Schmidt, Robert J. ; Trautmann, Stefan T.
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Abstract
We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.
Document type: | Working paper |
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Series Name: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
Volume: | 0661 |
Place of Publication: | Heidelberg |
Date Deposited: | 25 Apr 2019 11:17 |
Date: | April 2019 |
Number of Pages: | 30 |
Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | equality, procedural justice, discrimination |
Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |