Preview |
PDF, English
Download (638kB) | Terms of use |
Abstract
This paper investigates whether the strategic behavior of expected utility players differs from that of non-expected utility players in the context of incomplete information games where players can choose mixed strategies. Two conditions are identified where uncertainty-averse non-expected utility players behave differently from expected utility players. These conditions concern the use of mixed strategies and the response to it. It is shown that, if and only if these conditions fail, nonexpected utility players behave as if they were expected utility players. The paper provides conditions, in terms of the payoff structure of a game, which are necessary and sufficient for behavioral differences between expected and non-expected utility players. In this context, games are analyzed that are especially relevant for the design of experiments.
Document type: | Working paper |
---|---|
Series Name: | Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |
Volume: | 0614 |
Place of Publication: | Heidelberg |
Date Deposited: | 22 Apr 2016 08:11 |
Date: | April 2016 |
Number of Pages: | 40 |
Faculties / Institutes: | The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics |
DDC-classification: | 330 Economics |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Non-expected utility, Incomplete information games,Uncertainty aversion, Mixed strategies, Strategic behavior |
Series: | Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics |