Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
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Abstract
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
| Dokumententyp: | Arbeitspapier |
|---|---|
| Erstellungsdatum: | 30 Mrz. 2010 16:09 |
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2010 |
| Institute/Einrichtungen: | Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften > Alfred-Weber Institut |
| DDC-Sachgruppe: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Freie Schlagwörter: | Symmetric two-player games , zero-sum games , Rock-Paper-Scissors , single-peakedness , quasiconcavity |
| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
