Directly to content
  1. Publishing |
  2. Search |
  3. Browse |
  4. Recent items rss |
  5. Open Access |
  6. Jur. Issues |
  7. DeutschClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods

Reischmann, Andreas

[img]
Preview
PDF, English
Download (533kB) | Terms of use

Citation of documents: Please do not cite the URL that is displayed in your browser location input, instead use the DOI, URN or the persistent URL below, as we can guarantee their long-time accessibility.

Abstract

Many mechanisms have been designed to solve the free-rider problem in public good environments. The designers of those mechanisms focused on good static equilibrium properties. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism for the provision of public goods that has good dynamic properties instead. The mechanism gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. Under a reasonable variant of Better Response Dynamics all equilibrium outcomes are Pareto efficient. This makes the mechanism particularly suited for repeated public good environments. In contrast to many previously suggested mechanisms, it does further not require an institution that has the power to enforce participation and/or transfer payments. Neither does it use any knowledge of agents preferences.

Item Type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0586
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 17 Mar 2015 10:17
Date: March 2015
Number of Pages: 30
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mechanism Design, Public Goods, Better Response Dynamics.
Schriftenreihe ID: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
About | FAQ | Contact | Imprint |
OA-LogoDINI certificate 2013Logo der Open-Archives-Initiative