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Changing Collective Action: Norm-Nudges and Team Decisions

Diekert, Florian ; Eymess, Tillmann

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Abstract

We test whether a descriptive norm-nudge is a suitable policy tool to increase cooperation in a social dilemma when decisions are taken by teams, not individuals. Each team in our experiment comes from a different fishing boat at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The provision of a norm-nudge is randomized across two decision making mechanisms, enabling us to identify experience with egalitarian or hierarchical decision structures, both present at Lake Victoria. The descriptive norm-nudge increases cooperation by 14 and 16 percentage points for egalitarian and hierarchical team decisions, respectively. Captains from boats with hierarchical organization are particularly responsive.

Document type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0709
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2022 12:24
Date: December 2021
Number of Pages: 55
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
DDC-classification: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: collective action, team decisions, norm-nudges, common pool resources
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