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The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions

Diekert, Florian ; Eymess, Tillmann ; Luomba, Joseph ; Waichman, Israel

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Abstract

Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner’s dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants.

Item Type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0684
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 14 May 2020 14:33
Date: May 2020
Number of Pages: 57
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: common pool resource, collective action, social norms, lab-in-the-field experiment
Schriftenreihe ID: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
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