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Legislative bargaining with joint production: An experimental study

Merkel, Anna ; Vanberg, Christoph

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We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.

Item Type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0670
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 11 Oct 2019 11:46
Date: October 2019
Number of Pages: 50
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: multilateral bargaining, claims, fairness, majority rule, experiments
Schriftenreihe ID: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
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