Oechssler, Jörg ; Roomets, Alex ; Roth, Stefan
Vorschau |
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Abstract
In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.
Dokumententyp: | Arbeitspapier |
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Name der Reihe: | Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
Band: | 0588 |
Ort der Veröffentlichung: | Heidelberg |
Erstellungsdatum: | 14 Apr. 2015 08:11 |
Erscheinungsjahr: | März 2015 |
Seitenanzahl: | 15 |
Institute/Einrichtungen: | Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften > Alfred-Weber Institut |
DDC-Sachgruppe: | 330 Wirtschaft |
Freie Schlagwörter: | imitation, experiment. |
Schriftenreihe: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |