Oechssler, Jörg
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Abstract
I study a formal mechanism that can sustain Pareto optimality in a new and very broad class of dilemma games. In the absence of a central authority that could enforce multilateral agreements, the mechanism is based on binding unilateral commitments, which condition a player's (possibly multidimensional) contribution on other players' contributions. I show that unexploitable better response dynamics converge to Pareto optimal contributions when the game is played recurrently.
| Document type: | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | AWI Discussion Paper Series |
| Volume: | 0770 |
| Place of Publication: | Heidelberg |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Feb 2026 15:21 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| Number of Pages: | 18 |
| Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
| DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | public goods, climate treaties, conditional contributions |
| Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
