Oechssler, Jörg ; Roider, Andreas ; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Vorschau |
PDF, Englisch
Download (370kB) | Nutzungsbedingungen |
Zitieren von Dokumenten: Bitte verwenden Sie für Zitate nicht die URL in der Adresszeile Ihres Webbrowsers, sondern entweder die angegebene DOI, URN oder die persistente URL, deren langfristige Verfügbarkeit wir garantieren.
[mehr ...]
Abstract
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.
| Dokumententyp: | Arbeitspapier |
|---|---|
| Erstellungsdatum: | 12 Mai 2009 13:16 |
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2008 |
| Institute/Einrichtungen: | Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften > Alfred-Weber Institut |
| DDC-Sachgruppe: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Freie Schlagwörter: | negotiations , ultimatum game , emotions , cooling-off , cognitive abilities , behavioral biases , internet experiment |
| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
