Miettinen, Topi ; Vanberg, Christoph
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Abstract
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.
| Document type: | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | AWI Discussion Paper Series |
| Volume: | 0749 |
| Publisher: | Universität |
| Place of Publication: | Heidelberg |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jun 2024 11:55 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| Number of Pages: | 21 |
| Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
| DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | bargaining, commitment, conflict, delay, international negotiations, climate negotiations, legislative, multilateral, voting, majority, unanimity |
| Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
