity/custom (*'jig rten pa'i nyer spyod*), even though there is no actual object/locus of the fourth [case] in its actual meaning (*don thob kyi zhi pa'i 'jug yul dngos*) [here]. Not only in this context [of the fourth case], but also with some of the other cases such types [of case marking] occur frequently. These [uses of the] cases do not represent the actual meaning (*dngos kyi don du mi 'gyur*) and are therefore called *tsam po pa* (lit. 'mere' in the meaning of 'merely by designation,' i.e. 'fake' ?). Here, in Tibet, there is no need for such special distinctions, for which reason the actual meaning itself (*don 'thob nyid*) has to govern."[1106]

Si tu distinguishes between an actual fourth case and one that is only based on syntactic construction (*tshig tsam gtso bor byas nas*). It is the employed verb and its semantics that govern

---

[1106] GC 600.5.

the case marking pattern, but in Si tu's two samples the verbs' semantics are not representative of the ways in which the underlying scenario is understood by speakers. Such instances reveal that not only the morphosyntactic surface structure but also the underlying semantic structure of a sentence do not directly fall together with the underlying scenarios that may be represented in various ways. Si tu's strategy of dealing with this tricky example was to distinguish between a sentence structure that follows special conventions and an actual meaning connected to his indeed correct construal of the scenario as understood by speakers. Accordingly, the fourth case here is not an actual fourth case in Si tu's analysis, because the scenario as such prescribes a second and seventh case respectively, obviously because there is no benefit for the head being hit, nor for the pot being filled with water.

The scenario referred to seems not to have been directly represented in these sentences as understood by the speakers, thus the semantic value of giving is not the semantic construal *intended* in these sentences. There seems to be an additional semantic level involved in the sense that there is a semantic surface structure governed by the verb's semantics, and this structure then also connects to – yet not directly represents – the semantic construal of the phenomenal scenario as actually understood by speakers. It is mainly the lexical value of the noun phrases that tell us that the *intended* semantic construal is not directly that of the action of giving.

Si tu's analysis is accurate insofar as the sentence does not exhibit a fourth case in the sense that the speaker actually *meant* that there is a purposive meaning involved in the expressed scenario. But what does this intricate example teach us about Si tu's case grammar? It is correct to say that there is a semantic construal which is a speaker's *actual* understanding of an underlying phenomenon, although this understanding may significantly differ also among speakers of the same language. The problem arises (1) when this is equated with the idea that there is an actual construal of the scenario as such that persists across languages and may be captured through the eight cases, and (2) when Si tu assumes that languages have or perhaps even *must* have (?) forms to directly express these actual construals, especially in the case of Tibetan which according to him generally follows this actual construal of scenarios without the use of special conventions. The fact that both of these are underlying assumptions in Si tu's case grammar becomes evident through a few occasions in his work where he has attempted to reconcile Tibetan and Sanskrit case marking patterns based on a shared semantic construal that governs the case marking-patterns of both languages.[1107] It is difficult to assess Si tu's argument

---

[1107] Cf. e.g. chapter 10.2.2 and supra 402ff.

that Tibetan generally follows such actual construals. Perhaps it is to be understood as the observation that Tibetan language is more semantically based compared to Sanskrit,[1108] a possibly worthwhile point also for future linguistic research. Yet, he still treated the semantic structures of Tibetan as a direct representation of a scenario's actual construal persisting across languages.

It is intuitively comprehensible to say that all speakers refer to the same phenomenon and that everyone must have some shared basic understanding of it regardless of what language is spoken. I am not a linguist, but perhaps also modern linguistics and the search for universal semantic categories has some notion of this.[1109] The fact that the eight cases were regarded as a valid framework to capture this shared understanding is understandable from the given historical context. Therefore, the main issue in Si tu's case grammar was his assocation – perhaps conflation – of language-specific structures with such an underlying universal shared understanding of the world of experience, and the consequent application of this understanding to language-specific semantic and syntactic structures. What appears as an issue from a linguistic perspective was from a historical perspective an important mechanism that has propelled the adoption and adherence to Sanskritic grammatical knowledge.

However, how was it possible for Tibetan grammarians in general to follow such an objectivist approach and remain unaware of the highly inaccurate description of the Tibetan language that resulted from it, particularly as they are native speakers? Are sample phrases such as Si tu's *tshogs na nor 'gyed* ('to distribute the riches in/among the community'; fourth case) or perhaps even more so Rnam gling's *'tshang rgya 'dod na chos gyis* ('If [you] want to become enlightened, practice Dharma!'; fourth case) not simply stopgap solutions to maintain the authority of the case model as contained in SCP and TKJ? Such sample phrases were certainly inspired by the proposed taxonomy in the root texts, however, not necessarily only to maintain their authority. Any authoritative source, may it be fully authenticated or not, motivates a scholar to confirm or refute a theory through critical evaluation. If a source like SCP proposes that *na* is a fourth case marker, it is only natural to look for representative instances. Following an objectivist approach, representative examples will sooner or later be found which confirm the proposed taxonomy. The problem is that without a thorough distributional analysis that focuses on the marker itself and its behavior throughout the language, phrases such as *'tshang rgya 'dod na chos gyis* may give the impression that *na* has a purposive meaning in this clause

---

and thus an at least rare purposive function in the language. As clearly revealed in the work of Si tu, Tibetan grammarians have often focused only on one or two examples for each morpheme, which reveals that they mainly focused on testing whether a morpheme may have the function proposed in SCP and TKJ. Grammarians would have needed to focus much more on the morphemes and their distribution rather than simply their functions and how they might be manifest in certain sample phrases.

Although native speakers presumably have some form of intuitive understanding of the distribution and meaning of case markers, this is anything but accurate or extensive, as DeLancey has clearly revealed in his discussion of the objectivist error common among his students of English grammar.[1110] Likewise, Si tu may have indeed sensed that the unmarked PATIENT is different from the INDIRECT OBJECT or DIRECTION marked by *la* in Tibetan, but the focus on case functions rather than the case forms had him conclude that while this was a Tibetan specific-variation to distinguish these two types of *karman*, it was not sufficiently representative to compromise the multi-lingual validity of the cases. Perhaps there was some awareness of the possible shortcomings of the traditional Tibetan case model, perhaps Si tu's *tshogs na nor 'gyed* had an artificial flavor even for himself, but was it sufficiently concrete and strong to accept that there was something fundamentally wrong and in need for change? Or was it more in the sense that some details had to be changed, categories to be redefined and sample phrases reclassified? In view of this approach to case grammar, was any possible awareness about shortcomings and inconsistencies of the established Tibetan case model enough to retreat from the unquestioned authority of SCP and TKJ? Or was it more a matter of correct reinterpretation, finding the right sample phrases, etc. and taking the side of the accepted authority in difficult and inconclusive subject matters that could not be answered straightforwardly? It is difficult to address where within all these options the correct answer is ultimately situated, and the response may differ from grammarian to grammarian, but I hope this study has made it clear that this is a matter of degree and nunances.

In sum, Sanskritic grammatical knowledge remained authoritative in the Tibetan context because the adopted analytical framework was proven to provide a representative account of linguistic expressions, partially because they in fact represented linguistically significant categories in Tibetan language and partially because linguistic expressions were understood from their reference to the world of scenarios as their semantic basis.

[1110] Cf. DeLancey 1991, 339.

Returning to the initial question of the Indo-Tibetan relationship and the principle of scriptural authority, it was elaborated in chapter 4 that the authority of Sanskritic knowledge was mediated through SCP and TKJ in a source like Si tu's GC. Following the investigation into Si tu's case grammar in part II, it can be added that the authority of Sanskritic case grammar as presented in foundational sources such as SCP and TKJ was further mediated through the objectivist approach and the universal validity of the eight cases in their adopted form. This approach not only allowed the case model to become part of sources such as SCP and TKJ, it also allowed commentators to reconfirm the authority of this model and the texts in which they figure.

In the context of Si tu, it should be further specified that the adherence to Sanskritic knowledge was not only mediated through the objectivist approach, but more accurately through an objectivist approach in which he argued for the existence of actual meanings of actions which are prototypically followed in the grammatical structures of Tibetan.[1111] Si tu allowed for language-specific peculiarities to a certain degree, even distinguishing which facets of Sanskritic knowledge are applicable in the Tibetan context, but he still presupposed that there are generic case marking-patterns based on actual or genuine semantic construals of the underlying world of phenomena which persists across languages. In this model, the eight cases represent those categories which are capable of capturing the actual semantic constitution of phenomena.

It was also stated in chapter 4.5 that especially the basic constellation of GC's double value as a commentary on two fully authenticated root texts as well as a grammar of Tibetan language constrained its grammatical theory formation first of all to the conceptual framework of SCP and TKJ. Based on the investigation of part II, it may now be stated more accurately that the focus of explaining Tibetan language through an explication of the contents of SCP and TKJ constrained grammatical theory formation in the form that it only fostered the objectivist focus. As just stated above, with the focus on an authoritative source and the attempt to test or even defend it, an author or commentator will have naturally started searching for those linguistic expressions, language structures and definitions of categories that fit together and prove or disprove the root texts. Especially in the context of an established authority, commentators were inclined to confine themselves to basic definitions and exemplary lists of sample phrases that confirm a taxonomy. Starting from the case functions and their markers, a commentator may simply search for a small selection of representative sample phrases in which a morpheme has the proposed meaning; yet, without accurate knowledge about a marker's distribution, he will

---

[1111] Cf. supra 314f. and 436.

easily take recourse and adhere to the objectivist focus of explaining language structures based on morphosyntactically insensitive semantic construals of scenarios, even more so if this was already a recurrent feature in linguistic analysis and there possibly existed a strong notion of language as a more direct representation of the expressed scenarios.[1112] In this way, the feature of the commentary inhibits further attention to distributional features and consequently fosters the objectivist focus. In turn, this objectivist focus then also confirms and fosters the authority of the root texts and their contents. Through this cycle, *Sum rtags* commentaries such as the GC are imbedded in their own dynamic and promote the continuous adherence to grammatical knowledge that from an outside modern linguistic perspective appears inadequate and artificial.

In this way, historical features such as the promotion of the Thon mi narrative, the Tibetan scholastic features of commentary and scriptural authority, together with the theoretic-conceptual foundation in the objectivist focus have all intermingled and interacted in Tibetan case grammar in and before Si tu.

Even if a source like Si tu's GC perhaps did not arrive at a "definitive explanation" of the two roots SCP and TKJ, both linguistically as well as historically, it may nonetheless be concluded that he has kept his word and has critically approached these two authorities by means of reason in that very form Tibetan scholastic methodology and the conceptual foundation have enabled him.[1113]

[1112] Cf. supra 427f.
[1113] Cf. supra 62ff. and chapter 4.2.

Appendix – On the Numbering of *śloka*s in *Sum cu pa* and *Rtags kyi 'jug pa*

Modern academic research on SCP and TKJ demonstrates significant disagreement as to the ways of numbering and citing the two root texts. Perhaps the most established version goes back to Bacot's study of an anonymous post-Si tu *Sum rtags* commentary entitled *Sum rtags gzhang 'chan legs bshad nor bu'i phreng ba* (?),[1114] in which also the first separate, full edition of the two root texts is provided in Europe. His numbering was followed by scholars like R.A. Miller and Peter Verhagen. In his introduction, Bacot counted a total of 65 so-called "articles" that are "inappropriately called *śloka*s."[1115] He defines a *śloka* as an "article comprising an indefinite number of verses from one two fifteen,"[1116] presuming that this would be the Tibetan understanding he deliberately preserved also in his study. A look at Bacot's edition of the root texts at the end of his study reveals that indeed the 65 identified articles vary from single verse lines up to 15 verse lines. According to his numbering, SCP counts 29 such *śloka*s and TKJ 36. Bacot's numbering was contested by Tillemans in his article on Tibetan verb theory, namely TKJ's *bdag/gzhan* and Si tu's *tha dad min*.[1117] In another article, Tillemans informs us that his alternative numbering was (partially or fully?) based on another post-Si tu commentator, namely the well-known Dngul chu Dharmabhadra, who wrote a famous subcommentary on the GC, entitled *Si tu'i zhal lung* ('Si tu's Words').[1118] The two counting systems have not only resulted in differences such as *śloka*s 12-15 in Bacot's version of TKJ becoming verse 12 in Tillemans's study, they have further evoked an unresolved controversy between Miller and Tillemans about the citation of the root texts.[1119] Additional numberings are also found, such as that contained in Zeisler's study of *las/karman* in Tibetan grammaticography, in which she adhered to the notion of *śloka* in its common use as a verse consisting of four lines, which she consistently applied to the root texts as contained in Si tu's GC.[1120] In view of these competing counting systems, I therefore agree with Tillemans's assessment already in 1994 that "one thing is clear: the usual numbering of the *śloka*s badly needs some serious re-examination."[1121]

[1114] This is the title provided by Bacot 1928, 1 and 109. Unfortunately, I lacked access to any other edition of the Tibetan commentary, but the term *gzhang 'chan* appears more like a typographical error and should be substituted with *gzhung mchan* ('text annotation'), resulting in the title 'Precious Garland of Elegant Sayings: Annotations/Comments [on] the *Sum rtags* [Root] Texts.'

[1115] "Toute la loi du langage y est incluse sous une forme parfois énigmatique, en 65 articles improprement appelés ślokas." (Bacot 1928, 1; transl. Graf)

[1116] "Nous conservons ce nom de śloka, adopté par les Tibétains, à des articles comprenant un nombre indéterminé de versets depuis un jusqu'à quinze." (Bacot 1928, 1; transl. Graf)

[1117] Cf. Tillemans and Herforth 1989.

[1118] Cf. Tillemans 1994, 121f.

[1119] Cf. Miller 1991, 372; Miller 1992; Cf. Tillemans's reply in Tillemans 1994.

[1120] Cf. Zeisler 2006, ft. 2.

[1121] Tillemans 1994, 122.

At this point, it is helpful to introduce an important distinction regarding the organization of any type of commented texts in Tibetan commentaries, namely *sa bcad* ('topical outline') on the one hand and *śloka* ('verse,' 'stanza') on the other. The first category is a commentator's attempt to segment the commented text into logical units for a better understanding of its meaning. These topical outlines can vary significantly from commentator to commentator and are not bound to any restrictions in terms of number or range of verse lines. Ultimately, they are the result of a commentator's hermeneutical-philological examination. Considering the term *śloka*, in contrast, *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary* of Apte provides entries such as 'verse of praise,' 'proverb or saying,' 'a stanza or verse in general,' and 'a verse in the *Anuṣṭubh* metre in particular.'[1122] In Apte's Appendix I on Sanskrit prosody, it is further stated that Sanskrit stanzas are also called *padya* and generally consist of four verse lines or four *pāda*s ('legs,' 'parts,' 'quarters'), and variations in the number of syllables or syllabic instants result in different metres.[1123] In its most technical sense, *śloka* is mentioned in Apte's appendix as an alternative label for the *Anuṣṭubh* metre that consists of eight syllables per *pāda*. Therefore, there seems to be a broader and a narrower understanding of *śloka*, but generally speaking it is a category that belongs to the domain of compositional style and refers to a verse or stanza. Tibetan compositional style adopted the four-lined version of stanzas, translating both terms *padya* and *śloka* with Tibetan *tshigs (su) bcad (pa)* and *pāda* literally with *rkang pa* ('leg'),[1124] but without restricting it to one particular type of metre.

Both Bacot's and Tillemans's numbering are based not on the number of *śloka*s but on the *sa bcad* of different authors, namely one anonymous author and Dngul chu Dharmabhadra. Interestingly, it is ascertained that both commentators were inspired by Si tu's GC, although they did not directly follow his topical outline.[1125] As for Bacot's study, it should be added that it is more difficult to discern from where precisely he has adopted his numbering, since the *Sum rtags gzhang 'chan legs bshad nor bu'i phreng ba* (?) as such does not segment the text in Bacot's proposed form, but instead quotes and annotates the SCP and the TKJ word by word. However, a comparison with Si tu's GC reveals that Bacot's numbering follows exactly the *sa bcad* of Si tu.[1126] The only noteworthy differences are that Si tu has omitted Bacot's TKJ 7,

---

[1122] Cf. Apte 2012, 567.

[1123] Cf. ibid., 648ff., who provides a more detailed account of the different classes and metres in Sanskrit prosody.

[1124] Cf. Negi 1993, 137.

[1125] Cf. Bacot 1928, 164f.; As for Dngul chu's grammar, already the title *Si tu's zhal lung* unmistakably indicates a relation, although this does not mean that there are no noteworthy theoretical deviations between them.

[1126] This statement is not considering spelling differences or minor deviations in the phrasing of single verse lines.

which is nonetheless included in Si tu's separate edition of the root texts in his collected works, as well as Bacot's TKJ 17.1-2, which does not occur in any other edition or commentary to my knowledge, in fact not even in the *Sum rtags gzhang 'chan legs bshad nor bu'i phreng ba* (?) in Bacot's study, thus most likely a typographical error in which he mistakenly repeated his TKJ 22.[1127]

The dependence on different commentators and their respective *sa bcad* thus explains the discrepancy in the counting systems of Bacot and Tillemans. However, the two systems do not sufficiently distinguish between a numbering based on the *sa bcad* and a numbering based on *śloka*s. As has been stated, Bacot went as far as to claim that the topical organization represents nothing but the number of *śloka*s according to the "inappropriate" Tibetan understanding. Inappropriate indeed, but this is simply not the generic understanding of *śloka* (*tshigs bcad*) in the Tibetan tradition, and also not in the field of Tibetan grammar. This is best demonstrated by Bacot's proposed numbering itself that ultimately goes back to Si tu's GC. Although Si tu introduced a topical outline (*sa bcad*) and segmented SCP and TKJ precisely into the 64 articles (65 minus Bacot's TKJ 7) of one to 15 verse lines, Si tu is unmistakably clear about the fact that a *śloka* (*tshigs bcad*) consists of exactly four verse lines (*pāda*, *rkang pa*). First, he argues that the title *Sum cu pa* ('The Thirty') is derived from the fact that SCP consists of precisely 33 *śloka*s, of which the first three are not counted by Si tu because he argues that they contain four opening homages (*mchod brjod*) and the opening declaration (*dam bca' ba*) that all equally pertain to the remaining – mostly lost apart from TKJ – grammars written by master Thon mi.[1128] This results in precisely 30 verses à four verse lines, instead of Bacot's 29 verses (also omitting the three homages) à one to 15 verse lines. Secondly, Si tu closes his quotation of TKJ 16.3-19.4 (Bacot's TKJ 23), 14 verse lines in total, with the following comment:

> *shlo ka gsum dang rkang pa gnyis kyis bstan te/*

> "Through [these] three *śloka*s (*shlo ka*) and two *pāda*s (*rkang pa*) the following is taught: […]"[1129]

This statement makes clear that a *śloka* only consists of four *pāda*s, no more and no less. However, it should be noted that the term is not necessarily employed based on the absolute number of *śloka*s in a source, but relatively within a quoted passage of the root texts. Tillemans

---

[1127] Cf. Bacot 1928, 173 and 174; Si tu 6.444.2 and 6.444.4.

[1128] Si tu's entire discussion of the reason for SCP's title, including the critique of other interpretations, starts with GC 452.2. It will not be further investigated here, whether Si tu's interpretation of the title is the most reasonable or whether other interpretations – of which there exist several in *Sum rtags* – are preferable.

[1129] GC 570.5.

mentions, for example, two Tibetan commentators who explicitly refer to TKJ 11.4-12.3 as one *śloka*, [1130] four verse lines that form a single unit in the topical outline of Dngul chu Dharmabhadra. The same may even apply to our final quotation of Si tu. On an absolute basis, Si tu's quoted passage (TKJ 16.3-19.4) would be one half and three full *śloka*s and not Si tu's three and a half. It may be argued that this amounts to the same, but it is equally possible – if not more likely, in view of the fact that Tibetan scholars memorize but not necessarily number or count the root texts – that he simply did not consider any absolute number of verses and thus based his numbering only on the volume of this particular passage. It also cannot be categorically excluded that Tibetan authors have never used the term *śloka* (*tshigs bcad*) more freely to refer to a logical unit in the *sa bcad* regardless of its size, since Apte's dictionary has demonstrated that a *śloka* may refer to a versified saying in general also in the Sanskritic tradition. *Tshigs bcad* or *śloka* as a relative category and as an indefinite one may cause confusion and complicates the numbering of root texts. However, despite any occasional free usage of this terminology, it is safe to assume that Tibetan scholars in general had a clear understanding of what a *śloka* is and how to distinguish it from the *sa bcad* of a commentary. Since topical outlines are numerous and not bound to any unanimous criteria that allow for a consistent and standardized numbering, I agree with Zeisler's solution to base the counting of the root texts more neutrally on the number of *śloka*s in their generic form of four *pāda*s,[1131] also because this is Si tu's understanding of the terminology in his GC as the main text of this dissertation.

In the following, I propose a numbering of SCP and TKJ based on a *śloka* consisting of four *pāda*s. The edition of both texts is based on the one contained in volume 6 of Si tu's collected works, immediately preceding his GC. The edition counts exactly 33 *śloka*s (= 132 verse lines) for SCP and 34 *śloka*s plus one *pāda* (= 137 verse lines) for TKJ, in total 67 *śloka*s and one *pāda* (= 269 verse lines). In addition, SCP and TKJ each feature a title and translator's homage at the beginning as well as a colophon that indicates the end of the texts. Si tu's edition does not number or segment the *śloka*s, and the full texts of SCP and TKJ are provided right after each other without any partition in and between them. I have deliberately chosen a separate edition of the texts and not one contained in a commentary, since commentaries may omit parts or even swap passages for various reasons. Both has happened in the GC, where Si tu, for example, has omitted the title, translator's homage and 1.1-2 in TKJ. For some reason, he also

---

[1130] Cf. Tillemans 1994, 122.
[1131] Cf. Zeisler 2006, ft. 2.

omitted (or forgot?) TKJ 8.3. As evident below, in his GC he has also swapped SCP 19.3-22.1 with 22.2-23.2, something I am unaware of happening in any of the other commentaries.

All deviations between the root texts in Si tu's separate edition and his GC in terms of phrasing, spelling, omissions, swapping of passages, etc. were annotated. Obvious orthographical, typographical or grammatical errors were corrected but also annotated and compared with Si tu's GC. Likewise, Si tu's topical organization (*sa bcad*) of the root texts in GC was indicated on the right side. Not further indicated are deviations and typographical errors of *ba*/*pa*, *bo*/*po* that are particularly common in word endings as well as those of *da*/*nga*, because any such accurate assessment is often severely impeded by the readability of passages. Typographical or errors and deviations are in these cases only indicated if they result in a noteworthy change of meaning. The use of *shad* follows the standard use in Si tu's separate edition, although two special uses were neglected: (1) Occasionally, double *shad* appears randomly, typically after *'o* and *ro* in the edition, but neither always nor after other allomorphs of *slar bsdu*; thus the rationale of double *shad* in this text is not comprehensible to me. (2) A special form of *shad* is used only if the final syllable before the *shad* is truncated due to the end of a folio's line and thus the syllable was placed in the next line. Since this issue does not occur below, this use of *shad* was also neglected.

As a final remark, the following edition and numbering of the root texts is not a critical edition. It simply follows and compares the root texts in Si tu's separate edition and the GC as they are both contained in volume 6 of his collected works published in 1990 by Sherab Gyaltsen. A critical edition of SCP and TKJ definitely is a desirable future project, since deviations between different versions used in commentaries are multiple, significant and have even evoked debates on the correct reading of selected passages.

Sum cu pa (SCP)

śloka	*pāda*	Text	*Si tu'i sa bcad*
Title		རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། སྨྲ་ག་ར་ཏ་སྨྲ་ལ་ཏ྄ི་ཤྃད྄ན[1132]་མ།	1
		བོད་སྐད་དུ། ཡུང་སྟོན་པ་རྩ་བ་སུམ་ཅུ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ།	1
Translator's homage		ངག་གི་དབང་ཕྱུག་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།	2
1	1	ཁང་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་མཚོག་མངའ་བའི།	3
	2	དཀོན་མཆོག་དེ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།	3
	3	ཁང་གིས་སྐྱ་དབྱངས་ཀུན་གསུངས་པའི།	4
	4	འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།	4
2	1	ཁང་གིས་མིང་གཞི་སྟོན་གསུངས་པ།	5
	2	རྟག་ཞི་བ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།	5
	3	སྟེབ་སྟོར་ལེགས་མཛད་མཁས་རྣམས་དང་།	6
	4	བླ་མ་ལ་ཡང་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས།	6
3	1	བསླབ་པ་ཀུན་གྱི་གཞི་འཛིན་ཅིང་།	7
	2	རིག་བྱེད་སྒྲ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ།	7
	3	མིང་མཚག་བཙོད་པ་ཀུན་གྱི་གཞི།	7
	4	ཡི་གེའི་སྟོར་བ་བཤད་པར་བྱ།	7
4	1	ཡི་གེ་ཨ་ལི་ཀ་ལི་གཉིས།	8
	2	ཨ་ལི་གསལ་བྱེད་ཨི་སོགས་བཞི།	8
	3	ཀ་ལི་སུམ་ཅུ་ཐམ་པའོ།	8
	4	དེ་ལ་རྟེས་འཇུག་བཅུ་ཡིན་ཏེ།	9
5	1	དེ་ལས་ལྔ་ནི་སྟོན་དབང་འཇུག	9
	2	མི་འཇུག་པ་ནི་ཉི་ཤུའོ།	9
	3	ཀ་ལི་ཕྱེད་དང་བརྒྱད་སྟེ་ནི།	10

[1132] 6.440.1: *na* GC 451.4: *nā*

	4	།བཞི་བཞི་དག་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ་ལས།	10
6	1	།དང་པོ་གསུམ་པ་བཞི་པ་ལ།	11
	2	།མས་གཞིས་དྲུག་པའི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།	11
	3	།བདུན་པ་ལ་ནི་ཤ་མ་གཏོགས།	11
	4	།རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་ར་འདོད།	11
7	1	།རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་ཞིང་ལས།	12
	2	།དང་པོ་གསུམ་པ་ལྡ་པ་དྲུག	12
	3	།བདུན་པ་རྣམས་ནི་སྟོན་དུ་འང་འཇུག	12
	4	།མིང་གཞི་གཉིས་སམ་གསུམ[1133]་སྦྱེལ་ལས།	13
8	1	།དེ་ལ་དབྱངས་ཀྱི་བཞིར[1134]་ལྡན་ཡང་།	13
	2	།གང་དུའང་འཇུག་མིན་སྣུར་བའང་མིན།	13
	3	།རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ནི།	14
	4	།མིང་གང་གི་ནི་མཐར་སྣུར་བ།	14
9	1	།དེ་ལ་ཨ་ལི་བཞི་པ་སྣུར།	14
	2	།སྣུར་བསྡུ[1135]་བར་ནི་ཤེས་པར་བྱུ།	14
	3	།རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་རྣམས་ལས།	15
	4	།གང་མིང་མཐའ་ན་བཅུ་པ་གནས།	15
10	1	།དེ་ལ་ཨ་ལི་གཉིས་པ་སྣུར།	15
	2	།གང་མིང་མཐའ་ན་བརྒྱུད་པ་གནས།	15
	3	།དེ་ལ་གཉིས་པ་ཨུ་ཡང་སྣུར།	15
	4	།གང་མིང་མཐའ་ན་གསུམ་པ་གནས།	15
11	1	།དེ་ལ་ཨ་ལི་གཉིས་པ་སྣུར།	15
	2	།བཞི་པ་དགུ་པ་དྲོས་ཀྱང་སྟེ།	15
	3	།ལས་དང་ཆེད་དང་རྟེན་གནས་དང་།	15

[1133] GC 466.1: *sum*
[1134] GC 466.1: *bzhi*
[1135] 6.441.2: *'sdu* ? GC 467.5: *bsdu*

	4	དེ་ཉིད་ཚོ་སྐབས་ལ་སྨྲ་ཡིན།	15
12	1	རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ནི་[1136]	16
	2	ཨི་དང་མཐུན་ལུགས་འདི་ཞེས་བྱ།	16
	3	དང་པོ་གཉིས་ལ་དང་པོ་མཐུན།	17
	4	གསུམ་ལྔ་བཅུ་ལ་ཀྱུ་དང་སྦྱར།	17
13	1	བདུན་པ་ཉིད་ལ་བདུན་པ་སྟེ།	17
	2	ལྷག་མ་རྣམས་ལ་གྱུ་སྦྱར་བ།	17
	3	དེ་དག་ཨི་སྦྱར་འབྲེལ་བའི་ས།	17
	4	དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་བཅུ་པ་སྦྱར།	18
14	1	ཁྱེད་པ་པོ་དུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།	18
	2	ཨུ་ལི་ཕྱིས་ནས་གཉིས་པ་སྦྱར།	19
	3	ཚིག་རྒྱུན་གཉིས་དང་སྡུད་པར་འགྱུར།	19
	4	ལ་དོན་སུ་ལ་ཨུ་ཕྱིས་ནས།	20
15	1	དེ་ལ་གསུམ་པའི་དང་པོ་སྦྱར།	20
	2	དེ་ལ་ཨུ་ལི་གསུམ་པ་སྦྱར།	20
	3	དེ་ནི་ལྷག་དང་བཅས་པའོ།	20
	4	རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ལ།	21
16	1	དྲུག་པ་སྦྱར་ན་འབྱེད་སྡུད་ཡིན།	21
	2	རྗེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ཡི།	22
	3	བཞི་པ་དྲུག་པ་ལ་བཅུ་པ།	22
	4	སྦྱར་བ་འབྱུང་ཁུངས་ས་ཡིན་ཏེ།	22
17	1	དགར་[1137]་དང་སྡུད་པའང་དེ་བཞིན་ནོ་[1138]	23
	2	གང་མིང་བརྗོད་པའི་དང་པོ་རུ།	24
	3	ཀྱི་སྦྱར་བ་ནི་བོད་པ་ཡིན།	24

[1136] GC 484.2: *la*

[1137] 6.442.2: *dga'* ? GC 493.3: *dgar*

[1138] GC 493.3: *yin*

	4	གང་མིང་མཐའ་དང་མཐུན་པ་ཡི།	25
18	1	བཞི་པ་ལ་ནི་ཨེ་སྒྱུར་བ།	25
	2	དགར་དང་བརྟན་པའི་ཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར།	25
	3	མིང་གང་རུང་བའི་བར་མཚམས་སུ།	26
	4	གསུམ་པ་ལ་ནི་གཉིས་པ་སྒྱུར།	26
19	1	དེ་ནི་སྣད་དང་འབྱེད་པ་དང་།	26
	2	རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཚེ་སྐབས་གདམས་ངག་ཕྱིར།	26
	3	གང་མིང་བརྗོད་པའི་དང་པོ་ཉ།	28[1139]
	4	དང་པོ་ལ་ནི་གཉིས་པ་སྒྱུར།	28
20	1	ཕྱི་ལ་ཁྱབ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར།	28
	2	གང་མིང་གི་ནི་མ་མཐའ་ན།	29
	3	པུ་ལིངྒ་ཡི་སྒྲ་མེད་པ།	29
	4	དེ་ལ་པུ་ལིངྒ་སྒྱུར་ན།	29
21	1	བདག་པོའི་སར་ནི་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།	29
	2	གང་མིང་བརྗོད་པའི་ཡ་མཐའ་རུ[1140]།	30
	3	སྟྲི[1141]་ལིངྒ་ཡི་སྒྲ་མེད་པ།	30
	4	དེ་ལ་སྟྲི[1142]་ལིངྒ་སྒྱུར་ན།	30
22	1	དགག་པའི་གནས་སུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།	30
	2	གང་མིང་གི་ནི་ཡ་མཐའ་རུ།	27
	3	གསུམ་པ་ལ་ནི་ཨེ་སྒྱུར་བ།	27
	4	ཐ་སྙད་དབང་དུ་གསུམ་ཡིན་ཏེ།	27
23	1	དངོས་པོའི་དབང་དུ་བཞི་རུ་འགྱུར།	27

[1139] The rule ordering of SCP 19.3-23.2 that contains the presentation of the four syntactic links *gang sgra*, *bdag sgra*, *dgag sgra* and *de sgra*, is altered in Si tu's GC. There, after finishing his discussion of *dang sgra* (SCP 18.3-19.2), he first starts with *de sgra* (SCP 22.2-23.2) and then goes on to quote and explain SCP 19.3-22.1 on *gang sgra*, *bdag sgra* and *dgag sgra*.

[1140] GC 512.1: *na*

[1141] 6.442.4: *stri* GC 512.1: *strī*

[1142] 6.442.4: *stri* GC 512.1: *strī*

		2	དུས་ཀྱི་དབང་དུ་གཞིས་ཡིན་ནོ།	27
		3	ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་རྣམས།	31
		4	ཤུང་ཟད་བསྡུས་པ་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་།	31
	24	1	དེ་ནི་དེ་བཞིན་སྒྱུར་བར་བྱ།	31
		2	སྤྱིན་འཇུག་ཡོད་དས་མེད་ཀྱང་རུང་།	32
		3	མིང་གཞིའི་ཡི་གེ་གང་ཡིན་ལ།	32
		4	ཞེས[1143]་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་དས་སུམ་འབྲེལ་ཡོད།	32
	25	1	ཨཱ[1144]་ལེ་བཞི་ལས་གང་ཕྱན་ཡང་།	32
		2	རྗེས་འཇུག་བཅུ་པོ་མ་ཞུགས་ན།	32
		3	མིང་གཞན་སྒྱུར་བ་ཡོད་མི་སྲིད།	32
		4	རྗེས་འཇུག་བཅུ་ཡི་དོན་ཤེས་ན།	33
	26	1	འབྲི[1145]་དང་ཀློག་དང་བཀླད་རྣམས་ཀྱི།	33
		2	མཚམས་སྒྱུར་སྐ་ལ་ཐོགས་མེད་ཅིང་།	33
		3	འབྲེལ་པ་སྐ་བའི་མཆོག་ཏུ་འགྱུར།	33
		4	གཞན་ཡང་རྗེས་འཇུག་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས།	33
	27	1	དོན་གྱི་སྦྱོར་བ་མ་མཐོང་ཡང་།	33
		2	དོན་དང་མཐུན་པའི་སྦྱོར་བ་ཤེས།	33
		3	རྗེས་འཇུག་སྦྱོར་བ་མཁས་པ་ན།	34
		4	ལྱང་གི་དོན་དང་སྦྱོར་བ་དང་།	34
	28	1	བླ་མའི་མན་ངག་གསུམ་སྦྱར་ནས།	34
		2	དོན་གྱི་ཐོག་ཏུ་དབབ་པར་བྱ།	34
		3	བསླབ་ལ་བརྩོན་པའི་གང་ཟག་གིས།	35
		4	དང་པོར་ང་རོ་རྣམས་ལ་སྦྱང་།	35
	29	1	སྤྱིན་འཇུག་མིང་གཞི་རྗེས་འཇུག་གསུམ།	35

[1143] GC 514.3: *gnyis*

[1144] 6.442.5: *a* GC 514.3: *ā*

[1145] 6.442.6: *’di* GC 515.2: *’bri*

	2	ཀློག་གི་ཚད་དུ་བསླབ་པ་ཡིན།	35
	3	ཏེས་འཇུག་བཞི་ཡི་སྒྱུར་བ་ནི།	35
	4	མཐུན་བསམ་བསྟན་པའི་དོན་དུ་སྦྱར།	35
30	1	ཡན་ལག་དེ་དག་མཐུ་ཡིས་ནི།	35
	2	འབྲས་བུའི་ཚད་དུ་དོན་ལ་དབབ།	35
	3	བསླབ་པའི་རིམ་པ་འདི་ཡིས་ནི།	35
	4	གང་ཞིག་འབད་པ་ཅུང་ཟས་ཀྱང་།	35
31	1	ཤེས་རབ་སྒྱུར་དུ་གྲོལ་བར་འགྱུར།	35
	2	དེ་ཕྱིར་དང་པོར་འདི་ཉིད་བསླབ།	35
	3	དེ་ནས་རྒྱས་པའང་མཉན་བྱས་ཏེ།	35
	4	བསླབ་པ་གང་ལ་དད་པ་ཡི།	35
32	1	གཞུང་ཉིད་བླ་མ་དག་ལས་མཉན།	35
	2	སློབ་དཔོན་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་འཛིན་ཅིང་།	36
	3	ལེ་ལོ་གཡེང་བ་རྣམ་པར་སྤངས།	36
	4	ཟོ་བཟང་དད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ།	36
33	1	སྐྱེས་བུ་དེས་ནི་མྱུར་རྟོགས་ཏེ།	36
	2	དེ་ལ་དུས་སུ་འདོམས་པར་བྱ།	36
	3	ཅིག[1146]ཐོས་དེ་ལས་ཕྱག་པའོ།	36
	4	དེ་ལྟར་ཀུན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་གྱུར་ཅིག	om.
Colophon	། གླུ་ག་ར་ཁའི་རྩ་བ་སློ་ག་སུམ་ཅུ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སློབ་དཔོན་ཨ་ནུས་མཛད་པ་རྫོགས་སོ།།	om.

Rtags kyi 'jugs pa (TKJ)

śloka	*pāda*	Text	*Si tu'i sa bcad*
Title		རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཙ་ལིངྒ་བ[1147]་དཱུ་ར་ནྲྀ[1148]་མ།	om.
		བོད་སྐད་དུ། ཡུང་སྟོན་པ་རྟགས་ཀྱི་འཇུག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ།	om.
Translator's homage		བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཏའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།	om.
1	1	།སྨྲ་བའི་སྐྱེས་མཆོག་སྨྲ་བའི་རྒྱལ།	om.
	2	།ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།	om.
	3	།ཀོ་ཡི་ཡི་གེ་འབའ་ཞིག་ལ།	1
	4	།སྤྱེ་པ་ཕྱེད་དང་བརྒྱད་གནས་པའང་།	1
2	1	།སྤྱི་ཚོན་ལྱུ་རུ་དྲིལ་བྱས་ནས།	1
	2	།ཕོ་དང་མ་ཉིང་མོ་དང་ནི།	1
	3	།ཁྱིན་ཏུ་མོ་དང་བཞི་བཞི་དུ།	1
	4	།སྤྱེ་པ་བཞི་པ་ཡན་ཆད་དབྱེ།	1
3	1	།ལྷག་མ་བཅུ་བཞི་གནས་པ་ལ།	1
	2	།ཚ་སོགས་གསུམ་ནི་ཚ་སོགས་སྒྱུར།	1
	3	།ཕ་ནི་བ[1149]་དང་སྒྱུར་བར་བྱ།	1
	4	།ལྷག་མ་དྲུག་ནི་མོ་རུ་སྒྱུར།	1
4	1	།ར་ལ་ཏུ་ནི་མོ་གཤམ་སྟེ།	1
	2	།ཨ་ནི་མཆན་མེད་ཅེས་ཀྱང་བྱ།	1
	3	།མོ་ཡི་ཡི་གེའི་ནང་ནས་ནི།	2
	4	།འཇུག་པའི་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་དབྱུང་བྱ།	2
5	1	།འཇུག་པ་བཅུ་ཡི་ནང་ནས་ནི།	2
	2	།སྤྱོན་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་ལྷ་དབྱུང་བྱ།	2

[1147] 6.443.4: *pa*
[1148] 6.443.4: *na*
[1149] 6.443.5: *pa* ? GC 523.5: *ba*

	3	ཁྱོན་འཛག་ཡི་གི་ཨྲུ་པོ་ལ།	3
	4	ཁོ་དང་མ་ཉིད[1150]་མོ་དང་ནི།	3
6	1	ཕྱིན་ཏུ་མོ་དང་བཞི་ཏུ་བྱེ།	3
	2	དེ་དག་རེ་རེའང་བཞི་བྱེད་དེ།	4
	3	གང་ལ་འཛུག་བྱེད་གང་གིས་བྱེད།	4
	4	ཇི་ལྟར་འཛུག་བྱེད་ཅི་ཕྱིར་བྱེད།	4
7	1	གང་ལ་འཛུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།	5
	2	ཕོ་ནི་ཕོ་དང་མོ་ལ་འཛུག	6
	3	མོ་ནི་མོ་དང་མ་ཉིང་ལ།	6
	4	མ[1151]་ཉིང་ཡང་ནི་ཕོ་མོ་ལའོ།	6
8	1	ཕྱིན་ཏུ་མོ་ནི་མ་ཉིང་དང་།	6
	2	མོ་དང་ཕྱིན་ཏུ་མོ་ཉིད་ལའོ།	6
	3	མི་འཛུག་པ་ནི་འདི་ལྟ་སྟེ།	om.
	4	ཕོ་ནི་མ་ཉིང་ལ་མི་འཛུག[1152]	7
9	1	མོ་ཡང་ཕོ་ལ་འཛུག་མི་འགྱུར[1153]	7
	2	མ་ཉིང་རང་ལ་རང་མི་འཛུག	7
	3	རང་གི་སྟེ་དང་འཕྲད[1154]་པ་ན།	7
	4	ཕོ་ཡང་མོ་ལ་འཛུག་མི་འགྱུར།	7
10	1	མ་ཉིང་མོ་ཡང་དེ་བཞིན་ནོ།	7
	2	ཇི་ལྟར་འཛུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།	8
	3	ཕོ་ནི་དྲག་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་ཏེ།	9
	4	མ་ཉིང་རན་པར་འཛུག་པ་ཡིན།	9
11	1	མོ་ནི་ཞན་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་ཏེ།	9

[1150] 6.443.6: *rang* ? GC 528.1: *ning*
[1151] 6.444.1: *mi* GC 529.1: *ma*
[1152] 6.444.2: *'dzug* GC 533.3: *'jug*
[1153] GC 533.3: *mo ni pho la 'jug pa min/*
[1154] 6.444.2: *phrad* ? GC 533.3: *'phrad*
454

	2	ཁིན་དུ་མོ་ནེ་མཐམ་པས་སོ།	9
	3	ཅི་ཕྱིར་འཛག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།	10
	4	ཕོ་ནེ་འདས་དང་གཞན་བསྐྱབ་ཕྱིར།	11
12	1	ཨ་ནིང་གཉིས་ཀ་ད་སྤྱར་ཆེད།	12
	2	མོ་ནེ་བདག་ད་ཨ་འོངས་ཕྱིར།	13
	3	ཁིན་དུ་མོ་ནེ་མཐམ་ཕྱིར་རོ།	14
	4	རྗེས་འཛག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ལ།	15
13	1	ཕོ་མོ་མ་ནིང་གསུམ་དུ་དབྱེ།	15
	2	ཕོ་ལ་སྐྱེས་བུ་རབ་འབྱིང་གསུམ།	16
	3	མོ་ལ་མོ་དང་ཁིན་དུ་མོ།	16
	4	ཨ་ནིང་འགྱུར་དང་མཚན་གཉིས་དང་།	16
14	1	མཚན་མེད་དག་དང་གསུམ་དུ་འདོད།	16
	2	དེ་ཡང་བྱེད་པ་བཞི་བྱེད་དེ།	17
	3	གང་ལ་འཛག་བྱེད་གང་གིས་བྱེད།	17
	4	ཇི་ལྟར་འཛག་བྱེད[1155]ཅི་ཕྱིར་བྱེད།	17
15	1	གང་ལ་ཡི་གེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ།	18
	2	གང་གིས་བཅུ་པོ་དེ་དག་གིས།	19
	3	ཇི་ལྟར་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཏེ།	20
	4	སྐྱ་ཡི་འཛག་ཆུལ་རྡོན་གྱི་ཆུལ།	20
16	1	ཕོ་གསུམ་མོ་གཉིས་མ་ནིང་གསུམ།	21
	2	དྲུག་ཞན་བར་མ་གསུམ་དུ་འཛག	21
	3	དྲུག་པ་གསུམ་ཉིད་ནང་ཕྱད་དམ།	22
	4	ཁལ་ཏེ་ཞན་པ་ནང་ཕྱད་ན།	22
17	1	དེ་ལའང་ནང་གི་ཆ་ཤས་ཀྱིས།	22
	2	དེ་ཡང་དྲུག་ཞན་གཉིས་སུ་དབྱེ།	22

[1155] GC 568.2: *byad/byang* ?

	3	༄།ཨ་ཞིང་གསུམ་དུ་གང་གཏོགས་པ།	22
	4	༄།དུག་དང་ཕུད་ན་དུག་པར་འགྱུར།	22
18	1	༄།ཞན་དང་ཕུད་ན་ཞན་པར་འགྱུར།	22
	2	༄།གཉིས་ཀ་དག་ནི[1156]་ཕུད་གྱུར་ན།	22
	3	༄།དེ་ནི་གཉིས་ཀ་ཅན་དུ་འགྱུར།	22
	4	༄།གཉིས་ཀ[1157]་དག་དང་མ་ཕུད་ན།	22
19	1	༄།གང་དུ་ཡང་ནི་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།	22
	2	༄།དེས་ན་འགྱུར་དང་མཚན[1158]་གཉིས་དང་།	22
	3	༄།མཚན་མེད་དག་དང་གསུམ་དུ་འདོད[1159]།	22
	4	༄།དེ་ནི་སྐྱེ་ཡི་འཇུག་ཚུལ་ལོ།	22
20	1	༄།དོན་ནི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཏེ།	23
	2	༄།སྤྱ་མ་གང་སྦྱར་གྱུར་པ་དང་།	23
	3	༄།ཕྱི་མ་གང་སྦྱར་འགྱུར[1160]་བའོ།	23
	4	༄།སྤྱ་མ་སྟོན་འཇུག་སྤ་བཞིན་སྦྱར།	24
21	1	༄།ཕྱི་མ་དག་གི་འཇིན་ཚུལ་ནི།	25
	2	༄།ཁོ་ཡིས་ཕོ་ཡི་མིང་མཐའ་དང་།	26
	3	༄།ཨོ་ཡིས་མོ་ཡི་མིང་མཐའ་དང་།	26
	4	༄།ཨ་ཞིང་གིས་ནི་མ་ཞིང་དོ།	26
22	1	༄།མིང་མཐའ་དེ་དག་ཞིད་ཀྱིས་ནི།	27
	2	༄།དེ་ཞིད་རང་གི་སྐྱ་མཐུན་པའི།	27
	3	༄།ཚོས་དངོས་ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་དང་།	27
	4	༄།སྤྱིན་དང་འགྱུང་ཁུངས་འབྱེལ་པ་དང་།	27
23	1	༄།གནས་དང་བོད་པའི་སྐྱ་ཡང་དང་།	27

[1156] GC 570.4: *dang*
[1157] GC 570.4: *pha*
[1158] 6.445.1: *mtshad* GC 570.4: *mthsan*
[1159] 6.445.1: *mdod* GC 570.5: *'dod*
[1160] 6.445.1: ? GC 575.1: *'gyur*

		2	།གཞན་ཡང་སྐྱར་བསྐྱ་ཕྱག་བཙས་དང་།	27
		3	།འབྱེད་སྒྲུད་བསྐྱན་དང་བདག་པོ་དང་།	27
		4	།དགག་སྒྲུབ་རྒྱུན་དང་དུས་ལའང་འཇུག	27
24		1	།དེ་དག་སྟེ་ཤུགས་འདྲེན་པས་འབྱུང་།	27
		2	།དེ་དག་ནང་གསེས་གང་འཇུག་པ།	28
		3	།མཐར་སྒྱུར་འོག་མའི་མིང་དོན་ལས།	28
		4	།སྒྱི་འཇུག་ཡོད་དམ་བྱེད་པ་ཡོད།	29
25		1	།དེ་བཞིན་ཆེད་བྱེད་རྟེན་བྱེད་དང་།	29
		2	།ལས་བྱ་བླང་བྱ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ།	29
		3	།སྟོན་དུ་འོས་པ་གནས་པའམ[1161]	29
		4	།གཞན་ཡང་ཚིག་དོན་འོག་མ་ལས།	30
26		1	།བསྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་པ་དང་།	30
		2	།གོང་མ་ལས་ཀྱང་དེ་བཞིན་ཏེ།	30
		3	།རྣམ་གྲངས་དག་ཀྱང་བཀོད་པ་ལས།	30
		4	།བསྐྱར་བ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་པ་དང་།	30
27		1	།པོ་སྒྲ་དང་ནི་མོ[1162]སྒྲ་དག	30
		2	།མིང་གི་མཐའ་ན་ཡོད་མེད་དང་།	30
		3	།རྒྱུན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་།	30
		4	།དོན་ལ་བསྟེགས་པ་ཡོད་མེད་དང་།	30
28		1	།བསྟན་བྱ་ཕྱག་མ་ཡོད་མེད་དང་།	30
		2	།ཚིག་དོན་རྟོགས་དང་མ་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས།	30
		3	།དེ་དག་ནང་གསེས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ།	30
		4	།ཅི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།	31
29		1	།ཡི་གེའི་ཁོངས་ནས་མིང[1163]དབྱུང་སྟེ།	31

[1161] GC 591.6: *pa 'am*

[1162] 594.5: *mro*

[1163] 6.445.5: *med/meng* GC 608.1: *ming*

	2	ཁྱེད་གི་ཁོངས་ནས་ཆོག་ཤུང་ནས།	31
	3	ཆོག་གིས་དོན་རྣམས་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད།	31
	4	ཨོ་ཨི་ཡི་གེ་མེད་པ་ན།	32
30	1	ཕོ་ཡིག་བརྗོད་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།	32
	2	ཕོ་ཡིག་དེ་དག་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་།	32
	3	འཇུག་པར་བཅས་པ་མེད་པར[1164]་ནི།	32
	4	མེད་དང་ཆོག་ཀྱང་གསལ་མི་ནུས།	32
31	1	མེད་ཆོག་གསལ་བ་མེད་ན་ནི།	32
	2	དོན་རྣམས་བརྗོད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།	32
	3	དེ་ལྟར་གྱུར་ན་འཇིག་རྟེན་དུ།	33
	4	དོན་མཚན[1165]་བརྗོད་པ་ཀུན་ཀྱང་མེད།	33
32	1	རིག་བྱེད་སྔ་བའང་ཡོད་མི་འགྱུར།	33
	2	ཉན་ཐོས་རང་རྒྱལ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི།	33
	3	བསྐལ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།	33
	4	ཇི་ལྟར་འཇིག་རྟེན་སེམས་ཅན་དག[1166]	34
33	1	ཕྱུང་པོ་ཁམས་དང་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་དང་།	34
	2	གྱུབ་མཐའ་གཞན་ཡང་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་།	34
	3	རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་མི་ཤེས་བཞིན།	34
	4	དེ་བཞིན་ཡི་གེའི་འཇུག[1167]་ཚུལ་རྣམས།	34
34	1	སྨྲ་བ་ཀུན་ལ་གནས་གྱུར་ཀྱང་།	34
	2	རང་ཚུལ་དེ་ཉིད་མི་ཤེས་པས།	34
	3	དོན་ལ་སྟོར་བ་ག་ལ་ཞེས།	34
	4	དེ་ཕྱིར་སྨྲ་བའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་གེ[1168]	34

[1164] GC 612.2: *na*

[1165] GC 613.4: *mtshon*

[1166] GC 614.5: *rnams*

[1167] 6.446.1: *ngjug* ? GC 614.5: *'jug*

[1168] GC 614.5: *ga*

35	1	ཇེས་སྨྲས[1169]	34
		འདི་ཀུན་རྟོགས་གྱུར་ཅིག	35
Colophon		བྱ་ཀ་ར་ཉའི་རྩ་བ་བརྒྱུད་པ་ལས་ཀུན་ཏུ་བཟང་པོའི་བྱ་ཀ་ར་ཅ་གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་ཏེ་དྲུག་པའོ།། ॥	om.

[1169] 6.446.2: ? GC 614.6: *smras*

Bibliography

Abhyankar, Kashimath Vasudev. (1986). *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*. 3rd ed. Baroda: Oriental Institute.

Anderson, John M. (1977). *On Case Grammar: Prolegomena to a Theory of Grammatical Relations*. London: Croom Helm.

Apte, Vaman Shivram. (2012). *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: Containing Appendices on Sanskrit Prosody and Important Literary and Geographical Names in the Ancient History of India*. 1970. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. See Joshi and Roodbergen 1991-2011 and Sharma 1987-2003.

Bach, Emmon, and Robert T. Harms, ed. (1968). *Universals in Linguistic Theory*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bacot, Jacques, trans. (1928). *Une grammaire tibétaine du tibétain classique. Les ślokas grammaticaux de Thonmi Sambhoṭa avec leurs commentaires.* Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Études 37. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner.

Bhatta, V. P. (2001). *Navya-Nyāya Theory of Verbal Cognition: Critical Study of Gadādhara's Vyutpattivāda; with Introduction, English Translation, and Explanatory Notes*. Vol. 1. Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers.

Blake, J. Barry. (2004). *Case*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branner, David. (2003). "Eastern Traditions: Chinese Tradition." In *Ethnography of Speaking - Mamfe Languages*, vol. 2 of *International Encyclopedia of Linguistics*, edited by William J. Frawley, 192-193. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bu ston Rin chen drup. (1931-1932). *History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyung).* Translated by E. Obermiller. 2 vols. Heidelberg: Harrassowitz.

———. (2013). *Butön's History of Buddhism in India and Its Spread to Tibet: A Treasury of Priceless Scripture*. Translated by Lisa Stein and Ngawang Zangpo. Boston: Snow Lion.

Cardona, George. (1974). "Pāṇini's *kārakas*: Agency, Animation and Identity." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2, no. 3-4: 231-306.

———. (1975). "Some Features of Pāṇinian Derivations." In *History of Thought and Contemporary Linguistics*, edited by Herman Parret, 137-158. Berlin: de Gruyter.

———. (1997). *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*. 1976. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

———. (2004). *Recent Research in Pāṇinian Studies*. 2nd rev. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Cabezón, José I. (1981). "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures." *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 4, no. 1: 7-23.

———. (1994). *Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Cāndravyākaraṇa of Candragomin. See Liebich 1902 and 1918.

Chaix, Rémi. (2010). "Les aspects économiques des l'édition xylographique à l'imprimerie de sDe dge (1): La réalisation des blocs xylographiques sous le règne de bsTan pa tshe ring (1713/14-1738)." In *Édition, éditions: l'écrit au Tibet, évolution et devenir*, edited by Anne Chayet, Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, Françoise Robin, Jean-Luc Achard, 465-482. Collectanea Himalayica 3. München: Indus Verlag.

———. (2013). "Si tu paṇ chen and the House of Sde dge: A Demanding but Beneficial Relationship." *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7: 17-48. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/downloads/ (accessed September 12th, 2017).

Das, Sarat Chandra. (1972). *An Introduction to the Grammar of the Tibetan Language with the Text of Situ Sum-Tag, Dag-je sal-wai melong and Situi shal lung*. 1915. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Davidson, Ronald M. (2005). *Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.

de Jong, J. W. (1997). *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America.* Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company.

DeLancey, Scott. (1991). "Event Construal and Case Role Assignment." In *Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, February 15-18, 1991: General Session and Parasession on the Grammar of Event Structure*, edited by Laurel A. Sutton, Christopher Johnson and Ruth Shields, 338-353. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society. https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/BLS/ article/view/1610/1384 (accessed May 30th, 2012).

———. (2003). "Classical Tibetan." In *The Sino-Tibetan Languages*, edited by Graham Thurgood and Randy J. LaPolla, 255-269. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Deshpande, Madhav M. (1991). "Pāṇinian Syntax and the Changing Notion of Sentence." In *Studies in Sanskrit Syntax: A volume in honor of the centennial of Speijer's Sanskrit Syntax (1886-1986)*, edited by Hans Henrich Hock, 31-44. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

———. (2009). "Building Blocks or Useful Fictions: Changing View of Morphology in Ancient Indian Thought." In *India and Beyond: Aspects of Literature, Meaning, Ritual and Thought; Essays in Honour of Frits Staal*, edited by Dick van der Meij, 71-127. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Diaconescu, Bogdan. (2012). *Debating Verbal Cognition: The Theory of the Principal Qualificand (mukhyaviśeṣya) in Classical Indian Thought*. Delhi: Motilal Banardsidass.

Dixon, R. M. W. (1998). *Ergativity*. 1994. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dmu dge bsam gtan. (2006A). *Bod kyi yi ge'i spyi rnam blo gsal 'jug ngogs*. 2005. Reprint, Xining: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe sgrun khang.

———. (2006B). *Brda sprod blo gsal dga' ston*. 2005. Reprint, Xining: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe sgrun khang.

Dor zhi Gdong drug snyems blo. (1987). *Brda sprod rig pa'i don 'grel phyogs bsgrigs*. Lanzhou: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe sgrun khang.

Dotson, Brandon. (2006). Review of *Thundering Falcon: An Inquiry into the History and Cult of Khra-'brug. Tibet's First Buddhist Temple* by Per K. Sørensen and Guntram Hazod. *Études mongoles et sibériennes, centrasiatique et tibétaines* 36-37: 458-463. http://emscat.revues.org/1030 (accessed January 1st, 2017).

———. (2009). *The Old Tibetan Annals. An Annotated Translation of Tibet's First History. With Annotated Cartographical Documentation by Guntram Hazod*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Dpang Blo gros brtan pa. See Dpang Lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa.

Dpang Lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa. (2004). "Tshogs gsum gsal ba." In *Sum rtags dang dag yig*, by Sa paṇ Kun dga' rgyal mtshan et al., 235-265. Bod kyi bcu phrag rig mdzod chen mo las sa skya pa'i gsung rab pod gnyis pa. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe sgrun khang.

Dreyfus, Georges B. J. (2003). *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Faure, Bernard. (1991). *The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fillmore, Charles J. (1968). "The Case for Case." In *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, edited by Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms, 1-88. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Garrett, Frances. (2013). "Mercury, Mad Dogs, and Smallpox: Medicine in the Si tu paṇ chen Tradition." *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7: 277-301. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/downloads/ (accessed September 12th, 2017).

Germano, David, Karl Debreczeny, Bryan J. Cuevas, Steven Weinberger, Naomi Worth, Ben Nourse, and William MacGrath, eds. (2013). *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/downloads/ (accessed September 12th, 2017).

Gold, Jonathan C. (2008). *The Dharma's Gatekeepers: Sakya Paṇḍita on Buddhist Scholarship in Tibet*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Goldstein, Melvyn C., T.N. Shelling, and J.T. Surkhang, eds. (2001). *The New Tibetan-English Dictionary of Modern Tibetan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Graffi, Giorgio. (2001). *200 Years of Syntax: A Critical Survey*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Hackett, Paul G. (2003). *A Tibetan Verb Lexicon: Verbs, Classes, and Syntactic Frames*. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.

Hahn, Michael. (2005). *Lehrbuch der klassischen tibetischen Schriftsprache*. 7th corr. ed. 1996. Reprint, Marburg: Indica et Tibetica.

Hangartner, Diego. See Śāntideva 2005.

Harris, Zellig S. (1963). *Structural Linguistics*. (Formerly entitled *Methods in Structural Linguistics*). 6th ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Heine, Bernd. (2009). "Grammaticalization of Cases." In *The Oxford Handbook of Case*, edited by Andrej Malchukov and Andrew Spencer, 458-469. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hill, Nathan W. (2011). "The Allative, Locative, and Terminative Cases (*la-don*) in the *Old Tibetan Annals*." In *New Studies in the Old Tibetan Documents: Philology, History and Religion*, edited by Yoshiro Imaeda and Matthew Kapstein, 3-38. Old Tibetan Documents Online Monograph Series 3. Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

———. (2012). "Tibetan *-las*, *-nas* and *-bas*." *Cahiers de Linguistique Asie Orientale* 41, no. 1: 3-38.

Horváth, Zoltán. (1989). "Klong-rdol's Classificiation of Valid Logical Reasons." *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 43, no. 2-3: 391-397.

Houben, Jan. E. M. (1999). "'Meaning Statements' in Pāṇini's Grammar: On the Purpose and Context of the Aṣṭādhyāyī." *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 22: 23-54.

I-tsing. (1896). *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671-695)*. Translated by J. Takakusu. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé. (2012). *The Treasury of Knowledge: Book Six, Parts One and Two; Indo-Tibetan Classical Learning and Buddhist Phenomenology*. Translated by Gyurme Dorje (Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group). Boston: Snow Lion.

Jäschke, H.A. (1987). *A Tibetan-English Dictionary: With Special Reference to the Prevailing Dialects; to Which Is Added an English-Tibetan Vocabulary*. 1881. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Joshi, Milind Sanatkumar. (2011). *Anubhūtisvarūpācārya and His Sārasvataprakriyā: A Critical, Historical and Textual Study of the Sārasvata School of Sanskrit Grammar*. Vadodara: Mahiman Publishing House.

Joshi, S. D., and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1974). *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Bahuvrīhidvandvāhnika (P. 2.2.23-2.2.38); Text, Translation and Notes*. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 9. Pune: University of Poona.

———, and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1975). *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakāhnika (P. 1.4.23-1.4.55). Introduction, Translation and Notes*. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 10. Pune: University of Poona.

———, and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1976). *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Anabhihitāhnika (P. 2.3.1-2.3.17). Introduction, Translation and Notes*. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 11. Pune: University of Poona.

———, and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1980). *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Vibhktyāhnika (P. 2.3.18-2.3.45); Text, Translation and Notes*. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 12. Pune: University of Poona.

————, and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1981). *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Prātipadikārthaśeṣāhnika (P. 2.3.46-2.3.71); Text, Translation and Notes*. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 14. Pune: University of Poona.

————, and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1986). *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Paspaśāhnika; Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes*. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 15. Pune: University of Poona.

————. (1990). "Koṇḍa (or Kauṇḍa) Bhaṭṭa: *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, 255-309. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

————, and J. A. F. Roodbergen. (1991-2011). *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*: *With Translation and Explanatory Notes*. 14 vols. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.

Kātantra of Śarvavarman. See Liebich 1919.

Kapstein, Matthew T. (2000). *The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism. Conversion, Contestation, and Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————. (2003). "Indian Literary Identity in Tibet." In *Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South Asia*, edited by Sheldon Pollock, 747-802. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kiparsky, P., and J. F. Staal. (1969). "Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini." *Foundations of Language* 5, no. 1: 83-117.

Krang dbyi sun, ed. (2004). *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*. Vol. 2. 7th ed. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

————, ed. (2006). *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*. Vol. 1. 8th ed. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang, ed. (1994-2008). *Bstan 'gyur*. 120 vols. Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang.

Lati Rinbochay. (1986). *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism: Oral Commentary on Ge-shay Jam-bel-sam-pel's "Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge: Composite of All the Important Points; Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence."* Edited and translated by Elizabeth Napper. Ithaca: Snow Lions Publications.

Laufer, Berthold. (1898). "Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft der Tibeter. Zamatog." *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und der historischen Classe der königlichen Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München* 3: 519-594.

Liebich, Bruno, ed. (1902). *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa. Die Grammatik des Candragomin. Sūtra, Uṇādi, Dhātupāṭha*. Abhandlung für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 11, no. 4. Leipzig: Brockhaus.

————, ed. (1918). *Candra-Vṛtti. Der Original-Kommentar Candragomin's zu seinem grammatischen Sūtra*. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 14. Leipzig: Brockhaus.

⸻. (1919). *Zur Einführung in die indische einheimische Sprachwissenschaft. I. Das Kātantra*. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften 1919, no. 4. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Mayrhofer, Manfred. (1978). *Sanskrit-Grammatik mit sprachvergleichenden Erläuterungen*. 3rd ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Mchims 'Jam pa'i dbyangs. (2004). *Chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mngon pa'i rgyan*. 2nd ed. Tibetan Buddhist Philosophical Series, Book 24. Bylakuppe: Sera Je Library & Computer Project.

Miller, Roy Andrew. (1991). "On the Utility of the Tibetan Grammarians." In *Tibetan History and Language*. edited by E. Steinkellner, 353-381. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 26. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.

⸻. (1992). "Indic Models in Tibetan Grammars." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 112, no. 1: 103-109.

⸻. (1993). *Prolegomena to the First Two Tibetan Grammatical Treatises*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 30. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.

Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab 'od gsal. (2009). *Sum cu pa'i rnam bshad gsal ba'i sgron me*. 3rd ed. Mundgod: Dga' ldan byang rtse'i pe mdzod khang.

Monier-Williams, Monier. (1981). *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary: Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with Special Reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages; New Edition, greatly enlarged and improved*. 1899. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

M.S. Joshi. See Joshi, Milind Sanatkumar.

Müller-Witte, Frank. (2009). *Handlungsrichtung im Tibetischen: Die Verbalkategorien* bdag *und* gzhan *bei dPa' ris sangs rgyas und Dor zhi gdong drug und ihr Nutzen für das Verständnis tibetischer Texte*. Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Unversität München. https://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14885/1/Mueller-Witte_Frank.pdf (accessed May 10th, 2013).

Naga, Sangye Tender. (2006). "Aspects of Traditional Tibetan Learning." *The Tibet Journal* 31, no. 3: 3-16.

Nava Kishora Kara, ed. (1967). *The Sārasvata Vyākaraṇam of Anubhūtisvarūpācārya*. Vol. 1. 2nd ed. Benares: Caukhambā Saṃskrta Sīrīja Āphisa.

Negi, J. S. (1993-2005). *Bod skad dang legs sbyar gyi tshig mdzod chen mo; Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary*. 16 vols. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies.

Obermiller, E. See Bu ston Rin chen drup 1931-1932.

Pandit, M. D. (1963). "Pāṇini – A Study in Non-compounded Word-structures." *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal* 1: 224-38.

Panglung, Jampa L. (1994). "New Fragments of the sGra-sbyor bam-po gñis-pa." *East and West* 44, no. 1: 161-172.

Penna, Madhusudan. (2013). *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāraḥ: Śāṃkarīvyākhyāsametaḥ; Philosophy of the Grammarians*. Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation.

Pra ti. (2013A). "Bod kyi brda'i bstan bcos sum cu pa zhes bya ba'i bshad kun tu bzang po'i dgongs pa rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i rgyan." In Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub 2013, 179-237.

Pra ti. (2013B). "Rtags kyi 'jug pa'i dgongs 'grel gsal bar bshad pa." In Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub 2013, 238-251.

Raja, K. Kunjunni. (1990). "Helārāja: Commentary on Bhartṛhari's *Trikāṇḍi*." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, 193-198. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Raster, Peter. (2015). "The Indian Grammatical Tradition." In *Syntax – Theory and Analysis: An International Handbook* vol. 1, edited by Tibor Kiss and Artemis Alexiadou, 70-99. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Rau, Wilhelm. (2002). *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya: Versuch einer vollständigen deutschen Übersetzung nach der kritischen Edition der Mūla-Kārikās*. Edited by Oskar von Hinüber. Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur.

Rgyal dbang 'Phrin las rnam rgyal. (2009). *Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa'i legs bshad nyin byed dbang po'i snang ba*. 2 vols. 1996. Reprint, Bylakuppe: Sera Mey Library.

Richardson, H. E. (1985). *A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions*. James G. Forlong Series 29. London: Royal Asiatic Society.

Rnam gling. (2013). "Lung du ston pa sum cu pa dang rtags kyi 'jug pa'i rnam 'grel legs bshad snang byed nor bu." In Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub 2013, 45-178.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. (1995). *Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel dans la pensée boudhique de l'Inde et du Tibet: quatre conferences au collège de France*. Paris: Collège de France.

———. (2004). "The Indian and the Indic in Tibetan Cultural History, and Tsoṅ kha pa's Achievement as a Scholar and Thinker: An Essay on the Concepts of Buddhism in Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 32, no. 4: 321-343.

Ryder, Arthur W. (1925). *The Panchatantra of Vishnu Sharma: English Translation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sakaki, Ryōzaburō, ed. (1916-1925). *Mahāvyutpatti*. 2 vols. Kyoto: Shingonshū Kyōto Daigaku.

Sa paṇ Kun dga' rgyal mtshan. (2009). *Mkhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe sgrun khang.

Sakya Paṇḍita. See Sa paṇ Kun dga' rgyal mtshan.

Śāntideva. (1997). *Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung (Bodhicaryāvatāra): Poesie und Lehre des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus*. Translated by Ernst Steinkellner. 3rd ed. München: Eugen Diederichs Verlag.

———. (2005). *Anleitungen auf dem Weg zur Glückseligkeit: Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Edited and translated by Diego Hangartner. Frankfurt: O.W. Barth.

Schaeffer, Kurtis R. (2009). *The Culture of the Book in Tibet*. New York: Columbia University Press.

———. (2013). "Si tu paṇ chen on Scholarship." *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7: 302-315. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/downloads/ (accessed September 12th, 2017).

———. (2014). "The Fifth Dalai Lama." In *The Tibetan History Reader*, edited by Gray Tuttle and Kurtis R. Schaeffer, 348-362. New York: Columbia University Press.

Scharfe, Hartmut. (1977). *Grammatical Literature*. Vol. 5 of *A History of Indian Literature*, edited by Jan Gonda. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

———. (2002). *Education in Ancient India*. Handbook of Oriental Studies, section 2, vol. 16. Leiden: Brill.

Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina. (2002). "Enacting Words: A Diplomatic Analysis of the Imperial Decrees (*bkas bcad*) and Their Application in the *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa* Tradition." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 25, no. 1-2: 263-340. http://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/viewFile/8927/2820 (accessed April 21st, 2016).

———. (1999). "Translation, Transmission, Tradition: Suggestions from Ninth-Century Tibet." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 27, no. 1-2: 67-77.

Schlegel, G. (1900). Review of *Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft der Tibeter. Zamatog* by Berthold Laufer. *T'oung Pao* second series, vol. 1, no. 4: 357-359.

Schubert, Johannes, trans. (1928-1929). "Tibetische Nationalgrammatik. I. Teil: Das Sum.cu.pa und Rtags.kyi.'ajug.pa des Lama Dbyaṅs.can.grub.pai.rdo.rje. Ein Kommentar zu den gleichnamigen Schriften Thon.mi Sam.bho.ṭa's übersetzt und erklärt." *Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin* 31 and 32: 1-59 and 1-54.

———, trans. (1968). *Tibetische Nationalgrammatik. Das Sum.cu.pa und Rtags.kyi.'ajug.pa des Grosslamas von Peking Rol.pai.rdo.rje. Ein Kommentar zu den gleichnamigen Schriften Thon.mi.Sambhoṭa's auf Grund der Erklärungen des Lamas Chos.skyoṅ.bzaṅ.po, lo.tsa.ba von Zha.lu*. Artibus Asiae. Supplementum 1. 1937. Second printing, Ascona: Artibus Asiae.

Schwieger, Peter. (2006). *Handbuch zur Grammatik der klassischen tibetischen Schriftsprache*. Halle: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies GmbH.

Sharma, Rama Nath. (1987-2003). *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*. 6 vols. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Sherab Gyaltsen, publ. (1990). *Collected Works of the Great Ta'i si tu pa Kun mkhyen Chos kyi byun gnas bstan pa'i nyin byed*. 14 vols. Sansal: Palpung Sungrab Nyamso Khang.

Simonsson, Nils. (1982A). "Reflections on the Grammatical Tradition in Tibet." In *Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by L. A. Hercus, F. B. J. Kuiper, T. Rajapatirana, E. R. Skrzypczak, 531-544. Canberra: Australian National University, Faculty of Asian Studies.

———. (1982B). "On the Concept of Sentence in Ancient Indian and Tibetan Theory and on the Function of Case Particles in Tibetan according to Tibetan Grammarians." *Fenno-Ugrica Suecana* 5, 281-291.

———. (1984). "Reflections on the Grammatical Tradition in Tibet and Its Connection with Indian Buddhistic Speculation on Language." *Indologica Taurinensia* 12, 185-190.

Sinha, Anil C. (1973). "Generative Semantics and Pāṇini's Kārakas." *Journal of Oriental Institute, Baroda* 23: 27-39.

Smith, E. Gene. (2001). *Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature of the Himalayan Plateau.* Edited by Kurtis R. Schaeffer. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Smṛti. See Smṛtijñānakīrti.

Smṛtijñānakīrti. (2002). *Rgya gar gyi paṇḍi ta chen po smrī ti dznyā na kirtis mdzad pa'i smra sgo mtshon cha'i rtsa ba dang rang 'grel gnyis*. 2001. Reprint, Delhi: Bod gzhung shes rig dpar khang.

Sørensen, Per K. (1994). *Tibetan Buddhist Historiography. The Mirror Illuminating the Royal Genealogies. An Annotated Translation of the XIVth Century Tibetan Chronicle: rgyal-rabs gsal-ba'i me-long*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

Sperling, Elliot. (2013). "Si tu paṇ chen chos kyi 'byung gnas in History: A Brief Note." *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7: 1-16. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/downloads/ (accessed September 12th, 2017).

Stein, Lisa, and Ngawang Zangpo. See Bu ston Rin chen drup 2013.

Steinkellner, Ernst. See Śāntideva 1997.

Subba Rao, Veluri. (1969). *The Philosophy of the Sentence and Its Parts*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Subrahmanya Sastri, P. S (1956). *Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.* Vol. 4 (āhnikas 10 to 14). Tiruchirapalli.

Subramania Iyer, K. A., trans. (1971). *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari: Chapter III, pt. i.; English Translation*. Pune: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute.

———. (1992). *Bhartṛhari: A study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentators*. Pune: Deccan College Post Graduate and Research Institute.

Takakusu, J. See I-tsing.

Thakur, Anantalal, ed. (1996). *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

⸻. (1997). *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Tillemans, Tom J.F. (1986). "Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on Scriptural Authority." *Tetsugaku* 38: 31-47. (Reprinted in Tillemans 1999, chapter 1).

⸻. (1988). "On *bdag*, *gźan* and Related Notions of Tibetan Grammar." In *Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Schloss Hohenkammer, Munich 1985*, edited by Helga Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung, 491-502. Studia Tibetica. Quellen und Studien zur Tibetischen Lexikographie 2. München: Kommission für Zentralasiatische Studien, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

⸻, and Derek. D. Herforth. (1989). *Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan. The Indigenous Grammarians on bdag and gźan and bya byed las gsum*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 21. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.

⸻. (1991). "A Note on *bdag don phal ba* in Tibetan Grammar." *Études asiatiques* 45, no. 2: 311-323.

⸻. (1993). *Persons of Authority: The sTon pa tshad ma'i skye bur sgrub pa'i gtam of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar: A Tibetan Work on the Central Religious Questions of Buddhist Epistemology*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

⸻. (1994). "On Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan: A Reply to Roy A. Miller." *Indo-Iranian Journal* 37, no. 2: 121-138.

⸻. (1999). *Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan Successors*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

⸻. (2007). "Transitivity, Intransitivity, and *tha dad pa* Verbs in Traditional Tibetan Grammar." *Pacific World*, third series, no. 9. *Essays Celebrating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Numata Chair of Buddhist Studies at the University of Calgary*: 49-62. http://www.shin-ibs.edu/documents/pwj3-9/PWJ3-9.pdf (accessed January 6th, 2011).

Tinley, Dungkar Lobzang. (1993). "Development of the Monastic Education System in Tibet [*Bod-kyi slob-gso'i rig-pa gong-'phel ji-ltar byung-ba'i gtam gleng*]." Translated by Sangye T. Naga. *The Tibet Journal* 8, no. 4: 3-48. (Originally published in three consecutive issues of *Bod ljongs zhib 'jug*, 1986).

Tournadre, Nicolas. (1990). "Présentation de la grammaire traditionnelle et des cas du tibétain. Approche classique et analyse modern." In *Tibet, civilisation et société: colloque organisé par la Fondation Singer-Polignac à Paris, les 27, 28, 29 avril 1987*, 189-198. Paris: Éditions de la Fondation Singer-Polignac.

⸻, Kesang Gyurmé, and Heather Stoddard. (1992). *Le clair miroir: Enseignement de la grammaire tibétain*. Arvillard: Editions Prajñā.

———. (2010). "The Classical Tibetan Cases and Their Transcategoriality: From Sacred Grammar to Modern Linguistics." *Himalayan Linguistics* 9, no. 2: 87-125. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/94d0447c (accessed September 29th, 2015).

Tsering, Tashi. (2013). "Si tu paṇ chen and His Painting Style: A Retrospective." *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7: 125-192. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/downloads/ (accessed September 12th, 2017).

Tshe tan zhabs drung. (2005). *Gangs can bod kyi brda sprod pa'i bstan bcos sum cu ba dang rtags 'jug gi rnam gzhag rgya cher bshad pa thon mi'i zhal lung*. 1990. Reprint, Delhi: Bod gzhung shes rig dpar khang.

Tubb, Gary A., and Emery R. Boose. (2007). *Scholastic Sanskrit: A Handbook for Students*. New York: The American Institute of Buddhist Studies at Columbia University.

van der Kuijp, Leonard W. J. (1996). "The Tibetan Script and Derivatives." In *The World's Writing Systems*, edited by Peter T. Daniels and William Bright, 431-441. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

van Schaik, Sam. (2011). "A New Look at the Tibetan Invention of Writing." In *New Studies in the Old Tibetan Documents: Philology, History and Religion*, edited by Yoshiro Imaeda and Matthew Kapstein, 45-96. Old Tibetan Documents Online Monograph Series 3. Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Verhagen, Pieter C. (1992). "A Ninth-Century Tibetan Summary of the Indo-Tibetan Model of Case-semantics." In *Tibetan studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Narita 1989*, edited by S. Ihara and Z. Yamaguchi, vol. 2, 833-844. Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji.

———. (1994). *A History of Sanskrit Grammatical Literature in Tibet. Volume One: Transmissions of the Canonical Literature*. Handbook of Oriental Studies, section 2, vol. 8. Leiden: Brill.

———. (1996). "Influence of *Vyākaraṇa* on Tibetan Indigenous Grammar." In *Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre*, edited by José Ignacio Cabezón and Roger R. Jackson, 422-437. Ithaca: Snow Lions Publications.

———. (2001A). *A History of Sanskrit Grammatical Literature in Tibet. Volume Two: Assimilation into Indigenous Scholarship*. Handbook of Oriental Studies, section 2, vol. 8. Leiden: Brill.

———. (2001B). "Studies in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Hermeneutics (1): Issues of Interpretation and Translation in the Minor Works of Si-tu Paṇ-chen Chos-kyi-'byuṅ-gnas (1699?-1774)." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 24, no. 1: 61-88.

———. (2004). "Notes apropos to the Oeuvre of Si-tu Paṇ-chen Chos-kyi-'byuṅ-gnas (1699?-1774) (2): *Dkar chag* Materials." In *Gedenkschrift J.W. de Jong*, edited by H. W. Bodewitz and Minoru Hara, 207-238. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.

————. (2005A). "Studies in Indo-Tibetan Hermeneutics (4): The *Vyākhyāyukti* by Vasubandhu." *Journal Asiatique* 293, no. 2: 559-602.

————. (2005B). "Studies in Indo-Tibetan Hermeneutics (5): The Mkhas-pa-rnams-'jug-pa'i-sgo by Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 28, no. 1: 183-219.

————. (2008A). "Notes apropos to the Oeuvre of Si tu paṇ chen Chos kyi 'byung-gnas (1699?-1774) (1): Belles Lettres in his Opera Minora." In *Contributions to the Buddhist Literature. PIATS 2006: Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Königswinter 2006*, edited by O. Almogi, 513-548. Halle: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies.

————. (2008B). "Studies in Indo-Tibetan Hermeneutics (6): Validity and Valid Interpretation of Scripture according to Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*." In *Buddhist Studies*, edited by Richard Gombrich and Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, 233-258. Papers of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference, vol. 8. Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass.

————. (2010). "Notes apropos to the Oeuvre of Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas (1699?-1774) (3): The 'Editor' Si tu Paṇ chen." In *Édition, éditions: l'écrit au Tibet, évolution et devenir*, edited by Anne Chayet, Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, Françoise Robin, Jean-Luc Achard, 465-482. Collectanea Himalayica 3. München: Indus.

————. (2013). "Notes apropos to the Oeuvre of Si tu paṇ chen chos kyi 'byung gnas (1699?-1774) (4): A Tibetan Sanskritist in Nepal." *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 7: 316-339. http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/07/verhagen/ (accessed August 30th, 2017).

————. (2015). "'Tools of the Trade' of the Tibetan Translators." In *Tibetan Literary Genres, Texts, and Text Types: From Genre Classification to Transformation*, edited by Jim Rheingans, 182-196. Leiden: Brill.

————. (2017). "Studies in Indo-Tibetan Hermeneutics (7): Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Mkhas 'jug* on the Sanskrit-Tibetan Interface: Synthesis, Comparison and Translation." In Revue d'Etudes Tibétain 42: 246-267. http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ret/pdf/ret_42_06.pdf (accessed November 9th, 2017).

Viehbeck, Markus. (Forthcoming). "Indo-Tibetan Relations in Tibetan Polemical Discourse: Reconsidering Cultural Dynamics between Tradition and Innovation." In *Buddhism and the Dynamics of Transculturality*, edited by Birgit Kellner. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Vollmann, Ralf. (2008). *Descriptions of Tibetan Ergativity: A Historical Account*. Grazer Vergleichende Arbeiten 23. Graz: Leykam 2008.

Wackernagel, Jacob. (2009). *Vorlesungen über Syntax*: *Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Griechisch, Lateinisch und Deutsch*. 2 vols. 1920-1924. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wang, W. S.-Y., and R. E. Asher. (1994). "Chinese Linguistic Tradition." In *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* vol. 2, edited by R. E. Asher and J. M. Y. Simpson, 524-527. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Zeisler, Bettina. (2006). "The Tibetan Understanding of Karman: Some Problems of Tibetan Case Marking." In *Medieval Tibeto-Burman Languages 2. PIATS 2003: Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Oxford, 2003*, edited by Christopher I. Beckwith, 57-101. Leiden: Brill.

Zha lu. (2013A). "Slob dpon a nus mdzad pa'i bod kyi skad kyi gsung rab la 'jug tshul sum cu pa'i rnam 'grel." In Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub 2013, 1-19.

Zha lu. (2013B). "Byā ka ra ṇa'i rtags kyi 'jug pa rnam par gsal ba'i legs bshad." In Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub 2013, 20-44.

Zha lu Lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po, Rnam gling Paṇ chen Dkon mchog chos grags, and Pra ti Dge bshes Rin chen don grub. (2013). *Zha rnam bra gsum gyi sum rtags 'grel pa phyogs bsgrigs mun sel sgron me*, edited by 'Jam dpal rab brtan. 2000. Reprint, [Sarnath, IND?]: Dhi Publication.

Zürcher, E. (1982). "Perspectives in the Study of Chinese Buddhism." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 114, no. 2: 161-176.