Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
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Abstract
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
Document type: | Working paper |
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Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2012 14:48 |
Date: | 2012 |
Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Imitate-the-best, learning , exact potential games , symmetric games , relative payoffs , zero-sum games |
Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |