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Abstract

In monistic metaphysics like that of Dionysius, in which the absolute One/Good is conceived as the sole principle, “evil” (κακόν/kakon) does not seem to fit in. Hence, there have been numerous attempts to locate evil within the Dionysian ontology. To research it is obvious that evil cannot be an ontological category at all. Rather, it is a purely ethical concept that points to the existential philosophical orientation of Dionysian thought. Dionysius emphasizes our own responsibility: we as human beings are the reason for the realization of evil. But how does the Good as the sole principle fit into this scheme? If the Good is nothing other than omnipotence, how can the genesis of evil be explained? In this paper, I wish to demonstrate that Dionysius answers these questions through a concept adapted from Proclus: the concept of πρόνοια.