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Implementing (un)fair procedures? Favoritism and process fairness when inequality is inevitable

Schmidt, Robert J. ; Trautmann, Stefan T.

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We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.

Item Type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0661
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 25 Apr 2019 11:17
Date: April 2019
Number of Pages: 30
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: equality, procedural justice, discrimination
Schriftenreihe ID: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
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