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Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Duersch, Peter and Oechssler, Jörg and Schipper, Burkhard C.

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Abstract

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.

Item Type: Working paper
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2012 14:48
Date: 2012
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: Imitate-the-best, learning , exact potential games , symmetric games , relative payoffs , zero-sum games
Schriftenreihe ID: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
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