Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
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Abstract
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
| Document type: | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2012 14:48 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
| DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Imitate-the-best, learning , exact potential games , symmetric games , relative payoffs , zero-sum games |
| Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
