In: Journal of Modern European History, 23 (2025), Nr. 2. pp. 246-262. ISSN 1611-8944 (Druck-Version); 2631-9764 (Online-Ausg.)

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Abstract

A newly elected president declares NATO ‘obsolete’ and announces his country's withdrawal from parts of the transatlantic Alliance. Some European leaders fear a more complete abandonment. Although France remained a treaty ally after Charles de Gaulle's 1966 announcement, this episode remains the most significant rejection of NATO's organisation in its history. And yet, the potentially fatal crisis catalysed adaptations in the Alliance so successful that they endured through the end of the Cold War. This case offers lessons about institutional endurance in the face of such crisis. NATO adapted boldly, but also prudently; slowly perhaps, but effectively. The high politics of competing national interests and the high stakes of nuclear deterrence demanded change but could not afford catastrophe. How institutions adapt – and by whom – can mean the difference between vanishing and revitalising.