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Incentive Contracts for Politicians

Liessem, Verena

German Title: Anreizverträge für Politiker

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Abstract

The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable. Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.

Translation of abstract (German)

Die Dissertation untersucht mit spieltheoretischen Methoden das Potential von Anreizverträgen für Politiker. Diese Verträge sollen die durch die Wahl ausgeübte Kontrolle der Politiker unterstützen. Es werden zwei Arten von Anreizverträgen betrachtet: a) monetäre Anreizverträge, die den Politiker belohnen, falls er wiedergewählt wurde; b) Schwellenverträge, die das Recht eines Politikers, sich zur Wiederwahl stellen zu dürfen, an bestimmte Bedingungen koppeln, die der Politiker während seiner Amtszeit erfüllen muss. Die Dissertation zeigt, dass beide Arten von Anreizverträgen die soziale Wohlfahrt steigern können.

Item Type: Dissertation
Supervisor: Gersbach, Prof Hans
Date of thesis defense: 21 July 2003
Date Deposited: 18 Sep 2003 07:26
Date: 2003
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
Subjects: 330 Economics
Controlled Keywords: Wahl, Politiker, Wahlkampf, Vertrag
Uncontrolled Keywords: Anreizvertragincentive contracts , elections , campaigning , politicians
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