Vorschau

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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the effect of civilian control over the military amid the defense transformation agenda in Indonesia’s nascent democracy. Studies on civil-military relations and democratization has reached a consensus that civilian control of the military positively influences the democratic consolidation process. Well-institutionalized civilian control contributes to the entrenchment of democratically-elected civilians as the ultimate decision-makers in democratic regime. Nevertheless, systematic analysis on the relationship between the degree of civilian control of the military and policy change in the defense sector remains an understudied topic. In order to fill this lacuna, the author offers an integrative framework that is primarily derived from the institutional change theory approach. Accordingly, the scope of policy change in the defense sector is perceived as a function of two factors: the veto player configuration in the political decision-making arena; and the level of policy discretion in the national defense institution. This dissertation finds that the civilian government in post-Reformasi Indonesia was able to initiate limited change on promoting military jointness within the future orientation of national defense. Under the condition of multiple veto players and military domination in the defense institution, civilian government established new foundations of military warfighting integration. However, the civilian government was unable to replace the status quo of the total people defense doctrine that is heavily influenced by the army-strategic way of thinking. Ultimately, the Army domination in the defense institution influences the scope of policy change that could be afforded by the civilians.