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The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves

Tremewan, James ; Vanberg, Christoph

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Abstract

We experimentally study behavior in a finitely repeated coalition formation game played in real time. Subjects interact in groups of three, bargaining over the distribution of payments which occur at regular time intervals. During a given interval, payments occur if and only if a majority is in agreement about their allocation. Aside from these rules, we purposefully impose little structure on the bargaining process. We investigate the frequency and stability of different types of agreements, as well as transitions between them. The most frequent agreement is an equal split between two players, leaving the third with nothing. The most stable is the three-way equal split. Transitions between agreements are frequent and generally consistent with myopic payoff maximization. We find evidence that both fairness concerns and risk aversion may explain the prevalence of the three-way equal split, and that loyalty can play a role in cementing coalitions.

Item Type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0582
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 10 Feb 2015 14:42
Date: February 2015
Number of Pages: 42
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bargaining; group choice; experiments; coalition formation
Schriftenreihe ID: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
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